THE ROLE OF TRUST IN A SECURITY COMMUNITY: TRUST-BUILDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

By

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Abstract

This thesis explores the role of intra-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) trusting relationships in the formation of an ASEAN Security Community. The recognised long peace of ASEAN suggests that the primary outcome of a Security Community, the dependable expectation of peaceful change, exists between ASEAN members. Current literature focuses on this expectation emerging from a collective identity. Whilst this has often been operationalised in the ASEAN case, strong critiques have emerged persuasively arguing that there is no collective identity within ASEAN, encompassing neither society nor elites. Rival theories make claims that can explain certain phases of relations in ASEAN's history, but cannot persuasively explain ASEAN's peaceful relations throughout. This thesis, therefore, demonstrates the existence of the dependable expectation of peaceful change and the problems that emerge when utilising collective identity to explain it. Instead, it argues that trust, a recognised but under-theorized element within Security Community literature separate from identity, is an important causal factor in explaining the emergence of an ASEAN security community.

The thesis develops a framework to analyse the development of trusting relationships, primarily between governmental elites embedded in the ASEAN structure, through a longitudinal case study of ASEAN. Through exploring crises, it demonstrates that trust was essential in mediating Malaysian, Indonesian, and Singaporean elites' decision-making at critical junctures of the relationships, which led to a process whereby the emergence of trusting relationships became a significant and necessary causal factor in generating dependable expectations of peaceful change. Specifically, trust at earlier stages of the relationships was based on calculation and had a more limited impact, but it was still necessary for the emergence of positive behaviour towards one another and a trust-building dynamic to emerge. As knowledge of the other expanded, so too did trust deepen and become reciprocated, and more trusting behaviours were identified in the middle period of ASEAN relations despite crises that threatened to undermine the relationships.

Finally, the thesis argues that these behaviours gained significant meaning within the ASEAN structure, and became embedded as a 'natural attitude' through the enactment of trusting behaviours as practice. Through this, the dependable expectation of trust became part of the background knowledge of the structure itself, and dependent on specific practices developed throughout ASEAN's history rather than the characteristics of the particular actors. I argue that this is particularly important, as it explains how trust can become consistent outside of specific dyads and time, which enables trust to become an important mechanism even in a context whereby leadership is continuously rotating. As such, while agents often change and do not go through the trust-building process, it should not be assumed that trust cannot play a role – instead, it becomes a property of the structure which influences those that join it and enact the practices expected.

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Abridged Table of Contents

Introduction 1-29

Part One: Theory and Framework

Chapter 1: The missing role of trust in ASEAN? 30-60

Chapter 2: Trust, distrust, and distrust-reduction 61-93

Chapter 3: The development and strengthening of trust 94-121

Part Two: Distrust and Trust in ASEAN

Chapter 4: Distrust and Distrust Reduction Pre-1967 122-155

Chapter 5: Trust and the formation of ASEAN (1967-1975) 156-195

Chapter 6: Trust and the development of ASEAN (1976-1997) 196-232

Chapter 7: Trust and the embedding of ASEAN (1997-2015) 233-261

Conclusion 262-275

Appendices 276-284

References 285-320

Full Table of Contents

Introduction

The ASEAN Security Community	1-6
Research agenda and argument	6-13
Study design	13-18
Research methods	18-26
Contribution	26-28
Overview of chapters	28-29

Chapter 1 – The missing role of trust in ASEAN?

1.1 Introduction	30-31
1.2 Realist explanations of peace in ASEAN	32-38
1.3 Constructivism and the 'new orthodoxy'	38-48
1.4 The practice turn and ASEAN	48-52
1.5 Trust and 'mistrust' in ASEAN	52-53
1.6 A greater focus on trust in security communities	54-58
1.7 Conclusion	59-60

Chapter 2 - Trust, distrust, and distrust-reduction

2.1 Introduction	61-62
2.2 Defining trust	62-68
2.3 Trust-as-process	68-71
2.4 Different types of trust?	71-79
2.5 Defining distrust	79-82
2.6 Reducing distrust	82-88
2.7 Trust-building and Calculus Based Trust	88-91
2.8 Conclusion	91-93

Chapter 3 – The development and strengthening of trust

3.1 Introduction	94-95
3.2 Knowledge Based Trust (KBT)	96-101
3.3 Identification Based Trust (IBT)	101-103
3.4 The stability of trust in security communities	103-106
3.5 Practice Based Trust and the institutionalisation of trust	106-114
3.6 Institutionalising trust in International Relations	114-119
3.7 Conclusion	120-121

Chapter 4 – Distrust and distrust-reduction pre-1967

4.1 Introduction	122-123
4.2 Crisis 1: *Konfrontasi*	124-136
4.3 Crisis 2: Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia	137-143
4.4 Initial attempts at distrust reduction (1965-1967)	144-153

4.5 Conclusion 153-155

Chapter 5 - Trust and the formation of ASEAN (1967-1975)

5.1 Introduction 156-157
5.2 The Creation of ASEAN 158-169
5.3 Crisis 1: The Sabah Dispute 169
5.3.1 Background 169-170
5.3.2 Presence and role of trust 170-171
5.4 Crisis 2: Maritime Affairs 172
5.4.1 Background 172-174
5.4.2 Presence and role of trust 174-178
5.4 The bases of trust 178-179
5.4.1 Common Interests 179-186
5.4.2 Meetings 186-191
5.5 Conclusion 192-195

Chapter 6: Trust and the development of ASEAN (1976-1997)

6.1 Introduction 196-197
6.2 Crisis 1: The Cambodian Conflict 197
6.2.1 Background 197-201
6.2.2 Presence and role of trust 201-210
6.3 Crisis 2: Maritime Affairs 210-211
6.3.1 Background 211-213
6.3.2 Presence and role of trust 213-218
6.4 Bases of Trust 218
6.4.1 Cognitive knowledge 219-222
6.4.2 Social knowledge 222-224
6.4.3 Affective knowledge 224-230
6.5 Conclusion 230-232

Chapter 7: Trust and the embedding of ASEAN (1997-2015)

7.1 Introduction 233-235
7.2 Crisis 1: The Indonesian Haze 235-236
7.2.1 Background 236-239
7.2.2 Presence and role of trust 239-244
7.3 Crisis 2: Maritime Issues 244-245
7.3.1 Background 245-247
7.3.2 Presence and role of trust 248-251
7.4 Bases of trust 251-259
7.5 Conclusion – PBT and the development of ASEAN 259-261

Conclusion

Conclusion 262-263
Restating the theoretical framework 263-267
The Power of Trust – findings across cases 267-272

Contributions 272-274
Further research 274-275

Appendices

Appendix 1 – Interview Question Guide 277-278
Appendix 2 - Consent form, information sheet, and letter of invitation 279-283
Appendix 3 - Interviewee List 284

References

285-320

List of Appendices

Appendix 1 – Interview Question Guide pg. 277-278
Appendix 2 – Interviewee Communication Pack (Consent form, information sheet, and letter of invitation) pg. 278-283
Appendix 3 - Interviewee List pg. 284

List of Figures

Figure 1. Model of trust from Mayer et al. (1995) pg. 66
Figure 2. A model of trust adapted from Dietz (2011) pg. 69
Figure 3. Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) model of trust development pg. 78
Figure 4. Dietz's (2011) model of trust development pg. 78
Figure 5. Lumineau and Schilke's (2018) model of embedded agency pg. 107
Figure 6. Kroeger's structuration theory of trust (2011) pg. 113

Introduction

With trust underpinning many social relations it seems intuitive that trust would play an important role in the constitution of a community (see Möllering 2006a). However, twenty years since Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998a) released their volume on security communities, collective identity has defined the debate centred on the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a community. Adler and Barnett (1998a; 1998b; 1998c) built upon Karl Deutsch et al. (1957) who first conceptualised a community where war became unthinkable as being based upon the extent large amounts of interaction could lead to mutual sympathy, common interests, and a sense of community based on 'we-feelings'. Adler and Barnett (1998a) redefined security communities through their constructivist realignment of the concept, going on to focus on the socialising power of shared values and norms. In this framework norms constitute shared identities or 'we-feeling' grounded in the logic of appropriateness, as these norms become the appropriate way of enacting behaviour (Kratochwil 1989; Adler and Barnett 1998a; 1998b; 1998c). With the strength of ASEAN's collective identity increasingly under attack, following significant divisions over areas such as democracy (Acharya 2010), human rights (Davies 2014), the economy (Narine 2009), and a collective response to the South China Sea (Severino 2010), questions have arisen over its status as a security community. These questions assume ASEAN must have reached a collective identity in order to be a security community, but they continue to ignore the other constitutive element – that of trust.

ASEAN, founded by Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, has expanded since its original conceptualisation in 1967 to incorporate Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, and Myanmar. The organisation is now prolific in Southeast Asia with a purview covering social policy, economics, security issues (both traditional and non-traditional), and a huge range of technical areas. Thousands of meetings across multiple levels occur every year (Severino 2011). It also finds itself at the centre of a more extensive security architecture through initiatives such as the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), and incorporates meetings with a range of external dialogue partners such as the European Union (EU).

In line with ASEAN's expansion it has become one of the most popular examples of a security community outside of the West (Jenne 2016; 2017). In what has been termed the 'new constructivist orthodoxy' analysis of ASEAN centres on the strength of the collective identity it represents (Khoo 2004: 45). Grounded in Adler and Barnett's (1998a) book on the socialising power of norms, scholars have focused on the so-called 'ASEAN Way' emphasising informality, consensus, discreetness, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, respect for sovereignty, and non-use of force to settle disputes (Bellamy 2004; Haacke 2009; Acharya 2014). These procedural and rule-based norms have been constituted by, and have in return mutually constituted, identity throughout ASEAN's history. This has resulted in a dependable expectation of peaceful change where states 'resolve…conflicts short of war' and 'do not consider…security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening' (Adler and Barnett 1998b: 34-5). With community 'identified in terms of several features… the absence of war, and the… absence of significant organised preparations for war vis-à-vis any other members' (Acharya 2014: 18-19) ASEAN has been described as a nascent (Acharya 2014), soft (Chong 2011), thin pluralistic (Emmerson 2005), or loosely coupled (Bellamy 2004) security community.

ASEAN practitioners and elites themselves have reflexively attempted to develop ASEAN along these lines. Indonesia's pursuit of creating an ASEAN Security Community was inspired by former Centre for Strategic and International Studies head Rizal Sukma[1] (Sukma 2003; Acharya 2011a; 2014; Haacke 2009). There has been an adoption of the language of collective identity and a focus on emphasising the strength of norms in important ASEAN frameworks and declarations such as the ASEAN Charter (ASEAN 2007). Perhaps most tellingly of the traction security community

[1] It is important to note CSIS are an influential advocate for ASEAN. Rizal Sukma now serves as ambassador to the UK, and will purportedly be the next foreign minister (Interviewee 29). CSIS founder Jusuf Wanandi has been a long time influential political advisor, and he laments the 'stupidity' of the Jokowi regime for not engaging with ASEAN as much.

literature has had is the direct reference to one of ASEAN's three pillars as an ASEAN Political-Security community (APSC) alongside the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community (ASCC) (ASEAN 2009; ASEAN 2016a; 2016b). The APSC blueprint emphasises the rule-based order based on ASEAN's 'fundamental principles, shared values and norms' (ASEAN 2009; ASEAN 2016a). There have also been attempts to make such a community more 'people-oriented' in the second blueprint with the aim of 'deepening the sense of ASEAN identity' among the wider public (ASEAN 2016a).

There has been recognition, however, that ASEAN currently does not meet the threshold of being a mature security community asany identity has not yet proliferated to the level of society (Collins 2008; 2012; Davies 2014). This would be less problematic if there was consistent evidence of a meaningful ASEAN identity held by elites, but this too has been demonstrated as lacking despite discursive representations. Perhaps most strongly David Jones and Michael Smith call ASEAN an 'imitation community' and criticise scholars that perpetuate the 'propaganda' of an ASEAN community (2002: 100). Without 'we-feeling' ASEAN is not a community based on collective identity (Collins 2007: 215; Narine 2008: 412). Some scholars argue the ASEAN identity is just one weak identity competing against many others (Narine 2008). Others suggest that ASEAN has constituted a rule-based community as a result, rather than a collective identity-based community (Jones and Smith 2003; see also Peuo 2002). As such, there is relatively strong evidence that often it is national identities that drive behaviour and interests. This is not to say that collective identity should or can replace national identity. Patricia Greve, for example, has analysed the way in which security communities can both reinforce 'we-ness' while also recognising the members' distinctiveness and 'self' (2018). However, it seems in significant issues ASEAN identity consistently fails to national identity. If ASEAN is at best predicated on an inconsistent identity that has not transformed identities to a significant enough degree to mediate the differences and crises between the states, the question remains how ASEAN consistently contributes to peaceful relations.

Such deficiencies have led to new avenues of exploration. Adopting the 'practice turn' (Hopf 2010) scholars such as Mathew Davies (2016; 2018) and Aarie Glas (2017) propose that it is ASEAN's routine behaviour, rituals, symbols, and practices that contribute to the stability of the community. This is built upon Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot (2011) who have developed the practice turn in relation to security communities. They argue that practices, resulting from inarticulate background 'know-how', are endowed with social meanings that are shared by a given community (Pouliot 2008; Adler 2008: 202; Kratochwil 2011; Adler and Pouliot 2011: 3). Within security communities, therefore, patterned and competent diplomacy makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes and locks the participants into a performance of unity (Pouliot 2008; Davies 2018). I argue, however, that as the literature stands currently the causal process is less clear, particularly regarding how it is practices result in stable peace. These practices themselves are often linked to the norms criticised above. As a result, these new avenues have not yet fully departed from the debate which relies on the strength of ASEAN's articulated values and norms.

I argue that this debate misses trust - a fundamental gap in the foundational literature on security communities and the developments that followed. Deutsch et al. (1957) made references to the importance of mutual trust. Barnett and Adler (1998b) conceptualise trust to a greater extent than Deutsch and demonstrate that levels of trust matter as it is a key concept in delineating the level of development of a security community (see also – Bellamy 2004; Keating and Wheeler 2014). Trust, rather than just being an outcome in their conceptualisation as for Deutsch (1957), allows actors to reconceptualise themselves and 'reimagine their social bonds' (Barnett and Adler 1998b: 42-45). However, despite such a strong importance given to trust the explanatory role is limited because the causal process is not made clear. Identity remains most important and is both conceptualised and operationalised to a greater degree. This side-lining of trust has continued in the following debate. Authors have given it an important role to play without fully conceptualising it, exploring its dynamics, or operationalising it empirically. Amitav Acharya, for example, recognises the importance of trust and incorporates it into his conceptualisation and framework in the early

sections of his book, delineating levels of security community based on degree of trust (2014). Beyond this he provides no conceptualisation of what he considers the concept of trust to be (Acharya 2014).

This is problematic when even norms themselves would be underpinned by trust. Due to a lack of control mechanisms governing normative frameworks within ASEAN, trust underpins the expectation that the other will follow the appropriate behaviour agreed on in the face of competing interests (Kratochwil 1989). Trust is also recognised in the practice literature, where Pouliot identifies trust as playing a 'key role' within security communities as trust, defined as believing despite uncertainty, is an inarticulate feeling deriving from practical sense (2008: 278). Despite all of this, it has been side-lined in the resulting debates on whether ASEAN is a security community. There has been an inherent confusion as to the causal power of trust and no operationalisation of the concept due to weaknesses in the original argument. This is problematic because research on trust has expanded massively outside of International Relations. Studies have also emerged within the discipline applying trust in the analysis of a great variety of relationships (see for example Hoffman 2002; Kydd 2005; Rathbun 2012; Ruzicka and Keating 2015; Haukkala et al. 2015; 2018; Chan 2017; Wheeler 2018; Edwards 2018).

Such a gap is also significant as ASEAN may lack a stable collective identity and norms may be inconsistently followed, but there is undeniably a strong degree of peace and stability between the members. While there have been disputes, some of which have become militarized, the region has seen an avoidance of warfare. This meets the requirements of Boulding's concept of stable peace, where peace is the absence of war and 'the probability of war is so small' that it plays no significant role in planning, but where there may still be some forms of conflict (1978: 13). ASEAN is characterised by a 'long peace' relative to the conflicts that occurred prior to its formation (Kivimaki 2001). Growing militarization and the maintenance of military forces should not be seen merely as evidence of a security dilemma where warfare is expected or planned for (Collins 2000; Booth and

Wheeler 2008). Wider domestic factors such as internal sources of insecurity, prestige, corruption, routine modernisation, civil-military relations, and developing defence industries within the countries often drive military acquisitions (Edwards 2015a; Edwards 2015b; Laksamana 2018). Other external threats are often highlighted (Laksamana 2018). Concerns over neighbours are not often a primary reason for military acquisition and planning against one another is not something seriously engaged in consistently. Militarisation has not been followed, furthermore, by open conflict. Curiously there is a long peace without the commonly focused upon factors of a consistent collective identity that is stable enough to underpin a dependable expectation of peaceful change. Given the absence of these factors in light of the long peace and the underutilization of trust, the question emerges:

- *How important are trusting relationships in creating dependable expectations of peaceful change in Southeast Asia?*

I have divided this into three important sub-questions that each address different parts of this question in more depth:

- *Can the presence of trust explain peaceful intra-ASEAN relations?*
- *How do trusting relationships develop, and what effect does this have on ASEAN as a security community?*
- *Can trusting behaviour become embedded as practice?*

Research agenda and argument

Based on these questions the primary argument made in this thesis is that trust is a necessary causal factor for the emergence and maintenance of the dependable expectation of peaceful change in ASEAN. In order to demonstrate the importance of trust for ASEAN member states' peaceful relations I combine three primary literatures on security communities, the wider

theorisation of practice theory, and the expanding literatures on trust. By using these literatures as a basis, I develop a framework that allows not only for the development of trust to increase in intensity but also to proliferate beyond specific actors (or boundary spanners) to actors who follow, giving trust a more consistent role to play. This framework and the resulting empirical chapters show that trust emerges in limited forms in the early stages of the relationship and are primarily agent driven. I adopt Roy Lewicki and Barbara Bunker's (1995) framework of trust development based on 'Calculus-Based Trust' (CBT), 'Knowledge-Based Trust' (KBT), and 'Identification-Based Trust' (IBT), but modify and develop it based on the context of IR and the empirical cases. Their framework is first based primarily on cognitive assessments of the other's ability, benevolence and integrity (ABI) relative to common interests – CBT. Following this trust deepens between these actors as a result of increasing trusting behaviour and knowledge concerning the other allowing a growth in intensity – KBT. Arguing that IBT does not consistently emerge, I nonetheless argue trust can still become consistent through a process whereby the enactment of trusting behaviour results in a structure where trusting becomes established as background knowledge. New agents joining ASEAN continue to enact trusting behaviour based on the past enactments from their predecessors removing trust from a specific relationship – which I have termed Practice Based Trust (PBT). This allows for trust to mediate issues in a context where we-feeling and identification cannot be depended on.

In order to develop this argument, I argue that security community literature has missed the story of how trust does a majority of the work in giving norms meaning. It is also not only the normative framework which is relevant to trust. Trust plays a greater role in the constitution of a security community as it allows dependable expectation of peaceful change even in the ASEAN context where norms are currently in flux and have not been consistently enacted in the past. Instead, trust within ASEAN, while not absolute, has become a stable mediating factor in the constitution of the ASEAN security community and fluctuates much less than identity has done. This builds upon a growing focus of trust within IR that has begun exploring in greater detail the dynamics of trust, including in security communities. This has not yet been applied to ASEAN, a case

study where trust has great explanatory potential due to the absence of identity relative to other case studies (see for example Hoffman 2002; Kydd 2005; Rathbun 2012; Ruzicka and Keating 2015; Haukkala et al. 2015; 2018; Chan 2017; Wheeler 2018; Edwards 2018).

The second argument this thesis makes is that while trust is a concept that is gaining greater attention in IR, divisions between scholars have prevented a consistent operationalisation. Much of the scholarship so far has been divided as to the bases of trust – often social, psychological or rational accounts of trust (See Ruzicka and Keating 2015; Haukkala et al. 2015; 2018). This has led to a debate centred around 'types' of trust, where some are thought to have a meaningful impact while others are denied the same role.

In this thesis I follow Denise Rousseau et al. in defining trust as a 'psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of the other' (Rousseau et al. 1998: 395). However, I view trust as being best operationalised as a process suggested by Graham Dietz and Deanne Den Hartog (2006). Within this process there are three stages - antecedents to the decision to trust, a decision to trust, and an enactment of that trust as an action. As such it results in action referred to as 'trust as choice' (Li 2012: 101-2; see also Mayer et al. 1995). This enactment is considered significant as PBT is contingent on manifestations of trust becoming the normal behaviour of agents within the ASEAN structure. By adopting this process view of trust, it allows for the operationalisation of trust as a universal process that has different bases at different stages of the relationship, as the process allows variation within each stage. As this thesis aims to address the way in which trust evolves over a longer period than has been addressed so far in IR, it is important to have an underlying concept that allows for changes over time.

I also separate the concept of confidence from trust, something which has presented a problem in current ASEAN literature. I view confidence as lacking two distinct interlinked elements that trust has; obligation and betrayal. For it to be trust and not confidence I follow Hoffman's

(2002) fiduciary approach to suggest that if people believe that others have an obligation to fulfil their trust, and the trustee believes they are also obliged to honour the trust, this differentiates trust from risk undertaken due to confidence. This is because it further reduces the subjective perception of risk even though risk is always objectively present (Hoffman 2002 - See also Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Ruzicka and Keating 2015; Wheeler 2018). Due to this sense of obligation, once trust is broken it is followed by a sense of betrayal. Confidence is followed by disappointment because defection has been seriously considered in relationships of confidence (Michel 2012b). When it is trust, however, harm inflicted is not accommodated within the expectations of the trustor (Michel 2012b).

As the following cases begin with relations of high levels of distrust it is also important to demonstrate that I propose, in line with Mark Saunders et al. (2014), Roy Lewicki et al. (1998), and Shiau-Ling Guo et al. (2017) that trust can exist at the same time as distrust in a relationship, and the concepts are not merely opposites. Distrust, rather than being the absence of trust, is a different yet connected construct that encapsulates different expectations from that of trust (Saunders et al. 2014). This is important as a transformation in the relationships under study towards trusting could not rely on measures that develop positive expectations in isolation of also reducing negative expectations. What may build positive expectations may not be able to reduce negative expectations. Recognising this, the framework constructed initially argues that distrust-reduction is required to reach a threshold of ambivalence that creates space for the potential of positive expectations to emerge (Saunders et al. 2014). For this thesis distrust-reduction is extremely contextual but it required the direct reference to sources of negative expectations in order to attempt to overcome distrust. This incorporates what Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler refer to as 'security dilemma sensibility' as a primary stage, which focuses on an actor's capacity to show an ability to understand the role that fear and their actions might play in the attitudes and the behaviour of the other (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 7). Negative expectations can come from ideological or political differences, different interests or the desire for different outcomes, and even personal differences between leadership such as viewing the other as malevolent or dishonest,

leading them to view one another in bad faith or holding 'enemy images' (Holsti 1962; Jervis 1989: 5; see also Wheeler 2018). There is no uncertainty present and no questioning of whether they can be trusted, but instead a strong view that they cannot be (Wheeler 2018). To counter distrust, it requires an empathy-based understanding that there are actions, situations, or characteristics which are causing negative expectations and ultimately distrust from the other. Between the ASEAN member states this can be best seen between the leadership of Malaysia and Indonesia as demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5. Ideological differences and actions perceived as malevolent prevented any meaningful opportunity for trust-building. It was only when Suharto came to power in Indonesia and actively began demonstrating his distance from the previous regimes policy of *konfrontasi* (confrontation) against Malaysia, that Malaysian elites reduced their negative expectations and opened space to consider (limited) positive expectations. While high levels of distrust are unlikely in relationships with high level of trust, it will be demonstrated that in some relationships trust began to emerge even when there was weak distrust. In some areas there were high levels of trust while in others (such as economics) distrust reigned. Ignoring the specificity of trust and the differences between trust and distrust as a concept creates assumptions that any presence of distrust in a relationship makes trust a concept unworthy of exploration in IR (see Emmers 2016). This thesis aims to address such assumptions through operationalising a specific form of trust separated out from distrust; recognising it may still play a significant role.

Once distrust has been reduced and a threshold of ambivalence occurs, I argue that there is space for weak trust, CBT, to follow if positive expectations of no harm also emerge. This stage incorporates what is known as strategic, rational, reasoned or encapsulated trust (Hollis 1998; Möllering 2006a; Rathbun 2012; Edwards 2018). Within this conceptualisation relationships depend on interest-based calculations concerning payoffs and deterrence, akin to rational choice theory (Lewicki and Bunker 1995; Möllering 2006a; Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010). In the cases that follow an alignment of interests concerning anti-communism and the desire for national resilience opened a commonality of interests that were lacking previously. This allowed a positive assessment to occur

concerning the intentions and interests of the other. While trusting behaviour was limited these weak levels of trust and reciprocation enabled a process to begin that began to embed trusting behaviours into the ASEAN structure in relation to issues that had been too risky to cooperate on meaningfully in the past.

This reciprocal process then opens the space for the emergence of KBT. As actors within the first stage of a trusting relationships view each other as complying with their agreements or reciprocating trust they gain knowledge of each other through learning. This allows for the inputs in the decision to trust to expand and depend less on calculation but more on knowledge of the other's predictable behaviour (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). The development into KBT requires that 'activities (during CBT) develop in a manner that confirms the validity of trust' (Lewicki and Bunker 1995: 157; See also - Kydd 2005). This thesis suggests that only a simplistic form of knowledge has been operationalised - that of a knowledge of the other's behaviour or what I term cognitive knowledge. While predictability of behaviour forms a central component, I argue that so too does that of knowledge of the other as a person (affective knowledge) and knowledge of meaningful behaviour (social knowledge). In other models of trust development Relational Based Trust (RBT) depending on 'shared affection' follows KBT (Dietz 2011), with a separate recognition for Affective Based Trust (ABT) (McAllister 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998). I argue that in these cases shared affection and predictability develop parallel to one another and both inform the basis of trust in a significant manner. Knowledge in former literature has been too limited to cognitive forms (Lewis and Wiegert 1985; McAllister 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998; Dietz 2011). In ASEAN this is seen during the Cambodian crisis in Chapter 6, whereby positive expectations were simultaneously based on predictability of past behaviour to not defect as well as an affective 'bonding' (Wheeler 2018) between the primary agents.

In Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) and Dietz's (2011) frameworks IBT follows where identification incorporates 'a full internalization of the other's desires and intentions… [and] trust

exists as because the parties effectively understand, agree with, and endorse each other's wants' (Lewicki and Bunker 1995: 151). This thesis departs from this in that it puts only minor causal weight on this final form of trust. I see IBT as something that emerges in interpersonal trusting relationships and can enhance the chances of PBT emerging. However, it is not necessary for PBT to emerge and cannot be depended on for its emergence due to the rarity of it. As will be shown identification occurred at various stages of the relationships under study in this thesis, particularly between some Indonesian and Singaporean elites, but that they were neither consistent nor developed enough to provide a long-lasting stable trusting relationship.

Instead this thesis argues that PBT occurs when interpersonal trust becomes habitual for boundary spanners who have developed CBT and KBT previously. This results in the repeated enactment of trusting behaviours and the creation of particular ways in which to play the role of leader in this context (Goffman 1959). Through enacting these trusting behaviours as practice, it creates a structure (ASEAN) whereby new leaders are predisposed to trust one another. They continue in the reification of the structure by also enacting trusting behaviours which become the normal way in which to do things (Möllering 2006a; 2006b; 2008). Trust, therefore, becomes habituated in what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as a collective habitus, whereby similarly situated actors in a particular field (ASEAN) are exposed to common experiences of socialisation which results in the internalisation of similar non-reflexive dispositions and background knowledge that lead them to act in regular ways (1994; Pouliot 2008; Hopf 2010). The idea that trust be routinized, intuitive and habitual is one that has a basis in trust literature but that has not yet been meaningfully addressed in IR (Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2012; Möllering 2006a; 2006b; Welter and Alex 2012).

The thesis aims to demonstrate that the social process through which interpersonal habituated trust proliferates into structures, fields, collectivities or systems is through this logic of practicality (Pouliot 2008; Hopf 2010). This occurs in ASEAN's latter period. Elites had greater periods of time in the past to construct this field and habitus due to the authoritarian nature of the states

under view. Leader turnover has since increased rapidly meaning elites no longer have the time required to go through the process of developing CBT, KBT, and IBT. Instead they join the structure predisposed to trust as it forms their un-reflexive background knowledge due to the way in which their roles have been enacted in the past. CBT and KBT are important in the development of ASEAN as the trust that it gave rise to allowed ASEAN's further development. However, the structure of ASEAN itself takes on importance on guiding and maintaining trust in the future. Through this I aim to demonstrate the ways in which trust led to the development of ASEAN not only as an organisation but also as a security community. Trust is therefore a significant causal factor in the development of dependable expectation of peaceful change and the role that ASEAN plays in maintaining this. By arguing for PBT I aim to show that trust can be consistent enough to maintain a security community even when identity or norm adherence suffers extreme fluctuations.

Study Design

In order to demonstrate the way in which trust develops, both in terms of intensity and the ways in which it proliferates beyond specific actors, this thesis initially analyses trust at the interpersonal level between leaders, relevant ministers (foreign, defence), and senior diplomats (Wheeler 2018). Leadership preferences do matter in IR and generally they have significant agency to influence the decision-making policy in their countries (Wu and Wolford 2018; Yarhi-Milo et al. 2018; Horowitz et al. 2018; Wheeler 2018). Leader agency was particularly strong within ASEAN member states. In the early stages of their relationships foreign policy decision-making was the realm of their authoritarian leaders. In Singapore, for example, Lee Kuan Yew was being the primary decider of Singapore's foreign policy direction, with only a small number of elites having much influence on him. In Indonesia President Suharto often went against his advisors and chose his own foreign policy directions even in the face of criticism. Whilst this has changed in the previous two decades, and the foreign-policy decision-making agents have proliferated, I argue that this occurred in parallel with the development of PBT. As a result, the wider agents who are increasingly involved

in ASEAN as a result of these political shifts are considered in the final chapter. This also fits the framework for trust development that centres on the agency of boundary spanners in the initial stages who construct the field and habitus by engaging in trusting behaviours. The structure is barely established in the first two empirical chapters but when it is, and when foreign policy decision-makers proliferate, it takes on greater meaning and becomes of greater important as a unit of analysis as agency becomes increasingly embedded (Lumineau and Schilke 2018). This is in line with Pouliot who argues practices are suspended between structure and agency, so require the context of both to be analysed (Pouliot 2015). It is important to delineate agent and structure, and demonstrate the thesis aims to combine micro-level aspects of trust with macro-level aspects to see whether micro-macro transition can occur, making this a multi and cross-level analysis (Möllering 2006a; 2006b; Welter and Alex 2012; Lumineau and Schilke 2018).

I will focus on the development of intra-ASEAN relationships from its conceptualisation to 2015, delineated into three 'within sub-cases' of ASEAN development; 1967-1975 (conceptualisation); 1975-1997 (deepening); and 1997-2015 (embedding). This should satisfy the good practice consideration of choosing a well-thought out starting point. The thesis has begun with ASEAN's conceptualisation as it aims to demonstrate ASEAN's role in the development of trusting relationships (Bennet and Checkel 2015). The relationships chosen are those between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. All were involved in ASEAN's creation which provides a sufficient time period to analyse trust longitudinally, and they were the relationships whereby the largest transformation took place as they experienced conflict prior to ASEAN's formation. As I speak the languages in these countries this facilitated data collection that could not be carried out in the other founding countries.

Within each stage trusting behaviour relating to two critical incidents will be analysed. These incidents have been chosen as they had the potential to threaten the ASEAN security community as they caused significant tensions or conflict that could have halted the development of ASEAN. These

crises offered alternative paths for ASEAN. If alternative paths were chosen the organisation could have realistically faced break down, the stalling of relationships, or abandonment of the institution for alternative platforms. The successful resolution of these crises, therefore, was essential for the maintenance of the dependable expectation of peaceful change within ASEAN through the continuing development of ASEAN.

There is a further theoretical reason for choosing crises as points of analysis. The theory presented in this framework has some overlaps with ideas put forward by path dependency. Path dependency is applied in historical institutionalism and analyses the way in which decisions in the past can have a long-lasting effect on institutional arrangements (Sydow and Schreyogg 2010; Breznitz 2010; Capoccia 2016). Mechanisms often analysed are institutional reproduction, network effects, and dynamics of increasing returns, which narrows scope of action due to a specific sequence of events (Sydow and Schreyogg 2010; Breznitz 2010; Capoccia 2016). Within path dependency there is work done on how critical junctures put into action 'regime[s] of positive, self-reinforcing feedback loops, constituting and setting up a specific pattern of actions (social practices)' leading to lock-in (Sydow and Schreyogg 2010: 8). This resonates with the framework of the thesis as I argue that practice-based trust relies essentially on institutional reproduction of trusting practices in the later stages of ASEAN's development that resulted from the distal earlier period. Within path dependency this would result from strongly routinized individual behaviours being one of the self-reinforcing dynamics (Sydow and Schreyogg 2010). Despite its compatibility, however, it does not capture the behavioural aspects that practice theory focuses upon.

Critical junctures in path dependency are 'situations of uncertainty in which decisions of important actors are causally decisive for the selection of one path of institutional development over other possible paths' (Capoccia 2016: 1). Another definition identifies them as 'relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest' (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348). These critical junctures are

therefore times in which 'dramatic change is possible' (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 341). They are fundamentally linked to agency as agents face broader than normal feasible choices at that specific moment. The critical juncture provides a stronger degree of openness for political competition over the meaning of the institution to occur. In path dependency literature critical junctures are often used to explore change following long periods of continuity, or even continuity in the face of potential changes, whether agent based or endogenous (Solingen and Wan 2016). Capoccia and Keleman (2007) argue that these choices often 'close off' other options and instead generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes, but that they do not always have to result in change. Instead they cause re-equilibrium if 'change was possible and plausible, considered, and ultimately rejected in a situation of high uncertainty' (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 352) in what they term 'near-miss critical junctures' (Capoccia 2015: 25). This is also compatible with Korsgaard's discussion of events – whereby events are 'discrete happenings which involve some departure from the current state of the environment… [that] may prompt a behavioural reaction from one or both of the parties which could trigger an abrupt increase or decrease in trust' (Korsgaard 2018: 8).

This resonates with the choice of crises as points of analysis. Crises are events that cause uncertainty and open the greater possibility for agents to decide to defect. Often trust is instead reinforced or reciprocated, further reinforcing the tendency to trust. Similar to critical junctures crises offer alternative paths of development for ASEAN as a community that were not taken. Defection would potentially stall or reverse the development of the institution as reciprocity would also stall, while continuing or deepening trust would allow for diffuse reciprocity or more open mandates. I argue, therefore, the true test of the importance of trust is not the way in which it was present during ASEAN's most stable periods. Instead the extent to which it was present during critical moments in ASEAN's history are as greater significance as former decisions to trust had an impact on the mediation of later crises. The thesis demonstrates how trust was not only present in both crises but also that the crises themselves were mediated by it. These crises occasionally occurred bilaterally or outside of the formal ASEAN structure, but the structure still affected their

interactions. I aim to show that without trust during these crises the ASEAN security community would have been fundamentally disrupted.

The thesis adopts two crises in all time periods. They are *konfrontasi* and the separation of Malaysia and Singapore for the period pre-ASEAN. Between 1967-1975 the two chosen are maritime disagreements concerning the straits of Malacca and the Philippine's claim over Sabah. Following this the two crises examined are tensions concerning boundaries surrounding Sipadan/Ligitan and Pedra Branca and the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia for the time period 1975-1997. Finally, the chapter covering 1997-2015 will analyse Ambalat the proliferation of non-traditional security issues through the Indonesian haze. There were other crises that threatened the institution and could have acted as case studies, but these were chosen as they have very distinct security linkages and presented the largest security challenges, threatening to undermine the dependable expectation of peaceful change had defections occurred. The crises chosen are also linked to one of ASEAN's most sensitive concepts – sovereignty. They all threatened to undermined sovereignty in some form – something which is often considered unacceptable in post-colonial states.

There is a case for a greater focus on some of the cases omitted, especially the 1997 financial crisis. As Davies has argued, following the financial crisis 'ASEAN struggled to reconcile two competing pressures – the need to reform in light of the shortcomings of regionalism that the crisis had exposed, and the need to protect its particular contribution to regional affairs' (2018: 36). As a crisis it had a significant impact on the organisation, spurring partial reform that saw a massive expansion of cooperation. While this will be discussed in part in the final empirical chapter it was not chosen as a case. I argue that the dynamics of trust in the economic sector have always been different and there is a case to be made that distrust in the economic sector has been significant. This has not prevented the development of the ASEAN community. Furthermore, while it threatened the stability of the institution by forcing a reflection on what deficiencies led to the crisis itself there

were no direct military security implications. It was unlikely that the financial crisis would ever become militarized. As such, while there were questions on how to improve ASEAN following the crisis, the alternative paths did not threaten the institution as a whole. In the crises offered, however, there were direct security implications that presented significant challenges to sovereignty and, in some, a real threat of continued military escalation – of greater direct relevance to the dependable expectation of peaceful change.

In each of these crises the thesis will then trace backwards to link the trusting behaviour to trust by exploring the antecedents of the behaviour (behavioural, discursive, textual or uncovered in interviews), allowing an exploration of the basis of trust the decision to trust was grounded in. Following that analysis, the chapters analyse the way in which the trust that was present above impacted on the further development of the ASEAN structure. This is done in order to demonstrate trust as a causal mechanism for the mediation of crises and the continued development of the ASEAN community and the dependable expectation of peaceful change.

Research Methods

The field of trust is widely studied in several disciplines such as Business, Management, and Psychology. It has also emerged as a field of its own, beginning to standardise concepts (Li 2012). Concepts of trust relating to International Relations have undergone less exploration even though theories of trust are increasingly being applied to different cases and contexts (see Kydd 2005; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Rathbun 2011; 2012; Wheeler 2013; 2018; Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Ruzicka and Keating 2015; Haukkela et al. 2018). This thesis therefore adopts abduction, a methodology between induction and deduction, which allows the utilisation of theoretical and conceptual frameworks derived from the field of trust to provide a guide for data collection. It allows these data to be used to elaborate and develop these theories further for the International Relations context (Le Gall and Langley 2015). There is a starting point for exploring the development of trusting relationships coming from Business as there are some similarities in the sense that these are

professional relationships. There are however differences expected as the Business and International Relations contexts are different.

This thesis is qualitative in nature as it best captures the above process. As argued by Lyon, Möllering, and Saunders there are significant limitations in quantitative and trust measurement scales as they do not allow for an in-depth analysis of the trust process and the evolution of trust (2015). It does not necessarily allow for a broader context to be analysed. As a result, little understanding emerges of the structure in which these trusting relationships occur and the dynamics which led to the outcome of trust. This thesis deploys process tracing as Jeffery Checkel argues this is required to study hypothesised causal mechanisms (trust) in a context of combined social and institutional structure and individual agency (2008). Processes are analysed in order to examine the mechanisms that potentially generate an outcome of interest (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998; Checkel 2008; Bennet and Checkel 2015). Diagnostic evidence is sought concerning these mechanisms that are unobservable, but which are constituted by observable events that occur between the prior hypothesised causes and the effects (Bennet and Checkel 2015). By analysing events that occur before and after the hypothesised cause and effect, the analyst can infer the presence of these mechanisms through the analysis of evidence on processes and sequences of events (Bennet and Checkel 2015). As this thesis is looking at the development of trusting relationships it is analysing the 'process' in which trusting relationships as casual mechanism evolve and potentially cause the dependable expectation of peaceful change (Leander 2008: 15; Klotz 2008: 50).

The methodology departs from process tracing to a small degree to bring in Pouliot's concept of practice tracing (2015). The thesis shows that trust becoming 'practice' through trusting behaviour being routinely enacted is central to trust being relevant within IR. Practice tracing is similar to process tracing but, based on Bourdieu, it focuses on analysing the situational, dispositional and positional elements of practices so that the historical perspective, generative

relationships that made them possible, as well as socio-political processes that allowed their diffusion, are captured (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Applying a more interpretivist approach to traditional process tracing Pouliot argues that social causality is established locally and that the context is of particular importance in giving practices, or processes, their meanings and generative power (Pouliot 2015). Practices have particular meanings to practitioners, whereas mechanisms are the theoretical abstraction of these used to classify practices (Pouliot 2015). To operationalise this, therefore, the thesis ascertains what the practical knowledge is, to ask what it is an ASEAN practitioner would have to know, what locally enacted common sense there was in order to 'grasp the meaning of a given gesture' (Pouliot 2015: 244).

The importance of process tracing for trust can be seen in the call for longitudinal case studies to analyse the development of dynamic and temporal trusting relationships (Möllering 2006a; Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2012; Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012; Welter and Alex 2012; Nooteboom 2012; Blumberg, Peiro and Roe 2012; Searle 2012). For validity measurement of trust in this process consists of two elements with further sub-divisions; the first is representations of trust and the second is trusting behaviour. If representations of trust can be linked to trusting behaviour it can be demonstrated that trust is a causal factor of the behaviour enacted, and the process can be demonstrated. This is based on the argument that antecedents to trust and trusting behaviour are distinct (Glaser et al. 2000; Möllering 2006a; Dietz et al. 2010; Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012; Gilesppie 2012; Uslaner 2012). Nicole Gilesppie states that few studies operationalise trust as willingness to be vulnerable by engaging in trusting behaviour, creating a gap between the conceptualisation and measurement of trust (2012 - see also Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012). Instead these studies assess perceptions of trustworthiness; more distal and less accurate indicators of trust (Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012; Gilesppie 2012).

Robert Adcock and David Collier highlight the importance of the shift from a background concept to a systemized one, moving the researcher from abstractions towards measures (2001:

530-1). By looking at behaviour the thesis is looking at what 'people do, rather than what they say' (Leander 2008: Checkel 2008: 116). In order to operationalise trusting behaviours, the thesis views them as 'representational practices' embedded in context, from which it can be inferred whether trusting relationships exist (Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012: 30). Dale Zand, for example, conceptualises trust as a 'behavior that conveys appropriate information, permits mutuality of influence, encourages self-control, and avoids abuse of the vulnerability of other' (1972: 238). For Gillespie, this behaviour can be demonstrated by the amount that a trustor has reliance on 'another's skills, knowledge, judgements or actions, including delegating and giving autonomy' and disclosure of 'work-related or personal information of a sensitive nature' (2003: 10; see also Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012). Whilst this is a useful basis trusting behaviour needs to be adapted to IR, and I will adopt three primary indicators embedded in IR literature –voluntary acceptance of vulnerability, diffuse reciprocity and absence of hedging behaviour. Voluntary acceptance of vulnerability is an outcome of trust, as trust involves a willingness to be vulnerable. This measurement has been operationalised by several scholars in International Relations (Hoffman 2002; 2005; Booth and Wheeler 2008). However, it has also been criticized on the basis that trustors are unaware of their vulnerability if trust reduces the perception of risk (Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Wheeler 2018). Whilst the thesis agrees that trustors may be unaware it can still be measured by scholars who can explore whether an actor has voluntarily taken on a state which makes them objectively vulnerable. This can be linked through the counterfactual as argued by Checkel; 'absent these [trusting] dynamics, would the outcomes have been any different?' (2012: 120). This will be triangulated with the absence or presence of hedging and diffuse reciprocity. It is expected that trustor's behaviour will result in the lessening of hedging practices towards the other as hedging also reduces vulnerability, making an absence of hedging a behavioural manifestation of trust (Ruzicka and Keating 2014). Regarding diffuse reciprocity it has been argued by Brian Rathbun that trust may lead to increased cooperation in several different spheres as trust develops (2011; 2012). Outside of the trust literature this has been referred to as open mandates (Skirbekk et al. 2011; Morrison and Saunders 2019).

Whilst trusting behaviour is an important measurement the thesis also needs to explore the antecedents of such behaviour to ensure that trust is the causal factor. This is in line with Roy Lewicki and Chad Brinsfield's argument that researchers need understand the internal dynamics of trust and the 'make up of beliefs, emotions, intentions and expectations that constitute it', as well as Keating and Ruzicka's statement that trusting relationships cannot be studied without 'some reflection concerning the perceptions of leaders' (Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012: 30; Keating and Ruzicka 2014: 762). Ideally, ethnography would be performed to observe trusting behaviour as it emerges, allowing an observation of what constituted it (Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2012). As trust-as-practice is hypothesised, ethnography would be particularly well suited (Pouliot 2015). However, Pouliot (2015) recognises that this is difficult in IR; the case is partly historic, and access is extremely problematic (see also - Lyon 2012; Goodall 2012; Checkel 2012).

For antecedents the thesis relies on discursive and textual analysis. Interviews and documentary sources will be employed to ascertain whether narratives are constructed preceding trusting behaviour emphasising trust (Neumann 2008; Dunn 2008; Checkel 2008; Ashleigh and Meyer 2012). This is compatible with the practice tracing element of the methodology. Pouliot argues that if practices cannot be seen they can at least be talked about (through interviews) or read (through textual analysis) (Pouliot 2015). Representations, primarily discursive, become a 'set of statements and practices' through which certain language, and practices, become normalised (Neumann 2002: 61). Textual analysis and discursive analysis will include official speeches, government records, public announcements, and the private writings of political elites (Dunn 2008). This approach has been criticised by Vincent Keating and Jan Ruzicka (2014) due to discourse being potentially strategic (see also - Luhmann 1979; Möllering 2006a). However, this thesis contends that such an analysis can be useful placed within the context of preceding trusting behaviour. Indeed, trusting behaviour is taken as the starting point and then the causal chain will move backwards in order to attempt to link it to trust.

Interviews of governmental elites involved in the ASEAN structure were crucial to this method as they allow insight into attitudes, practices, and beliefs (Welter and Alex 2012). In order to assess the reasons why particular behaviours (i.e. trusting) were chosen over other behaviours during critical junctures, it requires interrogating the mindset of those that actually made the decisions. Furthermore, the thesis aims to demonstrate that the bases of trust evolve and argues that trust based in practice is of most importance in the latter stage. However, it is difficult to interpret why somebody trusted their counterparts without gaining insight into their decision-making process. Interviews were of key importance as they provided insights into why certain behaviours were chosen but, also where trust was expected to be of importance, what it was that formed the basis for the decision to trust, and the importance or lack of it attributed to the ASEAN structure. Interviews, therefore, allowed the thesis to conclude that trust played a key role, that it was based on different antecedents through an exploration of what it was the decision-makers considered to be important, and that ASEAN's structural components took on greater meaning as time developed. As trust is a sensitive topic, interviews were not recorded in all cases. Cases without recordings were followed by an immediate transcription based on notes taken. Of the 29, 21 were recorded and 8 were not. Interviewees were anonymised to prevent issues concerning their public standing, in line with the granted ethical approval.

29 interviews were conducted with former senior politicians and diplomats within the ASEAN structure.[2] Diplomats were those that were posted abroad in relevant countries such as ambassadors or ASEAN permanent representatives, those based in their home countries but with specific jobs in the ASEAN national secretariat or bilateral affairs with relevant countries, or those based in their home countries in a position of seniority such as secretary-generals involved in wider foreign policy decision-making. Politicians were those that had a direct impact on foreign policy decision-making including foreign ministers, their deputies, or senior governmental leaders.

[2] A summary of their approximate positions can be found in Appendix 3

Fieldwork consisted of three months in Indonesia, six months in Malaysia, and three months in Singapore, as well as ad hoc visits when I was based in Malaysia. Most interviews lasted on average an hour. One went beyond two hours and two lasted only thirty minutes. They took place in various locations such as the interviewee's office, golf clubs, hotel restaurants, and cafes. A snowballing technique was used in order to gain access. Due to personal connections from my time spent in the region I was fortunate to have access to several key gatekeepers. I also had institutional affiliation due to my visiting positions at regional thinktanks. These were the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Indonesia, Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) in Malaysia, and National University of Singapore (NUS). These allowed me access to some closed-door events with relevant interviewees and gave me greater credibility. After interviewing those that I had immediate access to I asked them to recommend colleagues or predecessors that may be willing to talk, or whether I could use their names in correspondence sent to other potential interviewees. There were cases whereby I contacted serving government officials or diplomats who passed on contact details for predecessors, but many were given either by the initial gatekeepers, were ascertained at events, or were found online.

Interviews were semi-structured in nature.[3] In order not to bias interviewees, the interviews did not focus on trust directly at the beginning and interviewees were not informed prior that trust was the primary factor being explored.[4] Instead interviewees were initially asked to recount their overall impressions of the time they served in the role under analysis, their counterparts, and more general insights into the events and processes that stood out to them. Following this, I asked respondents in detail concerning specific events within the relationship to allow their beliefs to emerge, with neutral prompts (Saunders, Dietz, and Thornhill 2014). These primarily centred on the

[3] For the semi-structured outline taken into interviews, see Appendix 1

[4] Interviewees were informed that the thesis was analysing the processes and beliefs that constituted decision-making in ASEAN, but not that trust was one of those factors. The forms that interviewees were sent prior for consent can be seen in Appendix 2. I gained ethical approval from the University of Birmingham based on these documents and this process

particular crisis in which that individual was involved, their perceptions of their counterpart's behaviour and the interactions with their counterparts, the structure in which their interactions were embedded, and the reasons why they acted the way they did to resolve the crisis or avoid its escalation. If trust emerged as a property that prompted their behaviour, either explicitly or implicitly through linked language such as belief or positive expectation concerning their counterpart, the interview then turned to greater depth about trust, the reasons for it, and the ways in which it linked to their behaviour and overall views concerning the other within ASEAN.

Trust did not always emerge as a property. I hypothesised that one reason for this, beyond its mere absence, was that if trusting behaviour is indeed practice, it may be tacit, and interviewees may not recognise it as being a significant factor. As a result, it may not be talked about due to it being taken-for-granted (Pouliot 2015). Pouliot suggests focusing on what they talk from rather than what they are saying and interpret the context in which these practices of trusting behaviour are performed (Pouliot 2015). Another method utilised was to unsettle taken for granted knowledge to examine their reactions. For example, after asking interviewee to reflect on why they made a decision they did I asked what would have happened if the 'other' had taken advantage or if an alternative result occurred. This forced a reflection on the background knowledge being drawn upon on and I could gauge their reaction to the suggestion of betrayal (Pouliot 2015). This unsettling of taken for granted knowledge, through hypothetical situations of defection, were deployed through vignettes. Vignettes are best used to explore actions in context, clarify people's judgements, and provide a less personal and less threatening way of exploring sensitive topics (Barter and Renold 1999). They are, therefore, extremely useful for exploring trust judgements in contexts of potentially sensitive crisis contexts and they 'enable participants to define the situation in their own terms' and engage in greater introspection (Barter and Renold 1999). Hypothetical alternatives of defection offered through vignettes therefore allowed an unsettling of their taken for granted knowledge. This allowed clarification of their judgements and a discussion of trust to occur even if trust was taken-

for-granted through interpreting their responses to hypothetical changes in the situation that they had been in.

Once the data were collected from the interviews I interpreted and categorised them based on what processes led to the decisions being made, perceptions of counterparts' behaviour and character, and what beliefs and expectations allowed the processes to occur. These gave clear insights into the ways of thinking of the interviewees, as well as the thinking of their colleagues and superiors. This facilitated a linkage to the process-tracing above as I did not have to indirectly interpret causal mechanisms, but I had direct access to interviewees' ways of thinking about what it was that caused their behaviour and their beliefs. This could then be implemented into the causal chain. As will be shown throughout the thesis the interviews not only demonstrated the presence of trust but also its importance. By collecting direct data on the viewpoints of the involved agents the thesis is able trace the processes of how trust evolved, what caused it to be held, and the causal impact it had on their behaviour and particular key events; all of which contributed to understanding and enabled the demonstration of the importance of trust to the formation and development of the ASEAN Security Community.

Contribution

By exploring the role of trust in ASEAN the primary contribution in this thesis is that it gives trust a greater causal role and explores more explicitly the role of trust in a security community. As of yet much of the debate focuses on the role of identity with only little attention given to trust. This is even though trust has expanded as a research focus within IR. However, this attention is limited in the way in which it has been applied to security communities which is surprising considering it has such a strong recognition in the literature. To the best of my knowledge there has been no in-depth longitudinal analysis of the impact and importance of trust within a security community (See Wheeler 2018). This is particularly important in a case where identity is inconsistent at best.

Except for Nicholas Wheeler's (2018) analysis of how relations transform between those holding enemy images to those based on trust, there has also been a lack of exploration in terms of how trust develops longitudinally in IR. Many studies within IR have focused on static 'snap-shots' within relationships and tend to rely primarily only on one 'type' of trust rather than the movement from one from one form to another. Building on the insights of different strands of literature I hope to make connections where others left off. CBT and KBT are well established in literature, as are analyses focused on practices. However, despite trust being an important example of background knowledge there has been no theorising or empirical analysis. My primary contribution is bringing this framework of development together with practice theory to examine the way in which trust on an interpersonal level can proliferate to wider relationships within a given structure. Keating and Ruzicka emphasise that if trust is primarily an individual belief or expectation then it has little relevance to IR because a trusting relationship between individuals is not a stable foundation for long lasting trust when leaderships of a country rotate (Keating 2015b; Keating and Ruzicka 2014). Wheeler (2018) has demonstrated that relationships can emerge interpersonally which impact on the relationship in the short term, but through my operationalisation of PBT I aim to bridge these viewpoints and demonstrate the way in which interpersonal trust can become stable and long lasting by influencing the predispositions of new actors joining the structure in which trust has become embedded. This begins with the individuals and provides one 'sense of how trust can be socialised into state apparatus', a missing link according to Keating (Keating 2015b: 6).

The final contribution this thesis makes is to further our understanding of ASEAN as an institution. By focusing on the role of identity, it is easy to criticise ASEAN. However, forcing a collective identity can be problematic if it furthers ontological insecurity within the member states by decreasing the extent to which they can exercise their distinct identities. By arguing that trust is the causal mechanism behind the emergence and deepening of community the thesis proposes other methods that ASEAN can pursue to continue the development of the community that do not risk such a forcing of tension between national and regional priorities. My analysis, therefore,

challenges the dominant understanding in the field that identity drives the security community process, meaning prevailing policy prescriptions will need to reconsider whether identity building is an effective means to further the ASEAN project in future.

Overview of chapters

The thesis is divided into two parts. In Part One I begin by embedding my thesis into the current literature regarding explanations of peace within ASEAN. By critically analysing these contributions in Chapter 1 I not only suggest that they fail to adequately address necessary mechanisms, but also demonstrate how there is a place for a refocusing towards trust due to the extent to which it is recognised in existing explanations. In Chapter 2 I develop my theoretical underpinnings by specifying the relevant concepts and demonstrate the first part of the framework whereby relationships based on distrust can be transformed into relationships characterised by low levels of CBT. Chapter 3 continues this framework, focusing on how trust, once it has emerged, can both intensify through KBT and proliferate through PBT.

Part Two of the thesis turns to the operationalisation of this framework into the case studies and therefore constitutes the empirical section of the thesis. Chapter Four contextualises the relations pre-1967 by demonstrating how Pre-ASEAN Southeast Asian relations were characterised by significant distrust between Indonesia, Malaya, and Singapore. It then analyses early signs of distrust-reduction following significant events - the separation of Malaysia and Singapore and Suharto's countercoup. Chapter 5 demonstrates the emergence of CBT following ASEAN's formation through an analysis of concessions made in the formation of ASEAN itself, as well as in the maritime arena and the Indonesian role in facilitating negotiations between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. Chapter 6 then explores the way in which this trust had deepened between 1976 and 1997 through a continued focus on the maritime sector, as well as the case study of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, demonstrating the role of KBT. Chapter 7, finally, demonstrates how trust had become embedded as trusting behaviour within the structure through PBT, utilising the continued

focus on the maritime realm and introducing the haze crisis, and finally focusing on the predispositions of new agents informed by the ASEAN structure.

The concluding chapter summarizes the findings. Based on my proposition that trust constitutes and maintains a security community I offer a final reflection on the implications of the study.

Chapter 1: The missing role of trust in ASEAN?

1.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore what has previously been written concerning explanations of peace within ASEAN, particularly with a focus on the role of trust and distrust. As such this chapter serves as a literature review of explanations of peace in ASEAN, but also intends to highlight the gaps this thesis addresses by demonstrating the deficiencies and debates within these explanations. The chapter will demonstrate that there is a basis for the exploration of trust to address this gap. It shows how trust has been addressed but not necessarily fully operationalized. Instead, this thesis argues that trust is a key causal mechanism for peace but that its treatment by this literature has been lacking.

The literature review will, therefore, demonstrate both the worthiness of trust as a concept to be analysed and its under-operationalization in the most relevant literature on security communities. Most security community scholars have identified trust as being significant whether based on constructivist reading of identities and norms or within the practice turn. Despite this, there are significant deficiencies in applying the concept to ASEAN, even though current understandings of the ASEAN security community are predicated on a weaker foundation. There are also deficiencies in the 'practice turn' literature as this too has recognised trust but failed to operationalise it. This is relevant as I argue that the dependable expectation of peaceful change, the cornerstone of an ASEAN security community, relies heavily on a habituated form of trust embedded in and informed by the practices of trusting behaviour within the ASEAN structural 'field'.

The chapter will first focus on the primary explanations of peace within ASEAN. By showing the deficiencies of the (neo-)realist approach it will demonstrate that the security community literature is not only most persuasive, but also increasingly the most accepted in explaining ASEAN's peace. In particular, the literature review will first focus on realist accounts of stability, or instability,

within ASEAN and demonstrate the way in which this previously popular theory, tending to prefer materialistic factors, is unable to explain the consistency of ASEAN's 'long peace' (Kivimaki 2001). Whilst constructivists argue this is because it ignores ideational factors such as identity, I argue that the core issue realism has in this context is that by focusing only on distrust it does not allow a constructive role for trust.

The chapter will then primarily focus on the constructivist security community framework, of significance because it is currently the dominant theory applied to ASEAN, termed the new 'orthodoxy' (Khoo 2004: 45). At a theoretical level it recognises the importance of trust. It will be shown that despite limited recognition of this importance by scholars analysing ASEAN through the constructivist security community framework, such scholars go on to focus on identity and provide an insufficient exploration on the role of trust. This would not be problematic if identity alone was persuasive, but, as this chapter will show, there are significant debates that question the strength of collective identity in ASEAN which weakens the argument that ASEAN's peace is predicated on identity alone. This will demonstrate that trust, long recognised yet ignored, is well placed for further exploration as a causal mechanism for the dependable expectation of peaceful change.

Finally, the chapter will move on to the final literature of relevance, that of the 'practice turn' (Hopf 2010: 539), as this has impacted significantly on our understandings of security communities and is growing in significance as an explanation of ASEAN's peace. As previously mentioned, it is also relevant as this thesis primarily argues that the dependable expectation of peaceful change relies heavily on a habituated form of trust. The limited works on practices within ASEAN continue to ignore the concept of trust despite the theoretical foundations of practice-based security communities recognising it plays a role as an expectation or disposition. Instead, these works often recycle the focus on norms with little exploration of why norms being practices fundamentally contributes to the debate.

1.2 Realist explanations of peace in ASEAN

Realist theories and assumptions have a strong heritage in their applicability to the Southeast Asian region, even though many accounts of Southeast Asian international relations were not theoretically 'self-conscious' (Huxley 1996: 232). Core realist assumptions have remained dominant and unchallenged until the constructivist 'turn' (Busse 1999: 39). It is worth briefly exploring because balance of power dynamics and material interests are still assumed to be at the core of many of the crises this thesis explores, despite the fact there has been some movement away from realist assumptions in explaining the longevity of the peace that has occurred.

Following the Cold War realism has continued to be constructivism's largest 'intellectual competitor' that has 'dominated our thinking of ASEAN in the past' (Simon 1995; Ravenhill 2009: 220; Peou 2002a; 2002b). Some scholars analysing the region continue to see realist accounts as being 'closer to the truth' (Buzan and Segal 1994: 96; Goh 2008; Emmers 2016). In these realist accounts of Southeast Asia ASEAN plays a background or minor role in regional order, reflecting more general neo-realist ideas that international organisations demonstrate the realities of power distribution, but cannot affect the state of anarchy as they cannot shape this distribution of power (Mearsheimer 1994: Leifer 1989; 1996; Emmers and Weatherbee 2005; Jones and Smith 2007). Anarchy, in the unchanging realist sense, is seen as a seemingly essential element in the tensions, distrust, and insurgencies that realist scholars see as being prevalent within Southeast Asia (Ruland 2000).

This is perhaps most clearly seen in realist accounts of ASEAN's origins where the formation of ASEAN was a strategy for restraining Indonesia's emerging power, as well as attempting to create a stronger balance against the interference of great powers (Leifer 1989). With such balance of power considerations being dominant in these accounts, the role of trust or trust-building is not a consideration, and mistrust or distrust dominates but is put aside temporarily in cases where there is some degree of peace. Not limited to ASEAN's origins, the realist focus on the material elements of

power leads to three further conclusions; firstly, regional order is dependent on power realities and external great powers; secondly, regional order cannot be assumed; and thirdly, membership of ASEAN cannot transform its members' conceptualisations of their national interests and cannot overcome underlying tensions. Realist scholars therefore see ASEAN's processes as being underlined by sensitivity to this balance of power, arguing, for example, that ASEAN's reaction to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, prior to Vietnam joining ASEAN, demonstrates an attempt to prevent Vietnam placing Thailand at a power disadvantage within Indochina or that Singapore aligns with the US to ensure a favourable balance (Leifer 1989; 1996 – see also Acharya 2005; Jones and Smith 2002; Goh 2008). It is important to note that perhaps the main advocate of the balance of power, Leifer, did not identify his work as theoretically informed by realism and incorporated many aspects of the English School, such as the role of international society. Despite this, Leifer's balance of power arguments are for the most part mobilised to demonstrate the longevity of realist explanations of peace.

Most problematic for this thesis is that trust only has a negative role in realist explanations as distrust is taken as a given. As such, it is fundamentally incompatible with the theoretical framework put forward by the thesis. I argue, however, that the realist understanding is not persuasive. The first reason for this is that such a balance is not occurring in line with realist logic. Goh (2008) argued, in line with Waltz's (1979) theory, that weak states such as those found within ASEAN would be expected to balance against the hegemonic power - that of the USA. If balancing against threat, however, in line with Walt's (1987) modifications then they would be balancing against China (Goh 2008). For ASEAN to remain peaceful in the realist logic they would be expected to collectively align themselves with one of these great powers, either against power or threat. Division amongst ASEAN members would undermine peace and make it fundamentally obsolete. However, different states within ASEAN have varied interests in relation to the great powers and while this has caused frustration over ASEAN's centrality, and particularly its ability to act as a collective, it has not divided the institution or heightened the propensity for conflict amongst the

members. Intra-ASEAN peace remains, and ASEAN endures even though some countries are increasingly aligning with China while others retain their reliance on the US. The second problem with this balance of power and materialistic logic is that it is not persuasive in explaining the consistency of peace. While the US has remained hegemonic, its interests and emphasis on the region has fluctuated to a great extent, especially since the Cold War. Balances of power have fundamentally realigned and shifted throughout ASEAN's history but peace in ASEAN has remained a constant.

Cooperation in this literature is based on the alignment of security interests, for example regarding common foes, and such co-operation will be abandoned following as it is instrumental and short term, having no effect on the way in which states will consider each other following the period of cooperation (Leifer 1996; Peou 2002b; Ruland 2002). As states cannot know each other's future intentions, especially when the balance of power shifts, there is little prospect for enduring peace. There has been some evolution in the conceptualisation of this balance with regards to ASEAN that while not solely based in realist thought is based in its assumptions. Emmers, analysing the role of balance of power suggests that it need not be adversarial but can instead become 'associative' (2003: 51). Despite realist thought underpinning his ideas he also draws upon the English School. He argues the balance of power can be used to sustain equilibrium, creating security regimes which deny intra-mural hegemony and, for Emmers, create trust and confidence while constraining larger member states (Emmers 2003). Power in this conceptualisation is not purely militaristic but can be diplomatic and institutional, creating non-military balances and restraints on hegemony (Emmers 2003). Despite this realist led argument recognising trust, in some form, can exist he goes on to argue that ASEAN is still characterised by mistrust in most dyads, including; Indonesia and Malaysia over Konfrontasi; Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah; Malaysia and Thailand over the Muslim community in Thailand; and Singapore's mistrust of all of its direct neighbours due to the ethnic Chinese feeling surrounded by Malays (2003; see also - 2016). Therefore, whilst Emmers sees as trust is possible even when informed by realism, he continues to see the balance of power being the

primary explanation of peace in ASEAN, using the examples of restraining Indonesia as the Southeast Asian hegemon (2003). However, whilst these arguments have their merits the focus on power alone cannot explain the consistency of peace as there have been changing distributions of power and interests over time, but continuity of peace.

Where this argument is problematic, furthermore, is that trust has been little discussed in security regime literature outside of Emmer's (2003) conceptualisation. For Jervis, who pioneered the concept of security regimes, states could enter reciprocal security cooperation based on 'principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be restrained in their behaviour in the belief that others will reciprocate' (1982: 357). Whilst this is long-term he was, however, sceptical of the endurance of regimes as leaders would remain suspicious about other states within the regimes and competition would remain salient. Furthermore, trust played no part in his original formulation of security regimes. Keating and Wheeler (2015), who also concluded ASEAN was a security regime – which will be discussed in more detail below – argue that trust could be compatible with security regimes but only in an extremely limited form. They argue that in Jervis's conceptualisation the leaders are rational egoists who only act rationally to maximise benefits and promote their self-interests, meaning only trust resulting from a cost/benefit analysis has some degree of compatibility. This is problematic, as will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and demonstrated in the empirics, because trust rarely is primarily a result of this and even when it is this type of trust is weak. Indeed, with his emphasis on balance of power and this limited form of trust, Emmers (2003) does not explore other forms of trust due to the grounding in realist assumptions of rational egoism and the emphasis on interests.

Generally speaking, therefore, realists see the region as highly divided with distrust and differences dominating between ASEAN members. Policy is being pursued based on self-interest alone (Leifer 1989; Emmers 2016). This has come about for many different reasons, with realists such as Jones and Smith (2002) focusing on areas such as communal problems (Jones and Smith

2002; Collins 2000), economic issues (Acharya 1999), and direct interstate tensions such as territorial problems (Alagappa 1998; Jones and Smith 2002). The most problematic relationship highlighted in this literature focused on distrust is between Malaysia and Singapore, whose history has been marked with tensions and demonstrations of suspicion (Collins 2000). Indeed, Collins suggests that such suspicions have seen no thaw and Singapore's defence policy is based on deterring Malaysian attack, using this as a basis to argue a security dilemma exists between the two (2000). For realists a continuation of dispute and tension occurs in line with military hedging and modernisation (Simon 1995; Huxley 1996; Bitzinger 2010).

This thesis, however, argues that such military modernisation is not a result of suspicion and distrust towards fellow members of ASEAN. Military modernization has traditionally been seen as being directed towards protecting the state against internal security crises and protecting coastal areas from non-state actors due to relatively porous borders. In his recent study of modernization trends in Southeast Asia, Laksamana (2018) does not even consider that regional arms increases are aimed at each other. He instead analyses three separate potential drivers (China, market supply, modernization of aging equipment). More conventional modernization, furthermore, seems to be in line with concerns of the external security situation such as the tensions in the South China Sea, China's rise, and the instability arising from great power aggression. Laksamana argues that this is not necessarily a strong driver in comparison to the fact that countries seem to be arming in line with their economic growth and replacing aging equipment (2018). Furthermore, the growing militarization of ASEAN countries is not followed by concerns or suspicion from other ASEAN states. On the contrary, military cooperation and capacity building is increasing and the ASEAN militaries are increasingly working with one another. Modernisation is not generating new intra-ASEAN security dilemmas or suspicion towards one another. This will be reflected throughout the thesis, as military cooperation and growing inter-military trust is a significant driver of the growing trust more broadly in the region between elites.

There are also under-explored domestic factors, such as prestige; corruption; civil-military relations; the strength of the military institutions; and developing industries within the countries (Edwards 2015a; Edwards 2015b; Laksamana 2018). In many Southeast Asian countries the military is a significant power base, and prestige purchases and the desire for new equipment are sometimes divorced from threat perceptions. Whilst this will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters, one indication comes from Defence Minister Mohammed Sabu statements in Malaysia that their military is the weakest of its neighbours. Mohammed Sabu said 'it is embarrassing right now for us (on the international stage), but I will work to make Malaysia great again, number one again' (New Straits Times 2018). There were not security concerns leading his lamentations but embarrassment. Malaysia had lost prestige but was not concerned that other states had overtaken them. These purchases can also be grounded in corrupt practices as they are the least transparent part of governmental spending (Edwards 2015a). These corrupt practices often lead to large purchases that seem divorced from the needs of the country (Edwards 2015b). Military leaders and their families can benefit financially. This is also a result of the fact that military institutions have important political roles in many of ASEAN's countries. Budgets increase in order to meet rising personnel costs and keep them relatively satisfied so they do not seek to expand their role in domestic politics. The size of the militaries has remained roughly the same as reducing manpower has often been controversial in light of this issue. While manpower costs have increased personnel spending relative to the budget is consistent. As Laksamana demonstrates, much of ASEAN countries' budgets are not focused on procurement but instead rising personnel costs: on average, countries spent approximately 78 per cent of their budget from 2012 to 2016 on these expenditures (2018). With regards to development, procurement has focused on offset contracts which include technology transfer and domestic production of equipment as the defence industry is seen as a vehicle for further economic development through job creation and technological advancement (Edwards 2015a; 2015b). Despite this, the policies pursued are assumed to be closer to the realist

conceptualisation by many scholars who ground their work in balance of power, with little exploration of the above factors, making their explanations less persuasive (Ruland 2000).

As will be demonstrated later in this chapter constructivists acknowledge these issues, but argue that the formation of a collective identity has created new possibilities for co-operation, as it changes how states think about their interests. The realist literature with the aforementioned focus on power disagrees with such a conclusion, however, and instead argues that national interest and the pursuit of security remains the dominant factor in relations, and institutions such as ASEAN cannot overcome these problems by transforming how states perceive their interests (see - Leifer 1996; Peou 2002b; Narine 2008; 2009). Throughout realist literature, therefore, trust and institutions remain unimportant as causal drivers of behaviour; the balance of power is the main consideration with tensions and crises persisting.

Contrary to this, however, there has been a consistency of peace at the interstate level despite significant changes in the balance of power and the policies of different ASEAN states towards the great powers. These issues will be raised further in the case studies, as will the most problematic of all - the argument that distrust dominates and there is no role for trust over materialistic considerations is antithetical to the conclusion of this thesis. However, for now the thesis aims to argue realism does not provide a satisfactory basis for peace in the region and over-emphasises distrust through a static and one-dimensional mobilisation of the meaning of trust.

1.3 Constructivism and the 'new orthodoxy'

The IR theory that provides the largest opportunity for considering the role of trust, due to the recognition the concept has in the theorising, is constructivism. This makes it the one most relevant to the grounding of the theoretical framework in this thesis, especially as debates concerning whether ASEAN has yet become a security community has been described as the 'new constructivist orthodoxy prevalent among many Southeast Asian analysts' (Khoo 2004: 45). As such, ASEAN's status as a security community has resulted in a great deal of academic debate. By

analysing the way in which constructivism treats the concept of trust this section aims to demonstrate that trust is recognised, contributing to the thesis argument that it needs to be operationalised to a stronger degree. This is significant because, as this section will also highlight, there are some important issues concerning constructivism's ability to explain ASEAN's peaceful transformation when it is applied as it currently is, with only the normative constitution of shared identities being operationalised in the ASEAN case.

The security community concept was originally pioneered by Deutsch and his co-workers in his book *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area* (1957 – see also Adler and Barnett 1998a; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Keating and Wheeler 2014; Wheeler 2018). They claimed a grouping of states could generate mutual trust through the long-term habitual evasion of conflict that would create assurances that any potential disputes would be managed peacefully (1957). Mutual trust was considered important alongside mutual sympathy, common interests, and a sense of community (Deutsch et al. 1957; see also - Acharya 2014). One such issue, however, in this foundation is that trust is not conceptualised and nor is it clear as to the extent to which trust is important as a casual element in constructing security communities, as highlighted by Wheeler and Keating (2014). Instead Deutsch focuses on the sense of community bought about by habits that are acquired by social learning (1957). Within his conceptualisation he sees three conditions as being of importance; the compatibility of values, the capacity to respond to each other's needs without violence and, crucially for this thesis, the mutual predictability of behaviour (Deutsch et al 1957).

Adler and Barnett's (1998a; 1998b; 1998c) work was significant as they revitalised Deutsch's work and refined the theory through a constructivist lens. They emphasise shared values and norms, and the role these play role in constituting shared identities grounded in the logic of appropriateness (see Kratochwil 1989). Arguing quantitative measures overlooked social relations, this addition of the 'social world' constituted by knowledge and material factors was a key element of the emergent constructivist literature (Adler and Barnett 1998a: 12). Of greater relevance to this literature review,

however, is that they expanded the focus on trust and reciprocity; a theme that contributors to their book also focused upon (1998: Tilly 1998; Bellamy 2004). Adler and Barnett's framework is constituted around three specific tiers, looking at the precipitating conditions, the process variables, and mutual trust and collective identity formation (Adler and Barnett 1998a). Within this framework interaction amongst the first two tiers led to the development of trust and collective identity formation, that were the two elements that would allow for expectation of peaceful change within security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998a). They conceptualise trust as 'believing despite uncertainty', making it the dependent assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with normative expectations, with the belief coming about from experience and encounter (Barnett and Adler 1998a: 46; Tilly 1998). In this conceptualisation, trust always involves an element of risk with 'confidence that disputes will be settled without war is unarguably the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena' (Barnett and Adler 1998c: 414). They also demonstrate that levels of trust matter as to the level of development of a security community, as the depth of trust decides the strength of the community (Adler and Barnett 1998b; see also – Bellamy 2004; Keating and Wheeler 2014). They see trust as being produced by social learning encouraged by initial acts of cooperation, with international organisations promoting mutual trust through establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce these norms (Adler and Barnett 1998b; 1998c; Tilly 1998).

Trust, rather than just being an outcome in their conceptualisation, allows actors to reconceptualise themselves and 'reimagine their social bonds' through the process of trust-building, with institutional actors encouraging the development of mutual trust through these transactions and reimagining (Adler and Barnett 1998b: 42-45). As such, emphasis is put on trust in reinforcing and constituting mutual identification (Adler and Barnett 1998b). They specifically state that:

'trust logically comes prior to identity, as a minimal measure of trust is required for collective identity… once there is some measure of trust a collective identity is likely to reinforce and increase the depth of trust' (1998b: 46).

However, despite such a strong importance being given to trust, the explanatory role is limited because the causal process is not made clear. They argue at some points that trust is a pre-requisite for the emergence of collective identities and at others that identity produces trust (1998b). Considering the weight put on trust it also suffers from a degree of under conceptualisation within this framework relative to identity. Identity remains of most importance and is conceptualised to a greater degree; whereby the relationship between member state and security community is mutually constitutive with the states affecting the identity of the community as a whole but also having their identities shaped by the community itself (see also - Bellamy 2004).

This almost singular emphasis placed on identity means trust remains under conceptualised and under operationalised in regards to ASEAN. Partly these limitations have occurred as a result of these weak foundations with regards to conceptualising trust amongst security community scholars, but another element may be that scholarly focus on an ASEAN collective identity was developed in line, and seemingly separately from, security community literature.

Busse (1999), for example, draws upon Wendt but ignores security community literature. He argues that adherence to ASEAN's norms have led to the emergence of a collective identity – conceptualised by Wendt as a 'relatively stable, role specific understanding and expectation about self' - making ASEAN a telepathic community (Wendt 1992: 397; Busse 1999). Focusing on Wendt's (1994) argument that cooperation can lead to collective identity, Busse discusses the way in which ASEAN's norms manage conflicts due to the focus on non-interference and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and norm compliance has led to a collective identity (Busse 1999). This has led to a high level of trust between all but Singapore, as they no longer plan for war against one another, making trust the outcome of a collective identity (Busse 1999). Busse is not the only scholar

who referred to ASEAN community in such a way with others, such as Antolik (1990), branding it a diplomatic community (See also - Haacke 2009).

Perhaps the biggest influence on the debate surrounding ASEAN's peace is that of Acharya's exploration of ASEAN as a security community. Acharya was an early scholar to draw upon the security community concept; arguing that ASEAN was a security community in 1991 (1991). Until Adler and Barnett's engagement with the concept, however, this saw only limited debate with Ganesan responding that ASEAN is not a security community as it would have to be a mature institution that has a common perception of threat and would be able to resolve differences (1995). As such a debate was informed by little theoretical grounding, trust was not a distinct element. Ganesan instead argued that tensions bought about by territorial claims and cross border intrusions led to mistrust, which was heightened by differences in leadership styles (1995).

Of significance is the fact that following Adler and Barnett's book, where Acharya had a chapter (Acharya 1998), not only does his conceptualisation of ASEAN relations within the security community framework recognise the importance of trust, but he incorporates it into his framework (2014). In the initial chapter of his book he explicitly states that 'the development of a pluralistic security community means investigating the development of trust, especially through norms of conduct' (Acharya 2014: 20). In his social constructivist understanding of ASEAN he explores the way that trust would occur through these norms which help constitute, and are constituted by, a common identity (2014). Beyond this, however, he provides no conceptualisation of what he considers the concept of trust to be, seeing it only as an outcome (Acharya 2014). He proceeds to focus on ASEAN's claim as being a nascent security community being based particularly on norms. These rule-based norms emphasising non-interference, the non-use of force, and informality have been constituted and have in return mutually constituted identity throughout ASEAN's history, resulting in socialised states that are potentially now trusting following a period of extreme mistrust that existed before ASEAN (Acharya 2014). These norms are underwritten, in Acharya's opinion, by a

unique operationalisation; the process of regional interaction is undertaken through the social norms of the 'ASEAN way' (Acharya 1997: 329). This process emphasises informality and pragmatism with consensus, open-ended consultation and discreetness allowing trust to emerge as it is a non-adversarial and non-hostile way in which to make decisions (Acharya 1997). He links these ideals to identity by demonstrating how 'consensus (*musjawarah*) and consultation (*mufakat*)' are interlinked elements of Javanese village decision making (Acharya 1997: 329).

Whilst this culture is seemingly embedded in society, identity is restricted to elites but created through these norms (Bellamy 2004). The normative elements are particularly well established within ASEAN literature, with there being a strong focus on them and their debated distinctiveness (Bellamy 2004). Despite this, debates remain over what norms constitute the 'ASEAN way' in particular with Acharya identifying the three above, Haacke identifying six (sovereign equality, the non-recourse to the use of force and the peaceful settlement of conflict, non-interference and non-intervention, the non-involvement of ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy, and mutual respect and tolerance) and Bellamy identifying 3 (non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, a consensus based style of decision-making, and the non-use of force to settle disputes)(Haacke 2002; Bellamy 2004). Despite debates it is generally agreed by security community advocates that non-interference, consensus, consultation and non-legalistic methods are the corner stones as highlighted by ASEAN documentation and statements, such as; the founding Bangkok declaration; the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC); the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN); and even the ASEAN Commission for Human Rights Charter (Bellamy 2004; AICHR 2009).

With these norms, therefore, dominating regional politics, Acharya suggests that they have helped constitute identity through a socialization process, more important than concrete policy goals, which has transformed state interests and resulted in overcoming tensions (Acharya 1997; 2014). Through this he implicitly advocates for the existence of trust. Such an argument is

problematic as there is no exploration of what his indicators would be in regarding the measurement of trust, and he comes to no explicit conclusion on whether trust is present. This is even though the three recognised stages of security community - nascent, ascendant and mature - are all argued to be delineated by different depths or degrees of trust, suggesting an exploration of trust would be beneficial in ascertaining where ASEAN lies (Acharya 2014). He also suggests that trust only exists in specific dyads, whilst dyads such as Malaysia and Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, and Thailand and Myanmar are vulnerable to mutual mistrust, and, therefore, security communities can seemingly be constructed with high levels of distrust (Acharya 1991; Acharya 2011a).

Acharya's work is particularly important as earlier editions of his books are the most cited with regards to ASEAN, and his ideas have been used as a foundation for other scholars' work when exploring the idea of ASEAN's 'peace' and relative stability, and are reflective of the 'constructivist turn' which dominates the current study of ASEAN (For example -Bellamy 2004). In line with this framing, scholars have seemingly limited themselves to the exploration of the strength of norms, and many have continued the lack of attention to the concept of trust or have only drawn upon Acharya's work without engaging with security community literature. Those that do engage with the literature tend not to focus on trust but instead continue with the focus on identity and norms (Bellamy 2004; Davies 2014). Few have added much in the way of significant amendments or a reframing of Acharya's arguments; resulting in a general consensus whereby common identity (Bellamy 2004; Emmerson 2005; 2008; Dosch 2008; Kivimaki 2008; Davies 2014), based on these norms (Wah 1997; Severino 2001; Bellamy 2004; Kuhonta 2006; Collins 2007; Katsumata 2008), are responsible for reducing suspicion and building confidence (Wah 1997; Emmerson 2005; 2008; Collins 2007; Dosch 2008), cooperation (Emmerson 2005), or 'trust' (Snitwongse 1998; Severino 2001; Katsumata 2008; Weissman 2009; Tonnesson 2009). When trust is explicitly mentioned (Snitwongse 1998; Severino 2001; Weissman 2009; Tonnesson 2009) none of these works invest any time to define the concept or explicitly explore the linkages to the theoretical framework, whether

trust is present between the states, the extent of such trust, or whether ASEAN increases trust. Instead, they mostly comment on how the norms are 'trust-building'.

This is made problematic by the fact that this literature mostly contributes only to our further understanding of norms. Ba (2009), for example, continues to ignore the role of trust, but argues that Acharya doesn't go far enough in looking at the ways in which norms are constituted and how the meaning of these norms is perceived by the states that subscribe to them. Bellamy also disagrees with Acharya's conclusions and argues that ASEAN is only a loosely coupled security community. He draws upon a similar reasoning with regards to the way in which norms have constructed only a limited identity (Bellamy 2004). Whilst the 'lack of downwards movement of a 'thick' collective identity does not disprove the security communities' it leads only to a loose or thin security community (Bellamy 2004: 98). Emmerson also takes Acharya's work and further refines the exploration of security communities by suggesting they can be 'thick or thin' (2005). The thick and thin element is potentially useful when explored in relation to trust as there are compatible elements with Booth and Wheeler's (2008) development of embedded trust that explores the way in which trust can move beyond the elite level to encompass the interaction between the wider societies, later operationalised in Keating and Wheeler (2014). By ignoring trust, not only are potentially important dynamics missing, but the absence makes some arguments unconvincing or unclear. Chalermpalanupap (2008), for example, states that ASEAN is a pluralistic security community despite continuing widespread suspicions, a large contradiction of both Deutsch et al. (1957), and Adler and Barnett (1998a; 1998b).

This has led to literature largely focusing on identity when attempting to measure the strength of the ASEAN community, and I argue this makes it relatively easy to dismiss ASEAN as a security community, even though factors such as trust should have the same consideration. Nischalke (2002), for example, systematically measures the significance of utilising community literature for ASEAN, but has done so with the operationalisation of the collective identity. In his

measurement, therefore, he looks at elements of identity such as rhetoric and policy behaviour, and disaggregates identity into three elements; shared structures and values; mutual identifications; and compliance with norms in context (Nischalke 2002). Nischalke's conclusion after measuring these elements in 14 different events is extremely mixed; whilst the Post-Cold war era has seen stronger shared structures and values, as well as compliance, mutual identification remains lacking – leading Nischalke to suggest that ASEAN has constituted a rule based community rather than one based on identity (2002; See also Peuo 2002). Without the 'we-feeling' being present, ASEAN cannot be being a community, some argue, based on collective identity (Collins 2007: 215; Narine 2008: 412). Some scholars argue the ASEAN identity is just one weak identity competing against many others (Narine 2008). Others argue that constructivists exaggerate the processes of collective identity building and underestimate divisive factors (Ruland in Bellamy 2004).

Jones and Smith call ASEAN an 'imitation community' and criticise scholars that perpetuate the 'propaganda' of an ASEAN community as no strong identity exists (2002: 100). They attack Acharya's focus on shared cultural practices and argue that non-interference is anti-constructivist as it negates any regional identity emerging (Jones and Smith 2002). Khoo agrees with the 'imitation community' label, arguing that 'the nascent ASEAN security community has arguably never existed' and criticises Acharya's work as being 'weak', largely through problematizing the normative element (2004: 35, 39). Instead Khoo contends that the ASEAN norms either have 'adverse consequences' or have simply not been complied with (2004: 40). He disputes the endless exercise in identity building as the argument can then not be falsified if it is seen as a continual process with no end in sight (2004). Following from this he suggests that more justification is required as to why these norms were chosen, even if they emerged alongside other norms and have since been broken (Khoo 2004). Changes within ASEAN in the past decade, with a focus on human rights and the expanding interference in each other's affairs, are also indicative of the weakness of the foundational norms. For example, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (2013) has been used to demonstrate that no shared identity exists with regards to human rights in ASEAN, and the lack of agreement over which

direction ASEAN should pursue indicates a degree of divergence within this collective identity (Davies 2014).

As norms have gained such a great deal of attention in this academic context, scholarship also exists which doubt their salience or their importance to the community. Jones argues that the consensus surrounding the ASEAN way and non-interference is misjudged (2012). He demonstrates how ASEAN has engaged in state intervention and that 'when these facts become too difficult to ignore [scholars] downplay them or explain them away, producing serious, unresolved inconsistencies' (Jones 2012: 2; See also – Jones 2008; 2010; 2015). In his study Jones highlights how ASEAN-led interventions in Cambodia, East Timor and Myanmar demonstrate the selectivity of the application of sovereignty norms, and that, instead of being an accepted followed norm of behaviour, the conceptualisation of what non-interference is depends on the power struggles occurring within Southeast Asian societies (Jones 2012). He argues the norm is dynamic, and while he does not disavow the significance of the norm, he questions its independence and ability to transform state behaviour as argued in constructivist theories, and therefore ASEAN's regionalism being built upon normative foundations (2012). Collins further criticises the reliance on the normative element alone, arguing that this would make ASEAN a security regime rather than a community, as norms regulate behaviour which allows the acceptance of short-term sacrifices for long term gains, supporting Emmer's claim discussed previously (2007). Collins criticises the fact that some scholars accept regimes can become communities and instead argues that responses are not generated by we-feeling (Collins 2007).

Therefore, the current debate between scholars of ASEAN has been framed by the security community concept, but in particular the conceptualisation of security community which emphasises norms and identity. This has resulted in a 'stale' debate (Jones 2015) which focuses only on whether norms have been breached or whether identity exists (Haacke 2005). By limiting the debate to these two elements it ignores the potential dimension of trust that is emphasised in the

literature in which these ideas are based on and which may provide a bridge between the divergent ideas. This thesis agrees that the focus on norms and collective identity is problematic but does not agree that this weakness suggests ASEAN is not a security community. Norms are slowly shifting in ASEAN against the will of several member states and the collective identity is diverging even more. Despite this ASEAN remains peaceful. By focusing upon the theorised yet under-operationalised mechanism of trust, this thesis will demonstrate that a security community can exist predicated on a strong form of trust, even while there are questions over how far there is a strong collective identity or we-feeling.

1.4 The Practice turn and ASEAN

As demonstrated in the introduction, Adler and Pouliot in particular have developed the 'practice turn' in relation to security communities, arguing that practices, resulting from inarticulate background 'know-how', are endowed with social meanings that are shared by a given community (Adler 2008: 202; Kratochwil 2011: 36; Schatzki et al in Adler and Pouliot 2011: 3; Bueger and Gadinger 2018). Pouliot identifies trust as playing a 'key role' within security communities as trust, defined as believing despite uncertainty, is an inarticulate feeling deriving from practical sense (2008: 278). Such links between practice and trust may suggest that the action trusting behaviour, acted out repeatedly over space and time, may constitute a habitus and background knowledge of 'trust' amongst the relevant actors (Adler and Pouliot 2011: 13, 16). Practice is important as it provides a strong theoretical insight into how relationships can be removed from an interpersonal dyad but still holds onto the notion of individual agency, and still suggests that trust is something held by individuals even if this trust is a result of structural factors such as the practical sense.

Despite the promise that this literature offers this has only been applied to ASEAN in a limited manner, and where it has been applied it lacks a focus on trust. Davies refers to the practice turn to demonstrate how ASEAN is simultaneously maintaining formal practices and diplomatic

culture while the informal culture's practices substantially evolve (2016). He argues that continuity in ASEAN's diplomatic culture is a result of 'what actors choose from' (Davies 2016: 219) and applies Bourdieu's triad of conceptual innovations; field (direct diplomatic interactions of members within ASEAN itself), practical sense (rules of non-intervention, sovereign equality and strict inter-governmentalism being the automatic and seemingly self-evidently right and natural way that ASEAN should operate) and habitus (the 'system of durable, transposable dispositions which integrates past experiences and functions at every moment as a matrix of perception, appreciation and action') (Davies 2016: 221-222). This created a habitus that constituted an ASEAN rationality that in turn created and supported the automatic expectation that ASEAN's formal diplomatic environment would be one characterised by strict invocation of non-intervention, sovereign equality and freedom from external interference. As Davies argues 'the quiet, informal and consensual informal diplomatic practices had emerged alongside this formal environment and had helped constitute it' (Davies 2016: 221). Further to this Davies focuses on the role of rituals and symbols within ASEAN (2018). Rather than having any tangible contribution to the community, he argues that the ritual following of ASEAN's values and the use of ASEAN's symbols creates a standardisation and repetition that serves the purpose of locking the participants into a performance of unity which are reified at each event (Davies 2018).

The result, for Davies, is that cooperation serves to familiarise and regularise peaceful contact between member states and develops a sense that they are partners, not rivals, in the pursuit of their respective national interests (2016; 2018). In order to support his argument, he analyses the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and how the code became learnt, performed and routinised by elites with formal and informal cultures working together (2018). Whilst Davies offers an interesting exploration of ASEAN's potential habitus, however, he attributes less focus on what it is this habitus does and how it impacted on peace or the relationships between ASEAN members. The closest he come to this is when he states: 'these policy choices would open the door to greater, peaceful, contact between ASEAN member states, and start the process of developing mutual

understandings of trust and benefit in place of rivalry and suspicion' (Davies 2016: 224). In a later work, however, he argues that the ritualistic representation of ASEAN as a region of peace is not supported by the empirical record. Instead, he argues there is evidence of suspicion and 'mistrust' but that rituals help to 'bracket the suspicion' making the reality of mistrust of less significance (Davies 2018: 2). For this thesis, then, the question remains of to what extent is trust derived from these practical senses, can this trust become part of ASEAN's habitus, and what affect does this have on peace?

Nair's thesis also has these limitations despite being perhaps one of the more interesting works on ASEAN's practical field due to its ethnographic methodology (2015). Nair studied ASEAN's practice in action, arguing that the secretariat (often assumed to be relatively impotent and insignificant) plays a central role in coordinating ASEAN's diplomatic activities and contributing to the saving of face among ASEAN representatives (2015). He draws upon Goffman and Bourdieu to argue that ASEAN's diplomacy is produced in everyday life by a set of tacit and grouped dispositions that allows the saving of face and the performance of a 'mystic sovereign equality among each other' (Nair 2015: 4). The secretariat aims to assist in the construction of consensus by avoiding situations that may serve to embarrass country representatives by ensuring that events are set up in a way that demonstrates they are all equals (Nair 2015). A limitation of this work for the thesis, however, is that again it does not consider the role of trust in the development of such practices, and does not link the ASEAN habitus analysed to the wider question of how ASEAN's diplomatic culture might affect peace.

Glase goes further in assessing the extent to which practices have impacted on interstate relations in ASEAN (2017). The driving question for Glase is how can we account for the absence of war between ASEAN members considering persistent militarized disputes? His beginning point is the same as this thesis; he too recognises a lack of we-ness suggested as explaining peace in the conventional security community literature applied to ASEAN. To address this question, he develops

a framework centred on the habitual dispositions of communities of practitioners that focuses on the unreflexive cognitive and behavioural qualities of regional relations. These habits of peace circumscribe thinking and behaviour among the ASEAN state practitioners and have led to a toleration of limited violence among member states (Glase 2017). He suggests seven habits of peace. There are three interrelated processual attributes of Southeast Asian habits including the practice of consensus, informal dialogue and a privileging of process over substance. The content or substance of these habits are also threefold including thinking from non-interference, equality among member states and face-saving. There is a seventh habitual element, the proclivity towards informal pacific dispute settlement, which he argues blurs this analytic divide. His primary contribution, apart from categorising ASEAN's habits of peace, is to more clearly define the relationship between norms and practices, explore the origins of the habits themselves, and explore the role that ASEAN's structure plays as an enabler in habituation. This is required as many works on practice seems to still take norms as the starting point but moves them into the realm of un-reflexivity. Glase argues that the relationship between codified norms and the practices that stem from — and often complicate or contest — them may be glimpsed through this turn to habit and practice. However, his 'habits of peace' are still strongly based on the 'ASEAN way' and the norms that underpin it.

Of importance is his discussion surrounding the actions of powerful and authoritative actors who impose meaning through practice (Glase 2017; See also – Pouliot 2008; Alder-Nissen and Pouliot 2014). He argues that ASEAN as an organizational setting is often recognized for its particularly insular level of decision-making, a setting in which practices are likely to see habituation (Kivimaki 2001; Ba 2006; Katsumata 2006). Here the 'peculiar, small world that multilateral diplomats inhabit' is just that and the transmission of habitual practices is likely (Pouliot 2011: 546). While Glase sheds light on the origins and processes behind the habit, he seems to suggest that these habits themselves are not 'shook' during times of crises – but his research question is focused on why the states tolerate limited crises (2017). This thesis suggests that it is trust that makes this tolerable. As such, these habits of peace are constitutive mechanisms but there is little explanation

of how they cause peace in themselves, whether the expectation of trust enables their continuation, and whether trust may mediate the outcome between these habits and peace.

1.5 Trust and 'mistrust' in ASEAN

This idea builds upon an emerging literature that has begun to analyse trust in the context of security communities, but which has seen only limited application to the ASEAN case and still lacks convincing theorising of the processes by which trust moves between levels. The two primary advocates of conceptualising trust in the context of security communities after Adler and Barnett are Wheeler and Keating (Keating and Wheeler 2014; Keating 2015a; Wheeler 2018 – see also Jenne 2016; Urban 2016; Chan 2017). Keating and Wheeler note the trust deficiency in security community research and highlight two causal mechanisms to develop a security community – Osgood's theory of Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction (GRIT, see Osgood 1962) and a 'leap of trust' (2014). In their theory these mechanisms require a development of what Booth and Wheeler call 'security dilemma sensibility' by elites, defined as

> *'an actor's intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that one's own actions may play in provoking that fear.'* (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 7 – see also Keating and Wheeler 2014).

These concepts will be explored in greater depth in relation to the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 but what is important to note is mechanisms of trust emergence seemingly come prior to the formation of a collective identity. This thesis argues trust is in itself a constitutive element of the dependable expectation of peaceful change, which Keating and Wheeler also argue in their application of trust towards the ASEAN context. They conclude that the habits and practices of trust need extend to the interaction between societies, 'embedded trust', for a security community to be resilient enough to account for leadership changes (2008; Keating and Wheeler 2014).

Based on this Keating and Wheeler conclude that ASEAN is a robust security regime based due to trust being absent among the societies of the countries. It remains one of the most convincing theoretical considerations of trust in the security community context that has been applied to ASEAN as trust is recognised, conceptualised, and linked to their argument throughout. They argue that ASEAN has the potential to become an emerging security community but that it remains a robust security regime as limited trusting relationships between elites are not yet embedded into societies, and military planning against each other continues (2014). Whilst this is a beginning, however, they argue that trusting relationships amongst elites, and in particular ASEAN's diplomats, are not enough to overcome wider mistrust concerning each other and hasn't led to the emergence of collective identity (Keating and Wheeler 2014). This leads to a circumstance where limited trust is not enough to overcome mistrust concerning each other's intentions (Keating and Wheeler 2014). However, the work is not particularly in depth empirically – limited to only a few pages – which limits the persuasion of the exploration (Keating and Wheeler 2014).

Wheeler's latest monograph on trust also highlights the importance of these dynamics in a security community and further theorises the mechanisms that lead to the development of trust between elites, especially those with enemy images of each other, in a level of analysis he terms the interpersonal (2018). Focusing primarily on trust as emerging from 'bonding' between elites engendered in face-to-face situations leading to identification at the interpersonal level, he argues that the process also has calculative elements. This then can transform through mutually reinforcing processes of humanization and a positive identification of interest that goes beyond a convergence if interests (Wheeler 2018). Through this a relationship of deepening interpersonal trust results. The endpoint of a process of social bonding is what Wheeler calls a 'relationship of bonded trust' at an interpersonal level that comes about due to identification as a causal mechanism and leads to 'suspension' (2018: 8). Suspension is a mental state where calculation no longer features that allows leaders to act as if this there was no uncertainty in the future with regards to the other. As Wheeler argues, this subjective state is a strongest form of trust (Wheeler 2018).

1.6 A greater focus of trust in security communities

These concepts will be elucidated further in the theoretical framework, but of significance is Wheeler has begun to apply these dynamics to security communities. Wheeler's focus is the earlier stages of the relationships, but he notes how trust can spill over from elite-level decision-makers into societies as integration proceeds and communication intensifies. As such he recognises the importance of the emergence of a 'habit' of trust, but the processes behind this wider emergence of a habit of trust in collectivities are not a primary focus of the book. This is still particularly important, however, as Wheeler provides a basis for the understanding of this process that this thesis aims to contribute further by demonstrating the ways in which trust at the interpersonal level proliferates into the wider ASEAN structure. While this is still short of the societal level advocated for by Wheeler (2018; see also Booth and Wheeler 2008; Keating and Wheeler 2014) I argue that the societal level is of less utility in understanding the ASEAN security community. Instead the mechanisms are still of relevance to this context, but the mechanisms are under-explored. Chan (2017) also recognises the importance of this habituated form of trust and argues that security communities are grounded in the 'strongest form of trust'. Trust among these states becomes institutionalized and their relationships take for granted shared expectations of continued amity. Again, however, there is little exploration of the process by which this occurs (Chan 2017). This highlights a gap that this thesis aims to address through the primary argument that practices of trusting behaviour can be embedded into organisational structures in order to inform a future 'habitualised' form of trust, that begins in the interpersonal domain but is removed from it.

Another exploration of trust within security communities comes from Urban (2014a; 2014b; 2015). In his work focused on the democratic peace, he argues that community and trust emerge out of a collective identification based on familiarity, shared commonality, and experience of positive affect for the other, meaning he reverses the causal arrow between trust and identity (2015). He identifies five trust enabling factors; altercasting (how agents communicate their understandings of

other agents to these others); interactivity (how interactions between agents build familiarity); homogeneity (the perception of sameness between agents); shared experiences (the extent to which agents perceive themselves and other agents as having experienced the past together); and common interests (common enemies, common fate)(Urban 2014b). However, this poses problems for the development of trust in the ASEAN context as Urban argues that only liberal collective identifications lead to trust and, therefore, only recognises liberal security communities (2014a). This thesis on the other hand argues ASEAN has a developed a security community despite the fact that it has an extremely varied range of political systems, including Leninist socialist states, absolute monarchies, military juntas, constitutional monarchies, and presidential republics – with only one or two that could be tentatively called liberal states. Keating and Abbott (2016) on the other hand demonstrate that illiberal states can develop trusting relationships in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), but again focus on the constitutive role of identity and the cultural norms under-pinning this identity in the formation of trusting relationships, and not the ways in which trust impacted on this.

These works, therefore, all suggest that trust retains primary importance in security community formation and maintenance. Each adds important understandings of how trust emerges. These will be explored further in the theoretical framework. What is important for this chapter, however, are the gaps on display with regards to an in-depth framework explaining how trusting behaviour has become habituated among the wider foreign policy elite. This is particularly problematic as, with the exception Keating and Wheeler (2015), the limited attempts to incorporate trust into our understandings of the ASEAN community have not engaged with the theoretical explorations in any great depth.

Garofano has introduced trust within the context of security communities and ASEAN; but is limited by the fact that his work is a call for a research agenda rather than a piece of research, and it too doesn't address the wider trust literature (2002). This seems to be a relatively common issue.

Roberts in his book *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis* explicitly states the importance of focusing more on trust and less on the normative aspects of ASEAN, giving greater attention to agents and actors close to Wheeler's argument of focusing on the interpersonal (Roberts 2010; Wheeler 2018). Roberts explores how feelings of mutual trust are preconditions for the existence of dependable change and draws upon Social Identity Theory (SIT) to justify the importance of actors in the formation of a collective identity (Roberts 2010). Whilst norms are the means to an end, he sees trust as being relevant in assessing how likely peace is and argues states will 'not agree to be bonded by agreements in the absence of trust' (Roberts 2010: 17, 30). The deficiency, however, in this work lies in the fact that it doesn't address literature on trust within IR; Robert's does not define his concept of what trust is but instead offers it as being a central dimension to the constituent elements of community where trust is required for predictability, removal of ideational obstacles to decision making and ultimately creating a sense of 'we-ness' (2010: 30, 31, 34). There are references to reciprocity that provides a vague outline of how he views trust in this context, but there is no further exploration made and no engagement with trust literature (Roberts 2010). It is also difficult to ascertain the level of trust he sees as being within ASEAN, as he does not offer indicators of trust beyond surveys among 'elites' from ASEAN countries. What is problematic is there is no definition of these elites or even implication that they have any role in foreign policy or ASEAN (Roberts 2008; 2010). Instead, his conclusion is implicit that that trust would be lacking in this case as elites lack cohesion, but he then argues that the 3 ASEAN pillars may result in 'continuing' levels of trust (Roberts 2010: 188-193). A further limitation is that it focuses on only one dyad within ASEAN that between ASEAN's other members and Myanmar. Myanmar was not a founding member, however, so there can be no exploration of trust from the beginning of the organisation which limits exploration of the dynamics themselves.

What is particularly problematic is these accounts are countered by those who do explore in greater depth the role of trust in ASEAN but conclude that it is non-existent, and therefore are not able to persuasively demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect as it has problematic foundations.

More rigor is required in this debate. This thesis aims to do just that, and it positions itself against the work of Emmers (2016). Emmers draws upon both trust and security community literature, but concludes ASEAN is not a security community. Instead states continue to 'mistrust' one another as they have been unable to conduct conflict resolution (2016). He argues that residual mistrust among Southeast Asian states is a key factor in explaining this lack of progress made towards conflict resolution under ASEAN (Emmers 2016). In his view, therefore, there is no community as there is no trust. The causal mechanism is the same as that analysed in the thesis, but the conclusion is different. What is problematic in Emmer's conclusion is that he specifically states that the paper does not study the origins of the mistrust or attempt to measure it (2016). Furthermore, he does not persuasively demonstrate that the failure to resolve crises is an indicator of mistrust.

A counter to Emmers is Jenne, as for her trust is specific and allows for trust in peaceful settlement to emerge despite ongoing territorial claims (2016; 2017). Jenne argues that the ASEAN way cannot be a source of trust on which communities can base dependable expectations. Instead she refers to no war communities, a weak form of security community, and posits that trust in the non-occurrence of major war was primarily based on an initial domestic incapacity to wage war and an inwards focus from states (Jenne 2016). For Jenne a lack of crucial war fighting capacity creates powerful incentives to manage disputes short of major armed conflict (2016). On the other hand, a lack of capacity provides for a common knowledge base on which community develops (2016). Jenne sees this as enabling a gradually increasing trust that warfare will be avoided (2016). Of note, in her thesis the no-war pattern is then regularized and institutionalized in time and this trust became habituated through multiple iterations of strategic restraint and conflict avoidance that serve to reassure the other (Jenne 2016).

Jenne recognises the importance of trust, conceptualises it, and operationalises it in a consistent manner. She explicitly defines the object of trust as the unlikeliness of war, making the dependable expectation of peaceful change dependable as it gives rise to a consistent expectation

that war will be avoided (2016). As she argues, Adler and Barnett's conceptualisation of trust is interwoven with common identities and 'hence locate stable expectations in the normative structure between states' making trust generalized (Jenne 2016: 69). Such a viewpoint is shared in this thesis, though I believe while the causal mechanism of domestic instability is of importance it is not the primary explanation for trust emergence. This is a result of Jenne's conceptualisation of trust being relatively static and thin, in the sense that trust only emerges from a calculation that the other cannot, or is not interested in, waging war due to a lack of capacity. There is little exploration of deeper forms of trust, especially between elites, and how this trust develops and impacts on the community's development. Trust is not the primary focus of her thesis, however. While it is defined and consistently applied conceptually, and its role is teased out as both an outcome and cause, there is no further exploration of the dynamics of trust or other potential bases of this trust. It could go further in engaging with the theoretically relevant work of practices and habits, especially within security communities, in order to best analyse the dynamics of trust and the processes behind it becoming habituated.

As both Wheeler (2018) and Jenne (2016) highlight this habitualised form of trust in the context of security communities it seems as if there is a strong overlap with the 'practice turn' (Hopf 2010). As Wheeler notes:

> *'the key to developing a security community between two previous enemies is to transform a dominant culture of fear and suspicion into one where a culture of trust—or what, following Hopf (2010), might be called a 'habit' of trust—constitutes the day-to-day practice of foreign-policy decision-making'* (2018: 279).

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter analysed what has previously been written concerning explanations of peace within the ASEAN region, particularly with a focus on the role of trust and distrust. Finding the realist explanations of peace wanting due to an inconsistency in the balance of power that they depend on, the thesis argues that realism is of little use in explaining a consistent 'long peace' within the region.

The second literature most drawn attention to in the ASEAN case was that of security communities with its foundation in constructivism. This literature served three purposes. First, it provides a theoretical grounding for the thesis as the thesis argues that ASEAN is a security community with a dependable expectation for peaceful change. However, as demonstrated there are also deficiencies in its explanatory power with regards to the causal mechanism for this dependable expectation in the ASEAN case, namely that there is no collective identity and the norms on which it is said to be constituted are not consistently adhered to. Therefore, the exploration of security community literature also demonstrates a gap in our understanding of ASEAN's peace and gives the thesis an impetus to find alternative explanations. Finally, emerging literature on security communities concerning the practice turn and trust offers alternative avenues for exploration. As has been demonstrated in an analysis of these literatures there are still significant gaps such as a weak understanding of the processes behind trust becoming habituated, a lack of a consistent operationalisation of a strictly conceptualised trust, and issues concerning levels of analysis. However, they provide a solid foundation for the further exploration that the role trust, and in particular habituated trust, plays in maintaining dependable expectation of peaceful change.

From the start scholars have placed trust at the centre of the security community concept even if they have gone on to under-theorise and under-conceptualise it. While advances have been made in our understandings of trust this has still not been applied with any sort of consistency to ASEAN. Of most promise so far are the works who are moving the ASEAN peace debate away from the stale back and forth surrounding collective identity, though in different directions (Glase 2017;

Jenne 2017; Davies 2018). However, these works only tell one part of the picture and fail to persuasively demonstrate how their bases consistently cause dependable expectation. This thesis argues that it is habituated trust that bridges this gap – a factor acknowledged by Jenne but one that was not focused upon in her work. With a movement away from the 'stale' debate and with a furthering of our understanding of both trust, as provided by Wheeler (2018), and practices and habits, provided by Pouliot (2008) and Hopf (2002), in relation to security communities, therefore, the thesis has the required foundations to take these explorations further and analyse the origins, dynamics and effects of habituated trust within the ASEAN case study. The next two chapters will engage with these works in greater depth in order to construct a theoretical framework for the habituation of trust in the ASEAN structure that will then be demonstrated empirically in a longitudinal study of trust development in ASEAN.

Chapter 2: Reducing distrust, building trust

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will conceptualise distrust and trust. It will demonstrate the relationship between the two and develop a preliminary conceptual framework for how distrust dissipates and trust, operationalised within ideational structures termed trusting relationships, begins and develops. As demonstrated in the introduction, in the primary stage this trust is between elites of states on a level that Wheeler has termed the interpersonal within IR (2018). As trust is conceptualised as something that occurs at the individual level the thesis has argued that states do not form trusting relationships as collectives (compare Keating and Ruzicka 2014). However, these interpersonal trusting relationships take place within an institutional structure and undergo a process where they can become 'institutionalised' within the structure's roles and practices. This framework analyses how trusting relationships develop in two ways. The first is how trusting relationships begin and 'deepen' over time as the sources of belief for trust progress and evolve. The second is how trust can be institutionalised or can proliferate within an organisation (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004; Kroeger 2011).

These chapters will argue that trusting behaviours, based first on calculation and then on knowledge, in the initial two stages of the process are performed over time. These behaviours go on to inform the routines and background knowledge of agents joining the structure and, therefore, move trust from the initial interpersonal relationships into a more stable and consistent structural predisposition. At this final stage, trust is theorised to exist as a structurally constituted predisposition among most diplomats and foreign policy decision-makers. As such it is possible that trust and trusting behaviour can evolve to become practice, whereby agential actions if consistently enacted can become embedded into organisational or institutional structures, that then influences agents that later join the structure. This is theorised as a layer between that of the interpersonal and

'embedded' trust that exists between societies but one that is sufficient for the construction of a robust security community (Booth and Wheeler 2008).

This chapter will focus on conceptualising distrust and trust, as well as the relationship between the two concepts. First, it will argue that trust is a multi-dimensional universal process incorporating inputs which influence a decision to trust, a decision on the part of the actor to make themselves vulnerable to another based on positive expectations, and a behavioural output that makes the actor vulnerable through the acceptance of risk. This process is universal but can have different inputs (antecedents to trust) and outcomes (trusting behaviours) that depend on a variety of factors, making it a multidimensional process rather than a unidimensional concept as often implied in the International Relations literature. Distrust will be shown to be a separate construct that encompasses negative expectations towards the other. Any transformation in a relationship requires a dual process of reducing distrust and developing trust. These are not always necessarily the same processes, as trust and distrust are not opposites but separate interlinked concepts. It will argue that in distrusting relationships, the source of distrust needs to be actively addressed and general processes of trust-building will not be fully meaningful without this. These relationships can become trusting once these sources of distrust are actively transformed, whether due to a significant change in the situation or attempts by the other. Once distrust reduces and ambivalence occurs, the initial stages of a trusting relationship can emerge based primarily in calculation concerning commonality in interests (Calculus-Based Trust - CBT) (Lewicki and Bunker 1995).

2.2 Defining Trust

For the purpose of this thesis the definition of trust is grounded in Rousseau et al.'s where trust is a 'psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of the other' (1998: 395). Going beyond this, however, I argue that this state must go beyond 'intention' and result in a trusting behaviour. Within this thesis

trust is operationalised as a process of 3 distinct elements – inputs to the decision to trust, a decision to trust, and resulting trusting behaviour. Within this process the decision to trust must incorporate positive expectations concerning another, that leads to a willingness to accept vulnerability. While this may seemingly contrast with the 'trust as suspension' previously discussed, I argue that this process is compatible as the decision to trust can be either reflexive or un-reflexive, dependent upon the stage of the relationship. As previously mentioned, I argue that within the positive expectations there must be a sense of obligation, as the trustor imputes to the trustee a belief that he or she should honour trust. It is this obligation which separates trust from confidence, overcoming the issue whereby trust is often conflated as confidence or reliance (Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Michel 2012a; Wheeler 2018).

This definition is broad but incorporates the key elements of trust. Trust has proven difficult to define – whilst many scholars within the wider trust field agree on core elements that constitute trust there is still a lack of a common general definition (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004; Colquitt, Scott, and LePine 2007; Li 2012). This lack of consensus was recently highlighted in an extensive meta-analysis of definitions of trust (Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). It concluded that whilst concepts had been clarified, with a number of common key elements identified and many using the same definition as a base, most analyses differed on how it should be operationalised (Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016; See also - Bornstein and Tomkins 2015). Such debates also occur in IR, and the disputes over the conceptualisation of trust has led to many differing accounts (See for example – Larson 1997; Kydd 2005; Booth and Wheeler 2008; Hoffman 2002; Rathbun 2012; Wheeler 2009, 2013, 2018). This chapter, therefore, will begin by analysing the most widely adopted definitions of trust adopted in both IR and external literatures. It will then suggest that core elements can be identified, allowing an uncovering of 'un-controversial' elements of trust.

Within trust literature, the definition of trust that has gained the broadest consensus is Rousseau and her colleagues adopted above (Rousseau et al. 1998; See also - Möllering, Bachmann

and Lee 2004; Möllering 2006a; Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007; Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2012; Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012). This definition of trust is found in many works on trust and consensus is increasingly emerging around this core definition (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). The other widely cited definition comes from an article written two years earlier by Mayer et al. who define trust as a 'willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of a trustee based on the expectation that the trustee will perform a particular action' (1995: 712; See also - Colquitt, Scott and Le Pine 2007; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016).

Both of these definitions have two core elements that need to be recognised in any operationalisation of trust, and have increasingly emerged as being the two elements that constitute the general agreement concerning any definition (Fulmer and Geldfund 2012; Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2015). These are the intention to accept vulnerability under conditions of objective risk due to the presence of positive expectations, which then increase once the objective condition of risk is subjectively seen as being lesser (Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007; Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2015; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). For example, Hardin argues any trust must be 'grounded in expectations' (2002: 10 see also Uslaner 2012), either favourable (Breeman 2012) or confident (Deutsch 1958; Ashleigh and Meyer 2012), forming a significant part of definitions in the trust literature. With reference to expectations, whilst some conceptualisations of trust view a belief that the trustor will not be harmed by the trustee as an important element this thesis argues that belief and expectation serve the same purpose and meaning in the definition of trust. McAllister, for example, defines trust as a 'belief in, and a willingness to act on the basis of the words, actions and deeds of another' (1995: 25) and Ferrin, Bligh and Kohles (2012) argue trust depends on elements of belief. In these definitions, belief seems to serve the same function as expectation.

The expectations held by the trustor towards the trustee are given meaning by two interlinked elements; risk and vulnerability. It is assumed that positive expectations lead a trustor to make themselves vulnerable to a trustee who has the potential to harm them as a consequence of

trust bestowed, and that without this potential harm, vulnerability, or objective uncertainty about the future, then trust would not be required (Zand 1972; Möllering 2006a; Gillespie 2012; Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2015: 169). Expectations are specifically concerning another's possibility to cause harm, meaning that by intending to act on this belief people are willing to accept vulnerability in relation to others in a potentially risky situation, whereby they believe they will not be harmed (Meyerson, Weick and Kramer 1996; Brockner et al. 1997). With this vulnerability, therefore, trust will be 'typically relevant when at least one party is free to disappoint the other' (Gambetta 1988: 219 – see also Meyerson, Weick and Kramer 1996). The trustor is vulnerable to the actions of the trustee and cannot fully control the latter's behaviour meaning risk and vulnerability occurs (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004).

These elements have been operationalised in the IR literature. For example, many definitions in this literature tend to agree that trust is a belief or expectation despite some significant differences in what underlies this belief. Hoffman argues that '[trust] is rooted in the belief that potential trustees will protect the interests placed in their care even if some of their own interests suffer' (2002: 288). Rathbun complements this by arguing that it is the 'belief that one will not be harmed' and 'belief that others will reciprocate' in the context of cooperation (2011: 349). Kydd too argues that trust is the 'belief that the other side is trustworthy' (2005: 326). Whilst others use different language it seems as if they have similar meaning. Wheeler, for example, argues trust is an 'expectation of no harm in contexts where betrayal is always a possibility' (2013: 479; 2018: 2). The second element focuses on the interplay between risk, harm, vulnerability and uncertainty. If trust is the 'exercise of discretionary power by some agent on behalf of another over matters that the trusting agent cares about' (Rennger 1997: 472) then it is clear that such an agent is taking a risk or taking on vulnerability and opening themselves up to potential harm. This is an uncontroversial view within the literature; Rathbun for example argues that trust 'entails a combination of uncertainty and vulnerability' (Rathbun 2011: 349) and Ruzicka and Wheeler, drawing from Baier, focus on acceptance of vulnerability to harm (Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010 – see also Wheeler 2013).

Wheeler argues there is always objective uncertainty, though trust allows a suspension of this uncertainty through a type of trust he refers to as 'bonding' (2018). Therefore, definitions of trust require positive expectation that no harm will occur when an actor makes themselves vulnerable in a situation of risk. It would seem uncontroversial to suggest that both these elements operationalised in several disciplines form a key part of trust.

Further to this I argue that trust is primarily an action, though informed by an attitude. There are debates that divide trust literature over disagreements concerning whether trust is a choice or an attitude (Li 2012). Colquitt, Scott and LePine argue that the expansion of trust is good for the field but has created significant confusion regarding the definition and conceptualisation (2007). Much of the debate has aimed to demonstrate a distinction between an attitude to trust based on trustworthiness (assessment of ability, benevolence and integrity and propensity), therefore, and trust as an outcome or action (Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007). Mayer's work is perhaps most significant for this, as he separated trust from trustworthiness by developing ability, benevolence and integrity measures as antecedents of trust and arguing these, alongside trust propensity, would affect the likelihood that a person would trust (1995: See also - Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007; Wheeler 2018).




Figure 1. Model of trust from Mayer et al. (1995)

Within this model the propensity to trust and perceived trustworthiness are clearly delineated from trust and its outcomes. Despite this conceptualisation, many studies seem to get confused by the distinction or focus on the propensity to trust and assessment of trustworthiness as trust itself (Wheeler 2018).

This idea of trustworthiness is central to understanding and predicting trust levels as it informs the belief that may result in the decision to trust, but that we cannot know the presence of trust without a trusting behaviour (Lewis and Weigert 1985; Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007). Proponents of trust as action such as Li (2012) and Dietz (2011) believe that trust is only trust when it results in a trusting outcome incorporating a risk-taking act (Hassell 2005), or what Li conceptualises as 'trust as choice' (2012: 101-2). Risk taking acts in this sense can vary based on context but involve behaviours that make the trustor vulnerable to the trustee. Li argues that studies which adopt Rousseau's definition demonstrate their adoption of trust as attitude which is problematic, as 'trust only matters if specific trusting behaviours that make the trustor vulnerable' are made, termed trust as choice where trust is the 'behavioural decision to accept vulnerability' (2012: 101-2). Dietz concurs with this opinion and further argues that trust doesn't become 'real' until there is a behavioural manifestation (Dietz 2011: 215). As trust, especially in long lasting trusting relationships, is a dynamic and relational concept it only becomes meaningful when it is acted upon and can initiate trust-building processes and reciprocity (Li 2012; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). Without this behavioural manifestation and the beginning of the process trust is merely calculative choice with no element of reciprocation (Pylikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). Furthermore, vulnerability is as strong as the actions of the trustor because the extent to which the trustee can harm the trustor depends on the trustor's action to trust – it is the acting on trust that increases vulnerability rather than the intention (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). Trust as an attitude or perceived trustworthiness is a static concept and therefore there is less rigorous evidence for trust absence of the act (Hassell 2005; Li 2012; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). As such, trust-as-attitude, whilst important, gains meaning through trust-as-

action, demonstrating the importance of both to the theory of trust. As this thesis considers trust to develop, such behavioural manifestations are of primary importance as behaviours and the reciprocity of trust lead to further development of trust. I consider trust as action to be of significance when defining trust, even though I also consider attitude of importance in the sense that it leads to this action. Having an input and output that incorporates both trust-as-attitude and trust-as-choice makes the concept of trust meaningful. Risk taking behaviour on its own, for example, without the decision made based on positive expectations, would mean that the behaviour could have resulted from something such as a mistake, gamble, weakness, or ignorance rather than trust (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006).

2.3 Trust-as-process

As a result of seeing trust as having both an attitude and choice dimension this thesis adopts a process model from Dietz and Den Hartog's 'universal dynamic sequence' (2006 – See also Dietz 2011: 215). This process is a multi-stage sequence where an assessment occurs based on varied inputs allows a decision to be made on whether to trust or not, which then results in a 'risk-taking act' and updates the initial assessments allowing the cycle of the sequence to occur again (Dietz 2011: 215).




Figure 2. A model of trust adapted from Dietz (2011)

The sources of trust belief, or input, incorporate: trustor's predisposition; the perceived trustworthiness of the trustee based on ability, integrity and benevolence; the nature of the relationship; the contextual and structural factors such as institutions and roles; and domain-specific concerns. These all act as inspirations for or inhibitors against trust and are all elements that have been recognised in the literature as being of importance (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). Furthermore, they incorporate both micro and macro factors. Bachmann has argued that studies focus too much on just the micro level and ignore the macro such as structure, roles, and institutions which can provide reasons to trust (1998). Based on this, he delineated between interactional and institutional trust (Bachmann 2011) though such divisions have already been demonstrated as unnecessary, as within the process model both factors can be considered as inputs and often influence each other (Weibel 2003; Dietz 2011). Of significance is the importance put on the nature of the relationship itself. Dietz and Den Hartog considered this important due to the nature of the shadow of the past and shadow of the future, and the effect of the stability, structure and progress of the relationship on trust (2006).

The trusting decision, in the process section, has led to some debate as to whether the decision is reflexive or un-reflexive, and 'whether actors consciously decide to leap' (Wheeler 2018: 64). Möllering sees trust as a 'leap of faith', which is essential as it confers agency on the actor to decide (2006). This thesis, however, will demonstrate that this differs depending upon the stage of the relationship. There are times, especially in the early stages, where actors are reflexive and are consciously deciding to trust. This is demonstrated by discussions occurring as to whether to trust or not, or how best build trust, showing a conscious choice to trust and be trusted. However, as will be demonstrated, this decision increasingly becomes un-reflexive, and actors trust without conscious decision-making. This will be unpacked in the following chapter, which analyses trust as habitual and practice based. Rather than suggesting the decision has one fundamental feature, this too can have variance dependent upon the stage and depth of the trusting relationship. The final stage of the process is the outputs, or trust-as-choice, and incorporates the trusting behaviours discussed in the introduction. The first is the voluntary acceptance of vulnerability, the most direct measure as intention to accept vulnerability is a major component of trust (Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007). Hedging will be analysed in relation to these actions, as hedges - anything outside of trust that such as military hedging or cultivation of alternative partners – provide a failsafe mechanism and form of control that also provides reassurance and reduces vulnerability (Meyerson, Weick, and Kramer 1996). The final is diffuse reciprocity or qualitative multilateralism, where trust may lead to increased cooperation in several different spheres (Rathbun 2011b; 2012; Keating 2015a). There are potential linkages in wider literature for this idea, which might suggest this is indeed the case – Colquitt, Scott and LePine, for example, argue that relationships become more 'effective' as they no longer require so much energy to monitor the trustee (2007: 910-1- See also Brockner et al. 1997). This is based on social exchange theory; trust as a mechanism allows exchanges involving diffuse future obligation (Colquitt, Scott and LePine 2007). It has also been referred to as mandates, with the suggestion that more open mandates of trust are a result of a deepening relationship and reciprocity of trust (Skirbekk et al. 2011; Morrison and Saunders 2019). As mentioned above, if trust

is a gradual learning process the more that the trustor learns about the trustee the more willing they may be to engage with them in wider issues over longer time frames. As such trust is specific but as it deepens it may begin to become more generalised (Wheeler 2018).

With these considerations in mind, the thesis argues trust is a conscious or unconscious willingness to make oneself vulnerable in a specific domain due to positive expectations towards the other. These positive expectations are informed by several bases and inputs that vary depending on the depth of trust and the context, as well as informed by a feeling that the other has an obligation to reciprocate on trust. This willingness to make oneself vulnerable results in a trusting behaviour that allows for a cyclical process to occur.

2.4 Different types of trust?

Definitions of trust are increasingly polarised over whether there are different types of trust. Whilst definitions are generally similar, or at least retain similar elements, divisions often emerge concerning where trust comes from and the way in which it develops. However, these divisions may be less meaningful than often made out – in other various trust literatures and models different sources of beliefs are often seen as being part of a process rather than different types of trust, even though there is a recognition that theories of trust can be distinguished between their preferred sources (Lane and Bachmann 1998; Schoorman et al. 2007; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). As such, by using the above process, I argue that there are not different types of trust, but trust may result from different inputs or be characterised by different bases.

Within IR, the divisions remain strong and can be primarily seen to fall into three categories; rational based trust, psychological based trust, and social based trust (Keating 2015a; Keating and Ruzicka 2015; Edwards 2018; Haukkala et al. 2015; 2018). As demonstrated in Ruzicka and Keating's review of trust research in International Relations (2015), there remain strong divisions between those that have focused on trust as a rational phenomenon (for example see Kydd 2005; Edwards 2018), those that argue this ignores the social dynamics of trust and the importance of obligation

(see, for example, Hoffman 2002; Keating and Ruzicka 2014), and those that question whether rationalist accounts of trust actually add value in analysing trust at all. Rathbun, with his focus on generalised trust, further enhances the divisions when he argues that the psychological dimensions of trust should be focused upon (2012). Instead he points to the disposition of actors as explaining variation in the origins of institutionalised cooperation (Rathbun 2012). These are embedded in the social, in that this form of 'moralistic trust' reflects the behaviour of the other's character, but such judgements arise from a psychological disposition (Rathbun 2012: 25). This has led to a situation within IR where definitions of trust remain divided due to the tendency to suggest that trust has one particular basis, that if another basis is utilised then it is not trust that is being discussed, and that some bases (such as CBT) are not meaningful. Other literatures, such as Business and Management also identify different types of trust primarily divided by the sources of trust. These are generally divided into the categories of rational (calculative), cognitive (knowledge), affective (emotional attachment), institutional, psychological, relational, identification-based, contextual, or habitual (Lane 1998; Bachmann 2011; Le Gall and Langley 2015; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016).

While there have been efforts to bridge the divides caused by these debates, through the conceptualisation of trust as a process in an integrative framework which encompasses multiple trust concepts, this is lacking in IR (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006; Khadyakov 2007; McEvily 2011; Möllering 2013a; Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2015; Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016). Wheeler is one exception in that he allows for relationships to involve elements of calculative trust and what he terms 'bonding trust' to occur at the same time, but generally in IR scholars see trust in a relatively static way (Wheeler 2018). Where Business departs from IR conceptualisations of trust is that they are not always necessarily seen as separate constructs, but have been incorporated into being part of a multi-dimensional and dynamic concept.

This is one reason the thesis draws upon the above trust-as-process model, as it allows for variance in each stage. This results in an integrative yet coherent framework that recognises the

relational, longitudinal, and reciprocal nature of trust, the importance of each element, and offers the ability to look at how trusting relationships may evolve over time and what variations affect each stage of the relationship. As such Dietz and Den Hartog's above model overcomes the 'multiplicity of trust' problem by suggesting that rather than there being different types of trust dependent upon their bases, the trust sequence is universal but different bases can be demonstrated as different inputs into the assessment and decision to trust (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006: 561; Dietz 2011). Whilst psychological based trust influenced by predisposition is considered, it is often part of an extensive process whereby disposition to trust (psychological), calculative elements (assessment of trustworthiness drawn from assessments of ability, benevolence and integrity), cognitive and affective elements (knowledge of previous behaviour, bonding), and structural/situational context all form the inputs to trust, though they will be weighed differently dependent on context. As Dietz argues, 'trust is a universal variform process, the sequence and dynamic is universal, but there is contextual preferences and conditions which shape the content and process at each stage' (2011: 219). This model, therefore, has several significant benefits as it allows research to move beyond arguing about differing bases (Pytlikzillig and Kimbrough 2016).

I argue in this thesis that this trust process is operationalised in a dynamic form by analysing 'trusting relationships' which can develop over time through different stages. This sequence forms the basis of the relationship. Each stage is categorised by the degree of trusting behaviour that occurs and the basis of such behaviour. When behaviour is repeated it constitutes a structure of a trusting relationship. Hoffman distinguishes between trust and trusting relationships, arguing that trust is a cognitive notion whereas trusting relationships involve actions (2002). Keating and Ruzicka define trusting relationships as an 'intersubjective, ideational structure that allows two or more actors to partially or wholly set aside existing risk and uncertainty…' (2014: 755). These trusting relationships are important in 'providing a glue that prevents the alliance from falling apart, because they instil a sense of expectation, based on obligation, that promises will be fulfilled' (Keating 2015a: 12). Ruzicka and Wheeler argue that one way trusting relationships can provide this glue is by

moving from being based on a rationalist calculation to a 'binding' approach (Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010: 73; See also Wheeler 2018). Within this binding approach the trusting relationships develop to become valued independently of the pay-off structure (Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010). This definition above also mostly fits into Ruzicka and Wheeler's conceptualisation, where a trusting relationship is seen as one 'into which actors enter knowing that as a consequence they increase their vulnerability to other actors whose behaviour they do not control, with potentially negative consequences for themselves' (2010: 72). This is similar to Wheeler's conceptualisation of interpersonal trust as 'a relationship between two individuals who, through a process of interaction, have come positively to value the continuation of the relationship, and where each does not expect the other to act in ways that damage the relationship' (Wheeler 2018: 19). For the purpose of this thesis a trusting relationship is therefore defined as a relationship involving two or more actors where both actors are part of a reciprocal sequence. Through their interdependence in the trusting sequence this relationship becomes an ideational structure, allowing the reduction of distrust and the development of trust to occur the longer they go through the sequence with no significant defections. As the actors are in this sequence with one another there is a sense of obligation shared, and vulnerability tends to become subjectively less significant.

This thesis argues that the depth of a trusting relationship can be defined by what stage it is in, with stages delineated depending on which basis of trust characterises the relationship. As a relationship deepens over time the inputs will be weighed differently or be assessed through different bases. As expectations are vindicated by experience, the inputs may be derived more from the quality of the relationship over time than from observation of the other party's specific behaviours, for example (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006: 563). Reciprocity is also of importance in the development of trusting relationships into deeper forms of trust (Korsgaard et al. 2018; Morrison and Saunders 2019).

Referring to trustor and trustee at specific points disguises some of the complexity surrounding trusting relationships. For trusting relationships to develop in line with my framework

trust needs to develop on both sides. There are times where the first agent is the trustor and the second agent the trustee. However, there are just as many times when this relationship is reversed, and the trustee becomes the trustor. As Korsgaard et al. (2015) notes, trust is bidirectional, and relationships of asymmetrical trust may stall or collapse completely. Korsgaard et al. (2018) have also argued that the stage model of trust adapted in this thesis recognises that relationships are dynamic, but it has not recognised enough the relationships between dynamic variables such as trust, its antecedents, and its outcomes. The developmental framework I offer, therefore, needs to recognise this complexity and the fact that trust needs to develop for both the trustee and trustor for the dyadic trusting relationship to develop along the stages offered.

This thesis refers to reciprocity to demonstrate one reason trust continued to develop for both trustor and trustee, as reciprocal trust is viewed as a significant dynamic for explaining the way in which both trustor and trustee may come to trust. Korsgaard et al. (2015) discuss the significant role of reciprocated trust in ensuring an ongoing trusting relationship (see also Brower et al. 2009). Basing their work on Blau's (1964) social exchange theory, that discusses the processes by which voluntary exchanges develop between parties, Korsgaard et al. view reciprocal trust as the 'iterative influence of one party's trust and trusting behaviour on the other party's trust and trusting behaviour' (2015: 50). This influence emerges as actors who trust will engage in more trusting behaviour, which then demonstrates their trustworthiness. Through this demonstration they elicit more trust from the original trustee due to the moral norm of obligation or reciprocity (Korsgaard 2018). As a result Korsgaard et al. argue that reciprocal trust not only explains the way in which parties within a dyad converge and come to share levels of trust, but also the way in which trust can become self-reinforcing through dynamic trust spirals (2015; See also - Ferrin, Bligh and Kohles 2007). These spirals occur when a benefit that requires trust due to the risk of non-reciprocation is offered, and then is instead reciprocated. This cooperation and its reciprocation demonstrate trustworthiness, and repeated exchanges can contribute to the growth of trust – especially if exchanges are escalated (Korsgaard et al. 2018). The focus on reciprocity can complement the stage model of trust development focused

upon, as it is a recognised mechanism for the growth of trust not only of a single trustor, but two trustors in a bidirectional relationship.

These models need not result in a linear process. Combined they offer a process of non-linear trust progression that recognises complexity (Korsgaard 2018). As a result, they have seen increasing linkages. Korsgaard (2018) argues that these aspect of reciprocal trust dynamics are central to the stage developmental models that will be adapted, even though they have not implicitly recognised the importance of reciprocation, as the influence of cooperative behaviour on trust should increase as the parties go through different stages of the model. Morrison and Saunders (2019) have also combined Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) model and the concept of reciprocated trust to explore the way in which trust between patients and doctors develops into stronger bases. This occurs through becoming more knowledgeable about the other, as well as through trust being reciprocated. As such, they incorporate both frameworks to suggest that when the trustee reciprocates the trust placed in them, there is a positive impact and trust can develop further. This furthers the dynamic nature of trust in these relationships as reciprocation of trust allows a cycle of strengthening trust (into different bases), with greater diffuse reciprocity or more open mandates, to occur (Skirbekk et al. 2011). Morrison and Saunders (2019) argue that these more 'open mandates', resulting from strengthening reciprocated trust, may also be reciprocated in the doctor-patient relationship. While this may not be fully reciprocated and did not always occur, it opens-up the possibility for the importance of reciprocity in developing stronger bases of trust and diffuse reciprocity or open mandates – of significance for this thesis.

When discussing the way trust is constituted at each stage, it is expected that the predisposition to trust as one of the inputs would remain relatively static. However, inputs such as the assessment of trustworthiness (through ABI), the nature of the relationship, and structure are expected to change the more a relationship develops, especially when they occur in an institutional structure such as ASEAN. For example, the assessment of ABI of the other is calculative in the primary

stage of the relationship as experience of the other is limited, so knowledge is less prevalent. However, once the relationship evolves and the sequence has been played out several times, it is expected that the trustor would gain knowledge of the trustee. As this knowledge and trust develops it could become influenced by positive feelings of affect, and even become tacit in the most developed stages of a relationship. This is dependent on the nature of the relationship and the way in which the trustee has responded to the trustor's trusting behaviours.

This idea is partly based on scholars such as Kramer (1999), who argue that different types of trust occur dependent on whether information is processed more rationally or intuitively, as it is expected that rational processing will occur earlier on and only intuitively after experience has been gained (See also - Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012). Mayer et al. also suggest that trust can have different bases in business relationships (Mayer et al. 1995; Bachmann 2012). By recognising that trust changes as it develops, it is possible to suggest a four-part model where the inputs of the sequence will be most heavily weighted towards a particular input. These four parts are calculus-based trust (CBT), knowledge-based trust (KBT), identification-based trust (IBT) and practice-based trust (PBT) (Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012: 29). This is broadly adapted from Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) multi-dimensional model of developing trusting relationships, where they argue trusting relationships in a professional relationship move between three phases; CBT, KBT and IBT.




Figure 3. Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) model of trust development

I also draw upon Dietz's model which focuses on five phases; Deterrence-Based Trust (DBT), CBT, KBT, Relational-Based Trust (RBT) and IBT (1995; McAllister, Lewicki and Chaturvedi 2005).




Figure 4. Dietz's (2011) model of trust development

In these, trust is evolutionary as relationships develop 'deeper and more complex levels of trust are attained' (Möllering 2006a: 35). Common accounts begin with rational choice rather than

knowledge as experience is limited, so CBT will be taken as the starting point (Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2015).

Regarding the five stages it will be argued that CBT through to IBT is primarily agent driven 'active trust', where actors play a significant role in creating the process and shaping trust (Giddens 1994; Möllering 2006b: 79). In these stages, a calculative and knowledge-based assessment of the trustee are of most importance. Following on from this, once institutionalised, PBT would emphasise the growing role of structure or situational context as an input. Agents still assess the trustworthiness of others, but due to the institutionalisation of trust this is tacit and habitual, or less reflexive, and instead situational or structural contexts (created by the early stages of the relationship) are highlighted. This creates a positive feedback loop between agent and structure that can be amended by an agent but may remain stable and create dependable expectation in a 'structuration theory of trust' (Möllering 2006a: 102).

The underpinnings of trust have centred primarily around three themes in IR; trust as predictability (rationalist, encapsulated or strategic); social elements of trust; and psychological elements of trust focusing on disposition and emotion. These inform the three initial stages of the trusting relationship. The final stage will be formed using the logic of practicality, that would suggest that if trust is enacted in the second stage, it can become a part of the common-sensical background knowledge informing actor's actions. These stages align with the different conceptualisations of trust held within IR which, rather than being incompatible, instead represent different bases of trust. These are weighed differently depending on the stage of the relationship in which the trust sequence takes place.

2.5 Defining Distrust

Now that there is a clear conceptualisation of what trust is thought to be and the way in which it has different bases, it is important to relate this to what is often assumed to be its opposite; distrust (Mayer et al. 1995; Bigley and Pearce 1998). As Schoorman et al. (2007) argue, a complete

lack of trust and distrust are the same thing. This thesis argues, in line with Saunders et al. (2014) and Lewicki et al. (1998) that distrust is not the opposite of trust, however, which is important for conceptualising how relationships can transform. Distrust, rather than being the absence of trust, is a different yet connected construct that encapsulates different expectations from that of trust (Saunders et al. 2014; Guo, Lumineau and Lewicki: 2017). This is also in line with Hardin (2002; 2004) who, while did not see trust and distrust as separate constructs, did emphasize that low trust is not the same as active distrust.

Lewicki et al. (1998) initiated the debate surrounding the role of distrust, suggesting it is an attitude in itself, that trust and distrust can co-exist in relationships and, therefore, they are not part of the same spectrum. In their conceptualisation, distrust, rather than being the absence of trust, is an attitude that another actor cannot be relied upon and will engage in harmful behaviour, making it 'confident negative expectations regarding another's conduct' (Lewicki et al. 1998: 439). Guo, Lumineau, and Lewicki (2017) extended the argument for distinguishing between trust and distrust in a review of the literature and the differences between them. They explore in greater depth the antecedents of distrust. They identified dispositional factors of the distrustor such as self-interest, personality characteristics and 'paranoid thought patterns' (Kramer 1994); characteristics of the distrustee such as perceived falsehoods and value incongruence; and the context or situational factors such as resource scarcity or intense competition (Guo, Lumineau and Lewicki 2017). These will be referred to in greater depth in the following section, but it is worth noting the difference in the antecedents to that of trust to demonstrate what distinguishes the concepts. Furthermore, where trust is seen to be reciprocal, so too is distrust due to the temporal factor. Guo et al. (2017) argue that if the distrustor is unwilling to engage in trusting behaviours the distrusting beliefs may lead to a 'malfunction' in the relationship where no cooperative interactions can exist, leading distrust to become institutionalised (2017: 17, 23).

This is not to say distrust is bad in all contexts – as will be demonstrated in the empirical sections there were times distrust was vindicated. There have been discussions surrounding the 'dark side of trust', whereby damage can be done as a result of misplaced trust. This can result in 'a trusting situation that is unwelcome and/or disadvantageous but effectively unavoidable for one or both parties concerned' (Skinner, Dietz, and Weibel 2013: 209 – See also McAllister 1997; Möllering and Sydow 2018). As such, distrust can sometimes result in more creativity than in contexts where trust dominates (Guo et al. 2017). Where it is problematic, however, is when relationships get locked into a distrusting reciprocity that prevents the emergence of trust even if the situation changes to one where trust is more beneficial.

The relationship between trust and distrust is also worthy of greater exploration as the thesis argues that distrust and trust can co-exist as they are different concepts, though they are related. Guo et al. (2017), for example, argue that low trust is not equivalent to distrust and offer three models that exist in the literature. The first is distrust and trust being two ends of the same conceptual spectrum with an overlapping midrange, making distrust and trust uni-dimensional polar-opposites (2017). The second model they theorise is the two concepts being viewed as two ends of the same conceptual spectrum with non-overlapping range, distinguished by an in-between region where individuals are neither highly trusting nor highly distrusting (Guo et al. 2017). The third model is distrust and trust as being separate concepts with different dimensions, as well as separate and distinct antecedents and consequences (2017). This thesis adopts the third view, as previously argued, as the antecedents to distrust and antecedents to trust are not the same in the empirics. Distrustworthiness judgements may be measured on incompetence, malevolence and lack of integrity, rather than ABI, but these could overlap and have different weight and effects (Guo et al. 2017). This is in some way supported by Saunders et al. (2014). Whilst Saunders et al. (2014) found the conclusion that relationships could embody both high distrust and high trust unpersuasive, their empirical exploration did reveal that there is a point of ambivalence constituted by neither positive nor negative expectations. They concurred that high trust is not the same as low distrust (an absence

of distrust), and high distrust not the same as low trust (an absence of trust) (2014). Furthermore, participants' expressions and manifestations of trust and distrust were in general supportive of Lewicki et al.'s (1998) framework, indicating that trust and distrust do entail conceptually different expectations and have their own distinct antecedents and expectations (2014). Through this, it is possible to recognise that a transformation in a relationship towards trusting cannot rely on measures that develop positive expectations in isolation of also reducing negative expectations. What may build positive expectations may not be able to reduce negative expectations, if distrust and trust are seen to be different constructs with different antecedents.

Furthermore, by suggesting they are different constructs, Lewicki et al. (1998) and McKnight and Chervany (2001) argue that they reflect the reality of contemporary 'multiplex' relationships. This thesis adopts trust as a specificity, allowing for actors to feel distrust regarding other issues (Schoorman et al. 2007). They can co-exist within a relationship (Saunders et al. 2014). This is because relationships are often complex and operate with regard to multiple sectors. Furthermore, there is a temporal dimension so judgements may take place not only in different sectors, but also across time. This is especially true in IR as states do not interact on one issue or sector alone, but on a huge amount of different areas (Saunders et al. 2014). This is not to suggest that trust in one sector cannot proliferate into another – one of the measures of deepening trust chosen is diffuse reciprocity and open mandates. However, it is particularly important to make this specification as the presence of distrust in another sector does not necessarily undermine the presence of trust in other sectors. One state may be relatively trusting regarding and absence of military competition, but may be distrusting concerning economic cooperation, for example.

2.6 Reducing distrust

By recognising these two distinct yet interlinked constructs, it allows us to further analyse how to transform conflictual relationships grounded in distrust to those of trusting and cooperative relationships. As distrust has been argued to be a separate construct, therefore, the thesis argues

that distrust needs to be first reduced to a satisfactory level; negative expectations need to dissipate to allow for the meaningful pursuit of nurturing positive expectations. These negative expectations have different antecedents to the positive expectations held by trust. Indeed, Guo et al. argue that 'approaches to rebuild low trust may not entirely release a relationship from distrust, and approaches to manage distrust may not necessarily build trust' (2017: 24-5). While distrust is not always inherently bad, this suggests it does need to be tackled independently if trusting relationships are more desirable but unable to emerge due to distrusting reciprocity or the presence of a security dilemma based on misperception. While it may be unlikely that distrust becomes completely absent, furthermore, I argue that there is a tipping point whereby distrust becomes weak enough that there is a space to consider the development of trust and prevent a lapse into greater distrust even in the case of trust violation.

For this thesis, distrust-reduction is extremely contextual, but generally requires the direct and active reference to sources of negative expectations in order to attempt to overcome these (Sitkin and Roth 1993; Saunders et al. 2014). As Guo et al. argue, (2017) dispositional factors of the distrustor, characteristics of the distrustee, and the context or situational factors are the antecedents that result in negative expectations. There are a large number of antecedents within these categories, but as will be demonstrated in the first empirical chapter (chapter 4) the ones of most significance for this thesis are 'sinister attribution error' (Kramer 1994); perceptions of value incongruence with the other (Sitkin and Roth 1993); the accumulation of perceived falsehoods (Kracher and Johnson 1997); perceptions of hurt and betrayal (Bies et al. 1997); the perpetrator of the incivility (Darley 2004; Gill and Sypher 2009; Scott et al. 2013); and finally the breaching of voluntary commitments (Sheppard and Sherman 1998).

Due to the complexity of these antecedents, as well as their differences from that of trust, more general trust-building exercises whether facilitated through face-to-face meetings, an alignment of interests, or predictability of behaviour will not necessarily have a meaningful impact if

the sources of negative expectations are not also addressed. Distrust-reduction, therefore, depends on an active decision by leadership to attempt to recognise and directly address the factors that are creating negative expectations in the eyes of the distruster. This is perhaps the first major obstacle, as it requires a great deal of reflection, conceptualised as 'security dilemma sensibility', as a primary stage (Booth and Wheeler 2008). However, distrust-reduction is broader than security dilemma sensibility on its own. For one, military intentions may not be the source of the negative expectations. Negative expectations can come from ideological or political differences, different interests or the desire for different outcomes, and even personal differences between leadership such as viewing the other as malevolent or distrustworthy. These create 'enemy images', defined by Wheeler as:

> *'a belief that another state has shown by its actions that it has hostile intent; cannot be trusted to keep agreements; conciliatory moves are either a trick or a sign of weakness; and security lies in developing countervailing military capabilities'* (2018: 75).

These can be bound into leaders or broader situations (Holsti 1962). Where the similarity lies, however, is that it requires an empathy-based understanding that there are actions, situations, or characteristics causing negative expectations and distrust from the other. Distrusting beliefs need to be directly addressed to put an end to the distrusting reciprocity, which may differ from attempting to foster trusting beliefs. If two leaders are distrusting and not actively addressing the sources of that distrust, then the likelihood is that when they meet this distrust will just be reinforced and confirmed as a result of this reciprocity. There is no uncertainty present and no questioning of whether they can be trusted, but instead a strong view that they cannot be. For distrust-reduction to begin, this empathy-based reflection, somewhat grounded in security dilemma sensibility, needs to result in actions that seek to address the sources of negative expectations. These actions may not be directed towards another. Instead, behaviour aimed to address the sources of negative expectations may be undertaken independent of the distrusting relationship, but the distruster is still able to see

that they are being addressed. Indeed, this thesis argues that it is when they are undertaken independent of the distrusting relationship that they are most meaningful, as then it is less likely to be perceived as deception if the changes being undertaken are internal and have a wider-ranging impact.

This argument adds a mediating level between distrusting and trusting that is not fundamentally incompatible with existing arguments such as Wheeler's (2018). Instead, this thesis argues that some of the mechanisms are more suited to contributing to distrust-reduction rather than trust-building, as they have more power in reducing negative expectations than they do in increasing positive ones. The beginning point is similar as Wheeler questions how signals of peaceful intent can be interpreted as such by receivers who hold 'enemy images' (Wheeler 2018). He lists five obstacles to overcoming these enemy images, but one of the most importance to this thesis is ideological fundamentalism:

> *'[a] syndrome . . . that assigns enemy status because of what the other is… [and where a] particular actor's behaviour is perceived as threatening and untrustworthy by virtue of certain inherent characteristics'* (Wheeler 2018: 93).

This has compatibility with distrust literature outside of IR that recognises similar antecedents such as 'sinister attribution error' (Kramer 1994) and perceptions of value incongruence with the other (Sitkin and Roth 1993). Overcoming an enemy image, therefore, is one of the primary challenges of transforming such relationships. The inability of proposed theoretical mechanisms like costly signalling, behaviour that is unlikely to be deceptive as it incurs costs to undertake, is one of Wheeler's (2018) primary criticisms of Kydd's (1997; 2000) work on actors assuring others that they have 'assurance game preferences', where states being open to cooperation if they are assured that others will reciprocate cooperation (Jervis 1989; Fearon 1997; Morrow 1999; Yarhi-Milo and Hall 2012). However, the challenge is signalling that this is the case, especially if costly signals are often not successfully interpreted as signals of peaceful intent. Those focused on cognitive dimensions

only essentially see signals as speaking for themselves and have little room for interpretation. Others such as Yarhi-Milo and Hall (2012) criticise this, and suggest there are psychological or affective elements that influence the way in which leaders perceive the intentions and signals of the other.

Where the difference lies for this thesis, however, is that these mechanisms are often aimed at building trust or signalling trustworthiness, without necessarily addressing existing distrust. This prevents distrust-reduction, important in the cases analysed in this thesis. This thesis agrees, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, that bonding and the constitutive elements that make it possible are important in trust development and, to some degree, trust emergence. However, I argue that security dilemma sensibility, and the wider empathy-based reflection, is best mobilized initially as a mechanism of distrust-reduction. Whilst it may not contribute to the development of trust, it instead assists in the enactment of behavior that can reduce distrust to a degree of ambivalence. Once this occurs, other mechanisms can then meaningfully begin the process of trust-building. Sources of distrust can be actively downplayed and there can be attempts to mute them through a refocusing of the relationship towards commonalities rather than differences. Distrustees can attempt to mute differences, such as ideology and interests, by side-lining them domestically, for example. By attempting to remove the foci of distrust, or at least attempt to mute its impact, ambivalence can result (low distrust/low trust) and common interests can be emphasised.

As this thesis adopts a particularly heavy focus on leadership it will also demonstrate that even the characteristics of leaders in this context contributed to the negative expectations. Face-to-face interaction (Wheeler 2018) and informal interactions can facilitate distrust-reduction, therefore, but only when one leader exercises a degree of empathy-based reflection and attempts to mute the characteristic that was resulting in the maintenance of distrust. In cases where negative expectations are not reduced by face-to-face meetings, it is often because there has been no reflection and no attempt to mute the offensive characteristics, making it unlikely that continued attempts at face-to-face diplomacy would have any significant impact absent reflection and

awareness on what it is causing distrust. A fundamental shift is required whereby sources of distrust dissipate and this opens space for an alignment of interests, further facilitated by face-to-face diplomacy as a way to confirm that interests are indeed aligned and sources of distrust are being actively muted in order for the first stage of trust-building to begin. These are not viewed by the thesis as mechanisms for building trust, but for creating a situation of ambivalence through distrust-reduction. This is not to say that actions aimed at distrust-reduction are not capable of building trust or that all trust-building attempts will not result in weaker distrust. The separation emerges, however, as it is important to recognise there can be significant differences between what causes trust and what causes distrust. The processes are often interlinked but it is not enough to try and build trust without reflecting on the sources of distrust, as well as attempting to ensure that these are unable to further impact on the relationship. Indeed, distrust must be lessened in order to make trust-building efforts meaningful. Transformations of relationships require the reduction of distrust allowing for the process of trust-building to begin in a meaningful way. The reduction of negative expectations cannot be taken for granted. As mentioned, distrust may continue to exist in weak forms and in various sectors, but it needs to be reduced in part to allow for trust to meaningfully develop in specific sectors, and weakening distrust to a certain threshold is required before trust can meaningfully take hold and preclude a return to distrust in the face of trust violations. In a further differentiation between the two concepts, if distrust becomes significantly weak then trust violations do not have to result in higher levels of distrust. Sitkin and Roth (1993) argue that trust violation is localized as context-specific, while distrust is more pervasive resulting from values being violated across multiple contexts. If distrust is reduced, then trust is both easier to take hold and maintain.

This may be seen to be problematic as a general theory, as distrust-reduction may be extremely contextual. However, it is what best explains the cases of transformation as will be demonstrated, and the underpinning ideas that distrust needs to be reduced and interests aligned before trust-building begins holds true and can be generalised. It allows for trust-building to begin

once enemy images are no longer held but does not require such a leap from seeing one as an enemy to trusting them, there is a mediating middle point of ambivalence and ongoing overlaps.

2.6 Trust-building and Calculus-Based Trust (CBT)

Once distrust is weak and the relationship is characterised more by ambivalence there is, therefore, a greater opportunity to meaningfully build trust. Trying to develop high trust where there is a coexistence of high distrust is extremely difficult yet trying to build trust without addressing distrust will only make this more so. Now the thesis has demonstrated the importance of those dynamics it will turn to arguing that the relationship, now ambivalent, can become trusting based on calculation.

I put the causal weight of a trusting relationship primarily on calculation. As distrust-reduction takes place separately, and is based on addressing sources of distrust, this opens calculation as being a significant beginning point for a trusting relationship. It provides a basis for two actors in a relationship of ambivalence to use their common interests to begin a process of trust-building characterised by weak trust, whereby the bases of trust can evolve into strong trust, which instead provides the endurance for the relationship. Distrust has not necessarily dissipated at this stage, and indeed can be present even in stages of high trust as trust is domain specific. Instead, trust becomes the focus in one domain, as it becomes more meaningful than the weak levels of distrust that may still endure. The more an actor may feel a stronger form of trust, the more they will doubt their own distrust. As a result, distrust-reduction becomes less necessary. Actors may, however, continue to engage in distrust-reducing behaviours to counter any possible negative expectations, even while positive expectations are increasing.

This chapter will consider the first stage as it provides the foundation for the deepening and expanding of trust outlined in the following chapter, and it is indicative of the transformation of a relationship where there is enough room to trust, even if it is extremely limited and there are still

levels of distrust enduring. Furthermore, it operates at an interpersonal level, whereas the other levels see a process of institutionalisation.

This thesis argues that the initial stage of trusting relationship in a professional context is that of calculus-based trust, incorporating what is known as strategic, rational, reasoned or encapsulated trust (Hollis 1998; Rathbun 2011; Möllering 2006a). Within this conceptualisation relationships depend on interest-based calculations concerning payoffs and deterrence, akin to rational choice theory (Lewicki and Bunker 1995; Möllering 2006a; Ruzicka and Wheeler 2010). A rational assessment of the other would be the primary input to the assessment of trust at the earliest stage outside of institutional frameworks and situational context. The benefits derived from either staying in the relationship or cheating, as well as the costs of both, are considered similar to a 'market oriented economic calculation' (Lewicki and Bunker 1995: 145). This conceptualisation of trust and the earliest stage of a trusting relationship is generally represented by Kydd within International Relations. Kydd focuses on prediction and estimates in assessing whether states have 'assurance game' preferences and are therefore trustworthy (Ruzicka and Keating 2015: 7; Kydd 2005). This is also observed outside of IR. For example, Hardin argues that there are two elements crucial to the rationalist account; incentives of the trustee to honour the trust, and knowledge to justify the trustor's trust (Hardin 2002: Rathbun 2011; Ruzicka and Keating 2015). However, where the thesis's model of CBT departs from these accounts is that it does not agree with the implication that agents are wholly rationalist, as often argued by scholars who focus on this conceptualisation of trust (Rathbun 2011). Instead, dispositions and emotions of individuals are important, but at this stage rationality and calculation dominates as experiences of the other and any feelings towards them is limited. It would be expected at this stage that trust is extremely relative and any sense of obligation is limited.

CBT is often criticised. Wheeler, for example, questions whether a state may change its preferences if the temptations for opportunistic behaviour are too great, and therefore it is vulnerable to defection (Wheeler 2018). He does not dismiss it entirely, but argues that the calculative approach

to trust should be 'broadened from a focus on the state-to-state dimension of signalling to encompass the signals of trustworthiness that are exchanged by individuals through the modality of face-to-face interaction at the highest levels of diplomacy' (2018: 5). Hoffman, too, argues that these small calculative trusting behaviours are not significant enough to cause spirals of trust, they will not lead to significant behaviours, and that actors may only pretend to be trustworthy until there is an incentive to defect (Hoffman 2002; 2005). His argument that risk need to be reduced through the creation of rules, norms and institutions will be supported through the empirical cases in part two. However, I argue that Wheeler is correct to focus on the interpersonal at the initial stage, and it is only when these interpersonal trusting relationships are embedded into wider structures, facilitated in part only by rules and norms but dependent mostly on practice, that trusting relationships become stable, as they are no longer predicated on specific actors that are prone to changing. This thesis agrees that the interpersonal is important in calculative trust as well, in that calculations of trustworthiness concerning interests are targeted towards another person rather than the state, and that interpersonal interactions opens greater space for calculating another's interests. Face-to-face interactions take on meaning as personal impressions concerning the other offer credible indicators of sincerity (Yarhi-Milo 2012; Wheeler 2018; Holmes 2018). I argue this can primarily be seen within the realm of CBT, as at this early stage such impressions are for the most part restricted into ascertaining sincerity concerning common interests. As will be demonstrated, common interests provide the most significant starting point for CBT as they assure the trustor that the trustee would be going against their own interests if defecting, which is expected to restrain them as the costs of going against their own (and the commonly held) interests are too high. In the face-to-face interaction, therefore, leaders in the beginning of a trusting relationship, once ambivalence has emerged, are not seeking an index of the other in general terms (Wheeler 2018) but they are specifically making impressions concerning whether the other does indeed hold the same interests as them.

Calculus-based trust is also criticised because it is often not seen as being 'real trust' due to it depending too much on rationality. One argument is that any defection at this stage would lead to

disappointment but not betrayal, because of only minor feelings of obligation and expectation. Michel, in his work, draws upon Baier to demonstrate the differences in this (2012b). He argues that disappointment naturally follows calculation because the defection has already been considered and the harm inflicted can be accommodated within the expectations of the trustor (Michel 2012b). However, in later stages the positive expectation of the other develops in such a way that harm is no longer expected, and any defection will result in betrayal as it challenges this expectation (Michel 2012b). If defection would not result in an act of betrayal is it really trust at all? I argue that it is indeed still trust, albeit extremely limited, and it is still of significance because it opens the space for new and deeper bases of trust to develop. As will be demonstrated in part two, decisions to engage in trusting behaviours were based in calculation, especially an alignment of interests, but there were positive expectations, and there was also an expectation of reciprocation with little consideration of defection. Distrust has not vanished from these relationships, but the resulting ambivalence following distrust-reduction allowed for the beginnings of trust to develop. As trust developed, distrust becomes bracketed despite its existence, but distrust-reduction is still required particularly in crises where negative expectations become more dominant than the positive expectations that have become the primary focus of the relationship.

2.7 **Conclusion**

This chapter has conceptualised trust and demonstrated the first step in a 'trusting relationship'; moving from a relationship characterised by distrust to that where space has opened for a limited form of trust to emerge. The thesis argues trust is a conscious or unconscious willingness to make oneself vulnerable in a specific domain due to positive expectations towards the other. These positive expectations are informed by several bases and inputs that vary depending on the depth of trust and the context, as well as the feeling that the other has an obligation to reciprocate on trust. This willingness to make oneself vulnerable results in a trusting behaviour that allows for a cyclical process to occur. This is a universal process, as stages always remain the same in

terms of the order they follow, and have the same dimensions, but there is variance at each stage in regards of the bases. Trust can occur best when distrust has dissipated but distrust and trust are not opposites, and the expectations that result from them do not have the same antecedents.

The first part of the framework emphasises the reduction of distrust separate from the development of trust. In the following cases, as will be demonstrated this was achieved through the (extreme) mediation of the foci of distrust; 'untrustworthy' individuals were replaced, situations that fostered distrust were brought to an end, and actors showed self-reflection on what it was causing distrust and attempted to ameliorate it. This allows for relationships based on distrust to be replaced by relationships where there is a general sense of ambivalence towards the other. While this seems like an unglamorous beginning point, this ambivalence is important as it opens the space for trust to be built in a separate process. Contrary to criticisms this thesis argues the process begins with CBT, a form of trust that is extremely limited and is vulnerable to defection. Calculation is marked by an assessment of similarity of interests and a relatively rational assessment of the other's trustworthiness (as in the following cases there has been little or no space for them to learn about the other or little knowledge of the other's behaviour). These rational assessments are important as it allows actors to initially recognise an alignment of interests and calculate the trustworthiness of another's ability, benevolence and integrity, which, later in the framework, they can confirm through other means and begin to develop greater certainty of the other through knowledge and Wheeler's 'bonding' (2018).

CBT as often criticised on the grounds that it misses the degrees of complexity in trusting relationships. However, this thesis argues that relationships can be characterised by calculation without depending entirely on it absent of all else. It is futile to believe something as complicated as trust can be based upon one thing entirely. However, at this beginning stage it is calculation that dominates, as other bases have not yet had chance to develop in meaningful ways, even if the beginnings of these bases can also be observed. Furthermore, Wheeler's (2018) focus on the

interpersonal opens up new possibilities for analysing the extent to which leaders calculate the trustworthiness and interests of other leaders based on interpersonal interactions that offer more ways for actors to confirm their intuitions, so far ignored by a lack of rigour concerning levels of analysis. The thesis argues at this stage it is the interpersonal that is of significance, and the interactions between leaders is the most meaningful level of analysis. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the framework will consider how this trust between specific leaders proliferates to wider communities of practice, and how this trust also deepens from this extremely early stage. By considering trust as a multi-dimensional process, with different potential bases dependent upon context, this moves away from an assumption that trust is uni-dimensional or static and proffers the importance of formerly criticised bases as the beginning building blocks towards a trusting relationship.

Chapter 3: Developing trust

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter conceptualised trust and demonstrated the first steps in a trusting relationship; moving from a relationship characterised by distrust to that where space has opened for a limited form of trust to emerge. As trust can occur best when distrust has been reduced, and distrust and trust are not opposites but instead have different sources of expectations, the first stage is a separate but linked process of reducing distrust. Following from that, trust can begin to be built beginning with a Calculus-Basis (CBT) enabled by distrust becoming mere ambivalence. This chapter will demonstrate the ways in which the depth of trust changes. While CBT is a minor form of trust, as it is informed primarily by calculation of another's interests and trustworthiness, it still results in a willingness to make oneself vulnerable based on positive expectations, and the outcome is a limited trusting behaviour.

This chapter argues that this CBT allows for a cyclical and reciprocal process to begin and for trust to strengthen by discussing the following variances with regard to the bases of trust. I argue that the stage following CBT is Knowledge Based Trust (KBT). Rather than depending on the predictability of behaviour only, which is the traditional purview of KBT, I will argue that KBT is more meaningful if it also incorporates knowledge of the other *(affective knowledge)* and knowledge of meaningful behaviour *(social knowledge)*. This knowledge of the other and the potential affection engendered is linked traditionally to Relational Based Trust, and has best been explored in International Relations by Wheeler (2018) in his theorising on bonding trust. However, as will be demonstrated in the following cases, knowledge concerning predictability of behaviour and the relational binding between leaders (knowledge of the other as a person) happened concurrently and were of equal importance towards the final stage - Practice Based Trust (PBT). I argue that Identification-Based Trust (IBT) further facilitates this process but is not a necessary step. Instead, an extended conceptualisation of KBT is sufficient for PBT to emerge. While IBT facilitates the

quickening of this process, in the following case studies there was little emergence of identification on an interpersonal level. In the dyads analysed there is one relationship that could be categorised as being based in IBT, but this did not limit the emergence of PBT on a wider level amongst other dyads and within the structure.

This chapter will then introduce and discuss PBT. It argues that trust becomes habitual and un-reflexive between relevant actors, as trusting behaviours (as practices) are enacted consistently within the structure or field. This practice-based trust comes to inform the background knowledge of relevant actors, allowing the proliferation of trust to occur. Trust has been recognised within the work of the 'Logic of Practicality' (Pouliot 2008) and security communities as a background disposition, as demonstrated in the first chapter, but it has not yet been linked to the wider literature on trust as habit, and there has been no detailed focus on such. This chapter will introduce theories of trust's institutionalisation and link these to the 'practice turn' (Hopf 2010) to suggest how such an institutionalisation can occur. This is one of the primary contributions of the thesis, as criticisms concerning trust between leaders argue that such trust is not stable as it will likely collapse when leadership changes. By suggesting that the behaviours that emerge from these relationships can influence the wider structural conditions in such a way, however, this thesis argues that the logic of practicality holds the strongest explanation of how trust is removed from a specific relationship and time to inform the future behaviour of states. The thesis will argue there are two stages of PBT that are of importance. The first is that trusting behaviour becomes enacted as practice, contributing to the depth of trust by moving it to a taken for granted basis. Trusting behaviour also becomes the normal outcome, and trust becomes unreflexively enacted in response to socially meaningful patterns of behaviour. The second is that it also explains how trust can proliferate outside of specific interpersonal relationships, as agents joining the structure who play roles that were informed by their predecessors continue to enact this behaviour and reify trust as a background knowledge.

3.2 Knowledge Based Trust

Once a trusting relationship emerges based on CBT there is the potential for the relationship to move to a deeper base - KBT. As actors within the first stage of a trusting relationship view each other as complying with their agreements and reciprocating trust, they gain knowledge of each other through learning, allowing the inputs to the decision to trust to expand and depend less on calculation but more on knowledge of the other's behaviour (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). Within KBT knowledgeable actors have a stronger belief, based on information, past experience, and the reciprocity of past trust, that they can trust others within the relationship and make themselves vulnerable with increasing certainty that the other will not defect. This has a basis in both IR and Business trust literatures, though this thesis proposes some differences.

In Lewicki and Bunker's conceptualisation rather than being calculus-based knowledge primarily stems from the learning process that has occurred; trust is strengthened as knowledge about the other is gained and information is updated (1995). They argue that KBT is like gardening; 'by tilling the soil year after year the gardener comes to understand what will grow' – knowledge is gathered and cultivated from the CBT phase (Lewicki and Bunker 1995: 154, 156). It requires regular communication (Lewicki and Bunker 1995). The development into KBT requires that 'activities (during CBT) develop in a manner that confirms the validity of trust' (Lewicki and Bunker 1995; 157 See also - Kydd 2005). In effect it begins a cycle of confirmation bias as the actors continuously update and reinforce their image of the other and discount evidence to the contrary, meaning trusting behaviour spirals (Möllering and Sydow 2018; Wheeler 2018). Actors still retain independent identities but increasingly value the relationship. In Business literature there are arguments that a sense of obligation is garnered as the continuation of such behaviour is more and more expected, especially as there is a greater expectation that trust will be reciprocated, though as of yet this is mostly missing in IR operationalisations (Vanneste 2016). Möllering and Sydow (2018) argue these social exchange and learning dynamics of trust have recently started to receive more attention again (see also - Möllering

2013; Jagd and Fuglsang 2016; Latusek and Vlaar 2018) and have a rich history in trust research (See Blau 1968; Zand 1972; Golembiewski and McConkie 1975; Ring and Van de Van 1994). Crucially, through these processes of learning about the behaviour of the other, they predict that trust will grow stronger (Ring 1997) while the level of vulnerability increases and necessitates further trust (Misztal 2011).

These dynamics of KBT are also recognised to some degree in IR theories of trust, even if it is also heavily criticised and the labelling of it is often different. Larson (1997), for example, focuses on how trust might be built gradually with the stakes of cooperation increasing over time. This is similar to Osgood's (1970) Gradual Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) model, whereby 'spirals of trust' occur regarding more important issues over time. Such learning models have been adapted in more current literature by Kydd's (2005) focus on states updating their information and preferences based on the behaviour of the other. The more states perceive the other as having 'assurance game' preferences through past iterations of cooperation rather than defection, they can increasingly trust in the other in an iterative process that is undertaken many times, reinforcing the level of trust each time there is no defection. However, it is important to note that as Kydd grounds his analysis in terms of states being rational egoists, there is little room for the emergence of obligation and reciprocation that this thesis considers of importance for a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of KBT. Rathbun (2012) emphasises the role of a generalised trusting disposition in beginning trusting behaviour. However, he does not see generalised trust as the only form of trust and references the self-perpetuating nature of exchanges based on strategic trust. Criticisms towards these forms of trust are like those discussed concerning CBT, mostly due to the focus on rationality. Wheeler (2018) and Hoffman (2002; 2005) for example argue that others can feign interest in cooperation and there is no certainty that they will not defect when the stakes become higher, meaning the actor cannot be certain the other will not act opportunistically, and that current evidence of trustworthiness and predictability is not a reliable basis for the future.

This thesis suggests that only a simplistic form of knowledge has been operationalised (knowledge of other's behaviour/cognitive knowledge). While predictability of behaviour forms a central component, so too does that of knowledge of the other as a person (affective knowledge) and knowledge of meaningful behaviour (social knowledge). The first part is informed by Wheeler's conceptualisation of the bonding that occurs as relationships progress, short of his outcome of identity transformation whereby two rational egoists have become bonded partners (Wheeler 2018). For Wheeler, it is this bonding that creates the sense of obligation towards one another to do the right thing (2018; See also Hollis 1998). Wheeler's primary contribution to the work of trust in IR is focusing on the interpersonal level, where face-to-face is of significance, allowing trust to emerge through a process whereby two leaders create this personal bond (2018). Whilst Hollis also recognised the importance of personal bonding, Wheeler argues that 'what is missing from Hollis's important discussion of trust is how individuals come to develop trust in the first place' and suggests two components: the positive identification of interests and humanization (Wheeler 2018: 59). Positive identification of interests has already considered previously as part of CBT, but this humanization is recognized in this framework as being important within KBT. For Wheeler humanization is 'a process in which two state leaders who represent two states with enemy relations come through face-to-face interaction to see the 'human' in their counterpart's attitudes and behaviour, rather than just a representative of cold state interests' (2018: 62). In the conclusion of *Trusting Enemies,* he argues that sharing food was an essential part in this as well as sharing stories about their personal lives (2018). This process of recognizing the other as human is expanded in this thesis to explain the way in which they get to know the other on a personal level, and as a result forge an affective knowledge of the other.

Wheeler convincingly argues that this bonding trust is closer to Identification-Based Trust (IBT), a form of trust that will be discussed following, but which is based on an altering of mental states due to identity transformation. Through IBT both actors come to place a high value on the other's security and care about the well-being of the other (Wheeler 2018). This thesis, however, will

demonstrate that an affective knowledge garnered through interaction and humanization stopped short of IBT in a majority of the cases under analysis. While it did not cause a transformation of identities in each case, it did facilitate the further development of trust and leaders emphasized this humanization and knowledge of the other as a person to be one of the factors of such development, but one that was grounded in the language of knowledge and occurred parallel to the element of predictability. I believe, therefore, it is important in the sense that these affective elements help increase knowledge of the other as a person and it is not just the knowledge of the other's behavior that increases KBT. As will be demonstrated, this knowledge of the other's behavior and knowledge of the other as a person were intertwined and happened concurrently.

Lewicki and Bunker (1995) in their original framework provide the groundwork for this way of thinking, though they do not explore affective elements in any great depth. They recognise the importance of 'courtship', getting to learn more about a possible partner, but they do not develop it or consider the affective outcome, instead focusing only on cognition. This affective element has been considered in the wider trust literature under the term 'Affective Based Trust' (ABT) (Mcallister 1998) or 'Relational Based Trust' (RBT) (Rousseau et al. 1998). Interpersonal trust has cognitive and affective foundations whereby Affective Based Trust consists of the emotional bonds between individuals (Lewis and Wiegert 1985). People make emotional investments in trusting relationships and believe that these investments are reciprocated (Pennings and Woiceshyn 1987; Rempel et al. 1985). Ultimately the emotional ties linking individuals can provide the basis for trust. Whilst behavior is akin to a predictability, ABT incorporates elements of dependability instead of reliability and predictability (McAllister 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998). McAllister (1995) separates cognitive trust from affective trust, arguing emotional trustworthiness and 'faith' is characterised by a greater investment of time and emotion with interpersonal reciprocation and care characterising the relationships. Such a separation has informed much of the theorising on trust even though Rousseau et al. argued relational trust as derived from predictability, but also sees emotion as entering the relationship (1998). As Rousseau et al. argue, this dependability comes from information from within the relationship itself

leading to a formation of attachments due to the entry of emotion into the decision-making process (1998). At its broadest this is often seen as IBT. However, I argue in this thesis that these need not be drawn out into two distinct stages of trust and instead can be incorporated in an extended KBT process that accounts for both the concurrent development of cognitive and affective knowledge. Affective knowledge, dependability and a greater expectation for reciprocity also entered into the decision-making process, but this was not distinct from KBT as traditionally seen as it did not lead to a transformation of identities in each of the cases under study. A lack of identity transformation did not prevent the same degree of trust emerging. IBT could occur, but it was not a necessary mechanism for the emergence of PBT. Instead, I argue separating them out fails to recognise the complexity of people and their relationships. Cognitive elements depend on predictability of behaviour, but affective knowledge also leads to an interlinked sense of dependability.

One final constitution of knowledge beyond the cognitive and affective that is also important to KBT and the eventual development of PBT is that of a social knowledge, or knowledge of meaningful behaviours. I argue that indicators of trustworthiness are not just predicated on knowledge concerning behaviour or the actor, but an increased knowledge in the structure in which these behaviours take place. As knowledge of the structure is gained, actors gain a greater understanding of the behaviours enacted and the meanings given to these behaviours, opening new avenues of recognising socially meaningful ways the other signals trustworthiness. The thesis argues that at this stage trusting behaviours themselves are imbued by meaning through the normative framework of the structure or field. These normative frameworks not only further facilitate the assessment of trustworthiness based on another's actions but contribute to a growing shared knowledge of what meaningful trusting behaviour is. This has some overlap with Adler and Barnett's theorising on security communities (1998a; 1998b). They argue that socialization occurs due to a social learning, allowing actors to learn of the other's peaceful intentions (1998a). There is also some overlap with Bachmann and Inkpen's (2011) focus on Institutional-Based Trust (Zucker 1986) or system trust (Luhmann 1979; see also Bachmann 2001), where institutional structures and their

norms of behaviour can reduce the risk of misplaced trust (see also Van de Van and Ring 2006; Bachmann and Zaheer 2006). Despite the importance of norms in these literatures, however, I argue that these institutions and norms do not coerce or have to influence the other to enact a certain accepted behaviour (Luhmann 1979; Coleman 1990) but instead they provide a socially meaningful 'signpost' of what a certain behaviour is meant to signal within the context of that structure. Behaviours are imbued by meaning; an actor following norms or grounding behaviour in a certain language may contribute to the perception they are trustworthy. If actors refer to 'myths' or norms in the justification for the behaviour this allows perceptions of trustworthiness to develop further, as actors are seen as undertaking behaviour which is accepted within the structure in which it takes place. I do not argue that actors are restrained by these norms, but that they begin to gain a socially constituted knowledge about what certain behaviours mean in the context of the structure in which it takes place. It may lead to signals of trustworthiness that are difficult to recognise outside of the structure but the actors who have knowledge of the structure may attribute trustworthiness to them.

3.3 Identification-Based Trust

This thesis departs from Lewicki and Bunker's conceptualization of trust development in that it puts only minor causal weight on their final form of trust, that of IBT. I see IBT as something that emerges in the interpersonal trusting relationships and can enhance the chances of PBT emerging, but that it is not necessary for PBT to emerge. For Lewicki and Bunker identification incorporates 'a full internalization of the other's desires and intentions… [and] trust exists as because the parties effectively understand, agree with, and endorse each other's wants' (1995: 151). This goes so far to reach the point that one party can serve as the other's agent. For Lewicki and Bunker there are four mechanisms that enabled IBT to emerge: collective identity/commonality in name; colocation; creation of joint products and goals; and shared values (1995). They utilize the metaphor of

harmonizing to show how the parties involved can 'learn to use their voices to sing a collective melody that is integrated and complex' (1995: 155). As will be shown these were neither consistent nor developed enough to provide a long-lasting stable trusting relationship and were not particularly widespread, occurring in only a minority of dyads and situations.

This thesis also departs from Wheeler (2018) when it comes to the focus on the role of identity in IBT. Wheeler criticizes Lewicki and Bunker for not making clear the mechanisms which lead to trust based on identification to occur (2018). Instead, he sees IBT is the outcome of bonding, whereby there is a positive identification of each other's interests and a sense of seeing each other as a human being (Wheeler 2018). This results in a trust that is now absent from calculation, allowing 'suspension' where all uncertainty about the other has effectively disappeared (2018). This altering of mental states due to identity transformation means both actors now place a high value on the other's security and care about the well-being of the other (Wheeler 2018). Trust based upon identity transformation is a widespread theory. Rousseau et al. argue there is a fine line between the existence of a good-faith relationship and the emergence of a shared identity where instead of a 'them' there is now an 'us' (1998: 400). The mechanism whereby this occurs is repeated interactions that lead to expanded resource creation, including shared information and concerns, which gives rise to a psychological identification of 'we' (1998: 400). Of importance in these conceptualisations is an emphasis on shared values that makes it compatible with literature on security community development. Adler and Barnett (1998a; 1998b) argue that the second stage of security community development is reached when the interactions between states begin to change the way in which they identify with each other. Urban has also focused on the role of shared values when analyzing liberal forms of collective identification in the democratic peace theory. Urban (2014) focuses primarily on narratives and 'conceptual vocabulary' that contributes to the construction of this shared identity and the trust that emerges. Resulting from this is a strong form of trust which eliminates degrees of uncertainty.

Whilst this thesis recognizes this step as important in developing the depth of trust, I argue it is not relevant to explaining the emergence of a breadth of consistent trust that can operate outside of the focused upon relationships. ASEAN's 'collective identity' is problematic and inconsistent, and trust seems to have emerged as a consistent property despite this fact. I recognize it as facilitating the process (in that it can make the process faster or more successful) but it is not necessary for it. Instead, KBT with the behavioral manifestations with regard to cognitive, affective and social knowledge mediate the emergence of a wider from of trust, that of Practice Based Trust (PBT). As will be demonstrated this is because practices are primarily behavioral in the sense they are grounded in actions endowed with particular meanings, and it is this trusting behavior based on knowledge that permeated into the structures.

3.4 The stability of trust in Security Communities

I propose PBT as being an important step in the constitution of a security community. While interpersonal relationships are required the initial stages of trust-building, this focus is problematic in relation to a security community that by its very nature is broader and more durable than specific interpersonal relationships. At the core of a security community is the dependable expectation of peaceful change, but this expectation cannot be dependable in a context where it relies only on a specific interpersonal dyad which is subject to change. My proposal of PBT, therefore, is a result of the fact the thesis is most interested in how there has been a consistent trust among decision-makers absent of trust among the wider collectivities, despite the fact elites often change within the structure. A security community cannot be durable if it depends on a long process of trust-building to restart every time a leader is replaced between a new set of elites. As will be demonstrated in the following case studies, the primary group of elites that matter is the foreign policy elite embedded into the ASEAN structure. This structure allows for trust even though these elites have little prior

direct interaction with their counterparts prior to gaining their status. Instead of constructing their own interpersonal relationships of CBT and KBT, they are informed by a background knowledge perpetuated within the structure itself and naturally enact trusting behaviours in response to 'normal' behaviour. This is a story of structural influence on an agents' predisposition to trust that emerged due to prior agency in the construction of trust through CBT and KBT by 'boundary spanner' elites. Strong interpersonal trust by these boundary spanners, predicated first on CBT and then KBT, resulted in the repeated enactment of trusting behaviours and the creation of particular ways in which to play roles in this context. Trust, therefore, becomes habituated. This follows the security community literature by Hopf (2010) and Pouliot (2008), though they have not considered its causal role or the process through which this occurs.

This thesis argues that trust is primarily an individual belief or expectation – it can be focused on an institution or collectivity but these collectivities cannot in themselves trust, meaning individuals are a necessary part in the trusting process. Keating and Ruzicka emphasise that if trust is primarily an individual belief or expectation, then it has little relevance to International Relations because a trusting relationship between individuals is not a stable foundation for long lasting trust when leadership of a country rotates often (Keating and Ruzicka 2014; Keating 2015b). For them, individual leaders have no impact on states forming trusting relationships (Keating and Ruzicka 2014). Keating also argues that states are complex institutions and more than just their elites (2015b). His secondary criticism is the easiest to address so will be addressed first by demonstrating an elite centric focus is not necessarily deficient.

Keating's primary contention is that individuals are not required for social processes of states becoming trusting. In line with other prominent IR trust theorists such as Kydd (2005), Keating suggests that states can trust states, and this is the only meaningful way of which to look at trusting relationships. Criticising Wheeler and Rathbun he argues that these conceptualisations descend into

'monodimension' which creates an unstable vision, and trust cannot be driven by the whims of leaders (Keating 2015b: 6). If trust is based on these individuals, he argues that leadership changes will lead to significant changes in the relationship between states – particularly problematic for a case study that covers over 50 years and involves many changes in leadership (Keating 2015b). In particular, he criticises Wheeler for not exploring the process through which individual trust becomes wider and how leader beliefs lead to outcomes at the state level (Keating 2015b). Wheeler recognises that even if future state leaders are 'able to develop and sustain relationships of bonded trust that lead to a de-escalation of the conflict, there is the 'future uncertainty' problem of whether they can rely on this trust continuing if new leaders come to power' (2018: 278). Wheeler and Booth (2007), and Keating and Wheeler (2014) do look to how trust becomes embedded among wider societies, though as Keating argues the mechanisms are lacking in that they focus on integration and increased communication (2015b). In the conclusion of *Trusting Enemies* Wheeler offers some discussion on how this may occur but as of yet there has been no detailed theoretical or empirical development. Keating, therefore, advocates seeing the state as trustor and trustee, collective agents phenomenologically suggested by international politics, and whilst individuals may have importance as a starting point they are not necessary in the wider social processes of trust (Keating 2015b; See also - Kydd 2005).

Whilst the thesis agrees that stability may be problematic if the relationship is predicated on a dyad of individual leaders, it argues that Keating falls victim to his own criticism of Wheeler. Keating states that Wheeler's process through which individual level trust on the level of leadership turns into wider trust between states is unclear (Keating 2015b). However, Keating does not theorise these linkages or how it comes to be that collectivities can trust. Furthermore, his argument that if there is concrete reference to an object such as states these can become symbol complexes in which actors can put trust is problematic (Keating 2015b). Keating specifically draws upon Luhmann (1979) to make this argument but Luhmann argues that collectivities (and institutions) can be trustees even though

he does not explicitly suggest they can become trustors – meaning trust is still a property of individual agents but that these agents can trust in abstract complexes.

Rather than ignoring the individual, this thesis argues that trust can be 'socialised', institutionalised, or embedded into structures but that this process is primarily agent (or individually) driven – especially in the prior stages of CBT and KBT (Keating 2015b: 6). The thesis aims to demonstrate that the social process through which individual trust proliferates into structures, fields, collectivities or systems is through the logic of practicality. Trust, if enacted repeatedly, becomes 'normal' behaviour and influences those new leaders that result from leadership changes to maintain 'normal' behaviour or attitude, especially as they take on the 'roles' that their predecessor leaders constructed and perceive others as playing their roles to which trust was a natural response. References are made, therefore, to the properties of the structure and the roles that the agents play in this structure. This begins with the individual and provides the 'sense of how trust can be socialised into state apparatus', a missing link according to Keating (2015b: 6). This chapter will now discuss the literature on trust's institutionalisation before arguing why the logic of practicality is of most importance, and the mechanisms behind it.

3.5 PBT and the institutionalisation of trust

The institutionalisation of trust is a process which has garnered increasing amount of interest outside of IR (Bachmann 2001; Möllering 2008; Sydow 2006; Kroeger 2012; Schilke and Cook 2013; Vanneste 2016). The idea that trust be routinized, intuitive and habitual is one that has a basis in trust literature (Lyon, Möllering and Saunders 2012; Möllering 2006a; Welter and Alex 2012). Luhmann argues that trust is based on a type of illusion, as a subjective world replaces the objective world meaning a world in which trust is the 'natural attitude' is possibly constructed (1979; see also Keating 2015a). This allows collectivities to 'trust' in organisational literature, but generally it

requires an institutionalisation or contagion process as individuals are those that do the actual trusting (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004; Fulmer and Gelfand 2012). Many articles discuss the institutionalisation of trust, but they also begin at the individual level, focusing on how particularly powerful 'embedded' agents such as boundary-spanners within the organisation began and maintain the process (Dietz 2011; Lumineau and Schilke 2018). Embedded agency not only stresses how macro-level meanings, such as organisational structures, can make their way into micro-level cognition and behaviour but also how, vice versa, micro-level phenomena can build up to either further maintain or change macro-level structures (Lumineau and Schilke 2018).




Figure 5. Lumineau and Schilke's (2018) model of embedded agency

Scholars go as far as to argue that it is 'bad practice to treat organisations like persons, to anthropomorphize the organisation' (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004: 561). This is because trust at inter-organisational levels cannot be separated from the influences of the individual actors, so whilst trust can be attributed to organisations the individuals maintain a strong role (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004). This has been reflected in William's thesis on trust in arms control, where she argues that individuals have a significant role in negotiations about national interest if they can build consensus across domestic and international levels (2014). In their review of levels of analysis and trust, furthermore, Fulmer and Gelfand found that trust at a higher level usually refers to the degree of trust collectively shared by individuals within a unit; it is an aggregated degree of trust

shared with consensus among members (2012). They argue that this is generally conceptualised through a composition model (see Chan 1998) which emphasises the shared psychological state. The literature also focuses on the institutional framework in which the relationship is embedded with a focus on the rules, roles and routines; an idea particularly compatible with the logic of practicality advocated by the thesis, as well as trusting or distrusting climates and shared consensus on whether to trust or not, though it does not explore how these occur (Möllering, Bachmann and Lee 2004). When trust becomes institutionalised in this way the shared expectations are 'relatively independent of time and space' (Möllering 2005: 11). Studies on how this occurs are limited (Vanneste 2006; Kroeger 2011) though they will be discussed here to demonstrate the commonalities that will be drawn into the final stage of the framework, that of PBT.

As Bachmann and Inkpen (2011) argue with their concept of an 'Institutional Based Trust' interactional forms of trust creation alone cannot be given attention as face-to-face contact is often time consuming. Instead they focus on institutional safeguards, which they suggest can develop trust absent of personal prior experience that coordinates (collective) expectations (Bachmann 2001; Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). These institutional safeguards are embedded in an institutional environment, the characteristics of which 'build favourable assumptions about the trustee's future behaviour vis-à-vis such conditions' and establish a 'world-in common' through shared explicit and tacit knowledge (Bachmann and Inkpen 2011: 284; see also - Garfinkel 1963). Bachmann and Inkpen draw upon Gidden's (1984) structuration theory and neo-institutionalist theories to suggest that these institutional arrangements act like a personal third party guarantor, capable of allowing an actor to trust as they provide patterns of behaviour to which action is oriented, and embed trust through the creation of a taken-for granted knowledge (Bachmann 2001; Bachmann and Inkpen 2011). For Bachmann (2001), and Bachmann and Inkpen (2011), both formal and informal rules and norms of behaviour are important and trust towards the institutional arrangement in itself is also seen as a significant element. Community norms, structures and procedures lend meaning to certain

behaviours involving the interaction between trustors and trustees. This is of importance, as will be demonstrated informal norms in ASEAN do contribute to the emergence of PBT. However, where Bachmann's concept of IBT is deficient is that he does not consider how these are built and their direct relationship in reducing uncertainty and creating the background disposition. As is shown in the ASEAN case such norms are followed inconsistently, and are an insufficient basis for trust in themselves as they have no coercive power, but they retain some prominence in the emergence of KBT and PBT as they help to pattern what is seen as meaningful trusting behaviour as previously argued. Another element of importance from Bachmann (2001) is that people retain importance as they appear as access points and provide face-work commitments in line with Giddens (1980).

Möllering too utilises the same language as Bachmann in his studies on trust as a 'natural attitude' (2006a; 2006b). He bases his work on sociological neoinstitutionalism, drawing upon concepts such as natural attitude and institutional isomorphism to explain the emergence of his concept of Institutional Based Trust (2006b). Rather than solely being interpersonal, for Möllering trust is enacted by embedded agents where it *'*may be rather 'normal' and reached quite easily by referring to institutionalized rules, roles and routines' (2006b: 356). Möllering draws upon Jepperson (1991) in arguing that institutions are socially constructed, routine-reproduced, program or rule systems which are accompanied by taken-for-granted accounts based on repeatedly invoked metaphors (2006b). This taken-for-grantedness enables trust as it creates a sense of natural attitude (Möllering 2006b). Trust emerges as the natural attitude which means interacting with others on the basis that everyone knows and accepts basic rules for the interaction (Möllering 2006b). If this results in isomorphism then this natural attitude is embedded in the expectations of the institution itself so that 'trustor A trusts (or mistrusts) the trustee B in a certain matter because it is natural and legitimate to do so and 'everybody would do it'', detaching it from the required collective behaviour and instead aligning expectations with highly institutionalised 'myths' concerning the prescriptions within the institution (2006b: 360 – Also Meyer and Rowan 1977). These myths are seen as less

important by Möllering who instead focuses on the coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism of an institution, whereby the coercive is external pressure, mimetic is mimicry of another's behaviour, and normative is following what is appropriate (2006b – See also Dimaggio and Powell 1983). These are relevant but myths will be shown to be one of the central elements to the emergence of PBT in the ASEAN case. Möllering suggests they are only complied with on the surface, and are 'a legitimate façade constructed 'decoupled' from the actual action' which allows for a natural attitude to occur despite the inconsistency of actual behaviour as long as the myths are consistently referred to (2006b: 360). These result in 'trust as normative isomorphism' which would mean that actors who have been socialized to place or honour trust in certain types of situation will conform to this expectation because otherwise they would be going against their own nature or against the objective reality of society (Möllering 2006b: 360 – see also Zucker 1986).

Of most significance of Möllering's (2006b) framework for this thesis is that he introduces the roles of routines. For Möllering routines are a heuristic in that they are regularly and habitually performed programmes of action or procedures endowed with social meaning that constitute the reality of everyday life within a structure (2006a; 2006b). Drawing on Giddens (1984) he argues that this, therefore, is integral to continuity as their continued reproduction allows the continued personality of an agent (2006a; 2006b). Trust can be routine if placing and honouring of trust itself is seen as part of the routine as routines apply generally and contain expectations as to the level of trust that is appropriate to display within an organization or across an organizational boundary (Möllering and Sydow 2018). This makes trust not only a 'social decision' (Kramer et al., 1996) but an inter-organizationally constituted practice (Lane and Bachmann, 1996). As will be shown, this finds affinity with the logic of practicality that offers the mechanism of the unreflexive reproduction of day to day practices as an important constitution of background knowledge in the interactions between state elites. However, Möllering again does not explore the dynamics of trust and how a relationship gets to this stage, which practices are important, or how the institution or structure

itself is creatively constructed and constituted, and reconstructed and reconstituted. This thesis aims to do this by suggesting it is a leader's based CBT and KBT that allows for the creation of structures and the initial enactment of trusting behaviours within this structure.

Sydow (1998; 2006) goes into greater depth of the mechanisms behind an institutionalised trust based on Giddens (1984), though he still focuses on 'social practices'. Structuration occurs through three dimensions; communicative actions referring to rules of signification such as views shared, sanctioning behaviour through reference to rules of legitimacy, and finally resources of domination (Sydow 2006). Therefore, the constitution of trust within and between organizations depends on agents developing an expectation towards the behaviour of a trusted person or system by referring in their interactions to structures that enhance the trust-building process (Sydow 2006). This theory allows agency and structural elements preventing either under- or over-socialization in other theories. The anthropomorphism of an organisation is also avoided as there is a role for individuals in this process of trust-building (2006). Organisations (and nation states) have no dispositions and emotions but 'individual organizational members, boundary spanners in particular, do matter a great deal in inter-organizational processes when they refer to the structural properties of the organization or other social systems that allow for these dispositions and emotions to be put into practice' (2006: 382). This is of significance as it vindicates the view of agency in the creation of such structures, but also imparts importance of agency in re-constructing the collectively held trust through continued re-enactment of practices and reference to the meanings imparted on those practices. Sydow refers to this as reembedding face-to-face work, in which agents also refer to the structures of the organization and the organizational field (2006; See also Giddens 1984). He also suggests that interpersonal trust 'may often be a seedbed of inter-organizational trust' (2006: 380). Sydow therefore considers the macro-foundations of trust and links it to the micro-foundations in the sense of actors referring to structural properties in their behaviour and institutionalising by means of abstract principles.

Möllering and Sydow (2018) demonstrate the strength of this form of trust when discussing the problems of a 'trust trap'. In line with path dependency, they argue that the self-reinforcing processes are so strong once they develop (the most difficult stage) that they tend **'**to spiral up to levels that essentially lock organizations into their trust-based relationships, even when the trust has been jeopardized', which is, in their view, a dark side of trust (Möllering and Sydow 2018: 1). However, they do not analyse how interpersonal trust could get to such a level that it begins to proliferate, nor the dynamics between that and institutional trust. Indeed, all these studies are limited, in that they theorise the linkages between interpersonal trust and its externalisation, but they do not specify which routines and roles are of importance and how the practices become habitualised. This thesis argues that this occurs first through CBT, but importantly this develops to KBT which emphasises the enactment of trusting behaviour in reference to an increasing social knowledge among the actors. As certain behaviours are an indication of trustworthiness in a certain context, actors learn to respond with trusting behaviour and this script becomes unreflexive following several iterations once it is attributed as being socially meaningful. It is the enactment of trusting behaviours and references to the structure that enables and reifies them that allows the emergence of PBT. This process will be discussed in more detail shortly, but for now it is important to note that it is only then that these structures or fields can guide the expectations and actions of embedded agents towards a collectively recognised form of trusting behaviour. While initially predicated on the interpersonal the relationships through such a process are removed and embedded into the field and, therefore, the relationships of new members to the field.

Kroeger is demonstrative of the utility of the logic of practicality in explaining how trust is institutionalised, even though he has not used that language himself, but instead utilises path-dependency and structuration theories (2011). By arguing that it occurs in the norms and routines for trusting, which are structural but need to be creatively enacted by agents who mediate the linkage

between the two levels of individual and organisation, Kroeger argues trust is institutionalised (2011). He delineates between trust in interaction (between agents) and trust as an institution, and argues that institutionalised trust emerges as a construct consisting of intersubjective rules for trusting (2011). These rules provide 'templates' that are 'reading' and 'writing guides' in that they give agents a guideline for recognising actions symbolic of trust and provide a script for conducting their own trusting conduct (Kroeger 2011: 751). Whilst this trust is structural, in that it influences agents, it only really exists in interaction and depends on agents to construct and reproduce structural forms of trust and organisational realities of trust, which then in turn reproduce trusting interaction (2011).



Figure 6. Kroeger's structuration theory of trust (2011).

Through adopting this structuration theory, Kroeger puts forward a framework for how institutionalisation occurs, is reproduced, and is 'transmitted to new generations of organisational actors' (2011: 743). This is important because he looks at the 'bottom-up' process of institutional trust-building that this thesis advocates for in its framework, but while these forms have been recognised as highly significant very little is still known about their genesis (Kroeger 2017). Kroeger's contribution addresses this crucial gap by exploring the concept of 'facework' (2017: see also - Giddens 1980; Goffman 2003 [1955]). He utilises an amalgamation of Goffman's and Gidden's view of facework to define it as 'the translation of interpersonal trust into trust which pertains to an institutional system,

based on the conduct of system representatives who, using their agency, are seen to draw on the system's rules and resources in devising behaviours able to signal trustworthiness' (2017: 496). He suggests five indicators to see whether institutionalisation through this translation by system representatives is successful:

> *'(a) routinisation—are practices scripted and well-rehearsed rather than being invented in the process?; (b) categories—are the categories which underlie communication about the institutional system and associated activities settled and sufficiently refined?; (c) roles—do the roles of the participants to the encounter seem clearly defined, especially regarding the responsibilities and expectations of the system representative?; (d) value-infused nature—does the representative appear attached to the above practices, categories and roles (e.g. do they appear disappointed or confused when these are not followed)?; (e) finally, as Colyvas and Powell (2006) point out, all of the above combine to form an image of taken-for-grantedness, the hallmark of successful institutionalisation'* (2017: 505).

These indicators are extremely useful and, as will be demonstrated, have some degree of compatibility with the framework. However, while he analyses the way in which to create trust in institutional systems—not of building interpersonal trust – he does not create a full framework for the development of trust in the context of security communities that covers the entire process. This framework the thesis has created does intend to do so by demonstrating the whole process of how trust is initially created between agents and how this is then translated into the wider institutional system.

3.6 Institutionalising trust in International Relations

These frameworks all provide a solid basis for exploration as they are all grounded in the language of practices, natural attitude and background knowledge - all essential parts of the logic of

practice. Such links between practice and trust may suggest that the action of trusting behaviour, acted out repeatedly over space and time, may constitute a habitus and background knowledge of 'trust' amongst the relevant actors (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Rengger, too, explored trust as a non-conscious and non-considered reflection belief linked to practice (1997). Whilst he sees rationality as an important aspect of trust, he argued that it cannot account for practices that embed trust habitually (1997). Michel, drawing upon International Relations literature concerning trust, also argued that trust is practical to argue that it is a non-representational practical form of knowledge (Michel 2012a; Pouliot 2008). However, he does not specifically analyse the process of the way in which these practices become embedded. Wheeler too argues a limitation of Pouliot's approach is that he does not identify the causal behavioural and psychological mechanisms that lead to actors trusting (2018).

When discussing habitual trust in the sense of PBT, it is important to note that I argue that PBT is habitual and influenced heavily by the structure, but I am not arguing that agency plays no role. Agency plays a significant role in constructing the field which then influences new agents. Agents can also act outside of the expectations put upon them, meaning habitual or PBT trust is extremely stable, but can be subject to renegotiation. Whilst the thesis argues that the structure at this stage is the primary influencer, it does not go as far as Hopf does in his criticisms of the logic of practicality and his operationalisation of the logic of habit, even if the thesis uses the language of habitual trust (2010). Hopf when advocating for a logic of habit argues that the 'practice turn underestimates the social, cognitive, even physiological, power of habit to prevent change' making the logic of practice more agential than the logic of habit (2010: 544). On the other hand, Holmes (2015) and Holmes and Traven (2015) critique both the logic of practicality and habit as not being agential enough. As a response, they develop frameworks for agency through mobilization of an affective intuitionism and rational intuitionism, whereby agents can choose to discount habits and practices, but these automatic or habitual sources of action still play a primary role (Holmes 2015; Holmes and Traven 2015). They argue that automaticity comes about from emotional dispositions that act prior to beliefs, and that this is subject to grater agentic control than practices and habits (Holmes 2015; Holmes and Traven 2015). I

argue, however, that this is problematic for the thesis in the sense that Holmes and Traven underestimate the strength and causal effect of the social structure.

Agents will be shown in this thesis to generally continue to comply with the practices, which creates a structural condition whereby new agents joining are increasingly constrained by the background knowledge of the structure. Agents are not denied their agency in the structure, meaning the final stages of the framework is structure oriented, but with a recognition it is subject to changes and renegotiation. As Pouliot argues:

> *'agency is not simply about 'defying' structures by making choices independently of them. It Is a matter of instantiating structures, old or new, in and through practice. Without practice, intersubjective realities would falter; thus agency or the enactment of practice is what makes social reality possible in the first place* (2008: 264).

Agents go through a process of 'the internalization of externality' (Bourdieu 2000). This exists as a middle ground or intersection between structure and agency that the thesis aims to demonstrate is of importance in the construction and maintenance of a security community. By drawing upon Bourdieu's habitus, where the practices are embodied subjectively but comprised of intersubjective dispositions, and Goffman's (1994) concept of social relations, the thesis argues that agents are deprived of complete free will as they have space in the structure only to improvise or renegotiate.

There are two aspects of Bourdieu's definition of the habitus as 'structured and structuring structure' (1994:170). First, the idea that the habitus is an internal structure that emerges from socialisation, such as class-based socialisation in Bourdieu's study of the French working class, professionals and bourgeoisie which appeared to explain the regularities of judgments in tastes over food, dressing and sports (Bourdieu 1984). It is via such socialisation that external structures get internalised into individual and groups dispositions, and set limits over the scope of possible action. This first aspect represented the 'structured structures' in Bourdieu's definition of the concept. The second idea is that of habitus as a propensity, a strategy generating principle that generates

perceptions and appreciations that correspond with the experiences of socialisation and dispose actors to act in certain ways. This second idea represents the dynamic feature of the habitus as 'structuring structures'. It is important to note, however, that the habitus is not confined to the level of the individual alone. Bourdieu refers to a collective habitus as well, one that is enabled by the occupation of a similar social position by actors, which exposes them to common experiences of socialisation and results in the internalisation of similar (though never identical) dispositions that lead them to act in regular ways. This is of particular importance to this thesis, as it opens up the opportunity to consider trusting behaviour as a regular way in which to act for diplomats and elites who have been socialised into their pre-defined role, which they then enact in the field of ASEAN.

I argue that these constraints are particularly salient because the predisposition to trust and enact trusting behaviour is not necessarily tied to the personal self of the agent, but instead the role that they have now inherited in the structure. Tied to Kroeger's (2007) focus on Goffman's facework, this thesis also adopts Goffman's wider conceptualisations of social relations and argues that a new agent in the structure inherits the script and expectations that were developed by their (trusting) predecessors (1959). Goffman calls this the 'sense of one's place' and utilises the analogy of a stage, where the agents are given a role to enact to a particular audience, and therefore follow the script they have been given. While they can deviate from the script because the relationships presented occur in the structural setting of the habitus, they are likely to continue in its enactment for the most part (1959). As the script, in this thesis, is to continue in the enactment of trusting behaviour in the face of certain cues from the other, the agents mostly continue to play along, making trusting behaviour embedded as practice a powerful force as background knowledge because it is continually reified. While they have agency, their role dictates that they are predisposed to trust one another even if there are deviations in the way in which their personal-self trusts or distrusts in the other, providing a motivation to not go against the common sense or habitus that the field encapsulates. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, agents are so embedded at this point that when they tried to reflexively change the structure or go beyond the script expected of them, they were met with

extreme opposition or confusion. This demonstrated to them that the only way to work effectively was to continue the re-enactment that was expected of them, despite the fact they had been more reflexive.

As a result of this discussion, it is important to note that interpersonal interactions can contribute to or detract from trust. Furthermore, if practices are unsettled then so too is trust. This is compatible, however, with the definition of trust adopted. Luhmann argues that trust allows us to replace a complicated objective world with one which is less complex and makes us certain where we should not be (1979). At its maximum point, trust can ensure that 'most of the contingently possible future events are thought of as zero for all practical purposes … because to trust is to live as if certain rationally possible futures will not occur' (Lewis and Weigert 1985: 969). Möllering (2006a) terms this mental state 'suspension' - a 'fiction' where actors can view social vulnerabilities 'as if' they were favourably resolved by bracketing out uncertainty (See also - Beckert 2005). This idea of suspension has been adapted and developed by Wheeler (2018) to explain the subjective certainty of the trustor that the trustee is sincere. Within this thesis, I argue at the stage of PBT actors produce and reproduce practices of trust but that this is not a decision to trust. Rather, these practices of trusting emerge out of earlier decisions to trust. Trusting remains unreflexive, performed, and reproduced until trust and the underlying practices are unsettled. Agents have a choice to not re-produce the structure and practices, and therefore trust, but as it is taken-for-granted often choose to. This may occur if practices are unsettled. Agents would either attempt to rationalize their feelings about trust and seek further indicators of trustworthiness, or even question their trust entirely. Within PBST this rationalization is prevented through the re-enactment of practices imbued with meanings of trustworthiness.

This thesis proposes certain diplomatic routines and practices facilitate this habitual form of trust. These are the practices of 'saving face' among decision makers, practices of private diplomacy, the practices of consensus decision-making, and informal diplomatic practices, in line with Glase (2017) and Davies (2016, 2018). These are linked in the sense that they are all essentially contributing

to the process in which diplomatic practices were structured to save embarrassment and the emergence of negative feelings, and these provide the rules and routines for trusting (Kroeger 2017). They have been insufficient in creating a shared identity, but they contribute to the script that the new agents follow, as they draw attention to the enactment of trusting behaviour in response by disposing actors to un-reflexively behave in this way. Leaders, when trusting others, refer to these practices or a wider mythology to demonstrate the meaning their behaviour is meant to convey and the behaviour expected in return. Following from this, other agents who had not had such interpersonal trust development come to see these trusting behaviours rationalised by this mythology as the normal way of conducting business. Through this, trusting behaviour becomes consistent through re-enactment and this allows a dependable expectation of peaceful change to occur, as throughout the field there is a constructed collective expectation or disposition of trust. As such, trusting behaviours as practices enacted by embedded agents lead to continued taken-for-grantedness. As will be demonstrated these trusting behaviours as practice becomes routinised, well scripted and well-rehearsed, and are undertaken by agents who have clearly defined roles in relation to the structure.

Of course, one concern that arises is how do we measure something that is taken for granted or recognise the script. This has for the most part being considered in the methodology, but it is worth noting that the measurements remain the same. Instead it is the frequency of the behaviour and the references to them that is demonstrated in this thesis to change. As trust becomes practice based there are less references to trust because it is already taken for granted. While the behaviour remains the same, but is enacted on a more frequent basis, references to enacting behaviour because that is how it has always been done are particularly important, as are references to the role being played by the agents. This will be supported by interview data that unsettled the worldview of the agents in order to get them to reflect on what constitutes their everyday rules of the game.

3.7 Conclusion

The final stage of the development of trusting relationships, therefore, is based on the logic of practicality. As previously discussed, Pouliot when analysing NATO argued that we-feelings have not occurred, but practices can constitute a security community, making practice an ideal starting point when looking at how trust evolves (2010). The argument is that trusting relationships can culminate in a relationship whereby the decision to trust is based less on reflexivity and more on background knowledge. This background knowledge- based trust results from trusting behaviours that have been enacted repeatedly over time, leading trust to become tacit and the 'natural attitude' in response to patterned sets of behaviour. In this conceptualisation trust has become habitus, routine, or habit within the relationship through praxis, and is embedded in structure; potentially providing a positive feedback loop allowing explanation for the long-term dependable expectations of peaceful change. When coming to a decision, therefore, these structural elements and tacit knowledge can influence the decision to trust by providing stable sources of belief.

Through the logic of practicality, it is possible to argue that if trusting behaviour as an action is repeated sufficiently it becomes practice linked to tacit knowledge, related to the role they play in a particular field. This demonstrates trust becoming institutionalised through proliferation across time that creates a stable relationship of trust (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Ministers and diplomats in the ASEAN structure come to be expected to enact a certain role and behaviour, particularly trusting behaviour that allows the institutionalisation of trust through enacted practices, embedded structurally. The thesis will adopt the framework that explores how trust is enacted by sets of individuals, and whether these trusting practices proliferates into wider states structures that is eventually independent of time and the original actors themselves, creating a stable framework for a trusting relationship that is individually driven and structurally embedded.

One of the previous limitations, however, on both the institutionalisation of trust literature and the literature surrounding the 'logic of practicality' is that there is little focus on how habits,

routines, or practices emerge. This chapter has provided a conceptualisation of trust as a sequence, whereby varied inputs inform a decision to trust which results in varied trusting behaviour. Through demonstrations of the limitations of debates over what causes trust and whether trust is an attitude or choice, it has argued that conceptualisations need to move beyond these debates and instead operationalise trust as part of an integrative framework. This framework allows for an analysis of how trusting relationships develop over time, as it suggests that different inputs can be weighted differently at different stages, as well as includes the nature of the relationship as a significant input.

The chapter has hypothesised different stages relevant to IR, by suggesting that KBT, reconceptualised to consider different forms of knowledge rather than the cognitive only, provides the primary inputs following CBT. It argues that KBT is of primary importance, as trusting behaviours constituted by the affective and cognitive knowledge of the other also begins to constitute a social knowledge of what behaviour is seen as trustworthy and trusting. KBT, therefore, is a bridge between the interpersonal and institutional, as it emphasises the emergence of patterning behaviour but recognises the importance of the individual in constituting the behaviour. This results in a structure or field built upon not only trusting behaviours as socially meaningful practices but also diplomatic practices which further contribute to trust. PBT provides a strong theoretical insight into how relationships can be removed from an interpersonal dyad, but still maintains trust as an individual concept.

Chapter 4: Distrust and Distrust-Reduction Pre-1967[5]

4.1 Introduction

With the framework and questions in place, the thesis will now analyse the extent to which distrust dominated in the period preceding ASEAN's creation. Such an analysis of distrust is a significant starting point to show Southeast Asia was a context where distrust initially had a substantial grounding. By demonstrating the extent to which distrust dominated, the chapter is intended to contextualise the study. Further than this, however, I aim to demonstrate the initial stages of distrust-reduction that were required for a point of ambivalence to take hold. I argue that ASEAN could not emerge when relations were characterised by high distrust, and instead distrust had to be reduced for ambivalence to emerge that facilitated the creation of ASEAN. By demonstrating the factors that led distrust to dominate, in line with the framework previously offered, this chapter therefore opens the opportunity for understanding why trust-building could not emerge without an initial process of distrust-reduction.

As discussed in the framework, distrust is a separate construct from trust. In effect high distrust will lead to no trusting behaviours emerging due to negative expectations formed upon elements such as certainties about the others malevolence or dishonesty, requiring a process of distrust-reduction. The chapter focuses on two interlinked crises that led to an overwhelming sense of distrust between Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian leadership; *konfrontasi* (confrontation) involving primarily Indonesian and Malaysian leaders, and Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia. Crucially, by analysing these two prior crises the chapter aims to demonstrate that distrust-reduction was a necessary, if not necessarily sufficient, condition for ASEAN's creation and the trust-building that occurred following, and therefore necessary for the beginning stages of the trusting relationships analysed in the following three chapters.

[5] Parts of the arguments made in this chapter have been published under Edwards 2018

Whilst such a focus on distrust may seem to run counter to the thesis, it highlights that trust was a necessary factor in transforming the relationships as the underlying issues within the crises themselves do not disappear, but instead become less significant as the interstate relations of ASEAN's member states develop. Through distrust-reduction, the relationships came to be characterised by low levels of distrust, that was not sufficiently high enough to prevent the emergence of high trust in relation to other areas. With distrust in some areas becoming manageable, trust could be consciously considered in reconciliation efforts following, meaning it became an important dynamic as ASEAN moved forward.

4.2 Crisis 1*: Konfrontasi* (1963-1966)

Prior to the formation of ASEAN, the Indonesian and Malaysian[6] relationship was defined by significant tensions, culminating in *konfrontasi* (confrontation). Contemporary accounts of the period just following ASEAN's formation point to the significant 'suspicion, even hatred' that had been instigated and are worth exploring to demonstrate how there was distrust between Sukarno[7] and Subandrio[8] on the one hand, and Tunku Abdul Rahman[9] and Tun Razak [10]on the other (Sudarsono 1973: 7). Lee Kuan Yew's (LKY)[11] perceptions will also be discussed, though this will be limited as Singapore was within the Malaysian federation for most of *konfrontasi*, and Singapore was not independent until one year before *konfrontasi's* end in 1965.

[6] Any references made to 'Malaysia' signifies this was post September 16th 1963, the day Malaysia was formed as a unified entity. References to 'Malaya', 'North Borneo', 'Sabah', 'Sarawak' and 'Singapore' are made pre-September 16th 1963

[7] Sukarno was the leader of the Indonesian independence movement against the Netherlands, and subsequently became President from 1945-1967.

[8] Subandrio was the foreign minister during this period, from 1957-1966, widely considered to be one of the architects of *konfrontasi.*

[9] Tunku Abdul Rahman is considered to be the primary actor in Malayan independence, serving as Chief Minister from 1955-1957. Following independence he became Prime Minister of Malaya between 1957-1963, and Malaysia 1963-1970. He also served as Foreign Minister between 1960-1970. Tunku is an honorific, so he will be referred to as 'The Tunku'.

[10] Formally Abdul Razak Hussein but commonly known as Tun Razak was Deputy Prime Minister between 1957 and 1970, as well as Minister of Defence and Minister of Rural Development

[11] LKY was Prime Minister of Singapore between 1959-1990. In this period there was no foreign minister post until 1965.

Tensions between the two states had not been expected – especially from the Tunku. Such unexpected tensions are of significance because Sukarno's actions seemingly existed outside of the Tunku's relatively positive expectations early on. In recounting these, he recalled a dream of Tun Razak's where he accompanied the Agung[12] to the Merdeka palace in Jakarta where the Agung was invited to sit on the empty throne, interpreted as an 'overture of peace…between peoples of the same origins and blood' (Rahman 1970: 54). Whilst a dream might be an odd source, such expectations of peace are also reflected in parliamentary records where the assumption seemed to be that Indonesia, based on same ethnic foundations, would become a friendly ally or bigger brother (For example Dewan Rakyat 1967). Despite this, prior to *konfrontasi*, the Tunku's government was viewed with suspicion from Indonesian elites (Mackie 1974). Not only did Malaya seem complicit in the smuggling that occurred between Indonesia and Singapore, where goods flowed out of Indonesia and enriched Singapore, they also withheld support from Indonesia's bid to claim control over West Irian (Mackie 1974). The Tunku also refused Sukarno's request that Malayan bases be used if conflict broke out with the Dutch (Liow 2005a). This was exacerbated by the Tunku's attempted mediation on this issue, whereby he was insistent that the Dutch were willing to compromise and expected that the terms negotiated would be acceptable to Sukarno. Instead, he was attacked by Subandrio who argued in a 'vehement manner', that the Tunku was exceeding his mandate (Mackie 1974: 31; Rahman 1975). These early tensions and representations of distrust soured the personal relationships between the leadership of Malaya and those of Indonesia, providing an obstacle to the emergence of trust that would come to characterise their relations.

When the Tunku announced his intention to form a unified Malaysian state he expected Sukarno to support its formation. Despite limited suspicions, there had been positive elements in their relationship such as the 1959 Treaty of Friendship, and the Tunku believed that the formation

[12] The 'Agung' refers to the to the more commonly spelt 'Agong' – a monarch elected from sultans in Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman would have been referring to either Abdul Rahman (not to be confused with the Tunku) who served until 1960, or Hisamuddin who succeeded him.

of the Malaysian state could benefit Indonesia by halting a perceived encroachment of the Chinese further south (Brackman 1966: 37; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973: 450). Senior elites in the Indonesian government, including Sukarno, Hatta[13] and Subandrio had already acknowledged awareness of the plan to form a unitary Malaysia as early as the fifties, and the Tunku ensured that the Indonesians were kept informed throughout discussions of the process to prevent perceptions of betrayal and falsehoods (Hatta 1965; Mezerik 1965; Brackmann 1966). This led Subandrio to publicly declare that there was no objection to the Malayan policy in a speech to the UN General Assembly, and a letter was published in the New York Times with the same statement (Brackmann 1966). Furthermore, after West Irian it was expected that Indonesia would focus internally with the unpredictable adventurism that had defined their foreign policy becoming significantly reduced (Liow 2005a).

Following the Brunei revolution of 1962, however, and Azahari's[14] declaration on a Unitary State of North Kalimantan, tensions quickly escalated; generating and demonstrating significant distrust[15]. Sukarno reversed the Indonesian policy of 'no objection' and supported the right of Brunei and the Northern Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak to be independent, despite the Tunku's prior assuredness that the Indonesians would not embark on such a policy (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973: 457). This reversal of policy can be seen as leading the Tunku to assume the worst of Sukarno, as he accused the Indonesians of complicity when arguing that 'the Borneo national army leading the revolt was created … in Indonesian Borneo', and claimed that 'Malaya's feelings were hurt' by the apparent funding, arming and training the rebels had gained in Indonesia (Mezerik 1965: 68; Liow 2005a: 114). Through this, the Tunku was made aware that Sukarno was willing to engage in

[13] Mohammad Hatta served as Vice President in Indonesia from 1945-1956

[14] Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud was a politician in Partai Rakyat Brunei between 1947-1962, but was involved in the failed revolt against the Sultan of Brunei.

[15] The Sultan of Brunei had initially announced his attention to join the Malay federation. Azahari, the leader of the Brunei's People Party instigated the Brunei revolt in 1962, on the basis of attempting to forge a Northern Borneo state separate from Malaya. Despite the failure of the revolt, the Sultan of Brunei reversed his decision and chose not to join the Malaysian federation.

falsehoods and the action was perceived as a betrayal, two important elements of distrust discussed above.

Singapore, being part of Malaysia, also bore the brunt of Sukarno's confrontation. The distrust that developed between Sukarno and the Tunku was also strongly felt by LKY. The issue of smuggling had also been a source of distrust, as had the Indonesian reaction to it. As LKY mentions, when he saw Subandrio in Singapore Subandrio remarked 'look at all the tall buildings in Singapore. They are all built with Indonesian money, stolen from Indonesians through smuggling. But never mind, one day Indonesia will come here and look after this country and put this right' (LKY 1998: 261). Such malevolent intentions caused distrust in their own right, but following the beginning of confrontation took on a greater certainty that intentions were indeed malevolent.

Following the Brunei revolt *Konfrontasi* was formally announced by Subandrio who according to the Tunku:

> '*For no reason that one could conceivably imagine, suddenly he turned a complete 'about-face' making a violent speech attacking Malaya'* (Rahman 1975: 96).

Sukarno, Subandrio and forces within Indonesia[16] therefore followed a process to undermine Malaysian control over areas in North Borneo, Sabah, and Sarawak – all of which had announced their intention to join the Malay federation alongside Singapore - through limited conflict and economic pressure (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973; Mackie 1974). As previously mentioned, trust in the early stages of a relationship is conceptualised as being based on elements such as a more rational assessment of ability, benevolence and integrity, as well as a perception of having an encapsulated interest. These actions on the other hand immediately undermined these bases of trust, and instead negative expectations were based on the idea that Sukarno and Subandrio were morally corrupt, and had malevolent intentions towards Malaysia. Instead of questioning whether

[16] Some of the forces generally pointed to are elements of the *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI – Communist Party of Indonesia) as well as *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* (TNI – Indonesia National Armed Forces)

Subandrio or Sukarno were benevolent or had integrity, the view was the complete opposite in the sense that the Tunku and Tun Razak became certain that the other held dangerous intentions. As will be demonstrated, once the Tunku began to feel certain that in his distrust towards Sukarno and Subandrio, he felt he could not reasonably engage in trusting behaviour as he believed Sukarno would certainly defect, leading to a reciprocal cycle of distrust. Sukarno and Subandrio had attempted to signal their apparently benign intent before the Brunei revolt, and in his letter to the New York Times Subandrio explicitly stated that their goodwill was an example of 'our honesty and lack of expansionist intent' (Liow 2005a: 99). Yet statements made following the revolt of having to choose a 'greater Malaysia or a greater Indonesia' demonstrated that such signalling was dishonest, increasing the view that Sukarno was deceptive in the Tunku's eyes (Liow 2005a: 99).

There are still debates concerning the extent either Sukarno or Subandrio premeditated *konfrontasi* or whether either party wanted to pursue it[17]. However, they at least embraced the concept and guided its escalation at different stages (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973). Various policy makers in the US and UK at the time viewed the conduct of affairs as being Sukarno's personal responsibility – a viewpoint shared by the Tunku who himself had a strong degree of autonomy in foreign policy making (Rusk 1965; Rahman 1973). By making himself the leader of *konfrontasi*, it is clear from the Tunku's writings that Sukarno and *konfrontasi* became inseparable, becoming a great source of personal distrust between the two due to the resulting value incongruence.

Diverging interests with regards to Western power and communist forces is particularly significant in the analysis of distrust between the two parties, as it demonstrates the degree to which they each considered the other to have diametrically opposing interests. These were based on

[17] Pluvier (1965) suggests that *Konfrontasi* was enacted by elites such as Subandrio who gained to benefit, and Poulgrain (1998) suggests that Subandrio was involved in the Brunei revolt preceding *Konfrontasi* and that his actions in misplacing a letter communicating proposed talks between the Tunku and Sukarno over the planned federation seems to verify some complicity (1998: 284). In both accounts Sukarno seems free of involvement and claims of premeditation. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung (1973), however, argues for Sukarno's complicity in the formation of *Konfrontasi*, and Mackie (1974) argues that the campaign 'bore the stamp of his personality' and that foreign adventures distracted from political instability domestically (1974: 2).

perceptions of ideological fundamentalism and value incongruence that helped constitute the 'enemy images' they began to hold of one another (Holsti 1962; Wheeler 2018). *Konfrontasi* had a basis in Sukarno's wider policy of confrontation against imperialism and the 'old established forces' and the 'new emerging forces', and a movement from non-alignment which he had supported in the past (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973: 313-4). This was marked by his speech referring to 'the era of confrontation', which laid out a militant policy against neo-colonialism (Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973: 314). This marked a complete separation in threat assessment, where Sukarno saw colonialism as the greatest threat and the Tunku saw communism as the greatest threat (Rahman 1960; 1980**;** Dewan Rakyat 1967: Mackie 1974; Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung 1973). Indeed, the majority of the threats discussed in parliament centred around the communist insurgency, with one backbencher MP arguing 'we were very much distracted by communism – it was our desire to focus on development, but how could we when instability threatened to undo all that we had inherited' (Interviewee 03). Sukarno's linkages to the PKI and his perceived sympathy for communism, therefore, represented a significant indicator he could not only not be trusted, but that he should be distrusted because his interests and values ran counter to the values of the Malaysian elite. These were unlikely to change, because they were predicated on Sukarno's increasing ideological fundamentalism (Interviewee 03).

Whilst it was unclear as to the extent to which Sukarno supported Communism himself, his connections to the PKI signalled to Malaysian elites that they should have little uncertainty over Sukarno's opposing interests (Interviewee 03). Malaysian elites were unsure whether Sukarno held communist views and sought expansion, or whether he was only appeasing his Communist base (Interviewee 03; Rahman 1975). Both intentions presented problematic aspects. If Sukarno was sympathetic to communism, he became a part of Malaysia's largest perceived threat, and no encapsulated interest or congruent values could emerge. However, if he was appeasing the PKI this too heightened distrust, as Sukarno had little ability to manage the domestic power bases without foreign policy adventurism. Once *konfrontasi* began certainty grew that Sukarno ultimately did

desire to expand Indonesia, as he did in West Irian, by incorporating Malaya and North Borneo (Subritzky 2000).

Sukarno also reciprocated the distrust placed in him, and began to attribute an enemy image the Tunku, especially related to concerns of what a greater Malaysia would mean for Indonesia. This resulted from Tunku's anti-communist rhetoric that had prevented Indonesian involvement in both SEATO and ASA, ASEAN's predecessor organisations (Haacke 2005). Malaya, under the Tunku, also sought to keep some of the vestiges of colonialism, particularly western involvement, due to the communist insurgency now threatening the stability of the Malaysian federation (Miller 1959; Haacke 2005). The Tunku himself stated that there was trust between Malaya's political parties and the British, resulting in continued goodwill and cooperation (Rahman 1984). This ran prior to Sukarno's desire to remove all Western, and indeed external, influence in Southeast Asia (Subritzky 2000). Indonesia had had a much bloodier decolonisation process than Malaya – leading Sukarno to argue Malaya was handed independence on a silver platter instead of having fought for it (Pluvier 1965). As a result Sukarno saw a Malayan controlled North Borneo as a direct threat to Indonesian security because it not only created a land border with Malaysia and divided the archipelago, but created the potential for the UK to maintain bases close to the Indonesian border (Mackie 1974; Severino 2006; Kupchan 2010; Subritzky 2000). Malaysia was viewed as a 'vehicle to perpetuate British influence in Southeast Asia' (Subritzky 2000: 42; Liow 2005a). Such tensions resulted in a strong polemical exchange resulting in the Tunku to state 'keep your hands out of our affairs', and with Subandrio suggesting they would arrange a Soviet base in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) if any neo-colonial bases were built on the Malaysian side (Liow 2005a: 108).

Certainty over Malaysia's attempts to undermine Indonesia was also reflected in their concerns over the Tunku's potential expansionist aims. Indonesia is constituted by many ethnicities, though the political class is often drawn from the Javanese. Whilst Malaya had some links in common with Java, it had a much stronger affinity to Sumatrans due to the proximity between

Sumatra and Malaya. Such areas had undergone rebellion against the Javanese centre during the 1958 outer island rebellion, and many of the refugees still found sanctuary in Malaya, creating the impression that the Tunku had sympathy for the rebellion (Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1960). Sukarno saw this as proof that a Greater Malaysia would be an attractive prospect for Sumatra (Liow 2005a). The Tunku had discussed the prospect of 'stirring up trouble in Sumatra' and was looking at contingency plans to create unrest (Rahman 1970: 25). This was done in such a public manner that the British had to apply pressure on the Tunku to not make further public statements which 'might tend to reinforce Indonesia's suspicions of Malaysia as a potentially hostile neighbour' (Salkirk 1963).

Despite this the Tunku continued to explore contingency plans concerning Sumatra, with Tory arguing:

> *'They seem confident that if they really set out to do so they could make trouble for Sukarno at home…have received messages from Sumatra in favour of Malaysia, and they are clearly much tempted to follow up leads of this kind into Indonesia'* (1963: 128).

Such attempts to prevent the Tunku from speaking out failed, and in a speech he called on the Indonesian people to overthrow Sukarno. Carrington, reporting a conversation with the Tunku, shared the comments the Tunku continuously made:

> *'Sukarno is now a helpless sex maniac, and incapable of rational thought on politics . . . Anti-Jakarta elements should be encouraged and assisted to split Indonesia up – Action could be independent; the Sumatran Malay rulers could easily bring their states into Malaysia alongside their Malayan cousins... There could be an all-embracing Federation of all the Malaysian countries. He was keeping in touch with Indonesian dissidents. They wanted money and other material assistance. This should be provided'* (Carrington 1963: 214).

This led to Subandrio viewing the Tunku as 'clearly wish[ing] to annex Sumatra', with UN under-secretary Narasimhan arguing that he found Indonesians 'very distrustful not so much of the concept of Malaysia, as of Malayan intentions, either of annexing Sumatra or of allowing a Chinese Communist danger to develop in the Borneo Territories' (in Peck 1963: 140). The potential expansionist aims on both sides, therefore, resulted in a situation whereby there was much certainty about the other's malevolence and dishonesty. Distrust became reciprocal as both increasingly engaged in behaviour which served only to increase this distrust. This resulted in bounded enemy images and significant distrust, grounded in perceptions of the other's ideological fundamentalism that ran counter to their own ideological beliefs and perceptions, as well as the tendency for the other to engage in falsehoods – two of the main causes of distrust discussed above.

As the course of *konfrontasi* continued, distrust between the elites also continued to grow due the reciprocation of distrust, growing differences of interest, and confirmation that they would pursue interests in ways that was damaging to the other. The way in which both negotiations and *konfrontasi* progressed, with representations of distrust and an absence of trusting behaviours, added to the negative expectations held on both sides. Negotiations were perceived to be an unnecessary risk, mostly on the side of the Malayan elite. They had no way in knowing what Sukarno's desired outcome was with regards to *konfrontasi,* and both felt certain the other was malevolent, influencing their viewpoints of each other from the start (Dewan Rakyat 1967; Mackie 1974)[18]. Disagreements over interpretation of the Manila and London Agreements prevented a reduction in distrust and ensured the continuation of *konfrontasi* – dooming the relationships. As *konfrontasi* was intensifying, tripartite meetings between Sukarno, the Tunku and Macapagal[19] were suggested, in order to seek a way to end confrontation and compromise on how Malaysia would

[18] Interestingly this lack of clarity of Sukarno's intentions was not limited to the Tunku or Malaysian side. Despite ongoing contact between the US and Sukarno, they claimed to find it difficult to assess his intentions, and were not sure on Sukarno's desired end point (Read 1964: 29)

[19] Diosdado Macapagal was the President of the Philippines 1961-1965

come into being. There was hope that such a meeting would provide a way to end the conflict, especially after Sukarno and the Tunku met in Tokyo in 'amicable conditions' and agreed on June as the date for the meeting (Jones 2000: 57). The path to negotiation contributed to significant certainty concerning Sukarno's insincerity. As mentioned, his integrity had already been decimated in the Tunku's view - but as Indonesia slipped further into political instability it seemed increasingly clear that Sukarno could not actually end *konfrontasi* even if he wanted to. Whilst some accounts demonstrate a degree of cordiality in initial meetings between Sukarno and the Tunku, there were contradictions in the leaders' recounting of the meetings and what was agreed – Sukarno claimed that the Tunku had agreed to an investigation into whether North Borneo wanted to join Malaysia but the Tunku stated he had not discussed any such conditions (Jones 2000).

Despite this, the meeting resulted in the Manila Agreement, whereby the Tunku, who had set the date as 31st of August for Malaysia's formation, compromised and suggested he was willing to await a UN investigation into the population of North Borneo's wishes. *Maphilindo*, a confederation of the three countries, was also formed to enhance cooperation. Whilst these were positive indications, there were some significant suspicions underlying the Agreement. The Tunku, despite offering to delay Malaysia's creation, was concerned that this was merely a delaying tactic that would allow Indonesia to step up their campaign against Malaysia (Subritzky 2000). This resulted in him remark to Baldwin 'it is impossible to trust the Indos' and that he only underwent the process to try and ensure Malaysia came about peacefully (Baldwin 1963). Subritzky argues that the text of the resulting Manila 'Joint Statement' has been called a masterpiece of evasion and compromise, and whilst this resulted in an agreement being made, these factors would go on to have a hugely negative impact on the Tunku and Sukarno's relationship. It destroyed any hope at all that distrust-reduction could be successful enough to bring distrust low enough to begin a process of trust-building. Interpretation over the role of observers created significant tensions – Indonesia wanted officials that would consult with the UN team as well as observe the process, whilst Malaysia

did not want Indonesian officials playing such a role (Jones 2000). Indonesian dishonesty was confirmed furthermore, when Malaysian intelligence reported that Nasution[20] and Subandrio had been working to ensure that Indonesian military intelligence officers would be embedded in the observer teams in order to sabotage the process as much as possible (British Foreign Office 1963).

Of most significance was the London Agreements, in which Malaysia and the United Kingdom agreed to transfer sovereignty of North Borneo to Malaysia. The Tunku's belief that the investigation was a tool for Sukarno to save face was quickly shown to be incorrect. When the Tunku and Sandys announced that the formation of Malaysia would go ahead before U Thant's report was released, Sukarno seemingly felt extremely betrayed, stating publicly 'I declare to the world that Tunku Abdul Rahman is a man who does not keep his word' (Mezerik 1965: 74). Later, privately to the US ambassador to Indonesia, he stated that he felt 'insulted and humiliated' due to the 'real tearing up of Manila agreement', where the Tunku 'betrayed Indonesia before the ink was even dried' (Mackie 1974: 151; Jones 1964a: 83). When the report was released Sukarno is quoted as saying:

> *'I cannot accept it …I know this game . . .I have seen the Dutch play it. Interview head men of tribes. Interview local officials. Interview people while soldiers with bayonets stand by. What do you expect? No, no, no… I will accept a real test but not this'* (Jones 1963: 62).

Such perception that one leader had gone against his word was not one sided, however; perceptions of dishonesty were reciprocated. The Tunku believed that at Manila Sukarno had been 'bluffing' the Tunku into believing he only wanted a symbolic acquiescence from the Malayan leadership, whereas the reaction to Malaya signing the London Agreements demonstrated this was not the case, and instead he suspected Sukarno would not have accepted it no matter what (Rahman 1970; Mackie 1974: 149). The Tunku later called the Manila meeting a:

[20] Abdul Haris Nasution was Indonesian Minister of Defence and Security 1959-1966

'shadow-play… [where] Indonesia and the Philippines were aiming at delaying Malaysia in every possible way, but these same velvet voices were those that were threatening us … the chronology of these events showed clearly that the President Sukarno had made up his mind never to accept the idea or the fact of a nation on Malaysia' (Rahman 1977: 96, 97).

These developments disrupted any potential for distrust-reduction and instead deepened distrust. Both elite perceptions of the other lacking integrity and benevolence was reinforced and reciprocated, as they became increasingly certain that the other was being dishonest and would defect at each opportunity. By going against agreements, for example, the Tunku (in Sukarno's eyes) signalled that he did not have integrity as he did not keep to the agreement, and instead defected. However, the Tunku had a similar view of Sukarno, as in his perception the agreement was meant as a face-saving device rather than strict guidelines on how to proceed. Instead he thought Sukarno was taking the opportunity to undermine the agreement, and had never intended to accept Malaysia but was instead still seeking ways to undermine it. Any attempts at trust-building were over-ambitious and instantly seen with suspicion, meaning any future negotiations continuously stalled, and the distrust on both sides prevented any meaningful outcome – demonstrating the necessity for its reduction. Whenever 'peace offences' were launched under privately guaranteed ceasefires, therefore, re-evaluations of the guarantees, continued border violations, and Indonesian guerrilla activity would undermine them. This reinforced the certainty concerning Sukarno's malevolent intentions and insincerity in wanting to find a peaceful solution (Reischauer 1964; Galbraith 1964; Komer 1964; Forrestal 1964; Ball 1964; Rahman 1977). The situation worsened to the point that the Tunku refused to meet Suharto before he could be sure of Indonesia's 'honesty and sincerity' (Rahman 1997: 109). For Sukarno any trust and meaningful action was seen as impossible because the Tunku and Tun Razak continued to make anti-Sukarno statements, he viewed them as attempting to exploit the situation of political instability and he thought the Tunku

and Tun Razak were ultimately unfairly rigid at conferences when they had suggested a degree of flexibility beforehand (Jones 1964a; Rusk 1964a). According to US Secretary of State Rusk, such actions produced an 'atmosphere [which] also failed produce hoped-for diminution of mutual distrust and antipathy between Indo[nesian] and Malaysian leadership. Instead, it sharpened them' (1964a: 113). It was at this stage where the Tunku remarked 'so ended any attempt to bring about a personal settlement between President Sukarno and myself' (Rahman 1977: 110), as when agreements were made the processes were 'cloaked with mistrust, suspicion and some degree of confusion' (Jones 2000: 265).

With regards to the level that such hostility and distrust was felt between the elites on an interpersonal level, it is important to demonstrate that the two leaders had a particularly problematic relationship personally – especially as the differences prevented them from being able to identify with one another, another foundation of trust. Sukarno's personality was particularly questionable in the view of the Tunku. The populist, self-aggrandizing and 'large' personality (or ego) of Sukarno caused interpersonal issues between the two leaders due to the Tunku's preference for reservation (Miller 1959: 7; Read 1964; Mackie 1974; LKY 1998). Sukarno's words 'were the rantings of a demented person… he was unpredictable, irresponsible, so irrational that everything relating to Malaysia annoyed him and his over-weening super-ego' (Rahman 1989: 110). This meant that personal differences would interfere and heighten poor relations (Rusk 1964c). As mentioned, *Konfrontasi* was often linked to Sukarno himself. This perception was clearly demonstrated by the Tunku in his various memoirs – confrontation was always framed as 'Sukarno's confrontation', with 'the threat from President Sukarno to annihilate us with a "*Ganyang Malaysia" (*Crush Malaysia) war cry' (Rahman 1977). Going further, the Tunku suggests that confrontation arose due to Sukarno's 'arrogance' and jealousy of Malaysia's relative success, and that he had to 'take things quietly' to 'oppose his wrath' (Rahman 1977: 86,97,99; 1989: 110). One interviewee recalled that Sukarno pursued confrontation as a distraction and to cover up his failings as a man, and that he could

adroitly mislead people due to his charismatic ways (Interviewee 03). The Tunku suggested that Nasution was 'sympathetic' to the idea of peace but that Sukarno and Subandrio had 'personal grudges' and that it was only this 'clique' who could stop hostilities (Rahman 1977: 87). Sukarno, too, distrusted the Tunku due to his background – the Tunku had been educated in England which Sukarno linked to as being an element of neo-colonialism (Subritzky 2005). Provocations and the war of words were generally quite personal with regards to attacks on each other's characters, not just the countries (Mackie 1974). When the Indonesian embassy was rioted against in Kuala Lumpur after *konfrontasi* began, claims that the Tunku had stamped on the *Garuda* (eagle)[21] and Sukarno was reportedly angered by the insults that had been directed towards him (Mackie 1974). Harsono, Subrandio's spokesman, issued an extraordinarily abusive attack on the Tunku claiming he 'was around the bend' (Mackie 1974: 121). There was a huge incompatibility in policy but also personality, meaning enemy images were not just bounded in the other as representatives but also as individuals.

This resulted in a period between the formation of Malaysia and the toppling of Sukarno whereby a stalemate was reached that required distrust-reduction in order to overcome. Distrust had been reciprocated to the point that both Tunku and Sukarno had conditions for negotiation as they could not trust the other to not exploit negotiations for their own benefit, so were unwilling to engage in them without prior assurances. The Tunku established conditions whereby any negotiations would only take place once Indonesian guerrillas had been withdrawn and Malaysia recognised, as he did not want to negotiate with such an exploitable situation overhanging him (Jones 1964b; Rusk 1964b; Ball 1964). Sukarno needed some sort of 'sweetening of the pill' but did not trust the Tunku to keep any moves made secret and not exploit Sukarno's domestic situation (Jones 1964b: 100; Rusk 1964b: 170; Ball 1964: 206).

[21] The symbol of Indonesia

4.3 Crisis 2: Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia

Prior to ASEAN's creation, another crisis that demonstrated the importance of reducing distrust was Singapore's expulsion from Malaysia in 1965, which affected relations of all three member states but contributed especially to a great sense of distrust between Malaysian and Singaporean leaders – the Tunku and Tun Razak, and LKY. The story of the separation itself is a story of distrust – focused around value incongruence such as racial and ideological differences that not only prevented the emergence of an encapsulated interest, but also led to significant enemy images. The immediate actions surrounding the expulsion of Singapore suggested that distrust between the two states' leaders would dominate their countries relations, due to the falsehoods they had both perpetuated. This event would therefore further contribute to obstacles for ASEAN's creation that required a reduction of distrust.

Perhaps one of the most iconic political images in Singapore's short history as an independent nation is LKY crying on national TV on August 9th, 1965, as he announced that Singapore would be leaving the Malaysian federation. Prior to this momentous event, however, distrust had quickly been growing between the elites of Malaya (later Malaysia) and Singapore. The first reason was the racial divisions between the two states, and this would also influence the second reason for distrust - political ideologies. Race has long been a contentious issue in Malaya and Malaysia – predominantly *Melayu*[22] but including a large Chinese minority as well as a significant Indian minority, that were bolstered by the need for migrant labour under British rule. The most immediate threat in the perception of Malays was seen in the narrative surrounding the Communist insurgency. The perception was that the communist forces were mostly constituted by Chinese, and there was an openly stated concern from Malaysian leaders and parliamentary members that the

[22] Melayu refers to 'Malay'. A Malay person is classed in Article 160 of the constitution as one who 'professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay customs and is the child of at least one parent who was born within the Federation of Malaysia before independence of Malaya on 31 August 1957, or the issue (off-spring) of such a person.' (Malaysia Attorney General's Chambers 2019) This is not to be confused with *Orang Asli* (Original Person) the indigenous peoples of Malaysia.

incorporation of Singapore, with its majority Chinese population, would feed the communist insurgency and lead it to escalate by providing extra forces. LKY himself acknowledged the large amount of support for communism - legitimised by the communists' active role in politics (LKY 1998).

The creation of the communist party, *Barisan Socialis*, and their success in the elections demonstrated how powerful they were in Singapore (Head 1964). This created problems with regards to the Tunku trusting Singapore in the first place, as he had no desire to allow communists to gain a foothold in Malaya, but particularly problems with regards to the fact he was suspicious of LKY's ability to maintain power and prevent this from occurring (Head 1964; Interviewee 03). Following on from this, LKY's planned visits to Moscow and Beijing led to the Tunku to be 'appalled' due to LKY 'associating with the enemy', the Tunku began to view him as disobedient, and many elites began to suspect his intentions (Dewan Rakyat 1967; LKY 1998: 251, 276; Interviewee 03). Immediately prior to the merger, therefore, much of the discussion centred on arresting prominent communists in order to ensure that they would be unable to destabilise the Malaysian federation. The process in which this was undertaken only seemed to have deepened distrust due to broken agreements, however, where betrayal and falsehoods were emphasised. It was eventually agreed that Singapore would take the brunt of the criticism by arresting the communist MPs and other prominent communists – which they had no desire to do as they thought that the British or federal government should shoulder the burden. In exchange, the Tunku agreed to arrest two 'subversive' federal MPs as a sign of solidarity and burden sharing. On the day, however, the Tunku changed his mind and the operation was cancelled, meaning that even when LKY eventually decided to undertake the operation, despite a lack of assurances from the Tunku, he had extreme doubts about 'the Tunku's real intentions' (LKY 1998: 283). From LKY's memoir it is clear that LKY's perception is that he had essentially been used by the Tunku, and any goodwill expected due to LKY's attempts to

signal that he was willing to cooperate was not reciprocated – instead it was distrust that was (LKY 1998).

Whilst the communists were a real immediate threat, such racial and communal divisions had longer roots due to the perceived lack of assimilation by the minorities into Malay culture, and the disproportional economic strength of the minorities due to a degree of favouritism under the British. Whilst the administration was run by the Malays, the commercial and industrial fields were dominated by the British and the Chinese (Head 1964). Head referred to the *'*mutual fears and suspicious [that] existed in the old Malaya; but that were lulled during British rule', when warning that these would prove problematic in the case of union between Singapore and Malaya (Head 1964: 88).

Policies fought for and negotiated during Malayan independence, therefore, had a strong focus on the political, economic, and social domination of the Malays, culminating in the so called *Bumiputera (*Son of the Land)[23] affirmative action policies (Rahman 1984). This became a key question during the merger, especially as Singapore inside Malaysia would be expected to follow the same *bumiputera* laws despite having a strong Chinese majority, in order to assuage tensions Malaysia felt in incorporating a state which was predominantly Chinese, and which could upset the racial balance that they aimed to ensure (Head 1964). LKY himself lost hope of merger based on the Tunku's public position the racial imbalance would cause upset, and the lack of trust he had that the Chinese would be serving the interests of Malaysia: 'Many Chinese-educated and new immigrants to the country,' he said, 'will always be loyal to China and they are less Malayan-minded' (LKY 1998: 219). Whilst LKY acknowledged this was the Tunku's reaction to vulnerability with regards to his relations with Malay nationalists, who would potentially revolt against the Tunku if he allowed the

[23] Bumiputera refer to Malays and the Indigenous peoples of Malaysia. They are mostly affirmative action policies that range from favourable entrance into universities, and economic assistance and discounts.

Chinese to 'swamp the Malays', it initially prevented a working relationship from forming (LKY 1998: 219; Interviewee 03). Constant discussions of race between the two leaders throughout the process led them to consider each other as extremely different and representing inconsolable positions, preventing trust from emerging (LKY 1998). Indeed, it formed a basis of distrust as it demonstrated that both leaders had very different values.

This representation of different viewpoints led to an atmosphere where compromise was impossible. Instead a deep-seated distrust in the other, based along the fact they represented conflicting communal societies, prevented meaningful cooperation. It was only the holding onto the bumiputera laws within Singapore, as well as limiting Singaporean representation in the federal government, that would allow the Tunku to 'get over his deep-seated fears about having to absorb more Chinese' (Dewan Rakyat 1967: LKY 1998: 248; Interviewee 03). Despite the importance put upon these laws, however, and even though Bumiputera policies resulted in a strong degree of distrust amongst the Chinese population in the Malayan government, they were not enough to bridge the divide between the two leaders themselves. Any negotiations surrounding different elements of the merger, including minor issues of semantics such as the Tunku not agreeing to the use of the term citizen for the Singaporean population, continued to stall (Dewan Rakyat 1967; LKY 1998). When the British attempted mediation between the two through Head, it was asked if the Tunku could reach a détente with LKY, to which the reply was: 'no, … he did not trust [LKY] a yard and about whom he was completely disillusioned' (Head 1962).

Whilst British mediation allowed for the two leaders to eventually overcome their differences, distrust continue to plague the relationship. Negotiations between the leaders concerning different policies continued even immediately prior to the chosen merger date of September 16th. LKY was extremely concerned of the Tunku's intentions to follow through with the merger along the lines that he had agreed – even though there were differences in interpretation

over many of the policies, due to them being based on 'loosely worded undertakings given by the Tunku – a man in which he doubted the integrity of' (LKY 1998: 300). LKY himself says he had to get Tunku to sign promises on envelopes due to the Tunku's 'elastic' memory, and that even despite these the Tunku attempted to go ahead without the implementation of these policies. LKY added 'that the light-hearted manner in which solemn agreements in writing had been set aside by the Malayans under one pretext or another was most disturbing' (LKY 1998: 300). This led to a unilateral declaration of independence from LKY to warn that he could 'make things difficult for the Tunku if he did not fulfil his promises' – demonstrating that distrust between the two was at such that LKY was certain about the Tunku's desire to defect, meaning he reciprocated on it, and 'from then on they would always be guarded when dealing with [LKY]' (LKY 1998: 303). This was especially the case due to a perception from the Malayan government that 'that in a matter of expediency LKY will brush aside all sentiment and all tradition, and will treat his best friends just as shabbily as he would his worst enemies' (Sir de ley 1970; Interviewee 03).

Once the merger was realised, it quickly became apparent that levels of distrust had reached an essentially unsustainable limit as their interests, in relation to race and divisions of power, diverged. The 1964 race riots were plagued by accusations that the Singaporean Malays had been incited by the federal government (Head 1964). Whilst the Tunku wasn't directly involved, and attempted in part to dissuade racial tensions, LKY argued that by publicly stating he trusted the Tunku to keep extremists under control he was attempted 'to signal to the Tunku that [he] trusted him to do the right thing' (1999: 342). Despite this privately he had extremely strong reservations that the Tunku and Razak were allowing politicking along racial lines to remove LKY from office – a perception that grew the more racial violence erupted (Swee 1982). LKY had initially believed the racial issue would become muted once they joined together, but later went on to state 'I was wrong. The Tunku had no intention, none whatsoever…. the Malays had to be on top' (LKY 1998: 330). Race became an issue that would dominate the Malay parliament but was often centred on criticism of

LKY himself, with ultimatums from Razak that the government would no longer work with LKY and Singapore must 'find a sincere leader', and comments from other MP's that LKY represented a selfish type of Chinese who 'see China as centre of the world and Malaysia as a very poor second' (LKY 1998: 366-369).

Finally, these growing issues led to one factor that would prove inconsolable – the growing divergence in policies due to the disagreements previously centred around questions of devolution of power, which race also proved to provide an undercurrent. LKY actively sought to create a Malaysian Malaysia in which all citizens were equal despite race, which ran counter to the Tunku and much of Malays' desires to ensure that the Malay race had the advantage. This was to be done through PAP dominance in Singapore, as well as a growing base in Malaya itself. LKY's decision to run elections before the UMNO-MCA alliance could mobilise within Singapore was rightfully seen by the Tunku as an attempt to limit the power of the Malay government in Singapore, creating 'resentful feelings' (Interviewee 03). PAP surprisingly won six Malay seats in Singapore creating 'serious apprehensions' from the Malays (Head 1964: 88; LKY 1998). Following from this, PAP began to contest seats in Malaya itself. It was this issue that could be seen primarily to have led to the expulsion of Singapore; LKY, advocating for a Malaysian Malaysia, entered federal politics despite prior assurances that his party would only focus their attention to the Singaporean state (Interviewee 03). The betrayal of this bargain was much felt by the Tunku (Rahman 1989; Head 1965; LKY 1998). Attempts by the Tunku to get LKY to disengage from federal politics by surrendering his seats in exchange for greater autonomy were rejected. Disengagement was abandoned, meaning the 'bitterness' could not be removed – especially as 'neither side trusts the other; in particular none of the Malays in the Federal Government' (Head 1965: 331-2). An interviewee, even though a back bencher at the time, argued that 'LKY tried too much to interfere in our politics… when he tried to show off in the Malaysian parliament we knew we couldn't trust his words… his attempts at using the Malay language and pandering to us seemed insincere (Interviewee 03).

In *Looking Back,* the Tunku wrote 'the straw that broke the camel's back was a speech Mr LKY made in Parliament... He brought up many issues which disturbed the equilibrium of even the most tolerant Members of the House' (Rahman 1980: 37). Following on from this, the Tunku worked on disassociating Singapore from the federation, resulting in its expulsion. The expulsion cast Singapore into uncertainty and an environment which it perceived as extremely hostile; becoming a small Chinese dominated city state with a population of two million, surrounded by over 150 million ethnic Malays with whom tensions had escalated. Further to this, the relationship between its leader and the Tunku had completely broken down. Representing different ideological viewpoints, they had cast each other into enemy images that existed as long as the perceived ideological fundamentalism did. As *Konfrontasi* wound down, LKY's concerns of Indonesia now using conflict with Singapore as a diversion from its domestic issues grew. The Tunku, furthermore, had previously argued that 'a complete break between Singapore and Malaya might mean war and bloodshed with devastating effect on the people…War would result if an isolated Singapore sought solace in the company of powers unfriendly to the Federation (meaning China)' (Rahman 1964: 76). Whilst this is a story of racial and political division, it demonstrates the amount of distrust that had grown between two leaders who reciprocated distrust at every turn and who could not work together. Indeed, it was the opinion of the British at the time that these issues could have been solved had it not been for the antagonistic and distrustful relationship between the two specific statesmen (Head 1964). Different crises preceding, during, and following the merger presented the opportunity for the two statesmen to work together, but enduring differences in interests, constant personality clashes, betrayals and falsehoods created a certainty that they were right to distrust one another, and a strong enemy image between them.

4.4 Initial attempts at distrust reduction 1965-1967

What these cases demonstrate is that distrust was significantly high. This prevented meaningful cooperation and ensured that any general process of trust-building would fail if the sources of distrust were not actively addressed and reduced. Enemy images had become particularly salient as they viewed each other as having contrasting interests and values, whether due to support of communism, colonialism, or supporting different racial viewpoints. This section will cover the initial mechanisms of distrust reduction, before the next chapter covers the later stages of distrust-reduction and the concurrent initial stages of trust-building. Of importance in this stage was a process whereby enemy images bound up in concerns of ideological fundamentalism were slowly reduced, due to significant transformations in the relationships. While new sources of potential distrust also became apparent, they were more easily manageable than the fundamental sources which had created deadlock in the previous section, as they were not bound up in the same enemy images that had proved so immutable. However, the emergence of new sources of distrust, and the salience of distrust from the previous section, means that trust-building as a process would not be able to achieve positive expectations if the sources of negative expectations in themselves were not addressed, requiring an empathy-based reflection grounded in security dilemma sensibility.

In the Indonesia case, it was Suharto's coming to power in Indonesia which slowly reversed many of the confrontational policies that Sukarno had embarked on. This allowed distrust-reduction to slowly occur through a process whereby Suharto distanced himself, both domestically and internationally, from Sukarno's worldview. As distrust was bound up in Sukarno as an individual and the perception that it was his ideology leading to conflict, Suharto's active and eventual distancing from Sukarno was able to mitigate these salient sources of distrust. Crucially, many of these distancing efforts happened in the domestic sphere, which assisted in the reduction of distrust as it was more unlikely that they were deceptive as they were not intended as signals that could be subjectively interpreted (Yarhi-Milo and Hall 2012; Wheeler 2018). Instead the Tunku was able to

see they were occurring relatively objectively, as there were public domestic changes not directly tied to his relationship with Suharto, but which impacted on it as a result of the changes it had on the outlook of the Indonesian elites.

Sukarno's downfall is a particularly controversial topic, especially as a result of the genocidal killings of communists (and ethnic Chinese) that took place in the period following (see Melvin 2018). The relatively accepted version, however, is that it resulted through the divisions that had emerged within the TNI due to Sukarno balancing his power between the military and the PKI. This resulted in a coup attempt in 1965, when *Gerakan 30 September* (30th of September movement), an organisation within the military, kidnapped and killed six TNI Generals. Suharto[24], at the time a Major General in command of strategic reserves (KOSTRAD), was not targeted in the coup and instead took control of the military and organised it in a countercoup. Blaming the PKI, he embarked on a violent campaign which gradually dismantled the PKI, leaving the military with effective power in Indonesia. Whilst he did not officially seize power in 1965, Suharto used his new status to also slowly dismantle Sukarno's power through threats, media pressure and political manoeuvring. This initially left Sukarno as only a figurehead, especially when Sukarno granted all executive powers to Suharto in 1966. Sukarno, even though he was 'President for Life' then announced his resignation in 1967 in the face of impeachment organised by Suharto.

Such attempts at reducing distrust were initially limited as Suharto was unable to immediately reverse Sukarno's policies without undermining the legitimacy of his government. As LKY noted:

[24] Suharto was President of Indonesia between 1967 until 1998, commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces 1968-1973, and Minister of Defence 1966-1971

> *'Suharto played it out slowly and subtly….so gradual the moves to strip Sukarno of authority, for some time we did not see that power had already shifted away from Sukarno'* (LKY 1998: 262).

Even in March 1966 he was still unsure that Sukarno had lost power. In a 1966 speech, referencing the possibility of a return of *konfrontasi,* he argued that there were:

> *'certain aspects of policy which any Indonesian Government must pursue regardless of its particular ideological or political flavour. You can change governments but there are basic compulsions of a people grouped together'* (LKY 1966).

This demonstrated that at the time he was sceptical that the Indonesian government headed by Suharto could move away from their policies in any meaningful manner. In public, therefore, Suharto continued to engage in *konfrontasi*, but border incursions declined significantly immediately following his ascension to decision-making power, and he made overt attempts to end the issue with Singapore in particular (Intelligence Memorandum 1965). The rapid decline of *konfrontasi* following this, alongside Suharto's undermining of PKI power in Indonesia, quickly changed the atmosphere of Malaysian and Singaporean-Indonesian relations. The Tunku stated his willingness to 'watch and wait for any change in the attitude of the new regime towards Malaysia' rather than too quickly biasing the relationship, and Suharto, in his perception, 'revealed the beginning of a movement towards a peaceful end of confrontation' (Rahman 1983: 111, 134).

It was in Hong Kong only one week after the coup that such a movement began, between delegates who happened to enter the same elevator. Interestingly, it was military elites that began the process, with one interviewee arguing that had it not been for the willingness of members of Indonesian military to assure the Malaysian military that *konfrontasi* would end, no matter the political situation at home, then the official foreign minister talks may not have taken place as quickly as they did (Interviewee 02). Suharto, through an empathy-based reflection, understood that the actions that Indonesia had been taking under Sukarno was causing not only significant economic

issues, but also distrust and insecurity for their neighbouring states. Desiring to address these concerns, therefore, he was quick to begin a process of reassuring Malaysian elites that Sukarno's adventurism was a thing of the past. This was not enough to begin a process of trust, as it did not aim to initially create positive expectations, but instead it muted the negative expectations that had intensified throughout this period as he took steps towards demonstrating his peaceful intent through security dilemma sensibility. Whilst the Malaysian military delegation were initially sceptical, they believed the Indonesian delegation, with appeals to common military background and values, now had stronger agency within their own state to make their own decisions (Interviewee 02; Liow 2015b). This chance elevator meeting led to six secret meetings in Hong Kong and Bangkok led by Indonesian Lieutenant Colonel Ali Moertopo and Malaysian Ghazali Shafie[25] (Rahman 1983). Moertopo would have a strong initial involvement, and when he visited the Tunku himself, he created a strong effect on the Tunku who seemed to believe that peace had become a real possibility and that there had been a return to 'old times' and 'friendship' (Rahman 1983: 135). Suharto, too, had undertaken a secret operation during the twilight year of *konfrontasi*, Operation Khusus, which aimed to end the war (Smith 2000). Through such contact, as well as through observing Suharto's public criticism of Sukarno, the Tunku was able begin a process of muting negative expectations through a recognition that Suharto did not embody the same ideological fundamentalism that Sukarno had.

While there was little sign that Suharto could be trusted, and positive expectations did not develop in any meaningful way, negative expectations were mediated by this change of leadership. Increasingly seeing Suharto's policy direction and interests as being counter to Sukarno's, due to the domestic distancing in particular and the destruction of the PKI's influence, the Tunku began to make concessions such as reconfirmation of Sabahan and Sarawakian desires to remain in Malaysia without an explicit public statement concerning the end of border raids and incursions. This was not

[25] Ghazli Shafie served as a member of the civil service at this point, but later became foreign minister 1981-1984

trust, nor was it seen within the context of trust-building (Interviewee 02/03). Instead, it resulted from a degree of reduction of distrust, and the early stages of a muting of negative expectations as they were no longer certain that Suharto was as malevolent as Sukarno had been.

Such a muting was also a result of the fact that the Tunku, LKY and Suharto perceived each other to hold similar interests (anti-communism) through which they could begin cooperation, but distrust still resonated as Sukarno had not yet being completely removed from power. Adam Malik's[26] appointment as Indonesian foreign minister further assured the Tunku that Indonesia had dropped its more radical approach and reassured them that Indonesia would no longer be a predatory state due to Malik's anti-PKI posture during the years of *konfrontasi* (Rahman 1983; Smith 2000). LKY was less assured of this when Malik's appointment did not lead to many behavioural demonstrations of change in the Indonesia-Singapore relationship (Cheng 2013). Public statements from Malik and Suharto in the years following, however, demonstrated that they were distancing themselves from Sukarno's regime, even if this was a gradual process that could not result in the immediate end of conflict for domestic purposes. This became significant in 1966 when Suharto began a process of 'purifying and cleansing' of the Indonesian bureaucracy, including the Foreign Ministry – the institution seen as being the ideological fulcrum of the communist-inspired interests Indonesia had pursued under Sukarno (Mukmin 1991: 69–72; Nabbs-Keller 2013).

Commonalities were also actively emphasised, in order to engage in distrust-reduction in a departure from Sukarno's policy of emphasising differences. Again, these were not strong enough to begin trust-building, but they did help to reduce distrust and the negative expectations that they held towards one another. One such commonality was the fact that Suharto embraced a leadership style of quiet dignity over Sukarno's flamboyancy, closer to that of the Tunku (Haacke 2005). In Liow's (2005) ideas about kinship between Malaysian and Indonesian elites, furthermore, he states a discourse emerged between the leadership that emphasised them being 'blood brothers' due to

[26] Adam Malik was Indonesian Foreign Minister from 1966-1977, and Vice President from 1978-1983

regularly focused upon common socio-cultural identities. This discourse did not seem to resonate between the Tunku and Suharto in a meaningful manner, but there were references by both elite groups in order to reduce differences to mute the distrust that had taken hold (2005).

A key stage in this distrust-reduction between the Tunku and Suharto was the Bangkok Accord which eventually led to the Jakarta agreement, signed between Tun Razak and Malik on 16th August 1966. This agreement ended *konfrontasi* and pledged a reintroduction of formal diplomatic links. Sukarno managed to use what power he had left in order to reject this stipulation. However, the agreement that emerged facilitated distrust-reduction as there was a compromise whereby relations would be normalised, but no exchange of Ambassadors was to take place until the ascertainment of public will in the Borneo territories (Haacke 2005). These new diplomatic initiatives demonstrated that Suharto sought to maintain a low-profile foreign policy and move away from the adventurism of the past. This did not lead to trust. There was little certainty or evidence of positive expectations emerging, as significant questions persisted over the durability and sincerity of Suharto's new moderate stance, and the Tunku was reluctant to make himself vulnerable in any form, but it did assist in muting the negative expectations that had come to mark relationships characterised by high distrust. A certainty concerning the malevolence of the Indonesian elite was replaced about uncertainty concerning their benevolence.

I argue that changes in the Tunku – LKY relationship were even more limited, in the sense that the emergence of new significant sources of distrust limited the power of any attempts at distrust-reduction. However, I also argue that early attempts to mediate and address these represented a significant shift from issues causing high distrust based on ideology. which was showing no signs of reduction, to less salient forms of distrust that could be actively addressed as they did not necessarily result in an enemy image. While this period was too short to do this, there were indicators that a process reduction was beginning. Much of the Tunku's distrust stemmed from the problems of having Singapore inside of the federation and the impact of LKY's divergent policy

on domestic politics. For the Tunku, the expulsion of Singapore addressed those issues and some salient sources of distrust could be reduced almost immediately as the situation had fundamentally transformed (Dewan Rakyat 1967). LKY could no longer be involved directly in domestic policies, and the population of Singapore could no longer upset the internal Malaysian ethnic balance (Dewan Rakyat 1967). For the Tunku, LKY had to do very little to reduce distrust concerning the ideological differences, because the impact they could have had disappeared overnight. This was different for LKY, however, and new sources of distrust had emerged - especially concerning the survival of Singapore and their relationship with Malaysia. Immediate distrust-reduction therefore centred around seeking assurances that Malaysia would not intervene malevolently in Singapore's security, and addressing the immediate post-separation logistics and concerns.

Malaysia's actions initially did little to address these. The Tunku exercised little empathy-based reflection or security dilemma sensibility, meaning that these sources of distrust became salient to LKY. LKY expressed continual concern over matters of defence and the potential for Malaysian forces to intervene within the newly independent republic (1999). At the time of independence, Singapore had no armed forces of its own as the two battalions in Singapore were dominated by Malay troops and had a Malaysian brigadier. LKY, for example, was unhappy that Brigadier Syed Mohamed bin Syed Ahmad Alsagoff, who oversaw the battalions, insisted on escorting LKY to the first parliament meeting (LKY 1998). He saw this as the Tunku reminding LKY of who was really in charge, but chose to acquiesce so that there could be no excuse of Malaysian intervention. LKY also continued to distrust 'Malay Ultras in Kuala Lumpur' who he believed would try and instigate a coup by the Malaysian forces in Singapore and reverse independence (LKY 1998: 6). In his mind, 'many Malay leaders in KL believed that Singapore should never have been allowed to leave Malaysia but should have been clobbered into submission' and it was only the Tunku that was preventing this from occurring (LKY 1998: 6). In cases where LKY attempted to reduce-distrust, through actions such as posting of battalion of troops for confrontation duties to 'demonstrate our good faith and solidarity with Malaysia even though a formal defence treaty had not been

concluded', the Tunku seemingly continued to not recognise LKY's security concerns (LKY 1998: 16). This was followed by an agreement where a Malaysian regiment would occupy the now vacant barracks. As LKY saw the continued presence of Malaysian troops as unreasonable, while it may have reduced the Tunku's distrust of Singapore by acquiescing, it only increased LKY's distrust of the Tunku (1999).

Sources of distrust also emerged for the Tunku, as Singapore increasingly began to exercise sovereignty through seeking its own independent foreign policy. Singapore's recognition of Indonesia, and LKY's willingness to consider negotiations to end confrontation with Indonesia before Malaysia, had the opportunity to halt any process of distrust-reduction. LKY justified this, arguing that he was prepared 'to talk to anybody, at any place, at any time, to achieve peace and security for Singapore' and 'we want to be friends with Malaysia, but that does not mean that we have to be unfriendly with all the people who are unfriendly to Malaysia' (in Cheng 2013: 20). For their part, Singaporean leaders were also troubled by the secretive circumstances surrounding the end to *konfrontasi* that had not involved them (Leifer 2000). In the 'messy divorce' (Leifer 2000: 20), furthermore, there were many items of disagreement. LKY's visits to communist countries in Eastern Europe, disagreements over retaining a common currency, and a withdrawal from the Combined Defence Council due to 'Malaysian unilateral decision-making and overbearing demands' all became new sources of distrust that replaced the prior distrust stemming from ideological fundamentalism (LKY 1998: 230). This heightened what LKY perceived to be as an improbable chance of survival for the city state. Whilst this paints an extremely negative picture, and suggests that distrust was heightened overall, I argue that high distrust based on the immutable ideological fundamentalism had been replaced by broader, yet less salient, sources of distrust. Indeed, these sources of distrust did not have to be as immutable as the ideological fundamentalism they had replaced, as they did not create enemy images but were instead a result of both parties having difficulty in negotiating

their new roles towards one another. As Foreign Minister Rajaratnam said[27]: 'there is something unreal and odd about lumping our relations with Malaysia under foreign relations' (in Ganesan 2005: 34).

The separation was extremely problematic, and sources of distrust broadened, but at the same time even in this short and immediate period they were able to begin to negotiate their new roles and move towards distrust-reduction in a way that they could not when the sources of distrust were based on incongruent values. They both sought ways to cooperate with one another and reassure each other that cooperation was the best thing moving forward, and as they became more comfortable with their new realities, this was able to begin muting negative perceptions. The Tunku organised informal meetings at Federation house in Singapore and golfing in the Cameroon highlands, with the professed aim to sort out all the difficulties and go back to a more relaxed relationship. While LKY retained his suspicions over the Tunku's sincerity and ability to let go of Singapore, he argued 'I was reassured…. I knew he… did not like prolonged tensions or crises' (LKY 1998: 228). This facilitated a reduction of distrust that remained high, but at least reduced it to the point where cooperation could occur in a meaningful manner in contrast to the previous relationship. The issues that had so divided them before, including the PAP involvement in Malaysian politics, were no longer an obstacle to cooperation and no longer resulted in them viewing the other as the enemy. Instead both elites realised that they would have to work together to solve common goals as they faced a common interest in a successful separation and the maintenance of both regimes in both countries. The Tunku may have disliked LKY in the past but he disliked even more the idea of an unstable Singapore which could act as a Cuba for Malaysia if it was to fall to Communism, and knew that cooperating with LKY was best way to prevent this occurring.

This led to a delayed yet clear attempt to reflect on each other's concerns and address them in ways that would at least attempt to mute distrust. Rajaratnam's speech argued that '[they] should

[27] Sinnathamby Rajaratnam was made Foreign Minister upon Singaporean independence, serving 1965-1980

be more than careful to devise rational and intelligent policies with regard to Malaysia' (in Ganesan 2002: 30). Such reflexive rationality seems to have been key in this transformation. LKY did not think the differences had been resolved, but acknowledged that both sides had moved some way to accepting the difference. Although there were 'compelling almost irresistible pressures on cooperation', the reality was 'the unity of the two in the security interest of both cannot be willed or wished away and we just have to learn to cooperate in a very quiet and common-sensical way or we both perish' (in Cheng 2013: 20). He felt that both sides should forget about sentiments and just do business with each other because 'if we go into sentiments, emotions, feeling, there is going to be a great deal of antipathy… you can go into real orgies of bitterness and hate' (in Cheng 2013: 21). While these statements and professed intentions are seemingly minor in the face of new sources of distrust that emerged, they did represent a slow shift from a situation where distrust-reduction could at least begin. This is in comparison to the preceding period where it seemed any attempts at reducing distrust were doomed to fail as the differences were too immutable, founded on ideological fundamentalism which contributed to relatively stable enemy images. This section does not aim to demonstrate that distrust was reduced significantly in the period of 1965-1967 - the period was relatively short making such a likelihood extremely unlikely. High distrust, however, was replaced by a more manageable middle intensity distrust, even if these sources were broader, which opened a space for the emergence of ambivalence and allowed a situation where distrust-reduction could meaningfully occur.

4.5 Conclusion

In all these crises, the foundations of trust as laid out in the thesis's framework were absent. During this period, it was distrust that dominated, whereby there was a certainty concerning the other's malevolence, incompetence, and dishonesty. Interests and values were diametrically opposed. The events that had progressed throughout this time, such as dishonesty during negotiations and clashes in personality, led to growing certainties that the other could not be

trusted. Rather than there being uncertainty and questioning of the other's ABI or intentions, they were seen purely in the negative. Sukarno, seeing the Tunku as being complicit with neo-colonialism and feeling a sense of betrayal following the Tunku's choice to follow only a superficial understanding of the Manila agreements, criticised the integrity of the Tunku at every opportunity. The Tunku, on the other hand, seeing Sukarno escalate *konfrontasi* whilst claiming he wanted to negotiate a peace, was led to believe that Sukarno was not a benevolent figure and that he had little integrity due to his dishonesty and expansionist intentions. Towards the end of *konfrontasi* it was Sukarno's ability that was negatively assessed as the Tunku came to believe that even if Sukarno had the integrity and benevolence to end *konfrontasi* he would not have the ability to do so due to his precarious position and the extent to which his credibility depended on 'crushing Malaysia'. Such a negative assessment in ABI, resulting in its opposites, also proved important in the case between the Tunku and LKY. The difficulty LKY faced in negotiating with the Tunku demonstrated to LKY that the Tunku had no problem reversing his position and going against his words, confirming the perceived dishonesty. LKY also engaged in behaviours perceived as dishonest, such as entering PAP into the federal elections even though it was agreed he would not do so, making such perceptions two-sided. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, for trust to emerge these negative perceptions need to be actively addressed in order to reduce distrust to a point that the certainty held about the enemy image of the other can be undermined.

ABI is not the only dimension of calculative trust. Two other significant dimensions emerge in the analysis of the leaders distrusting relationships and enemy images –the presence of opposing interests, and predictability that they would engage in actions that were harmful to the other. In the case of *konfrontasi,* the Tunku and Sukarno held particularly opposing interests as their priorities. The Tunku, fearing Communism, sought to seek some linkage with the former colonial powers. Sukarno, with the opposite view and depending on very different power bases wished to remove the vestiges of colonialism in all forms and instead was willing to work with the communists in order to meet this goal. Both also perceived each other, rightly or wrongly, as harbouring expansionist goals

and intent. These opposite interests not only prevented encapsulated interest to emerge, but also actively increased the level of distrust between the two leaders as they further diverged. In the second crisis the dynamics were essentially the same even if the interests were different. LKY, representing a majority Chinese population, and the Tunku, representing a majority Malay population, were perceived as advancing the causes of their respective bases at the detriment of the ethnicity base of the other. Whilst it is over simplistic to suggest that LKY and the Tunku did indeed advance these causes single-mindedly, the important thing is that they both perceived each other to do so, and therefore stood opposed ideologically. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters it was only when distrust was actively reduced, causing ambivalence, and an encapsulated interest emerged that trust became possible based on CBT, so the fact that its absence held such a prominent position as a dimension of distrust is of significance.

Distrust-reduction occurred in part in the period 1965-1967 in the sense that immutable differences, based on ideological fundamentalism and opposing interests, were replaced by new sources of distrust that, while broader, were less salient and did not result in a stable enemy image. As such, the distrust-reduction mechanisms in this period, such as Suharto's distancing from Sukarno, and attempts to find common solutions to common problems between the Tunku and LKY, were extremely limited but still had significance. While they did not allow ambivalence to emerge, they at least reversed the process of distrust growing and created a context whereby distrust-reduction could begin in a meaningful manner.

Chapter 5: ASEAN's Creation, Distrust-reduction and Trust-building (1967-1975)

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the extent and bases of the distrust that dominated the relationships between the leaders in the Southeast Asian region prior to ASEAN's creation. Such tensions are demonstrative of the ways in which reduction of distrust was required to overcome at least some suspicion, in order to facilitate ASEAN's creation and create an appetite for cooperation. Suharto, a critic of *Konfrontasi,* took control of Indonesia, partly facilitating ASEAN's emergence in 1967. However, there had been no change of leadership in Singapore or Malaysia, meaning there had also been a strong degree of continuity. This chapter will argue that the creation of ASEAN not only provided further distrust-reducing mechanisms, but also signalled that a movement from high distrust to weak distrust had occurred. In line with this, ASEAN's creation is also the first indication that positive expectations, or weak trust, emerged in an interlinked process. As will be demonstrated, ASEAN embodied several compromises which not only contributed to further distrust-reduction, but demonstrated how LKY, Suharto, and the Tunku were willing to engage in limited trusting behaviour based on positive expectations that such behaviour would not be exploited.

This chapter will analyse the 1967-1976 period to demonstrate the way in which these relationships were transformed from relationships based on decreasing levels of distrust to those reaching ambivalence, and eventually increasingly based on Calculus-Based Trust (CBT). Such calculative forms of trust, drawing upon the previously laid out framework, are based primarily on an alignment of interests leading the trustor to believe the trustee will not defect, as it would be costly for the trustee to abandon the interests they have in common. This, therefore, makes the risk worthwhile. I argue this is reinforced by an assessment of the other leaders' ability, benevolence and

integrity (ABI) in relation to ascertaining interests, facilitated during meetings. While meetings were important, they did not necessarily result in bonding at this stage or any emergence of common identity. Instead, they were primarily related to assessing what the interests of the other were. CBT was centred on interests, but assessments of ABI in relation to these interests were facilitated by face-to-face meetings.

In order to demonstrate the transformation from high distrust to ambivalence, and eventually weak trust, the chapter will analyse two distinct periods within the timeline. The first is ASEAN's creation in 1967, and the second the period of relative calm that followed despite the presence of potential crises that could have erupted into conflict had distrust still dominated. Specifically, three interlinked events are of most significance; ASEAN's creation, cooperation in the sensitive maritime sector, and the continuing Philippine claim over Malaysian territory in Sabah. All were mediated by significant processes of distrust-reduction. They incorporated behavioural outcomes that demonstrated high distrust had become weak enough that it could be bracketed and put aside, allowing for the emergence of limited positive expectations based on calculation of interests and rational assessments of the other leaders' ABI in relation to these. This shows that the relatively calm period following ASEAN's creation was a significant factor in the almost complete bracketing of distrust and the increasing development of trust in the two following stages of ASEAN's development, which will be explored in the following two chapters.

The chapter proceeds in four parts. First, it will analyse ASEAN's creation and demonstrate the interlinked processes of distrust-reduction and CBT emergence. It will then analyse two crises, the Philippine's claim on Sabah and negotiations surrounding maritime territories, to demonstrate the presence of trust which mediated the crises. The thesis will then analyse the basis of trust in this stage of the relationship. Finally, the thesis will demonstrate how this limited CBT facilitated the development of ASEAN – setting the foundation for the continued development of trust following.

5.2 The creation of ASEAN – distrust-reduction and trust-building

In the previous chapter, the final section argued that distrust had been reduced between the Tunku and Tan Razak in Malaysia, and Suharto and Malik in Indonesia. It recognised, however, that distrust-reduction was particularly limited due to concerns over the only gradual process of lessening *konfrontasi* and the lack of indication that Indonesia under Suharto would follow a different foreign policy direction. This was also reflected in the concerns of LKY and Rajaratnam towards Suharto and Malik, who had begun to reconsider their stance, but who were not yet convinced that the issues that had caused it had been addressed in any form. Such a lack of distrust-reduction was especially salient between LKY and the Tunku. However, while Lee seemingly attributed an enemy image to the Tunku prior to separation, the sources of distrust had shifted to those that could at least be addressed, compared to those before that had been embedded to such a fundamental degree that they seemed impossible to overcome, meaning such an image was not as salient.

This section argues that creation of ASEAN marked a further transformation that changed the trajectories of the relationships. ASEAN's creation has significance when analysing the dynamics of trust in the contemporary ASEAN security community, as the implicit aims of the institution were to allow Indonesia's reconciliation in Southeast Asia, and the founding values had an impact on the way in which trust developed in future. Through joining into a joint venture, Suharto was able to further reduce distrust in his regime by signalling that past sources of distrust no longer had salience and instead encouraged processes of reciprocation. This was extremely significant in reducing distrust, as it demonstrated Indonesia would be following a foreign policy of restraint and cooperation, rather than the aggressive foreign policy under Sukarno. However, in an interlinked process, strategic restraint and the distrust-reduction it gave rise to opened opportunities for ambivalence and the limited forms of trust to emerge. This section will analyse the dual process

before going on to demonstrate the way in which these limited forms of trust impacted on the relationships.

Whilst the institutional design of ASEAN was such that the declaration focused on uncontroversial topics, it reflected a number of symbolic compromises that demonstrated elites were willing to endure a perceived vulnerability for the purposes of establishing ASEAN. These were based on positive expectations that came to replace the negative expectations they held of one another previously, and therefore provided a chance for positive reciprocation to take hold. This chapter, therefore, argues that the creation of ASEAN was constituted by trusting behaviours between the Tunku in Malaysia, LKY in Singapore, and Suharto in Indonesia. However, these behaviours were limited. They could also only be undertaken as the negotiations leading up to ASEAN incorporated distrust-reducing mechanisms that addressed the ongoing sources of distrust. I argue this is primarily a result of Suharto's strategic restraint (Chan 2018) which was the behavioural manifestation of his security dilemma sensibility (Booth and Wheeler 2007). Suharto had the power to force his view and dominate negotiations due to the significant power difference between Malaysia-Singapore and Indonesia. Instead, he willingly chose to enter compromises in order to signal that he would not engage in the aggressive adventurism that his predecessor had, allowing a distrust-reduction that resulted from his empathy-based reflection. This allowed for the emergence of ambivalence and opened the opportunity for a new emergence of positive expectations, as the trustees reciprocated such trust. Of course, while distrust was reduced it did not mean trust had to develop. Critically, however, the thesis argues that limited CBT emerged as a result of the explicit addressing of the sources of distrust prior to this, but there was also a further requirement of a convergence of interests to make ambivalence into positive expectations.

ASEAN was created through the Bangkok declaration in 1967 by the five founding members: Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Of significance in this creation was Suharto's coming to power in Indonesia as it was Malik and Suharto who actively pushed for

ASEAN's creation. Acknowledging that Sukarno's foreign policy had created a strong sense of distrust, Suharto was keen to demonstrate a desire for reconciliation by embarking on a foreign policy of restraint and reintegrating Indonesia into regional politics. This sensibility led to what Anwar has argued was 'the urgency for Indonesia to co-found ASEAN… primarily to restore the country's regional and international standing' (Anwar 1994: 4), and intelligence officers were assigned to the Foreign Ministry in order to facilitate the rapprochement between Indonesia and Malaysia to allow for the establishment of ASEAN (Mukmin 1991). It was not without its difficulties. Disagreements emerged over Indonesia joining the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), whereby it was initially opposed by Malaysia in 1966 and then Indonesia in 1967. In response, Suharto submitted a counterproposal to form a new regional organisation, allowing both the Tunku and LKY to perceive that Indonesia had abandoned the foreign policy which had caused so much distrust in the past and was restraining its future policy.

This took some reflexive thinking from Suharto and Malik. The Tunku was initially suspicious of Indonesia's poor track record regarding multilateralism and saw no reason to create another organisation when the ASA could be used as a basis. A meeting with Malik in May 1967, however, as well as a delegation led by Brigadier General Soenarso in 1966 managed to reduce this suspicion somewhat, as they continually emphasised common goals and Indonesia's desires to engage in reconciliation. This enabled a relatively quick decision to go ahead in forming a new institution, and they met in Bangsaen to work out the charter. By demonstrating the strong desire to form this new institution, Suharto had weakened his domestic position by going against the nationalist furore that had gripped Indonesia, and effectively 'placed Indonesia in a hostage position, albeit in a golden cage' by voluntarily constraining his country's future foreign policy options and limiting potential future action (Acharya 2014: 49; Interviewee 02). Due to the seeming commitment to strategic restraint the Tunku and LKY were increasingly able to see that Suharto had turned his focus to *kethanan nasional*, or national resilience, through economic development and a restrained foreign policy (Interviewee 2). Indeed, one interviewee present at the initial negotiations and following talks

argued that trust was very much on the minds of the Indonesian elite – 'by entering the institution, even without its laws, they wanted to show to the Malaysians that they were willing to engage, to build trust, show that we could become a trustworthy part of Southeast Asia and repair our damaged reputation' (Interviewee 2). Following the establishment of ASEAN it was noted that ASEAN marked not only a joint realization of the need for co-operation in attaining economic and social goals but, as Singapore's representative has noted, 'a willingness to abandon some of their more extreme nationalistic stances' (in Severino 2006: 4). This was not a trusting behaviour, but it was a demonstration of strategic restraint which helped reduce perceptions of distrust, and led to a degree of ambivalence as distrust had been bound up in the enemy image of Sukarno and his policy of adventurism. The desire to create a regional institution predicated on non-interference in each other's affairs and institutionalising cooperation was a strong signal that this adventurism had been abandoned, especially as it was done in line with the dismantling of Sukarno's domestic power bases.

The negotiations over ASEAN's creation, furthermore, demonstrated further strategic restraint. The largest problem in negotiations was the section in the declaration concerning the desire for foreign military bases to be shut down. Suharto still wanted to retain the wording of previous proposals that 'the arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers' (Acharya 2011b: 101). This led to an arduous negotiation with some saying it dominated the three-day discussion, as Indonesia wanted a strong declaration against the role of foreign powers, while Malaysia and Singapore instead wanted to ensure they were not being perceived as kicking out the British who still underwrote their defence (Interviewee 02). The resulting passage, however, was:

'*Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly*

to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development (ASEAN 1967)'.

Indonesia's desire to be seen as restrained resulted in them compromising on a core aspect of their foreign policy, implying that existing defence links were acceptable. This was a significant concession and demonstrative of the way in which Indonesian intentions towards their neighbours had transformed. From Sukarno's days of violently countering the influence of great and colonial powers, there was a demonstration that Suharto's regime had softened its approach and would consider a role for great powers in order to prevent insecurity among their neighbours.

This did not have to cause the emergence of trust, however. I argue that, reflecting the dual process laid out in Chapter Two, ambivalence emerged whereby the Tunku and LKY did not have to perceive Suharto as trustworthy or hold positive expectations of him as a result of strategic restraint. Indeed, as previously demonstrated they also articulated their uncertainty over Suharto's future intentions as well as his ability to subvert Sukarno's worldview. In the case of ASEAN, I argue the other factor that led to ambivalence becoming weak trust with its associated behavioural manifestations was an alignment of interests. This alignment of interests in the new context of ambivalence allowed for a willingness to trust, albeit in an extremely limited manner, showcasing the way in which the relationships had transformed. Distrust-reduction, characterised by Suharto's security dilemma sensibility and resulting strategic restraint, opened space for the opportunity to consider positive expectations towards him that had not been possible in the past.

The primary trusting behaviour on display was a limited acceptance of vulnerability based on positive expectations, of which there were three key aspects of ASEAN's declaration that demonstrated these vulnerabilities. The first was the Tunku's calculated acquiescence to include the statement concerning the temporary nature of external powers' military bases. The Tunku had no desire to follow this line of thought, partially due to the communist insurgencies, but also because of

suspicion that without foreign involvement Indonesia would have the capability to enforce its vision on Southeast Asia as the largest state in the region – especially as now power had been consolidated by the military (Leifer 1989). Despite this the Tunku agreed to include the declaration, and to a degree made itself vulnerable to Indonesia by undermining one of the pillars that underwrote its security (Kupchan 2010). Indeed, Malaysia depended almost entirely on Britain through the Anglo-Malayan defence agreement of 1957 for the military underpinnings of her security (Mackie 1974). Independence was taken on with the expectation that Malaysia would initially be responsible for internal security, and a required budget of 180-million-dollars for the development of a military during the transition with a 55-million-dollar recurrent budget, was unattainable if they were to focus on development (Rahman 1972). Prioritising development they decided on a small army underpinned by the Treaty with the British, and at the time it was argued that the 'stationing of Commonwealth forces in the country is of greatest importance' (Rahman 1983: 144).

Whilst the terms were vague and there was no tangible upper limit set on the date in which British troops would be obligated to withdraw, the Tunku still viewed this as a potential vulnerability, and tangible preparations were made in Malaysia for the withdrawal of British troops, which meant hedging existed (Mackie 1974; Interviewee 03). The Tunku and Malaysian parliament were concerned that if they were to agree to this provision it would signal to the British, who were already trying to reduce their commitments in Asia, that they were been given the green light to 'abandon' Malaysia – an MP at the time described the issue as 'we were giving the British the perfect excuse to leave, even though we knew our bargaining power to get them to remain had been reduced following the Singapore issue… what would we do afterwards? We had no idea at the time' (Interviewee 03). Preparations, including the reinforcement of Malaysia's home-grown security capability, demonstrated that hedging was occurring, making this an extremely limited form of trusting behaviour. However, the Tunku's apparent willingness to accept this condition demonstrates a limited form of acceptance of vulnerability and he recognised it as such, as he was aware that the domestic capability could never fully replace the British and that no matter what

preparations were made Indonesia would always have greater capability (Rahman 1986). He had to be persuaded, particularly by Thanat Khoman[28] with whom he had developed trust 'consolidated from time to time on the golf course' previously, to not persist in formulating strong reservations about the wording in public (Boyce 1968: 229).

I argue that without a degree of trust concerning Suharto as well as the mediator Thanat, no matter how limited, it is clear the Tunku would have insisted on rigid conditions as he did in previous negotiations throughout *konfrontasi*. The Tunku could now demonstrate a degree of flexibility relative to his prior position of military bases being non-negotiable at previous institutional incarnations, and positive expectations had also emerged. Whilst the bases of trust will be explored in greater depth in the following section, it is important to note that the Tunku made comments of being able to work with Suharto, where he could not work with Sukarno (Rahman 1989). Feeling it would be unlikely that Suharto would ever find reason to attack Malaysia, he instead decided that the potential hastening of the British withdrawal would be a relatively small price to pay for a closer relationship with a, now, non-threatening Indonesia (Rahman 1989). His comments centred on Indonesia's sincere attempts at reconciliation and a coming together based on common interests, especially regarding the role of communism (Rahman 1989).

The second vulnerability was also Malaysia's to endure; giving Indonesia the leading role in ASEAN (Kupchan 2010: 223). The Tunku wanted Indonesia to join ASA, which had been his creation, ensuring his leadership role and reducing Indonesia's ability to subvert the power of other regional powers. Suharto had no desire to join ASA, however, due to the past identity issues which had made ASA an almost anti-Communist block which had sought to exclude Indonesia (Haacke 2005). Negotiations on these points lasted almost 12 months, though Malaysia finally capitulated and, in a final compromise, Indonesia's new foreign minister Malik chose to name the new organisation ASEAN due to its similarity with ASA (Severino 2006). Whilst the ASEAN mandate was extremely

[28] Thanat Kohman was Foreign Minister of Thailand between 1959-1971

limited, and any power role played by Indonesian symbolic, comments from both the Tunku and Tun Razak on Indonesian power at previous negotiations suggest that this symbolic power had importance for them (Rahman 1989; Liow 2005a). While it was clear that there were significant power asymmetries between the states, which would suggest Malaysia had to accept the Indonesian position, a new institution had greater benefits for Indonesia. Indonesia needed the new institution to signal to the international stage that it had meaningfully changed its foreign policy in order to begin attracting foreign aid and investment for its economy, which was on the verge of collapse (Anwar 1994). Before, Malaysia would not accept any sort of leadership role by Indonesia as they felt they did not have to. Indonesian aggression would mean the continued British presence, and it was clear that *konfrontasi* had done much more damage to Indonesia than Malaysia. Despite this, the Tunku had potentially weakened his domestic position by capitulating to Indonesia, a country which only a year or two previously had been in a state of conflict. The Tunku and Tun Razak, however, had assessed Indonesia's strategic restraint as being a continuing policy, meaning that even if they were given leadership, they would not seek to use their increased power to undermine Malaysia in future (Rahman 1973; 1984). The Tunku and Tun Razak had no reason to be objectively certain that following consolidation Indonesia would not return to its previous position. They believed, however, that Indonesia's interests as embodied by Suharto had fundamentally and permanently changed and were no longer threatening to Malaysia (Rahman 1973; 1984). This limited form of trusting behaviour saw less hedging than the first – Malaysia made no claim on the leadership of ASEAN and in the following years made no effort to subvert Indonesian leadership or seek overt policies to restrict it, in part because Indonesia exercised leadership subtly. Regarding a limited diffuse reciprocity, ASEAN quickly became the main vehicle for Malaysian relations in the region and even represented Malaysia as early as 1972 with trade negotiations with the EEC, headed by an Indonesian delegation.

At this point the Tunku and Tun Razak had taken on vulnerability, both personally in their domestic positions and also in regard to the vulnerability of the country they led; Indonesia, a state

which had instigated conflict against them now had de facto power over the new regional body and one of Malaysia's security pillars had been undermined (Interviewee 03). At the same time, Indonesia had been given the opportunity to rebuild and consolidate its much-weakened power. They could not be objectively certain that once Suharto did this he would not return to his former policy. Assessments of Suharto's success in the US emphasised that policies of *konfrontasi* had the potential to emerge again as late as 1968, whether resulting from Suharto needing to distract from continued domestic issues or his inability to keep control of power (National Intelligence Estimate 1968). This is not to suggest that such vulnerability acceptance was expansive, it is clearly extremely limited. However, the relationships had transformed from those whereby no vulnerability was acceptable as they were fundamentally certain that the other held malevolent intentions, to one where they were at least willing to consider actions that would make them vulnerable to a small degree due to a consideration that Suharto may instead be benevolent and possess greater integrity than Sukarno. Indonesia had engaged in strategic restraint and this allowed distrust to reduce to such a degree whereby new processes of trust-building could begin.

The Singapore case is similar; despite vulnerability being significantly one sided, and while trust seemingly is less of a sufficient motivation, it was still necessary. Neither Indonesia nor Malaysia seemed to perceive any vulnerability in allowing Singapore to join the association – indeed, their late entry into the negotiation process suggests that it was accepted relatively quickly. However, Singapore had its concerns in entering an association that was predominantly Malay. It had just been expelled from a federation for similar issues and it had looked in suspicion at MALPHINDO that was perceived as being too Malay and Muslim orientated (LKY 1998). They had also been excluded from rapprochement across the Malacca Strait. They articulated their willingness to join an organisation as long as it was 'political acceptable,' meaning that they should be presented 'in a more realistic way by a more representative cross-section of Southeast Asian countries' and that 'the objectives are clearly defined as not part of the Cold War conflict' (LKY 1998: 345). LKY believed that in the long term joining or forming a regional association or group was 'the only way in

which the smaller and not very viable countries in Southeast Asia can sustain their separate existence in a world dominated by two or three superpowers'… but was also concerned that the wrong organisation might lead to the subjugation of smaller partners by the larger ones, possibly in collusion (LKY 1998; Cheng 2013: 21).

They chose to enter the association on a more rational assessment that it was better to take the risk and cooperate in the face of potential domination than be left on their own and isolate themselves even more. This decision seems extremely forced, not requiring any sort of positive expectations, but the stipulation about foreign bases was an acceptance of vulnerability that they were under no obligation to make. The bases were of extreme significance to Singapore, perhaps more so than they were to Malaysia. There was an argument that LKY had 'told practically every journalist' that Singapore could not do without the bases (in Cheng 2013: 24). There was also a strong economic dimension as the bases provided jobs for a significant proportion of Singapore's workforce. The British had made clear that they would begin reducing their forces in Singapore, but LKY was concerned that if they entered an association which explicitly stated the removal of foreign bases as a provision, it would give the British an opportunity or 'excuse' to hasten their withdrawal and increase vulnerability to Indonesia and Malaysia (Head 1964; LKY 1998: 380)[29]. Indeed, LKY argued that he required great power presence to 'keep our larger neighbours honest and give us room for manoeuvre' (LKY 1998: 380). Hedging was difficult as there were few credible candidates who could replace the British as defender of Singapore. LKY was against the US presence, for example, and argued they couldn't be trusted to stay out of trouble like British troops could (Chua 2014a; 2014b; 2017). His anti-US position was seen to be calibrated to cause Whitehall to think twice before planning a military withdrawal from British bases in Singapore (Chua 2014a; 2017). Despite such careful calibrations in this regard, Singapore still accepted this statement.

[29] As it occurred, Britain did announce an accelerated timetable for Britain's pull-out from east of Suez in January 1968, meaning that British forces would vacate the island completely by March 1971.

This was so crucial a point that Rajaratnam almost walked out of the 1967 Bangkok meeting until he was finally able to compromise on the 'fiction that foreign bases in Southeast Asia were 'temporary'' (Kausikan 2016: 299). Singapore chose to believe that they would not be forced to give up their foreign bases, and that Indonesia would reciprocate by not going back on their word that this was merely a face-saving addition. At the same time there was the potential that the declaration would give the British an excuse to hasten their withdrawal. This seems to have been based on positive expectations that Indonesia would not push for actual neutralization, as they had already chosen to implicitly accept external defence arrangements when they watered down the declaration. The addition to MALPHINDO[30] of the reference to 'the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned' satisfied the requirements of the four ASEAN members on whose soil foreign forces or bases remained as it gave them agency in the face of Indonesian power. It was only possible, however, as LKY no longer considered Suharto either significant a threat or untrustworthy, as he had considered Sukarno. Indeed, positive expectations were demonstrated in LKY's comments that he did not believe they would be betrayed despite their history (LKY 1998). He had come to gain some positive expectations that Suharto had a desire to work together and no longer held negative expectations that Suharto would resort to force as Indonesia had in the very recent past (Guan 2013a).

While negotiations were an arduous process, they ultimately served to reduce-distrust and demonstrated a willingness to consider weak trust, even though Indonesia had yet to resume formal diplomatic relations with Malaysia or Singapore. While these vulnerabilities were extremely limited, I argue that this still demonstrates a significant transformation from what elites were willing to accept in the recent past as laid out in the previous chapter. As will be argued following, it is this limitation that is further reflective of the calculative basis of trust at this stage, as it is recognised as a limited

[30] MALPHINDO was a proposed association of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia in 1963 that only lasted one month

form of trust which does not result in deeper trusting behaviours as it is not resilient, being based merely on interests that are vulnerable to change in the future.

5.3 Crisis 1: Sabah Dispute

The distrust-reduction that ASEAN's creation had engendered and the trust which it gave rise to was extremely limited. This section will demonstrate the further presence and role of trust in two crises that emerged to demonstrate how even this limited trust was transformative in the relationships, allowing a further development of ASEAN that would not have been possible without the presence of trust, making trust a significant causal factor for security community development. The bases of trust will be discussed following as there are wider dynamics that influenced decision-making and impacted broadly on all the cases, but for now this section aims to further show the presence and role of trust. The Sabah dispute case demonstrated the way in which a key relationship, that of Tunku-Suharto, had transformed from one characterised by high distrust to one which saw weak trust. In the case of the Philippine's claim to Sabah, trust allowed Indonesian involvement as the Tunku no longer believed that Suharto was merely using it to continue the Indonesian subversion of Malaysian control over these territories, as he thought Sukarno had.

5.3.1 Background

It was not only Sukarno who protested over the incorporation of Northern Borneo into Malaysia, but also Presidents Macapagal and Marcos[31] of the Philippines. This resulted in a long-lasting claim over Sabah (Solidium 2003). Initially this claim served to heighten divides between the Tunku and Sukarno-Macapagal. During *konfrontasi* the Tunku did not consider Macapagal's offers for mediation as sincere, as Macapagal and Sukarno shared common interests in preventing Malaysia from successfully incorporating Sarawak and Sabah. While Indonesia had formally renounced *konfrontasi,* the Philippines had not renounced its Sabah claim and immediately following ASEAN's

[31] Ferdinand Marcos was President of the Philippines 1965-1986

creation it became a crisis. Malaysia discovered guerrillas were being trained at a Filipino base to infiltrate Sabah, violating the understanding that there would be no interference in each other's domestic spheres (Jones 1997: 49; Severino 2006). Tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines proceeded to escalate with mutual recriminations and accusations, diplomatic protests and counter-protests, 'popular' demonstrations and counter- demonstrations, flag desecrations, threatening military manoeuvres, and, finally, the suspension of diplomatic relations late in the year. In return Malaysia sent arms to separatist forces fighting in the Philippines, the Moro-National Liberation Front. ASEAN meetings were also suspended from October 1968 until May 1969. Previously, the Tunku had suspected that Macapagal and Sukarno would be motivated to work together to undermine Malaysian coherence in Sabah, and that Indonesia would be not only be incapable of being a partner in resolving any potential crises that occurred, but would instead serve as a second enemy partnered with the Philippines.

5.3.2 Presence and Role of Trust

Following ASEAN's creation, however, and the limited trust that had emerged, the Tunku accepted Suharto's offer to mediate the crisis – and by 1968 relations had been normalised on the basis that the maintenance of the inter-elite regional pact was of greater priority (Jones 1997). I argue that this crisis, and the Tunku's acceptance of Indonesian mediation, is demonstrative of an acceptance of vulnerability. Suharto had the chance to revert to the Indonesian foreign policy and side with the Philippines, but the Tunku, holding positive expectations of Suharto, gave Indonesia a significant role to play in being neutral concerning Malaysian and Filipino interests. Only two years prior, the Tunku had been unwilling to negotiate with the Indonesians directly, but was now giving them a role to play in the negotiations with the Philippines. As will be developed further in the following section on bases of trust, positive expectations were concerning CBT and an alignment of interests. The Tunku believed that Suharto could be trusted to represent the Malaysian viewpoint and would not pursue the former agenda of undermining Malaysian coherence, as he no longer had

interests in doing this. Instead Tun Razak was positive about Indonesia's involvement, as the talks lasted only one hour but resulted in a modest agreement (Anwar 1994). As such, there was positivity concerning Suharto and Malik's secret offer to mediate the positions and attempt to bring the Philippines around to the view that their claims should be muted for the good of ASEAN and regional cooperation. Suharto's involvement became increasingly important to bringing about an end to the crisis, as Thailand and Singapore had failed to assist, and there are no indications that the Tunku thought this may result in defection and harm (Rahman 1979).

Giving Suharto control over the Sabah issue had taken more tangible forms than giving him the power to mediate negotiations. Initial trusting behaviours surrounding ASEAN's creation had allowed diffuse reciprocity and more open mandates, including within the security sphere. Malaysia had undertaken tangible vulnerability when they agreed to engage in joint-anti-communist operations in North Borneo, that were significant in encouraging greater mutual trust and a way to 'bind' ASEAN (Sudarsono 1973: 7; Djojohadikusumo 1973; Suryohadiprojo 1973). Despite Indonesia engaging in limited conflict prior to this, Malaysia allowed joint-training, Indonesian forces within North Borneo, and information exchange concerning the area with no tangible verification in place that Indonesia would not take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to subvert Malaysian sovereignty over North Borneo, as they had done previously. Indonesia reciprocated on this by not exploiting Malaysia, and by recognising the local elections which confirmed Malaysian sovereignty over North Borneo (Kuhonta 2008). The joint-commission for defence and security, as well as Indonesia's lack of conflict over the local elections, assured the Tunku of the 'genuine nature of Suharto's political commitments' (Rahman 1972: 81). Trust served as a basis for the Tunku to grant Indonesia a strong amount of agency over Malaysian interests concerning an issue where Indonesian interests had previously aligned with the antagonist (Leifer 1989).

5.4 Crisis 2: Maritime Affairs

Another crisis that had the potential to undermine relations but demonstrated the presence of trust and its transformative effect on relations is that of Indonesia's archipelagic doctrine. In 1969 and 1971 Malaysia and Indonesia were able to sign maritime boundary agreements, that reflected a growing sense of trust from Malaysian elites. Singapore too agreed to maritime issues on the same basis, though theirs was significantly weaker and more limited. As will be demonstrated, however, the maritime realm is particularly sensitive to all states, and prior to the emergence of any form of trust there could be no meaningful cooperation. Within this period objective vulnerability was accepted based on positive expectations.

5.4.1 Background

The first maritime boundary agreements between the two countries were the 1969 Continental Shelf Treaty and the Agreement on Territorial Seas in the Straits of Malacca signed in 1970 and ratified the year after (Hamza 2014). Indonesia was the primary driver of maritime issues. Despite its size and relative strength, it felt significant vulnerability due to internal issues resulting from threats of separatism in the past. This was exacerbated by a lack of resources and difficulties in controlling the 17,000 islands inside of Indonesia, some with distinct cultures, varied languages, and little connection to the Javanese led government. Water makes up to 60 per cent of its territory, making it the world's largest archipelagic state and the third largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The maritime realm was a central priority for the Indonesian government, as it fundamentally held the nation together. This resulted in the archipelago principle, which had its origins in the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 and stated that all waters surrounding, between, and connecting the islands belonging to the 'Indonesian state… are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and therefore parts of the internal or national waters which are under the absolute sovereignty of the Indonesian state' (Draper 1977). Kusumaatmaja[32] stated the government at the time needed a

[32] Mochtar Kusumaatmaja is best known as Indonesian Foreign Minister 1978-1988

concept that could simply and clearly be made into a symbol of unity (Jenne 2016). The archipelagic concept became a strong nationalist symbol through its relation to Pancasila[33] and was demonstrated as being extremely significant for Suharto's regime as well as Indonesia as a whole. As Mulyana (2012) notes, such archipelagic underpinning is a logical built-in part of Indonesia's foreign policy that carries with it the country's archipelagic interests. The Archipelagic Outlook, therefore, was originally designed to complement Indonesia's Archipelagic Principle based on the Djuanda Declaration, and aimed to gain recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over its maritime neighbourhood. Malaysia and Indonesia entered negotiations in order to delimit baselines from islands and physical features, in order to assess who had the territorial rights over which maritime areas. In 1969 and 1971, Malaysia and Indonesia were able to sign maritime boundaries which agreed to Indonesia's delimitation and Malaysia agreed to recognise Indonesia's archipelagic doctrine.

The straits settlement was a further maritime agreement under analysis, consisting of an agreement whereby the three states asserted a shared exclusive responsibility for safety of navigation within the Malacca straits. Initially the settlements stemmed from an Indonesian desire to give the littoral states control over the navigation of the straits and to restrict some forms of international traffic to ensure security. As a consequence of these talks, in August 1969 Malaysia announced the extension of its territorial seas from three to twelve miles to conform to Indonesia's territorial sea limit, meaning that the straits were no longer international waters. In a following November 1971 meeting, the foreign ministers of the three coastal states moved to continue consideration of managing the passage through the straits. The results of these talks were full agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia, and partial agreement between these two states and Singapore who still had some reservations. A declaration was made stating: '1. The safety of navigation through the Malacca Straits was the responsibility of the three coastal countries;

[33] Pancasila are the 5 principles guiding Indonesian political philosophy. One of these is *persatuan Indonesia* (unified Indonesia).

therefore, it was necessary that all three nations cooperate towards this end. 2. To arrive at the fullest cooperation, the states concerned should create a coordinating body that would comprise only these three coastal countries. 3. The issues of safety of navigation through the straits and of their internationalization would be considered as two separate issues' (Vertzberger 1982). As part of this Indonesia and Malaysia initially suggested tankers of more than 200,000 tons should not pass through the Malacca Straits and warships could also not pass without consent. A meeting took place in 1972 agreeing that improving conditions for transit through the straits for the sake of navigational safety was needed, but this did not result in any tangible outcome, only further meetings (Vertzberger 1984). Negotiations were then concentrated on the issue of safety regulations. Indonesia and Malaysia supported strict regulations while Singapore supported more flexible ones. This matter was discussed at length by LKY with Tun Razak in 1975 and the result was several agreements centred on safety of transit throughout the straits.

5.4.2 Presence and role of trust

I argue in this section that the negotiations and agreements mentioned above demonstrate a required role for trust, and the resulting actions taken demonstrated the presence of trust through behavioural manifestations. Furthermore, distrust-reduction had so far allowed a sense of ambivalence to occur but there were lingering suspicions which limited the growth of trust. Some mechanisms through which distrust-reduction were also undertaken parallel to trusting behaviours will also be identified. As maritime issues were particularly sensitive no agreement could be made before normalization between Indonesia and Malaysia, as well as with Singapore, as resolving issues in a meaningful way meant they would have to accept vulnerability. This was taken, however, voluntarily and due to an emergence of positive expectations. This was a precondition for issues involving control and regulation of maritime territory that all viewed as essential to their national security and ultimately their survival.

In the case of Indonesia, I argue Suharto's actions contributed to the process of distrust-reduction because previous actions had not been related to issues where there had been Indonesian and Malaysian sensitivity. While the strategic restraint shown by Suharto in the concessions offered during the creation of ASEAN reduced distrust, the vulnerability he had endured as a result of this strategic restraint had been minimal. The signals had not been particularly costly. In the case of maritime affairs, however, the concessions from Indonesia were relatively unilateral as power imbalances did not force them to concede, reflecting they were even willing to show restraint and act benevolently even in sectors which were of most significance to them. In the enactment of archipelagic baselines, the lines agreed between Malaysia and Indonesia were advantageous to Malaysia, and Suharto did not wield Indonesian power that could have meant Indonesia negotiating from a position of strength. According to one count the difference between the actual boundary and the commonly used equidistant line amounts to 24,000 km^2 which Indonesia was prepared to concede in order to address Malaysian concerns. I argue that while this was most significant in the context of distrust-reduction due to the power asymmetries, the decision to give these concessions was mediated by the reciprocated trust that Suharto had developed in Malaysian leadership due to the extent of the vulnerabilities they perceived as being possible in the maritime realm. Malik declared that the archipelagic principle was 'life or death for us' and they were making concessions surrounding an issue which they had nationalised for domestic legitimacy (Vertzberger 1984). Despite this, Indonesian leaders did not think Tun Razak, now Prime Minister, would abuse this position. As one political advisor, interviewee 02, commented: 'Suharto had come to believe that Tun Razak would have no interest in lauding over their victory or making things difficult for us in the future'. In the absence of positive expectations, it is likely that they would have at least delayed negotiations and wielded their strength further in order to gain acceptance of a more favourable baseline, both in terms of their security and to present to the domestic audience.

Accepting Indonesia's doctrine and boundaries, furthermore, meant very real vulnerability for Tun Razak as it would essentially separate Malaysian territory. Indonesia would control the water

ways between the peninsular and Malaysia's new territories in Borneo. When Indonesia first proclaimed the concept in 1957, Malaysia had reacted with alarm. Innocent passage within the baselines meant the separation of Sabah and Sarawak from the peninsular and it was these territories that Sukarno had tried to assert his control of during *konfrontasi*. To now cede these waterways to Indonesia officially was representative of an extreme transformation in their relationship and reflected how Tun Razak could move forward in accepting a vulnerability that had been unthinkable in the past, as a result of positive expectations in the new leadership. Sulong said that the political decision was 'taken in the spirit of post-Confrontation rapprochement and ASEAN cooperation, and Malaysian officials were told to accept the Indonesian concept'[34] (in Jenne 2016: 201). As a result, the two sides signed two Memoranda of Understanding (1974, 1976) in which Malaysia reaffirmed its support to the archipelagic principle, and Indonesia pledged to safeguard Malaysia's interests in the sea separating the Malaysian peninsula from its eastern provinces. There is no evidence that Malaysian leadership at this time considered the likelihood that Suharto would use this to prevent passage between the two land masses, or would exploit the power they now officially, and legally, held. Military planning in Malaysia continued to focus on the domestic issues of communism, especially following the race riots in 1969. The relationship had transformed from one where no symbolic concessions could be made that would weaken Malaysia's hold over Borneo, to one whereby their position was considerably weakened if conflict would occur again. Diffuse reciprocity was also seen as Indonesia and Malaysia joined in military cooperation with a joint defence agreement signed in April of 1975, including joint operations in the Malacca Straits.

Singapore 's decision to accede to the straits agreement was also one which reflected a voluntary acceptance of vulnerability, even though this was more limited, as were the positive expectations. However, it did reflect that distrust no longer dominated and there was, admittedly a small, basis of trust for which there could be a voluntary acceptance of vulnerability and a small

[34] Zainal Abidin Sulong was Malaysian Ambassador to Jakarta during 1972–1977

degree of diffuse reciprocity. Singapore's interests were primarily centred on freedom of passage. The potential closing of the straits would prove deadly to Singapore as LKY argued:

> *'We had to create a new basis for our livelihood, and this required maritime lifelines… Any impediment to free navigation would destroy us. Therefore, we could support the archipelago concept provided there was a public declaration by Indonesia on the traditional freedom of navigation'* (1998: 268).

LKY, despite being the most hesitant about joining ASEAN, instead argued 'ASEAN members must show solidarity and unity in support' and rather than taking a firm stance, only 'took note' of their challenge to the customary legal regime of the interconnected straits (1998: 268). Instead, they insisted with their endorsement that the matters of safety of navigation and of the 'internationalisation of the straits' were two separate issues. The importance that Singapore placed on these matters had been indicated by the presence of Defence Minister Dr Goh Keng Swee at ministerial consultations with Indonesia held in Singapore in October 1971 (Leifer 2013). The issue was temporarily shelved by being turned from a matter of high politics into one of low politics stressing the technical-economic dimensions. Singapore was unwilling to express its opposition in an explicit way that would demonstrate disagreement with its neighbours, as it did not want to harm the evolving improvement in its relations with them after a long period of tension and damage the relationship by not reciprocating. In part, they seemed to have positive expectations concerning Suharto's integrity, but it was Indonesia's lack of ability that prevented negative expectations. LKY did not believe Indonesia could close the straits even if they wanted to, as demonstrated in his conversation with Djojohadikusumo[35] who stated 'that if the Russians tried to get tough, Indonesia would not hesitate to have a confrontation' and which was followed by LKY looking 'unconvinced' (LKY 1998: 265). LKY was assured by the fact that he did not think Indonesia would close the straits as they could not even if they wished to. Moreover, Singapore's strong stand over the legal regime

[35] Soemitro Djojohadikusumo was Indonesian Minister of Industry and Trade

of the Straits of Malacca did not prove an obstacle to practical cooperation with Indonesia in maritime matters. Diffuse reciprocity was demonstrated by the maritime boundary agreement in 1973 with Indonesia that implicitly recognised the archipelagic principle. By this point a certainty of Indonesian malevolence had given way to assessments that Suharto was relatively benevolent and had no intention of utilising its maritime power to undermine Singapore's security.

This period was also marked by several verbal promises made such as the 1969 agreement not to develop disputed territories, including Pulau Sipadan[36], which also had their roots in the new limited trust found between member state elites. No significant hedges were made against the promises and they remained unwritten agreements and assurances which did not arouse suspicion or distrust, and which were made based on positive expectations. These will be explored in the following chapter as it was the betrayal of this agreements which demonstrated that trust was present when the promises were made. This was transformative in this period, however, as it reflected a growing willingness to make verbal agreements with the expectation they would be kept, something not possible when Sukarno had been in power (Jenne 2016).

5.5 Bases of trust

The above sections demonstrate how distrust-reduction was facilitated through the addressing of issues and strategic restraint, which led to a degree of ambivalence. As demonstrated, however, there was also a degree of trust between the ASEAN leaders in the above situations which could have become crises had trust not mediated their successful outcome. This trust, demonstrated as present, had a significant effect in mediating crises and advancing relations. It was marked by trusting behaviours and positive expectations. This section will now analyse the bases of trust throughout this period, suggesting that such trust emerged and grew based on calculation that the other was trustworthy. due to a positive calculation of ABI and a belief that the other shared similar

[36] As discussed in Jenne (2016: 206) when this promise was broken by Malaysia in 1991 significant betrayal was felt

interests so could therefore be trusted. These emerged, most often, from personal meetings that allowed them to assess one another in greater proximity, but the assessments were most commonly concerning whether the other had the same interests as they themselves had, and not about the other as a person, meaning decisions remained prominently cognitive.

5.5.1 Common interests

In this section I argue that positive expectations primarily emerged due to an alignment of common interests. Recalling the theoretical framework which discussed Hardin's (2002) encapsulated interest, I argue that a cognitive assessment of commonality in interests led to elites believing that the other would take their interests into account. They believed their interests were encapsulated by the other as their own, not because of any affective attachment, but because interests were essentially the same and there was little risk of these changing. This led to a rational-choice decision centred on cost-benefits analysis. As interests were viewed as encapsulated, there was no real benefit to defection as there would be significant costs for the trustee if they undermined their own interests by defecting on the trustor (Lewicki and Bunker 1995).

The most significant alignment of interests was the new anti-communist outlook of Suharto's New Order regime. The creation of ASEAN included the Tunku accepting vulnerability that resulted from positive expectations that Suharto would not exploit them, as he too shared a common fear of communism, especially following the coup inspired by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). This prevailing climate of fear at the founding meeting of ASEAN in Bangkok in August 1967 meant Singapore Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam stated 'if we do not hang together, we of the ASEAN nations will hang separately' (in Bandoro 2007). Within the Singaporean case these assessments also seem to have underlined their desire to engage in limited trusting behaviours. LKY was fervently anti-communist, especially following his crackdown prior to merger with the Malaysian federation (LKY 1988). Singaporean interests aligned with both the Tunku and Suharto, and allowed him to have positive expectations concerning their security interests. Such interest-based

assessments of benevolence and integrity could occur as Suharto had signalled that he was seeking 'strategic realignment' with the neighbouring countries through joining ASEAN and embarking on an anti-communist foreign policy (Ganesan 2002: 77). In March 1968, for example, Malik speaking to the Indonesian community in Singapore 'disclosed that he had assured [LKY] Indonesia was ready to protect Singapore against the communists after the British withdrew in 1971' (LKY 1998: 263). Assessments of Suharto's trustworthiness were therefore centred on whether Suharto would stand to benefit if LKY lost power or Singapore was harmed, if that may prevent a common stance against communism. Believing Suharto to be rational, LKY considered it unlikely he would defect. Indeed, LKY argued that after the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in 1975, Suharto had noted that 'Singapore and Indonesia held similar views' and that 'we had a common enemy—the communist threat' (LKY 1998: 269). Regular intelligence contacts between Rajaratnam and Lieutenant-General Sutupo Juwono had convinced both LKY and Suharto 'that we shared their views on the big issues' and could perceive each other as having encapsulated interests (LKY 1998: 266). For LKY, therefore, vulnerability could be taken by joining ASEAN, as he had no reason to doubt that Suharto could be trusted to embark on security policy that would mutually strengthen both countries to prevent a spread of communism.

The desire to downplay ethnic differences also allowed Singapore to reflect upon and demonstrate the encapsulation of common interests with Indonesia, providing a further basis for CBT. Indonesia had been concerned that an ethnic Chinese Singapore would be a gateway for Chinese communism to take a hold in Indonesia's near vicinity. However, in mid-1972 Singapore provided advance notice to Jakarta of a visit to the island-state by a Chinese table tennis team. Apparently, the gesture of transparency was appreciated and served the desired goal of trust-building, as it showed to Suharto that LKY had integrity and was not beholden to communism. Of more significance is that LKY took the position soon after diplomatic relations were established with Indonesia in September 1967 that it would be the last country in ASEAN to establish diplomatic relations with China, to reassure Indonesia of its independence. This showed a commonality of

interests and commitment to the region that further allowed the calculative interest-based assessment of ABI.

Related to this, the Tunku and Suharto were able to come to view each other as having 'assurance game preferences' in Kydd's (2005) terminology, whereby they saw each other as being primarily interested in cooperation due to the emergent encapsulation of interests. The priorities of the new leadership boosted the assessment of integrity and benevolence (Kydd 2005). It was the Tunku's calculated assessment of Suharto and his regime's trustworthiness based upon this that led to positive expectations emerging (Rahman 1977: 93). According to Shafie, the fear of communism and 'the perception that Indonesia was playing a key role in stopping the advance of Communist China' was one reason why Tun Razak had decided to support the Indonesian archipelagic concept (in Maksum and Bustami 2014: 65). A strengthened Indonesia would assist Malaysia in preventing the spread of communism, and if communism was to emerge in Indonesia or in any of its peripheries it would be particularly problematic for Malaysia. This encapsulated interest, whereby both desired to prevent communism, provided positive expectations to allow for the risk the Tunku took by establishing the joint commission for defence and security and the 1967 Security Arrangement. This limited, but significant, form of security co-operation was extended in revisions to the arrangement in April 1972 to include joint maritime surveillance and naval exercises. These were considered to be worthwhile if they were both anti-communist, and the Tunku believed that Suharto had to consider Malaysia's interests and vulnerabilities as it would create greater risk for Indonesia if Malaysia was weakened enough for communism to take hold.

Another shared interest which proved important for the emergence of positive expectations was that of the *ketahanan nasional* (national resilience) security doctrine, which led to an expectation for restraint in the foreign policy realm. *Ketahanan nasional* reflected a desire to avoid foreign entanglement in order to focus on the number one priority of national development following their relatively young status as post-colonial states. Adventurism under Sukarno had led to

a near collapse of the Indonesian economy, and it was clear that many of the security issues faced by the regimes were internal rather than external in nature, while many of the population's basic needs had been disregarded. Suharto therefore put forward *Ketahanan nasional* as 'the ability of a nation to cope with, endure and survive any kind of challenges or threats she meets in the course of her struggle to achieve her national goals' (in Leifer 1983: 190; Also see Anwar 1996). Indonesia's focus on national development identified a common platform of concern in all ASEAN countries given the political consequences of economic adversity brought about by confrontation, and the opportunity it opened for communism to take hold. According to one scholar 'ASEAN regimes came to share an almost religious belief in the effects of rapid economic growth in diffusing the sources of social and political discontent within their societies' (Acharya 1992: 153). There were, therefore, rational benefits to be gained from cooperation that outweighed potential negatives, and positive expectations emerged that Suharto would be more likely to be benevolent as he had fundamentally realigned Indonesia's interests to those that emphasised the positive effects of non-aggression (Acharya 1992; Severino 2006). The Tunku believed the costs of defecting would be too high for Suharto as it would inevitability lead to economic collapse and further separatist movements, something the Tunku had been very aware of due to his earlier desires to exacerbate them.

This allowed a positive and interest-based calculative assessment of ABI in maritime affairs especially. As the purpose was to increase internal security, Suharto was increasingly seen as needing to be benevolent, as any aggression would undermine Indonesian internal cohesion and therefore be counter to his interests of building national resilience. This also influenced the Tunku in his allowance of Indonesian mediation during the crisis over Sabah. While Sukarno had been malevolent, Suharto was otherwise calculated to be benevolent, but only on the basis that both leaders had the same expressed goals of developing their national capability, which adventurism would undermine (Rahman 1972). Both the Tunku and LKY expressed their beliefs that Suharto would further be committed to ASEAN, as the institution was aimed to not only identify common interests, but give a mutual assurance that they would not interfere in one another's internal affairs

or threaten or use force against one another, and therefore allow a focus on internal resilience (Severino 2006). As Alatas[37] argued 'it was undeniably the convergence in political outlook among the five original members, their shared convictions on national priority objectives and on how best to serve these objectives in the evolving strategic environment in East Asia, which impelled them to form ASEAN' (in Severino 2008: 13). On 7 August 1968 Razak therefore warned the ASEAN delegates that 'it be our common concern to do nothing—and ensure that nothing is done—which could jeopardise the future of ASEAN' (Mahbubani 2017: 53). I argue this desire to engage in ASEAN and the trusting behaviours it engendered is a result of a calculation of trustworthiness centred on ABI, but one that was dependent on interests aligning which allowed them to be viewed as encapsulated, especially around national resilience. Alatas's discussion of convergence of outlook is key to this, as it demonstrates the extent to which they believed it was unlikely the other would defect from in the future. Such interests were likely to remain stable and the costs of defection would be too high for the trustee. This basis of positive expectations was articulated through their language of common concern and interests.

Suharto continually expressed his interests in national resilience, and this was reflected by his subdued behaviour in ASEAN, demonstrating willingness to reciprocate the trust placed in him and not risk national resilience by attempting to dominate the region as Sukarno had done. This reinforced the importance of this commonality of interest in the formation of positive expectations. Wong[38] said 'a key part of ASEAN's success was that Suharto was big enough and willing to support ASEAN' (in Mahbubani 2017: 59). Nathan[39] supported this in his belief that 'Suharto's maturity lies in the fact that he decided to play a backroom role in ASEAN, and allow the other member states to carry out their own relations' (in Mahbubani 2017: 59). Through this muted role, in deference to national resilience over international adventurism and dominance, Singaporean and Malaysian elites

[37] Ali Alatas was Indonesian Foreign Minister from 1988-1999
[38] Wong Kan Seng was Singaporean Foreign Minister 1988-1994
[39] Sellapan Ramanathan was the President of Singapore 1999-2011, and is commonly referred to as S. R. Nathan

saw that their interests had aligned with Suharto, who could be trusted to be benevolent to ensure national resilience was significant enough to counter the internal threats they faced.

While Singapore's interests differed, they did align in other fundamental areas such as the role of ethnicity, shown to be a source of distrust in the past. During the Tunku's leadership LKY trusted the Tunku to prevent extremist Malay attempts to exploit ethnicity for political gains which contributed to their ability to work together (LKY 1998). In this sense he viewed the Tunku as not only being benevolent in the sense of having the shared goal of muting ethnic differences for regime stability, but also as being able enough to do this in the face of those who wanted to exploit ethnic differences for their political goals. Initially LKY was concerned that Tun Razak would not have the same interests nor ability in reducing ethnic tensions, so viewed him with less benevolence and ability. However, racial antagonisms, which culminated in great violence in May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur, spilled over briefly into Singapore and pointed to the volatile way in which the two societies were connected, meaning they sought to contain tensions (LKY 1998). For example, a joint initiative was taken to discontinue circulating each state's newspapers which had helped flare tensions. They began to recognise a common interest in muting these issues and thought it unlikely the other would defect in other areas as any weakening of either regime would incur significant costs for their counterparts.

Another common interest which impacted on their ability to engage in trusting behaviour, and formed the basis of the calculative nature of positive expectations, was that of the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). Replacing the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement in 1971, the FPDA was constituted by Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Britain, and New Zealand, and was a consultative arrangement between the militaries of each country to reinforce the defences of both Singapore and Malaysia following British withdrawal and the division of the federation (Halvorson 2017). It reinforced the linkages between Singapore and Malaysia as it was established with the idea that pursing the security of one nation separately of the other would be counterproductive. Goh

considered they were ‘essential particularly as a means of bringing Singapore and Malaysia together’ and Razak stated that ‘as two separate territories, we talk to each other as equals. Wherever we can agree, we work together. If we cannot agree, well, we wait a while’ (in Guan 2011b: 29). While there were disagreements, such as when Malaysia told Australia they would not allow reference to cooperation in the texts, they argued this was to avoid exposing themselves to domestic criticism about relations with Singapore. Instead, Razak told Goh that the security of both countries was inseparable, that Malaysia could not afford heavy military expenditure, and Singapore, being a small island and very vulnerable to sneak attacks, should concentrate on its air defence capability while Malaysia with its long coastline would concentrate on its navy (Guan 2011a). While I argue that the FPDA did not directly impact on the trust demonstrated in the above crises in the way common interests concerning communism and national resilience did, it did assist in creating a context where security was so intertwined there was a common interest to not undermine each other so significantly. It also allowed the development of military capability without increasing distrust, as they retained a common interest regarding defence, and Singapore articulated that they were not hedging against the Malaysian regime, but instead any ‘madcap’ regime that may emerge in future (LKY 1998).

CBT is seen as a weak basis of trust, but in the case of LKY it seems as if the alignment of interests was not a weak basis but instead a necessary precondition for the emergence of any trust at all. LKY’s worldview was one in which international relations was extremely tribal and interests were the common glue (Guan 2013a). As Rajaratnam argued, ‘there may be differences and disagreements on occasions on specific issues, but so long as the fundamentals of their foreign policy and their deeds coincide with Singapore’s, then they should remain close friends and allies’ (in Guan 2015: 6). Without such interests, it was believed the states would resort to ‘the rules of the jungle’ (LKY 1998). In the above cases these combinations of common interests allowed a rational assessment of ABI predicated on the fact that they shared common interests, and therefore were benevolent. Benevolence was of the most importance at this stage, as it demonstrated the extent to

which the relationships had transformed from those based on malevolence and distrust, to one where positive expectations could emerge as the other was considered unlikely to defect because the costs would be to damage their own interests. Concerns over ability had mostly dissipated in the stage prior to ASEAN's creation, and integrity was still considered to be relatively weak because they had not yet had chance to prove this to one another. Assessment of benevolence and ability, and therefore positive expectations and trustworthiness, were strong enough for the emergence of limited trusting behaviours.

5.5.2 Meetings

In this section I argue that the rational assessment of each other's intentions was facilitated by meetings between the leaders that allowed them to ascertain to a stronger degree the extent to which their interests were encapsulated, further contributing to trust. This was still grounded in the basis of calculation as the meetings were essentially limited to them gaining a rational assessment of the other's interests, rather than forging any sort of affective bond.

As argued previously, the negotiations prior to ASEAN contributed to distrust-reduction. The creation of ASEAN and the meetings that occurred also allowed the assessment of the other to occur, and the organization's existence provided opportunities for the leaders to engage in a getting-acquainted process. Prior to ASEAN's creation, it had been difficult to assess each other's intentions as they had had little interaction with one another. According to Singapore's senior diplomat Mushahid Ali, in the first meetings the ASEAN leaders 'were telling each other how things were done in our countries, how we ran state administrations – and people were quite astonished about the differences' (Jenne 2016: 269). Through ASEAN links were to be forged by a slow, subtle, and often unnoticed process of familiarization and consensus building, that began at the top with political leaders and senior officials. It was even argued that even the early stages of ASEAN contributed in this, when, as Severino argues:

> *'On the golf course in Bangsaen and tie-less on easy chairs, the five men engaged in the convivial banter, the jocular repartee and the warm give-and- take. As Thanat Khoman described it… they played golf in the morning, had meetings in the afternoon and gathered for informal dinner in the evening'* (2006: 2).

I argue that the relevance of this new network of meetings was the fact they facilitated the calculation of the other's intentions and ABI to a more significant degree, which had been difficult in the past. I argue, however, this is more limited than the affective knowledge that is argued for as a basis of KBT in the following section, as contacts were more limited, and assessments were still marked by a rational assessment that was primarily concerned about interests rather than gaining deeper knowledge about the other as a person.

The meetings between LKY and Suharto, for example, proved decisive in the calculative assessment of the other's intentions. While interests aligning contributed to Singapore's acceptance of Indonesia's maritime agreements, and allowed those trusting behaviours to occur, there had been limitations as a result of some uncertainty that the other was sincere in their professed interests, limiting the certainty of the CBT and ABI assessments. LKY had attempted to forge links with Indonesian elites, and despatched Lee Khoon Choy as second ambassador. It was hoped that as Lee had an interest in Javanese culture LKY could signal sincerity. As a result, his efforts to befriend Suharto's advisors was successful as he 'wanted to understand us and found him a friendly and well-connected interpreter. Gradually he established personal understanding and gained their confidence' (LKY 1998: 264). Singapore's hanging of two Indonesian marines for acts of sabotage committed during *konfrontasi*, however, led to riots and a diplomatic impasse. While Suharto's 'immense restraint' in the face of military pressure to intervene demonstrated to the Singaporean's that Suharto had no further expansive desires, and would not continue Sukarno's adventurism, the fallout still limited the opportunities LKY had to explain his government's position in a number of areas**,** including those discussed above (Ganesan 2002: 35). Assessments of ABI were difficult to

achieve as meetings could not occur, and intentions could not necessarily be ascertained or articulated directly. It was only after Lee Khoon Choy put all his efforts into arranging a visit that one could actually occur, and this was preceded by visits to the island state by a number of Suharto's advisors who were specifically tasked with 'assessing LKY's intentions' (LKY 1998: 265). An initial meeting in Lusaka in 1970 led to some assessment that they 'shared some common views about developments and dangers in the region' (LKY 1998: 265). This was followed by meetings from Major-General Hoemardani[40] and Djojohadikusumo to 'drop in quietly without his ambassador's knowledge… [on a] secret mission for the president… to clear doubts about Singapore's stand on certain problems' (LKY 1998: 265). At this stage, it was clear they were attempting to assess LKY's intentions, especially regarding his stance on what were thought to be areas of common interest through interpersonal meetings.

This facilitated a visit to Jakarta, where LKY went to the marines' graves in 1973, sprinkling flowers as a symbolic gesture, and allowing relations to improve – as well as a degree of what they described as trust to develop between the two elites (LKY 1993: 562; Mahabuni 2017). Suharto especially was taken aback by this gesture of reconciliation by LKY (Ide Agung 1989). This resulted in a meeting that was said to be transformative as, without officials or interpreters, they could speak frankly - giving LKY an 'insight into the mind-set and strategic priorities of the Indonesian President, and also confidence in the prospect of a much better working relationship with Indonesia' (LKY 1998: 270). It was only this meeting that allowed a thorough assessment of ABI as it was the first time LKY could question Suharto about his actual interests, leading to greater information about whether these were indeed encapsulated. Following this an understanding of the priorities of the Suharto government served as a critical reference point for Singapore's trusting behaviours:

> *'I said that at the heart of the relationship, the question was whether we trusted each other's long-term intentions. He made clear that Indonesia had no claims to Singapore or*

[40] Sudjono Hoemardani was Suharto's spiritual advisor, an important gate-keeper in gaining access to Suharto

> *Malaysia and claimed only those territories that had belonged to the Dutch East Indies. He was determined to concentrate on the development of Indonesia, not on foreign adventures. Most important of all, he distrusted the communists, especially Chinese communists, who had been the cause of much trouble in Indonesia'* (LKY 1998: 267).

During his meeting with Suharto LKY further tested Suharto's trustworthiness when he made available barter trade figures whose lack of disclosure had a been a source of bilateral tensions, with the condition they would remain private. He also gave assurances that Jakarta would be consulted on the development of relations between Singapore and China. The new phase in the relationship was indicated in a speedy return visit to Singapore by Suharto in May 1974. These meetings were essential for rapid trust-building, as Mahbubani writes that these meetings or 'four-eyes' conversations, led to LKY and Suharto quickly building trust in one another, and consulting on any issues and crises that emerged' (2017: 1193). The ability to discuss maritime affairs seemed decisive in LKY's acceptance of Suharto's justifications, facilitating agreements that caused some degree of vulnerability – including the 1974 sea boundary agreement. It also lessened concerns with regards to ASEAN's stipulation on foreign bases as Indonesia began to feature less in LKY's threat perceptions. LKY argued 'he gave me the impression that he was likely to treat us correctly, even cordially, based on a realistic assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of our two countries' (1998: 267). The positive expectations that occurred, following the assessment of each other's benevolence in reference to their common interests, further allowed diffuse reciprocity when they held their first bilateral naval exercise. Not only was trust based on the calculation of the other having positive expectations, but the meetings facilitated a more thorough positive assessment of integrity and benevolence, though significantly these were primarily in reference to common interests**.**

A calculative assessment based on personal interaction was also important for LKY and the Tunku in Malaysia. The Tunku, in LKY's perception, seemed to have confirmed he had the same interests regarding domestic governance, especially in terms of ethnicity. The Tunku had been a

restraining force and following ASEAN's foundation any trusting behaviour had been limited by the possibility that the Malay Ultras would come to power if the Tunku was significantly weakened. Both LKY (1998) and the Tunku (1983) discuss the potential of this occurring, but they also talk about how they did not expect one another to utilise this ability for subversion, as they faced a common interest in a successful separation and the maintenance of both regimes in both countries. While there were positive expectations concerning integrity and benevolence, there was less certainty concerning the Tunku's ability to constrain problematic forces which could impact on the bilateral relationship. He had been openly attacked in a widely circulated letter by Dr. Mahathir[41] for having sold out the country to the Chinese, but meetings with the Tunku had demonstrated he was not going to acquiesce to these forces, and while there was less certainty about the future they facilitated the more accurate assessment of each other's trustworthiness based on common interests - in this case that of subduing ethnic differences for internal resilience.

There were initially concerns about Tun Razak where meetings were of more significance. One such meeting was in Australia in 1967. Initially, both on the same plane, Razak had ignored LKY. Following an Australian intervention, however, Razak was 'all reasonableness and accommodation as he spent three hours in the aircraft with [LKY] discussing Malaysia's defence and security' (LKY 1998: 45). This opened the opportunity for them to assess the commonality of their interests regarding defence and security, and allowed trusting behaviour to emerge in a limited form as they considered each other to have similar interests, and therefore held positive expectations towards one another. Positive relations following Razak's accession to Prime Minister were kept relatively private so as not to embarrass Razak with his Malay base. This was in line with Yarhi-Milo's (2017) assessment that costly signals can take place in secret, as there are costs to be endured if they are made public as Tun Razak's legitimacy would have suffered had many of the Malays in his party known that cooperation was occurring in meaningful forms. When they once again met in 1972,

[41] Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, later the prime minister (1981-2003 and 2018 – current), but then a member of UMNO's central executive council and MP 1964-1969

'Razak said he anticipated troubles for both Singapore and Malaysia from the uncertainties in Thailand and Indochina, and so we should not add to our difficulties by creating problems between ourselves', to which LKY agreed (LKY 1998: 239). These meetings were further carried out in 1973 and 1975, and continued the ability for the leaders to assess the other's benevolence based on the fact they retained common interests in national resilience and preventing conflict between the two countries, which facilitated the above issues concerning the Malacca straits. Furthermore, there were renewed conscious efforts to behave in a rational way, in the face of what was seen as an irrational separation (Ganesan 2002). Nathan argues that he believed conflict would only have broken out had someone 'miscalculated', demonstrating the importance of rational calculation in assessing the intentions of the other at this stage (in Ganesan 2002: 30).

The Tunku and Tun Razak had a head start with Suharto, and meetings were less important in assessing the other's trustworthiness in reference to common interests, as this had already occurred preceding which had facilitated the deeper trusting behaviours than occurred between Singapore and their counterparts. As a Malaysian senior diplomat and former ambassador to Indonesia stated: 'there is nothing like two groups having to work secretly together. Because of the strong bonds this created and the shared desire that there should be no more problems between us, contentious issues that arose in the years after were glossed over' (in Jenne 2016: 270). Meetings were instead seen as an opportunity to continue to demonstrate the way in which interests were encapsulated such as Suharto's visit to Malaysia where he vowed to observe the principle of non-interference 'in any way whatsoever, in each other's internal affairs' (in Jenne 2016: 270). The links forged at this stage gave opportunities to update assessments that intentions that were fundamentally aligned due to interests. As demonstrated this assessment of ABI towards these intentions and interests led to positive expectations and assessments of trustworthiness, which was what required for the above trusting behaviours to occur.

5.6 Conclusion

Trust based on calculation and a commonality of interest was extremely limited. It had the ability to mediate limited crises and allow some forms of meaningful cooperation that required vulnerability, due to positive expectations that occurred. I also argue it allowed the beginning of the ASEAN security community. ASEAN when established was seen as a vehicle of reconciliation, but leaders were extremely reluctant to give it a primary role in their foreign policies due to lingering suspicions. The institution, however, expanded slowly during this period, which I argue is based this CBT concerning common interests. As they came to see their interests were aligned, they were more willing to engage in deeper behaviour and give ASEAN a (slightly) larger role, in what Natalegawa[42] argues was a result of the state leaders gaining an increased 'comfort level' predicated on strategic trust (2018).

This is not to say there were not limitations to trust in this period. ASEAN's advancements were limited as leaders were unwilling to engage in great displays of vulnerability, and diffuse reciprocity or open mandates were extremely limited. 'At a pace comfortable to all' is understood within ASEAN to move as slowly as the least trusting member allows, and at this stage trust was such that advancement was extremely slow. It was only in 1976 that Suharto hosted the first ASEAN summit meeting, 9 years after ASEAN's creation. There were also significant signs of hedging in Singapore's militarization. I argue that this further demonstrates how trust was based on CBT, however, due to the extreme limits on display. CBT is often argued to be a very limited and tenuous form of trust, as it is predicated on interests which may be short term and prone to change. Positive expectations are, therefore, stable enough to allow some limited trusting behaviours, but not stable enough to allow deeper or consistent behaviours to occur. As will be demonstrated throughout the rest of the thesis, as trust developed these hedging strategies became less pronounced and more trusting behaviours were undertaken.

[42] Marty Natalegawa was Indonesian Foreign Minister 2009-2014

For the purpose of this chapter, however, it is important to note that ASEAN's limited successes were facilitated by the CBT argued for above. The first was ZOPFAN (the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), that declared Southeast Asia to be free from interference from outside powers and broaden the areas of cooperation (ASEAN 1971). That proposal was endorsed by ASEAN's governments in November 1971. It was agreed to be carried counter to the initial Malaysian proposal that emphasised strong neutrality. Instead the endorsement followed an alternative way articulated by Indonesia's scheme where resident states would assume prime responsibility for managing regional order (ASEAN 1971). In Singapore even the revised alternative proposal that only paid lip-service to neutralisation was seen to carry the danger of the island being exposed to a locally imposed distribution of power (Guan 2013a). This ran counter to Singapore's approach to regional order, where outside powers would have a stake in the region for stability. For all its vagueness, and despite continuing criticism of neutralization as impractical, the ZOPFAN declaration served useful political purposes, however, for ASEAN. It clarified ASEAN's integrating political concept, which had been extremely sensitive only four years before, and demonstrated how positive expectations concerning the other had allowed development.

The second was the establishment of the ASEAN secretariat. It was only in 1973 that ASEAN began seriously considering a central secretariat, as there was belief that any attempts to do so earlier would have set off 'ruinous competition' over its location, and it was only established in 1976 (Severino 2006: 20). They were unwilling to allow the secretariat to be held in each other's territory out of fear that it would allow the host country to enforce control or claim a leadership role. The acquiescence to locating it in Jakarta, therefore, demonstrates the strength of the transformation that had occurred, even if it had only been based on the assessment of the others' intentions through an interest-based calculation of trustworthiness based on ABI. As Indonesia was now seen as benevolent and committed to the regional body, due to the common interests of national resilience and anti-communism, Singapore and Malaysia allowed the secretariat to be located there.

Perhaps of most significance was the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (ASEAN 1976). Signed in February 1976, this treaty laid out the principles for cooperation between ASEAN members, such as mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of one another, renunciation of the threat of force, and settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means. As Severino argues, such a rule-based treaty had not been possible earlier:

> *'The delicate nature of the relations among the founding states of ASEAN dictated that the new association proceed very carefully, avoiding occasions for disputation and controversy — including the inherently contentious negotiation — and enforcement — of legally binding agreements'* (Severino 2006: 11).

As such, the TAC, while extremely simple in its outlook, was the first formal agreement signed by ASEAN members. Suspicions had prevented this in the past, but the leaders were now sufficiently trusting. Without the CBT analysed above it is unlikely this would have occurred had suspicions and distrust continued to dominate.

This chapter has argued that the creation of ASEAN reflected a distrust-reducing process from Suharto towards the elites in Singapore and Malaysia. This opened ambivalence and space for trust to emerge. The creation of ASEAN reflected trusting behaviours in limited forms, with symbolic acceptances of vulnerability being behavioural manifestations of trust. In the crises analysed above this acceptance of vulnerability and diffuse reciprocity furthered. Malaysia accepted vulnerability when giving Indonesia control over the waterways that separated the two Malaysian land masses, for example, and gave Indonesia a significant role over their interests concerning Sabah – something which had been unthinkable only two years prior. Singapore, too, began engaging in trusting behaviour, particularly in the maritime realm, which was especially sensitive to the small island city state that depended on the water ways for its continued survival. These positive expectations emerged as a result of CBT, as assessments were primarily made about the other's ABI and

trustworthiness in interpersonal meetings, but in relation to common interests. Whilst the chapter is limited in scope, it can be seen that CBT allows a platform from which emergence and deepening of trust may emerge in the trust-as-process framework, as it did in the short time following on from the formation of ASEAN, when states began to make ASEAN a more tangible pillar of their foreign policy through ZOPFAN, the TAC and the establishment of an ASEAN secretariat – all moves which they did not have the required 'comfort level', or trust, to do in the past (Natalegewa 2018).

Chapter 6: ASEAN's Development 1976-1997 – Knowledge Based Trust

6.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that the founding of ASEAN represented a significant turning point with regards to the trusting relationships between the elites of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Based on a calculation of shared interests, a weak form of trust emerged that military force, and specifically war, was becoming increasingly unlikely. Leaders began to trust each other that diplomacy would be relied upon as the means to overcome any issues. ASEAN was key to this, even if it played a muted role in these earlier stages, as it allowed all states involved to reduce distrust, demonstrate their intentions to rely on diplomacy, and increased their interpersonal interactions. Through this the first tentative steps to a security community were taken.

This chapter will demonstrate the continuing importance of trust in the development of ASEAN. During the 1976 – 1997 period ASEAN contributed to the deepening of trust by providing a structure in which diplomacy could take place, and a focal point for the demonstration that the leaders involved could trust each other. By codifying acceptable behaviour into expected practices of behaviour, leaders had increasing ways to assess the intentions of the other through a social knowledge. Furthermore, this chapter will demonstrate that evolution of trust further allowed the evolution of the institution. Limited in the past due to lingering suspicions, ASEAN was able to involve itself in many sensitive sectors due to the growth of trust of a more durable basis.

In order to demonstrate the evolution of trust, this chapter will highlight the way in which trust had increased and played a role in two crises, aiming to shed light on the dynamics of trust. By analysing the impact of trust on both the Cambodian conflict and the conflicting maritime territorial claims between the countries this chapter will demonstrate that trust between the leaders, fostered in significant part by ASEAN, played a necessary part in the decisions they undertook that led to a

continuing peace. Furthermore, the more they viewed the other as trusting the more they were willing to engage on a wider spectrum of trusting behaviours. The chapter will show that the trust based on common interests from the previous chapter evolved into a form of trust that became increasingly dependable. Instead they began to trust each other based on past actions (cognitive knowledge), knowledge of the other as a person (affective knowledge), and due to the social structure (social knowledge) - even at times where interests were not aligned.

6.2 The Cambodia Conflict

The first crisis that will be analysed is that of the Cambodian conflict. This was a particularly important crisis for ASEAN, as it was one in which many scholars such as Haacke (2005) and Acharya (2014) focus on the way in which it impacted on ASEAN's norms. They argue that ASEAN's norms came into question and it revealed differences between the ASEAN members on how best to pursue their interests. This chapter will address these differences, and argue that it was trust that allowed unity. Unity meant voluntarily subsuming the interests of some members to others, but those subsuming their interests did so as a result of positive expectations concerning these others.

6.2.1 Background

In 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia with the announced intention of replacing the Khmer Rouge regime which had been committing genocide. Internal conflict had spilled over into the areas surrounding the Vietnam-Cambodia border. ASEAN was at the forefront of the resistance to Vietnam's invasion and of diplomacy to bring an end to the issue more generally. Singapore and Thailand voraciously resisted Vietnam's actions and refused any sort of recognition of legitimacy, while Malaysia and Indonesia advocated for negotiation with the regime that Vietnam had put in place of the Khmer Rouge, opening significant diplomatic spaces in the later stages. Despite these differences ASEAN unity was a common theme throughout. Shortly following the Vietnamese invasion ASEAN called for the withdrawal of foreign forces and, in line with ASEAN's norms, called for a respect of Cambodia and Vietnam's sovereignty (ASEAN 1979a; 1979b; Haack 2005).

Kusumaatmaja initially made the call for withdrawal and Rajaratnam took the initiative to convene the special meeting.

ASEAN, with Thailand and Singapore taking the lead, spearheaded an international campaign against Vietnam that sought to limit legitimisation of both the invasion and the Vietnamese installed regime, the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), in favour of Khmer factions – eventually the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Predicated on their feelings of insecurity, Singapore was particularly concerned that legitimising the use of force and violation of territorial integrity not only undermined ASEAN's professed normative framework but could also lead to the justification of another state doing the same to them in future. For Singapore a rules-based order predicated on the inviolability of national sovereignty had become an important pillar of security, and 'Cambodia's problems could become Singapore's problems in the future' (Guan 2013b: 193). The invasion was seen to not only have reduced international and regional security, but also increased the chances of great power involvement, particularly with regards to the Soviet Union. Vietnam was perceived as being supported by the Soviet Union with Cambodia serving as a buffer between Soviet-led communism and Thailand. As discussed, communism was a key factor in the unifying of ASEAN's interests and a source of CBT in earlier stages of the relationships. Singaporean efforts at this stage were primarily undertaken through Tommy Koh[43] in the UN, where they sought to prevent the Vietnam-backed PRK government from gaining the UN seat. Memos detailing the 'big bullying Vietnamese' were also distributed and circulated to nonaligned countries by Rajaratnam to prevent them from embracing the PRK government in Phnom Phen (LKY 1998: 334). So intense were Singaporean initiatives, Leifer concluded that it spurred the development of the Singapore Foreign Service, as they desired to take a greater role in ASEAN's diplomacy regarding this issue (2000).

[43] Tommy Koh Thong Bee was Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations

The first ASEAN diplomatic initiative, beyond seeking the illegitimacy of Vietnam's invasion, was the 'Kuantan Principle' in March 1980 (Acharya 2014). While Singapore led a particularly sustained effort against recognition of Vietnam and the PRK at the United Nations, Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn[44] met in Kuantan, Malaysia. This meeting resulted in the Kuantan principle which called for a resolution to the conflict in Indochina in order to prevent possibility of serious regional insecurity and great power intervention. What was important about the Kuantan principle is that, before it was abandoned, it suggested a degree of acceptance of Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia's affairs. This ran counter to many of ASEAN's other initiatives led by Singapore and Thailand such as the 1981 international conference on Kampuchea, the 1983 Conference of Non-aligned nations, and the joint appeal for the independence of Cambodia (UN 1981). For the most part these initiatives failed as they called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, often under UN supervision, as well as arrangements for free and fair elections under UN administration. These were assumed to favour the ASEAN supported CGDK coalition government. Vietnam, therefore, declined to take part in these attempts though often engaged in dialogue. These dialogues resulted in limited agreements, such as Shafie and Thach's[45] dialogues focused on partial Vietnamese withdrawal, but were rejected by Thailand and Singapore who did not wish to legitimise the Vietnamese presence (Buszynski 1984).

1984 was key for ASEAN's unified approach. In the July meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers in Jakarta, they reasserted their common commitment to the Joint Appeal despite efforts from Vietnam to capitalise on different viewpoints. This led to an attempt by Rithauddeen[46] to persuade ASEAN to act as a mediator between the PRK and the CGDK in Proximity Talks. This was rejected by the CGDK who did not wish to confer legitimacy to the PRK. Instead, negotiations would be based on the 1986 eight-point proposal offered by the CGDK which stated that negotiations

[44] Hussein bin Dato Onn served as Malaysian Prime Minister from 1976-1981
[45] Nguyễn Cơ Thạch was the Vietnamese Foreign Minister 1980-1991
[46]Malaysian Foreign Minister Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen Tengku Ismail served between 1975-1981, and then again 1984-1986

would include the CGDK, a quadruphite government would be formed, and elections would be held under UN supervision (ASEAN 1986). ASEAN endorsed this and followed up with a proposal of CGDK talks with Vietnam that was also rejected on the basis that it was an insult to the PRK. These talks aimed to demonstrate an attempt to shed passivity and 'show some activism' (Interviewee 14). Later Vietnam would become more responsive to a settlement considering a decline in Soviet Union aid and a growing PRK self-reliance. As a result, negotiations were sought in 1986 with the CGDK, which Thailand also acquiesced to based on it seeming more and more likely that Vietnam would be withdrawing in future.

Kusumaatmaja, therefore, attempted to initiate the idea of a 'cocktail party' which would bring about informal discussions. Preconditions would not be attached, nor would there be any legitimacy conferred through a careful choreography of the meetings. Meetings would take place in a two-step process, the first involving the Cambodian factions absent of any political titles and the second including other countries including Vietnam. This proposal, combined with the first meeting between Hun Sen[47] and Sihanouk[48] in Paris, allowed the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM) to be held in Bogor in July. Following the meeting, a working group was established and there was a second meeting in February 1989. Whilst they did not directly lead to peace, this space for interaction did culminate in the Paris International Conference on Cambodia in 1989 which saw the involvement of the great powers and resulted, finally, in the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991 (USIP 1991). A military contingent was sent to Cambodia in November that involved all ASEAN states, and elections bought about the end of the Cambodian conflict.

ASEAN therefore played a prominent role through its diplomatic initiatives. Several scholars argue it was the Cambodian conflict that solidified ASEAN as a Security or Diplomatic community,

[47] Hun Sen was, and is, the Prime Minister of Cambodia 1985 until now, with a short break where he served as second Prime Minister with Sihanouk

[48] Norodom Sihanouk was King of Cambodia. Much of the opposition centred on him as the leader, as the Khmer Rouge were seen as politically problematic following their genocide

and ASEAN unity was a common theme (Mahbubani 2017; Acharya 2014). Mahbubani has gone so far as to argue that:

> *'When the full history of ASEAN is written, this will be recorded as one of the most significant decisions taken by ASEAN… that helped to generate and build a high degree of ASEAN solidarity'* (2017: 1084).

6.2.2 Presence and role of trust

In much of the literature on ASEAN this crisis served as a test of ASEAN's norms, as ASEAN sought to enforce non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states and the respect for territorial sovereignty. Whilst a direct military threat existed for Thailand, the other ASEAN states perceived danger towards ASEAN's normative principles. Indeed, as Wanandi stated:

> *'Its invasion of Kampuchea has infringed the fundamental canons of regional order embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Friendship concluded between the governments of ASEAN in February 1976'* (Wanandi 1983: 10).

While undoubtedly this is the case, and adherence to norms is significant, this thesis argues that such a unified front would not have occurred without a strong degree of trust grounded in the increased knowledge about one another and one another's behaviour.

As Davies argues, ASEAN's ability to pursue a reasonably coherent line against the invasion 'could not be attributed to a natural harmony of interest between ASEAN members' (2018: 28). Remarking on this theme of harmony Alatas remarked that it is 'a widespread but historically incorrect assumption that Cambodia is the cement of ASEAN' (in Acharya 2014: 93). As he saw it, the Cambodia issue had been 'divisive' (in Acharya 2014: 93). These divisions arose from two opposing threat perceptions that resulted in significantly different approaches. Singapore's interests, discussed earlier, led to an aggressive strategy of diplomatic activity both regionally and internationally, but Malaysia and Indonesia had severe concerns about this approach. They wanted

to address the conflict within a primarily regional framework in line with ZOPFAN which would serve to limit great power involvement in Southeast Asia.

Beyond this, however, were concerns amongst Indonesian elites that any weakening of Vietnam would allow Chinese influence to spread in Southeast Asia (Alagappa 1993). Indonesia favoured a conciliatory approach for this reason. As Wanandi argued, 'none of the governments of ASEAN wished to see Vietnamese dominance in Indochina replaced by Chinese dominance in that peninsula' (1983: 11). As it was Indonesia and Malaysia who viewed China as the more significant threat than Vietnam some Indonesian factions advocated for tolerating Vietnam's invasion if it meant strengthening Vietnam against Chinese incursion. The ministry of foreign affairs and Indonesia's armed forces, represented by Moerdani, had different viewpoints that centred around the extent to which they saw China as being the largest threat (Mahbubani 2017). Moerdani had argued that Vietnam posed no threat to Southeast Asia (Suryadinata 1991). Further to this, the military went as far as expressing that Vietnam had some right to unify Indochina under its leadership, just as Indonesia had invaded East Timor to unify their immediate neighbourhood, and that it was an act of national survival as Pol Pot had being particularly provocative towards Vietnam (Suryadinata 1996). As a result, Moerdani attempted to influence Suharto's policy and advocated for a tolerance of Vietnamese aggression.

The Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979 demonstrated to Jakarta that Beijing was prepared to use force (Haacke 2005). Many elites in Indonesia thought that ASEAN's undermining of Vietnam, under Singaporean leadership, would only benefit China (Haacke 2005). Furthermore, the Vietnamese were perceived as being nationalistic rather than purely a communist threat, persuading Indonesia and Malaysia that their interests did not lie in involvement of the Sino-Soviet conflict and that they should therefore remain a buffer against Chinese influence (Wanandi 1983). Given his strong suspicion of China and communism there was just a strong likelihood that Suharto could have followed Moerdani and in the process destroyed ASEAN unity (Suryadinata 1991). This viewpoint

was not limited to Indonesia, Mahathir also declared China to be a threat once he replaced Onn, meaning Malaysia too was sympathetic of Indonesia's perceptions (Saravanamuttu 2009). This went against Singapore's concerns centred less on Chinese influence and more about Vietnamese dominance in Indochina and the Soviet influence it led to, as well as the legitimisation of force that was concerning considering their inherent vulnerabilities.

As a result, there were two competing interest groups with ASEAN and two divergent methods of bringing the conflict to an end. Indonesia and Malaysia, seeking an end that would not weaken Vietnam, engaged in in activities such as the Kuantan principle and the JIM. Singapore on the other hand led activities that aimed to weaken Vietnam and deny any legitimacy to the CDGK, through activities at the UN and international conferences.

Throughout the conflict each party voluntarily took on vulnerability by subverting their own interests to the interests of the other at different stages to reach favourable compromise. There were also positive expectations that the other would not take advantage of this. Singapore was cognisant of the vulnerability that could potentially result from Suharto and Onn's initial efforts in the Kuantan principle. Branding it a 'bad mistake' (LKY 1998: 334), LKY seemed initially unwilling to accept vulnerability that could result if Vietnamese armed intervention could be legitimised. However, the continued unity that LKY showed, especially in the later stages of negotiations such as at the JIM, demonstrated that even though their interests were directly involved they could cede an active approach to both Malaysia and Indonesia. While ASEAN unity was a factor in this, it would not have been possible without Singaporean elites having trust in the Indonesian and Malaysian leadership not to forge ahead with negotiations without considering Singapore's reservations. Throughout the process both Indonesia and Malaysia had reciprocated the trust placed in them and shown a willingness to amend or drop proposals, on the basis that Singapore considered them too counter to their core interests, which had enhanced their trustworthiness in LKY's eyes (LKY 1998). As interviewee 16, a senior Singaporean diplomat based at the ministry at the time, stated:

'when we were briefed [about JIM] there was a sense that they would not push too hard… they would not ignore our interests completely because they'd shown they valued our relationship. They knew what our overarching issues were, and they continued to take this into account'.

Another Singaporean senior diplomat present at meetings, Interviewee 18, argued:

'[officials] asked whether we should be concerned about Mochtar's attempts, I remember I told them at the time that he had shown a lot of awareness about what it was we wanted to achieve, and had not yet shown signs of deserting our core interests. It was obvious that these frustrated him, but we in the foreign office believed this wouldn't lead to any issues, we knew that him seeking resolution wouldn't result in him abandoning completely our interests'.

These viewpoints support the idea that at this stage Singaporean elites had a strong subjective certainty that Indonesia led by Kusumaatmaja would not actively push for any agreement that would go against Singapore's interests, despite the fact they could easily do so if they wanted to. Instead Singapore allowed for Indonesia to make diplomatic initiatives on the assumption they would be halted if this occurred. At times, however, Indonesian elites did consider abandoning the process, demonstrating they had the capability to do so, as they grew increasingly frustrated with Singaporean obstacles. Despite this, they ensured they involved Singapore in the process. This behaviour from Malaysia and Indonesian elites was evident when ASEAN revised the Mochtar-Thach agreement to involve Vietnam, because Singapore was concerned that by involving only the Cambodian factions the international dimension of the conflict would be ignored.

This subjective certainty, predicated on positive expectations, was also present between Singaporean and Malaysian elites. Interviewee 16 stated:

'Vietnam's withdrawal was the primary goal, as long as they had forces in Cambodia there was some unspoken acceptance that you could avoid repercussions for military force… this isn't something we wanted to spread. We were lucky as our ASEAN counterparts never forced us to accept this… Shafie could show he was trying to bring it to an end on Malaysian terms, but in the end we could be sure they would stop short of selfishness, that our views would also be included in some way… we wouldn't have to fight for these too hard, at meetings he was always receptive and we knew it'd always be present with him'.

I argue this reflects there was a sense of positive expectation that Indonesia and Malaysia could continue to maintain dialogue with the government in Hanoi and Phnom Phen, and Singapore could be quietly supportive of these initiatives because they trusted the other parties to not undermine their interests, even if it could have secured Malaysia and Indonesia's interests at their expense. Interviewees held positive expectations that allowed an acceptance of vulnerability and discussed the positive expectations that their superiors also had.

An active Indonesian role had a wider potential cause for concern, furthermore. There were possibilities that JIM would enhance Indonesia's role in foreign policy, meaning they would strike out on their own and abandon ASEAN, especially as Suharto seemed increasingly frustrated by ASEAN's failures to solve the Cambodian issue in a way that suited everyone.[49] Where trust played a role in this, however, is in Singapore's assessment it was unlikely Indonesia would enforce their regional vision despite the differences of opinion and ambition (Guan 2013b). An official at the foreign ministry, who did not interact with his counterparts in other countries but was briefed by those who did (Interviewee 17), stated:

'sometimes in parliament, well and even the negotiating teams, people seemed on edge… Mochtar and Suharto were really striking out on their own, Garuda (Eagle) rising. We were

[49] Indeed, such a discussion is still ongoing today. Since Jokowi took power, the dynamics of Indonesia relegating ASEAN to just one of their pillars of foreign policy, rather than the primary pillar, is indicative of how this concern was justified

told though work with them. Senior officials seemed sure that they would continue to work towards ASEAN's interests.'

This was a common viewpoint. Interviewees 18 and 14, both diplomats at the time, were told to promote ASEAN's interests, as leadership had positive expectations that Suharto also held Singapore's interests as being of 'primary importance' and would in future.

These perceptions carried over to the JIM, which represented a unilateral approach by Indonesia to overcome the issue with less of a focus on persuading other ASEAN members of their threat perceptions. It resulted from Suharto feeling he could no longer defer to Singapore and should instead initiate his own policies. Multiple interviewees involved in the negotiations [17, 18, 13] discussed the way in which they saw the JIM as the best way forward, as they were relatively certain that Indonesia would not abandon Singaporean interests, and it did not reflect an Indonesian defection away from ASEAN. This is not to say they did not resist the attempts initially. It was the revision to make JIM two-staged that was key to Singaporean acceptance. Furthermore, it was not Suharto who was the source of any concern. Interviewee 13 reflected this, when he discussed Suharto's role:

'Suharto was important to us, because it was him who was mediating everything. Any concerns were a result of ABRI (the Indonesian military) and their lack of commitment to ASEAN. Suharto was a restraining influence on this, he stopped their views becoming policy'.

As such Indonesia and Singapore joined forces to protect ASEAN's diplomatic position but this was mediated by trust. Singapore still articulated their foreign policy in ASEAN, as they trusted Indonesia not to subvert its interests, making trust necessary for a unified approach (Mahbubani 2017).

Singapore's efforts also had the potential to cause issues had trust not acted as a mediating factor. Singaporean diplomacy, which both Indonesia and Malaysia supported, not only internationalised the issue at a time where both considered the role of great powers in Southeast

Asia as being counter to their security, but also raised fears that it would allow Chinese influence. At the time it was noted that 'to the Indonesians and Malaysians, the comprehensive effort smacks of a great power imposition of a security arrangement that serves primarily the interests of the United States, China, and Japan' (Sudarsono 2003: 299). With a Chinese majority ethnicity, furthermore, there had been concerns domestically and in factions in the military about the Singaporean-Chinese relationship, and the role Singapore may play in allowing Chinese influence to spread in Southeast Asia. As such, vulnerability could be seen as two-fold. Suharto accepted vulnerability by supporting Singaporean diplomatic efforts which could have led to the undermining of national security. Furthermore, there was the potential of his domestic support weakening due to him going against powerful domestic factions and choosing to subvert Indonesia's primary security interest. This resulted not only from his desire to continue an ASEAN-centric foreign policy, but also because he had positive expectations that despite the concerns of other members of his staff Singapore had benevolent motives.

This is reflected by a discussion with an Indonesian diplomat who was involved in preparing for the UN meetings (Interviewee 11):

> *'we were less sure than [Suharto] was. Some of us understood Pak Benny's viewpoint. It wouldn't be the first time Singapore put themselves first. But actually, the directives from above were extremely clear. We should be understanding of the Singaporean position, and we should continue to support this at the UN. Suharto seemed to know something that we didn't. He definitely put a lot a trust in [LKY]'.*

Interviewee 2, who had remained a significant political advisor argued:

> *'I was lucky…we were lucky. We believed in the ASEAN project. It was important that LKY was able to convince the President that he represented the regional interest, not just that of Singapore…. More and more Suharto viewed his intentions were benign'.*

Wanandi further described the outcome:

> *'In the end it came down to Suharto. And he said yes to Mochtar. ASEAN was our priority, and that was it. Benny was forced to withdraw a little because of the public support he had given Vietnam, and that had confused ASEAN'* (in Mahbubani 2017: 1178).

From the interviewee data and Wanandi's statement, it seems that trust played a significant part as even those that had concerns were told of Suharto's subjective certainty that Singapore would not betray Indonesian interests even if they were given the diplomatic lead, which facilitated the emergence of a unified approach.

Malaysia was also subservient to the Singaporean line even though it went against their primary interests. LKY noted this when he argued that he was able to 'persuade' Mahathir to support the formation of the CGDK, despite Mahathir's reservations (LKY 1998: 351). Interviewee 9 further supported this view. A Malaysian senior diplomat during the crisis, they argued:

> *'it is no secret we had so many disagreements with Singapore…you could be sure that whatever position we had on something; they'd be standing against it. The whole Cambodia issue could have gone a very different way. Actually, everyone stood above their own selfish interests, everyone rallied around even when things were really contentious, even when we were receiving criticism in parliament. Why could we do this? When we sat down with each other and straightened everything out, it was clear that we could all move forward. They kept us informed.'*

More explicitly Interviewee 03, now a senior member of the government involved in the negotiations, stated:

> *'[We] met LKY over this issue. We had many differences... I knew in this I could trust he wouldn't be self-seeking. We could follow them… he was always putting Singapore first, of*

course, even when it caused tensions with us, but when it came to Cambodia, I never expected him to put Malaysian interests too much to one side'.

Positive expectations in Singapore to be sensitive to Malaysian views, demonstrated by their willingness to consult and to persuade Malaysia, allowed Malaysia to subvert their interests to the Singaporean elites at various times during the negotiations.

Indonesia and Malaysia's, admittedly muted, support of Singaporean and Thai efforts to arm and train guerrilla fighters went beyond mere acquiescence and further reflected this process. Even though there were concerns that the Chinese were also supporting Thailand, Malaysia trained the guerrilla fighters, and Indonesia did not actively criticise the venture. With regards to diplomatic efforts, even when Malaysia and Indonesia were dissatisfied that diplomacy was only promoting Singapore's agendas, such as at the ICK, they both invested considerable diplomatic capital and remained committed to ASEAN-centred diplomacy. Malaysia, for example, worked to save the formation of the CGDK when it faced difficulties. Suharto also allowed the endorsement of the eight-point principle despite the fact he thought it undermined Indonesian interests, especially as it was announced in China and perceived to be a Sino-Khmer Rouge initiative (Interviewee 11, 2, 7)**.** This was evident in all post-conference joint communiques.

Singapore could also trust in Indonesia and Malaysia's support as a result of this willingness to make themselves vulnerable through the muting of their own interests for a greater good. Singaporean diplomats consistently referred to their 'friends' who they could depend on at non-aligned movement and UN conferences to argue the case despite their respective countries reservations (Interviewee 17, 19, 14). They did not even monitor them as one former member of the Singaporean UN team stated, 'we were given a free hand…. this trust was very important. We were not micro-managed so we were cowboys on the loose' (In Guan 2013: 31). Positive expectations from Mochtar seemed to be particularly key to this, as it was him who was persuaded by Rajaratnam to not oppose Thai, and therefore Singaporean, policy. As interviewee 11 argued, Mochtar was 'a lot

more certain than many of us, actually he persuaded us too that Rajaratnam was sincere, and that Singapore was moving forward with all of our ideas in mind'.

So obvious were the potential divisions that Vietnam continually kept trying to exacerbate them and play the ASEAN members against one another. As a result of positive expectations there was no concern of defection. In 1984 the Vietnamese foreign minister sought to exploit intramural contradictions by sensationally making revelations about Thailand and Singapore's 'duplicity' in providing sanctuary for the Khmer Rouge and engaging in under-the-table trade deals with Vietnam (Paribatra 1986: 212). Interviewee 12, a senior member of the ASEAN secretariat, recalled: 'We had our concerns, but even we knew that Singapore weren't twofaced and joining Vietnam. They were just trying to divide us. We didn't trust Vietnam no matter how sympathetic some of us were'.

Such trust that the other wouldn't defect was also reciprocated by Singapore. Vietnam made a proposal that they cooperate with Indonesia to meet the common long-term threat from the PRC and that the former act as a bridge between ASEAN and Indochina. Singaporean diplomats, Interviewees 17 and 18, were sure even at the time that there 'was no chance of Indonesia throwing in with Vietnam…and abandoning the ASEAN line'. Malik even proposed a joint military exercise on the border with Cambodia (Acharya 2014). Through this, I aim to demonstrate that trust was present, and mediated a crisis which had the potential to divide ASEAN if they had each given up on one another and chosen to pursue their own interests independently. Instead they showed great willingness to subvert their primary interests at different stages in order to maintain unity.

6.3 Maritime Affairs

As argued previously, the way maritime disputes are handled serve as an important measure of trust between elites. All countries involved in this thesis are particularly sensitive about territory and their maritime sectors, and such sensitivity meant only limited trust and outcomes in previous stages of their relationships. This section will demonstrate the way in which trusting behaviour with regards to the maritime sector had proliferated, demonstrating an increased presence of trust

despite the parallel presence of maritime crises. Whilst ASEAN was not directly involved, the relationships that it structured were key in the peaceful resolution, or avoidance, and key for the trust that allowed this to occur.

6.3.1 Background

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the maritime realm was particularly sensitive. Indonesia's claim of the archipelago doctrine had required a greater growth in relations, and I argue trust, due to the problems it posed for Malaysia and Singapore. The ASEAN nations had shelved potential sources of conflict in order to allow ASEAN a more auspicious beginning than past organisations that were mired in disagreements. However, in the period of 1975-1997 there were two potential sources of conflict, the first between Singapore and Malaysia, and the second between Indonesia and Malaysia. Despite conflict breaking out, I argue that that not only did both sides demonstrate strategic restraint, but they also held positive expectations that the other would not increase their aggressive stance, which allowed for a willingness to make the trustors vulnerable by lessening their own stance. Despite crises there was also a significant amount of diffuse reciprocity within the maritime realm which further demonstrated this trust, as they trusted each other to focus primarily on cooperation rather than conflict. Throughout these crises it was the leaders' trust that was of most significance, as it was leaders who were persuading those on the ground and in military structures not to escalate. While much of the problematic decisions on the ground were undertaken by other actors, they were then restrained by the leaders who held trust in one another.

The first territorial crisis was between Malaysia and Singapore over a small island called Pedra Branca. With distrust high between Malaysian and Singaporean elites in the previous stage of the relationship, they were unable to conclude any meaningful cooperation in the maritime sphere, beyond basic areas such as the straits management which they still had reservations over. Distrust-reduction had occurred, but they had yet to build much in the way of meaningful trust. The crisis that demonstrated the mediating factor of trust was that of the 1979 assertion of title to Pedra

Branca. Malaysia unilaterally redrew boundaries to include the island, even though Singapore had administered it for over a century (Mak 2008). The result was a series of protests from Singapore, as well as official discussions to resolve the issue. Singapore claimed they still had ownership of the island and the two adjoining islets - Middle Rocks and South Ledge. The issue, however, remained relatively muted until 1989, when Singapore established a radar installation on the island and traffic was banned from surrounding waters (ICJ 2004). They followed this up with the construction of a helicopter pad in 1991, and a Malaysia-Indonesia military exercise called '*Pukul Habis* (Total wipe out)', where paratroopers landed in the vicinity, was held in response (Ostwald 2019). Singapore followed up by putting its armed forces on full alert before significant efforts were made to resolve the conflict. These were undertaken initially by Badawi[50] who intervened in domestic politics to argue that leaders of the state of Johor, the Malaysian state which borders Singapore, should not escalate the issue domestically. When the two leaders of the countries met, Mahathir and Goh[51], in Langkawi they agreed to refer to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994, which was eventually undertaken in 2003.

Perhaps of greater significance, however, is the second conflict that saw the escalation of tensions surrounding disagreements over Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan between Indonesia and Malaysia. They are small islands in the Sulawesi Sea northeast of Borneo Island where the borders of Sabah and Kalimantan meet. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, disagreements had emerged during the 1969 continental shelf negotiations, and in a show of strategic restraint that had contributed to distrust-reduction the two sides had postponed the delimitation of the maritime zones in the Sulawesi Sea, in order to avoid issues that could create obstacles for the relationship. However, in this period the conflict grew into a bilateral problem in the 1980s and became openly known in 1991 when Malaysia issued deeds to a private company to develop Sipadan as a tourist

[50] Abdullah Badawai was foreign minister from 1991-1999, and Prime Minister 2003-2009
[51] Goh Chok Tong was the Prime Minister of Singapore 1990-2004. It is important to note, LKY still had significant presence in the Singaporean leadership as a 'Senior Minister'

resort (Butcher 2013). Efforts to resolve the issue were undertaken by, first, a bilateral commission in 1991, and then a Joint Border Committee which held three stages of talks between 1992 and 1994. These Committee meetings, however, did not result in any meaningful solution and Malaysia not only continued to promote the tourist resort, but also increased patrols in the area. As a result of this, Indonesia also increased patrols and there was a proliferation of military exercises around the islands, including Indonesia landing troops on Sipadan on two separate occasions (Haller-Trost 1995). This conflict, in contrast to the Malaysian tensions with Singapore, also resulted in live fire when Malaysian armed forces opened forces on Indonesian units (Jenne 2016). Suharto intervened with his armed forces on the ground to stop the 'unauthorised' missions (Jenne 2016). Negotiations were then undertaken by Anwar[52] and Moerdiono[53]. Initially it seemed as if a solution would be extremely difficult to come by. Suharto, in line with his commitment to ASEAN, wanted to bring the issue to the High Council of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation - the first time it would have been used in conflict mediation. Malaysia, however, refused such a suggestion as they were concerned that other ASEAN members would choose to support Indonesia as they all had issues with Malaysian borders. Malaysian officials also argued that it would unnecessarily burden ASEAN, as the organisation was not necessarily directly involved in the conflict. Instead, in 1998 they agreed that the ICJ would be the best venue to decide.

6.3.2 The Presence and Role of Trust

I argue that these crises, while being problematic, showed the existence of trust both prior and during. This trust was of importance in mediating the successful outcomes of the referrals to the ICJ, the avoidance of escalation, and the avoidance of damaging ASEAN's development.

In the case of Pulau Ligatan and Sipadan the emergence of the conflict itself is of interest as the Malaysian decision to build upon the islands was seen as a significant betrayal, a factor of

[52] Anwar Ibrahim was Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia 1993-1998
[53] Moerdiono was Indonesian Minister of State 1988-1998

distrust discussed above (Jenne 2016). As argued in both the Introduction and Chapter 3, when trust is broken it results in a feeling and expression of betrayal rather than disappointment. Once the resort was developed, Alatas argued that Malaysian leaders had betrayed Indonesia as Tun Razak had made a verbal promise in 1969 to not develop the islands in order to avoid claiming ownership. The Indonesian reaction was one in which betrayal was expressed both in terms of the narrative they deployed and their mobilisation of the armed forces (Interviewee 2, 11). The language of betrayal is of interest as it further supports the notion that prior to the crisis there was trust. The form of the agreement, furthermore, being only verbal in nature with no verification, hedging, or indeed any written evidence (made public), furthers this presence of trust. The leaders made such agreements based on positive expectations, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, and once this was broken it resulted in a sense of betrayal that would not have occurred had trust not been present in the first place. What is of further interest is that even though there was a sense of betrayal, trust at this stage was durable enough that it did not result in distrust. As mentioned above, if distrust is weak, behaviours which in other relationships of high distrust may cause further distrust, do not need cause to distrust but can instead damage the separate concept of trust. Within this case, there continued to be several trusting behaviours, including a willingness to make oneself vulnerable and diffuse reciprocity, predicated on the presence of positive expectations. This means that distrust did not necessarily grow, but that trust itself was damaged and quickly repaired throughout the crisis.

The first acceptance of vulnerability was the fact that even as the conflict escalated, resulting even in gunfire in 1994, Malaysia was hesitant to commit too many military forces to the islands, as leaders believed that Suharto had no desire for conflict and would focus solely on diplomacy (Interviewee 15). It was Suharto's intervention that prevented further escalation, and he even attempted to keep the issue a secret so that the population would not demand further action that he did not want to undertake. As a former aide to the confidential group at the Prime Minister's Office said, the leadership 'prefer[red] not to test how the population would react in such a conflict'

(in Jenne 2016: 184). Interviewee 10, a government official who played a significant role in maritime affairs, further argued, 'while Suharto trusted that Mahathir would not escalate the issue, he was not so trusting of the Indonesian and Malaysian people'. Malaysian elites, furthermore, believed that Suharto was doing what he could to prevent the issue from escalating and to not wield their strength in order to force a negotiation from a position of strength. Interviewee 03 demonstrates this in his discussion: '[We] sent Anwar to talk to the Indonesians. I knew Suharto had no interest in seeing this get out of hand. He negotiated with a lot of good-will and wouldn't allow an escalation just to force us to give up our claims'. This is a case whereby trust between leaders, therefore, acted as a restraint on possible courses of action.

Whilst this was demonstrative of the role and presence of trust throughout the conflict, Suharto also accepted vulnerability when he agreed to the outcome of submitting the issue to the ICJ. Suharto acquiesced to this even though he believed that Indonesia would not be successful. By going against the advice of many of his advisors, including Alatas and significant forces in the military, this was perceived as being problematic for his domestic position (Winanti and Rum 2018). Suharto's rule was already weakening, and while this was not so evident at the time, some have argued that by accepting Malaysia's solution it could have been perceived as a sign that Suharto was putting their interests behind those of their neighbours (Interviewee 11, 15). It seemed clear that they would lose, which would garner significant sovereignty costs for Indonesia (Abbot 1999). Autonomy was given up when the case was referred to the ICJ, but it was also expected that they would lose control of the islands and the waterways that surrounded them, something that was always perceived as being a cause of vulnerability for Indonesia. Suharto, however, had positive expectations that Malaysia would not exploit their victory by either restricting access, pushing further aggressive claims, or making a public show of their victory. Interviewee 15 argued that:

> *'for us, it would have been a more serious issue if Mahathir had gloated and tried to undermine us. There were a few of us in the ministry who believed this might happen, but the*

overwhelming view was that Malaysia would be sensitive to the loss if that was what the ICJ chose'.

Suharto himself argued that the conflict needed to be resolved not to burden future generations. He believed it best to attempt to deal with the issue now before there was a disappearance of personal relationships who knew the tacit understandings of the time. He was sceptical that any leaders that came to power that did not have the same levels of trust would not be able to solve the issues. Malaysia reciprocated the trust when they decided to submit the claim to the ICJ, as they accommodated these concerns when they excluded the ruling applying to maritime boundaries in the surrounding areas.

These dynamics were also present in the case of Singapore and Malaysia in Pedra Branca, even if it was to a lesser degree. They trusted each other to show some restraint even though they were slowly escalating. From interviews it was clear that while there was a militarization, it was mostly for a domestic audience, and that those negotiating over the islands recognised that (Interviewee 5, 6, 17). There was a belief that it was not the Malaysian leadership who were pushing the issue, but state leaders in Johor and more extremist factions within the government (Interviewee 17). Badawi and Mahathir's domestic statements were important in this trustworthiness, therefore, as it signalled a domestic effort to restrain these elites and prevent an escalation (Interviewee 8)**.** It was the personal meeting between the leaders that was important in further restraint. As Interviewee 03 argues:

'actually, when [we] met Goh we were able to talk about the issue without the domestic clamouring for action, I knew he wouldn't escalate, and I think at this point he was sure I wouldn't also'.

Perhaps of more significance in this case, however, is that there was diffuse reciprocity in maritime cooperation despite this crisis. Significant issues between the leaders as a result of residual

distrust had prevented a comprehensive maritime boundary agreement, so the conclusion of an agreement in 1995, during this crisis, is of significance. Interviewee 08 reflects on this:

> *'I guess it seems naïve, but even though all of [this crisis] was going on, we didn't think it should impact on other maritime issues. I mean, they could have used cooperation against us if they had wanted to, but the leadership was so sure that the conflict wouldn't escalate, we were told to keep expanding avenues of cooperation, so that once it was over, we could work together properly again'.*

Cooperative behaviour further included joint naval exercises conducted in the South China Sea in 1987, an agreement on exchanging students between the each other's defence colleges, and close cooperation between their internal security services (Chin and Suryadinta 2005).Perhaps of most significance, however, is the Five Power Defence Pact (FPDA). Land exercises had been initiated in 1981 but had to be conducted outside of Malaysia and Singapore due to Malaysian sensitivities. These quickly softened and Malaysia hosted Exercise KRIS SAKTI (Thayer 2003). LKY also called in 1990 for both countries to allow for open inspection of each other's military capabilities. A growth of military cooperation to such an extent during a time of crisis seems unlikely in the absence of trust that there would be a peaceful solution.

Diffuse reciprocity was also a trusting behaviour that was present between Indonesia and Malaysia. Even while the crisis was occurring, they were advancing avenues of cooperation. As diffuse reciprocity was present it acts as an indication that they trusted one another to solve the issue peacefully, so that these would not be exploited if the issue escalated. Indonesia and Malaysia strengthened border coordination to deal with insurgent activities and carried out bilateral military exercises as well as intelligence exchange (Colbert 1986). They also formalised a memorandum of understanding in 1982 that granted Malaysia access via two corridors through Indonesia's internal waters, allowing greater Malaysian military movements around the disputed islands (Hamzah 1984). Throughout the crisis this was not reneged, as they did not believe that Malaysia would exploit it

(Interviewee 10, 12). This was followed up in 1992 by coordinated patrol agreements with Malaysia and Singapore, which allowed law enforcement vessels from each state to cross boundaries when conducting hot pursuit, as well as extended information sharing, coastal monitoring, and coordination (Febrica 2017). Even the JBC established to deal with the islands were not just focused on conflict management, as it was also seen to deal with 15 additional issues, including piracy and migration (Febrica 2017). Again, this was a result of trust that existed despite the crisis that was occurring. As interviewee 20 argues:

'At the ministry we saw no reason to slow down cooperation. The issue would be solved, we would get it done, whether through the TAC or the ICJ. There was no reason to abandon everything else, especially as Malaysia had actually being restrained…. It's interesting that we probably had more exchange in this time than we ever had before, one issue wasn't enough to make us think, ok, maybe we should stop working with these people, piracy wouldn't go away'.

The potential gains from the agreements, preventing sea robberies and smuggling, was not significant relevant to the potential that these agreements could be used to undermine the other to advance the cause of the crisis. The agreements were reliant on good faith compliance, and there was no significant verification or hedging, demonstrating the presence of trust and the role it played in underplaying the potential of the conflict.

6.4 The Bases of Trust

Now that trust has been demonstrated as being present and having played a role in mediating potential crises, as well as allowing for the dependable expectation of peaceful change, this section will analyse the bases of trust. It will argue that trust at this point became grounded on the extended knowledge-based trust discussed in the framework, which focuses on not only cognitive knowledge, or predictability of behaviour, but also affective knowledge and social knowledge. These emphasise the role of elites getting to know one another, and learning what behaviour was meant to be perceived as trustworthy.

6.4.1 Cognitive knowledge

Cognitive knowledge was important in both the crises and the development of ASEAN. The trusting behaviour and positive expectations that resulted were primarily a result of expecting restrained behaviours due to that occurring in the past, making the actors predictable in their commitment to cooperation. This was especially the case in the Cambodian crisis. Whilst Indonesia had concerns about Singapore's way of dealing with the issue, they had come to believe that Singapore had no designs to undermine Indonesian interests due to past events. One of these was Singapore's silence in response to Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. As mentioned, any unilateral forceful invasion was contrary to Singapore's core interests. The invasion of East Timor, therefore, could be expected to have had the same reaction. As interviewee 12 discusses:

> *'LKY and Rajaratnam had been willing to put their interests to one side during our incorporation of East Timor. We had expected a real noise to erupt. During the problem with Cambodia we were reminded of this… we thought, if they had done that in the past, if they weren't always so inflexible with what concerned them, then there was a real opportunity to work properly on Cambodia, as maybe they wouldn't let it dominate here also'*.

Another case of this predictability resulted from Singapore's demonstration that they were not merely a lackey of China. As Interviewee 14 articulated:

> *'The guys in Singapore had done a good job of changing the opinion of our leaders. ABRI had been concerned [about their links to China], but at every stage they held talks with us, they put off recognising China and they showed us they were not one and the same'.*

By the mid-1980s 'the Indonesians had swung around to the view that, far from being a supporter of China, we had in fact consistently stood up for 'our' interests as Southeast Asians' (LKY 1998: 273). I argue that this is in line with Kydd's (2005) theorising on states with assurance game preferences demonstrating their likeness to other states with the same preference. It became an

important dimension of trust, as Singapore had repeatedly made cooperative moves that created positive expectations during the Cambodian crisis, an issue which also involved China. Their behaviour, therefore, had become relatively predictable. It was expected that they would emphasise regional interests and be transparent in any areas that may cause concern.

Furthermore, an increase in relations between Indonesia and Singapore with regards to military collaboration put the Singaporeans at ease that if any issue emerged, they would continue to work together (Interviewee 17). Indonesia had demonstrated not only significant restraint, but also an overarching commitment to cooperation. Singapore had been invited to assist in the development of Batam Island, for example, and the Singaporean Armed Forces and ABRI also became increasingly close throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As Kwek and Liow argue, 'defence relations were enhanced with the inauguration of Exercise Elang Indopura (which involved the air forces of both countries), Exercise SAFKAR Indopura (between the armies of the two countries) and the joint development of an air weapons range in Sumatra' (Kwek and Liow 2016: 138). Especially important was the fact that Singapore agreed to share defence technology – something which Indonesia has sought to improve (Kwek and Liow 2016). In exchange, Indonesia allowed Singaporean troops to train in Indonesia (Kwek and Liow 2016). Kwek and Liow argue this proved decisive in Singapore's acquiescence to allowing Indonesia a leading role in the diplomacy that occurred surrounding the Cambodia conflict (Kwek and Liow 2016). For Singaporean elites, they could trust in Indonesia as:

> *'Indonesia had increasingly shown us they were committed to us, they were increasingly opening up to us. We thought it extremely unlikely that they would just abandon all the work we had both put in to push forward on their own regardless of what we felt about it'*
> (Interviewee 19)

I argue that references to commitment demonstrates the existence of cognitive knowledge, whereby states became predictably cooperative, which allowed the other to have a relatively stable foundation for trust as they expected cooperation to continue.

It was particularly important for the trust demonstrated during Malaysia and Indonesia's maritime diffuse reciprocity or open mandates. As Interviewee 14 argued, it created a sense of familiarity between the two sets of elites, and especially their armed forces. This demonstrated to the other that cooperation in sensitive areas could be undertaken bracketed off from the crises that were occurring. As it had proven so fruitful in the past, there were positive expectations that such cooperation would continue despite issues. Furthermore, Indonesia had demonstrated 'time and time again' to Malaysian elites that they had exercised restraint so as not to disturb the regional security environment and to increase cooperation. As it seemed unlikely they would abandon this, there was little concern over Indonesian desires to seek a more proactive role in the Cambodian crisis (Interviewee 4, 9)

Such a commitment to cooperative behaviour, whereby states became predictably cooperative, was also an important dimension for Singapore and Malaysia's pursuit of diffuse reciprocity despite the ongoing maritime crisis. When crises erupted there was a basis of cooperation from which to judge the others' intentions, and channels of communication between the armed forces and elites could be maintained. Peter Ho[54], argues that the training opportunities have provided a 'platform for the two defence establishments of the two countries to keep channels of communication open and to maintain a level of contact not possible in a bilateral setting' (in Emmers 2016: 178). It was agreed that separate meetings of the chiefs of defence and defence ministers should become permanent and be scheduled every two or three years. This would prove a fundamental basis for the trust in each other's restraint during the Pedra Branca crisis. According to Interviewee 20, a senior Singaporean Diplomat:

[54] Peter Ho was the Permanent Secretary of Defence of Singapore

'I knew that [my counterpart] was more interested in cooperation than conflict, we had been working together in the last decade very successfully in a way we couldn't conceive of in the [19]60s. He hadn't abandoned this in the past. The signs had all been there, we squabble, we work together, and so on so on'

To suggest predictability of behaviour was the only factor would be problematic, however, as there were instances where other bases were highlighted by interviewees. As such, while it provided a basis for trust, I argue there were two other important dimensions to knowledge-based trust which made it more stable in this context, and that a conceptualisation of knowledge as only cognitive is too simplistic.

6.4.2 Social knowledge

ASEAN's structure was important as a basis of KBT as it allowed the proliferation of what I term social knowledge. Linked to the literature on ASEAN's normative framework, I argue that norms were significant not because of the way they transformed identity, but because they provided a framework for recognising indicators of trustworthiness. The procedural norms of consensus-seeking, informality, and face-saving were all assumed to be indicators as they had meant as such in the past.

The critical reason for the degree of success in Singapore's relationship with Indonesia was that LKY began to see the advantage of ASEAN. As Indonesia increasingly engaged with the ASEAN structure, it and enacted its behaviour in line with the ASEAN 'rules'. Singaporean elites refer to this as a way of assessing trustworthiness, as they had gained a social knowledge of ways they could assess Suharto's intentions. As argued by interviewee 16, before the Cambodian crisis Indonesia had demonstrated that it was extremely committed to the ASEAN project by demonstrating they were willing to engage in consensus-seeking even at times it would be easier to seek their own settlement:

'[this] was really important to us. Whenever it seemed Suharto might be going it alone, Mochtar made significant efforts to demonstrate how their behaviour was in line with the way we agreed it would be and the way it had been –they ensured that ASEAN was consulted and brought along. I think it helped that our meetings were closed off, we could just talk and work it all out and most of the time the results were good for all of us'.

This was corroborated by his counterpart in Indonesia:

'whenever there were concerns, we took each other aside, we had some really great dinners. We were able to come to a consensus that tried to reflect all our worries… of course this didn't always work, but we tried and that was reassuring' (Interviewee 13).

Informality was also important in the maritime crisis between Malaysia and Indonesia, as:

'there is less pressure to come to some perfectly articulated solution. We can talk out of the eyes of the public. We can be candid and resolve obvious problems before we have to go through the formal performance where consensus is much more difficult, especially once things are already written down or ideas are already out there' (Interviewee 11).

Being subjectively certain that the process of coming to a consensus in private often resulted in a lack of harm, I argue that the elites were able to take this as an indicator of trustworthiness in ways that they had not before. While the diplomatic processes had been relatively new and untested in ASEAN's previous stage, the region's leaders increasingly used the notion of the ASEAN-way as a diplomatic tool to promote peaceful relations and ASEAN's mode of activity. This 'informal process of confidence-building and trust creation' (Sukma 2010: 117) increasingly provided a focal point for what indicators of trustworthiness were. It is only by going through this process before, however, that they had subjective certainty during crises in this period, making it akin to a form of knowledge of their social structure and what certain behaviours were intended to mean.

This was given greater meaning and certainty when such attempts to forge consensus were made in reference to ASEAN's normative framework, as it began a patterned form of socially meaningful behaviour to emerge that could be pointed at to show they were being trustworthy. While not all concerns could always be accommodated it seems that the attempt itself, especially in informal settings, signalled trustworthiness as the behaviour became socially meaningful. Interviewee 5 reflected on the language used in the discussions they had in ministerial meetings:

> *'the thing about ASEAN meetings is we do try to encourage informality and familiarity, but there is also a way of saying things that aims to avoid highlighting division. People see this is as ASEAN being on the fence, but it isn't just that. During the conflict we knew when [Singapore] was saying 'positive considerations to a draft' they're trying to show they're aware of our concerns and welcoming of our viewpoints, that a consensus is possible and divisions can be overcome…we're not just saying 'let's fight argue over wording'… instead we know actually we can trust them, because they're not just going ahead and ignoring us'.*

As such, there is also a social knowledge concerning not only the way things are done, in trying to come to a consensus, but also the type of language used. This knowledge of what language is meant to mean in that context can form a basis of trust as it serves to reinforce a patterned form of behaviour aimed at coming to a consensus reflecting as many viewpoints as possible. When the other engaged in this behaviour of trying to reach a consensus, it signalled that they were able to trust as the other was following the social 'signposts' that had been created. Leaders had increasing ways to assess the intentions of the other and whether the other would remain committed to diplomacy and the institution if the other followed socially meaningful behaviour and language.

6.4.3 Affective Knowledge

I argue affective knowledge was also important as it allowed trust to be maintained even when behaviour diverged from that predicted. Affective knowledge is getting to know the other as a person and not merely a representative of their state, similar to Wheeler's (2018) humanization

process. Personal relationships increasingly facilitated trust at this time as they provided knowledge that the other was unlikely to defect as they had developed an obligation between one another. This was facilitated by a significant and durable network of personal relationships among decision-makers across the region. I would argue that in some cases this may have reached Identification-Based Trust, in the sense that some increasingly transformed their identities in relation to the other, but that this basis was not widely held nor necessary for the proliferation of trust in the ASEAN context.

One case of where leaders underwent a process of getting to know each other as people, providing the opportunities for consultation, dialogue, and trust in each other's intentions was LKY and Suharto. As Mahbubani argued, 'despite the fact that it is difficult to imagine a pair more unlikely to forge a close collaboration' their relationships were transformed by the fact they were able to get increasingly comfortable with one another that was conducive to providing a basis for trust (2017: 1182). LKY himself highlighted this, when stating 'throughout the 1970s and '80s, we met almost every year to keep in touch, exchange views and discuss matters that cropped up' in what were referred to empat mata (four eyes) conversations (LKY 1998: 102). Through these interactions they increasingly felt a sense of obligation between one another. LKY himself said of Suharto, 'I found him to be a man of his word. He made few promises but delivered whatever he had promised. His forte was his consistency… He decided he could trust me' (LKY 1998: 103). As a result of these interactions Mahbubani, who was close to decision-making, argued that 'they were able to build trust and confidence in each other. This trust and confidence between two key leaders helped to provide the foundation for ASEAN to come together' (2017: 1193).

When Suharto was advised to not follow Singaporean diplomacy in the Cambodian crisis, for example, it was his belief that LKY would not abandon his interests that made him comfortable in supporting something others in his country did not believe in (Interviewee 11, 19). LKY seemingly believed Suharto when he persuaded LKY that Indonesia did not have a desire to abandon a regional

interest despite their frustrations, because that would mean abandoning LKY as well (Interviewee 14). Their interactions had a strong effect on LKY. I argue LKY's concern over Suharto's family provides a strong indicator of the way in which they considered each other to be humans and not just representatives. In his memoirs LKY talks of the informal meetings he had with Suharto and his family, and the way in which he was concerned that Suharto's children, who were using their father's power for business monopolisation, would be Suharto's downfall. The language used is not the cold calculative tone that is targeted towards many other characters, but it seems as if there was a genuine warmth and a genuine concern that Suharto would be harmed by his own people as a result of his family's behaviour (LKY 1998). These meetings, therefore, engendered affective knowledge concerning the other that heightened a sense of obligation, but also led to stronger expectations that those feelings of obligation would be reciprocated.

Singapore's silence in the East Timor crisis was not initially taken as support. It took them meeting for LKY to persuade Suharto that he did not have contrary interests and reinforce this sense of obligation. As LKY said:

> *'A year passed before personal rapport was re-established when Suharto visited Singapore, unofficially, on 29 November 1976. I said Singapore would not put obstacles in the way of Indonesia's day-to-day relations with Timor; we accepted Timor as a part of Indonesia, but we could not publicly endorse its invasion and occupation. He accepted my position that if we had voted with Indonesia, we would have sent the world a wrong signal about our own security'* (LKY 1998: 281).

Suharto based this on the fact that he had gotten to know LKY as a person, which then later also allowed them to understand LKY's stance during the Cambodian crisis. LKY supported the importance of meetings in his recollection:

'At all our meetings, Suharto and I would always make time to meet empat mata, when we could have uninhibited free-ranging discussions, and I would test out ideas which he could reject without any embarrassment. This made for rapport…' (LKY 1998: 273).

By getting to know one another they managed to create a context whereby they could engage in personal transparency in order to reassure one another of their intentions and obligations. Goh was also in this position to build affective knowledge so that when he took over from LKY he too had a basis in place which proved important. Before his appointment, Goh had held the important position of Defence Minister for six years which afforded him numerous opportunities to work closely with his Indonesian counterparts.

The other relationships of importance were LKY's relationships with Malaysian leaders. LKY was able to trust in both Onn and Mahathir as he got the measure of them, but both for different reasons. LKY argued that Onn was 'open and direct… I liked him…I was impressed by his integrity and his good intentions' (LKY 1998: 399). When it came to mediating different interests this proved important. Following the Kuantan principle, for example, it was Onn's interactions with LKY that created a positive expectation from LKY that Malaysia was not going to completely abandon Singapore's core interests for the sake of finding a deal that benefitted Malaysia only (Interviewee 17, 16). Onn was not just the personification of Malaysia, but LKY had come to know him as his own person with his own characteristics.

This was different for Mahathir and LKY's relationship, but it was still one whereby affective knowledge formed some basis for trust. Trust grew as they got to know each other well as people, giving a subjective knowledge about the other. At the original stages of their relationship LKY and Mahathir had a cautious approach to one another. When Singapore joined Malaysia, he and Mahathir were political rivals, and Mahathir engaged in racially grounded attacks on LKY. Mahbubani argued that in their first meeting following Mahathir's appointment as Deputy Prime Minister at a dinner hosted by Wee Kim Wee they were cautious of one another, but once they gained awareness

of the other they developed a basis of trust (Mahbubani 2017: 1209). According to interviewees 3 and 5 Mahathir left this meeting feeling that he had connected with LKY in a way that he had not in the past. When Malaysian behaviour went against that predicted, for example in the case of them mobilising forces during the Pedra Branca dispute, their relationship mediated the issue. As LKY argued

> *'I did not believe they wanted to invade us. He said clearly that he accepted an independent Singapore and had no intention of undermining it. My reply was that on this basis we could build a relationship of trust and confidence'* (LKY 1998: 217).

Mahathir gave advice to LKY on how to lessen tensions and allowed Singaporean involvement in Johor which had previously been restricted. With regards to Pedra Branca this proved decisive according to LKY, when [Mahathir]:

> *'said both parties should sit down and sort it out. We could exchange papers and settle the issue. I agreed. On the Straits of Johor, he wanted the Thalweg line (the line along the deepest channel between the two shores) to be fixed and not to shift with the shifting of the channel. I agreed. I requested the return of a military camp they were occupying and the acquisition of a portion of Malayan Railway land at Tanjong Pagar Station for an expressway extension. He agreed. After dinner, he said with satisfaction, 'Nearly all bilateral issues have been resolved.' I replied, 'Let's keep it like that.' It was a good first meeting. We had established a relationship'. I visited Mahathir in Kuala Lumpur the following year, in 1992. In a two-hour one-on-one meeting, we moved from just solving bilateral problems to negotiating new areas of cooperation'* (LKY 1998: 245).

As such, the diffuse reciprocity was based on this process of them getting to know one another, which would prove decisive in the Cambodian conflict where it was LKY who personally persuaded Mahathir to allow the formation of the CGDK.

ASEAN as a structure further allowed other actors relevant to the foreign policy decision making of each country to get to know one another which formed the basis of KBT as it increased affective knowledge. Mahbubani argues ASEAN elites gained a sense of fraternity, and that when he served as Singapore's ambassador to the UN during the Cambodian crisis, he was able to forge personal relationships with leading ASEAN diplomats including Alatas (2017). I argue that trust was also gained and grounded in the fact that getting to know one another seemed to increase the sense of obligation between them (Interviewee 07, 15, 18). ASEAN meetings bought leaders together in less formal settings and was key to this. Relationships were forged in a way that allowed them to see each other not just as manifestations of state interests, but people who had their own intentions to ensure the relationships ran smoothly. Many ASEAN meetings were followed by 'a happy round of golf that generated friendship and camaraderie' (Mahbubani 2017: 986). Mahbubani discusses how Wong agreed that 'golf was an important factor. It helped to break down barriers and promote camaraderie. We even had an ASEAN golf game at a weekend when we attended the annual UN General Assembly' (in Mahbubani 2017: 994). Dinners, karaoke and cocktail parties all enhanced camaraderie and the knowledge of the other, as reflected on by LKY:

> *'Between golf swings, they would test out their ideas and proposals, which could be turned down with less contention than at a formal meeting…To Western diplomats, such activities may appear inane. In fact, they break the ice between people who, although close geographic neighbours, are strangers because they had been kept apart from each other for over a century by different colonial spheres of influence. Through these regular consultations and meetings, where business and recreation were equally important on the official agenda, habits of cooperation and compromise evolved'* (LKY 1998: 331).

This is in line with Wheeler's discussion of how sharing food facilitates the humanization process (2018). Interviewees corroborate that much of the 'work' was getting to know 'the person in the suit' by exchanging stories, enjoying golf and eating dinners with their counterparts and their

families (Interviewee 13, 15, 7, 18)[55]. Getting to know each other doesn't have to create trust, but I argue the importance it had for trust was an affective knowledge and a deepening of a sense of obligation, as expressed by interviewee 12:

'If I recall, around April or May, I had met [his counterpart] and his wife. We had a breakfast planned before my flight back. It was enjoyable, relaxed, we didn't talk about work. Then 2, 3 months later, I received reports that Indonesia might be leaving ASEAN behind [in relation to the Cambodian issue]. I didn't agree. It wasn't just the breakfast [laughs] though it was a good breakfast. It added to everything, added to the voice in your head saying, 'they won't do that…and if they did, I would have hoped [he] would have approached me first.'

6.5 Conclusion

These developments were extremely significant in allowing ASEAN to develop as a community. It had transformed from one where a strong degree of sensitivity based on distrust towards one another prevented cooperation, to a sense that even if interests were not aligned there would be a continuing lack of harm if they accepted vulnerability or allowed ASEAN's development. By this point trust had proliferated beyond specificity of interests, as the behaviour of the leaders become increasingly predictable, along with their commitment to the institution and one another. On this basis it had also deepened.

The Cambodian crisis was particularly important in this. Successful outcomes helped increase the strength of trust held by one another. As Davies argues, the 'coexistence of this divergence with ASEAN's action illustrated that member-states were willing to work together even when their narrow national interests pulled in different directions' which led to a coordinated pattern of consultation (Davies 2018: 28). With a greater sense of what Natalegwa (2018) refers to

[55] While social media was not present at this time, one only has to look at the accounts of current and recent foreign and defence ministers to see the amount of informal meetings they have with their counterparts in ASEAN, mostly dinners with family members in attendance as well.

as political 'comfort' about participation in ASEAN, it began to take centre-stage in their affairs and ASEAN was able to assume a greater political and security role**.** As trust and trusting behaviour increased during this period on a stronger basis, the security role for ASEAN continued to grow, as did the commitment of the three states to it. In September 1982, LKY went so far as to suggest that the time had come for greater military cooperation in ASEAN. Indonesia suggested military assistance could now be offered to ASEAN member states if they were attacked. At the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 1992, the ASEAN leaders decided that ASEAN should heighten its external discussions on political and security issues by using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conferences (PMC). A special Post Ministerial Conference Senior Officials Meeting (PMC SOM) was convened to demonstrate that ASEAN was prepared to discuss political and security issues. Subsequently, the ARF was officially launched in 1994, through which member states were able to discuss a wide range of both traditional and non-traditional security issues ranging from peacekeeping, non-proliferation and disarmament, to disaster relief, and maritime security. With the presence of distrust this had been unthinkable. Instead, the development of ASEAN and the sectors it was involved in proliferated in line with the growth of trust demonstrated in this chapter.

They had gone through a process where they had come to know one another's' behaviour as for the most part benevolent, while building a sense of obligation through affective 'humanization' (Wheeler 2018) and learned of new context-specific ways to assess trustworthiness. I argue it demonstrated the presence of trust and the way in which trust could mediate conflicts. It prevented the breakdown of community even when interests were not aligned, or even ran counter to one another as it had in the maritime crises. These crises were unable to stall trusting behaviours, growing cooperation, and a growing 'comfort', as leaders held a subjective certainty that they would be resolved in a way that prevented them being harmed, due to the positive expectations engendered by the three-pillared process described in this chapter. Interviewees discuss 'knowing' that they would not be harmed, and even in the face of objective uncertainty all leaders involved had engaged in trusting behaviours, from which the lack of defection reinforced trust as it confirmed

the views of trustworthiness that the leaders held in one another. As argued previously, KBT is traditionally separated from Relational Based Trust (RBT), with KBT being more cognitive and RBT being more affective. However, within the previous cases, both developed in parallel with one another, and divisions between the two are indistinguishable in the decisions that were made to engage in trusting behaviour.

Chapter 7: The Embedding of Trust (1997-2015)

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that trust between ASEAN's leaders had deepened from being based primarily on a cognitive calculation that interests were aligned, to a deeper trust that held increased certainty that the other could be trusted. This form of trust had cognitive, affective, and social inputs that all played a significant role in constituting a subjective knowledge and certainty about the other. I argued that such trust was significant as it muted differences and allowed outcomes, as they expected to receive no harm from the other. It was also important for ASEAN's further development as 'comfort' levels grew.

Of interest in this chapter is that trust continued to be enacted even though leadership turnover increased in frequency, and the number of actors involved in the foreign policy decision-making process and ASEAN proliferated. This turnover increased as a result of processes of democratisation and institutionalisation. I aim to show that intensity of trust was not only maintained but continued to increase despite the fact that these leaders and elites did not go through the same trust-building process analysed in the previous three chapters. In this chapter I argue that the enactment of trusting behaviour during these previous stages led trust to become a natural, yet meaningful, practice enacted in response to certain cues and signs of continuity which had also been imbued with meaning. New elites joining the structure as a result of regime change or a proliferation of the actors, therefore, also enacted these practices of trusting behaviour once they witnessed continuity in the socially meaningful behaviour discussed in the previous chapter. This is not a reflexive process, however. I argue trusting behaviour becomes a natural response that is undertaken un-reflexively, and that trust becomes an essential part of the background knowledge that informs decision-making. While trust was agential in the previous stages, in this chapter the structure is given increasing importance even though agents are essential in for the re-enactment and reification of this structure. This began to emerge in the previous chapter, as one of the pillars of

KBT was the social structure that provided information of what it meant to be acting in a trustworthy manner. These processes will be shown as significant to the formation of this habitual trust. The ASEAN structure as a field informed a certain habitus which encouraged those playing pre-conceived roles to enact behaviour informed by trust as a background knowledge, embedded as a meaningful practice previously and re-enacted throughout.

This is not to say there were no attempts at creative agency. Attempts at agency or reflexively changing the structure through deviating from expected practices were often rejected. Reactions to the rare occasions agents did try to do this demonstrated that if they sought to work together effectively, they would have to be careful in the scale of attempted changes. Instead, they often reverted to the embedded way of diplomacy. This meant attempting to showcase trustworthiness through the reproduction of practices that had become meaningful, and enacting trusting behaviours in return in order to continue the reciprocation of trust. Furthermore, even when agents attempted to change the way things were done there was no indication of them questioning their taken-for-granted trust in others. While their attempts at creativity occasionally unsettled the habitual trust in others, the reversion to expected ways of doing things halted such an unsettling, and habitual trust in this period did not face any significant challenges as a result.

In order to demonstrate the processes behind this form of structurally influenced habitual trust, which I have termed Practice-Based Trust, this chapter will first analyse the presence and role of trust in two crises within this time period. The first crisis is the transboundary haze that occurs as a result of forest fires in Indonesia, which has regional implications due to the smog caused, and is generally viewed as one of the region's largest non-traditional security issues. By choosing this as a crisis the thesis aims to demonstrate that trust proliferated beyond traditional bilateral military security issues, and impacted on a wider array of sectors, though still crucially tied to the question of security. The haze is particularly significant as it is caused domestically, and interference in domestic affairs (even in a limited manner) is something ASEAN previously restricted through the non-

interference of the internal affairs of others norm. The Indonesian decision to open their internal affairs to any sort of discussion was significant in this context, even if such measures have ultimately failed. The second crisis is the continuation of maritime issues, analysing how trust prevented the escalation of the Ambalat crisis. Trust was present due to the countries choosing to continue diffuse reciprocity, which could have created vulnerability had the crisis escalated. Instead, they trusted each other to seek a peaceful solution. Following this I analyse the bases of this trust with reference to a series of interviews I undertook, that aimed to unsettle taken-for-granted knowledge in order to ascertain whether trust was habitual (Pouliot 2012).

7.2 Crisis 1: The Indonesian haze

The first crisis under examination, which demonstrates how the presence of a greater degree of trust better mediated issues, is that of the trans-boundary haze. It is significant as it affects all parties under analysis in this thesis, attempts to solve it were pursued within ASEAN's structure despite it being an internal and domestic issue, and it resulted in a rules-based treaty that was directed towards a non-traditional security issue. While these solutions have not been successful, they demonstrated how Indonesia and other ASEAN states are increasingly trusting in the sense that they do allow some incursions into the oft-regarded unbreakable rule of non-interference in their sovereignty.

Before discussing the background of the haze, it is important to note that non-interference became increasingly questioned following the 1997 financial crisis. The financial crisis highlighted the weaknesses of ASEAN's regionalism as it was caused in part by the regulatory weaknesses, and ASEAN's credibility was called into question (Jones 2012). The following panic caused significant social and economic issues, and Davies argues that as a result of their inability to solve the crisis ASEAN leaders were framed as 'elitist, out of touch', calling into question the traditional ASEAN way of practicing regionalism (2018: 37). Severino went as far as arguing ASEAN's images was 'irreversibly altered' (2006: 96). The calls for changes to non-intervention discussed in the following

analysis, therefore, resulted in part due to a recognition that things needed to be done differently. The financial crisis had demonstrated strict non-interference would not necessarily build resilient societies, and that problems emerging in one country could have a significant knock-on effect on its regional neighbours (Jones 2012). ASEAN leaders tried to address this through re-imagining ASEAN, on paper at least, as a people-centred community focused on democracy and human rights. This has resulted in a context whereby non-interference is still formally followed, but informally there have been explicit dilutions of sovereignty. The financial crisis, therefore, sparked a conflict between those focused on ASEAN's traditional norms and those that believed they needed to be relaxed in order to enact much-needed change, which is still being played out. As previously discussed, these effects of the financial crisis are important and will be recognised throughout the analysis. I have chosen the haze as a case rather than the financial crisis, however, as it is linked more fundamentally to security by actors in the region. Many of the actors involved in the financial crisis were not those focused upon in this thesis, as they came from ministries more focused on finance, trade, and the economy rather than defence and foreign policy more broadly. The conflict over greater involvement in each other's affairs played out in this sphere as well, even though it resulted in part from the financial crisis. Furthermore, the haze is a repetitive event that occurred long enough after the transformative financial crisis, which allows the thesis to judge the impact of the financial crisis's dynamics more broadly on trust.

7.2.1 Background[56]

Haze is the result of burning forestry, particularly for land clearance for palm oil plantations, and it has been recognised as posing a consistent and severe environmental threat to Indonesia and its neighbours (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). Causing respiration, skin and eye illnesses for 70 million people in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, there is a human cost to the smog (Amul 2013). Forcing the closing of businesses and airports, estimates suggest that the 2013 haze caused losses of

[56] Some of the background for this has been previously published under Edwards and Heiduk 2015.

between USD 300 million and USD 1 billion for Singapore's economy, furthermore, reflecting a dire economic cost (Chan 2013). As the land that burns is peatland, which is a natural carbon sink, it also results in massive emissions which has helped push Indonesia to being the third largest emitter of carbon dioxide on the planet – much of it the result of burning forests and peatland (Jaenicke et al. 2008; Hergoualc'h and Verchot 2011).

While there is debate concerning the perpetrators, it is estimated that about 80 per cent of forest fires are deliberately set by plantation companies in order to cost-effectively clear land for the planting of oil palms (Varkkey 2012; Carlson et al. 2012; Greenpeace International 2013). Being particularly bad in 1997, with a haze that drew a great deal of attention to the issue, there seems to be no end in sight of the continuance (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). 2006 and 2009 saw extreme re-occurrences, with 2013 being the worst ever recorded (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). The 2014 haze began as early as March, and it continues to negatively affect both human and economic security in the region.

There has been little success domestically in curtailing the haze. Political will has been questioned, especially due to the extent to which the Indonesian economy increasingly relies on the expansion of palm oil for continued development. Since haze emerged on the regional agenda, however, various Indonesian governments have framed haze as a potential security issue (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). Suharto declared haze a national catastrophe and stated that haze could have a grave impact on future generations, apologising to neighbouring countries (Gordon 1998). Habibie[57] linked haze to human security in the country and region, arguing it posed a significant threat to human life. Yudhoyono[58] (SBY) declared 'war on the haze' as it was a 'key concern, nationally and regionally' and 'a troubling social, economic and regional problem' (Yudhoyono 2011; Edwards and Heiduk 2015). While SBY demonstrated a heightened political willingness to end the issue, the

[57] Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie was Indonesian President between 1998-1999
[58] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was Indonesian President between 2004-2014

structure of Indonesian domestic politics prevents a domestic solution. Attempts such as a moratorium on burning are undermined by the decentralization of laws and practices which give local politicians, who are often embedded in corrupt networks, power on the ground. Furthermore, many of the companies implicated are not solely owned by Indonesian entities, but also share Malaysian or Singaporean ownership. This complicates the ability of Indonesia to sanction these companies successfully when their headquarters are in the neighbouring countries.

In recognition of the failure of domestic solutions, there have been regional attempts to curtail the issue. In 1994, ASEAN held a ministerial meeting on the environment which led to the eventual acceptance of adopting a Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution (Varkkey 2011). This failed to achieve much in the way of tangible benefits, but in response to the 1997 haze the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze was established which formulated the Regional Haze Action Plan (ASEAN 1997). This action plan aimed to prevent forest fires through better management policies and enforcement, with greater monitoring mechanisms, and a significantly strengthened regional capability to fight haze (Heilmann 2015 – see also ASEAN 1997). This was followed by a zero-burning policy in 1999, and there was a proliferation of workshops and dialogue sessions held concerning tackling the haze (ASEAN 1999).

As a result of ASEAN's preference for non-binding treaties these were extremely weak interventions, which made little impact on the issue. The Transboundary Haze Pollution Agreement proposed in 2001, therefore, was viewed as a significant step forward as it was envisioned to be a full-fledged treaty regime with binding obligations. On paper it legally requires states to tackle the haze. Despite hopes, however, the agreement has instead become a non-binding approach based on the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention, designed with the ASEAN way in mind (ASEAN 2002). As such, the agreement itself has not managed to bring about change even though all ASEAN member states have ratified it, including Indonesia in 2015. In this context it has been argued

that the persistence of haze pollution, despite decades-long efforts at prevention, is due to the limitations of regional governance caused by the traditional characteristics of the ASEAN way.

7.2.2 Presence and Role of Trust

In this thesis, however, I argue that the regionalisation of the issue reflected a growth of trust. Indonesia allowed both criticisms of its domestic state of affairs, something previously unacceptable, but also regional interventions aimed at solving a domestic issue. This, seen in the context of ASEAN's prior focus on an extreme form of non-intervention in the sovereignty of other states' domestic affairs, reflected a diffuse reciprocity that had not been possible prior to the emergence of trust. This is especially the case as regional interventions have not been popular with other sectors of Indonesian society. Criticisms from Singapore and Malaysia are particularly sensitive, especially when targeted at an industry seen as crucial for Indonesia's economic growth. For the purpose of the thesis the importance of the case is not about whether interventions succeeded or not, but the extent to which they are reflective of the transformative role trust had.

Natalegawa[59], former foreign minister of Indonesia, discusses Indonesia's willingness to engage in a regional manner on this issue as being due to an increased 'comfort level' (which he uses in his book as being synonymous with trust) with their ASEAN neighbours that facilitated a constructive region-wide discussion (2018). This willingness, stemming from an increase in the intensity of trust, should not be taken for granted. Indeed, there remains several issues that countries see as being domestic in nature that are generally avoided as topics for discussion, and for which ASEAN continues to avoids taking a stance.[60]

[59] Marty Natalegawa was Indonesian Foreign Minister 2009-2014

[60] A current indication of this is the issue of the Rohingya in Myanmar. The Malaysian and Indonesian governments are under increasing pressure from their populations to engage on this issue, but it is limited as Myanmar is a member of ASEAN. Protestation from the governments have been stronger against China and their treatment of Muslims, despite the fact that many refer to what is happening to the Rohingya as a genocide.

The first demonstration that Indonesia has reached the trust required for this diffuse reciprocity or more open mandate, which incorporates elements of vulnerability due to the precedent of allowing domestic affairs to be discussed regionally, is the broadly positive responses to criticisms concerning the haze. Indonesian foreign policy elites between 1997 and 2015 rarely attempted to restrict this intervention in domestic affairs, neither through discouragement by referencing ASEAN's norms nor by responding negatively. Suharto, for example, issued apologies rather than arguing that it was a domestic affair that the others should not comment on (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). In 2013, SBY apologised to Singapore, which was received 'wholeheartedly' by Lee Hsien Loong (LHL)[61] in Singapore (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). Such acceptance of responsibility led to a weaker domestic position. SBY was criticised for shaming the nation when he apologised and other members of government have reacted in a much stronger way to Malaysia and Singapore's criticisms. Some have argued that Singapore is 'behaving like a small child' and questioned 'what has the Singaporean Government done? I feel that they should focus on their own role' (Jakarta Globe 2013). This will be important following, as it demonstrates that those outside of the structure have reacted in a negative way, while those inside seek to allow criticism. I argue in this context, this allowance is a symbolic form of interventionism that can only result from diffuse reciprocity. Interviewee 21, a current diplomat in the Indonesian foreign ministry highlights these dynamics particularly well:

> *'[laughs] the Indonesian people, well we can be really passionate. A huge fire of response is just part of how it is, it's political strength to stand up to our neighbours, we are a nationalistic country…. But it isn't weak to accept advice, most don't want to understand that. Singapore is just trying to help and they have a right to do that, they should be allowed to do that.'*

While it would seem politically expedient to invoke the 'ASEAN Way' of non-intervention, as they had often done in the past, the above statement is not only reflective of a growing willingness to

[61] Lee Hsien Loong is the Prime Minister of Singapore 2004-current

engage in broader areas, but also a strong certainty that Singapore's intentions were benevolent. Indonesian elites, increasingly accepting criticism and responding in a more positive manner, demonstrate a growing 'comfort' for intervention in their domestic affairs, driven by trust not shared by their publics. Interviewee 24, a former Indonesian diplomat, corroborated this analysis by demonstrating the way in which there is a strong subjective certainty within the foreign policy elite that Singapore is not just trying to cause political issues:

'I understand my colleagues in the forestry ministry. If it had been like it was before, then of course it would not be tolerated, but it isn't. We are not trying to undermine one another, they are not trying to cause instability, we are just trying to work it all out, together. Accepting criticism is difficult when it is something we avoided before, but it is a sign of the changes in our times'

I argue the lack of mention of trust is important for the later bases, but that the language used is reflective of a presence of trust that allowed this to happen. The statement reflects an increased subjective certainty about Singapore's intentions, which normalises criticism as acceptable in a context where it was actively avoided in the past.

Rather than hiding issues or attempting to downplay them, furthermore, the Indonesian elite has demonstrated they increasingly trust that the other will not use transparency to harm them:

'Far less formal, though not altogether inconsequential, after 2000 Indonesia began the practice of regularly informing fellow ASEAN member states of some of the internal challenges it was facing…. I recall that informal meetings of ASEAN foreign ministers provided avenues for Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to update the other ASEAN ministers on developments in the provinces of Papua and Aceh, as well as the disturbances to law and order the country was then facing in the town of Sampit in Central Kalimantan province and in the province of Maluku […] it is perfectly acceptable for ASEAN to demonstrate interest in and concern over the internal developments in another member

state, imbued not by a wish to 'pontificate' or interfere, but rather by a genuine sense of solidarity' (Natalegwa 2018: 3493).

This had a tangible impact when Indonesia not only accepted criticism, but also allowed the regionalisation of the issue. The 1994 and 2002 agreements were driven primarily by Singapore (Varkkey 2011). There were clear signs that the agreements were primarily declaratory in the past. Domestic issues that had seen attempts at regionalisation were often blocked by the country from where the issue emanated with appeals to the ASEAN way. Indonesian acceptance of bringing this issue to ASEAN was facilitated by their increased certainty about the benign intentions of their neighbours, which meant they could sacrifice some of their previously sacred sovereignty. The haze and its cause are not inconsequential for Indonesia – Malaysia is one of Indonesia's primary palm oil competitors. There are objective reasons for uncertainty centred on whether regional solutions are instead aimed at curtailing Indonesia's growing palm oil production. This uncertainty, however, does not seem to be subjectively experienced. The agreements are important in demonstrating trust, therefore, because they became a symbolic precedent that the countries of ASEAN are not necessarily free to act as they wish on their own territory. Instead, they have a responsibility to their neighbours that exploitation of natural resources is not causing damage to those in other states.

Some of the interventions go beyond mere symbolism of a declining sovereign right. Monitoring, as laid out in Article 7, includes transparency and information sharing through a centralized database under the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control – actions that Indonesia had been unwilling to engage in in the past (Jerger 2014). Shared satellite data is now used to help locate fire hotspots. The sharing of concession maps, something that has been extremely contentious in the past, is now a relatively common practice (Today 2013). Singapore also offered the use of their firefighters. While SBY approved of this, not everyone is happy about the presence of Singaporeans on Indonesian territory (Edwards and Heiduk 2015). This

growing acceptance of joint measures shows just how the relationships are transforming, as they reflect a growing diffuse reciprocity and the presence of more open mandates.

The case of the haze is important as it has occurred in the wider context of relaxing non-intervention in sovereignty of each other's affairs as mentioned previously. This required trust in the benign intentions of the other to change the attitude allowing this to happen. Most obviously this could be seen in the context of flexible engagement, a proposal by Pitsuwan[62] that sought to relax formally the principle of non-interference following the financial crisis. At the time this was rejected by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Alatas argued '[i]f the proposition is to now talk publicly about internal problems we will be back to when ASEAN was not formed, when Southeast Asia was full of tension, mutual suspicion' (in Haacke 2013: 178). Malaysian officials also believed it would undermine regional security and the future of regional cooperation, with Badawi arguing one 'should not take for granted the stable political environment and positive inter-state relations' of ASEAN countries' (in Haacke 2013: 178). Since the compromise of 'enhanced interaction' (Pitsuwan 1998), however, 'quite remarkably and contrary to outward appearances, over the past fifty years, and until most recently, ASEAN has actually gradually, and somewhat surreptitiously, pursued a more 'nuanced' application of the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention' (Natalegawa 2018: 3359). Natalegawa further argues:

'Indeed, the notion of an ASEAN 'family' and the development of 'comfort level' or 'trust' have made possible endeavours that would otherwise have been viewed as being 'interference' in the internal affairs of a fellow ASEAN member state. Despite the well-cited cases of ASEAN member states jealously protecting themselves from perceived 'interference', over the past fifty years Southeast Asian countries have also shown some willingness to turn to one another in dealing with internal developments in their own countries' (2018: 3392).

[62] Surin Pitsuwan was the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1997-2001, and he Secretary General of ASEAN between 2008 and 2012.

Some examples of this are the growing engagement with human rights, ASEAN's engagement with Myanmar following the shootings of monks in 2007 and cyclone Nargis in 2008, negotiations with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), engagement with East Timor, and the dispute between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear temple (Natalegawa 2018)**.** I argue in line with Natalegawa that enhanced interaction, signified here as interventions in the haze issue, could only open due to a growth in the intensity of trust. Interviewee 26, a Singaporean diplomat based in Jakarta during these times, expressed the changes that had taken place:

'I would say we are increasingly doing things we could not do before. We are talking a lot about things that we had to essentially ignore in the past. Yes, I can say that I think compared to my predecessor, I'm allowed to open up topics that were best treated with sensitivity before.'

As such, I use the haze case above as an illustration of how trust has led to diffuse reciprocity and more open mandates, including in areas that were particularly sensitive. Leaders have changed from seeing interventions in their sovereignty as something causing vulnerability, to no longer perceiving it as such due to a subjective certainty they hold that the other wishes them no harm. This was perhaps best articulated by Interviewee 24:

'How can working together on something make us vulnerable? They really were too sensitive in the past'

7. 3 Crisis 2: Maritime territorial conflicts

The second crises under examination, to demonstrate the presence and role of trust during this period, is the territorial conflicts that occurred in the maritime realm. The most serious was the conflict concerning overlapping claims to Ambalat between Malaysia and Indonesia. I aim to demonstrate that trust was present and contributed in a significant way to the mediation of the crisis. If trust was absent the crises had the potential to erupt in conflict or damage areas of ASEAN cooperation. However, during this period there is instead a strong diffuse reciprocity of maritime

cooperation during the crisis itself which could have led to vulnerability had the other side defected, demonstrating that the leaders and elites trusted that the conflict would not continue or escalate.

7.3.1 Background

The dispute occurring in Ambalat stemmed from disagreements over maritime zones in the Sulawesi Sea. There was a long history of overlapping claims and ambiguity, though these had been side-lined in the past as demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6. As part of this, while Indonesia had claimed sovereign rights in 1969 the continental shelf boundary agreement with Malaysia excluded Ambalat (Butcher 2013). Instead, the crisis emerged following the awarding of Sipadan and Ligitan to Malaysia, focused upon in Chapter 6. The ruling was problematic as Malaysia was awarded the islands on the basis of effective occupation, implicitly encouraging more efforts to occupy disputed zones (ICJ 2004). The conflict itself, however, was a result of differences of interpretation over the ruling. Malaysia based its claim over the territorial waters on the assumption that the judgement entailed the extension of EEZ boundaries from the islands, entitling Malaysia to claim the continental shelf. Such a claim, however, overlapped with Indonesia's. Based on Indonesia's archipelagic state designation EEZ claims were not valid, and they held the territory after they redrew their baselines from a rock called Karang Unarang (Jenne 2016). Indonesia had also been exploiting and exploring natural resources beginning in 1961, and Malaysia had not objected when oil concessions were given to state-owned oil firm Permina in 1966 (Jenne 2016).

The vague nature of the boundaries led to significant naval confrontations in Ambalat, and energy resources escalated the tensions. While Sipadan and Ligitan involved the relatively inconsequential tourism industry, Ambalat is said to contain 'up to 746 million barrels of oil and 130 billion cubic meters of gas in each of the nine points found in the area' (Jakarta Globe 2013). As a result of the resources at stake Hamidi[63] pointed out 'that had it been a mere territorial dispute

[63] Ahmad Zahid Hamidi was Malaysian Minister of Defence 2009-2013

without economic interest, the Ambalat case would be solved long ago' (In Jenne 2016: 209). While there had been some issues before 2005 the prior approach was generally extremely restrained. In 2004, however, Indonesia granted a US company the rights to explore for gas and oil, while in 2005 Malaysia granted oil exploration to a different company (Arsana 2010: 46). Indonesia argued such a concession was a violation of their sovereign rights, and it became the most controversial issue between the countries since *konfrontasi*. Militarization occurred after Indonesia began to construct a lighthouse on Karang Unarang in order to intensify their claims. Malaysia attempted to prevent the construction and arrested the workers (Jenne 2016). Following this, an elite Indonesian military unit was deployed to protect the workers, and extra naval forces were sent into the area. Military aircraft conducted surveillance while naval ships engaged in stand-offs with their counterparts. This led to critical situations such as collisions as they both became increasingly frustrated. One collision in 2005 between an Indonesian warship and a Malaysian patrol boat resulted in formal protests, but this did not prevent their reoccurrence (Forbes 2014). 2009 saw a resurgence of tension when Malaysian naval warships trespassed into Indonesian waters 19 times, with one intrusion almost resulting in an Indonesian warship firing upon the Malaysian intruders (Tejo 2009).

While Sipadan and Ligitan had resulted in little military planning and relatively quick calls for an end to militarization, the same did not occur in Ambalat. In Indonesia, for example, there were indications that the military was planning more assertive measures, and legislators demanded that the navy fire upon Malaysian intruders (Sinatra 2014). SBY visited the Ambalat block in response, in a move that the media presented as being the first visit to a battlefield by an Indonesian president in recent history (Sinatra 2014). It also seemed that Indonesian militarization had, for the first time since 1967, moved towards addressing a potential 'Malaysian threat'. Indonesia's National Defence Doctrine and the Minimum Essential Force program both emphasised a growth in naval capability inspired by the potential for growing conflict (Edwards 2015b). In response, the Malaysian military too submitted plans centred on the potential for military conflict with Indonesia, including a plan to the Prime Minister's Office to storm and 'capture' Karang Unarang (Jenne 2016). In a demonstration

of the changes Ambalat had the potential to cause, beyond this security dilemma, was Malaysia's National Security Council's assessment that they did not have the capability to effectively gather intelligence on Indonesian armed forces, as they only had a capable spying agency in regard to internal enemies.

There were further complications in this conflict in comparison to that over Sipadan and Ligitan. Due to Indonesia's democratisation the media was now relatively unrestrained, which allowed for nationalism to become particularly high. The media obsessed over the issue, displaying photographs of warships overlaid by popular patriotic songs (Sinatra 2014). Already inflamed by the judgement to award Malaysia the disputed islands, there was a perception that the nationalism on display would lead to an uncompromising position. This had the potential to lead to an inevitable militarisation of the dispute as the government in Indonesia, now a democracy, had greater motivations to listen to the passions of its population. Mass media and public opinion therefore fuelled the dispute further, and the *konfrontasi* phrase *Ganyang Malaysia* (Crush Malaysia) became increasingly common once again in street protests (Sinatra 2014). There was even the emergence of civil society groups such as Benteng Demokrasi Rakyat (People's Democratic Fortress), who threatened to send armed personnel into Malaysia, reminiscent of the PKI during *konfrontasi* (Sinatra 2014). In response to this nationalism, lawmakers began to adopt these same views in order to gain public support. Hayono Isman, a senior figure in Indonesian politics, did not accept the questioning of sovereign rights, and argued that Indonesia should go to war (Lensa Indonesia 2012). While parliament often avoids foreign policy issues, Ambalat gained a particularly high profile which meant increasing attention. As a result of these dynamics it seemed that trust would collapse, and there would be a rise of distrust, predicated on uncertainty concerning the other's intent to engage in military conflict due to nationalist sentiments, for which there were relatively clear signs of planning.

7.3.2 Presence and role of trust

Despite the above dynamics, however, the solutions to the crisis demonstrated that elites within the government at least trusted that the other would not resort to war or escalate it further, Instead, there were beliefs on both sides that the other would go against popular opinion and advice to deescalate the conflict through compromise. I argue this was an acceptance of vulnerability for two reasons. First, they voluntarily restricted their military options despite there being tangible indications on both signs that the other had the potential to increase militarization. Instead, as these indications came from the military, government elites trusted each other to restrain their forces and keep their word that they were only considering peaceful solutions. Second, going against public opinion over something so extreme was problematic for their domestic positions, especially when they advocated for compromise in the face of extreme public opinion. This trusting behaviour of accepting vulnerability was further seen in relation to another form, that of diffuse reciprocity or engaging in more open mandates. I argue that the many forms of cooperation that increased, despite this conflict, demonstrated that they trusted the other to engage in peaceful forms of resolution. They continued to invest in the relationship – including in ways that could increase vulnerability if the other did choose to defect (such as information sharing and capability development).

The behavioural choices of both elites seemed to demonstrate that they seemed assured that the other was only seeking peaceful means to ending the conflict, despite some potential signs this was not the case. As mentioned, there had been an increasing militarization and capability development, and SBY's visit to Ambalat seemed to suggest that he would be leading the military presence himself. Following this, however, he also sent a diplomatic note to Malaysia denouncing militaristic intentions and advocating for peaceful dialogue to emerge. This was followed by summit diplomacy between SBY and Badawi (Saraswati 2005). Badawai argued they would maintain diplomatic contact with Indonesia throughout the tensions, and the respective defence ministers

gave guarantees 'that there would be no war between the two countries' (Liputan 2005). These actions were followed by signs of decreasing hedging as both sides began to restrict their military action. Instructions to the militaries were sent to avoid provocations and reduce surveillance and patrols. In 2009 Malaysia withdrew all forces and instead put all their efforts into peaceful bilateral mechanisms. I argue trust was significant here, as even though they were aware that each other's publics were advocating for conflict and there were some tangible signs of militarization, they trusted that the other was sincere in their desire to seek a diplomatic end which facilitated the reduction of military hedging. A senior Malaysian diplomat (interviewee 25) addressed this idea, when stating:

'*I am … relatively certain … that we all knew it was a performance of sorts. We rattle our sabres and we say to our public 'look! We are defending our homeland staunchly', we give the militaries chance to get involved and unify everyone, but there was always the certainty that at the end of the day, we would meet and we would say 'okay, now we are ready to try''.*

Another Malaysian diplomat (Interviewee 1) who served in Jakarta at this time corroborated such a viewpoint:

'*it was never going to result in real conflict, there is a habit of focusing on the nationalistic elements of relations… we even argue about the origins and ownership of particular types of food'.*

As a result of these beliefs hedging decreased relatively quickly, and bilateral mechanisms quickly proliferated. First, both sides sought to utilise the Malaysian-Indonesia Dialogue, especially in 2009, to discuss the various issues. It also featured on the agenda in 2011, 2012, and 2013 (Diplomasi Indonesia 2011; Ali and Othman 2012). Reflecting the informality focused on previously, the issue was also discussed during intervals at the ASEAN summit in 2011 (Interviewee 1). This was

followed by regular visits between Najib[64] and SBY. Eventually a proposal from Zahid[65] that the waters should be closed off to prevent any encounters in future attributed the clashes not to malevolent intent, but accidents on the ground (Interviewee 20). New forums such as the General Border Committee (GBC) between Malaysia and Indonesia, chaired by the Defence Ministers, were also created with an aim of reducing misunderstandings (Sinar Pagi 2012). In an attempt to depoliticise the issue technical activities were advanced, such as the Technical Meeting on Maritime Delimitation, and the parties engaged in a joint exploration of the economic potential of Ambalat's disputed sea floor as well as a Joint Development Area in order to maintain peace (Butcher 2013). Both governments established a 'partnership' between their respective Ministries of Energy and Mineral Resources in order to conduct geological explorations in the Borneo border area of Nunukan (Jakarta Globe 2013). I argue this de-escalation could not have occurred successfully without trust – if they had harboured doubts concerning the others' intentions, they would not have had expected peaceful means to be successful. Hedging would not have been reduced as it would have disadvantaged them had conflict broken out**.** This incorporated vulnerability in the sense that they would open themselves up to military domination as a result of lessening their own military preparations. Even the Indonesian military planning was not subjectively considered as a future threat by Malaysia:

'They have legitimate reasons for needing to upgrade their navy. Look at how many islands there are. Their military has suffered recently, since democratisation, I think just because they're overhauling it doesn't mean we should be concerned' (Interviewee 25).

Trust was therefore present and played a significant role in ensuring that neither side escalated and both sides felt certain enough to pursue peaceful means.

[64] Najib Razak was Malaysian Prime Minister 2009-2018
[65] Ahmad Zahid Hamidi was Malaysian Minister of Defence 2009-2013, Minister of Home Affairs 2013-2018, and Deputy Prime Minister 2015-2018

A further trusting behaviour was the intensive diffuse reciprocity, where mandates became more open despite conflict being an objective possibility. The subjective certainty that it would not occur, however, allowed them to continue and intensify cooperation in the belief that relations would be better following the temporary tension. The behavioural manifestation of this was the growth in cooperation concerning Ambalat as well the maintenance of cooperation in other areas. An example of new initiatives was the GBC Malindo mentioned previously, which had a large mandate covering cooperation in social welfare, capacity building, and socio-economic integration (Arifin 2012). This resulted in numerous agreements on activities relating to security, including integrated land border operations and exchange of information, joint surveillance, and pacification of maritime border zones through integrated patrols. Agreements made prior to the crisis such as the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) agreement also continued. The MSP allowed for the improved coordination between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, the formalisation of the exchange of information, cross-border air and sea patrols, and capacity building for Indonesian maritime agencies (Febrica 2017). While the maritime boundary caused serious conflict in the Sulawesi Sea, the cooperation between the two countries in intelligence sharing and patrolling the Straits of Malacca continued unaffected (Febrica 2017). Even joint military exercises continued and proliferated shortly after the winding down of the crisis, conducted under the name 'Malindo Jaya' (Portal Rasmi Tentera Laut Diraja Malaysia 2014). Perhaps most interestingly, the states continued to sell arms to one another even during the height of the conflict. Indonesia sold six transport aircraft, Super Puma helicopters and armoured personnel carriers to Malaysia, while Malaysia sold training aircraft to Indonesia (Jakarta Post 2011; Matthews and Maharani 2009). As such, the Ambalat case seemed to be one that had the potential to result in conflict, but the mediating factor of trust allowed a certainty that cooperation and peaceful resolution would be the preferred methods for resolution.

7. 4 Bases of trust

In this section I argued that the trust that had a significant role in mediating sources of potential and actual conflict was primarily a non-reflexive or habitual 'natural attitude'. Informed by signs of continuity in the way in which issues were approached, primarily through informal consensus-based dynamics, actors 'enacted' their roles and the natural responses - trusting behaviour. Trust, therefore, became habituated in what Bourdieu refers to as a collective habitus (1994). This habitus occurs when similarly situated actors in a particular field (ASEAN) are exposed to common experiences of socialisation which results in the internalisation of similar non-reflexive dispositions and background knowledge that lead them to act in regular ways (Bordieu 1994; Pouliot 2008; Hopf 2010). As will be shown, ASEAN's procedural norms are important in the sense that they provide a sign of continuity in the way in which things are done and as meaningful indicators of trustworthiness. This allows trusting behaviour to naturally occur in response, making trusting behaviour a socially meaningful response automatically enacted, and trust a part of the background knowledge.

This is reflected in the interview data above. References were made to certainty that the other would not engage in harmful behaviour, and there was incredulity at suggestions this might be the case. As argued in the introduction, data collection concerning background knowledge are difficult as they are not reflexive, and interviewees may not consider articulating taken-for-granted perceptions. As described in the introduction and laid out in appendix 2, the interviews undertaken aimed at unsettling worldviews to assess whether trust truly was an inarticulate habit.

Perhaps most interestingly, only one interviewee knew this thesis was concerning trust as he was involved in my placement at an institution visited for this research. None of the other interviewees were informed of this concept so as not to bias responses. The interviewee that was aware was a senior Malaysian diplomat, and he started off the interview sternly saying, 'let me tell

you, it was not based on trust'. As the discussion continued, however, after around 40 minutes discussing behaviours and perceptions he laughed and said: 'you know, actually, it might have been trust. I hadn't thought about it before, but you are right, I never expected negative consequences from [the Indonesians, in reference to Ambalat]' (Interviewee 01). For me, this was one indicator of the habituated form of trust that was present.

For those that were unaware the thesis was about trust specifically, when they discussed their certainty and assuredness about what they did and did not expect from their counterparts I aimed to unsettle worldviews (Pouliot 2012) through vignettes of potential alternative scenarios. When I asked what would have happened had the other, relative to them, taken advantage of the situation, responses were generally uniform. Interviewee 21, for example, was presented with the vignette of a case where it was revealed that Malaysia and Singapore were colluding and leveraging the haze issue to limit Indonesia's development in favour of their own. His response of 'no, of course they would not have done that' reflected a great deal of certainty. Interviewee 24 was asked what would have happened if Malaysia had decided to attempt to enforce control after the naval patrols in Ambalat were limited, to which he replied 'why? Why would they betray us? I do not think they would have'. While he had not discussed trust or its importance, he saw any defection from Indonesia as being a betrayal, which for me was an indicator of habitual trust and a way in which to broaden the discussion around trust and betrayal.

Interviewees were asked why they did not think the other would have defected in the vignettes of alternative scenarios. This question was often met with hesitation. There were no rational answers given, and the responses came down to being 'sure' (Interviewee 24, 27), 'certain' (Interviewee 21, 28), or suggesting the other had 'no reason' to do what was being suggested (interviewee 26), despite the objective possibility existing. I argue this, alongside the continuation of trusting behaviours in the face of conflict, demonstrates a habitual form of trust that forms the background knowledge and results in a subjective certainty that the other would not defect.

In the previous chapters, the actors involved had remained relatively consistent. LKY had a strong presence in politics up until his death in 2015. Mahathir had a long reign, which he has now once again taken up with his victory in Malaysia's 2018 general election. Leaders following Mahathir, discussed in this chapter, have had much shorter terms. Suharto too had been in power for over 30 years until his downfall in 1998. These issues, however, all took place in contexts where new leaders had taken over and had rotated more frequently. Badawi and SBY had not had the time to build up processes of trust that their predecessors had, for example, before Ambalat occurred. This is significant because the KBT they had developed involved a fundamental longitudinal process of reciprocity that allowed them to develop knowledge concerning the other. Leadership turnover is particularly fast in Indonesia. Following Suharto were Presidents Habibie, Wahid, Sukarnoputri, SBY, and Jokowi in this relatively short period. None of them, apart from SBY, enjoyed anything approaching the longevity Suharto did. While SBY enjoyed a relatively stable 10-year term, the above case took place in 2005, not even one year after he was elected. Singapore had been particularly unprepared for losing the relationship with Suharto. For a quarter of a century their relations were conducted on a relatively stable basis because of the understanding reached between Suharto and LKY, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. They had tried not to court Suharto's opposition out of loyalty. For example, in September 1997 Singapore's government banned a forum on Indonesia organised by the local Foreign Correspondents' Association which opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri had been invited to address. As a result, they faced difficulties when these people came to run Indonesia as they had not had the opportunity to develop relationships based on reciprocity, knowledge, or identification (LKY 1998).

While the foreign policy direction in Indonesia had been relatively exclusive during Suharto's reign, even with the institutionalisation of a professional foreign ministry, his downfall led to significant dynamics that would impact further their ability to build relationships predicated on particular elites. In post-authoritarian Indonesia the general public has begun to exercise its influence in the government decision- making process. As Chow explains, there had been an

unlocking of 'the floodgates to expressions of public opinion on foreign and security policies brought by democratisation and decentralisation' (Chow 2005: 310). Media, legislators, and public opinion all bought new pressures to bear (Weatherbee 2015). Suharto's depoliticised foreign policy became a thing of the past as foreign policy became a source of great nationalistic focus with an aim to contribute towards nation-building (Weatherbee 2015). Indonesian leaders giving in to these nationalist aspirations saw a political expediency in attacking their neighbours. Habibie described Singapore as a country of 'real racists', and famously as the 'little red dot' (Nikkei 2015). Sinatra (2014) shows how public opinion driven by the media led to significant tensions over issues in 2009, even concerning such things as which country could claim ownership over various cultural outputs. Both governments have unanimously acknowledged these dynamics as a root cause to the increases in tension. Talking to one senior Malaysian diplomat based in Jakarta, he commented how:

> *'No-one really cares anymore about anything meaningful, now it is just nationalist sentiments turned into foreign policy. Migration, domestic workers, stealing cultural heritage'*
>
> (Interviewee 1)

These escalations are not defined by military or political confrontation, but such public antagonism has significant security, political, and social consequences in the sense of the pressure it puts on leaders to follow nationalist causes.

These dynamics raise the question of how has trust remained stable and how has it become part of the background knowledge when there is such a rapid change of leaders who did not have time to cultivate good personal relations. Drawing upon the framework in Chapter 3, as well as the data from Chapter 6 and here, I argue that the structure in which these relations took place, the ASEAN field, was a key component to the emergence of trust as habit, or PBT. Based on the socially meaningful behaviour of consensus decision-making and informality, as advocated for as a mechanism in Chapter 6, I argue that trusting behaviour became a 'natural response' to these taken-

for-granted indicators of trustworthiness. Interviewee 24, who had experience in the ASEAN structure, argued:

> *'when the Malaysians visit and make an effort, say that they're not going to go ahead unilaterally, but instead we should work out some sort of consensus, work together, until we can solve it properly, you don't take advantage'.*

This suggests the mechanism of consensus decision-making, or the act of seeking a consensus, is important in creating an environment where trusting behaviour is a natural response. In relation to the haze issue Interviewee 28, an Indonesian diplomat, stated

> *'It is just how it works, [Singaporean counterpart] came up to me and he said, quietly and privately, this is an issue and something needs to be done…. Because of how he did it, because of what it is he is said about it being a regional issue, not putting the blame on us, I could say yes, that's how it is done'*

This reflects an additional mechanism of being non-confrontational and avoiding openly blaming the other. Interviewee 27, a foreign ministry official, succinctly noted 'if he's doing things properly, letting us talk, then I don't cause problems, I do what I am meant to do'. This is not logic of appropriateness where it would be articulated as 'if someone does x, then I should do Y', but instead demonstrates a non-reflexivity where 'if someone does x, then I do Y' in line with the analysis concerning habit (Hopf 2010). It reflects an inarticulate subjective certainty concerning the other. What is most interesting here, however, is the relation to the way that things are done, and that trusting behaviour naturally followed the signposting of trustworthiness based on efforts made to forge a consensus and engage in quiet and informal diplomacy, where issues are not worsened by forcing a public confrontation. There was a way of doing things which invited an almost un-reflexive response of trusting. I argue, therefore, the social pillar of KBT suggested is one of the primary bridges between interpersonal trust and a wider trust that inhabits the entire structure, as it allows

for these signposts of trustworthiness to become socially meaningful, even to those that join the structure later on, as long as it results consistently in trusting behaviour.

In order to demonstrate the reason that new actors adopt the background knowledge of their predecessors I argued in the theoretical framework that that the roles they perform is a significant factor. Being a diplomat in ASEAN imposes a certain way of doing things which helps to constitute this background knowledge. In part this occurs prior to the agents joining the structure as they are taught through briefings and domestic-based training. Interviewee 25, for example, was a junior diplomat who had not yet been posted abroad:

'It is all presented very clearly. If someone does this one thing, you are told it means this, and that you can do this or align your expectations with what it is they are saying and doing'.

Interviewee 21, who had already served at international posts saw it in much the same way:

'in training, that's going back a bit, but I was told this is who you are, this is what you do. I went into it thinking maybe I can do things a little differently, but I quickly realised the routine is essentially what I was told it was'

Through this, it would seem the process of 'learning' the background knowledge begins before diplomats enter their posts, but that it is quickly reinforced by the structure. In the case of ASEAN, furthermore, there is a continued role of boundary spanners even if they have a less formal involvement. Retired leaders often retain their linkages to ASEAN, as demonstrated by Goh in Singapore and SBY in Indonesia. I argue, therefore, that there is a certain 'ASEAN script' of doing things which is aimed at resulting in trusting behaviours, and new diplomats entering their roles in ASEAN adopt the script due to the roles they play. This 'script' has been constituted by the trusting relationships of the former leaders but is continuously reified due to the strength of the structural field which it has given rise to.

This is not to suggest that there is a complete absence of agency, as agents are essential in reproducing the structure and habitual trust. As discussed in the theoretical framework, PBT also has space for agency as it is expected that agents do not merely adopt the structure but renegotiate it and perform practices creatively. While the structure constitutes a background knowledge, each agent will also bring their own idiosyncratic backgrounds and dispositions that will influence this. There were areas of discussions which centred on how personal interactions could contribute further or detract from trust. A surprising outcome from the data, however, was that these creative performances have been extremely limited, and the routine practices that signal trustworthiness have been particularly enduring – meaning that even when interpersonal relations were to some degree strained, the basis of habitual trust endured as they avoided changing practices. One interviewee (28), for example, served as a senior diplomat for Indonesia following democratisation. Seeing the opening-up of Indonesia and having a renewed outlook as a result, he discussed the ways in which he attempted to turn enthusiasm for reform towards ASEAN. He raised discussions of the Thailand-Cambodia conflict as a case where rather than enduring the long process of consensus-making, he had tried to instigate a more rapid response by quickly bringing all his counterparts into line. Instead of instigating change, however, he was often met by rejection of a more flexible process which began straining interpersonal relations. As a result, he instead expressed frustration that the only way he could only be trusted was by following the practices of very careful consensus-based decision-making. It is also important to note that even while his initial attempts may have caused his counterparts to question their trust, moving trust from being non-reflexive, at no point did he discuss his trust being unsettled. When this occurred, he quickly reverted to former practices to ensure they did not further question their trust in him, which prevented moving trust out of the habitual basis it was in.

There is room for agency, therefore, but this Chapter has focused on the agential reproduction of the structure, as in these cases trust was for the most part habitual and remained unsettled due to this continued enactment. While agents have a choice to trust this Chapter

suggests that if practices that constitute trust are enacted consistently, agents will not question their un-reflexive enactment of trusting due to them being taken-for-granted indicators of trustworthiness. It is only when these practices are unsettled that so too is the habit of trusting. As of yet, however, in ASEAN these practices have not been unsettled to a significant enough degree, showing the strength that they can have in forming a consistent trust despite there being the opportunity for agents to have differing levels of trust on a purely interpersonal level.

Interactionism has been important proliferating this script and these practices to a greater number of roles. The ASEAN charter, which will be discussed following, stipulates that leaders must meet at least twice a year, a committee of permanent representatives to ASEAN based in Jakarta was established, and community councils have been established to address ASEAN's core pillars. Meetings are very much on the rise. In 2001 officials from ASEAN member countries attended over 300 meetings annually (Ravenhill 2001), but by 2015 issues of maritime security generated fifty meetings alone (ASEAN 2015). An ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting was formally introduced in 2006, and ministers from all ministries now meet with one another in some capacity within the ASEAN structure in various ministerial forums and dialogues. Intelligence bosses also meet at an annual forum called INTELEX. As argued by Natalegewa (2018), the constant interaction has built mutual confidence, and I would argue the reason for this occurring is that interactionism encourages the spreading of these practices to a wider variety of roles. The meetings now take place within a structure which has a set way of doing things and a set outcome of trusting behaviours, as they become embedded in the ways of ASEAN's diplomacy.

7.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I argue that trust has become habitual. Demonstrated as being present and playing a significant role in the crises above, the crises gave rise to the question of how trust has remained

relatively constant in the context of leadership change. Through an analysis of interviewee perspectives, I made the case that trust is indeed habitual as it is not often reflexively considered, but when viewpoints were unsettled it contributed to demonstrating the way in which trust played a significant role in the background knowledge. Through an analysis of why they trusted, even if they did not necessarily realise they did, I argue that it came about due to a specific set of practices centred on non-confrontational, consensus-seeking, face-saving diplomacy that occurs in relatively informal settings, which encourages the natural response of a trusting behaviour as it subconsciously demonstrates trustworthiness. I argue this set of practices, and this response, are natural as they were enacted previously and consistently by those who underwent the trust-building process. By enacting trusting behaviour and creating a socially meaningful way of being recognised as trustworthy, this behaviour became the 'new normal' for those adopting the roles following the previous leaders who had greater longevity. As such, they follow an ASEAN 'script' which is centred on increasing trust and trusting behaviours, and are essentially taught to follow the script as that is what is normal for the role that they play.

I argue this stability of trust has fundamentally impacted on ASEAN in this period in two ways. First, it has mediated serious crises and differences such as Ambalat in what was a direct contribution to the dependable expectation of peaceful change within the ASEAN community. While a crisis was occurring, so too were arms sales between the antagonists, and cooperation intensified. The crisis showed that because of trust, even when there was military conflict that seemed to be on a trajectory of escalation, there was the opportunity to engage in behaviour to de-escalate. This was predicated on their certainty that de-escalation would not lead to a defection or escalation by the other. Even though leadership changed, trust has continued to develop due to the structural influence and continues to mediate the dependable expectation of peaceful change. This case also showed the limitations of military planning and how this is not perceived as a threat, as well as a decline in hedging as states have continued to engage in diffuse reciprocity. In the context of the haze, I argue this too was the case as it showed that norms can be transformed if there is trust that

allows the change. If states had begun to intervene without trust, and therefore the acceptance of their counterparts, it is difficult to see how the sense of community could be maintained.

Finally, I argue that trust has a continued impact at this stage on the deepening of the ASEAN community. This was seen in the case of the haze and the movement it represented to allowing other's to be involved in Indonesia's domestic affairs, even if this was mostly symbolic. As there was a subjective certainty about the benevolent intentions of the other, Indonesia could seek help and a regional approach even though it meant sacrificing some of their sovereignty. The impact of trust went beyond the haze, however, and ASEAN has deepened in several significant ways. The amount of areas where ASEAN can intervene with permission in the sovereignty of its member is continuing to grow, which trust has facilitated as it did in the case of the haze. Most clearly is the ASEAN charter, endorsed by ASEAN leaders in 2005 and becoming effective in 2008. It provided a clear institutional framework for ASEAN, articulating a greater number of commitments, and extending the institutional role. As mentioned in the introduction, ASEAN also established a community based on three overarching pillars, and it has a clearer security role to play than it did in 1967 when political sensitivities prevented the articulation of ASEAN as a security body. I believe it is here that trust has played a significant role, as it facilitates change at an increasing pace without causing significant tensions and issues within ASEAN.

Conclusion

There has been no interstate war between the countries examined despite significant tensions and conflicts prior to ASEAN's formation. Conflict has been limited and there is a perceived low probability of future war as demonstrated by many of the trusting behaviours that have made them vulnerable to their neighbours. This matches the premises of a group of states becoming a security community. There is a disjuncture between this and the mechanisms said to produce such a community, however. ASEAN lacks the common identity said to be both a constitutive factor and outcome of security communities, especially one predicated on socialisation from relatively stable norms of behaviour (Adler and Barnett 1998a). Other conditions such as political liberalism (Urban 2014) are also lacking. Alternatives such as realism are problematic as they cannot explain this consistency in the face of changing balances of power and the continuation of cooperation even at times that interests are not aligned.

This thesis instead proposes that trust is fundamental to understanding the development and maintenance of the ASEAN security community. Such an argument is articulated in response to literatures on security communities that emphasise the role of identity (Adler and Barnett 1998a; Acharya 2014). While they have recognised the role that trust could or should play, the emphasis on identity has led to the under-operationalization of trust as a concept. Instead, I have argued that it was trust in the other that led to the development and maintenance of the ASEAN community. While elites were initially wary about engaging in meaningful cooperation, the growth of trust facilitated the growth of ASEAN by increasing what Natalegawa refers to as 'the comfort level' of elites (2018). This depended on the emergence of trusting relationships grounded in a growing subjective certainty that the other was benevolent. This was further important for mediating both conflicts and differences, allowing the maintenance of the ASEAN community. In the case of conflicts, trust led elites to believe the other would not escalate. This ultimately prevented a growth in militarization and restraint, led to the reduction of aggression, and allowed for cooperation to

exist even during times even when there was limited military aggression. In the cases of differences of interest, trust was a mediating factor that gave elites the subjective certainty that the other would not work against their interests, even when they were heavily advocating for their own, or that a divergence of interests need not be damaging as they could come to consensus. As such, trust became a significant factor not just in the growth of community but also in ensuring it did not collapse. I argued, therefore, that trust is a necessary causal factor for both the development and maintenance of community in the ASEAN case.

Restating the theoretical framework

In order to make the argument that trust is a necessary causal factor in the development and maintenance of the ASEAN security community, I first critiqued current literature that seeks to explain ASEAN's stable peace. In Chapter 1, I argued realist theories of IR applied to the Southeast Asian context were insufficient as they were essentially focused on balance of power dynamics that created conditions for short-term cooperation (See Emmers 2006). By critiquing this on the basis that balance of power dynamics have fluctuated significantly and that ASEAN states have not always followed such a logic, I argued that they could not sufficiently explain a stable peace that has existed for the significant time period under analysis in this thesis. Instead, I argued that security community literature served as the most persuasive for describing peace. It has become widely adopted in the ASEAN case by both scholars and practitioners, despite the fact that the outcome of a collective identity has been demonstrated as lacking and their focused upon mechanism of the socialisation of norms is also problematic, due to a lack of consistency.

At the same time, I argued that security community theory was the most persuasive basis, as it offers the potential to explore dynamics which have for the most part been ignored in the ASEAN case. The security community literature recognises and attributes a role for trust. As trust literature has developed significantly in the past decade, I argued that this basis should be operationalised in a more rigorous way in order to both explore the dynamics of trust and assess the extent to which it is

a causal mechanism in bringing about dependable expectation of peaceful change. I demonstrated the history that trust as a concept has in the security community literature and grounded my argument that despite recognition trust is still essentially ignored. This has impacted on literature that has developed our understanding of security communities - especially that concerning the practical turn and the way in which it too has been applied to ASEAN.

On this basis, in Chapter 2, I drew upon the literature on trust from both outside and inside the discipline of IR in order to develop a concept that could be rigorously operationalised. Specifically drawing upon the definition of Rousseau et al. that trust is a 'psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of the other' (1998), I argued this serves as a useful basis. It incorporates the mostly accepted elements of acceptance of vulnerability in the context of possible harm and the role that positive expectations or beliefs play in allowing this. However, I also argued this presented two difficulties. The first was that being a psychological state it presents little opportunity for analysing the development of trust, as such cycles cannot begin without the 'psychological state' resulting in a behaviour that sees reciprocation or defection from the other (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). The definition, whilst serving a useful basis, was not necessarily interactive enough. This is especially the case as trusting behaviours comprised both the primary measurement and were significant in the increasing development of trust longitudinally. Second, it did not overcome perhaps the most significant debate in IR concerning trust - that of the bases or what it is that causes trust (Haukkela et al. 2015).

Following on from this I operationalised Dietz and Den Hartog's trust-as-process model (2006). Within their process they recognise the importance of the 'psychological state' in the 'decision to trust' stage of the process, as well as the antecedents which create positive expectations allowing for this, but also incorporate the behavioural manifestation of trust as being a significant part of the process as an outcome. They overcome the trust as multiplicity problem, or that of

different types of trust as it has emerged in IR, as they allow for variation to occur in the bases. This was operationalised in the thesis, whereby trusting behaviours were identified, and then the bases were analysed to assess what it is that led to the psychological state, and ultimately the trusting behaviour it resulted in.

Drawing upon this the thesis then began developing the framework. As a beginning point, I argued that there is a problem within IR in ascertaining how distrusting elites can become trusting, because IR scholars have for the most part operationalised trust and distrust as opposite constructs. There has been an assumption that the mechanisms that lessen distrust will increase trust. By reflecting on literature that mobilises distrust as a separate construct, though one which is interlinked with trust, I argued that the mechanisms for the two processes should be separated out. Essentially, I argue that the mechanisms theorised to build trust may not be successful if distrust is present because they are not catered specifically for distrust-reduction. Building upon this I draw upon Booth and Wheeler's (2008) security dilemma sensibility and Chan's (2017) focus on strategic restraint as beginning points for distrust-reduction, as long as they actively address the concerns of distrusting parties. This is theorised as allowing the relationship to reach a point of ambivalence which opens the opportunity for trust to emerge, based on separate mechanisms, as negative expectations have been replaced by subjective uncertainty rather than a subjective certainty that the other should be distrusted.

Finally in Chapter 2, I utilise the framework developed by Lewicki and Bunker (1995) in my argument that the first stage of a trusting relationship is Calculus-Based Trust (CBT). This form of trust predicated on rational cost analysis is seen as one where the trustor can engage in trusting behaviour because they see interests as being common enough that it would be costly for the trustee to defect. There is a calculative reason to engage in trusting behaviours, as the benefits are worthwhile when it seems unlikely costs will be incurred. I argued that while this is often not considered 'real' trust, it provides a strong beginning point for the emergence of positive

expectations in a context whereby negative expectations have been replaced by a greater ambivalence, and therefore is a worthwhile foundation for the continued development of trust.

I continued to build upon this framework in Chapter 3 to follow the framework offered by Lewicki and Bunker (1995) by adopting the next stage of trust as being Knowledge-Based Trust (KBT). The core of KBT centres on a cognitive knowledge that the other behaves in a certain way where their actions and responses to trusting behaviour become relatively predictable. As a result, there is a growing subjective certainty the other will not defect as they have not done in the past. The question that arises, however, is to what extent knowledge predicated on cognitive forms exclusively? By focusing so much on rationality and cognition I argue that Lewicki and Bunker's (1995) notion of KBT is fundamentally lacking other important dynamics such as affective and social influences. In the trust literature these have traditionally been separated out into Affective Based Trust and Relational Based Trust (McAllister 1995), but I argue they occur parallel to one another within the cases and were still grounded in this language of knowledge. I expand the concept of KBT beyond its purely cognitive basis (cognitive knowledge) to include a growing knowledge of the other as a person and the attachment this gives rise to (affective knowledge) and a growing knowledge of the structure which acts as a 'sign-post' for recognising socially meaningful ways the other signals trustworthiness (social knowledge).

I then depart from Lewicki and Bunker (1995) due to their focus on Identification-Based Trust, something which I argue is of less significance in the case studies due to the lack of collective identity. This led to a question of how to explain the presence of a stable trust when neither CBT nor KBT are strong enough for long-term transformation, as they are interpersonal and are predicated on certain individual dyads subject to change. Instead, I propose that trust can become 'practice-based' (PBT). Here, I develop the concept of PBT by drawing upon the IR literature concerning the practice turn and the way in which patterned behaviour becomes an un-reflexive way of doing things based on an inarticulate background knowledge. There are clear overlaps between practice theory

and the literature on trust which facilitated this way of thinking. As trust is behavioural in my framework, and is enacted with reference to certain behaviours and contexts, this has compatibility with the concept of socially meaningful practices if it can reach a stage where it is enacted repeatedly within a certain structural context or field. I argue this allows for a consistency in trust, important for the maintenance of the security community and the dependable expectation of peaceful change, but also allows for it to spread beyond certain dyads as it gives the structure an important role in shaping normal behaviours and background knowledge of actors. The frameworks in Chapters 2 and 3 are a process that is predominantly agential in the beginning stages of CBT and KBT, but the enacted trusting behaviour constitutes a particular structure which then influences the actions and the background knowledge of new elites that join who then go on to perform the acts of trusting. By taking this process into account the overall theoretical contribution of this thesis is an analytical framework that addresses the way in which trust can move from the interpersonal and become a more stable basis for the dependable expectation of peaceful change within a security community.

The power of trust – findings across cases

The theoretical framework for analysing the dynamics of trust within a security community was explored through the ASEAN case study, focusing on the presence of trust, the role that trust played, and the bases of trust. It did this by separating ASEAN into stages of development that have been recognised in the literature, and demonstrated that trust was indeed present at each stage.

The first role that trust played was transforming relationships to one where no cooperation was possible as distrust prevented the emergence of cooperation to that where cooperation was at least possible to consider. In Chapter 4 I used the case of interstate relations prior to ASEAN's formation to demonstrate the movement from a subjective certainty that the other was distrustworthy to one where there was a certain uncertainty or ambivalence that facilitated cooperative moves. Prior to ASEAN, neither LKY nor the Tunku trusted Sukarno and Subandrio. The

behaviour of the Indonesian elites and the conflict based on ideological fundamentalism created a context where there was a strong certainty that any attempts at mediation or cooperation would result in defection. In the eyes of LKY and the Tunku this certainty had come about as Sukarno had not only demonstrated malevolence in his foreign policy behaviour of *konfrontasi* but had also continuously demonstrated dishonesty in negotiations. This led them to be certain his intentions were to cause them harm. This dynamic was also reflected in the relationship between LKY and the Tunku during Singapore's merger and subsequent exile. Distrust-reduction undertaken by Suharto addressed the sources of distrust directly, in order to open spaces to consider positive expectations, confirming the importance of security dilemma sensibility in defusing distrust. Suharto did this by actively reflecting on the way in which Sukarno's policy had been causing insecurity and proceeded to distance himself from Sukarno's adventurism – signalling publicly that this was the case – which led to ambivalence between himself and the Tunku. For the Tunku and LKY, Singapore's separation was followed by a decline of ideological fundamentalism and the view they represented diametrically opposed interests as the problems of ethnicity and political involvement had been bound up in the process of merger. Once they separated distrust broadened to new sectors, but they were not as salient. Once there was growing ambivalence, therefore, there was space for trust to begin and develop.

With regards to the bases of trust I show in Chapter 5 how trusting behaviours were present but extremely limited. The positive expectations were predicated on CBT, as I argue they were primarily centred on beliefs that the other would not defect as it would be too costly to do so, as interests were encapsulated in the sense that they now had core interests in common. These interests were primarily articulated as anti-communism and a focus on national resilience, though the muting of ethnic differences was also of importance for LKY and the Tunku.

As reflected by my interviewees whose views are recorded in Chapter 6, subjective certainty grew as the LKY and Suharto in particular began to see themselves as knowing their counterparts in

terms not only of behaviour, but also attributing importance to getting to see the other as a human and not a state representative, as well as getting to know one another outside of their roles. They also learnt more about the social structure in which their relations took place and what meanings were attributed to certain actions.

In the Cambodian conflict LKY, Mahathir and Suharto had different interests, but were still able to make themselves vulnerable by subverting their interests to the other with the expectation they would not make any agreements that would create too much harm. They had come to believe that their counterparts did not harbour malevolent intent, and that if they put their interests in the hands of the other they would not break the trust placed in them. As demonstrated by the interviewees and other analysis, the decision to trust was predicated on the basis that the other had shown a certain predictability of not defecting, enhancing their perceived benevolence. They had also forged relatively close links and gotten to know each other as people, demonstrating an affective knowledge. This facilitated a growing sense the other was obligated not to defect as they were no longer seen as 'merely' state representatives but had a more personal relationship similar to Wheeler's conceptualisation of humanization (2018). This was seen in the relationship between LKY and Suharto, as well as more junior decision-makers who discussed the concepts of sharing food and meeting the other's family, highlighting the extent to which this impacted on their perceptions. Furthermore, this allowed an expectation that even when conflict occurred it would be resolved relatively quickly. In the case of Sipidan and Ligitan, cooperation continued and intensified in the maritime realm despite militarized conflict. This resulted from Suharto and Mahathir sharing a stronger subjective certainty, but one that was not absolute, that the other would act in a restrained way as they had in the past - leading to the crises de-escalation.

Finally, in Chapter 7 I argue that this subjective assuredness was not only maintained but was strengthened despite the fact there had been a change in the leadership and institutions of ASEAN. Indonesia's democratization was particularly important for this analysis. Prior to the late

1990's, relationships had been centred on LKY, Mahathir and Suharto. Suharto, however, was overthrown in 1998 and was replaced not only by leaders that had shorter terms, limiting processes of interpersonal trust-building, but also a domestic context which was more vocal in foreign policy decision-making giving a greater number of agents influence over this process (Sinatra 2014). Despite this, I argue that trust continued to grow, and hedging declined significantly. In the case of Ambalat, Indonesia and Malaysia were, at the same time, in a militarized standoff while continuing to sell arms to one another and operating in joint exercises. In attempting to resolve the haze, furthermore, Indonesia had gone against the principle of sovereignty and non-interference to actively advocate for the involvement of others in their domestic issues - something which had been unthinkable 30 years earlier. Interviewees expressed the strength their embedded roles played in informing them of the ways that things should be done. They spoke about how certain behavioural responses which I argue reflected trusting behaviour felt natural or normal, and that they did not reflexively consider that the other may defect. This was demonstrated in interviews where I aimed to unsettle their worldviews in order to assess their taken-for-granted knowledge when they were unable to accept alternative scenarios. As this trusting behaviour was a 'natural response' undertaken in response to practices of informal decision-making and consensus-seeking, trust had arguably become part of the background knowledge in the context of these patterned set of behaviours. I argue that the bases of trust developed over time. It moved from calculus to knowledge and finally to practice as articulated in Part One.

While the 'bases' of trust were demonstrated in the cases as steadily expanding to encompass the affective, the question remains to what extent it was the evolving practices of trust that constituted the ASEAN security community. In each Chapter in Part Two I showed that significant developments in ASEAN were a result of the growing trust or what Natalegwa (2018) refers to as 'comfort level'. In Chapter 5 I argue that ZOPFAN and the TAC, which codified ASEAN's relations, would not have emerged in the absence of trust. When ASEAN was created, latent distrust had prevented the institution from being given any sort of tangible or meaningful role. As these

bases developed, however, more tangible forms of cooperation emerged to the point that they had even considered weakening their own sovereignty in Chapter 7. While these were mostly symbolic forms of involvement it marked a massive transformation from the times where no sovereignty could be given up due to sensitivity resulting from the colonial experience and a strong sense of nationalism used as a unifier. Through these analyses a common theme can be drawn out – as trust developed it resulted in the ASEAN member states becoming more comfortable with allowing the deepening and involvement of ASEAN as a community. By the final period analysed ASEAN was prevalent in all sectors of their relations and was continuing to take increasing steps.

Trust played another significant role in this thesis and in this case. It prevented the breakdown of community. If ASEAN had been based on identity, or rational calculations concerning power and interests, it is difficult to see how it would have survived in any sort of meaningful manner. In Chapters 6 and 7, the cases reflected the extent to which interests differed and how identity predicated on ASEAN's norms were not consistent enough to mediate each of the four crises analysed. I argued that a further significant role for trust, therefore, was not just the continued development of community on an upward trajectory, but also its maintenance in times where community could have been undermined by the potential crises. Without KBT during the Cambodian conflict, where there were two sets of interests on display, it is unclear as how these differences would have been mediated. Instead, interviewees spoke of the trust they had in their counterparts to seek a resolution on their collective terms which reflected a consensus rather than concerns of Singapore abandoning Indonesia or vice versa. This allowed them to give each other agency in seeking a resolution, as well as continuing support even if the core interests at play differed. In the Ambalat case, it seemed as if PBT was a key factor that prevented a security dilemma from occurring. While Malaysian and Indonesian actors outside of ASEAN's structure, such as the military and the public, were advocating for a growing military stance against the other. Whilst this was occurring, neither SBY nor Badawi considered their counterparts would consider such an action, which resulted in its de-escalation. I demonstrate through these crises the role trust plays in

mediating significant crises and allowing for ASEAN cooperation to continue and intensify despite the objective conditions for conflict.

Of course, there is the caveat that the thesis did not consider this to be absolute trust present in all domains. While trust played these significant roles, there were other sectors and issues where it failed to have an impact. The case of economics stands as a counterpoint to the presence of trust. In Singapore, there were very real and very justified concerns over Malaysian attempts to undermine their economy. Malaysia's successive Prime Ministers have continuously attempted to raise water prices and undermine Singapore's economic success for their own benefit. This had been an early problem with Indonesia too, especially centred on smuggling. Even now, the ASEAN Economic Community, while being the most technical in outlook, is extremely politicised – especially the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). There is a real sense that by integrating economies within ASEAN, there will be big winners and big losers. It is no surprise that maintaining sovereignty in economic terms is still, therefore, a priority. Indonesia often holds events centred on this, such as the 'Strategic Contribution Indonesia' event held in 2015 titled 'Overcoming challenges towards AFTA 2015 in Protecting Indonesia's Sovereignty'. I argue that these trust dynamics were essentially reduced to whether the trustors trusted the trustee to not resort to warfare and to not mean them significant harm by undermining their core interests. However, as I demonstrate, even trust limited to this specificity is sufficient to build a stable peace and a community centred on ASEAN.

Contributions

By exploring the role of trust in ASEAN, the primary contribution in this thesis is that it demonstrated that trust plays a significant role in trust in a security community. As of yet, much of the debate focuses on the role of identity, with only little attention given to trust. To the best of my knowledge, there has been no in-depth longitudinal analysis of the impact and importance of trust within a security community (See Wheeler 2018). This was particularly important in a case where identity is inconsistent at best.

Many studies within IR have focused on static 'snap-shots' within relationships and tend to rely primarily only on one 'type' of trust rather than the movement from one from one form to another. Building on the insights of different strands of literature I made connections where others left off. CBT and KBT are well established in literature, as are analyses focused on practices. However, despite trust being an important example of background knowledge, there has been no theorising or empirical analysis. As such, my primary contribution was bringing this framework of development together with practice theory, to examine the way in which trust on an interpersonal level can proliferate to wider relationships within a given structure. This addresses Keating and Ruzicka's concerns that if trust is primarily an individual belief or expectation, then it has little relevance to IR because a trusting relationship between individuals is not a stable foundation for long lasting trust when leaderships of a country rotate (Keating 2015b; Keating and Ruzicka 2014). Through my operationalisation of PBT, I bridged these viewpoints and demonstrated the way in which interpersonal trust can become stable and long lasting by influencing the predispositions of new actors joining the trusting relationship structure in which trust had become embedded. This began with the individuals and provided one 'sense of how trust can be socialised into state apparatus', a missing link according to Keating (2015b: 6).

The final contribution this thesis made was to further our understanding of ASEAN as an institution. By focusing on the role of identity, it is easy to criticise ASEAN. However, forcing a collective identity can be problematic if it furthers ontological insecurity for the member states, by decreasing the extent to which they can exercise their distinct identities. By arguing that trust is the causal mechanism behind the emergence and deepening of community, the thesis proposed other methods that ASEAN can pursue to continue the development of the community that do not risk such a forcing of tension between national and regional priorities. My analysis, therefore, challenged the dominant understanding in the field that identity drives the security community process, meaning prevailing policy prescriptions will need to reconsider whether identity building is an

effective means to further the ASEAN project in future. Instead, I suggest that focusing on the role of trust and its bases is of greater importance.

Future research

Due to constraints in space there are, of course, opportunities for future research. The first results from the limited treatment of the dynamics between trust and identity. The dynamics between the two remains an area that would be worth exploring in more detail. As a preliminary contribution to this, I believe the thesis demonstrated that trust can emerge absent of any meaningful collective identification. This would suggest the causal mechanism begins with trust, and that perhaps a collective identity can still emerge in future but has so far been of little importance to the ASEAN project as it stands today.

Another opportunity is the impact of institutional expansion. The three countries I chose were all crucial to the establishment of ASEAN as a community. As such, I analysed the growth of trust as being relatively stable but due to constraints could not assess in greater deal what happens when the structure that envelops the trusting relationships change, and the way in which breaches of trust are best repaired. There was a limited insight into this in the case of Pulau Sipidan and Ligitan, whereby betrayal resulted from a breaking of the verbal agreement not to develop the islands. Trust seemed to be restored relatively quickly and with little active attention from those who broke it, but I did not have the chance to explore this greater detail.

Finally, I believe there is the opportunity to study whether these processes of trust can continue to grow further and intensify. As argued, trust has proliferated and become stable, but it is still relatively focused on a specific area. It has not yet diffused to such a degree into other sensitive sectors such as economics - though it has diffused into a great deal of other sectors. It is unclear as to the extent to which trust in the realm focused upon in this thesis can contribute to the growth of trust in these problematic sectors. I believe this would be worthy of greater exploration as there is the question of whether PBT is good for the growth of trust, or whether it instead suggests a

relationship becoming stale and unable to develop further. If roles are undertaken with little reflexivity and imagination and trusting behaviour is just a natural response, are agents encouraged to continue to develop trust, or merely enact the roles that they have inherited? This is a significant question and one that will impact on ASEAN's future. Many practitioners looking back at the glory days of when they were in charge lament the lack of leadership and imagination in ASEAN. Whilst this process is clearly good for the maintenance of a relatively stable community predicated on a stable peace, it may not be useful for developing the relationships further. In future such an exploration would be a fruitful avenue of research. This thesis, however, provides a basis for this by presenting the beginning of a theoretically informed and empirically driven analysis of the dynamics of trust within a security community.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Interview question guide

Part one (general discussion):

- Can you please tell me a bit about your role in ASEAN at the time?
- What events or situations stood out to you as being significant in your tenure? How did they develop?
- What are your thoughts concerning ASEAN?
- How were your interactions with [your counterparts]? How often did you interact? How did you interact? What stands out about your interactions?

Part two (event/crisis/counterpart):

- You were specifically involved in [event]. Can you tell me a bit more about your role in it, and how the event itself developed?
- During [event], what led you to choose [course of action]? What alternatives were being considered?
- When you met [counterpart] concerning this event, how were interactions established? Where did you meet?
- How did you feel about your counterpart and their course of action? Were your interests aligned, and if not, how did you overcome that?
- How did your relationship evolve with your counterpart?
- What were your counterpart's intentions during these meetings?
- What stood out about these interactions?
- Were these interactions important in choosing [course of action]?
- How did your colleagues feel about [counterpart]?
- What was the role in ASEAN throughout this event?

Part three (counterpart/unsettling through vignettes):

- You talk about [counterpart's behaviour/intentions] in this way. What led to that conclusion?
- Why is it you thought that about [counterpart's behaviour/intention?]
- You mention [counterpart's intention/behaviour] in this way. What would have happened if, hypothetically, they had instead chosen [alternative course of action/defection]?
- What was the likelihood that they had chosen [alternative course of action]?

- Would it not have been just as likely that they could have done [hypothetical alternative course of action]? Why or why not?
- Would that have changed your chosen course of action?
- Would that have changed your feelings about your counterpart?

Part 4 (trust)

- You mentioned having [positive expectation/belief/certainty/trust] concerning your counterpart, could you please share what it was that led to that conclusion?
- Did ASEAN itself play any role in the [positive expectation/belief/certainty/trust] mentioned?
- What part of your interactions earlier helped in bringing about this [positive expectation/belief/certainty/trust]? What is an important cause for that, for you?
- Do you believe that this [positive expectation/belief/certainty/trust] was important in your decisions to choose that particular course of action?
- How significant do you think this [positive expectation/belief/certainty/trust] was in relation to other factors at the time?
- Without [positive expectation/belief/certainty/trust] do you think you would have chosen or advocated for a different course of action during this [event/crisis]?
- Were there any times you questioned this trust?
- Were there any times you believe your counterpart questioned his trust in you?

Appendix 2: Document pack sent to interviewees (Consent form, information sheet, and letter of invitation)

Consent Form

'Relationships in a security community: the development of ASEAN'

We would greatly appreciate you taking the time to take part in this study. If you agree to participate, please Sign and Date this consent form which has been approved by the University's Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee.

- I have read and understood the Information Sheet
- I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study
- I understand that taking part in the study is voluntary.
- I understand that confidentiality will be ensured, and my identity will be protected in the analysis and further reports
- I understand that I can request the interview notes or a copy of the draft research from the researcher
- I understand that I can withdraw from the study and may request the return of any data I have provided, and request the researcher to destroy these data by contacting the researcher: SAE195@bham.ac.uk within 30 days of the interview

Signature of Participant: _____Date: _____

Signature of Researcher: _____ Date: _____

PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET

Study title

Relationships in a security community: the development of ASEAN

Invitation to take part

You are invited to take part in an original research project. Participation is completely voluntary. Choosing not to take part, or withdrawing part way through, will not disadvantage you in anyway. If you are interested in taking part please make sure you are fully informed about the study before agreeing to participate, take time to read the information below carefully. Please do not hesitate to contact the primary researcher (Scott Edwards, contact details at the end of the sheet) if you would like any further clarification.

What is the purpose of the research?

The purpose of the study is to analyse the relationships between policy makers within ASEAN, and the extent to which they have any role in the formation of a security community within the region. It will therefore analyse relationships between different policymakers within ASEAN at different stages of ASEAN's development.

Who is doing this research?

Scott Edwards, Doctoral Researcher, is undertaking this project on behalf of the Institute for Conflict and Cooperation at the University of Birmingham. He is supervised by Professor Nicholas Wheeler and Dr Nicholas Wright at the University of Birmingham.

Prof. Nicholas Wheeler can be contacted at:
Department of Political Science and International Studies
School of Government and Society
Muirhead Tower
University of Birmingham
Edgbaston, Birmingham,
B15 2TT, United Kingdom
n.j.wheeler@bham.ac.uk

Dr Nicholas Wright can be contacted at the same address and: N.Wright@bham.ac.uk

Do I have to take part?

No. It is completely voluntary.

What will I be asked to do?

You will be interviewed to discuss a broad range of themes relating to the research question. There are no right or wrong answers. The aim is to understand your experience. Any interviews will take place at a time and place convenient to you. With your consent interviews may be recorded. You may request that your interview is not recorded.

How will the data that has been collected be used?

The data will be used for the completion of a doctoral thesis on the topic of the research. The data may also be used in academic journal articles on the same topic.
None of the data used in either instance will include personal identification other than that agreed on an individual basis between the participant and researcher (Scott Edwards).

What are the benefits of taking part?

There are no specific individual advantages to taking part. It is hoped that the results of the research will be advantageous to the ASEAN project, and therefore policy makers, by furthering our understanding of ASEAN and its diplomacy.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?

There are no foreseen physical or psychological risks to participating. Anonymity and confidentially will be protected throughout the research process.

Can I withdraw from the research and what will happen if I don't want to carry on?

Yes, you are free to withdraw at any point with no consequences. In the context of this study this means that you may refuse to be interviewed up until the point of interview. You may also refuse to respond to any email correspondence. During the interview you can withdraw and any data from that interview will be handed over to you for disposal. Additionally, if requested (up to 1 month after the interview) any data you provided can be destroyed.

Are there any expenses and payments which I will get?

No

Whom do I contact if I have any questions or a complaint?

If you have any questions or complaints about this study, or if this study has harmed you in any way, you can contact the University of Birmingham Ethical Review Committee using the following details:

Dr. Sean Jennings

Research Governance and Ethics Manager

[redacted]

Will my records be kept confidential?

Yes. All written materials will be anonymised and stored on an encrypted USB storage device or kept in a locked cabinet at the University of Birmingham.

Only the primary research, Scott Edwards, will have access to the complete records. The raw data and any data including personal identification will not be shared with anyone (unless required by law).

As required by university regulations all data will be kept (securely) for a period of 10 years after publication.

Who is organising and funding the research?

Scott Edwards, doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham is undertaking this research as part of a University of Birmingham funded PhD. Scott will receive no other payment or inducement for conducting this research.

Who has reviewed the study?

This study has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by the University of Birmingham Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee.

Further information and contact details.

For any further information/clarification please contact the primary researcher as follows:

Scott Edwards
Room 627 Muirhead Tower
Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security,
University of Birmingham

Edgbaston
Birmingham
B15 2TT

Email: SAE195@bham.ac.uk
[redacted]

Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki.

This study complies, and at all times will comply, with the Declaration of Helsinki[1]as adopted at the 64th WMA General Assembly at Fortaleza, Brazil in October 2013; and also includes the accompanying footnote at the bottom of the page: [1] World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki [revised October 2013]. Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 64th WMA General Assembly, Fortaleza (Brazil).

Recruitment letter

627 Muirhead Tower

University of Birmingham

Birmingham

B15 2TT

Dear [Insert Name here]

My name is Scott Edwards, and I am a doctoral researcher at the Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security (ICCS) at the University of Birmingham. I am contacting you asking for your participation as an interviewee on a research project concerning ASEAN. You have been selected as a potential participant due to your role as a [role], and the involvement you had in the organisation. The project aims to analyse the foundations of peace within the region. As such, I would be extremely grateful if I could request an interview, of around 1 hour, to explore this topic with you due to your broad experience with ASEAN, and your expertise which would be invaluable to the research.

In particular, I would be interested in your experiences of [personalised section including events they were part of, and I would like to focus on]

I understand you may be extremely busy, so a concise information sheet has been attached which explains the core aspects of the project, as well as the guidelines for participation. A consent form has also been attached so you can understand the rights you would have if you did choose to participate. If you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to get in touch.

Your participation would be greatly appreciated, and I look forward to hearing from you.

Best regards

Scott Edwards

Doctoral Researcher

Appendix 3: List of Interviewees

Interviewee Designation	Position	Location and Date of Interview
1	Former Senior Diplomat (Malaysia)	7th May 2016 – Kuala Lumpur
2	Political Advisor (Indonesia)	10th August 2016 – Jakarta
3	Senior Politician (Malaysia)	4th April 2017 – Kuala Lumpur
4	Former Diplomat (Malaysia)	10th May 2016 – Kuala Lumpur
5	Government member (Malaysia)	10th June 2016 - Kuala Lumpur
6	Former Foreign Ministry Official (Singapore)	12th December 2017 – Singapore
7	Government Member (Indonesia)	15th August 2016 – Jakarta
8	Former Foreign Ministry Official (Singapore)	9th December 2017 – Singapore
9	Former Senior Diplomat (Malaysia)	8th June 2016 - Kuala Lumpur
10	Maritime Affairs Ministry Official (Indonesia)	16th August 2016 – Jakarta
11	Former Senior Diplomat (Indonesia)	2nd September 2016 – Jakarta
12	Senior Secretariat Official (Indonesia)	29th August 2016 - Jakarta
13	Senior Diplomat (Singapore)	18th December 2017 – Singapore
14	Former Senior Diplomat (Indonesia)	28th August 2016 – Jakarta
15	Former Senior Government Official (Indonesia)	22nd August 2016 - Jakarta
16	Former Senior Diplomat (Singapore)	19th December 2017 – Singapore
17	Foreign Ministry official (Singapore)	1st December 2017 – Singapore
18	Foreign Ministry Official (Singapore)	1st December 2017 – Singapore
19	Diplomat (Singapore)	7th January 2018 – Singapore
20	Senior Diplomat (Singapore)	4th January 2018 – Singapore
21	Diplomat (Malaysia)	1st July 2016 - Kuala Lumpur
22	Diplomat (Malaysia)	8th July 2016 - Kuala Lumpur
23	Diplomat (Malaysia)	11th June 2016 - Kuala Lumpur
24	Diplomat (Indonesia)	4th September 2016 – Jakarta
25	Senior Diplomat (Singapore)	6th May 2018 – Jakarta
26	Diplomat (Singapore)	8th May 2018 – Jakarta
27	Diplomat (Malaysia)	10th June 2018 - Kuala Lumpur
28	Foreign Ministry Official (Indonesia)	17th August 2016 – Jakarta
29	Embassy Official	27th November 2018 - London

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