GIVING THEM A VOICE: NARRATIVES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN PORTUGAL

by Raquel Beleza Pereira da Silva

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Institute of Applied Social Studies
School of Social Policy
College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham
December 2015

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

University of Birmingham Research Archive

e-theses repository

This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the lives and experiences of former political violent activists in Portugal, who acted in three distinct periods surrounding the Carnation Revolution of April 25th (1974), which overthrew *Estado Novo's* dictatorship and established democracy: a pre-revolution period (1964-1974), a counter-revolution period (1975-1976) and a post-revolution period (1980-1987). This research aims to explore the dynamics of engagement with, life within, and disengagement from, a political violent organisation from the point of view of the actors of the violence themselves, whose voices are traditionally silenced. This study is theoretically framed by the research produced by Critical Terrorism Studies' scholars and underpinned by narrative inquiry as the paradigm that guides the entire research process. This is, thus, the first in-depth qualitative investigation of the phenomenon in Portugal, which employed life history interviews to collect first-hand accounts about their subjective experiences, meanings and perspectives. The findings suggest that there are robust connections between the stories people tell about their lives and the social, cultural, political, historical and human contexts that frame these same stories. The showcase of the empirical, theoretical and methodological implications of the research concludes this thesis, emphasizing what this study adds to knowledge in the field of political violence.

To Professor Carla Machado for teaching me to see the world through the eyes of others

To my interviewees who kindly shared their stories with me

And to my husband for always believing that I can do anything

Acknowledgements

Writing this dissertation was a very special journey that knew mountain tops and a few valleys, and that, at times, took me across both disciplinary boundaries and geographical locations. However, I had the privilege of having fantastic people accompanying and guiding me on the way. First of all, I wish to express my gratitude for the research participants, all of whom willingly shared their experiences and insights, and by doing so made this research possible. I am also very grateful for my four supervisors, Dr Basia Spalek and Dr Surinder Guru who received me at the University of Birmingham and walked with me until the end of my third year, and to Dr Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Dr Harriet Clarke who took it from there. Thank you very much for supporting me through this journey, for asking tough questions and helping me grow as a researcher.

The work presented in this dissertation was made possible through the doctoral scholarship received from FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia), for which I am very grateful.

A special acknowledgement is due to Airi Lampinen, Ruth Densham, Josefin Graef, Jonathan Catling and Lynn Davis who read parts of this dissertation and provided important comments. Emily Lange and Paddy Greenleaf who helped polishing the translations of my interviewees' words into English. Diana Quigley, Ruth Densham, Deborah Condy, Julia Cole, Rosey Meiring and Susanna Sansom who were very patient in helping me putting my 'ins' and 'ons' in the right place. They did a spectacular job in proofreading different sections of this work. Any mistakes that remain are my responsibility. A big thank you is also owed to Alexandre Cardoso who took the time to understand my rough sketches of figures and tables and to help me bringing them to life, and to Pedro Piedade, who helped with the final formatting.

Across this doctoral journey I also had the privilege of collaborating in different projects and working with wonderful people. Partnering Basia Spalek, Laura Zahra McDonald and Zubeda Limbada in setting up ConnectJustice was a fantastic experience that taught me a lot. Thank you for welcoming me into the team, for your friendship and ongoing support. Being a member of the International Student Ambassador team lead by the wonderful Ellen O'Brien was equally a great experience. The opportunity of working alongside Ellen and other International Student Ambassadors to develop services for international students contributed to both my personal and

professional development, as well as to my own adaptation to the UK. So, thank you very much! Finally, I am very grateful to Jeremy Hollow from Listen and Learn Research, who was infinitely patient and kind, particularly when the doctoral crisis knocked at the door.

Nonetheless, this journey was not only work related, I also had the privilege of being surrounded by very good friends, both close and distant, whose support and encouragement was key in different moments. A special thank you is due to Monyhull Church folks, who lovingly welcomed us in their midst and always made sure we were doing all right. There are no words to thank John and Ruth Mountford for their acts of love and kindness towards us in the last four years. The only thing I can say is that they are family to me, my British family, and Ruth makes the best chocolate cake ever! It has been also amazing to keep in touch with my Geneva friends, particularly with Airi, Célia, Eva and Lauriane. Thank you for all the 'doctoral therapy sessions' that took place over the last years and for all the fun we have had together! A big thank you is also due to all my friends in Portugal who have kept in touch, who kept writing, sending videos and sharing their love: out of sight, but close to the heart!

Finally, I want to thank my family for loving me, for always being there for me and for supporting me at all times. My mother, Filomena Beleza, for being a life example, for always being honest with me and for having given me wings, so I could fly. My father, Francisco Pereira, for opening his house during my fieldwork and for always supporting my academic endeavours. My brother, João Pereira, for having a very big heart and taking care of everyone I love while I am away. My parents in law, Berto and Marta Batata, for loving and accepting this strange daughter in law. Last but not the least I want to thank the love of my life, Filipe da Silva, who is 'immeasurably more than all I asked or imagined'.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE 1
INTRODUCTION 1
The Dissertation Focus **1**
Setting the Scene **1**
Overview of the Thesis **3**
Researcher's Background and Position **4**
PART I 9
CHAPTER TWO 9
ARMED STRUGGLE IN PORTUGAL: A BRIEF CONTEXTUALIZATION 9
Overview **9**
Portuguese Armed Organisations in Context **9**
In the Beginning Was Salazar… **13**
The Opposition to Estado Novo **20**
LUAR: League of Unity and Armed Revolution **22**
ARA: Revolutionary Armed Action **26**
BR: Revolutionary Brigades **29**
The Revolution **31**
The Return of Politically Motivated Violence **34**
ELP: Portuguese Army of Liberation **36**
MDLP: Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal **37**
FP-25: Popular Forces of 25th of April **39**
Concluding Reflections: The Post-Dictatorship Memory Politics and Political Narratives in Portugal **40**
CHAPTER THREE 44
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE: MEANINGS, DRIVERS AND ACTORS 44
Overview **44**
Critical Perspectives on Political Violence **44**
Meanings of Political Violence: The Limits of Mainstream Studies **48**
The Drivers of Political Violence: The Role of Political Narratives **52**
Engagement with a political violent organisation 56
Life within a political violent organisation 58

Disengagement from a political violent organisation 59
Actors of Political Violence **61**
Gender dynamics 63
Concluding Reflections: Towards an Understanding of Personal Narratives **66**
CHAPTER FOUR 67
METHODOLOGICAL MAP: DRAWING ON STORIES 67
Overview **67**
The Research Focus **67**
The Research Backbone **69**
Fieldwork **72**
Interviewing 73
Interaction interviewer – interviewee 75
Accountability and responsibility 78
Narrative Inquiry: Dealing with Stories **79**
Analytical approach **86**
Immersion in the data 86
Thematic narrative analysis 87
Analysis of narratives 88
Representation 90
Ethical Concerns **91**
Concluding Reflections: The Role of Emotions in the Research Process **95**
PART II 98
CHAPTER FIVE 98
ENGAGEMENT WITH A POLITICAL VIOLENT ORGANISATION 98
Overview **98**
Origins of the Individual Political Awareness **98**
Pre-revolution militants: family and place of birth 99
Pre-revolution militants: political participation and education 106
Pre-revolution militants: Colonial War and exile 108
Counter-revolution militants: family and Catholicism 113
Counter-revolution militants: readings and political participation 114
Counter-revolution militants: Colonial War 115
Post-revolution militants: children of the Revolution 120
Post-revolution militants: readings and political imagination 122
Commitment to a Political Violent Organisation **127**
Pre-revolution militants: views on Estado Novo 128
Pre-revolution militants: justification for the armed struggle 132
Counter-revolution militants: views on the Revolution and on the democratic process 134
Post-revolution militants: views on the post-revolutionary ‘formal democracy’ 138
Post-revolution militants: justification for the armed struggle 138
Concluding Reflections: Three Different Moments in Time, the Same Result **140**

CHAPTER SIX 143
LIFE WITHIN A POLITICAL VIOLENT ORGANISATION 143
Overview **143**
The Dynamics of Life in the Underground **143**
Pre-revolution militants: going underground 144
Pre-revolution militants: challenges 146
Pre-revolution militants: gender 149
Counter-revolution militants: escaping into exile 154
Counter-revolution militants: challenges 155
Counter-revolution militants: gender 157
Post-revolution militants: going underground 158
Post-revolution militants: challenges 160
Post-revolution militants: gender 164
The Use of Violence **165**
Pre-revolution militants: armed actions 166
Pre-revolution militants: popular support 168
Counter-revolution militants: armed actions 169
Counter-revolution militants: popular support 173
Post-revolution militants: armed actions 174
Post-revolution militants: popular support 179
Concluding Reflections: The Personal Became Political and the Political Became Personal **180**
CHAPTER SEVEN 182
DISENGAGEMENT FROM A POLITICAL VIOLENT ORGANISATION 182
Overview **182**
Ending Commitment to a Political Violent Organisation **182**
Pre-revolution militants: disengagement and dissolution of the organisation 183
Pre-revolution militants: reintegration into society 187
Counter-revolution militants: disengagement and dissolution of the organisations 189
Counter-revolution militants: reintegration into society 192
Post-revolution militants: disengagement and dissolution of the organisation 193
Post-revolution militants: reintegration into society 197
The Past Re-worked in the Present: Continuities and Discontinuities **198**
Pre-revolution militants: reflections on the past 198
Pre-revolution militants: us versus them 201
Pre-revolution militants: continuities and discontinuities 203
Counter-revolution militants: reflections on the past 206
Counter-revolution militants: MDLP versus ELP 209
Post-revolution militants: reflections on the past 210
Post-revolution militants: continuities and discontinuities 213
Concluding Reflections: No Longer Violent, But Always Political **216**
PART III 219
CHAPTER EIGHT 219
CONCLUSION 219

Overview **219**

Empirical Implications **219**

Engagement with a political violent organisation 220
Life within a political violent organisation..... 222
Disengagement from a political violent organisation..... 227

Theoretical and Methodological Implications **230**

Further Research **233**

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Timeline……..... 11
Figure 2: Salazar's Consolidation in Office……. 14
Figure 3: The Seven Myths of *Estado Novo*'s Discourse……..... 16
Figure 4: Worldwide Contestation in the 1960's……. 23
Figure 5: LUAR's Political Line……..... 25
Figure 6: ARA's Principles and Rules……. 27
Figure 7: BR's Aims……..... 30
Figure 8: Trigger Dates for Post-Revolution Armed Struggle…… 35
Figure 9: ELP's Aims……. 36
Figure 10: Typology of Political Violence……. 49
Figure 11: Interviewees' Characteristics…… 73

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Portuguese Armed Organisations in Context……. 12
Table 2: LUAR's Armed Actions…… 26
Table 3: ARA's Armed Actions……..... 28
Table 4: BR's Armed Actions…….. 31
Table 5: FP-25's Armed Actions……. 41

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The Dissertation Focus

This dissertation is focused on the life stories of former political violent activists in Portugal. It is focused on the journeys of involvement with a political violent organisation narrated by individuals who at a certain moment in time, usually a moment of social turmoil, chose to take on arms to defend their political ideals. These are individuals who, over time, became convinced that they could not be mere spectators of the political circumstances of their times and that the only viable way of making a difference was through violent acts.

Therefore, a voice is given to uncommonly heard or taken into account individuals, whose lives represent a narrative usually suppressed from the official tales of the land in question. Independently of the reasons of such suppression, be they related to stronger ideological tales taking precedence or to the character of the teller being considered dubious, politically motivated violence perpetrated by non-state actors did take place in Portugal in the past, and did not appear out of thin air. In this vein, the pages of this thesis explore for the first time, on the one hand, the contexts that instigated the rise of armed organisations in Portugal through the life stories of individuals once committed to political transformation via violent means and, on the other hand, the individual experiences of engaging with, living within and disengaging from a political violent organisation.

Setting the Scene

Political violence is usually conceived as an umbrella concept that encapsulates different forms of violence which aim to attain political ends through violent acts (Wilkinson, 1986). The type of political violence considered in this thesis is commonly denominated terrorism. However, the use of the term terrorism assumes ‘pejorative connotations’, is ‘promiscuously overused’ (Jackson et al., 2011, p.108), and is ‘too plagued by conceptual stretching to be kept as a social science concept’ (della Porta, 2013, p.7). Similarly, the very use of the term terrorist has become ‘a delegitimising concept’, contributing to the illegitimacy of claims made by individuals

engaged in political violence (Herring, 2008, p.18), and limiting the scope of interrogation in regard to 'the actions and motives of those who use violence' (Mac Ginty, 2013, p.217). In this vein, in this study preference is given to expressions such as political violence and political violent militant/activist, rather than to the terms terrorism and terrorist, respectively. This preference does not invalidate the consideration of some invaluable research that has been conducted under the term terrorism, and encourages prejudice-free conversations with the actors of politically motivated violence.

This research is clearly steered by two paradigmatic lenses: critical theory and narrative inquiry. On the one hand, critical theory, as opposed to traditional theory, allows me to question the established knowledge about the social phenomenon under study and how such knowledge was generated (Cox, 1986, p.208). It allows me to 'isolate and critique those rationalizations of society which are advanced as self-evident truths, but which may be ideological mystifications' (Hoffman, 1987, p.236). On the other hand, narrative inquiry focus on the storied nature of human conduct (Sarbin, 1986), considering that 'social reality is primarily a narrative reality' (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p.211). According to Molly Andrews (2007), the way individuals present themselves through the stories they tell encompasses their past, their present and their imagined future, as well as the audience they are talking to and the narratives they constructed over the years. This author goes even further and adds that personal narratives do not only talk about the individual, 'but provide a small window into the engines of history and historical change, as we both shape and are shaped by the events of our day' (Andrews, 2007, p.51). Therefore, at the heart of life stories it is possible to find the intersection between historical context and personal circumstances, which shed light on how and why certain events take place and why individuals behave in certain ways (Andrews, 1991, 1997). The combination of these paradigmatic lenses aims to bring the historical, social, political, cultural and human contextual angles back to the political violence arena, avoiding the usual 'homogenization and trivialization of vastly different social realities under the buzzword terrorism' (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996, p.23). Consequently, as opposed to mainstream studies, this study looks at political violence 'as a symptom of a dysfunctional social order' rather than 'as a symptom of a dysfunction in the social order' (Toros, 2012, p.21), aiming to understand the role played by violence within the social reality through the perspectives and experiences of its first-hand agents. Thus, this thesis focuses on the life stories of twenty-eight former political violent

militants, who were part of six different armed organisations that acted in three different past moments of time in Portugal.

Therefore, this research gives priority to primary data gathered through face-to-face interviews, in a field lead by secondary data analysis and theoretical projects, and in a society where people often think that it is not worthy to talk with 'terrorists'. As Andrew Silke (2001, p.12) noted, the field survived until the moment 'on a diet of fast-food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and nutritionally dubious'. In addition, this research assigns relevance to contextual variables, including interpersonal and gender dynamics, acknowledges that the nature of the research process has different ideological, political and ethical layers, and that there is not an ultimate truth about political violence. However, when scholarly standards and procedures are applied some relatively secure knowledge claims can be made, always recognizing and reflecting on the researcher's fingerprints along the research project and the social, political and contextual factors that frame it. Finally, despite the small contribution of this research, it is committed to wave the flag that 'the point of knowledge is not just to understand the world, but to change it for the better' (Jackson, et. al, 2011, p.31).

Overview of the Thesis

This thesis unfolds as follows. Part one (chapters two to four) introduces and contextualises the research, and describes how it was conducted. In **Chapter two** I present a brief historical contextualisation of the armed organisations under analysis, in order to familiarise the reader with the Portuguese reality of the time, with the main characteristics of each organisation and with the debates around them. **Chapter three** engages with the relevant literatures in the field of political violence, exploring its meanings put forward over time, the drivers of individual activism, the actors involved in politically motivated violence and the theoretical perspectives that frame the present analysis. **Chapter four** outlines the methodological and paradigmatic underpinnings that guided the present research, alongside the methods of data collection, analysis and representation.

Part two (chapters five to seven) corresponds to the main body of empirical findings that constitutes this dissertation. In **Chapter five** I address the processes of engagement with a

political violent organisation. In this chapter I aim to explore the origins of personal political awareness, which are closely linked to different socialization agents, such as family members, and to tackle the dynamics of commitment to an armed organisation, which in many cases meant a total break in the militant's life course. **Chapter six** travels through the individual experiences lived within a political violent organisation, discussing the dynamics of clandestinity, including the process of going underground, the challenges of the underground life and the gender dynamics among clandestine militants. This chapter also addresses the use of violence for political means, particularly in relation to the perspectives, personal experiences and emotions that surrounded the commission of political violent acts. **Chapter seven** focuses on the influencing factors, reasons, incentives and barriers presented by those engaged in political violence when ending their commitment to the organisation. In this chapter I also explore how former militants re-work their pasts in the present, reflecting on their memories, on the moments and events that marked their lives, and on who they became.

Part three is composed of a sole chapter, **Chapter eight**, that encapsulates the conclusions from the research and considers their significance to knowledge. The empirical, theoretical and methodological implications of the research are equally highlighted and reflected upon.

Researcher's Background and Position

My PhD journey was, among other things, a reflective journey. At uncountable moments, I benefited greatly from stopping and thinking about my experiences in relation to the micro, meso and macro social realities, both personal and collective, that surrounded me. This practice helped ease the concern of balancing the inevitable unequal power relationships between researcher and researched, particularly concerning the need to be faithful to the meanings my interviewees attached to their experiences, and examining my personal influence on the research process from beginning to end. As a researcher I do not subscribe to the naïve realist view of qualitative research where the researcher can simply 'give voice' to the participants (see Fine, 2002), because over the whole research process I can identify my fingerprints under the form of theoretical, paradigmatic and methodological choices, which will be outlined in the following chapters. However, such fingerprints were left behind as a result of informed and thought through choices, not as a result of bias, partisanship or subjectivity, which, according

to Sluka (1989), are likely accusations when one chooses to study highly political and controversial subjects. In light of these reflections, I commit myself to representing a (possible) voice in relation to my interviewees' stories (which is further explored in chapter four), and I also choose to present myself upfront to the reader, providing insight into my personal motivations and stories concerning the research topic under analysis.

Thus, my subject position as a researcher can be summarised as follows. I was born in Portugal in 1987 to a middle-class family. My grandparents from both sides leaned towards the dictatorial regime of their time and were fervent Catholics. My paternal grandparents have lived in Portugal their whole lives, though my maternal grandparents in 1950 moved to Angola, which at the time was a Portuguese colony, and lived there until 1975. Such a move from the metropolis to the colonies was not unusual in those days and was motivated by the desire of having a better life, particularly at the economic level, which was generally achieved. However, with the Revolution of April 25th (1974) also came the independence of the colonies and a subsequent civil war in Angola, which forced my family to return to a very rural, impoverished and conservative country (which was a result of more than forty years of a dictatorship), bringing little more than the clothes on their backs. As my mother was only thirteen at this point, such a difficult move did not influence her as it influenced her older siblings, who, like many others in similar circumstances, attributed their misfortune to the Revolution, causing them to keep supporting rather rightist political parties. For my father (and my mother in her subsequent teenage years in Portugal), the left-wing promises and ideals brought by the Revolution opened up the possibility of living in a free and just society, which engulfed a whole young generation. As will be explored in the following chapter, such promises and ideals were only partly accomplished, though they left behind a trail of politicized individuals who opted for one of three pathways: 1) go on with their lives without being involved in formal politics; 2) join the legal political system; or 3) engage in armed struggle. My parents opted for pathway number one, however at home the dictatorship was always portrayed as something very bad and wrong, and the values of the Revolution, the establishment of democracy, as something very good and right. In this context, I grew up listening to the resistance singers who during the dictatorship lived in exile and every year we used to attend the celebrations of the date of the Revolution organized by my parents' leftist friends, where I met men who had lost body parts in the Colonial War, and people who had been tortured by the political police.

The first time I clearly remember coming across political violence in Portugal was during my high school years in long debates with some colleagues, who could not stop rejoicing in the fact that the last FP-25 militant had come out of jail[1]. At the time I found my colleagues' excitement outrageous (how could someone celebrate the release of a 'terrorist'?), but attributed it to their radical left views and party affiliation[2]. Additionally, in my last high school year one of the theatre projects I was involved in was invited to perform at the *Festival do Avante*, the annual Portuguese Communist Party Festival. It was a great experience, which was totally spoiled by the subsequent national scandal related to the fact that a FARC[3] delegation had also taken part on that year's event. Once again I felt outraged towards the festival organizers, in particular, and the PCP, in general (how could they support 'terrorists' and put me in a position of uninformed support?) which resulted in my decision to never, ever return to *Festival do Avante* (as if they would care!). These two short stories represent my early position in regard to political violence, which was strong, intransigent and linear – violence is violence, no matter what, and I don't agree with it. This position was likely influenced by the fact that a few years earlier, when I was fourteen, I sat at a friend's house and watched the two airplanes suddenly crashing into the Twin Towers in Manhattan, which deeply horrified me and shaped my perceptions towards 'terrorism'.

However, there was also a background noise that over time became louder and rattled my obstinacy, rendering myself available to start trailing my psycho-sociological curiosity around political violent activists through the research conducted in the context of my Master's degree. What I mean by background noise is related to having dug up a little family secret that turned my world upside down. Before I was born a FP-25 militant sought hiding in my hometown and stayed at my parents' house for a while. I cannot exactly remember how I discovered this story or how I convinced my mother to repeatedly tell it, against her will and shame. At the time she had no idea who this man was, because the story they told her was that he had been in the

[1] As it will be pointed out in the following chapter FP-25 was the last armed organisation in the Portuguese context.
[2] They belonged to *Bloco de Esquerda* [Left Bloc], a party that occupies the extreme-left position in the Portuguese political scenario, and that accommodated a few former violent activists over the years.
[3] *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* [The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia].

Colonial War, which brought him some psychological issues and, additionally, his wife had just left him, so he was going through a very rough period and needed somewhere to stay. However, after a while my mother started suspecting that there was something else that my father and their friends were not telling her and finally she was told the truth. In this story what always struck me the most was the way my mother talked about this man. She remembered him with affection, as a friend, and he came across to me as very nice. In some way I was never able to picture this person in my mind as a 'terrorist', at least not according to the traditional views and narratives around terrorists that populate the post 9/11 imagination.

With all this in mind, have I always wanted to study political violence? No! It was only when I came to my MA in Justice Psychology in Portugal in 2009 that I discovered that in fact there was a gap in knowledge in this area. Such a discovery was made through the hand of Professor Carla Machado, who during a lecture pointed out that, although around the world various researchers were looking into terrorism and political violence, in Portugal the subject was still buried. However, she recognised that such a research would not be easy to conduct, regarding particularly the hard to reach group of participants in question. At the end of the lecture I decided to be the one to fill the gap with my MA dissertation. It was not easy to convince Professor Carla Machado (who I wanted for my supervisor) that I could do it, but she posed a challenge: if I could find the participants she would supervise me. The details regarding this process can be found in my MA dissertation (da Silva, 2010), which was successfully concluded, though I was not yet satisfied. I needed more time, more data and a more comprehensive approach, so a PhD was the route for me. However, life is not always linear and uncomplicated and after a long and courageous fight against cancer Professor Carla Machado passed away. At this point, I lost my supervisor, my mentor, my academic reference and even my place at the University, but above all the world lost a great person. It was a very sad period. However, I knew she would want me to go on, particularly because she left things lined up with an academic here in the UK who she knew would take me on – and that is how I ended up in a PhD programme at the University of Birmingham. Yet again life is complex, my funding did not come straight away, I had to work quite a lot around the PhD, and my supervisors had their own issues, which got to the point of my lead supervisor (the one I came for) leaving the University. Unfortunately, the new supervision arrangement did not work and at the end of my third year I found myself changing supervisors. Despite being a very hard decision, it was

undoubtedly the right decision, which greatly contributed to the smooth conclusion of my doctoral work.

Thus, through this abbreviated confessional tale, I aim to introduce a slice of the story of the researcher behind the research, which has been constructed over time with the cultural bricks at hand, influencing my awareness and research interest on the lives of former political violent activists in Portugal, and how such a research project unfolded. It is true that I do not share the timing of birth of my interviewees and all the contextual aspects relate to it, but our stories do share at least a partial 'cultural locus', which serves as a reference to dive in their lives (Denzin, 1989, p.73).

Following this brief introduction that delineated the dissertation subject, set the scene, gave an overview of the thesis, and situated myself in the research context, I now present my PhD thesis.

PART I

CHAPTER TWO

ARMED STRUGGLE IN PORTUGAL: A BRIEF CONTEXTUALIZATION

Overview

This chapter provides the historical framework for three different periods of politically motivated violence conducted by non-state actors in Portugal. I begin by sketching the overall historical and political backgrounds that gave origin to the rise of political violent organisations in Portugal in different moments of time. I then zoom in to explore in detail the complexities of each period and the characteristics of each organisation under analysis. The chapter is closed by a reflection on the representation of the armed struggle in the Portuguese macro political narratives, inspired by broader discussions regarding post-dictatorship memory politics in this country.

Portuguese Armed Organisations in Context


The exercise of context reconstruction and exploration is greatly important for the understanding of how and why political violent organisations came into existence in Portugal (in different periods of time and in different political and social conditions), and how violence was legitimised by some and demonised by others. The present study is solely focused on political violence committed by non-state actors, however, both in this chapter and throughout the accounts provided by the interviewees in chapters five through seven, it will be also possible to access state violence, particularly in the period of *Estado Novo* (New State) (1926-1974). This period is also known as *Salazarismo* after the instigator then ruler (1932-1968) António de Oliveira Salazar. *Salazarismo* represented the embodiment of power and a strong state organized around a strong figure – Salazar was the answer to the claims of the reactionary factions of the bourgeoisie, of a good part of the Catholic Church, and of some intellectuals during the First Republic for a strong and competent government, which could bring an end to

the existing chaos[4] (Amaro, 1982). In this context, Salazar started his journey to leadership by assigning financial balance to the country as minister of finance, next accepted in 1932 to head up the government, and in 1933 presented a new Political Constitution for Portugal that gave birth to *Estado Novo* (designation given by himself to the regime he intended to rule). At that time Salazar emerged as the 'saviour of the homeland', which was submersed in financial, political, social and cultural turmoil, issues that he was ready to resolve (Amaro, 1982, p.1007).

Throughout this chapter it will be possible to identify the historical and political contexts in which six different violent organisations emerged in Portugal over a period of almost three decades (1962-1987). In a first wave (1962-1974), in a very clear and direct way *Estado Novo* determined the emergence of LUAR (League of Unity and Armed Revolution), ARA (Revolutionary Armed Action) and BR (Revolutionary Brigades) – the three revolutionary organisations that fought against the regime and its policies, predominantly the ones related to imperial, colonial and capitalist standpoints. These organisations resorted to violence against a regime that in their eyes was extremely violent and repressive and that could not be defeated by pacifist means, which had been tried for years without success and at a higher personal cost (e.g. arrests, torture, forced labour) (Antunes, 1974; Narciso, 2000; Mortágua, 2013; Pimentel, 2014). In a second wave (1975-1976), the rise of the reactionary organisations ELP (Portuguese Liberation Army) and MDLP (Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal) was triggered by fear of a possible communist occupation following the Revolution and by disagreement with the decisions taken by the provisional government (e.g. decolonisation). These organisations were essentially composed by right-wing military personnel, who in the majority of cases leaned towards the deposed regime. In a third wave (1980-1987), the revolutionary organisation FP-25 (Popular Forces of the 25th April) believed that the ideals defended by the Revolution were fading away, giving place to the return of the unjust capitalist society of the past. This was a situation that in their perspective only a socialist revolution could solve. The following figure (Figure 1) provides a timeline that depicts both the main historical events that set the context for the rise of armed organisations in Portugal, and the period of action and characterization of these same organisations.

[4] Sectors of society strongly inspired by the existent European examples, particularly the Italian with Mussolini and the Spanish with Primo de Rivera, favourable to a 'authoritarian solution' (Amaro, 1982, p.1006).

Figure 1: Timeline



In addition, Table 1 sets the political context behind the activity of each armed organisation under analysis, as well as their characteristics, which will be explored in more detail below. It is important to recognise explicitly here that the literature available on the action of armed organisations in Portugal is very scarce, and does not allow an even exploration and presentation of information, as what is available for some organisations (e.g. details about the armed actions carried out) is not available for others.

Table 1: Portuguese Armed Organisations in Context

Estado Novo (1926-1974)			
Organization	**ARA**	**LUAR**	**BR**
Period of action*	1964-1972	1967-1970	1970-1974
Government	Estado Novo	Estado Novo	Estado Novo
Ideology	Armed arm of PCP	• Plural lefts • Anti-Salazarism	• Rupture with PCP • Anti-Stalinism • Marxism-Leninism • Dialectical materialism
Main goals	• Overthrow the regime • End colonialism	Overthrow the regime	• Overthrow the regime • End colonialism
Target(s)	• Political and military structures • No human lives	• Political and military structures • No human lives	• Political and military structures • No human lives
Type of actions	• Explosives	• Explosives • Bank robbery • Attempt to take control of a city	• Petards • Explosives • Leaflets distribution • Bank robbery • Support to the colonial war
Revolution (25th April 1974)			
Organization	**ELP**	**MDLP**	**FP-25**
Period of action*	1975-1976	1975-1976	1980-1987
Government	Provisional Government	Provisional Government	• Coalition PSD, CDS, PPM (1980-1983) • Coalition PS and PSD (1983-1985) • PSD (1985-1995)
Ideology	• Connected to the Liberal Party • Anti-communism	• Connected to the Progress Party • Anti-communism	• Connected to the FUP • Marxist-Leninist • Small group of anarchists within the organization • Marxism-Leninism • Dialectical materialism
Main goals	• Stop communist invasion • Stop decolonisation	• Stop communist invasion • Decolonise differently (commonwealth type of thing)	• Stop capitalism • Fight injustice in the workplace • Attain socialism
Target(s)	• Communist headquarters • Communists	• Communist headquarters • Communists	• Business owners/managers • Representatives of 'fascism'
Type of actions	• Explosives	• Explosives	• Explosives • Shooting at close range • Bank robbery

*According to the literature

In the Beginning Was Salazar…

Estado Novo is a period of Portuguese history that has its origins in the military coup of 28th May 1926. This military coup ended the First Republic[5] and established a military dictatorship in Portugal, which at first did not have a well-defined ideology, but did have a deep scepticism regarding the effectiveness of parliamentary democracy (Braga da Cruz, 1988). The first months of the military dictatorship established which faction of the movement that deposed the First Republic would be in power – the liberal-republicans or the conservatives – a fight won by the conservatives on July 9th 1926 (Mattoso, 1994). However, even within the conservatives there were two different groups: one that advocated conservative republicanism and another that supported Salazar (Pinto, 2010). The first group considered the military dictatorship as a needed, but transitory regime, whose role would end when order was restored and a Constitutional regime secured (Rosas, 1992). However, this group presented certain characteristics that dictated its failure, such as the absence of a well-defined strategy of government, a weak internal cohesion and a weak leadership, resulting in the inability to avoid the profound aggravation of the financial and economic crisis (Mattoso, 1994). In this context, all attentions and hopes turned to Salazar, an important figure from the Catholic Centre, who seemed to hold the key for the country's financial problems[6] and at the same time did not appear as a political threat, not exhibiting any political affiliation and even showing reticence in accepting a political position (Mattoso, 1994). Thus, on 18th April 1928 Salazar assumed the Ministry of Finance for the second time[7], which made him a very powerful minister in the difficult financial conjuncture that Portugal was going through (Pinto, 2010). Salazar did not, however, only have a financial solution for the country, which assigned balance to the its


[5] The revolution of 5th October 1910 marks the end of the Constitutional Monarchy in Portugal (1820-1910) and the beginning of the First Republic. This political period was always followed by great difficulties of consolidation, which were evident through the existence of deep political, economic and social crisis, manifested, for instance, in the existence of successive governments, in the assassination of the republic president Sidónio Pais, in 1918, and in the ten coup attempts between 1921 and 1926 (Saraiva, 1993; Mattoso, 1994).

[6] Salazar was very critical in relation to the financial policies put into place by the July 9th government headed by Óscar Carmona in the presidency, and by Sinel de Cordes in the Finance Ministry, which took shape through various newspaper publications, where he started building his image as a very serious and competent man (Pinto, 2010).

[7] The first time was in the first year of the military dictatorship and only lasted a few days (3rd – 19th July 1926), because the government he was part of was quickly replaced.

economy and kept him in the same position through several different governments (Mattoso, 1994), he also had a political programme in mind – the foundation of a new political, economic and social order, based on an authoritarian state (Oliveira, 1990). Thus Salazar's political plans were strengthened in his first years in office, culminating in the promulgation of a new Constitution, as represented in the following chronological diagram.

Figure 2: Salazar's Consolidation in Office



In order to accomplish his mission, Salazar based the regime on 'a mythical idea of nation and national interest' (Rosas, 2001, p.1032), and aimed, similarly to fascist regimes in Europe, to create a new type of Portuguese people, regenerated by the regime's ideology (Cabrera, 2014). Such an 'ideological totalizing project' had its apogee in the decades of the 1930s and 1940s


and defined an aggressive propaganda discourse that claimed for a 'new order', which would end the liberal century and start the re-education of the Portuguese people in the context of a regenerated nation (Rosas, 2001, p.1033). With this scenario in mind the Portuguese historian and politician Fernando Rosas (2001) highlighted the existence of seven myths on *Estado Novo*'s discourse, which were smartly connected, by the regime, to idyllic symbols of the Portuguese identity, and that presupposed a strong and invasive action by the State. Thus, these myths are illustrated in figure 3 (developed from Rosas, 2001) in order to highlight the penetration of the regime in all areas of the Portuguese society of the time, as well as to frame the development of an illegal and persecuted political opposition and of clandestine armed organisations, which did not share the same views and strongly opposed such an organisation of society.

These values and principles of *Estado Novo* embodied in myths were summarised by Salazar himself in a speech delivered in 1936, upon the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the military coup. This was a speech that clearly infantilized the Portuguese people and neutralized the freedom of thought, speech, organisation and emancipation of the Portuguese people, as it is possible to see in the following excerpt:

> "To the souls torn by doubt and negativity of the present century we look for restoring the comfort of the great certainties. We do not discuss God and the Virtue. We do not discuss the Nation and its History. We do not discuss Authority and its Prestige. We do not discuss Family and its Moral. We do not discuss the glory of work and its duty." (Salazar, 1936, p.130, translation mine)

In order to preserve the referred myths and to exert its authority as wide as possible, *Estado Novo* fashioned and implemented different societal structures, which functioned as the 'keepers of order'. Among those, three were central to trigger the activity of armed organisations in Portugal: 1) the absence of political freedom, represented by the existence of a single party – the National Union; 2) the absence of freedom of expression, represented by the censorship; and 3) the existence of a political police, responsible for the institutionalization of violence and for the forced labour camp Penal Colony of Cape Verde.

Figure 3: The Seven Myths of *Estado Novo*'s Discourse



Thus, *Estado Novo* assumed anti-liberal, anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary positions, consequently denying public qualities such as individual freedom and popular sovereignty (Pinto and Rosas, 2009). In its perspective the State existed as a greater, organic institution and not as the sum of its nationals. This perspective was inevitably materialized in two instances: on the one hand, State interests were above individual rights, and on the other hand different political parties were deemed disruptive to the unity of the nation, since they simply represented individual ideas and interests (Pinto and Rosas, 2009). Therefore, the only allowed movement was the National Union, which functioned as a single party; and the Political Constitution of 1933 attributed to the President of the Council (Salazar from 1933 until 1968, replaced by Marcelo Caetano from 1969 to 1974) vast powers, including legislating through decree-laws, proposing the appointment and removal of members of the Government and ratifying the acts of the President of the Republic (Pinto and Rosas, 2009).

In order to control and restrict public opinion and any debates or ideas against the regime, *Estado Novo* implemented mass media censorship, which operated as a 'political tool' (Gama, 2008, p.225). Censorship worked as a State Secretariat, organized in different sectors and in control of all press and cultural production originated both in Portugal and abroad with access to the Portuguese population (Cabrera, 2014). From books to magazines, radio broadcasts, cinema, theatre and lyrics, anything that could be seen as endangering State interests would have to go through the *blue pencil*[8]. For instance, in relation to books certain 'criteria' were created in order to decide on their 'prohibition and seizure' (Fonseca, 2005, p.22). These criteria took the format of, for example, forbidden themes, such as: political contestation, political prisoners, colonies and civil war, agrarian reform, history contrary to the official view of the regime, religion, socialist ideology, poverty, living conditions of peasants and workers, social inequalities, morals and customs (e.g. women in society, eroticism, sexuality) (Fonseca, 2005). Thematic prohibition was also extended to the press and, in fact, to life in general. Through censorship a 'silence rule' was imposed, which affected not only the mass media, but also the quotidian, originating a 'self-censorship' and an 'inner repression' that gave birth to fear – 'fear of imprisonment, fear of aggression, fear of losing a job, fear of causing harm to the family,

[8] Written and visual materials crossed in blue are a very emblematic image of the censorship conducted by *Estado Novo* in Portugal, being at the origin of the expression *blue pencil*.

fear of being frequently bothered by anonymous phone calls, finally, fear of persecution' (Gama, 2008, p.225).

To suppress political opposition and those who criticize the regime a political police was established, which represented an instrument of persecution, repression, torture, and sometimes death to opponents of the regime (Rosas, 1992; Pimentel, 2007). The political police went through four different phases from its creation in 1933 until its extinction in 1974, which included denomination changes[9] and regulation of its activities[10] (Pimentel, 2011a). However, such wanderings never produced a fundamental change in its characteristics or aims, which were: 1) the affirmation of authority; 2) a corrective nature; and 3) 'neutralization' (Pimentel, 2011a, p.146). The first aim was directed at the general population, in order to dissuade and intimidate anyone planning to 'meddle in politics'[11]; the second aim was targeted at particular individuals who got involved in oppositional political activities and needed a lesson to not relapse; and, finally, the third aim was intended to withdraw people involved with subversive parties and organisations from the public space (particularly communist militants and members of far-left and armed organisations), through imprisonment and security measures (Pimentel, 2011a). The pattern of action of the political police involved detention, isolation of the detainee from any contact with family members or lawyers, and a period of horrific physical and psychological torture. The aim was to acquire information (e.g. confessions of political affiliations and oppositional activities, personal or regarding others) and to create and spread fear across society through the destruction of particular individuals' lives, who then served as examples for others (see more in Albuquerque, 1987; Pimentel, 2007; Cardina, 2010). When asked about this institutionalized violence and the maltreatment of prisoners, Salazar, in 1932, considered that such actions were justified by the nature of the prisoners ('terrible bombers') and by the intention of protecting the vulnerable citizens ('children and helpless people'):

[9] Started as Police of Vigilance and Defence of the State (PVDE), changed to International Police of Defence of the State (PIDE) in 1945, and ended as General Directorate of Security (DGS) from 1969.

[10] For example, in the first phase the political police could detain people without time limits, which changed from the second phase onwards. However, the political police always had vast functions and powers.

[11] Popular expression often used in this context, referring to people who opposed the regime and tried to act accordingly. Two of the participants in this study also refer to and reflect on this expression.

> I wish to inform you that it had been concluded that the mistreated detainees were always, or almost always, terrible bombers who refused to confess, despite all the skills of the police, where they had hidden their criminal and deadly weapons. Only after employing such violent means are they able to tell the truth. And I ask myself, continuing to repress such abuses, if the lives of some children and helpless people aren't well worth it and do not widely justify half a dozen shoves, at the right time, to these sinister creatures. (in Ferro, 1982, p.54, translation mine)

Another instrument used by the political police and at the service of *Estado Novo* was the Penal Colony of Cape Verde, commonly known by Tarrafal Camp or, simply, Tarrafal. This penal colony was created in 1936 under the tutelage of the political police and was intended for 'political and social detainees' (Barreto, 2000, p.486). Tarrafal is often compared to Nazi concentration camps, in the sense that it was a place where 'preventively' detained individuals were sent with no idea about the date of their trial or if they would ever be trialled (Barreto, 2000). In this sense, Cândido de Oliveira (1974), a Tarrafal former detainee, wrote that Tarrafal was 'a reduced Dachau'. Other individuals also identify themselves with the title given by Pedro Soares to his book in 1974 – 'Tarrafal, camp of slow death" – because in Tarrafal 10% of the prisoners died between 1936 and 1954 (32 out of 333). Thus, Tarrafal is considered the 'quintessence of state terrorism under Salazar', the place where people were sent to die in a country that forbade the death penalty (Barreto, 2000, p.487). The first director of Tarrafal, Manuel dos Reis, when arriving at the camp addressed the detainees with the following words: 'Here you do not have rights, you only have duties. And make no mistake – the one who enters that gate will die' (Pimentel, 2009). In Tarrafal, detainees were not summarily executed, but they were sentenced to death in a much more subtle way through the lack of sanitation and adequate hygiene conditions, malnutrition, virtual non-existence of medicines, refusal of medical assistance, deliberated exposure of detainees to the malaria mosquito (e.g. one of the punishments in the camp was the withdrawal of the mosquito net and of quinine, the medicine that fights malaria), forced labour, beatings and the *frigideira* (the frying pan) (Barreto, 2000). The *frigideira* deserves particular attention as an instrument of torture, corresponding to a small concrete building (five to six meters long by three wide), constructed on an isolated area, without any protection from the sun, without windows and with only two iron doors, one for

each room that composed the structure. These rooms were intended for the isolation of the detainees, who could be kept there one to two weeks in a group of up to twelve men (see Oliveira, 1987).

Estado Novo also had indoctrination structures, such as the Secretariat of National Propaganda, the Portuguese Legion, the Portuguese Youth, the National Federation for Joy at Work, which were used as instruments of advertising and defence of the regime, framing each person in a particular structure and enabling the control of the population (Cabrera, 2014). However, the most decisive factors for the regime's durability were the censorship and the political police, in their jobs of active repression and intimidation, and the cohesion of the army in moments of crisis (Pimentel, 2011a).

Finally, it is also important to highlight that in the popular discourse (and in the words of some of the individuals interviewed in the context of this study), *Estado Novo* is often referred to as fascism. This label does not always receive support in academic circles, because although it is considered to have been an authoritarian regime, *Estado Novo* did not portray all characteristics of an ideal type of fascism (Pinto, 2010)[12]. This argument was countered by Enzo Collotti (1989), who considered that the restriction of the liberty of expression, the repression of the political opposition, the violence against civilians perpetrated by the political police, the corporativism that eradicated the labour movement's autonomy, and the moralizing nature of the state in its intents to control every soul are enough to classify this Portuguese regime as fascism.

The Opposition to *Estado Novo*

The implementation of Salazar's political intents resulted in a strong wave of opposition throughout the year of 1931, including revolts in Madeira, Azores and Guinea led by the

[12] This exclusion is related to the fact that a fascist dynamic, where a single party mobilizes the masses and seizes power, was not at the origin of *Estado Novo*. In reality, *Estado Novo* was originated by one individual who took control of the government and transformed a military dictatorship into a dictatorial regime (Nolte, 1966).

Reviralho[13], student demonstrations against the dictatorship in Lisbon and Oporto, and the action of the liberal conservatives that still believed in constitutional normalization through elections (Pimentel, 2014). However, the Portuguese opposition during *Estado Novo* was always permeated with various difficulties, especially until the 1940s, years in which the regime was being consolidated, the repression strengthened and organized, the opposition dispersed and fascism expanded in Europe (Raby, 1988). However, during World War II and in its aftermath the increasing international challenge to authoritarian regimes had consequences for the opposition in Portugal – in 1941, the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was able to set up a clandestine structure and a strategy of infiltration in the official trade unions. Across the 1940s and 1950s, different opposition movements emerged in Portugal, such as the Anti-Fascist National Unity Movement (MUNAF); Salazar himself resolved to paint a slightly different portrayal of Portugal in order to disguise the authoritarian characteristics of his regime, and promoted the first elections since his arrival to power (Silva, 2000). In this context, in 1945, appeared the first legal opposition organisation, the Democratic Unity Movement (MUD). However, MUD's action was completely restrained by the regime, which prompted its abstention in consecutive electoral activities in order to discredit and denounce the totalitarian nature of *Estado Novo* (Silva, 2000). In 1948, the MUD was made illegal and the world events, characterized by the cold war and western anti-Communism, surpassed the unity against fascism and contributed, once again, to the fragmentation of the Portuguese opposition (Silva, 2000). However, in 1949 the Democratic National Movement (MND) was established amongst the exiled in Brazil and operated as the systematic critical voice against the regime, particularly raising lack of freedoms, human rights violations and war crimes being committed in Africa, among other issues (Silva, 2000). The exiled in South America (particularly in Venezuela and Brazil) instigated some very important actions against *Estado Novo*, such as the assault on the Portuguese ocean liner 'Santa Maria' in 1961, the assault on the military quarter of Beja in 1962 and, in the same year, the deviation of the TAP aircraft responsible for the connection Casablanca-Lisbon, which flew at low altitude over Lisbon and other cities, dropping propaganda leaflets denouncing the atrocities of the regime (Santos, 2011). There are a couple of books that tell these 'tales' in the first person and explore interesting facts and details, such

[13] Democratic and liberal republican opposition that from the start opposed the dictatorship established in Portugal on 28th May 1926, and tried several times to restore the regime initiated on 5th October 1910.

as *Andanças para a liberdade I* and *II* (Walks towards freedom I and II) (2009 and 2013 respectively) written by Camilo Mortágua, who was himself part of the exiled opposition in South America, took part in the assault of the ship *Santa Maria* and in the deviation of the TAP aircraft, and was co-founder of LUAR, one of the armed organisations explored below.


The 1960s carried a new wave of worldwide uprisings (represented in figure 4 below) that in Portugal met the beginning of the Colonial War in Africa in 1961, growth of internal instability with the replacement of Salazar by Marcelo Caetano in 1969, and increasing awareness about revolutionary movements around the world (Leitão and Pina, 1975). These circumstances strongly influenced and intensified the political opposition in Portugal, exacerbating anti-fascist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist positions and originating a movement towards the release of people from an oppressive regime (Leitão and Pina, 1975). At that time, the perception of armed struggle as a way out of an entrenched situation started emerging as a possibility, gaining supporters and replacing the traditional reformist discourse[14] (Bebiano, 2006a). Thus, in this setting, three of the organisations under analysis in the present thesis – LUAR, ARA and BR – took up arms and fought *Estado Novo* through political violent means.

LUAR: League of Unity and Armed Revolution

It is commonly considered that LUAR's first public manifestation happened in 1967, consisting of a bank robbery in the city of Figueira da Foz (Martins and Loureiro, 1980); though, at this point in time, LUAR was not yet LUAR (Santos, 2011). The group of individuals that conducted the assault – Palma Inácio, Camilo Mortágua, António Barracosa, Carlos Biló and Luis Benvindo – were indeed the same that constituted LUAR's first core (with the exception of Carlos Biló and the addition of some other names – see Pimentel (2011b, p.12), but at that moment were simply a group of individuals exiled in France (some of them having been previously exiled in South America), trying to access funds to start a political violent organisation to fight *Estado Novo* (Santos, 2011). As Mortágua (2013, p.184) described: 'what they called called LUAR was born from the 'violent birth' in Figueira da Foz, but had been

[14] The unforeseen defeat of General Humberto Delgado in the electoral process of 1958 was not accepted as free or credible, causing the opposition to start questioning the heretofore defended reformist measures.

Figure 4: Worldwide Contestation in the 1960's




germinating from seeds originated on the other side of the Atlantic'. However, the unexpected action referred to above became extremely well known, both in Portugal and abroad, being noticed by newspapers such as *Le Monde*, and receiving very positive popular reactions, highlighting the fact that for the first time a political group not originated in the Communist Party was able to organize and carry out an action of considerable visibility and impact (Oliveira, 1993). Nonetheless, not everyone in the Portuguese opposition rejoiced with the creation of LUAR. The Central Committee of the PCP in 1968, for instance, criticized 'initiatives to precipitate armed action without having created the conditions for the development of the insurrectional process' (quoted in Pimentel, 2011b, p.11). A different reading on this situation might be the fact that LUAR was 'the only organisation that was not originated by PCP, or by the politicized intellectual bourgeoisie' (Santos, 2011, p.24), but was the result of the convergence of various individuals opposed to *Estado Novo* (Martins and Loureiro, 1980). LUAR premiered the insurrectional path in Portugal, which through a

revolutionary army aimed to trigger an armed insurrection, a departure from the traditional 'mass struggle', preferred by the traditional opposition (Martins and Loureiro, 1980). In other words, they needed to transform the pacifist socialism into an armed revolution, in order to prove the practicability of the revolutionary means and the fallibility of the reformist and convenience theories, which sought to marginalize violent actions (Leitão and Pina, 1975). Mortágua (2013), one of the founders of LUAR, considered that at the origin of LUAR were frustrated people, in the sense that the product of their political fight was imprisonment. These then were people who considered that pacifism was not enough to overthrow the regime. In addition, Palma Inácio, also a founder of LUAR, (interviewed by unknown author, 1974) assumed that there was a popular disbelief that the regime could fall through elections. This disbelief was created by the frustrated electoral process at the time of Delgado's defeat in 1958, which led LUAR's militants to trust that they could only overthrow violence with violence (which would be always committed against the structures of the state and never against human targets).

It is also important to highlight LUAR's emphasis on the charismatic figure of Hermínio da Palma Inácio (Bebiano, 2006). This leader's movements seemed to dictate the rhythm of the organisation – for instance, Camilo Mortágua reports that he moved to Paris first and, while waiting for Palma Inácio, he accomplished various preparation tasks, but the action itself only started when Palma Inácio arrived (Mortágua, 2013). Palma Inácio was also arrested a few times during his participation in LUAR, which influenced the actions perpetrated by the organisation, its timings and, particularly, the departure and arrival of new members, giving origin to the existence of different generations of members within LUAR (Santos, 2011). Thus, LUAR was an organisation that served as an umbrella to different individuals with diverse political backgrounds to work together against the dictatorial regime in Portugal (Brinca, 2000). In fact, various LUAR militants were mainly anti *Estado Novo* and tended to discuss very little ideology or politics, only making sure that their fight was against the regime, not even flagging the Colonial War issue much (Mortágua, 2013). The only document, 'Political Line', aimed at defining LUAR's positions originated on a retreat of some members of the organisation in the Pyrenees, in 1968. Its statements are represented in the following table (developed from Santos, 2011).

Figure 5: LUAR's Political Line



Yet, LUAR's members had personal views and 'each element recruited in the opposition political milieus brought his own pretensions of making LUAR the 'armed wing' of his own or his group's ideological options' (Mortágua, 2013, p.200). Among these groups the most prominent were the marxist-leninists and the progressive Catholics, previously organized in exile, who saw in LUAR an opportunity to act (Santos, 2011). However, the lack of a well-defined ideology and a strong strategy, for some, and the *Marcelist Spring*[15], for others, led some people away from the armed actions (Santos, 2011; Mortágua, 2013).

Finally, the actions undertaken by LUAR, according to Hipólito dos Santos (2011) are represented in the following table.

[15] The *Marcelist Spring* refers to the period in the beginning of the 70's in which Marcelo Caetano replaced Salazar as head of the government, giving way to a number of different changes and reforms. During that period some people believed that the dictatorial situation in Portugal was changing and that the existence of armed actions could be a barrier. However, those hopes were quickly taken away by a strong wave of repression enacted by the political police.

Table 2: LUAR's Armed Actions

Actions	Date	Goal
Operation Diana	1967	Collection of weapons from the military quarter of Évora
Operation Matias	1968	Take control of the city of Covilhã
Operation Spring	1969	Sabotage of high voltage pillars and the installation of explosives in the American Consulate in Oporto

Not all actions were successful and, in particular, *Operation Matias* resulted on the arrest of several members of the organisation (including Palma Inácio), which was received as a strong blow from which it was difficult to recover (e.g. various people left the organisation). This factor in conjunction with the constant and solid repression from the part of the political police (which imprisoned and tortured numerous LUAR militants, and was even able to infiltrate the organisation, destabilizing its action) explains the comparatively small number of actions by the following organisations (Rosas and Brito, 1996; Santos, 2011).

ARA: Revolutionary Armed Action

ARA, according to Jaime Serra (1999, p.29), one of its members, aimed to engender violent actions against the 'fascist State apparatus and against the Colonial War machine, in order to psychologically weaken and disorient it, thereby stimulating the struggle of the Portuguese people for the overthrow of fascism, and the struggle of colonial people for their liberation.'

As the armed wing of the PCP, ARA constituted a semi-autonomous organisation, following the party's political instructions, but also having its own board, which used to take independent decisions about specific actions (Narciso, 2000). Although the decision to establish ARA had been taken in 1964, its revolutionary activity only began in 1970 (Serra, 1999). The reasons for this delay were related to various factors, such as the need of rigorous and time consuming preparations, the existence of a strong political repression that needed to be foiled, and some uncertainty within PCP, caused by members with divergent views concerning armed struggle (Narciso, 2000). Those divergent views divided people, generally, into two groups: one that


supported armed actions as the only way to overthrow a violent regime, and the other that would prefer the traditional 'mass struggle', in line with Soviet Union directives (Narciso, 2000).

ARA had a Central Command composed of three PCP militants, who lived in the Lisbon area (Serra, 1999). However, various militants, both men and women, contributed to the execution of different actions at diverse levels – technical, financial, logistical and operational (Serra, 1999).

ARA was an extremely closed and careful organisation, due to the strong repression and persecution perpetrated by the political police (Serra, 1999). For instance, all decisions were only discussed and taken by the Central Command, which would then communicate the action points to the people involved in specific actions, following the maxim: 'each person must only know what is needed to the accomplishment of the task' (Serra, 1999, p.35).

ARA was equally rigorous in regard to the principles and rules of operation, which are summarised in the following figure.

Figure 6: ARA's Principles and Rules



In terms of armed actions, ARA ‘aimed preferably at goals related to the support of the fight against the Colonial War, 'saving', for this reason, the repressive apparatus of the fascist regime’ (Serra, 1999). In the same line as LUAR and BR, ARA refused to make human victims, attempting to create circumstances in which such a risk would be reduced (e.g. exploding devices in empty places). As opposed to LUAR and BR, ARA was never part of any bank robbery. ARA’s actions, according to Raimundo Narciso (2000), are displayed in the following table.

Table 3: ARA’s Armed Actions

Actions	Date	Goal
Cunene	25/10/1970	Sabotage of the ship Cunene, in order to stop the transport of troops to the colonial war
Tancos Air Base	8/03/1971	Attack on the Air Base number 3 in Tancos, in order to destroy 16 helicopters and 11 aircraft, which meant 400.000 euros damage for the government
Central of telephones and telecommunications	3/06/1971	Sabotage of high voltage pillars and the installation of explosives in the American Consulate in Oporto
Power Cut in Sacavém and in Belas	3/06/1971	Sabotage of the electrical grid
Stone Quarry Storeroom Assault	3/10/1971	Collection of explosives
NATO Headquarters in Oeiras	30/10/1971	NATO Headquarters in Oeiras were targeted
War Material at Cais da Fundição	20/11/1971	Destruction of military material in a deposit located in Alcântara
Training college of the political police	20/11/1971	Detonation of an explosive device outside the training college of the political police (*Escola Técnica da PIDE*)
American Cultural Centre	20/11/1971	Detonation of an explosive device outside the American Cultural Centre
War Material to Muxima	25/01/1972	Destruction of war material that was destined to be shipped to the colonial war on the ocean liner Muxima
Sabotage of the Primary Electrical Grid	10/08/1972	Sabotage of the primary electrical grid in four different points of the country

Ultimately, ARA decided to suspend its actions in May 1973 (Serra, 1999). At the origin of this decision was the intention to decrease the strong repression directed to the general political anti-dictatorship movement (e.g. progressive Catholics who were organizing peaceful actions against the Colonial War). This was a movement which was gaining ground and whose actions culminated in the revolution of 25th April 1974 (Rosas and Brito, 1996). The revolution and the establishment of democracy allowed ARA to lay down arms, and its members to integrate in the new political life of the country (Narciso, 2000).


BR: Revolutionary Brigades

At the origin of BR in 1970, according to Carlos Antunes (1974), one of its founders, was the political rupture with PCP. A rupture that according to Isabel do Carmo (1974), who co-founded BR with Carlos Antunes, happened due to two needs: the need to break with the impasse aired by the opposition's pacifism, and the need to show people that it was possible to fight the regime – two needs that PCP was not seen doing or supporting (Júnior, 1999). These positions were particularly strengthened after the disillusionment with the electoral campaign and process of 1969, which for a while, as mentioned above, created reformist and electoral illusions (Carmo, 1974), but at the end opted for continuity (Sousa, 2006).

Thus, BR represented a new way of confronting the regime, turning away from PCP's Stalinism and proposing armed action to achieve a socialist revolution, where power would be taken by the proletariat (Antunes, 1974). In this sense, BR always pointed to the need for a revolutionary structure of the proletariat, in which the armed struggle and the mass struggle could converge (Carmo, 1974). The former was not considered more important than the latter, but it was seen as the trigger to a revolutionary organisation of class (Antunes, 1974). Thus, in 1973 the PRP – Proletariat Revolutionary Party – was founded in the underground, composed by militants from different cores of revolutionaries, such as the BR and the Revolutionary Workers Commissions (Carmo, 1974), which were united by anti-fascist, anti-capitalist and anti-reformist perspectives (Goulart, 2002).

BR's fundamental aims expressed in a first communiqué, dated from 1971, and further developed by a sixth communiqué, dated from 6th April 1973, are represented in the following table.

Figure 7: BR's Aims



In terms of armed actions, similarly to ARA, BR mostly attacked the structures that served the Colonial War and refused to target human lives (Carmo, 2012). BR also conducted various bank robberies, which were the sole financial support of the organisation (Carmo, 2012). Table 4 displays the armed actions conducted by BR according to Fernando Rosas and José Brito (1996) and to the webpage *Memoriando*[16].

Thus, BR was 'the only armed organisation that arrived at the Revolution in a position of open war against the fascist regime' (Antunes, 1974, p.12). After the Revolution of 25th April, BR started its full integration within the PRP, though the approval of a disarmament law, which forced everyone to surrender their weapons, steered new underground activity in order to safeguard the possibility to answer to right wing provocations or misuses (Manifest against the civil war: armed insurrection, PRP, 1975).

[16] This webpage was created by the *Memoriando* Association, which is composed by former BR militants and their family members.

Table 4: BR's Armed Actions

Actions	Date	Goal
NATO at Fonte da Telha	7/11/1971	Attack on NATO's installations in Fonte da Telha, in order to show solidarity towards the people from the colonies
Destruction of War Material	12/11/1971	Destruction of a battery of cannons in *Barreiro*
Power Cut Attempt	11/05/1972	Power cut attempt in part of the centre and south of the country
Explosives Collection	11/06/1972	Collection of hundreds of kilograms of explosives in the stone quarry between Loulé and Boliqueime, in the Algarve
Sabotage of Army Trucks	11/07/1972	Sabotage of 15 army Berliet trucks
Sabotage of Electronic Facilities	25/08/1972	Sabotage of the electronic facilities in Palmela and Sesimbra, which allowed international telegraphic and telephonic communications with the colonies
Cartographic Army Services	12/1972	Assault the Cartographic Army Services, in order to seize the maps of the colonies and hand them to the liberation movements (PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO)
Sabotage of Army Installations	9-10/10/1973 6/04/1973	Sabotage actions on various military installations
Ministry of Corporations	1/05/1073	Sabotage of various departments of the Ministry of Corporations in Lisbon
Oporto General Military Quarter	26/10/1973	Detonation of a bomb in Oporto General Military Quarter, destroying archives and building sites
Guiney General Quarter	22/02/1974	Sabotage of the Portuguese General Quarter of Guiney, in Bissau
Niassa	9/04/1974	Sabotage of the ocean liner Niassa, carrying troops to Bissau

The Revolution

The Revolution of April 25th (1974) or the 'Carnation Revolution', as it is commonly known, was the last leftist revolution in Europe, bringing an end to one of the lengthiest dictatorships of the 20th century (Rezola, 2007). At the micro level, such a revolution is often considered as totally unexpected, as Narciso (2000), Santos (2011) and Mortágua (2013) describe in their

memories; however, a macro analysis indicates many signs of a regime marked by deep crisis, particularly in its last decade, such as:

a) The Roman Catholic church, one of the pillars of the regime, prompted different actions against the Colonial War[17], which were influenced by Pope Paul VI himself, who in 1970 received a group of liberation movements' representatives from the Portuguese colonies, placing into question the validity of the regime's positions (Bebiano, 2006a);
b) The young urban students and workers were increasingly politicized and influenced by extreme-left ideologies, in a context of industrialization, war and forced exile in foreign countries, and being targeted by a violent repression[18] (Cruzeiro and Bebiano, 2006; Loff, 2006);
c) The Colonial War in three different fronts, which started in 1961, in Angola, and spread to Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, was draining the armed forces (Rezola, 2007);
d) The Portuguese in the colonies started protesting against the regime and the armed forces that were not able to protect them from the violent attacks perpetrated by the liberation movements (Rezola, 2007);
e) The pressure of the international community on the regime was renewed, due to the denunciation of the Wiriyamu massacre in Mozambique by Adrian Hastings, a Roman Catholic priest (Hastings, 1973);
f) The armed forces attempted coup in March 1974 (Rezola, 2007); and
g) The economic difficulties Portugal was facing, particularly due to the war and to the oil crisis of 1973 (Rezola, 2007).

Thus, Portugal could be compared to a 'pressure cooker', ready to explode by itself or with some encouragement (Pimentel, 2011a, p.22). Help that indeed came, but from a unexpected side, the side in which the regime leaned the most and the political police did not fear – the armed forces (Pimentel, 2011a).

[17] Actions originated both from priests and lay groups and essentially marked by the arrest of the priest Mário de Oliveira, who used to preach against the Colonial War; and by the *Capela do Rato Watch*, a initiative that happened on the 1972-1973 new year's eve and stated the Catholic church position against the Colonial War and the dictatorial regime.
[18] In January 1974 thirty students were arrested.

The role of the armed forces as agents of the 'Democratisation, Decolonisation and Development' discussed on the Third Republican Congress in 1973 was influenced, according to Maria Inácia Rezola (2007), by the factors stated above, but also by two other important aspects: on the one hand, the deep tensions within the army between cadets and militia soldiers and, on the other hand, the launch of the book *Portugal and the Future* by General Spínola in 1974. The first aspect, also known by 'the problem of antiquities', was caused by the decree law 353/73, which stated that Special Board officers could become part of the Permanent Board by undergoing a course of a year, while the normal course used to last four years (Oliveira, 2012, p.19). This legislation aimed to combat the shortage of human resources, facilitating access to the Permanent Board, but it was seen as offensive to the dignity of the military career, provoking a general feeling of injustice and discontentment and giving birth to the *Movement of Captains* (Carvalho, 2009). The second aspect, the book *Portugal and the Future* written by General Spínola, who was at the time deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, stated that the only solution for the Colonial War was not armed, but political, through the recognition of the right of people to self-determination (Spínola, 1974). The attitude of such an important figure was felt by the regime like a bomb from within, leading to the dismissal of the General, but still accomplishing the regime's worst fear – encouraging the young captains to revolt (Oliveira, 2012).

Thus, from the moment of creation of the *Movement of Captains* in August 1973 onwards, a part of the military connected to General Spínola did not stop planning the military coup (see Oliveira, 2012), which finally took place in 25th of April 1974. This was a military coup that quickly became a social revolution of the Portuguese people, who flooded the streets of the country supporting the armed forces and claiming the end of the regime (Oliveira, 1993) and who were finally able to actively participated in the 'transitional process towards a fully institutionalized democracy' that finished in April 1976 with the implementation of a new Constitution (Loff, 2014, p.3).

This revolution prompted deep structural transformations in Portugal, particularly at economic, social and cultural instances (Rezola, 2007). However, it also triggered new waves of armed action in the country, initially starred by ELP and MDLP in 1975, and later, in 1980, by FP-25, the three last organisations under analysis in the present study.

The Return of Politically Motivated Violence

The waves of violence originated after the Revolution happened as a reaction of two different factions – the extreme right and the extreme left – to the changes introduced by the democratic process. The first wave took place in the summer of 1975 and was motivated by the belief (held by the conservative and pro-regime people in Portuguese society), that the Revolution had opened the possibility for the implementation of a 'Marxist/Communist/collectivist/totalitarian dictatorship worse than Salazar's' (Loff, 2014, p.2). A belief that according to Kenneth Maxwell (1999) was strengthened by different circumstances, such as:

1) The active participation of the PCP on the political and administrative organisation of the country;

2) The strong divergences between General Spínola (at the time President of the Republic) and the PCP and the MFA (Movement of the Armed Forces that replaced the Movement of Captains after the Revolution), particularly in relation to the colonies;

3) The resignation of General Spínola, which internally weakened the political conservative and reformist forces in the transitional process, and externally allowed the independence of the colonies;

4) The failed attempt at an anti-communist coup on 11th March 1975 led by General Spínola, which contributed to the radicalisation of MFA[19]; and

5) The nationalization of banks, insurance companies and private property.

Thus, this was the context of eruption of popular anti-communist violence in the so-called Hot Summer of 1975, particularly in the north and centre regions of Portugal, which were rural areas mainly composed of Roman Catholic small landowners. These landowners did not receive well the socialist proposals of the Revolution Council in power; and in some cases joined the call of reactionary individuals and organisations to show their dissatisfaction by attacking Communist Party headquarters (Cerezales, 2003). Simultaneously two armed organisations (ELP and MDLP) were steering and contributing to these popular activities from Spain, composed of conservative individuals who sought exile in this country after the unsuccessful coup of March 11th (Dâmaso, 1997). Two organisations that in the midst of a clearly divided world

[19] After 11th March 1975 the MFA expelled its more moderate members and arrested members of the regime's old oligarchy.


characterized by the bipolar rivalries of the Cold War, and of a Portugal on the verge of a civil war[20], considered that they would be able 'to invade the country and defeat the communists by force of arms' (Dâmaso, 1997, p.11).

The denouement of this very troubled period in the Portuguese political history came on 25th November 1975, when a coup attempted by the extreme-left sector of the military was frustrated by Coronel Ramalho Eanes' troops, giving origin to an institutionalized democratic regime (Maxwell, 1999). Thus, November 25th 1975 marked the end of the armed offensive from the extreme-right (Dâmaso, 1997), but also laid the foundations for a new wave of political violence, this time conducted by the extreme-left (Costa, 2004).

Thus, FP-25 emerged in 1980 with two main purposes in mind: to stop the actions of the extreme right once again in power due to the counter-revolution of 25th November 1975, which re-established the capitalist order, repressing the proliferous social movements and even some rights obtained by the workers after the revolution (Sousa, 1992); and to attain a real socialist revolution (Costa, 2004).

The following figure represents the three dates that triggered the action of armed organisations after the Revolution, organisation that will be explored in more detail in the ensuing sections of this chapter.

Figure 8: Trigger Dates for Post-Revolution Armed Struggle



[20] The Revolution caused a partisan run for power among the left forces repressed during the dictatorship (e.g. Communist Party) and some emergent ones (e.g. Socialist Party) and an inexistent right that was trying to organize itself around figures of the former regime. This partisan game ended by dividing society into 'good and bad guys', or 'democrats' and 'reactionaries' respectively, giving birth to deep hate, injustices and violence committed by both sides (Dâmaso, 1997, p.14).

ELP: Portuguese Army of Liberation

Salazar's political replacement by Marcelo Caetano gave birth to irreconcilable divergences between the conventional right, supportive of Caetano, and the so-called ultra or orthodox right, composed by intellectual nationalists, who blamed Caetano's government of: 1) being extremely superficial in terms of its politics and ideology; 2) ignoring their presence and opinions; and 3) allowing left wing activities and the revolution, considered a 'disastrous date in the Portuguese history (Dugos, 1976, p.39). Before the revolution, the ultra-right was responsible for multiple political events and gatherings, for the edition of various newspapers, and had close links with other anti-communist movements around the world, which were crucial activities to the recruitment of new and young militants (Dugos, 1976). After the revolution, many right-wing people organised themselves in different political parties to enter the democratic structure (e.g. the Liberal Party, the Progress Party, the Independent Republican or the Christian Democracy), yet some right wing elements felt that the classic political parties were not able to fight the growth of the communist presence in the new democracy, which was exacerbated by the assault of the Progress Party headquarters in September 1974 and by the police persecution of its militants (Dugos, 1976). Thus, in January 1975, ELP was officially founded by Barbieri Cardoso (former sub-director of the political police), and was composed by supporters of the deposed regime, including former elements of the Portuguese Legion and of the political police (Matos, 2005); and supported by elements of the Spanish secret services, and by European neo-fascist refugees living in Spain (Marchi, 2012). ELP was then a counter-revolutionary, secret organisation, which aimed the liberation of Portugal from Communism, and whose structure dwelled in the underground and followed a military configuration (Dugos, 1976). ELP's main political goals, according to Carlos Dugos (1976), are displayed in the following table.

Figure 9: ELP's aims



In regard to the colonial issue, ELP took the integrationist approach, which aimed the permanent integration of the Ultramar in national territory (Dugos, 1976). This approach would mean: 1) the eradication of the many existent differences between Portugal and its colonies; 2) the extinction of the liberation movements from the colonies through a tough process of war; and 3) the disposition of the Portuguese people to finance and accomplish all this (Dugos, 1976).

This organisation had militants in various countries – Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Angola, South Africa and Brazil – and received financial support from Portuguese small and medium size business owners, emigrants and other sympathizers of its cause (Dugos, 1976). The first ELP's action on May 1975 – the assault to the Work Centre of the PCP in Bragança – marked the start of the already mentioned Hot Summer of 1975, and advertised the acronym ELP, which would become extremely popular in the country over the next few months (Cerqueira, 2015). Numerous other bombings and assaults on Communist Party headquarters were attributed to ELP (Cervelló, 1993), however they are not systematically recorded in the existing literature.

MDLP: Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal

MDLP also emerged from the ultra or orthodox right that before the revolution showed its opposition to Caetano's government, and was presided over from the Brazilian exile by General Spínola and simultaneously led in Spain by Alpoim Calvão (Dugos, 1976; Hortelão et al., 2012). MDLP was considered less radical in its views than ELP, in the sense that its militants contemplated that the time for authoritarian regimes was over and that the future belonged to a democratic right wing government (Dugos, 1976). However, MDLP agreed that counter-revolutionary measures were needed to 'prevent the establishment of a communist regime or Marxist military dictatorship in Portugal; and create the conditions for the implementation of a free and pluralistic democratic system' (Untitled Document, 1975 cited in Hortelão et al., 2012, p.372). MDLP was thus planning a democratic Portugal, in which all parties, excluding left-wing ones, would have a place (Dugos, 1976).

MDLP's armed activities started in May 1975 and officially ended in November 1975, including several types of actions, such as detonation of explosives, particularly against PCP headquarters (Dâmaso, 1997). Thus, across the Hot Summer of 1975 the organisations conducting armed struggle on the ground could not be easily distinguished, because they were all pointing at the same targets – communist structures and individuals – encouraging the population in the north of the country to fight as follows:

> When you hear the bells ringing in your parish, come to the street with the weapons you have: shotguns, pistols, picks, hoes and scythes […] It is urgent to prepare to unleash all over Portugal a white crusade against the red oppression, against foreign Communism, the godless usurper and oppressor (MDLP Flyer in Hortelão et al., 2012, translation mine).

MDLP actions were financially supported by people in various countries – Spain, France, England, Angola, Zaire, South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Brazil, Venezuela, United States of America and Canada – and also attracted the political attention of the United States of America, which were concerned with a possible communist implementation in Portugal (Dugos, 1976; Dâmaso 1997).

In regard of the Ultramar issue, MDLP took the federalist approach, which aimed at the creation of a cultural, political, economic and linguistic federation of the colonies in Portugal, following the ideas presented by Spínola in his book *Portugal and the Future* (Dugos, 1976).

Finally, on 25th November 1975, with the defeat of the attempted extreme left coup, MDLP could not envisage a way forward and started a slow dismantlement of the organisation (Hortelão et al., 2012; Marchi, 2012). However, not everyone within MDLP agreed with such a decision and a few militants carried on placing bombs without the approval of the organisation, 'some as revenge against the communists, others for money, running into a spiral of violence that quickly evolved into a more or less sophisticated terrorism' (Dâmaso, 1997, p.20).

FP-25: Popular Forces of 25th of April

The FP-25, created in 1980, were composed of left-wing radical activists who were disappointed with the social and political pathway brought by the counter-revolution of November 25th (1975), which in their perspective was the cause of serious social injustices, happening particularly at the workplace (Costa, 2004). A few FP-25 activists had been organized underground beforehand in the context of PRP/BR and their choice to join FP-25 was motivated by two different circumstances: in the case of some individuals they did not politically agree with leaving the arms aside after the Revolution, considering that the armed struggle was still needed to attain a socialist revolution; while others felt that they did not have any other option than remaining underground, because they had committed armed actions after the Revolution, even if PRP/BR's leaders in jail were distancing themselves from such occurrences, in order to negotiate an amnesty (Sousa, 1992).

According to Barra da Costa (2004), the FP-25 was the armed arm of the *Global Project*, created in 1979 by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, one of the captains of the Revolution, whose main goals were: 1) the prevention of a fascist coup d'état; 2) the creation of the necessary conditions to the seizure of power; 3) the establishment of popular power; and 3) the consequent change on the operation of the State institutions. The *Global Project* was composed by different political legal structures, but also by a clandestine component, the FP-25. This component was designed to fight against the extreme-right, which was once again confiscating the power and violently secluding the left in the country (Ventura and Nascimento, 2001), justifying militants' right to take justice into their own hands and the revolutionary struggle. According to these principles, FP-25 members[21] were divided into small cells based around the country, which started a series of violent acts, including the recuperation of funds to support the organisation (essentially through bank robberies), and the attempts on the life of certain individuals through the firing of weapons or the detonation of explosive devices (Costa, 2004). Such acts resulted in several deaths and injuries of mainly factory administrators, who were seen as abusive towards their employees (e.g. unpaid wages, unjust redundancies), enabling FP-25 to claim they supported the working class by setting the example to both the workers – encouraging them to fight against

[21] In total 152 individuals were in jail, in probation or awaiting trial, of which 46 were considered to have had a direct participation in armed activities (Costa, 2004).

injustices – and to the administrators – discouraging them to ignore their employees' rights (Vilela, 2005). Other targets of FP-25 violence were a few police officers, the Director of the Prison Services, and the repented members of the organisation who collaborated with the police (Vilela, 2005). The main armed actions carried out by FP-25 are displayed in table 5.

FP-25 was totally dismantled by the police with the collaboration of three repented members of the organisation in 1983, which culminated in the *Orion Operation* in June 1984, performed by the Judicial Police in conjunction with the Public Ministry, arresting eighty people (Ventura, 1999). However, FP-25 remained on duty until its total dissolution in 1989, even if between 1985 and 1987 the majority of its militants were arrested or sought refuge abroad (Ventura, 1999).

The trial of the organisation began in October 1986, including eighty-seven defendants and unfolding in the following way: in December 1991 a presidential pardon was granted to seven of the detainees in the process; in March 1996 an amnesty was passed in Parliament for the imprisoned members of FP-25; in April 2001 sixty defendants were acquitted from the homicides committed by the organisation for lack of evidence (the homicides had not been included in the amnesty of 1996); and in 2004 prescribed the judicial process designated *Crimes de Sangue* (Blood Crimes), which included the non-acquitted defendants regarding the homicides committed by the organisation (Loff, 2015).

Concluding Reflections: The Post-Dictatorship Memory Politics and Political Narratives in Portugal

The purpose of this chapter was to set the historical context in which armed organisations emerged, acted and were dissolved in different periods of time in Portugal. This context is fundamental to the understanding of the narratives of political violence further explored in this thesis, portrayed by individuals who invested a significant part of their lives fighting violently for their political ideals. These individuals' voices and stories have been recurrently silenced in the Portuguese 'battle over memory', because their activities were linked to events, such as the Revolution, that have been themselves politically and socially depreciated in mainstream political narratives (Loff, 2014, p.10).

Table 5: FP-25's Armed Actions

Actions	Date	Goal
Cometna	-	Board Member. The company unjustly fired employees, did not take complaints into account and practiced corruption.
Standard Eléctrica	23/07/1981	Director. Response to layoffs and labour disputes affecting the company. The action caused minor injuries to the target and his driver.
Louças de Sacavém	6/12/1982	Administrator. The company had a record of unpaid wages, which led the workers to various protests. The action caused the death of the target.
Espírito Santo Bank	3/12/1983	Detonation of explosives in two different locations of Espírito Santo Bank in solidarity with the workers of the company CIVE, for which the bank refused financial support, causing unemployment and unpaid wages.
Ivima	25/01/1984	Property assault. Several shots were fired on the façade of the house of the Administrator of IVIMA, a company having problems with the workers, and a Molotov Cocktail was left at his door.
Covilhã	02/1984	Property assault and detonation of explosives aimed at business owners in Covilhã and Castelo Branco.
Gelmar	29/05/1084	Administrator. The company unjustly fired employees and the administrator caused its bankruptcy, as well as the bankruptcy of other companies where he worked. The action caused the death of the target.
Cerâmica de Barcelos	4/06/1984	Attack on the GNR (rural police) outpost in Barcelos, and property assault against the owner of Cêramica de Barcelos.
Francisco José Simões	22/02/1974	Administrators. The company was in the process of firing employees.
São Manços	30/04/1974	Landowner. An explosive device was detonated in the outer wall of the house, killing a 4 month old baby.
Manuel Pereira Roldão	06/1984	Administrator. The action caused serious injuries to the target.
Rosa Barradas	19/07/1985	Penitent. Through the death of one of the former militants collaborating with the police, the organization aimed to discourage further collaboration.
Director of the Prison Services	15/02/1986	Director of the Prison Services. Response to the harsh conditions of detention of FP-25 militants and to the alleged intransigence of the Prison Services represented by its Director. The action caused the death of the target.
Police Outpost at Olivais	27/04/1986	Police outpost. Retaliation for the alleged abuse suffered by a FP-25 militant under arrest on that outpost. The action caused minor injuries on a police officer.

Only recently the traditional political narratives started being questioned and debated by Portuguese scholars. Such political narratives took root in the country in the decades that followed the Revolution, particularly during *Cavaquismo*[22], with various scholars and politicians denying the Fascist-categorization of *Estado Novo* and adopting an authoritarian, non-totalitarian and non-Fascist perspective, while recurrently depicting the Revolution as highly negative (particularly as the source of the economic troubles of the country) (Loff, 2014). Thus, for a long time Portuguese conservatives opted 'to impose a politically-motivated discussion on the negative legacy of the 19-month Revolution, rather than discussing the 48 years of the *Estado Novo*, at least whenever it became impossible to elude the debate on Salazar, Caetano, political police, repression, corporatism or war in Africa' (Loff, 2014, p.5). Hence, a 'negative perception of the Revolution and of the democratic system built upon it apparently concealed the negative memories of Salazar's regime' (Loff, 2014, p.6). In this context, one of the most striking ways in which such memories were concealed was through the interdiction of access, until 1996, to Salazar's personal and political archives, as well as those of the political police by Cavaco Silva's government (Loff, 2014).

However, in the 1990s public debates concerned with a 'sheer whitewashing of the dictatorship' by right-wing governments began to take place, starting a 'rebellion of memory' (Loff, 2014, p.10). Such debates were triggered by the public acknowledgement that former political police members were receiving pensions for 'exceptional and relevant services rendered to the country', as well as retired military men who fought in the Colonial War, while Captains of the Revolution, such as Salgueiro Maia, were denied their pensions. These were circumstances that showed a clear depreciation towards the military men who contributed to the overthrow of the dictatorship. However, the last straw, according to Manuel Loff (2014), came in 1994 when a commercial TV station organized a debate between a former political police member (Óscar Cardoso), a historian who had been a political prisoner (José Manuel Tengarrinha) and a former member of the Revolution Council (Sousa e Castro), giving the opportunity to the first to draw a positive picture of the political police and to deny the torture practices and executions carried out by this institution during the dictatorship. This debate raised serious controversies, leading,

[22] Period from 1985 to 1995 in which Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the new-liberal head of PSD, was the Portuguese prime minister. Nowadays *Cavaquismo* is perceived by some as a continuation of Marcelo Caetano's 'authoritarian modernizing project for Portugal', which was blunt to the point of bringing back to power key-people of Caetano´s government (Loff, 2014, p.6).

for instance, the Republic President at the time and anti-Salazarist resistant Mário Soares (1994) to affirm: 'it was as if [Klaus] Barbie – the butcher of Marseille – had been invited to a debate with his own victims. […] What are we going to tell our children after they have watched this debate on TV? That we have imagined this whole story? What on earth will be our legacy?' A few right-wing personalities equally contributed to this debate, reiterating their perspective that the Revolution was undoubtedly worse than Salazar's dictatorship, and recalling the atrocities that in their opinion happened in the country afterwards – 'nobody recalled the arbitrary arrests, censorship, intimidation, tipping off, manipulation, slander, death threats, torture and injuries, squatting in properties, purges, destruction and other post-April 25th savagery. It was not the PIDE [political police] who did those. It was the MFA-PCP [Movement of the Armed Forces – Portuguese Communist Party] alliance of rejuvenating memory, that true spittle on our country's democratisation process' – and in the colonies as a result of the decolonisation process – 'they [the leftist individuals composing the Revolution Council] preferred heroically, to abandon to their fate [in Angola and Mozambique] millions and millions of people who, in the meantime, died in one of the most terrifying catastrophes in the history of mankind and whose responsibility is all theirs' (Moura, 1994).

Although the Portuguese public opinion at present is still fairly influenced by revisionist perspectives on the Revolution and the decolonisation process, since the 'rebellion of memory' of the 1990's some progress has taken place. In particular, by the turn of the century a few former political violent militants decided to write down and publish their memories and the 'history' of their respective organisations (e.g. Serra, 1999; Narciso, 2000; Santos, 2011; Hortelão et al., 2012; Mortágua, 2013), a decision also made by family members (e.g. Lindim, 2012), and academics (e.g. Cardina, 2011; Pimentel, 2014). However, in some of the books (e.g. Narciso, 2000; Lindim, 2012) pseudonyms are still kept in a few cases, because people fear discrimination in their social circles (e.g. family, friends, workplace).

In the following chapter the literature on political violence will be critically examined, offering an analysis into the most significant meanings, drivers and actors of violence, in order to shed light on the particular dynamics of the Portuguese case. This literature will be linked with the work produced by life course and narrative theorists, which is a core component of prefacing and providing a rationale for the narrative analysis to follow.

CHAPTER THREE

CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE: MEANINGS, DRIVERS AND ACTORS

Overview

This chapter provides a review of the relevant literature that underpins the present study in order to contextualize the study of political violence and, essentially, the role played by non-state actors engaged in violent activities. I begin by presenting Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) perspectives and how they frame the present study, as opposed to mainstream terrorism studies. Then, through the same lens, I explore three different spheres of political violence: its meanings put forward in the literature; the factors that drive individuals to engage with, remain in and disengage from political violent organisations, paying particular attention to the role of political narratives; and the aspects that characterize the actors of politically motivated violence, with a particular focus on gender dynamics. The over reliance of terrorism research on secondary data sources brings some limitations to the existing literature, which in most cases produces and reproduces flat descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon, in general, and of the first hand experiences of political violent activists, in particular. Therefore, in order to tackle these limitations this chapter will elicit conversations among the 'usual' voices in the political violence arena, but will also bring forward 'unusual' perspectives, such as those from life course and narrative theorists.

Critical Perspectives on Political Violence

As already suggested, this thesis is based on the assumption that voice should be given to the actors of politically motivated violence, to make sense of their own experiences and access the contexts and narratives through which their lives are framed by. This assumption is in open contradiction with many research projects conducted to date, in which, according to Zulaika and Douglass (1996), actors' perceptions are almost always ignored, and the human being behind them simply considered evil (see also Jackson, 2005; Toros, 2008; Gunning, 2009).

Therefore, this study is aligned with the literature generated by CTS scholars, particularly the ones from the fields of anthropology, sociology, history and other area studies (see, for example, Townshend, 1983, 2002; Zulaika, 1988; Sluka, 1989; Feldman, 1994; Mahmood, 1996; Zulaika and Douglass, 1996; English, 2003, 2006, 2009; Toros, 2012). In these fields, researchers tend to consider that the lack of primary research in the field of terrorism and the lack of context, whether historical, social, cultural or political, create knowledge flaws, identifiable by the existence of diverse stereotypical facts and misconceptions (Jackson, 2007; Gunning, 2007). Terms such as terrorism and terrorist are not perceived as helpful, because they elevate the phenomenon to an exceptional plan when compared with other types of equally relevant politically motivated violence, represent power relations, and dehumanise the actors labelled as terrorists (this topic will be explored in detail later in this Chapter) (Toros, 2008; Sluka, 2009). Consequently, political violent activists' perspectives 'are rarely sought, and little effort is made to arrive at an empirical understanding of why they engage in or support political violence' (Sluka, 2009, p.144). In this context, the importance of ethnographic methods accompanied by discourse and narrative analysis is highlighted in order to arrive at 'different layers and types of understanding, which produce a 'thick' account of political violence' (Jackson et al., 2011, p.33).

Thus, CTS emerged in rupture with the so-called orthodox or mainstream terrorism studies (Jackson et al., 2011), which is a line of research originated in the field of security studies (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). The mainstream terrorism studies contain a large amount of the terrorism research produced since the establishment of terrorism as a field of study during the 1960s and 1970s (motivated by the combination of the rise of anti-colonial movements and wars, and by the conflicts promoted by the bipolar rivalry then installed around the globe). This field of studies was further strengthened by particular events in the global North and West in the early 21st century, such as 9/11 (2001), the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings (Jackson et al., 2011). These events brought many researchers into terrorism studies, led by the urge of preventing future attacks (Jackson et al., 2011).

According to CTS (see, for example, Jackson et al., 2011), mainstream terrorism studies have been organized since their conception around Western states' interests, which raises a set of issues that range from definitional to methodological (the former explored below and the latter

discussed in chapter four) and implies various limitations that can be seen at both analytical and normative levels (Jarvis, 2009). On the one hand, the analytical level is related to the fact that terrorism is seen through essentialist lenses that consider it as an objective reality, neglecting contextual factors (e.g. social, political, historical), and, subsequently, neglecting the very 'processes of its construction'. On the other hand, the normative level is related to the fact that terrorism studies are based on a 'problem-solving pursuit' approach and show, above all, concerns with generating 'policy-relevant research' (Jarvis, 2009, pp.14-15). Consequently, the concerns of mainstream terrorism studies are focused on developing counterterrorist proposals, rather than 'gaining a social science understanding of the phenomenon' (della Porta, 2013, p.12). In addition, they tend to engage in a discourse that delegitimises the use of political violence by opposition groups against the state, while legitimising the violence perpetrated by the state to enforce its political will (Franks, 2009). Moreover, as contended by Roger Mac Ginty (2013, p.219), the mainstream terrorism studies community is 'stuck in a *Groundhog Day* of confirmation bias, unable to conduct research among the very group it has subjectified.'

Nonetheless, it is important to note that critical approaches to terrorism are not a new take on terrorism studies; in fact, they always co-existed with mainstream approaches. In the 1970s, left wing scholars developed political-economy approaches to violence, whose contribution was marked by the affirmation that terrorism, seen as a strategy, could be employed by both state and non-state actors (see for example, Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O'Sullivan, 1989; Gold-Biss, 1994). After 9/11 CTS authors focused, predominantly, on the critical assessment of the so-called 'war on terror' (see for example, Jackson, 2005; Stokes, 2005; Blakeley, 2007, 2009; Miller and Mills, 2009). Therefore, as opposed to mainstream terrorism studies, CTS consist on 'terrorism-related research that self-consciously adopts a sceptical attitude towards state-centric understandings of terrorism and which does not take existing terrorism knowledge for granted but is willing to challenge widely held assumptions and beliefs' (Jackson, 2007, p.246). In this vein, *The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies* issued by Richard Jackson, in 2007, are organized around three overarching elements: ontological, epistemological and ethical. In ontological terms, CTS perceive the term terrorism as a label that merely represents a political violent strategy at the service of state and non-state actors, and as a social fact that evolves and changes according to spatial and temporal coordinates (Toros, 2008); not as a stable, objective and scientifically identifiable phenomenon,

as described by orthodox terrorism studies (Jarvis, 2009). Terrorism is rooted in historical, political and cultural contexts, which at a micro-level are subjective, are constructions of reality made by individuals that see in violence a strategy to achieve their goals (della Porta, 2013). In epistemological terms, knowledge is considered a social process attained by language, discourse and relational exercises, which is always dependent on the context of its conception and connected to power, being susceptible to serving 'as a political tool of influence and dominance' (Jackson et al., 2011, p.37). Thus, CTS recognize the uncertainty and partiality of knowledge regarding terrorism, suggesting a clear and constant critical reflexivity in the knowledge production process, acknowledging the subjectivity of the researcher, the interests behind the research and the effects it can have on society in general. CTS equally invite methodological and disciplinary pluralism, the combat against a-historical and decontextualized analysis, raise gender issues, and engage with communities and professionals in the field (Breen-Smyth, 2007; Jackson, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011). Finally, in ethical terms, CTS give precedence to universal human values and societal security, rather than national security concerns, and assume an emancipatory approach (McDonald, 2007). Such approach aims for the eradication of myths and preconceptions that surround terrorism and that, on the one hand, incarcerate people on dynamics of fear and terror (Breen-Smyth, 2007), and, on the other hand, address the conditions impelling individuals to resort to terroristic strategies (Jackson, 2009).

Since the establishment of CTS, a few scholars (e.g. Horgan and Boyle, 2008; Lutz, 2010; Boyle, 2012) have levelled criticisms at some CTS assumptions. For instance, John Horgan and Michael Boyle (2008) consider that CTS employs a superficial reading of terrorism literature and that its characterisation of terrorism studies is not representative of the existing breadth of research activity in the field. However, these criticisms have received answers from CTS scholars, such as Ruth Blakeley (2008), who demonstrates that CTS' research agenda is credible and 'goes well beyond simply reinventing the wheel' (p. 152), as counter-argued by Horgan and Boyle (2008, p. 52). In order to do so, Blakeley (2008), further explores the selective application of definitions of terrorism which ignores state terrorism and the lack of scholarly debates on this matter. This author also shows that CTS scholars are already embarking on research that will help overcome the gaps in the literature, and that such work is being complemented by the work of other scholars from various social science disciplines. Finally,


she still addresses the questions raised by Horgan and Boyle (2008) concerning the transparency of scholars associated with CTS, who argue that the use of state terrorism only makes sense within this wider context, and their emancipatory goal, showing that one of the priorities of those working on state terrorism by liberal democratic states should be to challenge foreign policy practices which involve state terrorism and other forms of repression.

Meanings of Political Violence: The Limits of Mainstream Studies

Political violence is, put simply by Paul Wilkinson (1986, p.30), 'the use of violence for political ends'. However, this definition does not cover the fairly broad spectrum of different types and manifestations of political violence that can take the form of, for instance, 'guerrilla warfare, national liberation movements, and sometimes even strikes and demonstrations that turn violent' (Eager, 2008, p.1). In this sense, a tighter definition accompanied by a set of typologies is needed, in order to enable a more exact identification of the phenomena under analysis. Donatella della Porta (2013, pp.6-7) suggested that 'political violence consists of those repertoires of collective action that involve great physical force and cause damage to an adversary to achieve political aims'. This author recognised that words such as 'great' and 'damage' are open to differentiated subjective understandings. Thus, she added that 'political violence is generally understood as behaviour that violates the prevailing definition of legitimate action', but again recognising that 'the degree of legitimacy is not easy to assess empirically' (della Porta, 2013, p.7). In this context, della Porta resorted to a fourfold typology of political violence based on two dimensions created as a result of a comparative study on Germany and Italy, between the 1960s and 1980s (della Porta, 1995), represented in figure 5.

Following della Porta's typology the format of political violence considered in the present thesis is *clandestine violence*, which refers to violent actions committed by rather small organisations operating underground and composed by non-state actors (della Porta, 2013). This type of political violence has been commonly located under the label 'terrorism', which is not used in the context of the present research, as justified above, but whose relevant literature is explored. Thus, in this section, a few definitions of 'terrorism' are discussed, as well as the debates surrounding them, allowing the acknowledgement of the scholarly perspectives that frame the present study.

Figure 10: Typology of Political Violence



In general, mainstream studies tend to consider that terrorism '(1) hasn't been defined, (2) should be defined, and (3) can be defined' (Ramsay, 2015, p.211). However, in fact, terrorism has already been defined countless times; what does not yet exist is a consensual definition of the term. Robert Hoffman, for instance, dedicated the totality of his doctoral thesis to the study of the definition of terrorism. After interviewing various scholars in the field (n=1084), Robert Hoffman (1984) arrived at the conclusion that terrorism

> is a purposeful human political activity, which is directed toward the creation of a general climate of fear, and is designed to influence, in ways desired by the protagonist, other human beings and, through them, some course of events (Hoffman, 1984, p. 181).

Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2005) took a similar approach and created a definition

composed by the sixteen most consensual elements among academics' views on what terrorism is, which resulted in terrorism being defined as

> an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent actions employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid and Jongman, 2005, p. 28).

Other academics generated definitions from the analysis of a considerable number of already existing definitions. For instance, Leonard Weinberg et al. (2004) analysed 73 definitions present in three scientific journals – *Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* and *Terrorism* – and considered that terrorism is

> a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role (Weinberg et al., 2004, p. 786).

All these definitions contemplate terrorism as a tactic of violent communication, though not all contemplate the same motivations and actors of violence. For instance, only Schmid and Jongman's definition broadens the spectrum of terrorist motivations, considering not only 'political factors', but also 'idiosyncratic' and 'criminal' factors, and including the state as a possible perpetrator. This is an inclusion that, according to Blakeley (2007), is often ignored by mainstream definitions, despite having been put forward a long time ago by authors such as Brian Jenkins (1980) and Jessica Stern (1999). These authors affirmed, for instance, that 'governments, their armies, their secret police may also be terrorists' (Jenkins, 1980, p.3), and that 'states and their leaders can and do unleash terrorist violence against their own civilians'

(Stern, 1999, p.14). In fact, a few state actors are known to make use of terrorism definitions to stigmatize, delegitimise and condemn opponents (Herring, 2008; della Porta, 2013), portraying the state as inherently legitimate and moral (the 'good guys'), and the militants opposing them inherently illegitimate and immoral (evil, the 'bad guys')" (Sluka, 2009, p.144). However, Schmid and Jongman's definition also presents a few weaknesses, particularly in regard to aspects that may be applied to different phenomena, such as the 'anxiety-inspiring method', which is also present in nonviolent strategies (della Porta, 2013).

Therefore, the mass production of terrorism definitions and the lack of a consensual one are justified by the nature of the phenomenon under analysis, because terrorism is neither a solid concept, nor a stable and objective reality that can be impartially defined. As Jenkins commented:

> Terrorism is a generalized construct derived from our concepts of morality, law, and the rules of war, whereas actual terrorists are shaped by culture, ideology and politics – specific, inchoate factors and notions that motivate diverse actions (Jenkins, 2006, p. 117).

Terrorism is, subsequently, a label that tends to disguise 'the true nature of the conflict' and carries 'emotional or ideological responses and presuppositions about the actors, their intentions, and their strategies that are unwarranted and potentially harmful to successful policy achievement' (Thompson, 2014, p.6). This perspective is corroborated by CTS scholars, who consider that 'in practice it is often the politically and culturally determined legitimacy of the particular group under scrutiny that determines whether its actions are labelled as 'terrorism' and not necessarily the characteristics inherent to the violence itself' (Jackson, 2008, p.28). In the words of Jeffrey Sluka:

> Just as 'races' do not exist in reality, but classifications of mankind do, so too terrorism, at least as presented by elites, the mainstream media, and much of orthodox terrorism studies is unreal, but the classification of this political violence as 'terrorism' has real and fateful results (Sluka, 2009, p. 154).

Hence, terrorism is never defined from a neutral angle, but always involves contextual variables, which are very often ignored. Such variables can be political, social, economic, cultural or even historical in nature, and that when analysed contribute to the re-construction of the sequence of events that surrounded violence (Toros and Gunning, 2009). Such a re-construction enables the understanding of what came before and after violence through the reflection on questions about 'how the violence became possible?', 'what impact it had on society?', and 'how it relates to other social practices?' (Toros and Gunning, 2009, p.94). Thus, this type of contextual rooted analysis of political violence allows a more dynamic and fluid perspective on terroristic-labelled actions and actors, recognizing their place on the wider social contestation spheres and networks, and shedding light on the dynamics between the state and individuals, the state and violent organisations, individuals and violent organisations and violent organisations and other social movements (Toros and Gunning, 2009). This is an analysis that might change the actor's place in the terrorist scenario, possibly placing some states' actions at the origin of terrorism (Gunning, 2007a), and corroborating the assumption that the line between terrorism and counter-terrorism acts is sometimes very tenuous (Jackson, 2008). Hence, 'thick descriptions' of political violence that enfold temporal and historical aspects, that look at violence in the context of wider practices and at violent activists as people with a past and a future, are needed and much more useful than mere definitions of the term terrorism (Jackson et al., 2011, p.119).

The Drivers of Political Violence: The Role of Political Narratives

In this section, I will explore the relevant literature regarding three distinctive drivers of individual agency in the context of political violence: the engagement with, the life within, and the disengagement from a political violent organisation. In this dissertation, I argue that these drivers can provide a framework to analyse and understand political violent activism in the context of the broader life stories of its actors and the political narratives surrounding them.

Mainstream studies often deem individual radical dispositions as the primary driver in political violence. Nonetheless, the issue is not focusing on radical dispositions at the individual level, but not connecting such radical dispositions with biographical experiences and contextual factors. Thus, the descriptions and explanations offered by mainstream studies are often flat and limited, lacking the complexity and richness of intertwined individual, social, cultural,

political and historical processes. In this vein, this section elicits uncommon conversations in the political violence arena, bringing to the table, for example, life course and narrative theorists, with the aim of enriching the characterization of the personal experience of those engaging, remaining and disengaging from a political violent organisation and of understanding the role played by political narratives.

So what are political narratives? According to Andrews (2007, p.8), political narratives are the 'stories people tell about how the world works, how they explain the engines of social change, and the role they see themselves, and those whom they regard as being part of their group, as playing in this ongoing struggle'. However, elsewhere, this author considers that political narratives are not only constituted by personal stories, but also by larger clusters of national stories in which individuals position themselves (Andrews, 2014b). The latter compose the macro political narratives which portray the contextual 'cultural stock of plots' (Polletta, 2006, p.10) or the 'cultural narratives' (Rice, 2002, p.82) which give primacy to certain stories to the detriment of others, and which elect the stories to be remembered and the stories to be forgotten (through, for instance, history textbooks or public officials' speeches at certain key national events). In this context, Selbin (2010, p.9) considers that the stories people tell about their lives and 'the popular political culture of their society' are at the origin of the possibility or impossibility of change. Thus, political narratives are situated at the interplay between micro and macro narratives, between personal and public stories, constituting the building blocks of individual identity and informing how the self and others are perceived. Jerome Bruner (1987) also underlines the narrative connection between cultural and individual identity, affirming that:

> One important way of characterizing a culture is by the narrative models it makes available for describing the course of a life. And the tool kit of any culture is replete not only with a store of canonical life narratives (heroes, Marthas, tricksters, etc.), but with combinable formal constituents from which its members can construct their own life narratives (Bruner, 1987, p.15).

Thus, individuals respond to the conditions and stimuli of their environment in ways that are consistent with their life stories; in other words in ways that are consistent with the perceptions they hold about themselves, others and their political, social, cultural, economic and historical

milieu (see for example, McAdams, 2008). Such perceptions are generated by a personal cultural repertoire, which is influenced by the 'early narrative environment of the family', by the stories individuals' access while growing up (Wang and Brockmeier, 2002, p.54), and by the social interactions that occur across their life course (Elder, 1994). Thus, individuals' perceptions differ significantly according to the cultural resources available to them (Ochs and Capps, 1996; Brockmeier, 2009), as well as according to two other aspects: their life stage, and the historical moment in which they are born.

According to Bertram Cohler (1982) and corroborated by several other studies (see for example, Habermas and Paha, 2001; Habermas and de Silveira, 2008) the acquisiton of a coherent life story narrative is only first possible at the life stage of adolescence. In developmental terms it is only at this point in life that individuals are able to give both internal and external context to their life stories and to 'integrate memories and self-concept into a coherent overall account' (Habermas and Hatiboğlu, 2014, p.38). Thus, adolecence enables individuals to conceive and talk about themselves and others biographically, recognising the temporal linearity of their stories, how stories connect and offer explanations for different life events, and what social, cultural and historical contexts surround and influence their lives (Habermas and Hatiboğlu, 2014). At this stage individuals start building their narrative identity, which, according to Dan McAdams (2008, p.243), corresponds to 'an individual's internalized, evolving, and integrative story of the self'.

In terms of the historical moment in which individuals are born, my understanding is based on Karl Mannheim's (1952) 'problem of generations', which aimed to understand how the life courses of generations were influenced by their shared socio-historical location in the social processes. As Sofia Aboim and Pedro Vasconcelos (2013, p.166) noted, Mannheim conceptualised generations 'as cultural constructs that involve historical participation guided by individuals self-awareness'. In this context, Mannheim (1952) made the distinction between generation as location and generation as actuality. The former implied that same generation individuals share the same location in the socio-historical process, both in terms of time and space, which results in shared experiences, lines of thought and action; while the latter goes beyond the mere co-presence in a particular social and historical location, encompassing a set of shared historical responses within a generation to its location. In this sense, as contended by

Mannheim (1952, p.303), an actualised generation emerges 'only where a concrete bond is created between members of a generation by their being exposed to the social and intellectual symptoms of a process of dynamic de-stabilization'. Consequently, Mannheim (1952) argued that periods of socio-political turbulence particularly dispose young generations to politicization and to perform social change. These generations, according to Andrews (2002), become deeply aware of their historical location and ability to impact their social world, braving the route into the transformation from generation as location to generation as actuality. However, being an actualised generation does not equal homogeneity, in the sense that within an actuality there are a number of diverse generation units, mirroring Mannheim's (1952) conception that the same historical context may produce different worldviews.

Finally, as affirmed by Andrews (2002, p.84), 'story telling is part of the journey to generational consciousness'. Individuals tell stories as members of a particular generation, and it is through stories that they learn about others and others learn about them (Andrews, 2002). However, stories do not only work 'for people', but they also work 'on people', leading their construction and understanding of reality, and their course of action (Frank, 2010, p.3). Michael Jackson argues thus:

> Our lives are storied. Were it not for stories, our lives would be unimaginable. Stories make it possible for us to overcome our separateness, to find common ground and common cause. To relate a story is to retrace one's steps, going over the ground of one's life again, reworking reality to render it more bearable. A story enables us to fuse the world within and the world without. In this way we gain some purchase over events that confounded us, humbled us, and left us helpless. In telling a story we renew our faith that the world is within our grasp. (Jackson, 2002, p. 245)

Nonetheless, it is important to note that stories are rooted in the place and time in which they exist and in the social relationships in which they are created, repeated and transformed (Frank, 2010). Thus, personal stories depend on the narrative resources available to individuals; resources that enable them to build relationships, establishing 'cognitive and affective processes' that may gradually lead to violence and that are strengthened by violence itself (della Porta, 2013, p.19). Then, resorting to political violence is not automatic; it is rather a process –

'actions of some kind associated with other actions and reactions, often expressed in some sort of reciprocal relationship' (Taylor and Horgan, 2012, p.130). In addition, such actions are often not violent, in the sense that various 'underground organisations evolve within and then break away from larger, nonviolent social movement organisations' (della Porta, 2013, p.159), these in turn are permeated by stories and storytelling, and where 'narrative goes to the heart of the very cultural and ideational processes' (Davis, 2002, p.4). Consequently, the aspects driving individuals to political violence involve a relational, but also a cultural component, which highlights the symbolic nature of the phenomenon and its roots in images, in stories, in experiences, and in conditions available to individuals at a given time (see, for example, Cordes, 2001; Tololyan, 2001; Arena and Arrigo, 2005). Thus, stories are shared collectively and individuals grow with such stories and use stories to justify their actions, because stories 'make the unseen not only visible but compelling' (Frank, 2010, p.41). Eric Selbin adds the following:

> It is the articulation of compelling stories […] that allows people to deploy them in ways which resonate with others and empower them to seek to change the material and ideological conditions of their everyday lives (Selbin, 2010, p. 6).

Therefore, this author defends the line of reasoning that research should go beyond the usual material and structural factors and focus on the thoughts and feelings of political activists, recognising the role played by stories and narratives 'of past injustices and struggles as they fight for the future' (Selbin, 2010, p. 9).

Engagement with a political violent organisation

The study of the motivation to engage in a political violent organisation has frequently been focused at the individual level, considering, for instance: affiliative factors (e.g. familiarity with radicalised individuals, search for a sense of belonging), risk factors (e.g. lack of family support, connections with criminality), economic factors (e.g. unemployment), social factors (e.g. desire for networking, existence of shared narratives and cultural resources, lack of confidence in official institutions, frustration with the current legal way of fighting), and psychological factors (e.g. personal or family crisis, identity problems, experience of feelings of injustice, association with the victims' suffering, conception of the violent actions as not immoral) (see, for example,

della Porta, 1992; Hundeide, 2003; Fink and Hearne, 2008; Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008; Horgan, 2008; Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Briggs, 2010). However, as mentioned above, individual factors should not be considered in isolation, but in connection with contextual factors, which impact individuals' perceptions of the external reality and their subsequent responses (della Porta, 2013). Contexts of state repression often instigate violent responses from non-state organisations, as can be seen through one of the observations gathered by della Porta (2013) in her study of left-wing activists in Italy in the 1970s:

> Repression also increases the perception that there is no other way out, as it is read as proof of the need to take up arms to resist an authoritarian state (della Porta, 2013, p. 68).

In della Porta's study, the drivers to radical action found in the life stories collected were related to the 'high expectations of change' individuals held at the time, and 'the impression of living in an historical moment'. Consequently, the involvement with a political violent organisation was a political and ideological choice for these individuals, influenced by contextual circumstances, which often feed grievances and intensify demands for violent action (Briggs et al., 2006; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). This is a choice that according to the literature (see, for example, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Ashour, 2009) involves a radicalisation process, which comprises a revolutionary positioning that implies the pursuit of political ends through violent actions. Such a radicalisation process entangles changes in 'beliefs, feelings and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify intergroup violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in-group' (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, p.416). This has often raised debate regarding the causation between cognitive and behavioural factors, it being common to think that radicalised views lead to violent action, and the change of such views affects action. However, research on this subject shows that often individuals develop radicalised views after adhering to a violent organisation, not before (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009); and it is important to note that while radicalised views may open a path to the commission of politically motivated violence, they are not criminal or harmful in themselves (Expert Group on Violent Radicalization, 2008).

Therefore, the engagement with a political violent organisation is steered by the role played by beliefs, strong ideological commitments, and relationships in the radicalisation process, in intersection with contextual factors and conditions. Thus, 'political violence has to be understood as one of the outcomes of intense interactions developing during moments of heightened conflict', which acquaint and socialize individuals to violent actions and strategies (della Porta, 2013, p.111).

Life within a political violent organisation

The commitment to an underground political violent organisation is seen by della Porta (2013, p.243) 'as a continuum of the slippery slope that had brought activists to join the organisation'. In this context, this author suggests two characteristics of life within a political violent organisation that fuel both continued commitment and violence: affective and cognitive closure. Affective closure represents the deep and intense relationships that occur among the members of a usually small, closed, restricted, and restrictive organisation. Affective closure increases as actions become more dangerous, casualties start happening (e.g. death and/or arrest of comrades), and militants do not imagine their lives differently, devoting everything they have and are to the organisation. Consequently, affective closure, according to della Porta (2013), contributes to the elaboration of a freedom fighter identity, to the strengthening of solidarity within militants, and to the increasing perception of opponents as evil and non-human, which presses organisations and individuals to escalate the level of violence of their actions.

Cognitive closure relates with the need militants have to make sense of their behaviour. However, such an exercise happens in a constrained environment, which over time becomes tendentiously more and more isolated from the outside world, impacting the narratives and value systems adopted by militants. Thus, in this context according to Herbert Jäger (1981):

> We see not only the breakdown of normality but also the development of a counterculture, of an alternative system of norms and aims that establishes the frontiers, reduces the constraints, imposes compliance, and – in a situation of complete isolation from the external world – replaces the normal standard of right and wrong, good and evil with a different or alternative value orientation (Jäger, 1981, p.157).

Therefore, life within a political violent organisation causes transformations within individual lives (Horgan, 2009a), which can be seen through the reflections of a former militant of the Italian Red Brigades, Adriana Faranda:

> When you remove yourself from society, even from the most ordinary things, ordinary ways of relaxing, you no longer share even the most basic emotions. You become abstracted, removed. In the long run you actually begin to feel different. Why? Because you are different. (quoted by Jamieson, 1989, pp.267-268)

These transformations are often a product of the type of life activists need to conduct in the underground, which in some cases implies accepting and taking part in actions considered wrong or criminal by the activists themselves (e.g. bank robberies) (Zwerman et al., 2000). However, from the moment activists leave the underground they can hardly return to their previous lives without facing arrest, which converts a pure 'ideological choice' into a 'restrictive consequence of their prior actions', and strengthens the 'investment in sustaining a revolutionary identity' (Zwerman et al., 2000, pp.94-95). Thus, Gilda Zwerman et al. (2000, p.101) considered that clandestinity may be responsible 'for the depoliticization and degeneracy of underground action at both the group and individual levels', causing a change of focus from the initially defended political goals to the ends of violence themselves, and to the maintenance of the collective identity.

Disengagement from a political violent organisation

Leaving behind a political violent organisation is a complex process, which involves different options for different individuals and that can happen in different circumstances and formats, involving a 'range of push-and-pull factors' (Ferguson et al., 2015, p.201). It may be performed by a single person or by a group of people; it may be either performed accordingly to the activist's will or against it; and it may be motivated by ideological factors (e.g. disappointment with the paths chosen by the organisation, differences at strategic, political and ideological levels), psychological factors (e.g. sentiments of burn-out, change of political and/or personal priorities) or physical factors (e.g. detention, change of function within the organisation, exclusion from activity by the organisation itself) (see, for example, Garfinkel, 2007; Horgan,

2009a, 2009c; Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Rashwan, 2009; Vidino, 2011; Reinares, 2011; Ferguson et al., 2015). Yet despite being disengaged from a political violent organisation the activist may still agree and support its cause, which brings us to the important distinction between disengagement and deradicalisation. According to Fernando Reinares (2011, p.780) 'disengagement focuses on behavioural modification', implying a physical disconnection from the commission of violent activities, while deradicalisation 'emphasizes an attitudinal change', implying a process of ideology transformation, whose essential characteristic is the abandonment of the belief that violence is a privileged tool at the service of the political struggle (Ashour, 2009). In this context, when deradicalisation occurs at the collective/organisational level it is important to take into account that not all members of the organisation may agree, which can cause unrest, further violence and even the creation of a new organisation (Ashour, 2009; della Porta, 2013). In fact, in many cases disengagement from a political violent organisation does not occur because activists lose their radicalised views, but because they are prevented for varied reasons (e.g. imprisonment, change of priorities) from being engaged in the struggle (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009). However, issues such as behavioural changes (voluntarily or not), traumatic experiences, disappointments with the organisation, experience of high levels of distress, make individuals more open to cognitive and life transformations (Fink and Hearne, 2008). Additionally, the effectiveness of such transformations is not related to traditional forms of punishment alone, but to the existence of support at educational, social, psychological and economic levels (see for example, Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Ferguson et al., 2015).

The contextual factors surrounding a political violent organisation, both internally and externally, also have a very important role in terms of the disengagement of its members and of the end of the organisation itself (Crelinsten, 2001; Cronin, 2009; della Porta, 2009). External incentives are, essentially, related to the political context in question. On the one hand, contexts of strong repression pose many difficulties to an organisation that opposes the established order, possibly meaning torture and even death of its members. On the other hand, contexts that encourage political participation and offer second opportunities (e.g. amnesty) may also counter violence and support disengagement decisions, opening the opportunity to legal actions, and leading to processes of de-escalation and transition to a legitimate political process (della Porta, 2009). However, above all, disengagement decisions seem to result from changing political

contexts (e.g. undergoing democratisation processes), where activists can perceive social and political changes taking place, because activists do not see the need for further violence (see Reinares, 2011). Another external incentive that may bring an organisation to the end is the decline of popular support, which usually happens when very extreme violent actions are taken by the organisation, actions with which the general public does not agree or identify themselves with anymore (Cronin, 2009; Reinares, 2011). Internal incentives are, essentially, related to the organisation's own structure and dynamics: political violent organisations require sacrifices from their members, such as full availability, which means physical and emotional absence from the outside world, and give a prominent place to relationships inside the organisation, creating strong emotional connections among the activists (della Porta, 2009). However, over time a few grains of sand start entering the wheel and militants feel frustrated, discouraged, and unsure about their further commitment to the armed organisation. These feelings can be caused by disagreement with decisions taken by the leadership, which are seen as deviations from the initially defended political aims, such as the abrupt escalation of violence. Moreover, militants can start blaming the leadership for mistakes and the experience of hostile circumstances (e.g. death of comrades, death of children) (see Reinares, 2011). Some long-term organisations face difficulties in the transition to the next generation, which precipitates their end, others simply achieve their political aims and do not engage in violent activities anymore, and others opt to leave the terrorist format and follow a criminal or warfare path (Cronin, 2009).

Actors of Political Violence

Political violent activists are often described as aggressive, ruthless and insane beings. In the words of Zulaika and Douglass (1996, p.62) terrorists are seen as 'kooks, crazies, demented, or at best misguided'. This is a portrayal that helps justify the above mentioned lack of primary data on the field of terrorism studies, in the sense that there is no point in talking with people that will certainly lie; moreover, 'contact with them is polluting' (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996, p.62) and researchers that dare to establish such contact tend to be considered terrorists themselves or at least 'sympathisers' of the cause (see Sluka, 2009, p.151). Conversely, the actual experience of researchers that included the voices of 'terrorists' in their projects is different. For instance, John Horgan (2004, p.47) reflecting on the research process of his doctoral thesis says, after interviewing 'terrorists': 'the caricatured images of fanatics are not

confirmed', but their 'normality'. This is an aspect corroborated Bruce Hoffman (2006), who reported:

> I have been studying terrorists and terrorism for more than 20 years. Yet I am still always struck by how disturbingly 'normal' most terrorists seem when one actually sits down and talks to them. Rather than the wild-eyed fanatics or crazed killers that we have been conditioned to expect, many are in fact highly articulate and extremely thoughtful individuals for whom terrorism is (or was) an entirely rational choice, often reluctantly embraced and then only after considerable reflection and debate (Hoffman, 2006, p.7).

This image of the actors that in the words of Hoffman 'we have been conditioned to expect', is also nurtured by the use of the label 'terrorist' in relation to individuals that "challenged the power, authority and legitimacy of the state" through violent actions (Thompson, 2014, p.19). It is comprehensible that naming the phenomenon facilitates understanding and engagement with the complex reality we inhabit, though a simple name has the authority to 'place emphasis on certain aspects and characteristics of an object, while neglecting or omitting other key areas'. This arguably does so in a way which reflects power relationships, makes the scale fall towards the 'authority of the name-giver' (Bhatia, 2005, pp.9-10), and in the particular case under analysis ignores the individual as a whole person, as a being whose actions are not only of terroristic nature, and have not always been nor will not always be (Toros, 2008). Furthermore, the actions are terroristic, not the individuals (Toros and Gunning, 2009). Individuals involved in political violence are political actors, 'fellow human beings and not of dog-headed cannibals' (Leach, 1977, p.36), whose lives are influenced and influence their spatial, temporal and relational context and are liable to change (Gunning, 2009).

When talking with armed fighters it is not unusual to find that they do not accept the label 'terrorists' (Cordes, 2001), often preferring terms such as 'revolutionaries', 'guerrilla fighters', or 'freedom fighters', which might derive from the ideological stance they take or simply because they do not see a parallel between their actions that may involve destruction of property only, and the actions of organisations that, for instance, kill people (Colvin, 2009). Armed fighters also show aversion to be considered common criminals, which implies personal gains

and motivations, when they see their actions as being at the service of everyone's greater good (Colvin, 2009). In the literature these distinctions are mirrored, for example, by debates around 'how to distinguish the criminal attacks of terrorists from the legitimate use of force by freedom fighters?' (Schmid, 2004, p.414). In this context, freedom fighters are conceived as liberators, as actors that resort to violence to overthrow a greater evil and whose targets are well defined and do not aim at harming or terrorizing civilians in any way (Schmid, 2004). However, the issue, as pointed out by Paige Eager (2008), is that on the ground it is very difficult to make such rigorous distinction. The same individuals might carry out both terroristic and non-terroristic actions, and, in the end, it all seems to come down to the choice of governments to quickly label individuals and organisations as 'terrorist', persuading 'the world […] that the solution need not involve political negotiation and concessions but merely a vicious 'counterterrorism' (really counter-insurgency) campaign' (Sluka, 2009, p.150).

Furthermore, the report produced by the Expert Group on Violent Radicalization (2008, p.11) arrived at the conclusion that 'individuals involved in terrorist activities exhibit a diversity of social backgrounds, undergo rather different processes of violent radicalisation and are influenced by various combinations of motivations'. In this sense, efforts towards profiling individuals prone to violent radicalisation and to terrorism were considered ineffective, as well as the preventive strategies based on these measures. A more favourable opinion was elaborated in relation to the profiling of dimensions, processes and pathways based on largely diverse case studies, which could help structure preventive programmes towards the inhibition and disruption of processes of radicalisation into political violence.

Gender dynamics

Gender is a central topic when focusing on the actors of political violence, particularly in relation to the role of women, which is often surrounded by stereotypes and misconceptions, as the overall research on the field. However, as noted by Caron Gentry:

> Women in terrorism studies seem to have been lost or misconstrued more easily. It is the women who are typically taken out of context (Gentry, 2004, p.288).

In this vein, the participation of women in violent actions and organisations is often seen as an 'aberration', as the opposite to the 'ideal of womanhood', 'women give life – they do not take it' (Colvin, 2009, pp.189-190). Subsequently, women who engage in violent actions are often labelled as not only 'tough-as-males', but also as 'tougher-than-men' (Nacos, 2008, p.265; Colvin, 2009), labels that are shaped by 'gender norms, where a violent woman is equated to an emotional, ruthless woman' (Gentry, 2004, p.289). Women are also described as bored, naïve and 'out-of-touch-with-reality' beings, who do not have a clue about the goals of the organisation or the reasons behind specific actions (Nacos, 2008, p.266). External attention is often focused on the 'personal' and 'private' lives of women activists (Hamilton, 2007, p.133), special notice being given to their physical attributes, family connections and love lives over their political grievances or agendas (Nacos, 2008). In this context, women's romantic relationships inside the organisation are frequently highlighted, in order to show that women join violent organisations as an act of love (Hamilton, 2007; Nacos, 2008).

The issues at the origin of such misconceptions and prejudices are very similar to the issues that permeate studies on political violence in general – gender issues are regularly ignored, women's voices are seldom heard, and gender-sensitive approaches are seldom taken (Breen-Smyth, 2007; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011). However, it is imperative to bring gender to the political violence arena, not only considering women as victims, but also as performers, who willingly join violent organisations (Sylvester and Parashar, 2009). A gender-focused research practice could shed light on areas little explored, such as how and why do women come to enter an armed organisation; the role, place and behaviour of women (as well as men) in a hyper masculine setting; the gender relationships within armed organisations; the leadership dynamics among men and women; and the complex interaction of the personal and the political in shaping female participation (Hamilton, 2007; Jackson et al., 2011).

The answer to some of these questions have been attempted by several researchers, some basing their assumptions on secondary data (e.g. Mahan and Griset, 2008), others on historical documents (e.g. Gentry, 2004; Hamilton, 2007), and others on primary data (e.g. de Cataldo Neuburger and Valentini, 1996; Alison, 2004). It is interesting to note that many studies arrived at the conclusion that women's and men's roles do not differ much. For instance, in an effort to describe the role of women within political violent organisations, Susan Mahan and Pamala

Griset (2008, pp.242-243) considered four options: firstly, women can be *sympathizers*, which means that they know the organisation and agree with its goals, might be involved in logistical support or might even be partners of militants, but they are not publicly identified with the organisation; secondly, women can be *spies*, who help family members or friends that are part of the organisation, but they do not have a political agenda of their own; thirdly, women can be *warriors*, participating in the conflict in the same way as men, but not in a leadership position, and often not having a say on the decision-making process; fourthly, and finally, women can be *dominant forces*, they can be ideologues, leaders, motivators and strategists, a role which is usually played by few women. Whilst the reality is that a man can also exert any of these roles this does not mean we should dismiss the value of a gendered analysis. Various studies about women who joined armed organisations also arrived at the conclusion that their paths into the organisation were very similar to that of the men (e.g. through relational networks), and that their political grievances and agendas were the same and as firm as the men (Hamilton, 2007; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Ness, 2008; Alison, 2009). Thus, as Brigitte Nacos (2008, p.259) affirmed: 'there is no evidence that male and female terrorists are fundamentally different in terms of their recruitment, motivation, ideological fervour, and brutality'. However, I would assert that whether or not significant differences can be found, gender should be actively considered in research in this field as a potentially important element of experience and interaction within political organisations.

In terms of the type of organisations that are more open to women's participation, Miranda Alison (2004, 2009) concluded, from her research with women combatants and ex-combatants from Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, that organisations with left wing, liberationist, egalitarian and emancipatory perspectives are more receptive to women's engagement, than pro-state organisations. In the sense, that women's participation is conceived as a symbol of the societal equality and transformation that those groups are fighting for (Yuval-Davis, 1997). However, it is also important to note that over time some armed organisations have taken advantage of gender stereotypes, using women to undertake certain actions, because their political participation is often disregarded, in some places they are less controlled, they can act in ways that men cannot (e.g. faking a pregnant belly in order to transport guns), and their presence gives an appearance of 'normality' to different scenarios (e.g. a couple going for a walk that in fact is observing a target) (Alison, 2004; Mahan and Griset, 2008; Jackson et al., 2011). In this

context, the ‘usefulness’ of women reflects the gender norms mentioned above, portraying women as submissive recruits at the service of men’s plans (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007).

Concluding Reflections: Towards an Understanding of Personal Narratives

This chapter has explored the relevant literature on political violence, with a particular focus on the personal experiences of the actors of politically motivated violence and their contexts of action. The theoretical discussion has mostly been framed by critical terrorism perspectives, which raise the importance of including the actors of violence themselves in the dialogue, as opposed to mainstream terrorism perspectives.

The focus on the life stories of political violent activists, both men and women, is particularly important because it enables the access to individual dynamics of response to tumultuous socio-political contexts. Thus, the understanding of their constructions of reality that fuel action is greatly important: understanding why them and not their neighbours, or their fellow non-violent activists engage in political violence; and understanding their positions, roles, gender dynamics and broader lives within an armed organisation. However, such a focus on individuals does not intend to suggest that political violence can be explained through individual experiences only. Political violence is a phenomenon that operates at different levels – macro, meso and micro – yet the exploration of individual dynamics, pathways and perspectives through primary sources is of extreme importance to the development of an integrated and well-informed approach.

Therefore, instead of pursuing exact definitions of fluid concepts, or building theoretical profiles based on static ideal types that cannot be applied to all organisations, and that may not even be applied to the same organisation over time (because sociological and demographic characteristics of activists change across the lifetime of an armed organisation), I argue that in-depth accounts of political violence should be brought to the centre stage. These accounts should be embodied by the experiences of political violent activists, who act in certain temporal, spatial, cultural, social, political and historical dimensions, resorting to violence as a response to their ideological commitments and to the stories that tell who they are and what they live for.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGICAL MAP: DRAWING ON STORIES

Overview

In this chapter I reiterate the focus of the present research and develop the approach taken toward answering my research questions. I begin by exploring the research focus, including the emphasis given to personal stories of former political violent activists in Portugal, which are the unit of analysis of my narrative inquiry. I then discuss the ontological and epistemological assumptions in which this dissertation is anchored, which are informed by CTS perspectives and by narrative analysis as a paradigm. The fieldwork involved in this research is portrayed next, including information about the research participants and the procedures of data collection through interviewing. The following section is dedicated to the steps taken in the analysis of data, and finally I present the ethical concerns related to the conduct of the research. The chapter closes with a reflection on the role of emotions in social sciences research.

The Research Focus

> Very often the data is not only scarce, but also contradictory, it has never been transferred to paper and only relies on memory, the most perishable of things. (Pereira, 2013, pp.18–19, translation mine)

Personal stories of involvement in politically motivated violence are the focus of the present research, which attempts to produce an in-depth account of this social phenomenon that has been very little explored in the Portuguese context. However, as José Pacheco Pereira (2013) noted[23], it can still be retrieved from one of the few places where it lives: the memory of the individuals who took part in these processes. Therefore, I firmly believe that the stories people

[23] Pereira in his book *Paper Weapons* is only referring to the clandestine press produced by the opposition to *Estado Novo*, however, I argue that his citation also applies to the data concerning political violent organisations that emerged both before and after the Revolution of April 1974.

tell about their lives are connected with and shed light on the social, cultural, political, historical and human contexts which frame these same stories and these same lives (see Chase, 2005; Andrews, 2007; Frank, 2010), enriching the study of political violence. Yet, it is important to note that personal stories are socially constructed and cannot be taken as *the* representation of *the* reality, but as *a* representation of *a* reality (see Esin et al., 2013). Stories are the vehicles through which individuals represent their experiences, based on the narratives available at their temporal and spatial locations; narratives which constitute the cultural and social resources which enable individuals to put their stories together (Spector-Mersel, 2010), giving meaning to themselves and to the world (Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988), and shaping their personal identities (McAdams, 1993). Thus, story and narrative are different. As Brett Smith (in press) argues, 'people tell stories, not narratives', but their stories draw on their cultural knowledge, on their relationship with the receiver, and on the shared and divergent understandings of which stories are appropriate in different contexts (Gubrium and Holstein, 1997).

This study took on board the perspectives of former political activists who were positioned on both the political left and right spectrums, and who belonged to six different armed organisations that acted in Portugal in the past, both before and after the Revolution of 1974, and in dictatorial and democratic conditions, respectively (see Table 1 in chapter two). The variety of organisations and people under study represent the attempt of capturing a complex phenomenon, of exploring the social and political specificities of a country at a time when it was the scene of violent conflicts, and of reflecting the diversity of experiences and understandings.

The central research question that guided this study was, 'how do former political violent activists in Portugal narrate their experiences in terms of engagement with, life within, and disengagement from an armed organisation?' In this vein, by exploring how politically motivated violence came to be a part of my interviewees' life course, I was able to examine the contexts that surrounded their activism (e.g. historical – 40 years of an oppressive regime –, social – growing up listening to tales of family resistance), what their activism meant for them (e.g. martyrdom of personal interests in order to achieve a greater good), how it impacted their lives at different time points (e.g. while living underground, after being released from prison), and how a few women, against all societal expectations (including in some cases the

expectations of their own male comrades), played active roles within armed organisations, dealt with gender motivated conflicts, and became symbols of emancipation.

The Research Backbone

> Our philosophical commitments influence the logic behind our research methods and our knowledge claims and how we might use them to craft our research. (Cunliffe, 2011, p.648)

This research's philosophical commitments served the purposes pointed out by Philipp Cunliffe (2011), but also assisted the constant efforts of grounding both the fieldwork experiences and the analysis of the collected data in a certain way of perceiving the nature of such a complex social reality as it is political violence, and how to go about examining it.

In 1980, Gareth Morgan and Linda Smircich provided a framework that drew a continuum between objective and subjective approaches to reality, outlining 'the assumptions about ontology and human nature' (p.492). On the one hand, objective approaches defend that there is one reality, which exists independently of both individual action and wider context, and that can be scientifically tested and measured, allowing the discovery of the rules and configurations that underlie the phenomenon under study; on the other hand, subjective approaches consider that there are multiple realities, which are dependent on the individual living and reporting them, placing the person at the centre of the research (Guba and Lincoln, 2005).

In the quest for the ontology of political violence in the context of the present research, I opted for a self-reflexive minimal foundationalism put forward by CTS scholars Harmonie Toros and Jeroen Gunning (2009), which has its origins in the Frankfurt School of critical theory (see Horkheimer, 1992). These authors distanced themselves from a pure post-structuralist ontology generally defended by critical theory scholars (e.g. Gold-Biss, 1994; Zulaika and Douglass, 1996; Oliverio, 1998; Jackson, 2005; Hulsse and Spencer, 2008; Jarvis, 2009), who mainly focus on terrorism as a discourse that legitimises the state and its violence, and not as a category of violence in itself; thus, for post-structuralist scholars, it is only when an act is labelled as

'terrorism' and receives a state response as such that terrorism becomes a category (Toros, 2012). However, a self-reflexive minimal foundationalism argues that terrorism is a category of violence, which is historically positioned and changes over time (Toros, 2012). Consequently, minimal foundationalism allows the investigation of how terrorism is represented in discourse, 'while at the same time retaining a category that also engages with the strategies of the violence of a conflict' (Toros, 2012, p.29). In this sense, as put by Jackson (2015, p.25), 'the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualized as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other'. Therefore, this ontological approach creates a bridge between what Morgan and Smircich (1980) considered to be objective (e.g. positivist) and subjective (e.g. post-structuralist) approaches to reality, 'retaining categories of regularity while remaining aware of their contingency and political effect, and thus constantly seeking to interrogate and destabilize them' (Toros and Gunning, 2009, p.93). However, it is important to note that despite differentiating phenomena according to their characteristics, such an ontological perspective also acknowledges that these characteristics and their interpretation are context-bound, and not positivist objective facts (Jackson, 2015). In this sense, a 'relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts' is put forward by critical scholars (Jackson, 2015, p.25), who consider terms such as terrorism, conflict, violence and the like to be constructed by social and political narratives, discourses and practices, rooted in specific contexts and variable across time (Zulaika and Douglas, 1996; Jackson et al., 2011). Accordingly, political violence is not a universal, concrete and immutable fact, and acts of violence are not extraordinary occurrences, unrelated to other social and political, violent or non-violent activities (Jackson et al., 2011). Thus, political violence is a 'narrativistic' social reality, whose holistic nature informs both agent and observer according to their contextual and temporal dimensions (Spector-Mersel, 2010, p.211).

In terms of epistemological commitments the present research chooses to approach political violence through constructionism, which conceives it as a social phenomenon, and not as an objective reality (Turk, 2004; Spalek, 2008), and is aligned with CTS (see Jackson et al., 2011) and the narrative paradigm (see Sparkes and Smith, 2008; Spector-Mersel, 2010; Esin et al., 2013). Both perspectives highlight the fact that knowledge production is a social process always tied to a particular context, in which a story is co-constructed between interviewer and

interviewee, and is also influenced by broader social, interpersonal and cultural relations (Jackson et al., 2011; Esin et al., 2013). Both perspectives also emphasize the relationship between power and knowledge, in the sense that 'knowledge can be employed by actors as a political tool of influence and dominance' (Jackson et al., 2011, p.37; see also Phoenix, 2008; Tamboukou, 2003, 2008). Consequently, power relations, gender issues, historical contexts, and ethical concerns on conducting research must always have a place at the research table (Breen Smyth, 2007). Therefore, such a constructionist epistemology is based on a 'socio-cultural oriented approach that conceptualizes human beings as meaning makers who, in order to interpret, direct, and intelligibly communicate life, configure and constitute their experience and sense of who they are using narratives that their social and cultural world have passed down' (Smith, in-press). However, narratives can never be taken as ultimate products, because their dialogical nature (Bakhtin, 1981; Riessman, 2008) involves elements prone to change over time (e.g. public discourses, available storylines), which impact tellers' perspectives and positioning in the narrative process (Jones, 2002; Esin et al., 2013). In this vein, a constructionist epistemology takes into account the positions taken by both the researcher and the researched, because as Cigdem Esin et al. (2013, p.206) argued: 'Storytellers and listeners do not move freely between subject positions; they are invested in and by them.'

Finally, my reasoning during the research process was guided by certain criteria that have been used by different qualitative researchers in recent years to judge the quality of their work (e.g., Richardson, 2000; Smith and Deemer, 2000; Smith and Caddick, 2012; Sparkes, Smith and Caddick, 2014; Sparkes and Smith, 2014). Such criteria (adapted from the above authors) were: 1) worthy topic – the research topic is pertinent, timely, significant, and interesting; 2) rigour and width – the research uses sufficient and appropriate theoretical constructs, data and time spent in the field, and data collection/analysis processes. There is a comprehensive body of quality evidence on which the interpretations/analyses are based; 3) honesty – the research is characterised by self-reflexivity about subjective values, biases and inclinations of the researcher, and transparency about methods and challenges; 4) significant contribution – the research contributes to the understanding of social life and advances knowledge conceptually/theoretically, practically, methodologically, and empirically; 5) ethical – the research was conducted in an ethically sound manner and aspired to strong moral codes; and 6) coherence – the study achieves its stated aims, using adequate methods and procedures, and

meaningfully interconnects literature, research questions, findings and interpretations with each other.

Fieldwork

> Fieldwork is a gamble, an experience, an education, and something of an adventure as well. One is never the same person at the end of it as one was at the beginning. (Sluka, 1989, p.34)

As Toros (2008, p. 289) acknowledged, fieldwork is composed by 'experiential data', which opens the possibility to deepen the understanding of political violence. Through fieldwork we come into direct contact with the human beings behind our assumptions, we establish personal relationships with them, and we strive to grasp the complexity of their lives, in order to trustworthily represent their perspectives and enrich the knowledge that surrounds the social processes under study (Sluka, 1989; Toros, 2008). In this sense, the individuals we meet in the field become partners in our research endeavour, and not cold objects of study (Toros, 2008), with whom we co-construct meanings and re-construct their lived experiences.

Fieldwork involved in research on violence, according to Antonius Robben and Carolyn Nordstrom (1995, p.3), has its particularities, especially regarding 'the emotional intensity of the events and people studied, the political stakes that surround research on violence, and the haphazard circumstances under which fieldwork is conducted'. In this sense, these authors considered that it is not uncommon that researchers involved in this type of fieldwork experience a personal 'existential shock' (p.13), and sometimes even a theoretical 'fieldwork crisis' (p.14), caused by a diverse array of dilemmas and tensions. However, both Robben and Nordstrom (1995) and Toros (2008) agree that the issues that emerge in the context of fieldwork have the potential of deepening the understanding of both the individuals and the phenomenon under examination.

The present investigation's fieldwork was composed by interviews with former members of political violent organisations that acted in Portugal in the past. Through this method, the

interviewees were able to share, in their own words, their experiences, perspectives and stories about their past choices and activities (see Kvale, 2007; Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009)


Interviewing

All interviews were conducted in person in January and February of 2013 with a total of 28 individuals. Although an opportunity sample was used, significant attention was invested to ensure that the selected interviewees were representative of their organisation, and that even within the same organisation different individuals, with different perspectives were being reached (see Arksey and Knight, 1999). This was achieved through the use of a technique known as snowball sampling, which in the present case did not start from square one, because I began by contacting five individuals from three different organisations, who I interviewed in the context of my Master's thesis in 2010. Other than conceding me a second interview, these individuals, acknowledging my intents of expanding the research, discussed, recommended and put me in contact with other individuals, both within and outside their own organisations. These conversations, and the subsequent ones with other interviewees, allowed the identification of individuals who, for instance, assumed different roles within the organisation (e.g. leadership, logistics); were part of different phases of the organisation; and had different perspectives about the actions, the ideology and even the organisation itself[24]. Thus, this quest was in part led by my interviewees' recommendations, but also by some specific requests I had in mind, either because someone not related to any of the organisations, but well aware of their activities told me about the importance of interviewing particular individuals, or because I came across a few names on the existent literature on the subject. Only one contacted individual refused to be interviewed, arguing that personally she prefers to never talk about or remember the past. Hence, I found snowball sampling exceptionally useful in assisting the access to a hard-to-reach group of interviewees. However, it is important to note, that this technique was combined with the concern to safeguard diversity, in order to counter the tendency some interviewees might have had to recommend individuals they trusted would tell the 'right' version of events, or individuals they considered to be 'the right ones' to listen to. In this vein, the potential bias and homogeneity effects instigated by the snowball sampling technique were taken into account and adjusted (see Renzetti and Lee, 1993).

[24] Although using the singular, this applied to all organisations under analysis.

Before starting fieldwork, I planned to interview five individuals from each organisation under analysis, despite being aware that on the ground such plans could change. In the end, as it is possible to see in Figure 11, I was able to find five individuals for four different organisations (LUAR, ARA, BR and MDLP) who conveyed enough variety in terms of experiences and perspectives to the study. However, in two cases I was not able to stick with the initial plan. In the case of ELP, I was not able to interview more than one individual, because, as I became aware during my fieldwork, the organisation was originally very small and many militants at the time of the interview had passed away, were living abroad or refused to be interviewed. In the case of FP-25, I considered beneficial to interview two more individuals for the sake of variety of points of view and experiences. The pseudonyms used in the present dissertation are also featured in Figure 11, in order to facilitate the reading of the following chapters.

Figure 11: Interviewees' Characteristics



As described above, I began the interviewing process by going back to the individuals I had interviewed in the context of my Master's thesis three years ago. There were three main reasons behind this decision: 1) these individuals already knew me and my work, having read and commented on my Master's thesis; 2) these individuals trusted, by experience, that I would not use their words in any disrespectful manner or without their consent; and 3) based on points 1 and 2 these individuals could vouch for me when contacting other former members of their organisations to be potentially interviewed. All these points proved to produce fairly good results, both in terms of accessing new interviewees, and in terms of deepening the relationships and conversations with the Master's contacts. All follow-up interviews turned out to be fruitful conversations, where aspects explored before were further developed and new aspects were raised and explored, contributing to 'a more credible, in-depth, and complex understanding of participant's lives' (Smith, 2013, p.111).

After providing informed consent (see appendices A and B for information and consent sheets respectively), all of the interviewees were involved in semi-structured life history interviews. The semi-structured interview schedule (see appendix C) was used in a flexible way to help stimulate reflection on important topics related to the research question posed by this study, while allowing the interviewees to lead the course of the conversation and to choose what and how to recount. In this sense, each singular interview had its own dynamic, from interview to interview the order of the questions varied and often some questions were not asked, because the interviewees would answer them along the flow of their narrations. Consequently, the interview process allowed the interviewees to tell thorough, multi-layered stories about their lives in general, and their involvement with a political violent organisation in particular, thereby creating rich storied accounts.

Interaction interviewer – interviewee

The interactions that took place in the context of the present research are considered 'a source of enrichment', which assists and improves the 'mutual comprehension' between the interviewer and the different interviewees (Andrews, 1991, p.51). In this vein, a set of factors that may deeply influence the interview process were taken into account and reflected upon, such as: the way in which the interviewees perceive the interviewer and vice-versa; the type of

questions interviewees ask the interviewer and how the interviewer answers them; the effort from the interviewees' part to find similarities with the researcher's experience or context; the attempt to undermine the interview from the interviewees' part, because they do not agree with the research aims; the motivation behind assenting to be interviewed; and the feelings the interview may stir in the researcher. A few examples related to these factors will be now drawn from the present study.

From my experience, the way I was perceived by the majority of my interviewees was mostly influenced by my age (mid-twenties) and my gender. Although the reactions of different interviewees varied, the conversations tended to display a patronizing tone, based on the assumption that we did not share the same lived experiences in terms of socio-political contexts and realities. However, some assumed a *grand-parent-patronizing tone*, while others assumed an *offensive-patronizing tone*. The former assumed their duties as storytellers, as guardians of past realities that need to be communicated to a younger generation, who did not live through such times, consequently needing quite a lot of details to understand what is being told; and the latter assumed that I was too young to possess enough knowledge to be conducting such an enterprise, which resulted in one interviewee addressing me as 'baby', two others describing me to other people in my presence as 'the little doctor', and one other telling me repeatedly and directly, during our time together, that my project was rubbish. At the same time, I consider that both my age and gender also contributed to an easier access to interviewees, because a young woman is not perceived as a threat (see Gomez-Cespedes, 1999), and to a greater openness of some of them who perceived me as a daughter or granddaughter who, for a change, was interested in their experiences (some interviewees complained that nowadays' generation does not care about political matters).

My interviewees also tended to ask me various personal questions at the start of the interview. In most cases they wanted to trace the origins of my research interests, so they asked questions about my academic path, my Master's research (which was available to them) and my move to England. Some of them also wanted to know more about my family and the place where I grew up. However, in terms of personal questions there was one interviewee who stood out by asking how many children I am planning to have, when, and if my husband treats me well. At the end of the interview he also gave me a piece of advice, because he was very impressed by the fact

that my husband waited for me in the car during our three-hour conversation, so he told me to treat him well and to not abuse his patience. At the time I found this interviewee's questions and advice quite odd and a little bit too detailed, yet for him they made total sense, as I came to understand afterwards when reflecting on his interview, which was populated by family stories and statements about the importance of family. Thus, my position in relation to answering interviewees' questions, both professional and personal, was always to reply in an honest and personal manner. This is a position inspired by various reflections around asking individuals, who are seeing me for the first time, to tell me about their own lives, feelings, experiences and perspectives. So, in my perception, stimulated by Andrews (1991), it does not hurt my research or myself if I too answer some questions about my career or even my family prospects; on the contrary, it deepens the relationship built around the interview process and strengthens the needed trust between the different parts, particularly in the context of research on violence.

Finally, there were two important reflections on the process of conducting interviews that helped me frame some challenging experiences. The first was related to what Charles Briggs (1986, p.123) described as the 'ideological assumptions […] tied to relationships of power and control' that engulf the interview process; and the second to what Robben (1995, p.83) called 'ethnographic seduction'. Thus, I was initially aware that as the researcher I had the control over all the research process, from the creation of the interview schedule, to the analysis and presentation of the results. Yet, according to my perceptions of the world and ways of understanding it (in other words, my ontological and epistemological commitments), I was also aware that I needed to relinquish such a full control and elevate my interviewees to partners in the knowledge construction process. However, what I was not expecting was the strong indignation I felt when coming across a specific group of interviewees who tried to clearly shape the course of the research, according to their own ideological perspectives, giving me only access, for instance, to individuals of their choice who they knew would reproduce their viewpoints. At the time of the interviews this situation was new to me, it did not take place during my Master's interviews, which were much more reduced in number and did not include militants from the right-wing organisations who fought after the Revolution, and who behaved very differently in relation to the left-wing individuals interviewed, or so I thought. My indignation took a while to be appeased and benefited from the support of some 'critical friends' (Sparkes and Smith, 2014), whose perspectives helped me realize that my own ideological

assumptions were playing a role in the interviewing process, and could even affect the data analysis. Thus, on the one hand I became unintentionally antagonist to the group of interviewees that were against the Revolution and leaned towards the dictatorial regime, and on the other hand I was caught on the above-mentioned 'ethnographic seduction' in relation to the interviewees from different organisations who opposed the dictatorship and aimed for the establishment of a fair political system. According to Robben (1995, p.83), a researcher encounters 'ethnographic seduction' when the interviewees are allowed 'personal defences and social strategies' that get in the way of the research focus and block critical insight. In this sense, this author considered that when looking at interviewees' accounts, as researchers we must 'be attentive to our own inhibitions, weaknesses, and biases' (p.84); and must not become so entwined on the interview process that we 'no longer seek to grasp the native's point of view, but we believe […] that we have become natives ourselves' (p.85). Thus, when analysing my interviewees' accounts, I had to be rigorous in distinguishing empathy and seduction, in order to retain the same level of interest and understanding to all of them, and to not become more excited about and consequently focused on some stories than in others. In this sense, I tried what is considered to be ideal:

> Ideally, the anthropologist develops an intentional schizophrenia between being an objective scientific observer and a subjective humanistic participant. (Sluka, 1989, p.9)

Accountability and responsibility

Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed to all interviewees when first contacted, and reiterated at the start of each interview. These features of the research were very relevant for some individuals, who in some cases did not even sign the consent form, while for others were seen as unnecessary, because in their perspective they assume their positions and have nothing to hide[25].

All interviews were consensually audio-recorded and lasted, on average, two hours and a half (the shortest took forty-five minutes and the longest four hours). Most interviews took place at the interviewees' residences, workplaces or public places of their choice (e.g. cafes). At the end

[25] However, even in this cases anonymity and confidentiality were put into place.

of each interview, interviewees were informed that they would receive the verbatim transcript of their interview, in order to make any changes, rectifications or to exclude any sections that they would prefer to not be included in the final document. This exercise was very useful regarding the correction of errors and inaccuracies that occurred during the transcription process, and also gave participants the opportunity to reflect on their words, to be able to better represent their feelings or positions when desired, and to remove anything that might have made them feel uncomfortable when published. One of the interviewees, for instance, after reading his interview transcript wrote back to me saying: 'I would like to remove some personal 'confidences' I told you, but that exposed on paper like that bother me a bit'. In this vein, a 'theoretical democratic stance' was employed, allowing interviewees' engagement with different phases of the research process, and sharing with them the control over their own words (Simons, 2009, p.36).

Above all transparency, respect and honesty were the values pursued during this research process. In this sense, no action was taken with second intentions in mind or in order to catch the interviewees making mistakes or hiding something. As contended by Steinar Kvale (2006, p.482), the interview should never be a process 'where relationships of empathy and trust may serve as social lubrication to elicit unguarded confidences'.

Narrative Inquiry: Dealing with Stories

> Stories work with people, for people, and always stories work on people, affecting what people are able to see as real, as possible, and as worth doing or best avoided. (Frank, 2010, p.3)

Various researchers who focused on human experience consider that individuals resort to narrative in order to organise their lives (Bruner, 1987; Freeman, 1993; McAdams, 1993). A narrative is produced through the process of emplotment, and according to Paul Ricoeur (1984, p.64) it is the plot as the "organisation of events" which performs the mediating role between both action events and speech acts, and interpretation. A plot puts together a story composed of numerous events (see Czarniawska, 2004, p. 122) by arranging a chronological sequence of events (episodes) into "meaningful totalities" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 278). In this sense, Ricoeur

perceives narrative not only as a whole discursive unit, but also as a process of organising events (emplotment) which creates something new and makes it interpretable. This turns the story into the thematic dimension of narration, the '*what* happens' based on '*how* we learn of what happens' through the plot (Frus, 1994, p. 35).

In Ricoeur's (1984) conception, the reader also has certain internalized expectations when following a story, such as: stories have a beginning, a middle and an end. Thus, according to Ricoeur:

> […] [T]o follow a story is to understand the successive actions, thoughts and feelings as displaying a particular *directedness*. By this I mean that we are pushed along by the development and that we respond to this thrust with expectations concerning the outcome and culmination of the process. In this sense, the 'conclusion' of the story is the pole of attraction of the whole process. But a narrative conclusion can be neither deduced nor predicted. There is no story unless our attention is held in suspense by a thousand contingencies. Hence we must follow the story to its conclusion. So rather than being *predictable*, a conclusion must be *acceptable*. Looking back from the conclusion towards the episodes which led up to it, we must be able to say that this end required those events and that chain of action. But this retrospective glance is made possible by the teleologically guided movement of our expectations when we follow the story. Such is the paradox of the contingency, 'acceptable after all', which characterises the understanding of any story (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 277, original emphasis).

Equally important to note is that the process of following a story over time is based on the ability of the human mind to conceive of a "present" which is created by the process of something passing "*from (ex)* the future, *through (per)* the present, *into (in)* the past" (Ricoeur 1984, p. 13, original emphasis). In other words, making sense of events in the present is only possible through reference to memory, (what has already happened) and expectation (what might still happen). Thus, Ricoeur considers the act of remembering in the present to be one of the key elements of story-telling:

> It is not just to recall certain isolated events, but to become capable of forming meaningful sequences and ordered connections. In short, it is to be able to constitute one's own existence in the form of a story where a memory as such is only a fragment of the story (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 253).

Other scholars agree with Ricoeur, particularly as the so-called 'narrative turn' in the social sciences has deemed memory to be the 'narrative root metaphor' (Sarbin, 1986). It has brought insights into the role of 'narrative thought' in the economy of daily life (Bruner, 1987) and 'the narrative structure' of memory itself (Rubin, 1996, p. 2). In this context, William Randall (2013, p. 12) affirms that 'going forward into the future depends on insights gained by looking back and seeing patterns in our past, acquiring distance on our life to date, and perceiving it as indeed a story with a Beginning, a Middle, and eventually an End.' For this author, memory can be in fact 'looked upon as text', it can be considered as a literary work in progress, as a narrative that is continually evolving and that is created by an 'author (or co-author), narrator, character, and reader, all at once – and always from within: that is, after The Beginning yet before The End' (2010, p. 150). In addition, memory allows individuals to access 'materials with which they can manufacture stories that are freighted with meaning and thus useful to move people into and through a process' (Selbin, 2010, p. 49). However, this does not happen in isolation, 'but in intimate interaction with a complex set (or setting) of larger stories still' (Randall, 2010, p.151), because stories are 'in part profound societal memory, meaning and message' (Selbin, 2010, p. 28). Consequently, stories make sense of events which are embedded in the 'symbolic universe' of collectives, while contributing to the establishment of institutional facts as a shared past which forms the basis for the narration of new events (Berger and Luckmann 1991, p. 120). Thus, 'memory is not simply a private affair' (Randall, 2010, p. 156) and by nature it misrepresents the past (Spence, 1982). This is because, as Ricoeur (1981, p. 176) pointed out, despite our perception of 'the story' as a whole which is continually unfolding, we are, in effect, 'reading the end in the beginning and the beginning in the end'. According to this philosopher, 'recollection invert[s] the so-called natural order of time' (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 176). In this vein, Randall affirms that:

> Romanticizing, fantasizing, embellishing, embroidering, shrinking, stretching: all of these, to some degree, are inevitable – and normal – whenever we remember. We can never succeed in recalling things exactly as they happened. (Randall, 2010, p. 160)

This is linked to wider debates within the social sciences regarding conceptions and assumptions of truth, which usually refer to what actually happened (see Miller, 2000). However, as already discussed earlier in this chapter, and as defended by various scholars, where memory is concerned, this objective truth cannot be attained (see Randall and Phoenix, 2009; Randall, 2010), even if 'our memory systems do a remarkably good job of pre-serving the general contours of our past' (Schacter, 1996, p.308). Nonetheless, a different conception of truth is proposed by different scholars who focus, for instance, on 'textual truth' (Freeman, 2003, 2010) or on 'social truth' (Selbin, 2010, p.32), which is 'a performance of memory talk serving particular personal and social functions through the stories that are told to explain who we are, what we are, and where we are in life at a particular time and place' (Randall and Phoenix, 2009, p. 127). In this context, Randall and Phoenix (2009) present five reasons why individuals do not tell 'the truth' when interviewed, which are: literacy, narrative environment, temperament, interview as event and interview as relationship. For these authors, literacy involves the 'ability to match words and phrases to their inner thoughts and feelings' (p. 131), but also the style in which stories are told (e.g. use of metaphors) and the interviewees' narrative tone (e.g. pessimistic, optimistic). Narrative environment is composed of the different contexts experienced by individuals throughout their lives that influence the tone of their stories (e.g. family, community, school, but also gender and race). Temperament is related to individuals' personality traits, but also to what is happening in their lives at the time of the interview and to the interview context itself which can affect the interviewees' mood. Interview as event refers to the fact that the interview can be a 'turning-point event […] transformative in nature' (p. 133) which can impact the interviewees' views of their own lives, leading them to re-story and re-narrate their selves differently. Finally, interview as relationship is led by the perceptions that interviewees and interviewer have about each other, as well as the perceptions they wish to cause in each other. In addition, interview as relationship implies that the stories produced in the interview context are co-authored and are undoubtedly influenced by the listener, who shapes 'the precise path that tellers take with their narrations, and how the versions of the various stories they relate are thereby slanted' (p. 143).

Moreover, the act of storytelling is selective because '[u]p to a point, it is possible to tell several stories based on the same events' through their organisation around different plots (Ricoeur 1996, p. 6; see also Czarniawska 2004, p. 7). Thus, stories re-configure 'our confused, unformed, and at the limit mute temporal experience' (Ricoeur 1984: xi), based on the author's 'interpretative code'. Consequently, individuals do not have a life story, but many stories, which do not inevitably amalgamate into an overall coherent life story. Yet, individuals become whatever story they want. Stories are always told in social, historical, political, cultural, and interpersonal contexts. This was described by Holstein and Gubrium (2000) as a narrative interplay between discursive practice and discourse-in-practice. Discursive practice is 'the interactional articulation of meaning with experience' and 'the artful procedures through which selves are constituted' (Holstein and Gubrium, 2000, p. 94). Discourse-in-practice is 'the discursive possibilities for, and resources of, self-construction at particular times and places' (Holstein and Gubrium, 2000, p.9 4). Acknowledging that our stories are told, sustained, and transformed by public narratives is crucial in political narratives. Stories are subjective accounts, but they are always told 'at a historical moment with its circulating discourses and power relations' (Riessman, 2008, p. 8), which influence what can and cannot be told in individual stories. Hence, storytelling is both actively constructive and locally constrained (Holstein and Gubrium, 2000), and 'stories serve to unite people within a shared society, in which certain symbols, themes, and characters provide recognition, knowledge, community, and at times plans of action' (Selbin, 2010, p. 27).

Furthermore, as already discussed in the previous chapter, identity, according to McAdams (2001, p. 643), 'is a life story', by which he means an 'internalised and evolving personal myth that functions to provide life with unity and purpose' (McAdams, 1996, p. 132). This is corroborated by Yuval-Davis's (2006, p. 202) argument that identity is always in transition, 'always producing itself through the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and longing to belong', which is indeed a lifelong process. However, Margaret Somers (1994) pointed out that identity should not be perceived as a set of rigid and stable categories, but should be seen through 'the categorically destabilizing dimensions of time, space and relationality' (p. 606). For Somers (1994), narrative and narrativity are defined as concepts of social epistemology and social ontology, because 'it is through narrativity that we come to know, understand, and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives and

narrativity that we constitute our social identities […] all of us come to be who we are (however ephemeral, multiple, and changing) by being located or locating ourselves (usually unconsciously) in social narratives rarely of our own making' (p. 606). Somers (1994) distinguished between four different dimensions of narrative: ontological, public, conceptual, and meta-narrative. Ontological narratives 'are the stories that social actors use to make sense of – indeed, to act in – their lives' (p. 618). According to this author, ontological narratives are social and interpersonal, rooting identity in time and spatial relationships. Thus, Somers (1994, p. 618) defends the argument that 'agents adjust stories to fit their own identities, and, conversely, they will tailor 'reality' to fit their stories'. Public narratives 'are those narratives attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the individual' (Somers, 1994, p. 619), such as the family, the workplace, religious and educational institutions, media, government, and nation. The third dimension of narrativity, meta-narrativity, is constituted by 'the 'master narratives' in which we are embedded as contemporary actors in history', which are described as 'the epic dramas of our time' and as 'progressive narratives of teleological unfolding' (Somers, 1994, p. 619). The final dimension is conceptual narrativity, defined by Somers (1994, p. 620) as 'the concepts and explanations that we construct as social researchers'. According to this author, conceptual narrativity has the responsibility to bring temporality and relationality to a 'social analytic vocabulary' which constructs 'social life, social organisations, social actions, and social identities' narratively through both ontological and public narratives (p. 620). Thus, Somers (1994, p. 621) believes that combining narrative with 'identity reintroduces time, space, and analytical relationality' into the approach to identity, allowing the understanding that individuals 'are guided to act by the structural and cultural relationships in which they are embedded and by the stories through which they constitute their identities – and less because of the interests we impute to them' (p. 624). In this sense, the ontological and public narratives in which individuals are emplotted need to be recognised in order to access the narrative dimension of their identity, because 'narratives are not incorporated in the self in any direct way; rather they are mediated through the enormous spectrum of social and political institutions and practices that constitute our social world' (Somers, 1994, p. 625).

Ricoeur (1992) equally saw the life of individuals presented as 'a temporal totality which is itself singular and distinguished from all others' (p. 147). However, the events in a story threaten to disrupt this totality – events that are initially seen as contingent, but reveal the

necessity of the history of a life, corresponding to the person's identity, once the story has been concluded:

> Thus chance is transmuted into fate. […] The narrative constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in constructing that of the story told. It is the identity of the story that makes the identity of the character. (Ricoeur, 1992, pp. 147-148)

Consequently, characters can themselves be treated as plots, which implies, according to Somers (1994, p. 631), that competing for what stories to tell also implies competing for what identities to construct. It is thus narrative identity that captures our permanence in time by mediating between the poles of sameness – 'symbolized by the phenomenon of character, by which the person can be identified and reidentified'– and selfhood (Somers, 1994, p. 631), 'represented by the essentially ethical notion of self-constancy', which is 'for each person that manner of conducting himself or herself so that others can *count on* that person' (Ricoeur, 1992, p. 165, original emphasis).

Finally, personal stories are closely linked to history, portraying historical shifts in a culture, establishing collective memories and bridging cultural history and personal biography (Plummer, 2002). Thus, the historical contexts of people's stories are key, because discourse is, essentially, the act of someone saying or writing something about something in a given situation which implies that context is key to the process of understanding (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 44, 134). Then, we must understand how narratives and history are related, to which Ken Plummer adds:

> 'Narrative processes refer to a wide array of social actions that make stories and narratives work. Structures of narration speak to the historical and cultural structural contexts in which these processes are embedded. With these concepts in mind, storytelling becomes a creative political and symbolic strategy to bridge the macro and micro, the process and the structures: it becomes a key human active way of transforming how we grasp, connect to and change the world' (Plummer, 2017, p. 3).

This author suggests that there is a new area of storytelling and politics emerging focusing on the organisation of stories under different political systems. This is particularly relevant to the present study, because the stories of my interviewees encompass different political systems in Portugal and showcase a before – life under and authoritairan regime – and an after – life after the Revolution and across a democratic system. Such a transition created opportunities for new stories to emerge and to tell stories differently, in a more open and democratic way (see Plummer, 2017).

Analytical approach

The analytical approach put into place in this study was composed by four stages: 1) immersion in the data; 2) thematic narrative analysis; 3) analysis of narratives; and 4) representation. The different stages were complimentary, in that the immersion in the data and the thematic narrative analysis arranged the data into a convenient format for the analysis of narratives, which were then represented throughout the analysis chapters (chapters five through seven).

Immersion in the data

The interviews were conducted in Portuguese, the native language of both the interviewees and myself. All interviews were fully transcribed, including mood and attitude indicators, such as interjections, laughter and pauses, and selected parts were translated into English, in order to be included in this dissertation (more details will be given below). At the end of each transcription the field notes were equally analysed and added as notes to their respective sections.

At this stage of the analysis several readings of the data took place, in order to enable me to dwell in the different accounts produced by my interviewees (see Frank, 2010; Smith, 2013). This process was accompanied by note taking, both about verbal and non-verbal performative elements displayed by interviewees during our time together, and about the way I bodily felt some conversations. Such a focus on bodies was framed by Lars-Christer Hydén's (2014, p.139) affirmation that ‘telling and listening to stories is an activity that is accomplished through the use of bodies. Both telling and listening to stories involve bodily processes: the body and its parts are used as communicative instruments and as resources for structuring and interpreting

stories'. Thus, in an interview encounter bodies are used by both the researcher and the researched to create, communicate and clarify meaning (Smith, in press). In my particular case, some conversations about politically motivated violent acts, especially the ones involving killings, caused my stomach to cramp, exposing the sensitivity of the topic and ringing alarm bells in relation to how to interpret and present it.

The transcripts produced at the time of my Master's dissertation were equally revisited at this stage, in order to see if the perceptions of the individuals interviewed twice had changed, if there was something worth using in the present analysis, and if my own perspective as a researcher on their accounts had changed much (see Riessman, 2008; Andrews, 2013). In this context, I did not find the individuals twice interviewed holding different perspectives on their past involvement in an armed organisation, which on the one hand shows how crystallized their views are, but on the other hand can also result from the short time interval between interviews (only three years); in general, there were no important topics discussed in the first interview that were not covered and further developed in the second; and, finally, my perspective on their accounts was not immensely different either, although better informed by additional readings and reflections.

Thematic narrative analysis

The primary unit of analysis of this study was composed of stories of different lengths, which could vary from a few lines to several pages of an interview transcript. Thus, the first step at this stage of the analysis was the identification of stories within each transcript separately. Stories were identified through usual clues, such as the setting of the scene (e.g. 'When I was a child we were very poor…'), the presence of complicating action (e.g. 'Then our comrades started falling dead or getting arrested, we could not leave the organisation like this…'), or the indication of a resolution ('When I left jail I decided to dedicate the next ten years of my life to my children who were not guilty of my activities.') (Smith, in press). After this process was completed for all transcripts, the following step constituted the thematic organisation of the different stories under narrative themes, according to their content and to the patterns running both through the same story and through a set of stories. Each narrative theme was not mutually exclusive, which meant that the same story could figure under different themes. Consequently,

stories were always treated as a whole, never sliced in pieces or separated from contextual information, preserving the complete sense of the different accounts (Riessman, 2008). This step was applied to each organisation separately, in order to account for the different experiences that resulted from having taken part in a political violent organisation at different temporal, historical, social and political moments. The organisation of different stories under narrative themes was supported by the software QSR-NVivo 10, which allowed the creation of theme and sub-theme files where all stories related to a particular narrative theme were grouped. The different narrative themes generated by the content and patterns of the collected stories embraced allusions to interviewees' lives before, during and after the involvement with the armed organisation, and to the way they conceived their lived experiences. The last step at this stage of the analysis looked at the similarities and dissimilarities of the experiences displayed by the interviewees belonging both to the same organisation and to different organisations.

Thus, the exercise of creating themes across the data (Chase, 2005) allowed the connection between interviewees' voices, laying the bases to build interpretations that contribute to the understanding of individual experiences of involvement with a political violent organisation. In this vein, as explained in the following section, this approach allows more than pure data description, applying an interpretative stance in order to build an argument about how people become involved with politically motivated violence (Mason, 2002).

Analysis of narratives

After identifying stories in the data, I began considering these stories in relation to the research question that frames this study, which aims to understand 'how do former political violent activists in Portugal narrate their experiences in terms of engagement with, life within, and disengagement from an armed organisation?' In this sense, I began weaving together the life stories told by my interviewees and the different levels of socio-cultural and historical contexts that generated these same stories and are responded to by them (Josselson, 2011).

In order to shed light on the role stories were playing in the lives of former political violent activists in Portugal, I also resorted to a set of dialogical questions informed by Frank (2012) and Smith (in press). These questions can be summarised as follows:

- *Resource questions:* What cultural, social, political and historical narrative resources frame the stories told by former political violent activists in Portugal? How do these resources shape their subjective experiences? What actions do these resources both facilitate and limit? How are these resources distributed according to different organisations that acted in different moments of time? How are stories reiterating or countering the narrative resources?
- *Identity questions:* How are former political violent activists in Portugal building a sense of who they are through the stories they tell about their lives? What are their key identity stories?
- *Circulation/affiliation questions:* What stories are shared among former political violent activists in Portugal? What stories connect them and what stories cause rupture among them? What stories connect them with non-political violent activists and what stories are not shared with everyone, and why not? Who are stories representing or speaking for and who are stories speaking against?
- *Body questions:* What are the most important stories to both researcher and researched? What stories do they 'hold close to their hearts'? How does my body react to the stories told by my interviewees, and what does this mean?
- *Function questions:* What are stories doing for and on former political violent activists in Portugal? What are their stories doing for and on others? How are their stories framing what they do and do not do?
- *Stake questions:* How are former political violent activists in Portugal 'holding their own' through the stories they tell? What are the advantages/disadvantages of telling some stories and not others?

This stage of the analysis involved a constant exercise of writing and re-writing multiple versions of chapters that intertwined the answers to these questions together and represented the interpreted subjective experiences of engaging in, living within and disengaging from a political violent organisation. Although having finally produced a last version of these chapters, they do not represent the ultimate version of my interviewees' lives (Frank, 2012). On the one hand, the stories they told me were performed according to the way they perceived me and to what I asked them, and on the other hand, human beings are constantly evolving and changing;

thus chapters five through seven 'represent only some of the selves, or partial selves' of my interviewees (Josselson, 2011, p.42).

Representation

In the following chapters (five through seven) I act as a 'story analyst' as defined by Smith (in press). That is, I work from an interpretive rather than a purely descriptive approach, using my own theoretical and analytical lens to make sense of my interviewees' accounts (Josselson, 2004, 2011). As a result, I produced a 'realist tale', which according to Andrew Sparkes (2002, p.55), allows 'spaces for participant voices to be heard in a coherent text, and with specific points in mind' and 'can provide compelling, detailed, and complex depictions of a social world'. In this sense, according to Susan Chase's (2005, p.665) typology, my voice as a researcher in the interpretive process is an 'interactive voice', which examines the intricate interactions between the voices of the interviewees and my own. It is also important to add that I am aware that 'the self is always multiple and multivocal' (Josselson, 2011, p. 37), and that working from an interpretive rather than a purely descriptive approach, does not allow me to purely give a voice to or speak for my interviewees. Rather, when I argue that I am giving *a* voice to my interviewees, I am arguing that I am speaking about the texts I have obtained from them and I am representing some of their selves, or partial selves that are co-constructed through dialogue, interpersonal interactions and perceptions regarding who I am and what audience I represent (Josselson, 2011). Thus, in order to be transported into the frameworks of meaning of other people, whose life circumstances are very different from my own, I resort to what Martha Nussbaum has called 'the narrative imagination':

> This means the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person's story, and to understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have. (Nussbaum, 1997, pp. 10-11).

In this context, the findings represented in the following chapters are permeated by quotations from biographical talk produced in the face-to-face interviews I conducted. The quotations selected exemplify significant aspects of the larger body of accounts collected and support the

arguments being made. However, these quotations are only representative of the life stories of the interviewed individuals and were co-constructed in the temporal interaction of the interview process (see Taylor, 2012). In the particular case of this dissertation one of the challenges of representation was related to the translation of the interviewees' quotations, which support the analysis of the data. As noted by Esin et al. (2013), the translation of interview excerpts adds a layer to the construction of stories, and according to Catherine Riessman (2008, p.42) 'involves difficult interpretative decisions'. In this context, Bogusia Temple (2005) considered that the role of the researcher is not limited to being able to understand and communicate in two languages, but also includes the subjective knowledge about the contexts of those same languages. Thus, in some cases I opted to not translate the words of my interviewees literally, but rather slightly nuanced, in order to make their meaning understood in English. For instance, when left-wing interviewees mentioned 'the power' or 'those in power', they meant the government and the politicians in office or people closely connected to them who influence their decisions (e.g. owners of large firms) respectively. This exercise was supported by two friends who master both Portuguese and English: Paddy Greenleaf, who is a native English speaker and English teacher living in Portugal for the last twenty-two years; and Emily Lang, who is bilingual, being born to an English mother and a Brazilian father and having lived all her life in Portugal. Their help was essential to make sure that my translations were not only correct, but also made sense in English and conveyed the message transmitted by the different interviewees in Portuguese.

Ethical Concerns

> With the close personal interaction of qualitative interviews, and the potentially powerful knowledge produced, ethics become as important as methodology in interview research. (Kvale, 2006, p.497)

The motto of this section borrowed from Kvale (2006) aims to recognise the significance of ethics during the research process, particularly when it involves interviews and sensitive topics (see Renzetti and Lee, 1993), as in the present case. As Kvale (2006) noted, interviews assign the researcher both the role of participant and observer; though, not all interviewees are aware

of this duplicity of roles, especially in a setting where the researcher presents him or herself as very interested in the subject, friendly and someone who can be trusted (which is supported by information sheets and consent forms, holding the impressive university logo). In this context, the responsibility towards the data collected lies on the researcher, who must reflect the potential 'societal uses of the knowledge produced by academic social science interviews' (Kvale, 2006, p.497) and, particularly, its impact on the research participants and the ways they can be ethically protected. CTS scholars equally emphasize such a concern, considering that a responsible ethical research on political violence must be committed to:

> identifying marginalised and silenced voices, the adoption of a 'do no harm' approach to research, operating transparently as a researcher, recognising the vulnerability of those we research, honouring undertakings of confidentiality and protecting our interviewees, utilising principles of informed consent, and taking responsibility for the anticipated impact of our research and the ways in which it may be utilised. (Jackson, 2009:8)

Therefore, in this study ethical concerns were not limited to certain stages of the research (e.g. data collection) or to certain people (e.g. the interviewees only), but were rather present throughout the entire process, from the moment individuals were contacted to take part on the study, to the analysis and presentation of their accounts, and took into account the different people involved (researcher, researched, supervisors and reader) (see McCosker et al., 2001).

In this sense, interviewees were always debriefed at the start of each interview about the purposes of the study, which helped drawing a clear line between a police investigation motivated inquiry and a social sciences research motivated interview. This distinction was needed because some interviewees felt unsure about the goals of the interview and what ends the information shared would have. It is interesting to note here that this initial discomfort was not related to any ongoing criminal processes or allegations against the interviewees (in all cases criminal processes were dealt with or prescribed), but to the discomfort of being potentially portrayed as simply terrorists, evil or psychologically unbalanced (which had already taken place in a few Psychology Master's projects). The typical warning given at this debriefing stage in the context of studies on political violence regarding the responsibility to

report any illegal or harmful, current or planned behaviour perceived during the interview was absent from this research. Its inclusion was initially advised by the University's Research Ethics Committee, though after some discussion it was acknowledged that such a warning would create an unnecessary breach on the establishment of an empathic relationship with interviewees whose actions happened decades ago, as did their criminal processes and charges when applied (more than a half of the interviewees were never criminally charged) (see Stark and Hedgecoe, 2004). Moreover, these kinds of practice represent 'ethical codes that are not method-sensitive [and] may constrain research unnecessarily and inappropriately' (Murphy and Dingwall, 2002, p.340), and are rooted in the environment created by the 'war on terror', which often constrains and prevents social sciences research being conducted with political violent activists, because of the ever present security shadow (Jackson, et al., 2011).

As already mentioned, all interviewees received the verbatim transcript of their interviews in order to have the opportunity to correct any inaccuracies, to make sure that their views were correctly represented on the data produced, and to exclude any sections that would make them feel uncomfortable if publicly revealed. At this stage, informed consent was again requested from the interviewees, as suggested by Ruthellen Josselson (2007), in order to make clear that I was going to use what they have told me to shed light on the subject under analysis and not on their personal lives. In addition, I clarified that their stories would be treated as possible versions of the social world, as expressed by Dingwall (1980, p.873), so that they would not feel betrayed or expect me to affirm or endorse their version of events.

Lastly, all transcripts were anonymised and the quotations to be included in the dissertation were carefully chosen, in order to protect the interviewees' identities and at the same time to produce a coherent and thick account of their experiences (Jackson, 2009; Stark and Hedgecoe, 2010). This was a challenging exercise, which comprised several attempts, starting from a totally anonymised analysis that did not include pseudonyms at all, but that was very difficult to follow, to the final version which includes pseudonyms and, in some cases, the role played by the interviewees within the organisation (e.g. founder) and the relational dynamics between some interviewees (e.g. married couple). However, the interviewees targeted by this more comprehensive contextual analysis were contacted and asked permission to explore their life stories in more detail, which was accepted. This concern with anonymity and confidentiality,

even in cases where interviewees affirmed that their names could be used, was justified by the awareness that the greatest risk in ethnography takes place when the work is published (Murphy and Dingwall, 2002). In my case, such an awareness was raised by a story told by one of my interviewees, whose activism as a BR member had been portrayed in Isabel Lindim's book *Women of Arms,* published in 2012. My interview happened one year after the book's publication, however, she was not yet able to deal with the fact that her grandchildren asked her whether in the past she had been like those people who throw planes at skyscrapers. This was a particularly difficult question, because BR militants rejected harming human lives. Since she did not know how to answer it, she told her grandchildren that she would do so when they grew older. Consequently, as affirmed by Murphy and Dingwall (2002, p. 342), 'the publication of ethnographic accounts may expose individuals to other versions of reality held by those close to them, breaking down protective silences'.

Therefore, all these measures aimed at, first of all, the ethical protection of my interviewees, but also at balancing the inevitable power relations between researcher and researched. Such relations are often perceived as oppressive and exploitative by feminist and post-colonial researchers, who consider that truly ethical research is impossible (see Patai, 1991), and that attempting to interpret others' experiences is 'a new form of colonization' (Murphy and Dingwall, 2002, p. 345). However, other authors defend the argument that power relations do not necessarily lead to exploitation, and that exploitation is only present when researchers achieve their objectives at real cost to their participants (Wolf, 1996). From my perspective, I need to give interviewees the choice to add or to withdraw any words from their final transcripts, and I also need to assure them that I will retell their stories in a way which respects their origins and intentions, while at the same time offering my analysis of the issues in question. This is what Paul Gready (2013, p. 249) considers to be the difference between 'life-story interviews/testimony that needs to be respected as such, and event or issue-driven interviews/testimony, in which moments in a given life are of relevance to the extent that they converge with the event/issue in question, and this is made clear to the interviewee'.

Finally, I equally agree with Kum-Kum Bhavnani (1990, p. 141) that 'the assumption that empowerment is necessarily synonymous with 'giving a voice' is not a valid one', because bringing silenced voices forward can also be disempowering through the reproduction of social

stereotypes, as in the story of the BR militant detailed above. Thus, according to this author, it is of vital importance to understand the political, economic and social framework allowing certain voices to be silenced (see chapter two), but also to be clear regarding who is being empowered through the research process. Regarding the latter point, and in line with Bhavnani (1990, p. 149), I aim aiming to give my interviewees a voice that will 'begin to present narratives: and that through their narratives, people may be moved beyond their words to the possibility of action. That is, that they may begin to realise their capacity to create history.'

Concluding Reflections: The Role of Emotions in the Research Process

Stories of lives carry emotions and cause emotional responses in the listener. However, scholarly research often ignores the emotions felt by the researcher during the research process and chooses to advocate the researcher as an objective scientific observer, rather than as a subjective humanistic participant. Nonetheless, Sluka (1989, p.9) considered that ideally the researcher should develop 'an intentional schizophrenia' between those two stances, because objectivity does not imply the absence of emotions, but 'a genuine commitment to letting the evidence lead to the conclusion, and an intellectual and moral preparedness to accept, record, and then report, what the evidence shows to be true even if it does not conform to what one might wish to be true' (p.15).

Throughout this research I experienced diverse emotions, which sometimes contributed to the development of empathy and understanding towards my interviewees' experiences (see for example, Kleinman and Copp, 1993; Holstein and Gubrium, 2004), and other times forced me to stop and retune my conceptions, in order to avoid partiality and favouritisms over some stories to detriment of others. Nonetheless, there were two key highly emotional stages in this research: the data collection and the analysis of the data. The stage of data collection was mainly permeated by the excitement of accessing rarely told and really good stories. In the majority of cases, interviews went smoothly and interviewees were very kind in accepting my request to talk about their pasts and very patient in answering all my questions in detail. The only bumps in the process were the above mentioned *offensive-patronizing tone* of a few interviewees, and only one case in which I felt that the individual in question accepted my request moved by the irritation towards the fact that I found out his link to the organisation, and by the curiosity about

what exactly I was doing. This resulted in me being interviewed and my research project judged, and quite poorly judged, because this interviewee considered that I would never be able to conduct such an enterprise, mainly because in his opinion 'nowadays people are trying to re-write history in their own words and not as it happened'. It was a very difficult interview, he hold his own, I hold mine, though after reflecting on it I arrived at the conclusion that it was a fruitful encounter, because this interviewee had a very different perspective on events, which could be contrasted with the perspectives of his fellow militants. Another emotional aspect of the data collection stage was the face-to-face, in vivo encounter with difficult stories, particularly the ones about death. Fortunately, I was always able to keep my composure in the interview scenario, but at times after some interviews I felt very sick and very sad. However, my own embodiment of such stories helped me live with them and try to understand the individuals behind the stories, analysing and representing their own motivations, emotions and thought processes. Lastly, in relation to the stage of data analysis I needed to be very careful in allowing a space for all stories, all perspectives, all voices, not only my favourite, the poetic or the heroic ones. I had to watchfully separate my ideological positions from my interviewees' and be the most faithful possible to the meanings they shared with me, linking them to the contexts in which they took place.

It was in this process of reflection on my emotional responses to the accounts of my interviewees that I truly grasped the until then abstract concepts of ontology and epistemology. At some points, in the midst of emotional turmoil, reflecting on the socially constructed nature of reality and on how I chose to approach it, helped me make sense of complex stories produced by complex human lives.

The following three chapters comprise the analysis of the primary data produced during this research. The present analysis intends to grasp the 'story' of the life course of a militant in a violent organisation through the eyes of the militant her/himself, covering the three different aspects present on my overarching research question: the engagement with, the life within, and the disengagement from a political violent organisation. The presentation of the findings will be organised around three groups of militants, which encompass the six organisations under analysis: pre-revolution militants (corresponding to the organisations LUAR, ARA and BR), who conducted armed struggle in Portugal during the dictatorial period of Estado Novo;

counter-revolution militants (corresponding to the organisations ELP and MDLP), who carried out armed action in Portugal right after the Revolution as a response to the progress of the Communist Party in the newly born democracy; and post-revolution militants (corresponding to the organisation FP-25), who fought violently in Portugal in the 1980's in order to recover the socialist promises made by the Revolution, stop the escalating capitalist tendency, and restore social justice.

PART II

CHAPTER FIVE

ENGAGEMENT WITH A POLITICAL VIOLENT ORGANISATION

Overview

In this opening empirical chapter, I start tracing the life stories of individuals who chose to engage in a political violent organisation in the past. In this sense, I firstly outline the origins of the individual political awareness, which tell the story of how ideological stances were cemented in individuals' lives through different socialization agents. Secondly, I discuss the dynamics of commitment to a political violent organisation, which varied at both the organisational and the individual levels. This chapter closes with a reflection on how three different temporal and contextual moments instigated the same result: the rise of armed action.

Origins of the Individual Political Awareness

The exploration of the origins of political awareness at the individual level emerged from the inevitable journeys different interviewees made through their life stories before their commitment to a political violent organisation. These journeys aimed to explain who they were and where they came from both personally, in terms, for instance, of their family, and historically, in terms of their spatial and temporal locations that influenced their choice of political violent militancy. This last aspect had particular relevance, because of the age difference between my interviewees and myself. In different moments I sensed that they were concerned with providing a complete account of their life stories, including various historical details, because, on the one hand, I had not shared the historical moment with them, and, on the other hand, they perceived me as a representative of a broader audience – the posterity – and as one of the few people writing about their personal experiences (see Andrews 2007, p.19). Thus, various interviewees located their stories in the experiential context of a particular generation, as if in understanding their generation I could understand how their political awareness and subsequent action developed.

Such an outlook in their experience is framed in this study according to Mannheim's (1952) 'problem of generations' discussed in chapter three. In the sense that Andrews (2002, pp.84-85), reflecting on Mannheim's work, considered that 'Stories are products of their times; not only what someone tells, but how they tell it or even that they tell it might be evidence of generation as location, even possibly as actuality'. This is a perspective that will be patent throughout this section, which explores how different interviewees, in different moments of time, developed a consciousness of their location in the historical process that shaped their political awareness and framed their subsequent activities. Thus, drawing on Mannheim's notion of generation, and considering narratives as the empirical location of generational consciousness, this section includes my analysis of the individual stories of two generations of political violent activists in Portugal. The first generation in my analysis is represented by the 'children of the regime' whose discourses, identities and actions are shaped by the way they perceived and related to *Estado Novo*'s regime. In this generation it is possible to find two types of militants: the ones who fought in the 1960's until the Revolution and who opposed the regime (pre-revolution militants), and the ones who fought after the Revolution and opposed it and the changes it entailed (counter-revolution militants). The second generation is the 'children of the revolution' who were, at a young age, socialised and politicised in the euphoria of the Revolution and who engaged with an armed organisation in the 1980's.

I will equally draw on the typology proposed by Somers (1992, 1994, 1997) and Somers and Gibson (1994) which explores different dimensions of narrativity – ontological, public conceptual and meta-narrativity – in order to sketch the social functions and political significance of narrativity and narrative identity.

Pre-revolution militants: family and place of birth

All pre-revolution militants mentioned the importance of their family in the development of their personal political awareness, and some also mentioned the weight of their birthplace. These factors are closely related to Glen Elder's (1994, p.4) concept of 'linked lives', which refers to the 'interaction between the individual's social worlds over the life span'. For this author, the 'social forces' present in the life of different individuals are responsible for the development of their life courses. In this sense, in many cases at an early stage, the family,

explicitly or implicitly, cemented the political values for which these individuals would fight in the future. In some cases, the tales of relatives who fought against the regime were extremely inspiring. For instance, Emílio from LUAR, talked about a 'tradition of resistance' in his family, portrayed by a cousin that was arrested and sent to Tarrafal[26]. Emílio considered this tradition stronger and more influential than all the extensive reading he had done on political matters. Gustavo, also from LUAR, referred to the republican activity of his grandfather during the monarchy which had him sent to jail, but which also inspired his father's and his own convictions against the *Estado Novo*. Yet, in the case of these militants who acted during the dictatorship, such a family influence was often implicit, because any political connotation against the regime could be severely punished. Thus, parents would be very cautious, not only fearing for themselves but also for what could happen to their children if they engaged in oppositional political activity. However, many interviewees reflecting on the past recognized the role played by some members of their families, who discreetly countered the dominant narratives of the regime by exposing the younger generation to the social reality of the time. An example of this can be seen through the story shared by Diogo from LUAR:

> I'm from the time when teachers at school would always make great speeches, 'Now, with Salazar, there are no more poor people, the roads are good, the houses are good, the people are happy'… And so on... Then I used to go home and tell all that to my father, and he never once said it wasn't true, never! We lived with great hardships, but on Sundays we would always go for a wander around the area near where we lived. My father would always find a way of showing me the homes of extremely poor people. How people lived in such appalling conditions, I do not know. The roads were full of potholes, the state of the schools and so on – that opened my eyes. He never actually said what we were told was wrong, because otherwise I could go and tell the teacher, 'My dad says that it's not true!' So he did his political work in this way, I think it had a great impact on me.

Diogo's story showcases the regime's portrayal of Salazar as the saviour of the nation, the ruler who restored the country's finances and social issues (see Mattoso, 1994). Such a portrayal was spread through the channels at its disposal, such as the education system. However, the image

[26] See chapter two, page 19.

painted by the regime's propaganda did not correspond to reality, as Diogo's father knew and subtly showed his son through their Sunday excursions. Later in his life, Diogo reached the conclusion that this was his father's way of doing politics and contributing to his son's political awareness.

Artur, one of ARA's founders, also explained how his place and family of birth contributed to his political awareness. In his own words his village was 'very Catholic, apostolic and roman […] but also *salazarista',* as was his family – 'from my father's side there was a priest [...] and there was also a nun […] and one part of my family was *salazarista,* fascist and pro-Hitler during the war. The other part was republican, secular and social democrat. And then there was my father, who was more communist.' And it was his father who influenced him the most. His father had been an immigrant in the United States of America, an experience that seemed to have influenced his political choices. In the words of his son: 'whoever [in general] went to the Soviet Union would come back right wing, reactionary and fascist. Whoever went to the capital of entrepreneurship, to the United States, would return half communist, which happened to my father.' At home his father would talk about the Soviet Union, but never about the Portuguese Communist Party – 'probably he feared that I would associate myself with the Communist Party and then something could happen to me'. For Artur it was also in his village of origin that he had contact with one of the darkest products of the regime – extreme poverty – that made him 'conscious of a certain social reality'.

> ...from quite a young age I came into contact with the huge social disparities in our country. I shan't say extremes, because I did not know about the heights of nobility at the time[27], but anyway, I knew it existed. On the other hand, I was born in a village where [...] the social extremes and poverty were not too blatant [...] but at the time of harvest internal migrants (from other regions of the country) would arrive at the village. I saw how those people were helpless, owned nothing and subjected themselves to staying there for about a month, living wherever they could – in haystacks, sometimes under bridges over dried rivers. Many had completely crippled lives, escaping the hardships of life through alcohol. Sometimes whole families came [...] and I entertained

[27] Arthur used a monarchic metaphor ('heights of nobility') to represent the upper classes of the time.

> myself hearing their stories in the mills, chatting with them alongside the wine and olive oil presses. And I began to realize the misery, the social disparity and the social injustice prevailing in our country. So, there is this whole... this training... this awareness of a social reality.

This was an 'awareness of a social reality' that led Artur to conclude with an analogy: 'society was distributed by the basements and the top floors of the skyscrapers', representing the clear societal division between the lower ('the basements') and the upper classes ('the top floors of the skyscrapers'). Thereby, places of origin were important niches of influence on a young individual's views of the political world. This was a viewpoint corroborated by Gustavo from LUAR, who described an early 'naïve' socialization into anti-*Estado Novo* positions, just by being born in a certain village, whose citizens hold anti-regime views; and by a few other pre-revolution militants, who just stated: 'We were from the Alentejo', which at the time conveyed a high probability of being against the regime. The Alentejo is a large region situated in the south of Portugal, between the Lisbon area and the Algarve, geographically marked by its extensive open rolling plains. In the Alentejo the population had always relied mainly on agriculture, livestock and forestry, whose production during *Estado Novo*, according to Xavier from ARA, was in the hands of a few landowners, who would contract workers from the region at a very low wage and in very precarious conditions. This context of extreme poverty and injustice strengthened the political opposition in the region, as described by that same interviewee:

> In the Alentejo, more than in the north, […] life was very hard for a lot of people. In the north, they also suffered a lot, but they had small properties, almost everyone had a little bit of land, and having a little bit of land is a support, you can go hungry, but you don't starve to death. In the Alentejo, people starved to death. […] We had the great big properties, which were thousands of hectares, and the poor had nothing, and what does that mean? It means people were in the hands of the landowners, so they had nothing. […] So, the people of the Alentejo suffered more, and it is no accident that they were more politically aware; it is not because we were smarter or dumber. It's because they suffered more. They earned next to nothing and accepted whatever they could get; they

> worked as slaves for fear of losing their jobs. This all began to create in us a certain political conscience.

These conditions attracted the attention of the clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), which had a strong presence in the area. As Rita from ARA affirmed: 'that area provided many members for the party [PCP], which was only natural, because it was the only force that brought some hope to people. People had nothing to lose, really'. Subsequently, coming from the Alentejo meant coming from an area marked by resistance to the regime, from a place where daily hardships made people aware of the need to fight the system, fight for justice. In this sense, these people were more likely to join the ranks of the PCP, which was the only active opposition party in the country during the *Estado Novo*, despite it being prohibited by the regime and obliged to stay underground, as explored in chapter two. In the specific case of Rita her parents went underground to work for the PCP, leaving her with her grandparents until she finished primary school. At age ten she joined them mainly motivated by the 'normal' desire to live with her parents – 'I could not live with my grandparents forever. I wanted to join my parents' – but also by the conviction that it was 'the natural thing to do', because she was brought up to see the misery and repression in which people lived. She described how aware she was of the limitations of life underground – 'we could not go to the movies, we could not play, we could not have close friendships, we could not have a boyfriend. Everything was very limited, so people would not suspect us' – how in her adolescence she questioned her choice – 'when we enter adolescence, we understand everything better. At that point we can ask ourselves: do I want to stay here or not?' – and what her final decision was – 'continuity is usually the normal way'. Thus, over time Rita's decision became more politically rather than relationally grounded, leading her not only to remain underground, but also to join a training course in the Soviet Union when she turned eighteen. During that time, she met her future husband – the already mentioned Artur – with whom she resumed the underground life upon their return to Portugal, in order to give birth to the armed organisation ARA. Again something that Rita considered 'normal', and in her opinion 'well done', as 'everything' was 'working to overthrow the regime'. The repetition of the word 'normal' in Rita's discourse is interesting: it was 'normal' to wish to join her clandestine parents, it was 'normal' to remain underground and it was 'normal' to be involved in the start-up of a political organisation to fight the regime. In fact, what Rita considered 'normal' in her personal story represents the choices she made

motivated by the meanings she chose to give her life. Meanings that according to Jens Brockmeier (2009, p.222) enclose three basic characteristics that can be found in Rita's early life story: 1) they are relational –Rita simply wished to be reunited with her parents, and later her involvement with ARA was closely related to the fact of being the partner of one of the organisation's founders; 2) they are societal and historical – the need to fight an oppressive and violent regime despite great personal sacrifice strongly influenced Rita's socialization; and 3) they are not deterministic, but set out a variety of possibilities for action – along the way Rita had opportunities to turn in different directions, yet she chose 'continuity'. Thus, Rita, like every human being, was not able to escape the cultural meanings of her environment and had no other 'choice but to choose', setting the course of her unique life story (Brockmeier, 2009, p.222) and shaping her narrative identity (McAdams and McLean, 2013). Hence, the lives of pre-revolution militants were intensely bound to the time and context they lived in and to their cultural socialization, aspects that gave origin to their personal narrative and at the same time were moulded by it (Ochs and Capps, 1996). Something that was echoed by Henrique from LUAR, for whom the choices made were not 'extraordinary', just as Rita's choices were 'normal':

> People might say that I had great democratic awareness. Two big words to which I can say…no! I usually say that if I had been born somewhere else, in a different time, in different circumstances, I would be someone completely different. Therefore, this is not extraordinary, that's what I tell people; it is not extraordinary to be one thing or another. People react, and I think that in life we react to the circumstances.

Although both the family and place of birth played a central role in the political awareness of many interviewees, it is also important to highlight that a few individuals considered that this was not always the case. Diogo from LUAR, for instance, pondered that the family factor 'is not fatal'; in the sense that it was also possible to find militants whose parents were solid supporters of the regime. An affirmation confirmed by the experience of Nuno from BR, who recounted that his family was 'quite closed' and:

> "Right wing, totally right wing! (laughs) Humanists, but absolutely right wing. Just to give you an example: in the year Salazar fell off his chair and was in a coma and

> everyone thought he was going to die, my birthday was a few days after that. My mother did not allow me to have a birthday party because Salazar was dying. You see, this was the family I came from."

In Nuno's case, other factors played a role in his political awareness, such as the fact of having been born in one of the Portuguese colonies in Africa and having had contact with individuals connected to the African liberation movements opposed to the Portuguese colonial rule.

Thus, the prevalent anti-regime narratives shared within the place of birth and/or early socialisation of different individuals, which were opposed to the nation's political master narratives, combined with first-hand experience of a reality that did not coincide with the latter, contributed to the formation of militants' social and political identities. This corroborates Somers (1994) argument regarding the connection between identity and different dimensions of narrative explored in the previous chapter. According to Somers (1994), the social and interpersonal stories that situate identity spatially and temporally – such as Artur's story of how seeing the life conditions of the internal migrants who used to work in his village contributed to developing his political awareness – correspond to ontological narratives. These types of narratives are focused on the self, but they are also interpersonal in nature, because '[t]he person has to exist, to tell their story, in a social world – they are a situated, located self' (Whitebrook, 2001, p. 24). Another dimension of narrativity is occupied by public narratives which are defined as stories created by and circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual (e.g. family, religious groups, educational institutions, workplace) (Somers, 1992, 1997; Somers and Gibson, 1994). According to Baker (2006), individuals either agree with the public narratives surrounding them or dissent from them. Dissent happens when in-group narratives 'include aspects which the person as a member of the group cannot easily accommodate in their own story of identity' (Whitebrook, 2001, p. 145). In the case of Diogo, as already mentioned, the public narratives of the educational system did not coincide with the social reality he was able to observe and experience.

Pre-revolution militants: political participation and education

At a later stage, the voluntary involvement with activities and events of a political nature also shaped and contributed to the maturity of pre-revolution militants' political awareness. *Estado Novo*, as explored in chapter two, did not allow the existence of multiple political parties or any type of political activity that would oppose the regime. In this context, a secret network of informers working for the political police was put into place, which created an environment of fear and avoidance of political issues. Anyone could be an informer and any suspicion of political activity against the regime could be harshly punished if uncovered. However, this did not seem to not stop the pre-revolution militants, who in some cases had very astute ways of acting, using apparently innocent gatherings, such as 'cultural events', to discuss matters of the day; and in other cases would engage clandestinely in political events or organisations regardless of the consequences. For instance, Marco from LUAR considered that the uncensored newspaper coverage of the Vietnam War was quite useful for the political environment in which they were living in the 1960's in Portugal, marked by repression and lack of freedom of speech. In the sense that 'the Vietnam War was openly discussed, it was not something that our newspapers censored much', which allowed people 'to discuss and follow the American crimes in Vietnam'. Marco carried on and reflected that such discussion on the Vietnam War was maybe motivated by a sense of revenge 'because we could not discuss ours, because our crimes in Africa were always covered up'; yet in the daily life people 'could follow our war closely, because our friends were joining it and were coming back alive or injured.' Another type of struggle was the one carried out by the guerrillas in Latin America, who in the words of this same interviewee were as common as their 'daily bread, it was impossible to hide them'. Thus, such events, both at the national and the international levels fuelled the imagination of pre-revolution militants, who even under repressive circumstances found ways of plunging into the experiences of others, in order to make sense of their own experiences (Andrews, 2014a). This was a practice that concurrently presented and strengthened possibilities of action, in the sense that, as argued by Brockmeier (2009, p.215), 'narrative imagination is pivotal in probing and extending real and fictive scenarios of agency'.

The university was equally an environment that stirred political activity during *Estado Novo* (see Cruzeiro and Bebiano, 2006), because it allowed participation in student unions, access to new readings and opportunities to write, and access to a new world of politicized and anti-

regime individuals, who were ready to debate, recruit and get organized, as described by Artur from ARA:

> Well, then, let's say, the university environment added layers to the idea of the need to fight this regime, to bring change to the social order, but with a view to what? To achieve democratic freedom and, moreover, to stop a society that was organized in such a way that some people were down-trodden while others were elevated to very high positions. So there you have it, I began university in 1956/1957 and in 1959 I joined the PCP.

Thus, on one side we have individuals who went to university and had a very solid theoretical knowledge that moulded their views, choices and struggle. Emílio from LUAR, for instance, described:

> I read Gramsci, I was a theorist. I went to university, part of my studies I did in France, I got two Master's degrees from France and was a teacher there. I came here to do my doctorate in 1977, no, it was later, in 1980. So, I was reading the theoreticians of contemporary Marxism-Leninism, about the fight against historicism and the attempt to find a dialectical praxis that was a little different from the Communist Party. A Party that for us was very crystallizing.

On the other side we have individuals whose life experiences led them to look for answers that would support their views in the books. Ana from BR, for instance, talking about her political awareness, explained that at home political matters were taboo – the first time she questioned her father, who had a weak heart, he fainted, because children, and specially women, were not supposed to question the head of the household. Thus, what Ana was reading was shaping her views, but the absence of opportunities to discuss it always left her unsure about her thoughts. After finishing secondary school, Ana started working as a maid in a very wealthy family's home, which, coming from a poor family, was a great shock. A shock that led her to ask: 'What is this? Wait, there are those people on that side, my parents, my parents' friends, my uncles and so on, and then there is this?' This questioning and eagerness to understand society and social issues followed Ana over time, leading her to become involved with the BR and also to

look for answers in books, and not the other way around – the books leading her to gain awareness of the need to fight. Thus, Ana concluded:

> It was what I had experienced… I did not attend university; I did not study politics and then wanted to implement what I'd learned. There are people like that, aren't there? They want to implement... and maybe they have much more solid grounding than me, of course. In regards to my theoretical basis I had those feelings of: 'Now I have to go and read Marx, how awful! Now I have to read to back up my feelings… because there must be a reason of some sort for all this. So to plot against those blokes who are screwing us, what do we do? What must be done? And Hegel, Hegel I still remember, I still remember the dialectic, it stayed with me for life! And Engels …and I know not what… I read and read and read to try to understand...

These militants' experience of disciplinary narratives in the university context is an example of what Somers' (1994) meant by conceptual narrativity, because it portrays how theoretical concepts managed to penetrate the public space and shape public narratives during a specific period of history. In Emílio's case it was the disciplinary narratives of leftist scholars which raised his political awareness and led his political struggle. Ana's case was the opposite, since it was the acknowledgement that there should be some sort of disciplinary narratives that would support her thoughts regarding a lived social reality.

Pre-revolution militants: Colonial War and exile

Finally, there were two other experiences that finalized the development of pre-revolution militants' political awareness at a later stage: the participation in the Colonial War and the exile. The Colonial War worked in different ways for different interviewees. Some never participated directly in it, because they fled from Portugal into exile, but still felt it quite closely, through the death of people they knew, through the return of physically and psychologically injured friends and relatives, and through the social rejection felt for having fled the war, causing the soldiers in the field to partake in longer campaigns (see also Antunes, 2015). Others had a personal experience of the Colonial War, being sent to fight in it by the Portuguese regime – some were forced into compulsory military service and others chose a military career. These

distinctions are important, because they framed people's experiences and were decisive in the direction taken by the development of their political awareness. Having said that, none of the interviewees that conducted armed struggle against *Estado Novo* participated voluntarily in the Colonial War, and, in the majority of cases, they opposed it fiercely. This was an opposition primarily motivated by ideological stances against colonialism and imperialism, and, secondarily, by the human and economic toll to pay for such a war. An opposition solidified by the first hand participation in the Colonial War, which in many cases created a very strong emotional stand against it and its precursor – the regime. In this context, the words of Xavier from ARA mirrored the myths fostered by Estado Novo exposed in chapter two:

> …it was the defence of the nation, of the regime, which created an almost sacred image; this was a sort of sacred country - Salazar, Cardinal Cerejeira, the nation and all those things... and they [the military] were bred on that feeling that our actions are always justified and that [the colonies] are ours, they are ours, ours, it is our nation and so on and so forth …

In this sense, fighting in the Colonial War to defend 'a sacred country' was 'an almost sacred image', as was the image of the figures of the regime, such as Salazar himself and Cardinal Cerejeira, the head of the Catholic church. Nobody dared to question these figureheads, much less the military. These figures created and nurtured the myth that the African territories were a part of Portugal, were part of 'our nation' and had to be defended for their own good – a country has to defend its people at all costs. However, not everyone bought into such ideas, nor did they choose to do anything to counteract them. As Xavier continued:

> ARA's goals were, basically, to create problems for the regime, especially for the Colonial War. Because we used to say that we had been in the war, the war was a terrible thing... for men and women in general, either they already have a good education, a good political and social awareness or they become beasts... all those values, those principles, all go to pieces. The aim was to kill as much as possible. And I came to hate the war, so we used to say: 'We went to war in the service of the state and now we dedicate our lives to making war on war', and so we did.

Thus, Xavier was sent to a war where he was confronted with the darkest sides of his fellow human beings. This experience made him hate the war and join an armed organisation who had as one of its main goals to end this same war. In the context of ARA, I found another interviewee whose participation in the Colonial War had a very deep impact on his political awareness and subsequent actions – Rui. His line of reasoning was very interesting, displaying the pattern of his radicalisation, which peaked with the participation in the Colonial War. Rui started by telling me how damaging the war was for the country and for its people at that time, which led him to question the war itself and the regime waging it:

> The Colonial War turned out to be the drop of acid that stings the eyes causing them to open and to see. […] an injured country... injured in its womb, which is its people. How many people were there in Portugal who didn't have a son in the war? How many had already lost someone in the family? So, on a subjective level, the Colonial War greatly accelerated the rejection of the regime by most people.

Then, Rui reflected on his personal and close experience with such a war, which was a determining factor in his decision to conduct armed actions against the regime behind it:

> When I joined the war I was willing to fight it here and there. Before going, after going and after returning, for me it was like a civil duty, but when I joined the war and saw what I saw... I thought that all possible limits had been exceeded and anything would be legitimate to end it. I came back with my mind made up, not only feeling a very deep indignation, revulsion... but willing to do anything.

In order to illustrate what he meant by 'all possible limits had been exceeded', Rui proceeded to tell me a story of something he had witnessed while doing his military service in Mozambique:

> One day I was in Nampula, in the military hospital, and a lady arrived that looked like a cupcake, she looked like she was coming out of a jewellery shop in Cascais [a posh area in Lisbon]. She was very, very angry, because a maid from her house […] had put her fingers in the sugar bowl, taken some sugar and put in her mouth, defiling her sugar!

> The lady got a broom, and I'm going to tell you something that you will not believe, but this is what she did: she broke both the maid's arms and both her legs... and nothing happened to her (the woman)! Things like this were part of daily life, things that I would see or that others would tell me that they had seen. The military were often cruel, but not gratuitously, they were violent, but less spontaneously; they were more thoughtful. The settler, especially the settler in the countryside, the landowner was not only very violent but also full of prejudice. There was an absolute racism, an irrational racism that would not make the distinction between a black person and a dog or a cat or any other wild animal! There was no distinction either in terms of dignity or nature. Look, I saw so much of it, didn't I? Therefore, I returned in a state of fury; the order that leads to the implementation and perpetuation of what I saw there had to be destroyed.

This story was told in a very solemn tone. It was a story that represented one of the many atrocities witnessed by Rui during the two years of his military service in Mozambique, which changed his life. Being a witness of colonial and war atrocities made him realize that something had to be done and that he needed to play a role in it. In his opinion 'almost everyone did not approve' the sort of behaviour described in his story, 'but there was still a large number of people who approved and, more pertinently, very few people who would report it or fight against it'. Nonetheless, he concluded: 'I was part of the latter group.'

As mentioned earlier, the Colonial War also meant exile for many young people, who chose to evade military service. The Portuguese exile of the 1960's and 1970's was mainly directed to central European countries, such as France, Luxembourg and Belgium. In the organisations that took action during the dictatorial period, LUAR was the one whose majority of militants were in exile. Various interviewees described life in exile as difficult, but at the same time as an influential factor on the development of their political awareness. For these interviewees, the combination of being forced out of their country, the hardships of life in exile and the opportunity of getting to know democratic societies, created a great awareness that something needed to be done to stop what was happening in Portugal. Aspects clearly described by Marco from LUAR:

> When I joined LUAR my view, in fact, was that the world had to change, that the world was not well as it was. And being abroad made this situation, more or less easy, easier than it was here. […] I went to a country where I could make the comparison: but, after all, why doesn't the world look like this country? Why can't we function like that? Given the absurdities with which we lived, because of the Colonial War we could not emigrate – in short, all this led to anger, to revolt that made us feel bad. And on top of being in that country, I still felt worse because I felt that I did not have the right to enjoy it, you see? Unlike most people, I thought I had no right to take advantage of a society to which I had not contributed, when my country needed me.

However, Marco recognized that not every person in exile followed his line of thought. In fact, in his opinion, numerous people in exile were very much pro-regime, not recognizing it as the origin of their arduous circumstances:

> Our emigration at the time was very fragile economically, but also culturally, in a sense, we could say, that our emigration was quite *salazarenta*, it was fairly dominated by the priests' mentality – religion weighed people down terribly. Despite leaving Portugal clandestinely, going through dreadful circumstances to go abroad, they were still connected to the system, still attached to Mr Priest, still attached to the official policies […] those emigrants who had gone abroad in terrible situations, instead of accusing Salazar and instead of accusing the system for the misery that had led them to leave the country in order to earn their daily bread, they accused me and the others, because we had fled the Colonial War and we were guilty because they spent 30 months in the army, instead of 24. We were guilty! They never referred to the misery in Portugal and the reasons why they had fled […] Very often, theorists put our emigration in a situation of opposition... but it was not, our emigration was, generally, subservient... because history is made as it is and not as we imagine it […] when they sensed that an emigrant had fled the Colonial War, just because of these circumstances they said: 'Turn away, a radical is coming'.

Thus, according to Marco, few individuals took part on the Portuguese opposition, and even fewer had plans to take on arms to fight the dictatorship. In his view the majority of the

population had a passive attitude and only wished to live their lives, following the principles into which they had been born and bred. Consequently, their voices were not lifted against the regime or against the church, but against those trying to fight these institutions who were seen as traitors. Nowadays, I agree with Marco, it is difficult to recognize such a situation and it would be more comfortable to look back and see a strong opposition against an oppressive dictatorship. However, as he interestingly stated: 'history is made as it is and not as we imagine it'; and the 'history' this interviewee experienced was punctuated by the lack of support from the conservative exiled people, who were blind to the origin of their hardships, because they were unable to disconnect from the traditional storylines inculcated by *Estado Novo* (which were, in other words, the myths cultivated by the regime described in chapter two, pages 15-16).

Counter-revolution militants: family and Catholicism

The family descriptions presented by counter-revolution militants were rather different when compared with those of the remaining militants. Firstly, they were much shorter and restrained, giving the impression that family members kept more to themselves; and, secondly, they showed concern for raising children in accordance to the regime's values and ideals. Thus, stories revolved around an education based on a very strict morality, steered by Catholicism and tradition, which, as already mentioned, was the norm across Portuguese society, whose population, in general, leaned towards the regime's ideology. In this context, I believe that it is possible to extend to Portugal the explanation put forward by López (2002, p.113) in relation to the same period in Spain, who argued that 'the young Europeans of the 1960's […] were the children of a generation that had experienced wars and post-war periods […] and their ideological influences consisted of nationalist expansion and dictatorial government regimes. They all trimmed their parents' creative expectations and moulded their own childhood on their experience of political inflexibility and the repression of civil liberties.' In this sense, the fact that the majority of the Portuguese people in general, and counter-revolution militants in particular, did not oppose the dictatorial regime can be explained by an intergenerational continuity of political values (De Martini, 1992). Thus, the majority of the population preferred to remain loyal to a regime that created a stable and morally respectable narrative of nation, a sense of order and control, and an image of happiness and prosperity – aspects handed from

generation to generation. Such intergenerational continuity of political values was clearly represented by the case of Afonso from ELP, whose political education took place at home, which he considered to have been greatly important to prevent 'ideological drifts' that happened to some young people after the Revolution:

> I received my political education at home when I was little. At my place, at mealtimes, we did not talk about money or about other people, but we always had subjects of conversation. International politics was one of the themes that my father used to develop. My mother talked more about religion. She was a great activist in social work. I had good political training, but when (the Revolution of) 25th April came most kids of my age hadn't had this and therefore were easily manipulated.

The role of Catholicism was equally highlighted as a compass of political awareness, which, in the words of Dinis from MDLP 'would prevent, in normal people, the adherence to extremist ideologies and political systems.' Thus, according to Dinis, the 'normal people' were the people supporting the regime, the followers of morality and good manners; and 'extremist ideologies and political systems' were Communism and a communist dictatorship, which in the opinion of counter-revolution militants was an inch away from settling in Portugal after the Revolution.

Counter-revolution militants: readings and political participation

If for pre-revolution militants readings contributed to developing an awareness of the injustices of the regime, for counter-revolution militants they worked as a warning to what Portugal could become if taken by a communist regime. Dinis, for instance, considered that readings on 'the process of the installation of Communism in other countries' alerted him for the eventual occurrence of a 'bloodbath' in Portugal; while Daniel, also from MDLP, believed that what he read about 'what happened in Russia in 1917, could happen in Portugal too.' These were political concerns that proliferated in Portugal after the Revolution, finding adherence within various newly created political parties. In the midst of those parties, two in particular marked MDLP's militants: the Portuguese Federalist Movement and the Progress Party. The former was created in order to defend a federalist solution for the Portuguese problem of the colonies, in which the British model of the commonwealth would be adopted. However, the

independence of the colonies caused a division within this party, giving birth to the latter, the Progress Party, as Daniel explained:

> And there were some people, among whom I include myself, who thought that we should continue our political struggle. No longer just on the question of Africa, where there was nothing else to do, but for a more balanced approach, which would not be too capitalist, or too socialist, but a third way. This party came into being at the end of July, but was never legalized, because we were still in the beginning. It was the Progress Party, which was banned on the 30th September. I was arrested at that time, along with many others, and this is my historical past.

According to this militant it was after this experience that many members of the Progress Party escaped into Spain in order to avoid being arrested, and joined MDLP's embryo which was in formation in the neighbouring country. This was a decision that at least in the case of Daniel seemed influenced by his 'historical past', as he called it, which was lived in a time of social and political turmoil and in which the future of the country seemed at stake. Subsequently, the experiences provided by this 'historical past' were at the origin of Daniel's politicization and subsequent involvement in the armed struggle.

Counter-revolution militants: Colonial War

As mentioned earlier, the Colonial War played a different role in regard to the political awareness of different interviewees. This difference is particularly clear when comparing pre- and counter-revolution militants, who in the majority of cases belonged to the same generation, but who, supporting Mannheim's (1952, p.304) belief, chose to 'work up the material of their common experiences in different and specific ways'. Thus, the vast majority of ELP and MDLP militants were former military personnel who deliberately fought in the Colonial War, an experience that helped frame their political awareness and views on decolonisation, as mentioned in chapter two. In this context, it is interesting to trace the experience of Afonso from ELP, who received his military training and fought both in Angola and Mozambique, seeing such an experience as the propeller of his subsequent involvement with ELP:

> The reason behind my fight in '74/'75 [within ELP] follows on from the two tours of duty I did in Africa. They were mostly missions in defence of the African populations and their development in relation to very, very violent armed extremist groups, which were MPLA, UNITA (UNITA less), FRELIMO and PAIGC. They all trained in the Soviet Union and in China and were based on a Soviet campaign to take control of Africa and subsequently to get rid of the European countries, the so-called decolonisation.

Throughout his narration, Afonso highlighted that the Colonial War was about 'defence missions'; it was about defending both the settlers and natives from the extreme violence of the communist guerrilla warfare movements. Thus, Afonso's position mirrors the macro narrative in which *Estado Novo* based the need for the Colonial War: fight against terrorist organisations supported by international communist forces (Antunes, 2015). Additionally, Afonso also highly praised the work done by the Portuguese regime concerning the development of the colonies, emphasizing security – 'in '74 you could pick up a Volkswagen and travel in Angola from one end to the other without trouble' – economic growth – 'Angola was in a development boom, with a GDP growth of 12% per year during all those years' – and the role of the military – 'the armed forces had a major role in the development and support of African populations: schools, hospitals, access roads, everything. 40% of the budget of expenditures of the armed forces in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea were connected with the supporting the population, because our strategy was to never lose the full support of the population to the communist movements.' In fact, the strategy described by Afonso was the strategy of General Spínola, governor and commandant-in-chief of Guinea, summarised in his slogan "For a Better Guinea". The aim of such a strategy was to improve the living conditions of the population, so that they would adhere to the Portuguese cause, reducing the control of the PAIGC[28] in the area (Antunes, 1995, p.57). A strategy implemented not only in Guinea, but also in Mozambique, where, according to Afonso, the majority of the 'native' soldiers who made up the military companies had better qualifications than the Portuguese soldiers, which was due to the development of the education system in the country. In this vein, Afonso vehemently concluded: 'Thus, it was all consistent, because we had the support of the population and we had done a brilliant development job.' Therefore, it is possible to see that Afonso's perspective (which represents the perspectives of

[28] Guinean liberation movement led by Amílcar Cabral.

the interviewed counter-revolution militants) on the Portuguese presence and action on the different African colonies, including the Colonial War, is utterly opposed to the perspective harboured by pre-revolution militants on the exact same issues, as displayed above. In fact, Rui and Afonso tell an opposite tale about the same subject, which is originated by the distinct social, cultural and political resources that constitute their subjective experience. While Afonso was educated to recognise and admire the positive features of the regime and to uphold its ideals, Rui was educated to oppose injustices and to help the most vulnerable in society. Consequently, the way they perceived their past was totally different, as were their political grievances and the pathways of action chosen.

Meanwhile, continuing Afonso's story, the Revolution took place, but this interviewee never supposed 'that the coup in Lisbon would jeopardize the delivery of the population to the enemy'. This was something that for Afonso was unthinkable, because as displayed above he believed that the African colonies were part of Portugal and would always be. In this vein, Afonso was totally taken by surprise by the news regarding the decolonisation process:

> I was in the middle of giving advanced training to my company and I started to feel that things were, after all, not so (good)... when was the day I truly understood that something very serious was going on? It was in July, no, it was in June, it could have been June 27th, the deputy chief of staff, named General Costa Gomes, went to Mozambique and stated that the power in Mozambique would be handed over to FRELIMO. Just like that. That was a tremendous shock, because we were in the bush, fighting normally, and suddenly the deputy chief of staff says: 'No, we will hand over all power to the enemy'.

It is interesting to note that for Afonso the decolonisation process meant betraying the people of the colonies, by delivering them to 'the enemy'. However, there is a conundrum here: the people of the colonies who Afonso referred to were the ones that supported the Portuguese colonial rule and who would be in trouble if independence was to be given to the colonies; but 'the enemy' was also the people of the colonies, though they were the ones who opposed the Portuguese colonial rule and fought for independence within the liberation movements. Nonetheless, by constructing them as 'the enemy' Afonso disregarded that some of the people

he wished to protect did not want his protection, instead they wanted an independent state, free from the colonial rule. Thus, less than one month after the announcement about the decolonisation process, Afonso had the opportunity to publicly address a large number of officers and sergeants gathered in Mozambique with a speech that they were not expecting:

> I climbed up to the dais and saw the officers and sergeants from the area before me. I picked up the microphone, looked them in the eye, in the first row were the colonels, brigadiers and so on, and I told them that according to the words of general Costa Gomes, power would be handed over to the enemy and that 60% of our troops were African – and in the case of GEs[29] and GEPs[30] 100% were local African troops. And I said that it would be a crime, of which we could not be cleansed for many generations, to hand over our men to the enemy, knowing that they would be slaughtered. And we were not talking about half a dozen men; we were talking about more than 6,000 men. Therefore, I suggested that at the very least we gave them what we called a military passport, so they could go to national territory, disappear in the population and avoid problems with FRELIMO after it took over. The General began screaming for me to shut up and I did not shut up, I said everything I had to say.

This speech resulted in Afonso's expulsion from Mozambique, which he described as very painful and sad, due to the fate that awaited the men he was leaving behind. Before leaving he tried to find solutions, having, for example, contacted the president of Rhodesia to accept his men as refugees, which was not possible; and, finally, addressing his men with an open heart, explaining what was happening, what would occur to them and that they could not trust the Portuguese government anymore. Afonso's description of the farewell with his men was poignant and expressed how hard it was to leave:

> I was completely devastated, as you can imagine... I prepared my bag and went to the airport one or two days later. The plane was at 4pm, a military aircraft. And then GEPs officers began to appear to say goodbye. The airport of Beira has a large room upstairs

[29] Special Groups (translated from the portuguese *Grupos Especiais*).
[30] Special Paratroopers Groups (translated from the portuguese *Grupos Especiais Pára-Quedistas*).

> with a terrace, which became very crowded. I was sitting down and on my left was Lieutenant B., who was my second-in-command, he was older than me, he was around 50 years old, he was a fantastic chap. B. got up, opened his left pocket, took out a package with a bow on it and gave it to me: 'My Captain, here is a present to remember us by' – it was a lighter – 'We are very pleased, the Captain will marry, have children, but what about us? What will be our future?' I felt an enormous anguish in my heart. And I, Captain of the controls and paratroopers; son of Princess M., great heroine in the second World War, sentenced to death twice by the Gestapo and the soviet NKVD; I always had an austere upbringing, a man does not cry and such things... but tears started falling from my eyes, I was not crying, but raindrops were falling, raindrops. I said goodbye to them one by one, I boarded the plane and the drops continued to fall. Beside me was a national lieutenant, who was radiant because the war had ended and he was going back to the metropolis. He looked at me and must have thought: this guy is mad…

In this excerpt we see Afonso grieving as he took up his duty of returning home, after being discharged from his post for opposing the circumstances surrounding him. He had to leave, but before he exhausted all options to save his men, though nothing worked out and he felt defeated. At this watershed moment Afonso resorted to evoking three different aspects of his life: his career in the military ('Captain of the controls and paratroopers'), his family history ('son of Princess M., great heroine in the second World War, sentenced to death twice by the Gestapo and the soviet NKVD'), and his education ('I always had an austere upbringing'). These were the pillars of Afonso's self, his points of reference, the definers of his morals and values, the episodic particulars of his autobiographical memory that were at the origin of his narrative identity (McAdams and McLean, 2013). However, none of these aspects prevented his suffering or avoided the tears rolling from his eyes at that farewell meeting, but they largely contributed and motivated his subsequent struggle. In the sense that Afonso's upbringing and subjective experiences did not allow him to accept the 'betrayal', the 'delivery', the 'abandonment' of the colonial population to be 'slaughtered' by 'the enemy', which in his perception constituted a crime perpetrated by the political establishment originated by the Revolution:

> "…decolonisation was the final straw of April 25th. The banks being more or less nationalised... from all that, more or less, we could recover. Now, with 2 million dead

> Africans in Africa, who trusted us? And we abandoned them to the enemy…that is terrible!"

Thus, this was the storyline that framed and justified Afonso's struggle upon his return to Portugal after the Revolution, as the cruelty of the Colonial War framed and justified Rui's struggle before the Revolution.

Post-revolution militants: children of the Revolution

The early stage of FP-25 militants' lives happened in two very different contexts: they were born in the last years of *Estado Novo*'s regime, which already knew some turbulence, and in their early teens (12-16 years old) the regime was overthrown and gave place to a period of euphoria and politicization, which shaped their political awareness – aspects that corroborate Mannheim's (1952) belief that moments of social turmoil politicize generations and plant the seed of social change. Mariana's life experiences mirror these circumstances quite well: she started by placing at the origin of her political awareness tales of a republican grandfather, who was 'systematically arrested' – tales told by her mother in order to discourage her children's involvement in politics, but that in reality increased their curiosity and enthusiasm. Mariana continued reflecting on the fact that she was 'born and bred in fascism', which caused a 'reactionary training' – 'I was having political meetings at age 14, listening to Zeca Afonso[31] and reading Trotsky bound books in secret'; and, finally, Mariana felt that she possessed 'a natural predisposition to respond' to social injustices. In this vein, to illustrate her story, Mariana described her political journey as follows:

> I had already been involved in political activity prior to April 25th. I was a very young girl. The first time I was arrested I was sticking up a poster of Ribeiro dos Santos[32], when they killed Ribeiro dos Santos. I must have been 14 years old.

Mariana continued describing her political activity in school, stating that she got involved in all

[31] A very influential political musician, due to the role of his music in the resistance against *Estado Novo*'s regime.
[32] A law student assassinated by the political police, in 1972.

'school wars', and she was eagerly waiting for the Revolution, which was why she was organized, because she knew the Revolution would come:

> At secondary school, I was always part of student organisations, when April 25th came I was waiting for it, there were rumours, I was 16 and I knew, I was organized. So, when the April 25th happened I was more than available!

This availability then took shape through her involvement with PRP/BR[33], the political party which developed out of BR, and in her subsequent involvement with a different political organisation – OUT[34] – and, finally, her recruitment to FP-25:

> I joined the PRP in '74, when I was 16 years old. In PRP I was a militant. Then there were the PRP prisons, I worked on the connections with the prisoners, I visited them in jail, conducted the connection with the outside, I fully supported the prisoners and the people retreated into clandestinity. And then there were the FPs in '79, if I remember correctly - when I was 20, 19 or 20 years old I started seriously. […] So, I was part of the PRP, then went on to the OUT, changed party legally. In the OUT I supported the prisoners of PRP and then I was recruited for the FP-25.

In this sense, FP-25 militants in their early teens were greatly influenced by the political environment of their time, which from a life course perspective indicates that the impact of social change on the developing individual is in part influenced by factors associated with their 'life stage […] at the time of the change' (Elder, 1994, p.6). A life stage in which they were ready, and in some cases eager, to embrace social and political ideas and ideals (see Sugarman, 2001), seeing themselves and constructing a narrative identity as being a 'product' of the Revolution and of all the intense political activity that followed it. This was an exercise seen as natural by Habermas and Hatiboğlu (2014, p.33), who consider that a key feature of adolescence is the inclusion of context in constructing the life story, allowing the personal narrative to become coherent with 'a family constellation, a family history, a socioeconomic and

[33] Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat / Revolutionary Brigades (translated from the portuguese *Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado / Brigadas Revolucionárias*).
[34] Unitary Organisation of Workers (translated from the portuguese *Organização Unitária dos Trabalhadores*).

sociocultural situation, and a historical situation'. This is a perspective built on Cohler's (1982, p.218) belief that in adolescence 'persons remodel their histories in a manner analogous to that in which a nation much later rewrites its history in order to create successive legends about the past relevant to that later point in history'. In this context, Humberto affirmed:

> I'm like most people, I am a product of April 25th history, so... I'm actually a product of the April 25th generation. […] The bulk of the people are the ones that, formed on one side or the other, were involved in the demonstrations, occupations, in this and that, in the things on the streets, until they reached a point when they said: 'We have had enough of all this, let's move forward'.

Thus, the reported experiences of both Mariana and Humberto portray the experiences of many FP-25 militants and corroborate the research conducted by social movement studies on political pathways from legal activities to political violence (see for example, McAdam et al., 2001; della Porta, 2009, 2013). In this sense, these militants described being somehow politically aware before the Revolution, continuing their politicization afterwards through different political parties and activities, and eventually ending up taking the step into a political violent organisation in the wake of the perceived failures of peaceful strategies. In fact, the militants under analysis reconnected through the stories about their early years who they were (a product of the Revolution), what they did (engaged in a political violent organisation), why they did it (to accomplish the promises proclaimed be the Revolution) and who they became (political violent activists) (Frank, 2010). Their stories set the boundaries of their pathways through political activism (which were both non-violent and violent), giving meaning to past experiences and attaining coherence to their present selves.

Post-revolution militants: readings and political imagination

Early readings on political matters and political events occurring around the world were also quite influential for some post-revolution militants. Duarte, for instance, who was connected with PRP/BR after the Revolution and later with the ideological branch of FP-25, described an ongoing curiosity and desire for knowledge while growing up. He came from a remote village in one of the Portuguese archipelagos and the first books he bought were part of a *Sociological*

Anthology written by a Portuguese author, António Sérgio, who was influenced by the Nordic corporatism and social democracy. Duarte considered that at that time 'there were many things I did not understand. I was very young, but I kept trying to understand.' His readings on social democracy, defence of freedom and pedagogy were at a certain point in time challenged by the news about the Cuban Revolution and by reading other authors, such as Lenin and the Brazilian Jorge Amado, whose books had been banned by the censorship, but would discreetly circulate. This confrontation of ideas led Duarte to the conclusion that 'in Portugal, through pacifism it was impossible to abandon fascism […] the route of violence was needed, the armed fight.' Thus, after some years, when he moved to Lisbon to study, he realised: 'before coming to study in Lisbon I had done all this reading! So when I came here I already had a left wing position.' In this vein, FP-25 militants were surrounded by a revolutionary culture and by revolutionary political narratives, which were not only based in Portugal, but all around the world. This generation of militants admired the revolutionary figures of their time and had a specific way of reading their acts, which in some cases was not the same as it is nowadays, as Humberto explained:

> The movements and this generation come from another culture. We were still quite enclosed in communist political logic, right? The anti-capitalist organisations, revolutions, revolution this, revolution that... things that we did not live, but that were part of our imagination – the Spanish Revolution, the Cuban Revolution, the armed struggles in Africa and so on. Even in my case, I did not live it, but I met people who did, I met people who took part in the Spanish Revolution, I don't think I met people from Russia, but I met people who fought in the African liberation movements and that created a picture in your mind … today you look at the MPLA[35] and laugh, don't you? However, I am from a generation that looks at Amílcar Cabral with respect and sees people who fought against the Portuguese, small groups that were fighting against a powerful colonial army… many of them left everything to go and fight for the independence of the colonies and so on. I mean we had a different idea, you would see people who were part of PRP, of LUAR, of PCP, who were in France preparing the armed struggle and so on. So, we come from this culture of people, some a little older than us, some quite a bit older, but people who think that only through armed

[35] Angolan liberation movement led by Agostinho Neto.

> revolution... this is a totally different culture.

In this excerpt it is possible to see the influence of foreign and national resistance movements, revolutions and fighters on Humberto's political imagination – 'things that we did not live, but that were part of our imagination'. Thus, as affirmed by Andrews (2014a, p. 86), 'political narratives engage the imagination, not only in constructing stories about the past and the present, but in helping to articulate a vision of an alternative world'. Such an influence of shared political narratives of the time was fairly vibrant across post-revolution militants' personal narratives, and strongly shaped their political awareness, identity and action. This, in conjunction with the perception of the events that took place in the early years of democracy in Portugal, drove FP-25 militants to reflect on the path they had chosen. They pointed out that their generation went through the April 25th (1974), experiencing personally the euphoria and promises of a democracy leaning to the left. However, such promises were quickly overpowered on November 25th (1975), the day of the counter-revolution, which engendered a sense of disenchantment and shattered dreams. This was a portrayal well painted by Júlia:

> The dream almost became reality, almost, almost… […] The perception that we almost took control was very strong. The fact that the military were supporting the little people... well, not to speak of the agrarian reform, the self-management of companies, the occupation of houses, the occupations of certain companies and so on. All that created a sense of power, didn't it? That we were... that the power was ours.

In this excerpt, Júlia listed some of the main achievements of the Revolution which happened in the period between 25th of April 1974 and 25th of November 1975 and which made the dream become almost true. Such a dream was composed by a strong political narrative of empowerment of the 'little people', the people who during the previous regime could not be involved in political activities without suffering harsh consequences. So, when Júlia refers to the 'we' – 'The perception that *we* almost took control was very strong.' – she is talking about everyone who tried to take the destiny of the country into their own hands after the Revolution, and who felt that their involvement, weather big or small, had the power to promote social change. Thus, through Júlia's excerpt it is possible to see the role played by political narratives in realising social change, in which they contribute to establishing the framework through

which communities make sense of themselves and of their place and role in the political landscape (Andrews, 2014a).

Júlia also suggested the role and importance of age in the process of political awareness and radicalisation. The majority of FP-25's militants were quite young, both at the time of the Revolution and at the time of involvement with the organisation:

> From an objective point of view, we now realize that we were a handful of young adults, we were no longer teenagers, young adults, who had lived… who had seen a fascist State fall from one moment to the next, weren't we? […] We believed we were able to make an impact. Why did we believe? Because we were all very young; we had experienced the first phase of adolescence... I was 16 on April 25th.

Júlia articulated a clear generational difference between the people who fought during fascism – a generation that she did not consider hers – a generation made up of the 'young adults of fascism', in opposition to her generation, the 'infants and young teenagers of fascism'. This is a distinction which reveals the interaction between generations, as in Mannheim's (1952) argument explored above. Moreover, after the Revolution these two generations worked together. For instance, she joined PRP/BR, which was mainly composed by BR militants, and reported how she looked up to them as 'gods'. At that time Júlia viewed fascism as 'an anachronism, something exotic and incomprehensible', something that meant oppression and lack of freedom, something that prevented her from wearing a short skirt. Humberto also connected generational and historical issues in his personal narrative. In his opinion, the political context of the time gave origin to a radicalised and frustrated generation. This was a political context characterized by the existence of various armed organisations, both in Portugal and abroad; by the 'street combativeness' that occurred in the years that followed the Revolution; and by the counter-revolution of November 25th, which shattered all hopes. He concluded:

> What was the logic? It was an intrinsic thing to regress to the hangover that followed April 25th... radicalised people with accumulated anger, who were very frustrated, wanting to fight.

Consequently, for post-revolution militants, democracy was not enough, unlike the majority of militants who fought during the dictatorship and who simply longed for a democratic system. On their horizon was not only 'formal democracy', but also 'economic democracy', which gave rise to their defence of 'various forms of struggle against the capitalist system'. In this context, the story of how Jaime became aware of political and economic injustices is quite illuminating:

> I usually say this: one of the things that struck me the most in my political adolescence, I don't think I was even involved in political activity yet, but something that impressed me deeply was the time right after the April 25th. For four or five months I went with a group of friends to play soccer in a nearby estate, which was owned by landed gentry. The place had a square, a grocery store, a cafe, a tavern, peasant houses, a GNR [rural police] outpost, and a soccer field. The nearest village was twenty or thirty kilometres away. What happened? The pittance that the workers received was soon spent in the grocery store and in the tavern, and anyone who protested had the GNR to deal with. And the guy, a gentleman, a very highly regarded rural gent, because his workers had soup to eat... the scheme was set up in such a way... that everything would return to him... the added value was always his.

This story shows how a young individual acknowledged the inequalities present in the social fabric of his country, in a period in which such inequalities were supposed to fade and finally disappear. At this point in his life, Jaime had been through the Revolution and had incorporated its values – no more dictatorship, no more oppression, and no more social injustice. However, this was not what he could see with his own eyes around the corner; he could still see the landowner abusing his employees, through very low wages, which would end up back in his hands anyway, because they would be spent on the businesses he had set up to serve them. So, for Jaime, despite the Revolution, the workers were still trapped in an unjust social system, a situation that kept hammering away in his mind and shaping his political awareness and pathway.

Thus, it is possible to conclude, with the assistance of Hélder, that the development of someone's political awareness is a process that occurs over time, through the contextual factors, 'the culture that involves people':

> The choices are not made from one day to the next, the choices evolve according to the environment that people live in. No one is born and says: 'Look, today I'll be republican or today I'm going to be communist or today I'm going to be reactionary'. It is related to the culture that surrounds you.

This is an idea that resonates with Andrews' (2007) assumptions explored in chapter three that life stories result from the cultural baggage individuals carry, which makes them unique, but at the same time similar to others living and sharing identical circumstances. Thus, the stories surrounding individuals and communities help them 'to make sense of their world, their place in it, and their (im)possibilities' (Selbin, 2011, p. 30).

Commitment to a Political Violent Organisation

This topic of analysis explores the fact that not every Portuguese citizen who developed an oppositional political awareness, either during the dictatorship or after the Revolution, took the step of commitment to political violent militancy; and even among those who did, the political direction taken was, in some cases, diametrically opposed. Thus, commitment to a political violent organisation was described as a process that occurred over time and that was influenced by specific contextual factors in interaction. This interaction is a very important feature, because at times the same factor produced different reactions. The dictatorial regime, for example, shaped politically aware people who sought to fight it (LUAR, ARA and BR), and politically aware people who sought to defend what it incarnated (ELP and MDLP). In this sense, a certain political awareness developed in the early years of life in conjunction with the perceptions militants had about the state of their time, seemed to contribute to the development of a sense of agency, to an awareness that violent actions were needed, in order to bring social transformation. In this context, Elder's (1994, p.6) views on human agency resonate with the experiences of this study's interviewees, who within the resources available to them at the time made 'choices among options that construct their life course'. These choices, in some cases, took the shape of a decision to join a political violent organisation, based on the realization that this was the only possible form of effective dissent.

Pre-revolution militants: views on Estado Novo

As a result of a political awareness built on the aspects explored in the previous section, pre-revolution militants developed particular views on the political establishment of their time; views that strongly stirred their engagement with political violent activities, motivated by the resistance to and fight against a repressive and violent state (also seen in della Porta, 2013). Thus, according to Rui, from ARA:

> The state was seen as a structure captured by an ideology. […] The state was at the service of a regime, not at the service of a people or a nation, but at the service of a captured regime. […] The state was a terrorist power of the monopolies, it was not a democratic power, it was not even an authoritarian power; it was a terrorist power, because they attacked like wild beasts. In some places things happened in which the attacker was indistinguishable from a beast; things characterized by folly, cruelty, a lack of humanity…

This interviewee interestingly positioned the *Estado Novo* as a 'terrorist power', reversing the usual application of the label, which was reserved for the armed organisations fighting the regime. However, the case he made is that the state itself used to terrorize its people by employing extreme levels of repressive violence, which made its agents look like 'wild beasts'. In addition, in his opinion the *Estado Novo* was not as violent as Nazism or the Spanish and Italian fascisms, because 'the context did not allow it', because 'the context did not require it'. However, in his perspective, 'absolutely evil' events happened during *Estado Novo*'s period, such as:

> When they took whole families who came fleeing [from Francoist Spain] in their dozens, sometimes in their hundreds: fathers, mothers, children, grandparents, elderly women and returned them to the Spanish Civil Guard to be arrested and then… For example, in Badajoz, where they put hundreds of people in a limestone mine and then flooded it with water, cooking the people alive in the limestone. Salazar knew about it, the Portuguese soldiers who joined this also knew about it and threw firecrackers when

> these things happened; and paid for tickets to go to Spain's arenas to attend the torture and massacre of republicans, who were imprisoned, just like in Chile.

Thus, Rui concluded:

> These people were actually bad, not only for what they did, but for what they were, and they were a tool to establish and perpetuate a form of using society to benefit themselves and their ideals.

Rui's views on the regime were consistent with his cultural repertoire, which was generated by the influences he had while growing up, particularly the narrative environment of his family – represented by his father strong sense of justice and honour – and the stories he accessed while growing up (e.g. the regime's knowledge and blind eye to the atrocities being committed in Spain) (Wang and Brockmeier, 2002). HE was also influenced by the social interactions he experienced in is youth (Elder, 1994), predominantly the ones that took place during his participation in the Colonial War, as explored above.

Gustavo from LUAR equally considered that the state was 'marked, on the one hand, by non-legitimacy, because it had not been democratically legitimated, neither the state, nor the government; and, on the other hand, it was a repressive state, because it was based on repression at all levels'. In this sense, from the stories told by different interviewees, repression was the most powerful tool at the service of the state to feed and sustain its dominant narratives. Through repression the dissent voices were silenced and the regime's storylines upheld. In this context, some of the areas affected by repression mentioned by different interviewees were: arts and culture, education, justice and political activity. In terms of arts and culture, various books, films and plays were simply prohibited in Portugal. Nuno, from BR, reported that *Woodstock* was one of the censored films, and why? '…because (it showed) people were together on their own initiative, 300,000 people together was something that the Portuguese people could not know was possible. That was the reason.' In terms of education, Ana, also from BR, considered that 'education was ideological, the regime's ideology existed throughout all institutions and one of the strongest was the school.' In terms of justice, freedoms and rights were on hold, as Gustavo explained: 'freedoms were not guaranteed', because the political

police perpetrated violent atrocities against prisoners, whose rights were not secured – 'we could not have a lawyer, the lawyer would only come on the day of judgment; interrogations had no rules, it was the police themselves who conducted the entire process and had the power to... they had the role of nowadays judges, they conducted the whole process and then sent the case to the court, which were courts of exception. We had a full court, which obeyed rules that were also exceptional...' Finally, in terms of political activities, repression was present in the absence of free elections, in the existence of a single party and in the devastation of any possibly existent opposition. Several repressive forces installed on all levels of society, such as the Portuguese Legion, would make sure that everyone behaved; but in case of suspicion that someone would 'get into politics', the political police (PIDE) would intervene by arresting the suspects and questioning them, often resorting to torture. Ana from BR, reported that during *Estado Novo* any suspects would be 'arrested and badly abused, suffering horrible tortures, a very serious thing'. A situation corroborated by Emílio from LUAR, who considered that being part of the Portuguese opposition under *Estado Novo*'s regime meant putting one's life at risk – 'in cases of clandestine and political struggle, given the ferocity of Portuguese fascism, … the PIDE (secret police) used to kill people' – causing much insecurity, unease and suspicion regarding everything and everyone:

> …relationships were very difficult. This flexibility we can have here now to talk calmly about things like this, it was terrible then. You cannot imagine what it was like being a young student here in Portugal or someone who conspired – whenever he saw a man in a cloak and hat, the man could be a PIDE; or the sensation that we were always being followed – there was a guy in the corner and… or the neighbour is in with the PIDE. All this was the world we lived in; this marked people's behaviour.

Such a constant state of alert and suspicion was fuelled by the stories based on both first hand experiences and the experiences of acquaintances. For instance, Artur from ARA described what happened to one of his comrades when caught by the political police:

> The young man […] had been badly tortured and had moments of madness, because they used sleep torture, and not only that, the statue torture, thrashing, they blackmailed him with his family and pretended that they were torturing his child… there were times

> he was let out … he had periods of torture that his companions said made him go mad, because he returned to his cell and at lunch time he would hide under the table, or climb on top of the table, talking in a very upset and unsettled way… complicated things… […] After April 25th he came to me and he was totally disturbed…

Therefore, such circumstances caused what in fact they were supposed to cause – fear. According to Irene from BR 'fear was the main weapon of the state and the majority of people answered fear by being silent'. Fear controls people's actions and choices, fear limits people, fear for one's life, but also for the life of loved ones. Fear spread from mouth to mouth about the horrors suffered at the hands of the political police and through living examples, whose body survived, but whose mind never recovered (see Pimentel, 2007). Fear that caused a 'dramatic' situation and made people who tried to fight the system be considered 'mad', according to Ana, who added that 'fear was predominant, there is no doubt about that, and people were right to be afraid, the PIDE was a horrendous thing, people were right.' However, at the same time people wished 'to exist', as Irene from BR put it – 'we wanted to exist, simply to exist. The person wants, especially when we're young, we want to exist, because we did not exist, people did not exist.' Thus, for some individuals such a will 'to exist' was so strong that led them to question the identity of a nation that lived in a subservient fear and 'did not exist'. This was a nation where the people who tried 'to exist' were considered 'mad'. Such a questioning, according to Hammack (2008, p.224), was then one of the factors that provided 'direct access to the process of social change', being generated by the conflict between the 'master narrative' inculcated by *Estado Novo* (particularly based on the myth of corporate order exposed in chapter two, which positioned the Portuguese people as simple, conformed to the norms, dutiful), and 'the personal narrative' of a young generation in the 60's who craved to be set free. In addition, according to Baker (2006), such shared narratives of fear offer the blueprints for what Somers (1994) termed ontological narratives, 'including the blueprints for the social roles and spaces that an individual can inhabit' (Baker, 2006, p. 29). To recapitulate, '[o]ntological narratives are used to define who we are; this in turn is a precondition for knowing what to do' (Somers and Gibson, 1994, p. 61). Thus, Baker (2006) believes that such shared narratives act as forms of oppression in people's daily lives, influencing their narratives of who they are and how they should behave in order to live safely, according to 'their place within a pre-existing collective narrative' (p. 29). In the case of *Estado Novo*, the shared

narratives of fear were nurtured by the violent means employed by a state institution – the political police – which had a considerable stake in the stories and roles people constructed for themselves (e.g. one is mad to get involved in politics or to try to exist). However, the shared narratives of fear took root in the Portuguese context of *Estado Novo*, because there were several personal stories attesting to the consequences suffered when trying to oppose the regime. Consequently, such shared narratives of fear were accepted, normalised and unquestioned. Therefore, Baker (2006, p. 30) argues that '[i]t is this willingness on the part of many individuals to bring their ontological narratives in line with specific collective narratives that sustains the latter and gives them their legitimacy and power'. Nonetheless, Irene's cry to 'exist' resisted the dominant narratives and elaborated an alternative narrative, one that unsettled the social order of *Estado Novo,* and that led her to behave differently in order to negotiate the conflict between her ontological narratives and the collective narratives around her.

Pre-revolution militants: justification for the armed struggle

In *Estado Novo*'s scenario non-violent struggles were considered unfruitful, in fact 'the usual ways of doing politics, protests and so on... led to a thirty something year old regime', according to Diogo from LUAR. This is an aspect that in Rui's opinion rendered pre-revolution militants no longer interested in 'mass struggles, such as demonstrations, written communiqués or to spray paint a wall'. They wanted more; they felt that they needed to go further, because they were tired of being repressed by a cruel dictatorship that denied them other forms of opposition, as described by Emílio from LUAR:

> In Portugal this was not possible [non-violent struggle]... in the first student movement in 1962 I sat on the floor when the police came in. I followed what Gandhi had done, I read Gandhi, I'm honestly telling you, to show you that my background was quite pacifist. I had a great admiration for Gandhi, for provocative operations to power through absolutely incredible moral processes of peaceful resistance. Well, after a while I saw that this did not work in Portugal, it worked with the English, in parliamentary democracies, it worked in Italy, but in Portugal it did not work, they would have thrown us in jail, shot us, killed us. […] So, I had to accept that in Portugal, in the Portuguese

> case at the time of Salazar, only armed action could lead to a break. And I had to accept this. […] We had a war, which was a fundamental problem; we had a Colonial War, organized violence, the PIDE, massacres, criminality. Right? When we talk about the problem of violence from a Portuguese perspective, our violence was to end the violence that had been organized for years, for 40 years. Our violence was the only moral stance that we could have taken regarding the general criminalization of society. In this sense, not to partake in such a thing was kind of… I'll say the word: it was moral cowardice.

As it is possible to see from Emílio's words the experiences of the pre-revolution militants interviewed evolved into the realization that armed struggle was needed, in order to achieve political transformation. This was a realization attained through the personal experience of failed non-violent ways of fighting and through the sensation of living in a criminal state, which attacked its own citizens. In this context, the struggle of the pre-revolution militants was steered by three different aims: weaken the regime, disturb the Colonial War and raise people's awareness that it was possible to resist and to be an instrument of political change. Thus, according to Lídia from BR the commission of armed acts was 'important from the point of view of the creation of an environment that weakens the power [...] an armed act jeopardizes the power, because the power does not control it'. A power that was slaughtering the nation's sons through the 'Colonial War machine', which according to Artur from ARA 'was the most notable political event of the time'. The Colonial War was the beacon of the regime, the symbol of imperialism and colonialism, but also the symbol of repression, violence and loss. A symbol that pre-revolution militants considered crucial to exploit, not only to undermine the regime, but also to get to people's hearts and raise their awareness and determination to be an instrument of change.

This realization of the need for armed struggle was also complemented by a strong sense of personal duty, of being called to make a difference, which hit a generation feeling the burden of more than forty years of an oppressive regime, as it was possible to see through Emílio's words above. Thus, for these interviewees such a decision was a matter of dignity, a matter of being courageous enough to leave one's comfort zone and to risk everything to weaken the regime, as described by Lídia from BR:

> I go because my dignity forces me to, because it is not possible to go back, because when we go back in this type of situation we are betraying ourselves; because the way of revolution is irreversible. People are not heroes, people accomplish the destiny they chose and the way is irreversible. It is not possible to go back, because if we go back we put ourselves in question.

In this process very difficult choices had to be made, such as leaving the family behind, as it is possible to gather from Henrique's account. However, such choices were seen as decisive for the good of a nation that needed to be set free, as Henrique concluded:

> When I walked into Santa Maria [action that preceded the creation of LUAR] I had two young kids and I pondered: 'Well, here are my two kids, two kids that may suffer as a consequence of my attitude' […] and here is the great story: either you think of your two kids or you think of everybody's kids [...] if nobody thinks about other people's kids and they act only thinking about their own, this situation will never be solved.

Thus, what Henrique identified as 'the great story' is the way in which he reviewed his past and reworked it into a more bearable reality, a reality in which he sacrificed his relationship with his children for the greater good. Through 'the great story', Henrique established the value of his political choices, built the bridge between his inner world and the world outside and managed to turn a complex reality into a set of events within his grasp (Jackson, 2002).

Counter-revolution militants: views on the Revolution and on the democratic process

The views on the state held by counter-revolution militants were also quite influential on their subsequent struggle. According to Ilídio from MDLP 'the government was very much illegal', because 'no one elected them'. For this militant the government was 'neither in nor out of the law, but above it!' In addition, Ilídio depreciated the Revolution and the revolutionary process, and considered that it was something against the nature of the Portuguese people:

> Nobody knew what the revolutionary movement was, even today I don't know what the revolutionary movement is and I am not sure if I will ever learn… […] Revolutions are

> imposed, nobody asks questions, that's why revolutions… a traditional people, connected to the land; Catholic like the Portuguese is very difficult…

This was a perspective shared by other counter-revolution militants, such as Sérgio also from MDLP, who believes that the Revolution was unnecessary for the evolution to democracy – 'Melo Antunes[36] said that if the Revolution had not happened we would not have democracy in Portugal nowadays. It is evident that we would and for years, because it is the evolution…everyone used to say that the Soviet Union would never fall, but it did fall, they all fall, all empires have fallen, everything falls.' However, what alarmed these militants the most was what they called the 'undemocratic acceleration in Portugal', which took place after April 25th and culminated on March 11th – the day that marked a failed coup undertaken by General Spínola, the representative of the conservative forces and later leader of MDLP. Thus, according to Daniel from MDLP 'this acceleration was compatible with democratic elections, but these elections were held under a very strong political conditioning. […] Therefore, it was a tutored democracy.' The tutors of the democracy described by this interviewee were the members of the Revolution Council, mostly composed by military personnel, who had been involved in the Revolution and who were regarded as leaning to the left. Daniel reflected further on this situation, explaining that the Revolution Council had large powers, conferred by the new constitution, especially by a particular article 'which said that the military had the mission of ensuring the peaceful and pluralistic transition to socialism'. According to this interviewee's interpretation then:

> The constitution said that if tomorrow there was a party saying: 'Well, we now want to go to socialism more slowly, in 10 years', the military would keep quiet. One could still admit a party that would say: 'In the next 10 years we do not want any socialism'. It can be said that to ensure the peaceful and pluralistic transition may imply breaks, but what was not acceptable was that a party would win the elections and say: 'Now we want to stop socialism'. Here the armed forces had a constitutional duty to intervene.

In this vein, Daniel concluded:

[36] Military officer who had a major role in the Revolution of April 25th 1974.

> After March 11th in Portugal there was no democracy, make no mistake. […] …the time from March 1975 to November 1975 the real situation in Portugal was that things happened that had nothing to do with democracy.

This interviewee later explained this reference to 'things that had nothing to do with democracy' as specific events that took place after the Revolution that put the country 'in a situation of open violence'. Events like 'warrantless arrests', 'popular trials', 'simulated executions of people in barracks', and 'holding people in jail without allowing them to talk with a lawyer'. Not to mention the control of the media and the powers assigned to the Revolution Council (considered leftist) in the new constitution, the 'total lack of influence of the government', and the 'increasing weight of the Communist Party', with this latter factor being one of the most concerning, as also explained by Afonso from ELP:

> …the situation was getting out of hand. The PCP was clearly already commanding operations in Portugal. The PCP had made a colossal campaign in the media and had vastly increased the number of party followers. The party was very small on April 25th, but then gained many supporters.

This situation, according to various counter-revolution militants, became worse when PCP's influence in the national politics started showing results, like the occurrence of various nationalizations and the decolonisation. Thus, MDLP and ELP militants contemplated that 'we were gradually walking towards a totalitarian state'. Such an alarming context led counter-revolution militants to the assumption that violent actions were needed. The Revolution had turned the Portuguese political panorama to the left and the country was at a serious risk of being taken by a communist dictatorship, which was considered by Daniel:

> Tougher, worse, make no mistake. The communist dictatorships were always much worse than Salazar's dictatorship. The human rights violations that occurred in Eastern Europe were always worse than the worst times under Salazar. What was coming was much worse.

Counter-revolution militants: justification for the armed struggle

The decision to commit one's life to a political violent organisation for the counter-revolution militants was originated by strong anti-communist positions, which according to Sérgio from MDLP, were 'strongly influenced by the dominant culture at the time'. A culture that depicted Communism as evil, as an ideology capable of turning people into wild beasts, thirsty for power and world dominance, as it is possible to grasp from the words of Álvaro from MDLP:

> I was always very afraid of believing in dogmas and I always knew that Stalin was one of the greatest criminals in history, he killed 6 million Russians and destroyed Russia. He looted and killed so many millions of people, because he was possessed by power.

Thus, it was within this 'culture' that after April 25th the PCP was considered the propeller of a possible civil war, which had to be stopped; not only the civil war, but also 'the myth of the invincibility of the PCP', according to Afonso from ELP. In this sense, counter-revolution militants were certain that the Portuguese people, in their majority, did not lean towards Communism, but was afraid of it, as explained by Afonso:

> What was happening was that the Portuguese people, who were not communist, were afraid. They were afraid, because they thought that the PCP had the majority and ruled all, because that was the image portrayed by the PCP: 'The people are with us and we will never be defeated'. Then, we had to prove that the PCP was a minority, that the PCP could be made afraid, if necessary, and that the majority of the Portuguese people was not communist.

Thereby, action had to be taken to stop Communism from damaging the country and to strengthen the Portuguese people's voice in affirming: 'We are the majority and we have the right to choose, not an active minority, violent and armed like the PCP', as stated by Afonso.

Counter-revolution militants' accentuated anti-communist positions represent their embeddedness 'as contemporary actors in history' (Somers and Gibson, 1994, p. 61), and showcase one of the 'epic dramas' of their time – Capitalism vs. Communism (Somers, 1992,

p. 605). In this vein, it is possible to observe how such meta-narrative, which was mainly generated by the Cold War, travelled far beyond its immediate temporal and spatial locations, influencing the lives of ordinary individuals in the 1970's in Portugal.

Post-revolution militants: views on the post-revolutionary 'formal democracy'

In the case of FP-25, the state was viewed as the establishment allowing the return of the past – of a dominant right, of capitalism and even fascism. Different militants echoed the message conveyed by Jaime that the state was 'again opening the doors to the people who had ruled the country for years'. For this interviewee it was as if the capitalist families had gone on holiday after April 25th and then came back three or four years later untouched, to occupy the same positions in society as before. In this sense, everything that had been gained with the Revolution was at risk of being lost again, because according to Duarte 'the state apparatus existed to protect the capitalists and, therefore, they were one; and we are against this social organic, this logic of social organisation.' Thus, for FP-25 militants the late 1970's democracy was a mere 'formal democracy', it was a democracy because people had the right to vote; but it was a democracy that only 'protected the dominant classes', clashing with these militants' anticapitalistic and socialist principles (a perception shared by other political violent organisations at the time, such as the Greek N17 – see Kassimeris, 2013). Thus, the central justification of FP-25 militant's narratives about their activism was: to show the workers that it was possible to fight and resist the oppressive capitalist values that had returned to the country.

Post-revolution militants: justification for the armed struggle

Six years after the Revolution, in FP-25 militants' opinion, violent action was needed in order to accomplish their 'ideological conception'. According to their views voiced by Duarte 'the armed struggle was an indispensable element of the mass struggle, together with intervention in the unions, in various places'; the armed struggle 'was the driving force and the radicalisation of the struggles'. Thus, according to Jaime, for FP-25 militants 'violence is a weapon' that can be used 'according to the political analysis of a certain situation'. In this vein, if the political analysis identifies severe injustices and inequalities in the social fabric, 'violence is a weapon

in the workers' hands to show their revolt'. Therefore, the position of this organisation can be condensed in Júlia's words:

> I believe that the political confrontation in certain concrete situations goes through processes of violence, and often violence that comes from one side only. I believe that in our case, though, the process was from both sides, because when you leave people without solutions for life, you are using violence. Even if such violence is passively consented and the people applying it are not being targeted by social criticism or repudiated by society. However, for me they are obviously using completely anti-social behaviour, because holding the means of production does not mean that you can do whatever you wish – buy Ferraris instead of capitalizing companies and then throw away the garbage that is the producers. […] So, I believe that social conflict is not absolutely reprehensible.

In the case of the FP-25 then, the decision to join a political violent organisation was something originated by the disappointment with the political path taken by the country after the Revolution, which instead of evolving to socialism, allowed the return of a fierce right wing, responsible for copious social injustices. In this sense, in the words of Júlia 'a choice was internalized', which was:

> …clearly, an active response in relation to the advances of the right was needed, and here I am always referring to the universe of 1974, which was the time when we were going to build socialism based on this logic and I then did things that seemed necessary to achieve it.

Thus, in this scenario, those already possessing a certain political awareness chose not to keep quiet, but to act according to the principles on which their life stories were being built, as Mariana explained:

> I was born in fascism, was raised and educated... I had a very reactionary education... but I also had interests and used to think about stuff, I used my head for something else besides growing hair. I was only a kid, but there were a number of things that bothered

> me – the war in Africa bothered me… and I used to be very upset because those things did not bother my colleagues.

When I asked her what then, in fact, made her available to fight she swiftly answered:

> I was disappointed with peaceful ways. I used to support ETA, I used to support the IRA, I used to support the Red Brigades, all this was for me... I was absolutely available for armed struggle, because it was necessary, it was essential.

In this vein, there is a personal sense that one's life was tailored for such action. It was a natural path in one's life story when the opportunity came in the shape of a new organisation, ready to fight back and to recover what the Revolution had brought and was being lost.

Thus, the political narratives of justification for the armed struggle presented by post-revolution militants are interesting from the point of view of meta-narrativity, where it is again possible to see the influence that opposition between left and right, Communism vs. Capitalism has in individuals' identities and actions. However, such political narratives also show how personal biographies are closely related to history, as argued by Plummer (2002), and how the historical context is of the utmost importance in understanding personal stories, as defended by Ricoeur (1981). By telling their stories, post-revolution militants are bridging the meta- (master) narratives of their past and their micro experiences, in order to personally grasp, but also to communicate their involvement in political and social change.

Concluding Reflections: Three Different Moments in Time, the Same Result

This chapter explored the processes of acquisition of political awareness and consciousness of historical location that led different individuals, at different moments in time, to engage in a political violent organisation. In this sense, two main aspects were conveyed through the life stories of the different interviewees: the weight of the ideas and values passed on from generation to generation, and the significance of times of social turmoil. Most militants reflected on the importance of their families of origin in the early development of their social, political and historical awareness, both implicit and explicit. For some, family members who

suffered at the hands of the regime were a source of inspiration, but above all, they were the proof that the country was ruled by a regime that repressed civil liberties and cruelly mistreated any opponent. For others, the family represented the order, rigor and morality enacted by the regime, guided by Catholic principles, and characterized by a profound sense of nation, which included the colonial territories. Nonetheless, such an intergenerational stimulus could only be converted into personal agency by the times of social turmoil lived by the different militants. In the case of the pre-revolution militants, the weight of a forty-year dictatorship and the turbulence of its last decade and a half, marked by the political replacement of Salazar and by the progressive appearance of new social movements mostly related to anti-war campaigns, led a group of people to consider the moment ripe to contribute to the awareness of the masses and to social change through violent actions. Thus, these militants can be considered a product of the dictatorship that they fiercely opposed. Counter-revolution militants can also be considered a product of the dictatorship, but they sat at the opposite extreme, because they were against the Revolution and the majority of its achievements, particularly the decolonisation. These militants' greater motivation was the prevention of the implementation of a communist regime in Portugal after the Revolution, which they believed to be the next step. Thus, their violent actions were aimed at restoring order and stopping communist expansion. Lastly, post-revolution militants can be considered a product of the Revolution, because their politicization was solidified at the height of social euphoria in the period between April 25th (1974) and November 25th (1975). A time of vanquished and victors nourished by both a national and international revolutionary imaginary, in which everything seemed possible and where socialist promises were in the air. However, the counter-revolution of November 25th shattered all dreams and restored an order that slowly returned everything and everyone to their former places in society. A situation that led to the creation of the last political violent organisation in Portuguese history, the FP-25, composed by a group of individuals who were not able to be mere spectators of social injustices and capitalist development, not after what they had lived through.

In the following chapter I explore the dynamics of life within a political violent organisation. These are dynamics that, according to Zwerman et al. (2000), have been little examined in the existent literature, leaving a gap between engaging with and disengaging from a political violent organisation. Such a gap undoubtedly brings to my mind Mahmood's (1996) stance that we

actually do not know enough about political violent militants to effectively engage with them, since we ignore what for some individuals involved several years of their lives.

CHAPTER SIX

LIFE WITHIN A POLITICAL VIOLENT ORGANISATION

Overview

This chapter addresses the narratives that surround the past experience of being a committed militant in a political violent organisation. My intention in emphasizing these moments is to shed light on what motivates individuals to remain in a political violent organisation and how daily life is lived – the challenges and the relational dynamics, the thoughts and emotions around violent acts, and the supporters of their causes. Thus, in regard to the narrations of life within a political violent organisation two main areas of discussion are explored: the dynamics of life in the underground and the use of violence. The chapter ends with a reflection on how entangled the personal and the political become in the lives of political violent activists.

The Dynamics of Life in the Underground

This topic of analysis encompasses three different areas: going underground, the challenges of the underground life and gender dynamics. Its relevance is based upon the fact that life within the studied organisations was often lived underground, a situation that, in some cases, was chosen voluntarily and, in other cases, was forced on individuals identified by the police. Either way such a factor shapes militants' lives, attitudes, choices and opportunities (della Porta, 2013). In the present study, interviewees experienced life in the underground differently: some for a large number of years, others for a few months; some in a total break with their former lives, others still in contact with a few loved ones. In the case of militants who escaped underground life, they were able to maintain, simultaneously, their 'normal lives' (e.g. jobs, family routines) and the militancy in the organisation without being identified by the police. These are some individual aspects that will be brought to light and discussed in the context of the different political and social moments of time. Life underground was also often represented as challenging, which is why the difficulties experienced and narrated by clandestine militants are presented in this section, helping to bring to life their daily routines as part of a political violent organisation. Militants across different organisations reflected on how they coped with

cutting ties with significant others; how they related to each other and what circumstances were at the origin of interpersonal conflicts; how power relations were handled within the organisation; how a militant could survive the high levels of stress (a consequence of taking part in illegal activities and being constantly chased by the police); and how closed and fragmented organisations produced militants who could easily become out-of-touch with what was happening in society. Finally, the gender dynamics of life underground is an equally pertinent topic to contemplate, both from male and female perspectives, when possible. This was a subject deeply influenced by the dominant cultural storylines (see Jones, 2002) of the time, which particularly framed the participation and role of women within political violent organisations. However, each organisation in the present study had a different take on gender aspects, ranging from defending a liberationist approach (e.g. BR and some militants in FP-25), to totally excluding any relevant participation of women in the struggle (e.g. ELP and MDLP).

Pre-revolution militants: going underground

Artur, one of ARA's co-founders, chose to go underground voluntarily, without having been identified by the police. However, his decision was only taken at the time of a second invitation, made by the PCP in 1964. The first invitation came two years earlier, but he considered it totally inappropriate, because as a young person Artur was more focused in sorting out his life – 'I had a life in front of me, right? I had my degree, a girlfriend…well, all those things, right?' However, he explained that with time his involvement in the party deepened, as did his conviction of the need for armed action to assist the overthrow of the dictatorship, which resulted in his decision to go underground. Thus, Artur's decision was motivated by his views on the contextual circumstances of his time. In his opinion 'the context is absolutely decisive', a context characterized by the existence of an oppressive regime that had been in power for almost forty years, not allowing any form of different political choice and violently repressing any dissidents (Pimentel, 2007, 2014). However, even with such a context in mind, Artur still considered that going underground 'is a very violent thing', an expression that describes a very difficult experience, both emotionally and physically. This is a choice that according to Artur completely disrupts one's life:

> …it was a very difficult decision in my life, because I knew what I was getting involved in, and what I was leaving behind - my family, all my friends, not friendship in itself, but relationships with people, leaving my degree unfinished… well, it would be a radical change in my life.

Across Artur's narration about his experience of choosing life underground the theme of the 'degree unfinished' leaps out as being referred to several times as an example of the 'incredible restrictions' imposed by life underground, and one of the consequences for the rest of his life of having chosen such a path. As he explained: 'in that time, say, having a degree, particularly being an engineer, meant having a good job and a smiley life. Not like nowadays.' On the contrary, going underground meant 'scientific and cultural limitations' and the collapse of any 'professional perspectives', because the university degree had to be left behind, as did the contact with any vibrant cultural and scientific environments. Artur concluded that the clandestine period of his life was not 'unpleasant' for him, but what was unpleasant was the way it affected his further professional life, preventing him from finishing his degree. However, Artur closed this topic on a positive note, considering that his choice was justified because of the position he occupied in the past, in a particular moment in time and space, in a particular context that framed the decision of committing his life to a clandestine organisation. This was a position that made him choose 'martyrdom' of his self-interests for a greater good, as he described through this story:

> In all wars, there is always one of those heroes, a martyr hero, who instantly throws himself onto the grenade that is about to blow up to save the fifteen or twenty comrades fighting around him. So, these things are highly dependent on context, aren't they?

This then is a story echoing that in particular politically troubled contexts one can choose to be a hero and live by his/her ideals, even if doing so involves the sacrifice of one's life (actual life, or an alternative possible life path). This story also portrays how Artur responded to the conditions and stimuli of his environment in ways that were consistent with his narrative identity, with the perceptions he held about himself and about his political, social, cultural, economic and historical context (Ricoeur, 1981; Plummer, 2002; McAdams, 2008). However, being a hero is a choice made by few ('one of those heroes'), because it is more comfortable to

keep a ‘normal life’ and refuse the sort of invitation that Artur accepted. Although many people ‘believed’ in the principles of the struggle, a ‘personal contribution’ was seen as ‘too much’. Therefore, Artur represents those from the pre-revolutionary organisations who voluntarily went underground to build and further the work of political violent organisations, whose goal was to overthrow the dictatorship.

Nonetheless, in the case of some interviewees there was no other choice, because from the moment a person was detected by the police the options were: to be arrested and tortured, in order to denounce other people and activities being carried out, to leave the country, or to go underground. In this sense, Lídia, one of the co-founders of BR, considered going underground as ‘a necessary evil’, because in her opinion ‘nobody likes to do the underground work, the risk is always there, the risk of being arrested is always there […] there are only disadvantages’. Conversely, a ‘normal life’ is more resistant to the interference of the police and is more effective, because the limitations and cautions of the life underground do not apply.

Pre-revolution militants: challenges

The absence of contact with the family was the challenge of the underground life mentioned most often. All militants agreed that it was not possible to live underground and keep in touch with family and friends, which would be too dangerous both for the militant and for the people he/she contacted, who could be arrested and tortured by the political police, even if they did not know anything about their relatives’ activities. In this sense, Henrique stated that:

> The problem of family is that it becomes more difficult to live this sort of life, because, well, you feel fear. On the other hand, the police of repression are always counting on that, they always want to use affections as a weapon to arrest us. And those who falter in this respect rarely save themselves, which is why I say... here there can be no infidelities, if you're married to the fight and to freedom you cannot commit infidelities.

Henrique’s analogy between marriage and commitment to political violence is interesting, and serves to demonstrate that it is extremely dangerous to keep in touch with the family as a clandestine militant without suffering harsh consequences (e.g. seeing family members tortured

by the political police), just as it is difficult to have an affair (Henrique's 'infidelities') without the danger of being caught. However, in some cases, like in the case of Artur and Rita from ARA, they were a couple living underground who had two children. According to Rita, such an experience was extremely difficult and there were moments of 'despair', particularly related to two situations: health issues and the compulsory separation from children who reached school age (a normal practice within PCP's clandestine militants). The first situation was especially relevant to Rita, because her youngest child had asthma and she said that once she thought that the little girl would die at home. The second situation, the compulsory separation from children who reached school age, was something this couple always had at the back of their minds and was considered by both as 'a terrible thing', which they would have to go through if it hadn't been for April 25th happening before their children reached school age, as Rita explained:

> When the children reached school age they had to go somewhere. Either they would go to the Soviet Union, which happened to many and ended very badly – the children were separated from their parents and then, in several cases, they did not want to be with their parents anymore; or they went to live with family, grandparents, which was the most usual. [...] If it wasn't for April 25th, such a thing would have happened to ours. And that's one of the terrible things, it's one of the most terrible things, for sure.

Both respondents felt extremely relieved that April 25th arrived before they had to personally make such a choice, but at the same time they also indicated that they knew that it was something that could have happened and that they would have had to go through with it, as Rita's own parents had done in the past, as described in the previous chapter.

Some of the challenges of the underground life were also found at the level of the interpersonal relationships and dynamics among militants. In the case of the pre-revolution militants the relationships within the organisation were virtually always described as positive, although limited and very constrained for security procedures – the militants did not know everyone in the organisation, only the people they conducted actions with, and even with those they could not share personal details, in order to protect themselves if anyone was to be caught and tortured by the political police. However, this exact situation seemed to create a deep sense of complicity

and strong bonds of affection, as Lídia from BR explained, because militants were 'taking risks together'. In an exercise of diving deeper into how militants could trust each other so much without having forged strong ties beforehand, I sought to understand what were the pillars of such trust, which were presented to me by Rui from ARA:

> Rui: I did not know them, but the fact of meeting them in those circumstances made me assume that trust, assume that they already deserved that trust. Moreover, a clandestine today, but especially at that time, had for me a certain aura of an exceptional person... which could often be mistaken for a certain degree of heroism. If there was someone to whom I would give all, my liver if need be, it would be to that person...
> Raquel: Then, you did not question this issue of trust or...
> Rui: We did, through being aware that in that regime someone living underground had to be a militant of the highest credibility, who consciously adopted a life of hardship, sacrifice and risk, thus a hero. It's someone that in the church context would be a martyr or a saint. Since it was not in the church then this was a citizen of utmost value and trust, it was like that.

Here Rui, like Artur above, compared the clandestine militant to a martyr, to someone who sacrifices his/her life for a greater cause. This is a comparison that draws on the cultural resources available to these militants, who despite holding a communist ideology, selected a Catholic metaphor to express their views, which shows the strong influence that the religious meta-narrative of the Catholic church had in Portuguese society, as described in chapter two. Thus, as argued by Bruner (1987), each culture offers narrative models that individuals can use to tell their life stories, combining canonical life narratives, such as those of martyrs and heroes, with other elements that give life to personal biographies. Furthermore, opening a parenthesis here, the description of the clandestine militant offered by Rui as someone that sacrifices his/her life was also something that he himself experienced. Rui was arrested by the political police along with his wife and nursing baby, and was tortured. However, it is interesting to note that Rui chose to not bring this up in our conversation, and he begged me to not talk with his wife, as I requested, since she gets very disturbed when remembering the past. Nevertheless, some of his fellow comrades mentioned this episode in their interviews, in order to give me an example of the cruelty of the political police, and of someone who suffered terribly at their

hands. Therefore, closing the parenthesis, my analysis led me to the conclusion that there were two main pillars of trust for the militants interviewed: the choice of dedicating one's life to a cause, which meant a vast amount of personal risk and trouble, and the fact that such risk and trouble were part of a shared experience. These pillars resulted in the existence of strong affections and almost complete absence of conflicts. The latter aspect is specific to pre-revolution militants' narratives, where interpersonal conflicts did not have a relevant place, which according to my analysis was a consequence of the existing repressive political context that prevented extensive interpersonal contact, thus contributing to a total focus on the actions and goals to be accomplished rather than on issues of power or interpersonal intrigues (this will be explored later in this chapter in relation to both counter and post-revolution militants).

Pre-revolution militants: gender

Gender issues were equally discussed in my conversations with the different interviewees, especially those that concerned the role of women within a clandestine organisation and how gender relationships unfolded. As the armed section of PCP, ARA did follow the party's directions in the majority of issues, including the role of women within the organisation, which presupposed, essentially, acting as a housewife in order to lend an air of normality to different situations. This was a role considered extremely important by all militants. Thus, women in ARA did not have an operational role in terms of the direct commission of actions; their place was mostly in the background, supporting the operational men (who might be partners or not). The justifications of ARA's members for this situation were essentially related to the position of women in the Portuguese society of the time. Rita was the first to recognize that at the time it was very difficult for a woman to move around as well as a man – 'Men could move around better. We have to situate things at that time, in the 60's and 70's, women did not have, as they do now, freedom to do whatever they wished'. However, Artur also considered that the secondary role of women within ARA was a mirror of the influence societal views had in the PCP, which was supposed to be 'the vanguard', composed of 'many clandestine workers who were supposed to already have great political ability and understanding of major political and ideological approaches, but who had maintained prejudices in relation to women'. Nonetheless, the lives of clandestine women in the organisation were not easy. As Artur affirmed, there was a 'very great pressure on women', particularly when it came to raising children and maintaining

the appearance of a normal family, living a normal life above suspicion. In order to portray the role women played within the organisation Artur shared the following story:

> She [Rita] had a specific task, which was to keep the house safe by maintaining a good relationship with the neighbourhood – which had to be very limited, on the one hand, in order not to arouse suspicion, but enough to see if the neighbours had any idea about our situation. For example, we had a neighbour that liked us very much, because every day when coming from work (she was a teacher and a great admirer of saint Salazar), she would always bring a little present for our daughter, who was two or three years old, and we sometimes invited her to come in, sit in our living room and have a small chat. Then, there was a day at lunch time, we were having lunch with our daughter, who was about 4 years old, and an extraordinarily interesting landscape appears on television: my face – 'Wanted Terrorist' – me and three or four more people [...] We were a bit stunned, our daughter did not notice anything, because I was very different, it was a picture from the time when I was at university, with a plumper face and no glasses. On that day my wife went to the neighbour's house to ask her for something, I do not remember what, maybe some parsley or something similar, in order to see the reaction – and she had a reaction! She told her: 'Look, sit here, sit here', she wanted to talk, because she lived alone, she was a 60-year-old lady, very isolated, and she said: 'Did you see these terrorists in the news? Look this one is a worker and wants to be a minister, this is a shoemaker and this is a student, who is deceived' – it was me. Then Rita, my wife, looked clueless and said: 'Well, I do not know, perhaps...', 'Oh, you don't know about this?', 'We do not care much about these things' and that was that for that day.

Thus, women in ARA, from my perspective based on the conversations with both male and female interviewees, were an effective part of the organisation, whose role was simply different from that of men. Women were never involved in the direct commission of violent actions, but they took part in a variety of other activities, such as field research and recognition, writing for clandestine publications and most important of all, maintaining the so called 'theatre of normal life'. This was an expression used by Lídia from BR in a contemptuous tone to describe women militancy in ARA, which in her opinion could not be compared with the role of women in BR, because the former followed the role of women imposed by society and followed by PCP, and

the latter represented women's emancipation by offering them the same role as men. I consider that Lídia is right in the sense that a 'qualitative leap' took place in relation to the role of women in armed organisations from ARA to BR. However, I also consider women in ARA to be as fully members of the organisation as any men, because they shared the same sense of agency by agreeing to engage in the political struggle like men; they put their lives on the line like men; and they took care of some aspects of the life underground to a greater extent than men (e.g. relationships with the neighbourhood).

The role of women within LUAR was not much different from what has been described within ARA. Women were equally respected and acknowledged, as can be seen in the answer I got from Henrique when I asked if there were women in LUAR: 'I think that there were no women in LUAR, sorry, there were people'. However, as Diogo explained, the role of women was mostly linked to logistical support – 'women were to give support, possibly to hide weapons, to transport them from here to there, to drive cars knowing that the cars carried weapons. All this, though, requires a lot'. However, Henrique made some relevant points in relation to the participation of women in armed organisations:

> As they were very few, the difference was positive. As there were far fewer women than men, those who were willing to join and gave proofs of being as operational as any man, these were considered more than maybe a man who had the same attitude, but… […] However, I think that for women as for men it's about getting the hang of the thing [armed struggle]. There was a woman named Helena Vidal, who is now dead, but she never stood out, why? What did she do? If you ask me what did she do? There was no distinction; she was just one more element. Of course, sometimes they did things that a man could not do, for example, when we assaulted the TAP plane in Morocco, we needed to smuggle the weapons in and Helena did it, because she pretended to be pregnant, I could not pretend to be pregnant... there are things that you know, clearly a woman can do with much more success than a man, if nothing else, they can resort to seduction and resort to many other things that a man cannot. That is the difference between two guns, isn't it? You have two guns and you will choose the one that is most appropriate for the operation. With people and with companions it's the same.

Some of the assumptions made by Henrique fit well with some of the stereotypes that surround women in armed organisations. For instance, he pondered that women who volunteered to armed action 'were considered more than maybe a man who had the same attitude', because there were very few women doing so, which increased the value of such attitude. Such a reflection echoes some of the labels presented by Nacos (2008, p.265), who contemplated that women in armed organisations are often seen as not only 'tough-as-males', but also as 'tougher-than-men'. And although Henrique considered that a man or a woman conducting an action was the same, he also recognized that a woman could do things that a man could not, such as fake a pregnant belly in order to transport weapons, or resort to seduction.

Yet, the organisation that was distinguished by subscribing a prominent role to women was the BR, which was composed of a large number of women and even had one woman in its foundation and direction. The reasons laid down for such circumstances were related to liberationist, egalitarian and emancipatory perspectives that characterized BR, an organisation that wished women to be a symbol of societal equality and transformation, and an incentive to other women, as explained by Adriano:

> Women, in my view, were as capable as men. Furthermore, from a political perspective it was essential for us to present ourselves with women, because there was a part of the population that just being men would not feel drawn to the activity, women would not feel attracted to the activity. For example, just to tell you, one day we were doing a bank robbery and we took one comrade and I told her to wear a mini-skirt, which she did not usually do, so she asked me why, I told her: 'After the action I'll tell you why'. After the action all the newspapers highlighted that there was a girl wearing a mini-skirt, because it was still a novelty and I wanted to show women who wore mini-skirts that there were other ways of expression, that there were girls in mini-skirt that had the audacity to do that sort of thing. So it was a way of communicating a message in conditions of censorship. [...] I tell you sexism existed at the time, but sexism is vulnerable, why? Because when a woman appears doing the same things as men, she provokes admiration in them and also calms them down in the sense that they consider that they are not better than women; because if a woman is able to do such advanced things in their opinion, they feel a bit disarmed, their sexism ceases to have something

> to feed on. Therefore, we always had a policy of, sometimes even a little bit artificially, of bringing women into the process of armed struggle. Not least because they are less prone to violence, to gratuitous violence, are more resilient, because they were many centuries in a dominated situation, consequently they know how to resist, they have psychological conditions that seemed interesting from the point of view of armed action.

Adriano's views on the importance of women being seen conducting armed actions echoes Leila Khaled's reaction when asked why in her opinion she as a woman was chosen to carry out important missions – 'They had wanted a woman to show to the world that women were involved in the revolution' (MacDonald, 1991, p.108). The BR wished to fight sexism and to liberate women from the domination and oppression suffered for centuries, in other words, BR looked for societal transformation, which was similar to the perspective of a former female ETA commando interviewed by MacDonald (1991, p.21): 'ETA is the vanguard of our revolution. If the revolution plans to change society, it means that the vanguard has to change its own attitudes towards women in the first place'. Finally, Adriano also echoed the idea that women are less violent and more resilient than men, which is corroborated by MacDonald's (1991, p.40) research with various women involved in political violence, who consider: 'because we are women we are better at suffering, we have to endure it in our everyday lives, and therefore we are stronger than men'. In this context and by way of conclusion I consider it useful to point to Sjoberg and Gentry's (2007) considerations about the apparent positive description of women's role within armed organisations, which can be masking a dynamic of instrumentalisation of women at the service of men's tactics. In a sense, women are useful because they can act in ways that men cannot. They are less sought after by the police, but their wills and motivations in the struggle are rarely taken into account, and their position as independent and valuable assets rarely recognized. In the present case, I consider that there was respect towards women, women's roles and women's views within the different organisations, especially because the women interviewed considered that they never felt that they were being treated differently in relation to men and that above all they felt that they were people, they were militants and comrades, not women.

Counter-revolution militants: escaping into exile

Going underground for militants belonging to ELP and MDLP took a different shape in comparison to the case of the pre-revolution militants described above. The core of counter-revolution militants chose to escape from Portugal, some right after April 25th (1974) and others later on March 11th (1975)[37]. Spain was undoubtedly the first choice of the fugitives, which can be justified by its geographical proximity, but also by the 'friendly protection' offered by that country (Dâmaso, 1997, p.11). Such a concentration of people who were both sympathizers of the deposed regime and opponents to leftist ideals contributed, according to Ilídio from MDLP, to filling the ranks of the emergent counter-revolutionary movements, which allowed them to take their 'revenge' against the 'hated communists, who made them run away from their homes'. Various interviewees also shared the impression that Spain sympathized with the Portuguese counter-revolutionary movements, granting political asylum to those who requested it and not pestering the ones who did not, leaving them alone to carry on with their affairs. According to Ilídio, for instance, 'the Spanish authorities often turned a blind eye' to his organisation's political activities. In this sense, counter-revolution militants in Spain only experienced life underground when travelling to Portugal, where they were facing charges for army desertion and counter-insurgency. Otherwise, for the majority of their time in Spain, the authorities did not disturb them, and this only ended when the United States of America, according to Afonso from ELP, pressurized Spain to deal with 'the so-called reactionary right movements in Spanish territory'. Nevertheless, a few counter-revolution militants never left Portugal and were considered clandestine by the organisations they belonged to. However, Ilídio assumed that their life underground was not too complicated, in the sense that 'those who were inside did not have problems, they were clandestine, but they could move around with open doors, because no one knew who they were'. An example of this is the case of Dinis, who remained in Portugal, kept his military career and simultaneously belonged to MDLP:

> I had my own cell [MDLP cell] and used to develop a direct action of protest at different levels - street, neighbourhood, guild – in order to raise people's awareness. I also protested in the military units where I was, and even had a military process for that. I

[37] See chapter two for more details about the significance of April 25th and March 11th.

was an undisguised MDLP that everyone could see and I did not deny it. Of course, I could not say that I was part of MDLP, obviously…

Here it is possible to appreciate that the police pursuit of counter-revolution militants was not as severe as of pre-revolution militants, who had the authorities constantly at their heels, and needed to have extreme caution to avoid detection. This is an aspect that speaks to the turbulent political context of the time, the so called *Undergoing Revolutionary Process*[38] that took place between April 25th (1974) and November 25th (1975), in which the country was politically divided between 'democrats' and 'reactionaries', with both committing excesses and driving the country to a civil war scenario (Dâmaso, 1997, p.14). Additionally, both MDLP and ELP had the support of Spain (albeit reduced over time); of the Portuguese in exile in Spain; and of the fervent Portuguese Catholic church and the people of the north, which created two almost liberated zones where counter-revolutionary militants could move at ease – one in the neighbouring country, and another in Portugal, above the river Douro.

Counter-revolution militants: challenges

The challenges of the underground life for counter-revolution militants seemed mainly related to interpersonal dynamics, particularly with the type of power relations specific to the military. In this sense, Sérgio tried to explain such relational challenges as follows:

MDLP combined a set of military people holding diverse opinions, as you know the military people are a bit... this is true, they have a spirit of unity when there is a very clear mission, with very clear borders. When the mission is more wide-ranging, then military people are like women, pardon the expression, they are terrible, because they organize small cliques and groups and... and little leaders and... this happened in MDLP, although people respected the figure of the General [Spínola], but...

Thus, according to Sérgio, being an MDLP militant posed a number of challenges for a few military people, who were used to very specific missions and to the existence of a chain of command, and who in the context of a looser organisation ended up focusing on power issues

[38] Commonly known in portuguese as PREC – *Processo Revolucionário em Curso*.

rather than on the goals to attain. This was an aspect that led Sérgio to compare the military with women, a comparison made in a clearly derogatory tone, but that reflects the sexism that still permeates Portuguese society.

I also considered it relevant to explore the existence of particular challenges in respect to the role of operational militants and the role of ideologues within the organisation (the main difference among them being that the former were directly and only involved in the commission of armed acts). The answers received made it evident that in MDLP there were clearly those whose role was 'to think', and those whose role was 'to act', as put by Ilídio:

> There are guys who are essentially operational militants, it is not worth telling them: 'Think'. With an operational you say: "Do this" and they know how to do it. Then there were others who were terrific thinkers, but if we told them to do something they started shaking without courage.

This interviewee continued and explained that a good leader would have to know how to best take advantage of the different people that composed the organisation and work with it. This was a situation quite similar to what happened within pre-revolution organisations.

Counter-revolution organisations were the only ones to mention important relationships outside the organisation, something that differentiated them from both pre- and post-revolution organisations, which were much more isolated at this level. In this sense, different militants affirmed that they maintained contact with important political figures in Portugal, including the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic of the time, in order to discuss the matters of the day, especially the imminence of a civil war. However, it is important to bear in mind that such a difference between counter-revolution and pre- and post-revolution militants is due to the fact that some of the former had been important figures of the regime (e.g. General Spínola, head of MDLP, was the first President of the Republic after the Revolution). This is an aspect that placed them in a much better position to have such external contacts and relations. In addition, MDLP also had privileged relations with the secret services of other countries through its *Information Bureau*. The man responsible for this bureau explained:

> I started having contact with foreign secret services - American, French, etc., people who also wanted to... the Americans, the CIA sent an employee to talk to me daily and sometimes twice a day an employee to talk to me, which for me was an honour. What did they want? They wanted several things, they wanted to know everything, but what else did they want? At that time, we had the Eastern Bloc, countries like Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Russia… and there were many people who came to Portugal to take the plane to these countries. For many of these people in their countries no one knew they were leftists or had connections. I had daily access to these lists of passengers and sometimes I found very curious things. The American guy himself would say: 'Wow!' I had the passport numbers, the names, everything, and for them it was like gold. [...] And they, in turn, also exchanged information, services exchange information, right?

Thus, according to counter-revolution militants the challenges of life underground were mostly posed by the management of interpersonal relations, both within and outside the organisation. Within the organisation, power relations which mirrored hierarchical arrangements and differences between ideologues and operational militants caused stressful situations and might have, at some points, led militants to question their own loyalty to the organisation. However, unlike clandestine militants in general (see Zwerman et al., 2000), counter-revolution militants did not burn their bridges with the important political figures of the aboveground of their time. On the contrary, they persevered in influencing Portuguese political life at the time and in negotiating their objectives, which might have contributed to the facilitated return to their normal lives in Portugal after the dissolution of the organisation (a topic explored in detail in chapter seven).

Counter-revolution militants: gender

There were very few women among counter-revolution militants and, according to the accounts of men interviewed in the context of this study, the existent ones had a very secondary role. Daniel from MDLP only vaguely remembered one or two women who were part of the *Political Analysis Bureau*, but who, in his opinion, did not have any 'political importance', because MDLP 'was a structure of men'. This was a perspective explained by Dinis as follows:

> It [MDLP] was an organisation made up of civilians and servicemen, and women in this respect were somewhat spared, why? You need to see that in 1975 we did not talk much about the emancipation of women, there was more the concept of the woman as a housewife, who would guarantee the children's upbringing. There were very few women working – that's how it was in the 70's. They had very little action, only in sporadic cases that I was aware of, due to the social concept in which we lived at that time.

Thus, the scarcity of women among counter-revolution militants seems to be due to the wider beliefs about the appropriate role of women in society at the time. However, in my opinion, the predominance of military people and military attitudes in counter-revolution organisations also contributed significantly to this situation. This is an opinion that is not only based on the simple fact that counter-revolution organisations mirrored the Portuguese military in terms of the minimal participation of women (which was very low in numbers), which in the majority of cases did not take place on the battle front (see Torrão, 2008); but also considers the way in which a few counter-revolution militants referred to women. A couple of examples are: the previously mentioned comparison, made by Sérgio, between military men without a strong leadership with women, conveying the message that women tend to form small groups to undermine and fight each other; and Ilídio's affirmation in the context of conflicted relationships:

> There were some wives of some people who were linked to the movement, who thought that one glass was more important than another. You see, these normal intrigues.

In this vein, women in the context of the counter-revolution organisations studied were considered of little relevance and were portrayed in a very stereotypical manner. This creates a window into the views counter-revolution militants had on women in the past, which in some cases did not change over time.

Post-revolution militants: going underground

Different FP-25 militants distinctively depicted their experience of going underground: a few described the moment from which they totally cut contact with family and friends and

incorporated a different identity (quite similar to the experiences of pre-revolution militants); yet, the majority of interviewees described a more 'light' and 'mixed' situation, in which less cautions had to be taken. In this sense, Hélder started by stating:

> In the clandestine movement, which was our case, not everyone was clandestine, only a minority, otherwise we could not survive. And it was a society like a normal society, we are made of flesh and blood, we have our frustrations and joys, we have our passions, we have our desire to fulfil dreams. […] Children are raised, there are comrades who even came to have children in jail, because conditions were created for this.

So, Hélder was affirming that, before anything, the clandestine movement was composed of human beings who followed the same patterns of behaviour of any human society composed the clandestine movement. His voice truly echoes the work of diverse researchers, who after interviewing people involved in political violence attested to their humanity (for instance MacDonald, 1991; Mahmood, 1996; Zulaika and Douglass, 1996; Sluka, 2009). And as humans, not programmed violent machines, the people interviewed had needs and feelings. For instance, Bruno confided that despite clandestine life being very strenuous, he used to have his recreational moments:

> …we also had fun, we had meals out, we went to parties, I happened to be a guy who never refrained... I am known as an underground dude who went to discos at night and all. Everyone used to say 'one of these days you'll get yourself caught', but I was very fond of African music and dancing... I had a lot of fun, you understand? I'm not a great example; I'm not a guy who stayed hidden at home. I also had many social circles, acquaintances and guys who gave me support... I even got women for most of my comrades! I cannot... it was not like something... I cannot say that it was something painful, or that I was driving myself nuts.

As Bruno himself acknowledged, he was an extreme case and not everyone was willing to take the risks he took, but for a variety of people in the organisation clandestinity had different depths. For instance, Júlia described her clandestine involvement with FP-25 as follows:

> I was arrested in 1985, and during this time – 1980-1985 – I was not always underground, although I was almost always in a more or less safeguarded position. I had three children, the last one was born already in jail. At the time of my first child it coincided with that first start-up [of the organisation], I did not have a clandestine identity yet, but I was moving house almost every month, I weaved around to prevent being identified and so on... then my second son was born, I gave him my own surname at the clinic where he was born, but in a very speedy situation. So, that's why I said at the beginning that clandestinity in this organisation was something light, more so for some than others.

In this vein, the depth of the clandestine experience of FP-25 militants seemed to be up to each militant – some would prefer a more shielded take, diving in the deep underground waters; while others would keep some bridges to their aboveground lives, living with one foot in and the other out. However, these circumstances were only possible for a determined period of time, to which Júlia referred as 'before the arrests', because when militants started to be arrested and the police harassment began to close in, the sense of being a full-time clandestine militant increased. Besides, another feeling started breaking in: there was no going back. As Júlia put it: 'after a certain point there is no more turning back, there was nothing else to do'. People could not simply get tired or disappointed with the organisation and decide to leave, because they had nowhere to go, they needed to keep going, be killed in confrontation with the police or face imprisonment (a topic further explored in the next chapter).

Post-revolution militants: challenges

The accounts of post-revolution militants about the challenges of the underground life were mainly related to interpersonal conflicts, due to shared stressful daily routines – house sharing, for instance, seemed to be one of the most challenging issues. Júlia reported that usually militants were not able to choose their house partners, who were chosen by the leadership, bearing in mind the operations to execute and other logistical issues (e.g. no money to rent another house). This situation often threw together people that had never seen each other before, who could have a good or a terrible relationship, as described by Júlia:

> In regard to living in the different houses I lived a little bit of everything: people with whom I avoided speaking, people with whom it was very difficult to discuss what we would eat the next day, but also people with whom I shared a relationship for life. But it was fractious, in general; it was tense, because we were always short of money, there was always a great tension regarding whether the house was safe or not. People had to behave so that we did not have to leave the next day… in this sense, the situation was not very comfortable.

These conflicted relationships were clearly rooted in the context in which militants were acting. This was a context characterised by a stressful daily routine, not only because people did not know each other well and each person had his/her own way of seeing and doing things, but also because the conditions they lived in made life difficult. For instance, the lack of financial resources and the poor logistics seemed a central point on the narrations of different militants. So much so that Mariana referred to the fact that at times she starved, because she did not have money to buy food; and Júlia considered that the 'dominant feeling' of her underground experience was related to the stressful daily life experiences linked with the existence of poor means and logistics – 'there was a permanent lack of money, bad cars, weapons that did not work, very rudimentary logistics, very badly suited to what we wanted to do. We were always amending situations; we were always looking for money to take care of the essentials.' In this sense, the material aspects of the underground life for post-revolution militants marked their experiences and added significant layers of stress to their involvement with a political violent organisation, influencing the way they related to each other and the existence of conflicts.

At the individual level, several militants also considered that the underground life involved many psychological challenges. Militants pondered that they were living in an environment that made them prone to 'seeing ghosts', because they were constantly alert and constantly suspecting the people around them. This was a state of mind accompanied by high levels of stress and fatigue that would never go away or give militants a break. Hélder illustrated such challenges as follows:

> This is a huge psychological game... so, if people begin to think that they are being followed, they are in fact being followed, in their imagination. While underground, I've been in situations in which my picture was in front of me in a police station and nobody

> identified me; or, in other situations, my picture came in the newspapers and on television and I was in a cafe and nobody recognized me. Obviously, in these circumstances a guy has to be calm and cold blooded. Then, you have to have a huge psychological balance; if you start to think that you are being followed you always see shadows. […] It is obvious that psychologically there are moments of panic, right? […] It is not easy, of course, we are always on a knife-edge – 'Did they recognize me? Did they not?' The big problem is to start imagining, imagining that one was recognized. Then, there are the noises; you hear a lot more than what is there. Then, there are things you must do, you never turn your back to the door in a restaurant, this is part of the underground manuals, this is part of the novelists' literature, sometimes of no use, but you must do it. And then you must be careful to not be betrayed, right?

Above all, Hélder pointed out that clandestine militants needed extraordinary doses of self-control in nerve-racking circumstances and needed to be psychologically balanced, so as to deal with the 'shadows' and 'noises' of daily life. Otherwise, militants would stay at the window taking notes of the car registrations that pass by, in order to make sure that they are not being followed or that the safe house is still safe, as Júlia mentioned in regard to this topic. In this sense, as advised by Hélder and by other interviewees, clandestine militants needed to find strategies to deal with such 'psychological games'. Hélder, in the quote cited above, gave the example of never turning the back to the door when seated at a restaurant; and Jaime said that he would always go around the neighbourhood twice or three times before going home to make sure that he was not being followed. These are strategies that, above all, brought some peace of mind and contributed to the so much needed 'psychological balance' mentioned by Hélder in the context of underground life. Lastly, Hélder also reflected on why some militants did not stand up to the pressure:

> There were many people who were not 100% convinced of what they were doing, that's why some became informers, others suffered badly, and others had to be exiled, because they were going crazy. It takes a very tough inner strength and conviction. You get to a point when you step into a double personality and you do not easily strip yourself from this. Even at present I still have some things, habits that I still have.

Thus, according to Hélder, ‘inner strength and conviction’ were the ingredients that kept clandestine militants in the game. However, even for those who played such a game until the end, like Hélder, there were consequences stretching down to the present day.

Finally, a few militants saw the closed and fragmented nature of clandestine organisations as an obstacle to the struggle. Clandestine organisations, such as FP-25, are usually compartmentalised into different small cells that work together towards the execution of operations; and are characterized by the lack of debates involving large numbers of people – procedures taken in order to protect the organisations and its militants from being exposed and caught. Therefore, militants are often rather focused on daily matters that involve their survival and safety, rather than on theoretical and thought processes about the bigger picture. This was a situation that led Júlia to reflect:

> The fact that the organisation is completely clandestine also creates great limitations. People close themselves into a world very centred on small goals, particularly on the objectives of each operation... so there is little communication with the rest of society. Therefore, this creates great difficulties for relaxed daily living. This is an objective situation that creates significant limitations. The organisation, by imposition of its political choices, was a violent organisation, clandestine, and consequently very fragmented, which limited greatly the ability of people to discuss the decisions.

This detachment from society described by Júlia was termed ‘militant enclosure’ by della Porta (2013, p.247). This author considered that ‘militant enclosure’ is responsible, on the one hand, for the increasing dependence that militants have on the organisation and, on the other hand, for the decreasing contact with and understanding of society. Thus, this is a process that engulfs militants’ cognitions and causes, ‘a dramatic change in the militants’ images of their external world’ (p. 274). Furthermore, I believe that ‘militant enclosure’ equally explains why militants keep a long-term commitment to a clandestine organisation, despite all daily hardships and emotional hurdles. In a sense, their lives become encrusted in an indisputable narrative that lays them down as committed fighters and trusted comrades, who are responsible for the survival of the organisation. In this context, there was very little to be discussed, but much to be done.

Post-revolution militants: gender

Within FP-25 there were very few women directly involved with armed operations. According to Júlia, in jail there were roughly nine women and sixty men, 'a massive difference'; and from the nine women arrested only four had lived underground. The rest were supporters of the organisation and fulfilled a logistical role (e.g. allowed militants to sleep at their places, kept materials). This was a situation that Jaime, for instance, found deplorable, because not only in violent organisation, but in politics in general, women are under-represented. However, this interviewee considered that the role of the few active women within FP-25 was 'the same as men'. Hélder agreed with Jaime, though he also affirmed that not all militants accepted the participation of women in violent actions well, especially the older ones. In his opinion a few militants within FP-25 were sexist, which caused ideological debates, but other militants were liberal and 'treated women in a reactionary way'. Júlia went further than Hélder and considered FP-25 as a 'deeply sexist' organisation:

> There was a male predominance in the organisation and I think that when organisations close themselves onto one gender they gain strange vices. So, there was a discourse in which everything was done in a logic of manliness and virility... not virility in the strictly sexual sense, but in the affirmation of strength and courage. Concepts that maybe the left should be able to abolish.

I consider that this reflection is extremely interesting, because Júlia connected the existing sexism with the leftist ideology advertised by FP-25 militants, which did not permeate all areas of the organisation, because some men were still bound by social prejudices and traditions, both about women and about what it is to be a man. This is a viewpoint corroborated by women in other political organisations, such as ETA (see MacDonald, 1991, p.31), who considered that not all their comrades were 'women libbers' and that they also needed to be 'educated'. Still on this topic, Júlia mentioned the role of women within the organisation in terms of romantic relationships, which mirrored the referred sexist attitudes:

> Despite the vanguardist discourse – 'we are all equal, we are all equal' - but they did not sleep with each other, when they sought someone to sleep with, they sought women.

> […] The emotional side of people who were underground was not very healthy. The few female militants never lacked company, which I don't know if it really meant a settled affection, generally I don't think so. However, almost all got involved with people who were in the organisation, but I think this was inevitable, because our universe was quite limited. It was not very easy to find a boyfriend around the corner, because we did not go to clubs and stuff, there was a world completely closed to us and this was the universe people had got into.

In this vein, Júlia started by criticizing the kind of romantic relationships present in the organisation, but ended by recognizing that it was inevitable. Like Hélder, Júlia echoed the idea that clandestine militants are human and have needs and affections that take place in a circumscribed universe, in a circumscribed manner.

Both Júlia and Hélder also believed that the society of the time was utterly sexist, which played in favour of the organisation. According to Hélder, the police would 'never see a woman as a potential enemy'. This was corroborated by Júlia, who described situations in which she had been very close to being caught, but the fact she was a women diverted the authorities' attention, because in her opinion they 'were always looking for men, even though they knew there were women'.

Ultimately, Júlia concluded that none of the four female members of FP-25 left an undeniable mark on the organisation. In her opinion they were just four more members, who 'voted, participated in discussions… but having been those four women or having been another set of four women would not have changed the reality of the organisation'.

The Use of Violence

This topic of analysis emerged in two different ways throughout the conducted interviews: on the one hand, as a natural part of the stories and experiences being narrated by the respondents; and, on the other hand, prompted by the researcher, in order to understand the thoughts and feelings behind the commission of political violent acts. My intention was never to gather detailed information about specific actions such as who did what, where and how, which I made

clear at the beginning of each interview. My interests were related to the collection of first-hand accounts of the personal experiences, emotions and thoughts that surrounded the commission of political violent acts. Thus, in this section two different topics will be explored: the type of actions carried out by the different organisations with a particular interest in the experiences, thoughts and emotions narrated by different militants; and the perceptions of the sources and dynamics of popular support to the different organisations' causes.

Pre-revolution militants: armed actions

Despite conceptually justifying armed acts (as analysed in chapter five), across various conversations, pre-revolution militants endorsed a sense of dislike for guns and devices alike (e.g. explosives). A few militants mentioned that it was not in their 'nature' to use guns, which they would only do as a last resort. For instance, I asked Henrique, LUAR's co-founder, what in his opinion was the best armed struggle tactic, to which he answered:

> The best armed struggle tactic is to disarm the struggle. Would you believe me if I told you that I never fired a gun? I don't like guns. There are people who have a passion for guns. I don't. What is the best tactic of armed struggle? There is no better tactic than to be right. Not personally, but being right within a collective understanding, because everyone can say they are right personally, but that is not what I mean. It is to be collectively right, consensually, socially if you want, this is the best tactic.

Henrique went further still and presented his stance in relation to homicides, which represents the stance of all pre-revolution organisations – a patent 'no kill' position as a strong personal and organisational choice. In his opinion he could not 'simultaneously fight for freedom and be the destroyer of someone's life'. Additionally, he considered that 'the problem was social and political', it was much deeper than taking the life of a tyrant. Thus, pre-revolution militants argued that human targets only weaken the political struggle and negatively affect popular support. For these militants such an action would not solve the political and social problem they had in hand, but instead a consistent attack on the regime's structures could raise political awareness that major action had to be taken, which was finally brought by the Revolution of April 25th.

Throughout pre-revolution militants' narratives there were various stories that revealed their thoughts and feelings around the commission of an armed act. The most curious case was, undoubtedly, Henrique's, who told me:

> Listen, I, for instance, as I told you, when I was little I had a difficult life… and then each one of us has his ghosts... my biggest dream while I was growing up was to have a bath, a tub to take a warm bath, that was my biggest dream. And when I was in that kind of life I always tried, before the action, to find a way to take a good bath and say: 'This one is done, this one nobody can take away from me, right? From here on, no matter what happens...' We always have mechanisms, we always find mechanisms, but whatever mechanism we have there is a certain time from which we don't care about what might happen. When I say we don't care about what can happen it means that there is a point from which we no longer think about it, it's been thought out and studied that we have to do this and that, and that's that. So, let's get on with it, there is nothing else we can do.

At first, Henrique's story of always trying to have a warm bath before each action seemed comical and futile to me. However, the more I thought about it, the more I could understand its purpose and the more I could humanize a political actor, who represents a wider group of people who make similar choices and who are, more often than not, dehumanized through the traditional discourse on political violence (Zulaika and Douglass, 1996). The second half of Henrique's story also points out to something referred to by most militants – the unshakable certitude that no matter what happens, the planned action has to be carried out. Adriano from BR also described the same calm and composure before an action, but the opposite after it, displaying the effects of participation in highly stressful and dangerous situations – 'I was never afraid or stressed before an action. I never questioned its implementation, nor thought about going back. The stress would come afterwards, then I used to throw up, have diarrhoea and insomnia, but always after the actions.' In relation to fear, pre-revolution militants were in general more afraid of being caught and tortured by the political police than of being killed, as stated by Leonel from ARA – 'when we were going into the action, I had no fear. I knew that if something went wrong I could even die, but it seemed that I was on a high, seriously! I was just afraid of something else, I was not afraid of death, I was afraid of suffering, imprisonment

and such like…' Finally, the day of the action itself was commonly described as a joyful day, as 'a day of celebration to the revolutionary', as the fruitful product of so many difficulties, which according to Henrique is not much talked about, despite its importance. According to this interviewee, with the exception of the few joyful days of the actions all the other days in the life of a full-time revolutionary were felt to be permeated with difficulties, frustrations, precarious conditions and lack of resources – feelings shared by several militants across the three different groups under analysis. Feelings that filled the dark days of life in the underground and that echo the affirmation made by Zwerman et al. (2000, p.97): 'The reality of the life underground was that a relatively small portion of the professional revolutionary's time was actually spent on revolutionary activity, creating a conflict between an imagined revolutionary identity and daily life.'

Pre-revolution militants: popular support

The views and stances around armed actions in the case of pre-revolution militants were strongly guided by a solid desire for popular support and approval. As already mentioned, these militants aimed to win people's hearts and minds in order to attain political transformation. As Henrique emphatically explained, violent actions would only make sense if they were representative of everybody's will – 'It is an image: if the revolutionary is a fish, people are the water. Fish do not live without water. So, when you are preparing your arm, be it to punch or to shoot, your arm somehow has to be the extension of many arms that would like to do the same thing'. However, here an important question can be raised: how was popular support measured? Various militants admitted that it was not something easy to measure, especially when one was exiled in a foreign country or leaving underground and avoiding contact with anyone outside the organisation for security reasons. Nonetheless, some methods were described, such as through conversations heard by non-clandestine militants after an action at their work places, on the street, at the cafe or on public transportation, in which people perceived and discussed the political significance of an armed act and praised it. BR militants, for example, referred to the fact that when robbing banks, most people were not afraid of them, because they knew they had political aims in mind and that they would not make use of violence against people. So much so that once after robbing a bank they were applauded by the people standing on the street. However, at a different time in the same circumstances some people also

hunted them down and were only dispersed after some shots were fired into the air. In this context, such a perception of popular support at the time was quite subjective and event-specific, corroborating the point made by della Porta (2013) that the images militants construct about the external reality are a consequence of 'small-group dynamics' (p.265), which in their isolation become 'the sole point of reference for their members' (p.273).

Moreover, there was an aspect of pre-revolution militants' identity that in their opinion was crucial to gathering popular support: they were not terrorists or common criminals. Their actions were never targeted at killing people, which was always made clear through the political statements released after each operation. In this sense, according to Rui from ARA, 'our actions would not create victims and would not enable the regime to call us terrorists. They never managed to be able to say that. And the population could also make the distinction, and as they themselves were not bombed, they themselves were not confused.' Thus, their efforts were focused on showing people that they were fighting the regime, not the general population, seeking their awareness and support.

Counter-revolution militants: armed actions

The armed struggle conducted by counter-revolution militants was aimed, according to Ilídio, co-founder of MDLP, 'against the implementation or the possible implementation of a communist regime in the country' after the Revolution. This was a struggle openly influenced by a clear anti-Communism political position and by strong religious principles, as elucidated by Afonso from ELP:

> With March 11th there was an acceleration in the seizure of power by the communists, with the nationalization of the whole banking system, large industries, large agricultural properties south of the Tagus, and almost total control of the radio, television and newspapers. There arose a policy of terror; no one dared to do anything (or almost no one...). Then, that little organisation [ELP] that was still in an embryonic phase saw the need to accelerate and get to work... And what did we do? We especially encouraged uprisings of the population in the various villages, towns and cities, against the headquarters of the Communist Party. When there were markets and fairs, we took

> advantage and carried out armed break-ins, destroying the premises, papers, and so on... However, the guideline that always existed in this organisation was, as we have a Christian background, and we are not Marxists, the ends do not justify the means. We cannot begin to have gratuitous violence, but we must have clear objectives, giving strength and confidence for the people to rebel... And so it was!

Therefore, according to Afonso, ELP's actions aimed to drag the populace into revolt and target Communist Party headquarters, in order to prove that 'the Portuguese people were not communist' and did not want Communism installed in Portugal. Neither Afonso, nor any other MDLP militant, mentioned the turmoil that their violent actions caused throughout the Hot Summer of 1975, placing the country 'on the brink of civil war' (Dâmaso, 1997, p.99). Violent actions kept taking place until February 1977, long after the official end of those organisations, including attacks on property, but also homicides (Dâmaso, 1997). However, Afonso's version of ELP's violence is different. As he mentioned, ELP did not follow Marxist principles, but Christian, so gratuitous violence was not an option. The following story supports this affirmation:

> I can tell you an interesting story: after November 25th, with a very active PCP destroying the whole country's economy, I was contacted by a pilot who had worked with me in Mozambique, who I knew well: 'I'm flying to Belém Palace on the day of the Congress of the Communist Party and according to the information I have all the party structure will be there, as well as guests from the international Communist Parties, particularly from Latin America. I can organize a way to get a bomb of great capacity inside the helicopter, which I'll drop vertically, wiping out 80 to 90% of the participants'. […] In those times we felt the right to react, I mean, who was more of an enemy? Was it the FRELIMO, the MPLA I fought in the bush in Angola and Mozambique or was it these PCP guys that were doing everything to destroy the rest of Portugal? For me, as a military, they were the enemy. So if they had told me this when I was in Angola, about a meeting of the leadership of MPLA I would not have hesitated: 'Let's take the opportunity and get rid of all those guys.' Doing so in Portugal, in those circumstances, despite them being as much of an enemy as the ones in the bush, or even more dangerous... but I had to have a very clear notion that an action of this kind would

> lead to a civil war. […] I had the two worst nights and the three worst days of my life, because I was alone and had to decide whether or not... and I said no. Now if I had had a communist training I would have said yes, right? So that's the big distinction between a movement like ELP and a terrorist movement, communist guerrillas, we know throughout the world. The members of the ELP had a Christian background, which obliged them to consider very carefully the use of violence.

Thus, Afonso felt that ELP was an organisation faithful to higher principles, which was defending a righteous cause, leading him to the conclusion that his obligations have been fulfilled and his conscience is clear – 'I am even glad to have been able to do what I did, both in the military, and afterwards. I even take a certain pride in it.'

Conversely, across MDLP militant's testimonies the narrations about the homicides that occurred during the period of the organisation's operations were often blurred. Ilídio, for instance, stated vehemently that within MDLP 'there was a great concern not to kill'. And, interestingly, this interviewee used exactly the same justification as Henrique from LUAR: 'It is the famous maxim of Mao Tse Tsung: the guerrilla must live in the crowd like fish in water, if not it becomes the enemy'. Sérgio, another MDLP militant, corroborated Ilídio's statement saying that 'there were no physical attacks, it can be said that we did not kill'. However, he admitted 'at the meetings we gave some thought in regards to physical attacks on people, which today makes me put my hands on my head to think that this was even discussed in the meetings'. Then, Sérgio continued reflecting on the homicides that occurred at the time, clearly concerned to exculpate the presumed role of Commander Calvão, MDLP's second in command:

> There was the case of Father Max, but this story is very complicated, and the case of Ferreira Torres, which is even more complicated. I have my own opinion, my opinion because I did not participate. Regarding Ferreira Torres, I'll tell you one thing: at the time he died Commander Calvão was with me in Lisbon, in the Imovis building, next to the Sheraton Hotel when he received the call that Ferreira Torres had died. That was the news: he was not responsible, but then they created the hypothesis that he had been the one who gave the order. I am absolutely certain that... at that time, I had a very close relationship with Commander Calvão […] if he had done such a thing I would know.

Nonetheless, not every militant agreed with this description of events, and in the case of my interviewees one in particular sturdily opposed it:

> Álvaro: Mr Commander Calvão is the father of it all! And there is one thing I cannot tell you because I do not have 100% proof, but he is one of those to blame for the death of Ferreira Torres, he was the man who sold fake stamps for the movement, but who was the man controlling everything? It was Commander Calvão...
> Raquel: But he says that at that time he no longer controlled anything…
> Álvaro: What did you want him to say? That it was him? [...] A farce, but that gave money to many people, 6,000,000 fake stamps were sold at the Finances Bureau, that's why Ferreira Torres died.

Thus, in terms of the use of violence in the context of the counter-revolution organisations, particularly in relation to the assassinations, the circumstances were not clearly defined by the participants in this study. The narrations of some of them sought to absolve the organisation's role in any of it, while the narrations of others pointed the finger at the organisation and at some of its members in particular. This is a situation also discussed by Dâmaso (1997, p.12), who considered that the relationships among the members of those organisations were rather fragile and 'in the overwhelming majority of cases the only things that lasted were hatred, resentment, serious allegations, insinuations, defamations, accusations, leaving in the air a perfume of total distrust about the true role played by various individuals'. In this context, it is worth noting that counter-revolution militants (as well as pre- and post-revolution militants), in general, were committed to hold their own version of events, defending it as representative of what actually happened, and of what should make history (Tschuggnall and Welzer, 2002). In this sense, the stories told were at the service of my interviewees' construction of their sense of self and identity (Frank, 2010), which implies that 'personal narratives represent a personal truth, or truths, even if that truth does not coincide with reality' (Andrews, 2014a, p.26). However, as was explored in chapter four, finding 'reality' was not the aim of the present research, but the aim instead was to acknowledge the significance of its meaning for the different interviewees (see McAdams, 1993. 2001).

Counter-revolution militants: popular support

Counter-revolution militants perceived the support of the people of the North of Portugal and of the Catholic Church as strong and steadfast towards their cause. The reasons for the support of the Northerners were exposed by Dinis, who, echoing the above mentioned words of Afonso, also considered that the people of the North were not receptive to Communism, because they 'did not want to see their land devastated'. According to this interviewee the rest of the country was less prone to the counter-revolution organisations' cause, because they were coerced by PCP, which was more organized and had more popular support in the region of Lisbon and Alentejo – 'in this region it was difficult to raise a voice and to oppose. After all fear and coercion were dominant'. Counter-revolution militants also conceived the support of the Catholic Church as central. In the words of Sérgio, this was still the 'Church that comes from the old regime', and that, according to Ilídio, would 'bring a popular army at arms' to fight the 'red invasion' if necessary. Different militants also mentioned the support of a great part of the military and of the police, which, for instance, allowed their easy circulation at the border between Spain and Portugal. However, in the midst of various militants passionately attesting the existence of a robust popular support, Daniel held a different and interesting perspective:

> There is a fantastic book of a great Spanish writer of the time of the Carlist Wars[39] that I read when I was in Spain and which made me laugh, because it was exactly what was happening to us. It was about the immigrants in France, who thought that the country was eager for their return, that the country was waiting with open arms to welcome them, saying: 'We need you to come'. It was not true. The country continued to live normally. So, would I ever know if we had support or not. I had no idea at all. Those who wandered in and out talked about enormous popular support, but in the Carlist Wars, in Algiers, Delgado... they all said the same. Whenever there is a force that wants to overthrow a regime or wants to fight the abuse of a system, there is also autointoxication – people consider that the country is waiting for them. Probably, as the country was not communist, it was not MDLP either; it wasn't anything. It just wanted

[39] The Carlist Wars were a series of civil wars that took place in Spain during the 19th century, whose contenders intended to establish a separate line of the Bourbon dynasty on the Spanish throne (see Lawrence, 2014).

to be left alone. That's what I think, but I cannot be sure.

Daniel's evaluation of the intensity of popular support received by MDLP seemed to me very down to earth, which can be due to the fact that many years had passed and many reflections had been made. However, it is interesting that this interviewee resisted the temptation of romanticizing the importance and role of the organisation, which happened to many others. This is a position that may be related to the fact that Daniel considered his engagement with a political violent organisation to be due to 'youthful idealism', to a phase in his life in which he felt responsible for the fate of his country and believed that he could be of service. However, after the experience with MDLP, Daniel never engaged in political activities again, and at the time of our conversation he clearly had made a cut with the past, which was acknowledged, but at the same time performed in a rational manner with no ramifications into the present.

Post-revolution militants: armed actions

The FP-25, according to Bruno, 'appeared in the context of a major assault from the right, in order to articulate some more radical ways of struggle and to show the workers that when certain forms of struggle are exhausted, there are other forms to respond to the arrogance of the capital, there are other ways of acting'. Thus, for Jaime, the FP-25 was 'the armed arm of the workers' against the abuses of the employers, which meant that 'shooting the knee' of an abusive employer would be:

> An attempt to convey a practical message for both sides, for the employers and for the victims who had been laid off. If there was a guy who was not paying the salaries, or who had fled to Brazil, that guy needed to realize that he could not do that. And since the state did not act, at least there were some guys that would keep him frightened.

From Jaime's testimony, it is possible to anticipate an organisation composed of militants who saw the need to take justice into their own hands, encouraged by a perception that the state would rather protect the powerful than the vulnerable. However, the opinions about the type of violent actions to perform were not as homogeneous as the goal that brought people together. In fact, several militants mentioned endless discussions and conflicts around what type of

violence to perform, which used to fall into two options: violence that would not endanger people's lives – 'symbolic actions, such as placing a few bombs, robbing banks, eventually attacking one or two people, but without killing them' – and violence against people's lives. Thus, on one side there was a group which considered that people should not be killed, because such an action could harm the struggle and turn out to be ineffective. This was a position defended by Bruno, who affirmed:

> I was against the killings, not for moral reasons, but for tactical reasons. […] I considered that if we wanted to lead by example, in pedagogical terms it was preferable to put them in a wheelchair, transforming them in living examples. Pedagogically that would work better than killing the guy, who would make the news, but after a while nobody would talk about it anymore, it would be forgotten. While in a wheelchair: the guy did this, but that happened.

On the other side, there were people like Júlia who could see the benefit of killing a representative of the class they were fighting against – 'a symbol of the employers' – in order to set the example to the workers and encourage their struggle:

> I defended, while I was involved, that the examples... I don't know if you have sufficient knowledge, but from a certain point the organisation chose to act against employers who fired people. For example, there was an action against the administrator of Sacavém Tableware Factory, and I thought that this was the type of action that could trigger the workers' reaction. I mean, the fact that that person was reached could trigger a sense of strength and lead the workers to react.

Thus, in order to go further and explore the perceptions of these militants on taking someone's life for political reasons, it is interesting to analyse how the targeted victims are portrayed in their narrations. For instance, Jaime considered that there were always socio-political reasons attached to the killings – 'If people, historians, or people like you, checked FP-25 actions – those where people died – you would note that there was a reason, I mean, the path of those who turned out to be victims of the attacks of FP-25, was a path that showed that they were available to...' Jaime did not finish this sentence, but he started a list of the people killed by the

organisation and the reasons why it happened:

> For example, the Gelmar guy was used by the government to close companies. He would arrive and destroy the company, this was his speciality! […] At Sacavém Tableware Factory there were several suicides caused by the life the employer imposed on the workers [unpaid wages] […] In the case of Castelo Branco [General Manager of the Prison Services] there were people who fell ill: he was a tyrant, he was a *salazarista*. […] Doctors would say that people needed to go to hospital and he would say: 'No, I am the boss here', which led doctors to resign, this is suicide… the prime-minister did not give it any importance, because he was the general manager… what was the way that the organisation had of dealing with the situation at that time? Send him a postcard wishing him happy holidays? In addition to his behaviour regarding the prisoners in general, what he was doing with FP-25 prisoners was totally inhuman. […] Another case that I almost forgot is the case of the penitent, these are actions that I personally understand, and I understand them as messages that need to be pushed through.

In summary, according to Jaime, FP-25's victims were in fact perpetrators, they were responsible for the suffering of others; and ending their life would not only be just in a particular case, but would also prevent other cases from happening, conveying a message 'as clear as water'. The only exceptions in Jaime's list are the penitents, the militants who were arrested and decided to collaborate with the police to bring down the organisation. The death of penitents, as argued by Jaime, also aimed to convey a message, which was expanded by Bruno who said that within the organisation 'it was assumed that guys who clearly betrayed, who chose to go to the other side and cooperate with the police, including joining them in the searches for militants, these guys if we had the chance, we would kill them, of course'. Thus, despite being against homicides of the organisation's targets as seen above, Bruno was not against the homicide of penitents. This, according to his account, seemed an agreed punishment within the organisation, which was never exposed as negative by any interviewee, in fact the opposite was true, as it is possible to see through Júlia's poignant reaction:

> What we call penitents are militants who were arrested and later cooperated with the police. There is one who was killed. Well, in all honesty in the world, the day I got up

> and heard on the radio 'FP-25 repentant was killed', I leaped for joy and said 'Hallelujah, at last'. […] They are not really people to me, I would not care if I saw them fallen on the sidewalk, quite frankly.

Such a reaction corroborates della Porta's (2013) observations on the lack of tolerance that political violent organisations have in regard to penitents. According to this author, militants are supposed to act in conformity and are encouraged to reject any form of dissent, which endangers everything the organisation achieved and lived for. Thus, both the descriptions of the people targeted by the organisation, and the views on the homicide of penitents, clearly show that opponents 'in the militants' eyes became progressively dehumanized' (Bandura, 1999; della Porta, 2013, p.261). Both Jaime's and Júlia's narrations are characterised by a sense of disgust for the targets' behaviours – 'They are not really people to me, I would not care if I saw them fallen on the sidewalk, quite frankly' – and by a sense of limited ways to fight injustices – 'So, what was the mechanism that the organisation had at that time? Send him a postcard wishing him happy holidays?' – which justified the use of violence by the organisation. However, there was one action that was mentioned by all militants that made everyone lower the tone of their voice and become introspective – the action that accidentally killed a baby and his grandmother. According to the perception of the militants' interviewed, those were the only innocents killed by the organisation and were killed by accident. However, this became a very serious situation within the organisation, which weakened the militants' ties, both among themselves and towards the organisation, causing numerous arguments and finger pointing. Bruno, for instance, considered that 'it was an accident, but an accident caused by negligence of the guys who were carrying out the action. It was not their intention, but they did things wrong'. Nonetheless, the activities of the organisation continued and a few militants also highlighted the fact that their struggle also created victims on their side, which was quite difficult and painful individually and at the organisation's level. Thus, they did not show regret, but the accomplishment of a political choice, which carried consequences for both sides, as Jaime put it:

> This does not mean that I think or that I can say that I live well or interacted well with those decisions or situations, I do not live well with anything… the day of the attack turns out to be outrageous, but it's like I said on my wedding day: this is part of the

> political struggle. […] I have as much respect for people who eventually died at the hands of FP-25, some by accident, others, of course, through the determination of the organisation, as I do for my comrades, who also died in that fight. Everyone speaks about the victims, and what about FP-25 militants who died? There weren't just one or two of them, there were several. They did not die from car accidents, right? So, I have the same respect for the 'victims', shall we say, as for my comrades, because I think that the political struggle is the political struggle. […] So, my answer is that I am not sorry for anything that I did, basically; I believe that violence is a means of political struggle.

Through Jaime's words it is possible to see how important the political struggle is in his life, to the point of being mentioned on his wedding day. This was a struggle in relation to which he is not remorseful, because everything was done in accordance with his political views of the wworld and framed according to a specific context, which involved deaths on both sides, which are lamented, but are, at the same time, part of the broader picture – the political struggle.

Across Jaime's reflections represented in this section it is difficult to clearly draw his personal position regarding the human victims of FP-25. As seen at the beginning of this section, he presented justifications for such actions, particularly the tyranny exerted by employers over their employees, but he never talked personally, instead he always focused the attention on the decision-making process and responsibility of the organisation (e.g. 'I have as much respect for people who eventually died at the hands of FP-25, some by accident, others, of course, through the determination of the organisation'). However, he personally acknowledged and agreed that violent means are inevitable and a tool in the political struggle.

The explicit or implicit support of post-revolution militants for actions against human lives represented one of the main ethical dilemmas I encountered as a researcher vis-à-vis the interview process itself. From the beginning of my research on political violence, I wanted to be empathetic and non-judgmental towards my interviewees' experiences, but at times I struggled in my role as active listener to nod in order to validate some of their views regarding the killings. My way out of this dilemma and towards emotional balance was, as advised by Adam Dolnik (2011), to 'look for empathetic ways to acknowledge or validate the legitimate

grievances behind the militants' actions while carefully differentiating these from the actions themselves'. Such differentiation was never clearly made in conversation with any of my interviewees, because they never asked my opinion about their actions, which was, in my view, quite empathetic of them not to put me in a difficult situation. However, it permeates my methodological reflections on the subject (see chapter four).

Post-revolution militants: popular support

In terms of popular support, post-revolution militants considered that their actions gathered the support of many workers. For instance, Jaime vigorously asked 'Has anyone ever asked the workers of Sacavém Tableware Factory whether they agreed that FP-25 should destroy their tyrant? If you had asked, people would have said yes, even though they didn't have the courage to do so themselves.' The reason for such support, according to those militants, was related to the fact that they planned their actions bearing in mind, and in solidarity, with the workers' struggles. However, it was also recognised by Júlia that FP-25's actions only made sense for the urban and industrialized areas of Lisbon and surroundings, and that further north, in mainly rural areas, the organisation's popular support was reduced. Simply because FP-25's actions, as Júlia explained, 'were the exponent of the idea of conflict between what we called the proletariat and the lords of power and, therefore, it was an eminently urban phenomenon'. Nonetheless, this was not the only reason for the reduced popular support to FP-25's cause, which decreased over time in inverse proportion to the increase in the organisation's violence, particularly with the step of starting to kill people. It was quoted above that at the time of her involvement with the organisation, Júlia believed that killing the "symbols of the employers" would encourage the workers to react by themselves. However, over time Júlia's perspective changed: 'the reality of the facts proved me wrong; on the contrary, it scared people and made them flee from such situations.' In her opinion, the opposite happened, because 'people felt scared to commit to such extreme situations'. Thus, she concluded that her 'reading of that social situation' was mistaken. This dynamic of popular support presented by Júlia follows the direction of what Zwerman et al. (2000, p.95) believe that happens when clandestine organisations escalate their violence levels – instead of inspiring supporters, high levels of violence 'horrifies' them. This was a conclusion only reached afterwards by some post-revolution militants, after serving time in jail and having time to think about their experiences

and how to re-organise their inner selves and outer lives (a topic further explored in the next chapter).

Concluding Reflections: The Personal Became Political and the Political Became Personal

Throughout this chapter it has become evident that from the moment an individual makes a commitment to a clandestine organisation their whole life becomes a political matter, because everything else is left behind and their only focus is on attaining the organisation's goals. The opposite is also true – every political matter becomes the militant's whole life – because the politically-motivated events in which militants were involved in the past constructed them as subjects and shaped their life stories.

In the three different periods of time analysed, and in some cases in the specific case of a particular organisation, the dynamics of underground life differed. Pre-revolution militants were the ones who took underground life more seriously, because what was at stake was higher – not only imprisonment but also torture. In this sense, militants described a very restricted life (e.g. no contact with family or friends), in which they were totally focused on the objectives they were to accomplish, which prevented interpersonal conflicts and strengthened the trust among militants. The role of women was different in the three pre-revolution organisations under analysis, in which a crescendo of involvement can be seen from ARA, where women performed the roles expected by the society of the time; to LUAR, where women accomplished logistical roles; and finally to BR, where women participated in armed actions at the same level as men. The experience of living underground for counter-revolution militants differed widely, starting from the fact that the ones exiled in Spain enjoyed a non-clandestine daily life, and the ones that stayed in Portugal were not overly harassed by the authorities, due to the political turmoil within the country at that time. The main challenges posed to these militants were related to interpersonal conflicts motivated by power dynamics and by the difficulty of keeping a tight control over all areas and decisions made by their respective organisations. Women did not have a place among counter-revolution militants, who were conservative and considered that their role was to stay at home and to take care of the children. In the case of post-revolution militants, life underground was lived differently by different individuals. However, when the authorities started closing in, the commitment to living underground increased. These militants

focused intensively on the stressful routine of being a clandestine militant, which in their case was permeated by interpersonal conflicts and poor means and logistics. Thus, the day-to-day needs often diverted their attention from the political goals of the organisation. In general, post-revolution militants considered that there were sexist attitudes within FP-25 that a leftist ideology was unable to change. However, women were effective militants of the organisation and partnered men in its different activities.

The use of violence was also distinct in the three time periods at different levels. For pre-revolution militants, violence was the only form of expressing dissent and of fighting a dictatorship. Additionally, the armed acts of these militants were never targeted at people: thus they were not seen as a moral issue, but as a political responsibility justified by a repressive and violent regime. The violence perpetrated by counter-revolution militants was justified by the prevention of a perceived threat to the country – a communist invasion. These militants were reticent to talk about the violent acts committed by their respective organisations, preferring to draw general lines around their objectives and the actions that they could have done, but chose not to. For post-revolution militants, violence was openly a political strategy, and their targets represented the symbols of the organisation's objectives. As the organisation that openly targeted people's lives, FP-25 militants explored in detail the thoughts and emotions around such violent acts, considering that the majority of the people killed were killed for a set of reasons that placed them in a position where nothing else could be done and that a price had to be paid in order to make a political point and cause political transformation. However, what this organisation did not expect was the withdrawal of popular support caused by the escalation of violence, because extremism was seen to intimidate people who did not want to feel responsible for bloodshed.

In the following chapter I examine the experiences of former political violent militants in relation to their disengagement from a political violent organisation. This is a topic little explored by the existent literature and a topic that can in fact shed light on individual perspectives about the social, political and organisational contexts that both encourage and discourage the commission of political violent acts (Horgan, 2009).

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISENGAGEMENT FROM A POLITICAL VIOLENT ORGANISATION

Overview

In this chapter I discuss two distinct areas regarding the disengagement of individuals from a political violent organisation: ending commitment to a political violent organisation; and the past re-worked in the present. First, I look closely at the reasons presented to stop committing politically motivated violence, at the existent incentives and barriers for such a decision and at the pathways taken by individuals who disengaged from a political violent organisation. Second, I address the way in which individuals reflect on their memories, on the moments and events that marked their lives, and on who they became. This chapter is closed by a reflection on the discontinuity of violence, but continuity of political views in the lives of the interviewed individuals.

Ending Commitment to a Political Violent Organisation

In this topic the dynamics of disengagement from a political violent organisation will be examined according to two different areas: disengagement and dissolution of the organisation and reintegration into society. In the majority of the cases represented by the interviewed individuals it is difficult to clearly separate individual disengagement and dissolution of the organisation, because usually the latter gave origin to the former. However, a few cases in which this pattern was not followed will be explored, particularly in relation to a group of counter-revolution militants that decided to carry on armed actions after the dissolution of their organisation, and to two other individuals, one pre-revolution militant and one post-revolution militant, whose disengagement before the dissolution of the organisation was triggered by a range of organisational and personal factors (e.g. disappointment with the strategic choices of the organisation, change of personal priorities). Thus, in this area the whys and hows regarding the dissolution of an armed organisation will be discussed, shedding light on how they influenced personal choices and how they were influenced by the political and social contexts of the time. The reintegration into society of militants belonging to organisations operating in

distinct time frames was undoubtly different. In this context, it is possible to clearly distinguish how different historical and political circumstances gave origin to storylines that in some cases facilitated, and in other cases difficulted the reintegration into society of former political violent activists.

Pre-revolution militants: disengagement and dissolution of the organisation

BR militants claimed that they were the only ones capable of keeping their commitment to the armed struggle until the eve of the Revolution. In the case of ARA, there was a decision to suspend the organisation's activities in May 1973, because PCP leaders considered that the political landscape was starting to change in Portugal. Something that could be seen, according to Artur, by 'new manifestations of struggle', such as the vigil at the *Rato Chapel*[40] and the appearance of Catholic organisations contesting the regime's directions, particularly in relation to the Colonial War. Subsequently, Artur considered that ARA was afraid that 'the existence of armed action rather than to attract people, could contribute towards the repressive apparatus and could be an excuse for the political police to arrest more people and to intensify the repression'. However, ARA's militants made very clear that the organisation did not end, but suspended its activities (that were never resumed), because of the ocurrence of the April 25th Revolution. For these militants it was also important to clarify that such a suspension was the result of a political analysis of the conditions in the country at the time, and not a result of the arrest of a few militants. In this sense, Leonel, compared the decision taken by PCP to suspend ARA with what had happened in Vietnam:

> Near the elections of 1973, the Communist Party suspended the armed struggle to go to elections. Just like what had happened in Vietnam, the guerrilla was suspended to participate in the elections and then resumed again. So, they took advantage of that electoral space, of the election campaign, to do that. It was not like some people thought that we were weakened, no, because in jail there were only six of us, and in total there were about forty of us. Moreover, none of the leaders were in jail. The aim was to suspend in order not to disturb the election campaign. So, they could not take advantage

[40] This vigil took place in the last couple of days of 1972, stirred by a group of progressive Catholics and motivated by a growing dissent in relation to the Colonial War.

> of any action to say: 'It's all the same and so on'. This could have made the elections difficult.

In the case of LUAR, its dissolution and the disengagement of its militants appeared to be a gradual process, to which different factors contributed. According to Marco '…nobody conducts an analysis to decree the death of a political organisation. Nobody gets together to say: 'Well, from now on our store is closed, this is not going anywhere…' Nobody does this. People simply fade away.' Thus, within LUAR the reasons presented by different militants to 'fade away' from the organisation can be attributed to a number of reasons: to the arrest of various comrades, including the leader Palma Inácio; to some particular actions and decisions made by the organisation; and to the perceived improvement of the political circumstances in Portugal caused by the replacement of Salazar by Marcelo Caetano. Hence, there was a tone of disappointment in the accounts of some of LUAR's militants, which can be exemplified by the different points made by Emílio, who was the only interviewee who left the organisation before its dissolution. This militant started by mentioning the blow he received from the operation *Taking of Covilhã*. An operation planned from exile in extreme secrecy, at the point that the militants did not know exactly what the operation was about until they reached Portugal; but they trusted Palma Inácio and believed that it would be something blustering:

> Then the man [Palma Inácio] appears and does not speak about the details of the operation – 'But you'll see that it's an easy thing, we'll have an extraordinary operation, it's not an ordinary operation, small as I've done so far, it will be something that will be seen worldwide, more than Santa Maria[41].' I thought: 'What can it be? We'll take a small army!' Then when we were ready to go, we had a number of cars, a few rotten ones… we were all coming down [from France], not knowing what it was we were going to do, but we thought that there must have been some organized opposition inside the country or something… I did not know… when we discover that after all everything was glued with spit… it was another disappointment for me personally...

[41] Hijacked ocean liner on January 22nd 1961, whose objective was to call the attention of the international community for the Portuguese dictatorial regime.

This operation, instead of resulting in taking the city of Covilhã and turning it into a liberated area against the regime, according to the plans of LUAR's leader Palma Inácio, resulted in his arrest and the arrest of a number of other militants, who accompanied him. Emílio considered this as a setback to the revolutionary struggle, in general, and to the organisation, in particular, which were both 'again in standby'. Moreover, Emílio reflected that for him, personally, the organisation's leadership had lost charisma with the arrest of Palma Inácio:

> I no longer saw the charisma. Mortágua was fine, but Mortágua is not Palma, Palma had... Mortágua was a man who was afraid, which is normal, he'd done his share. He was not with us [at the *Taking of Covilhã*], he was afraid. Hipólito was also afraid, but not Palma, Palma was always there. This man had the charisma to draw us on.

To these circumstances were added two other factors that dictated Emílio's disengagement from LUAR: the perceived political changes happening in Portugal and his comfortable position as lecturer in exile. In relation to the first factor Emílio considered (echoing ARA's reasons to suspend the struggle) that '*Marcelismo* was eventually the possibility of modernization' for Portugal, because in his opinion 'a closed institution was disappearing' and 'when a society begins to have certain openness, violence makes fascism worse'. In relation to the second factor Emílio had a job, a good job, he was not a full-time revolutionary, which contrasted with the scenario presented by a shattered organisation such as LUAR was after the failure of the operation *Taking of Covilhã*. Thus, the origins of Emílio's disengagement were seeded at the psychological level (see Horgan, 2009), starting with disenchantment with the operations conducted by the organisation, which was strengthened by the arrest of a charismatic leader and his replacement with less charismatic figures. Emílio also expressed his decision to leave LUAR in less emotional terms, explaining that according to his political analysis armed struggle could threaten the political changes taking place in Portugal, which, in his opinion, was not a closed country anymore, as it had been under Salazar's governance. Finally, it is also possible to see a slight change in Emílio's personal priorities – 'as I told you, I was lecturing in France'.

Nevertheless, in the case of the majority of pre-revolution militants the key factor that determined their disengagement from political violent activity was the Revolution of April 25th. These militants considered that after this date their aim had been accomplished – the regime

had been overthrown and democracy was taking its first steps. In this light, Rui from ARA considered that 'with April 25th ARA was no longer necessary, no longer had legitimacy. Even if ARA's operations were just, they did not have legitimacy in a democracy that was developing'. The same opinion was defended by the majority of BR militants, who according to Nuno left the organisation officially in August 1974 at an extended meeting of the organisation, called to decide its future. In this context, Nuno emphasized:

> Fascism had ended, to whom would we keep placing bombs against? It was too violent for us; we needed a very strong cause to be doing that kind of thing. So, it did not make any sense to continue.

Irene, also from BR, agreed with Nuno and added that in her opinion the organisation was not needed anymore, because after April 25th she could 'see people solving their problems and improving their self-esteem, their self-awareness, because they were able to get organized'. This was something that led her to consider that the post-April 25th period was the happiest time of her life, because 'people were happy'. Finally, LUAR's militants also saw the April 25th Revolution as the stepping-stone to legal political participation and above all to the end of armed militancy. Henrique, for instance, would not concede the possibility of political violence in a context of democracy and freedom of expression:

> I have always said, and I got some enemies out there because of it, but I have always said that against a dictatorial regime that employs force and repression everything is justifiable, because there is no alternative. In a regime where there is freedom to say what you think, to organize, to... does not admit violence, they are two different things, eh? And that's why I've never agreed with those post-April 25th adventures. It is one thing if I open my mouth and I'm arrested, tortured, then... but if I can talk without being controlled, if I can convince others of what we need to do, then words are the weapon.

Thus, the disengagement of the majority of pre-revolution militants and the dissolution of the organisations they belonged to were triggered by the accomplishment of the political aim they fought for, which is one of the key-factors highlighted by Cronin (2009) in the termination of political violent organisations. According to this author, external factors influence both the

creation and the dissolution of armed organisations, which is clearly perceived through the cases here explored, in which different individuals could only justify their commitement to an armed organisation in the context of an authoritarian regime which left them few other methods to express dissent and opposition.

Pre-revolution militants: reintegration into society

After leaving politically motivated violence behind, pre-revolution militants reported very few difficulties in relation to their reintegration into society. Artur from ARA, for instance, reported that he had 'an excellent transition', he reconnected with his friends and family right after the Revolution and resumed life in the aboveground. However, he also mentioned a few people that had some troubles, particularly at the psychological level in turning off the clandestine identity – 'they kept using pseudonyms like if they were still underground'. A few militants also mentioned integration in different organizations after April 25th, some legal like PRP/BR, and others illegal like FP-25. In the case of Diogo from LUAR he chose to integrate into PRP/BR, because he agreed with the party positions and, personally, he appreciated the fact that the party 'was run by a woman', which for him was 'totally new'. However, Diogo's involvement with PRP/BR did not last more than three years, after which he decided to leave, because:

> After 1977, PRP/BR also entered a phase of denial! It also became an organisation that conducted robberies, and I was not okay with that, with the robberies, robberies that were to pay employees! I was never paid by any party, nor any union, I was never any organisation's employee.

These circumstances were also referred by Humberto, who was part of PRP/BR and later also belonged to FP-25, in order to explain why some PRP/BR members later chose to integrate into FP-25. Humberto reflected that some of the people fighting with BR before the Revolution, and who remained on standby during the first years of democracy (clandestine within Portugal or in hiding abroad), had nowhere to go and nothing else to do. Their options were to either keep on fighting or to go to jail, because after the Revolution they kept robbing banks to support PRP/BR. Thus, according to Humberto, 'as they did not want to get caught, they needed to find different organisational solutions, because PRP was no longer responsive, because the leaders

of PRP were all in jail, or at least the majority of them. FP-25 was born here'. On this topic, interviewees from BR and interviewees from FP-25 had slightly different views. Lídia from BR considered that the militants who broke with PRP/BR after the Revolution and joined FP-25 simply did not know what else to do, because they had entered the armed struggle at a very young age. In this sense, the Revolution left a void in these militants' lives, which was filled by their engagement with a different organisation. Yet, according to the views of Humberto the PRP/BR leadership was responsible for their militants joining FP-25, because after the Revolution they kept some of them underground robbing banks to support the organisation. However, BR's situation deteriorated with the arrest of a large number of PRP/BR people, including its leaders, who tried to cover up their illegal activities and negotiate an amnesty. At this point, Humberto reported that the PRP/BR leaders in jail told the clandestine militants to 'keep silent and still, because they were trying to negotiate an amnesty'. This directive was not well accepted by the people underground, whose line of thought was:

> F*** them! Until now we were ordered to do things, now we are ordered to keep quiet? […] People had been radicalised and now they could not radicalise anymore… so, people said: 'Let's break with this and join a different story [FP-25].

Thus, it is interesting to note that the reintegration into society of pre-revolution militants was not, in the majority of cases, described as a negative experience. This might be related to the fact that the political violent activity that ocurred during *Estado Novo* was not considered criminal after the Revolution. In addition, after the Revolution in Portugal, there was a sense that every single person was an opponent to the regime (mentioned by Marco from LUAR in the previous chapter). Subsequently those who actively fought it, even through violent means, were not considered terrorists or criminals. Actually, they were predominantly ignored and erased from the collective memory, particularly through the lack of acknowledgement of their existence (and of political armed struggle in general) in the history books and school curriculums in Portugal. Something that the Portuguese historian Rui Bebiano calls 'unmemory' rather than 'forgetfulness', because while the later involves 'carelessness, accident, casual blur of past reminiscences', the former involves 'a voluntary erasure of memory, a lack of knowledge or even a lack of interest in certain areas of living, considered

irrelevant and not instrumental' (Bebiano, 2006, p.9) (see concluding reflections in chapter two).

Counter-revolution militants: disengagement and dissolution of the organisations

The disengagement of counter-revolution militants was equally prompted, in the majority of cases, by the dissolution of the organisations they belonged to. A dissolution triggered by the change of the political scenario in Portugal, caused by the November 25th (1975) counter-revolution, which ended the *Ongoing Revolutionary Process* and started the *Ongoing Constitutional Process* (Cruzeiro, 2005). Thus, for the majority of militants the date November 25th marked the beginning of their disengagement process. In regard to MDLP, for instance, General Spínola announced the end of the organisation after November 25th, which resulted in two different reactions among the organisation's militants – some rejoiced and started making plans to return to Portugal and carry on with their lives, others did not agree with such a directive and decided to continue the struggle on their own. Both Sérgio and Daniel are an example of the first group. In Sérgio's case, General Spínola's decision was received with great joy – 'I agreed immediately, I accepted immediately, for me it was a relief. It was a relief, it was a relief in the sense that... I really wanted to go back to Portugal, I was so homesick, I really wanted to return to Portugal.' For Daniel, such a decision was also accepted without questioning, because like Sérgio he felt that the November 25th brought MDLP militants the freedom to return to Portugal and resume their normal lives:

> MDLP, this is seldom mentioned, following November 25th was simply extinguished. It was over and was never to be heard of again. In fact, everyone or almost everyone, who was in MDLP in Spain after November 25th ended up moving back. I returned in January, February, got integrated in normal life and never met up with people who were part of MDLP again. [...] When there was freedom after November 25th, a new freedom, like the one after April 25th, the people concerned or most of them withdrew from politics. All these Spinolist military, were never heard from again. Others, in my case, I withdrew completely from politics, I started working as a lawyer. [...] Most of the people who were with me in Spain never engaged in politics again.

Daniel states very clearly that after returning to Portugal the majority of MDLP militants simply resumed their lives and never engaged in political activities. Such a prompt disengagement form politically motivated activities, both violent and non-violent, seemed to be motivated by the fact that these militants felt that their duty had been accomplished, so their lives could carry on. As Ilídio said 'on November 25th we shut the door and left […] Communism has not entered Portugal.' However, this was not the case for all MDLP militants. The second group described above was composed by militants, who chose to carry on violent actions, as Sérgio explained:

> I now could tell you thousands of episodes, but you may want to know how it ends. It ends after November 25th, General Spínola decides to dissolve MDLP and there is a group that does not obey. They want to continue and consider that they are able to continue. [...] When MDLP split, MDLP operational militants, the so called Internal Action Network, were paid, right? Many were paid. When MDLP split and was dissolved the money tap was closed. Since there was no Internal Action Network anymore, which used to place the bombs, many MDLP elements became authentic lawless people, who made assaults and so on, on behalf of MDLP that no longer existed. [...] There was a dark shadow after the fall of MDLP, uncontrolled guys, bandits, who may have participated in MDLP, but were now out of control... there was no control, it was impossible to control.

Thus, there was a sense, among the intervieweed militants, that the people who chose to continue the fight were motivated by financial gains. As Dinis described 'there was a number of MDLP operational militants who felt unemployed and still having a number of devices, decided to act on their own.' In this sense, in the narrations of the majority of MDLP militants intervieweed the voice of those who chose to rebel against the organisation's decision was silenced. Everyone talked about them, but always related their actions to financial interests. The initial interviewees went even further and politely refused to facilitate a meeting between me and those militants, arguing that they had no idea where they were, that some of them were very old and unable to talk coherently, and that, above all, they did not see the need to talk with them. Nonetheless, after profuse scrapping and asking around I finally got access to one of the individuals who organized the actions of the group composed by former MDLP militants that

carried out violent actions throughout the years following November 25th. When I asked him, Álvaro, who that group was, he answered:

> They were half a dozen guys who were about, including me, with a score to settle, it was anger against the Communist Party and against others. And it was because those who made the Revolution wanted to control all this and to remove those who had some connotations [with the deposed regime] that they did not control. They never had proof that I had placed whatever it was [in terms of bombs] and I was in prison for four months without an accusation. Let me say this, in Salazar's time one could only be arrested 90 days plus 90. Today you can be arrested for three years without trial, what democracy is this?

Thus, Álvaro considered that the reasons motivating former MDLP militants to carry on fighting after the dissolution of the organisation were still related to political grievances towards the actors of the Revolution, in particular the Communist Party. Álvaro's personal narrative was very much centered on the economic hardships Portugal was going through at the time of our conversation (early 2013), which in his opinion are a consequence of the Revolution and the political landscape since then. Across his interview several times he compared the democratic present that resulted from April 25th with the past under *Estado Novo*, seeing the latter in a much better light. Thus, acording to Álvaro's point of view, stopping engagement with the struggle would mean stopping pursuing his ideals – the counter-revolution that would bring back the past and not simply peace to the country under a different governance, much different from Estado Novo. However, Álvaro eventually disengaged from his political violent struggle due to the responsibility he felt towards his family, and despite maintaining the same views at the time of the interview he considered that:

> Today we no longer think about it [armed struggle], I have two children and the reasoning is that if today I am here talking to you, it's because I have children, because I am responsible. They did not ask to be born and I have no right to make them follow me and visit me in jail, leaving them marginalized, without a father, but it was only for that reason, because I have no respect. I respect some people, not many, no one is to blame for being poor, but all are guilty of being stupid.

Counter-revolution militants: reintegration into society

In terms of reintegration into society after the dissolution of MDLP, different militants had different experiences, according to the type of involvement they had with the organisation. The ones in Spain, in general, opted to wait a few months before returning to Portugal, in order to make sure that they would not face criminal charges. In the case of Sérgio his wife returned first and contacted the Navy in order to know if the return of her husband would mean his arrest. It was agreed that he could return and face desertion charges, but he would not be arrested. In the case of other militants they opted for exile in other countries, since Spain was notified to extradite all MDLP militants, as in the case of Ilídio, who only returned to Portugal two years after the dissolution of the organisation. For the MDLP militants in Portugal the situation was simpler, because they were never identified by the authorities and were able to maintain their 'normal lives', as in the case of Dinis, who kept his military carreer intact and never suffered any consequences. Finally, some of the militants who chose to keep going after the dissolution of MDLP were tried and some spent some time in jail, but nobody was ever convicted. Nonetheless, the most common story I heard from counter-revolution militants concerning their disengagement from the organisation and reintegration into society was, as pronounced by Afonso from ELP:

> In January 1976 I returned to Portugal. A member of the Council of the Revolution said I could return. I went to Lisbon and after some time I went to Caxias where my file was closed without any reprisals. I was freed from any illegal situations.

Therefore, these exact circumstances originated grievances that have been fluctuating around Portuguese society until today (see Dâmaso, 1997). There is a sense that these militants were treated differently, particularly in relation to FP-25 militants, because in their majority, in a democratic country (not under a dictatorial regime anymore), they did not have to answer before the justice system for a process that involved violence, both against property and against people. This was referred to by Bruno, from FP-25, during his interview, and who considered that the justice system did not treat FP-25 badly, but treated 'the right better'.

Post-revolution militants: disengagement and dissolution of the organisation

When I asked Júlia how she disengaged from the organisation, she bluntly answered: 'There are two types of FP-25 militants: the ones who were arrested and the ones who fled abroad' (being arrested was the case for her). It was a simple answer that represents the fate of post-revolution militants, the final consequence of their commitment to a political violent organisation. However, the reality and scope of disengagement in the life of a political violent militant grew broader and more complex than simply being arrested or fleeing abroad, as discovered when conversations deepened. In fact, in my conversations with former FP-25 militants I uncovered various psychological processes, daily decisions and events in the life of a clandestine militant that made some leave the organisation before being arrested or being forced to go abroad, and that made others stay, even if they could see the end drawing near. In the case of Mariana, for instance, it was possible to sense from her narration that she was very tired and wanted to leave:

> I always lived underground and it is very complicated, it's tough going... I must have been the one who lived underground longer. [...] I lived well... I mean... how shall I explain? It's hard. I was fine with that situation, I chose it, but I had immense needs, the family had stayed behind, I had no contact with the family. What cost me most, in fact, was that I could not do a number of things that I wanted to. I once had to flee the theatre halfway through, because the police entered; if I'd go to a cafe I had to be watchful of those who came and left, because if the police came we had to leave, and it happened countless times. […] It was complicated. In the meantime I got pregnant, it happened, and I decided to have the baby. From the moment that I assumed that I was going to have the baby I had to distance myself, but I did not know whether to tell the guys I was pregnant... then I found a way. I did not do it on purpose, to get pregnant, it happened...

Mariana was aware of her conscious decision to go underground, however, the sizable number of years removed from society were starting to take their toll, and the daily life grind was becoming very 'heavy'. Mariana was tired of running, which was aggravated by the fact that she became pregnant and decided to have the baby. This decision seemed at least partly motivated by being weary of the clandestine militancy, because she said that she had been

pregnant before and had gone through an abortion. So, maybe this time the place where she was psychologically contributed to her decision to go through with the pregnancy, and in the interim leave the organisation. However, it was still a difficult decision and it was particularly difficult to communicate it to her comrades. Humberto pondered that often leaving the organisation was a very difficult deed for clandestine militants, because:

> One day they get involved in something, the next day they engage in another and then the situation can get out of control, then it is difficult to draw back. It is all very nice, but why is it that most people do not leave the armed organisations? They don't, not because there may be intimidation, but because it is often more convenient to stay in an organized scheme. They engaged, but then they cannot get out, not because they are forced to stay, but… what am I going to do? While I am here I have money, I have a setup that allows me to survive from the physical point of view, I have access to documents, eventually, if I go abroad I have technical, logistical support, money and such. So the temptation is always to remain in the clandestine setup. One day the organisation thinks it's not going anywhere, then closes, gets a collective arrangement, an amnesty, this or that, but the isolated disengagement is not very common because of this.

Humberto's picture of why clandestine militants do not leave armed organisations echoes the reasons presented by other militants. Contrary to what is often believed, Humberto considered that the main incentive to remain part of the organisation is not coercion, but the comfortable 'setup' provided to militants, who see their needs cared for and are given a purpose to carry on, instead of being arrested for their illegal activities or exiled to a foreign land. Thus, according to Humberto at a certain point the incentives to stay outnumber the incentives to leave, and above all the sentiment (also verbalized by Júlia) of 'not having anywhere to go' takes over and strengthens individual commitment to the organisation. This does not mean that clandestine militants never seriously consider leaving the organisation, but the circumstances in which they find themselves are quite complex. Júlia, for instance, considered that 'there was a time when I began to question what everything was, and how we were running the organisation, and I said I could not continue to participate in operations, but at the same time I could not move to the legal structure, or simply go home.' Thus, Júlia felt trapped in a situation that was not

comfortable anymore. This was a situation that involved the death of comrades in confrontations with the police, which in her opinion 'were a tsunami within the organisation', 'an earthquake' that caused 'an extremely strong sense of guilt', because she considered that 'a good part of the deaths occurred due to clear operational failure'. In other words, she considered that the way the organisation was being run was responsible for the death of its militants, because 'people with little experience were involved in actions too soon, because there wasn't anyone else, and some of them fell along the way'. Looking back Júlia considered that the death of comrades 'was a path to the awareness that we were being decimated', and that 'for the first time in the organisation people did not feel so manly and so bold as they thought they were, people began to feel more vulnerable'. Obviously Júlia did not cope well with these circumstances and in the present considers that 'this is a perception that still brings a lump to my throat'. However, despite questioning the organisation's strategies and being deeply upset by the death of her comrades, Júlia never opted to leave the organisation, because she simultaneously felt that she could not abandon 'that mess' and that she 'needed to honour the memory of the comrades who died', and to keep fighting for the comrades in jail. This was a situation that represents an additional set factors weighed up in the decision-making of clandestine militants who consider disengaging from the organisation. So, Júlia concluded:

> …stupidly we stayed. It was really stupid, because then there was nothing to do, we were waiting to be arrested. I will not say that I regret it, I don't know if going abroad, my path would have been necessarily different, but I don't know if it would have been better. So, we stayed and we put up with prison.

Whilst Humberto found himself in the same situation as Júlia he was able to make an earlier decision to leave the organisation, because his circumstances still allowed him to resume his normal life without having any issues with the authorities. From his perspective the reasons that dictated his disengagement from the organisation were the death and arrest of comrades, the fear of being part of an organisation that could lead to his own death, and the disagreement with the strategic decisions made by the organisation. In Humberto's opinion it was not worth dying to rob a few small banks, which to him seemed to have become the main strategy of FP-25. In his view to die would have to be justified by a political reason, not by getting some money – 'These things started hitting hard with the start of the repression, arrests, deaths... who was

playing around? I mean we had left everything behind to get money? Steal some shitty corner banks? These were things that made no sense to anyone, in that context people were not there to rob small banks, they wanted to do other things, even without a great degree of violence, but things that were significant to them.'

Thus, according to Humberto, the long existing divergences within the organisation, the absence of a way out, and the high number of arrests lead the majority of militants in jail to support the amnesty solution. This was a solution that in the opinion of this interviewee 'was not opportunistic or motivated by the pressure of those who were in jail and wanted to get out'. In fact he considered that the majority of militants 'learned from the experience and paid the price, because contrary to what people say that they paid the price with very few years, there were people who paid with many years, some had been arrested more than once and had paid the price with many years.' However, the amnesty solution was not accepted by all FP-25 militants. Among the militants I intervieweed the couple Júlia and Jaime, for instance, refused the amnesty and chose to serve their sentences until the end. Júlia affirmed that she was constantly aware that sooner or later she would be arrested, that was 'the price' to her militancy; but at the same time she felt that she had to refuse the amnesty in order to be able to look in the mirror for the rest of her life and live well with herself. In the sense that in her opinion:

> The price of requesting the amnesty, for all purposes, is an apology, look at it the way you wish, but it's the person recognizing wrongdoing, and this has a price in people's heads. It is true that the organisation had no future? It is! The organisation was shattered, it is true, but it is one thing for the organisation to be shattered, and something else for people to assume that their attitudes were wrong and, for all purposes, the application of an amnesty is this recognition.

Both Júlia and Jaime talked about the lack of understanding they received from their families, especially because they had three children leaving with Júlia's parents. However, even this did not move their convictions. For Jaime the most important thing was to pay his debt to society and only by then be able to live unreservedly:

> I am the last prisoner who got out of jail. It closed the inquiry. I am the person who

> spent more time in jail. [...] I'm not saying it was me alone, we were four in total, they stayed three more years and I stayed four more. [...] And you suddenly see the doors opening, everyone leaving and you stay, because you would not sign a paper, you have your dignity. I owe nothing to society. Therefore, I consider myself an activist, a political activist, who was with others in the political struggle until the end of the fight, I dared it all and suddenly I lost. I lost and such a defeat symbolized ten years in prison, but I left without owing anything to society, because I served the sentence until the end. I did not get out with a pardon, or with an amnesty, I left with my time served. I served it all, I owe nothing to society.

In this sense, in the case of FP-25, the organisation ended because its militants were physically disengaged from the activity by being arrested or by having fled abroad, in order to avoid detention, foreseeing the short and disappointing future that the organisation had ahead. Such an end caused a general feeling of frustration across the interviewed militants, who dedicated years of their lives to the cause in which they believed and which FP-25 represented.

Post-revolution militants: reintegration into society

Restarting life after serving a prison sentence was described as challenging by different post-revolution militants. There was a sense in militants' narrations, represented by Júlia's words, that 'people who have been in jail and even those who have been abroad had their lives totally shattered'. This interviewee focused on the practical aspects of resuming life after being removed from society for criminal reasons:

> You have to realize that coming out of jail at the age of 30, with children, no job, no money and no house was a path… we started our adult life with a 10 years delay. So with 10 years delay and in debt, we started in debt, because when I got out of jail I was jobless and went to my parents' house, this because my parents opened their house to me. People started from scratch, absolutely without money from banks to buy the house, because they had their record spoiled.

Bruno equally pointed to the material 'damage' inflicted by the experience of having been a

full-time revolutionary – 'Who got the damage? It was our loss. At age 20 I was chief of a journalists' bureau, had two cars and then became a revolutionary and lost these things. Now it is the first time I own a house after all these years, you know? I have fifteen years of social security contributions, which were made in the last years of my life'. However, this interviewee also considered the personal emotional impact that the struggle had in his life – 'I got married three times already, have children with four different women, and had other women with whom I've had children. I already organized my life about five or six times, this is not what I had planned, right? I would have stayed with the first woman, would, probably, have had three or four children, and had been a guy with a perfectly normal life.' Thus, both interviewees assessed that having been a political violent militant was extremely disruptive in terms of their life course; life was not what could have been, 'there are no shortcuts and people are left with marks at different levels'. This aspect will be explored in the next section, where the ways in which past experience was incorporated in someone's life story are discussed.

The Past Re-worked in the Present: Continuities and Discontinuities

This topic of analysis revisits the past lives of former politcal violent militants and how they are framed and recounted in the present. The way in which individuals reflect on their memories is analysed, as are the moments and events of great importance that marked their lives and who they became. In this context, identity appears as a relevant aspect, in the sense that interviewees define who they are in relation to the perspectives of others (e.g. the State of their time), to other armed organisations and to the usual labels impinged by society in these circumstances (e.g. 'terrorists'). Finally, the continuities and discontinuities in the life of former political violent militants are analysed at both personal and political levels, in order to grasp the personal narratives of individuals who made strong and decisive political choices in a now historical past and that found one of two ways of living with it: being proud and coherent about what they have done, or being uncertain of the path taken, questioning if a different choice would have been better.

Pre-revolution militants: reflections on the past

A few pre-revolution militants hinted that the whole point of our conversation was about rethinking the past, their past. Some were more comfortable in that position than others. Some,

like Irene from BR, said that the past is rarely verbalized, which she considered a habit that she kept from the time in which she could not talk about it – 'I got so used to not talking about it... to keep it in drawers that then, naturally, I never talked about it.' In addition, Irene also reflected that she sees no need in highlighting her past activism, which she does not want to be perceived as boasting, because in her opinion several other people also took part in activities where 'a certain amount of courage was needed'. Nonetheless, she asserted, as did several other pre-revolution militants, that 'it's something that makes me quite glad to think that I did, it's a choice that pleases me very much'. Thus, such a display of such highly positive sentiments in regard to past activism resulted in the repetition, across different conversations with different individuals, of the statement 'I would do it all again'. However, some militants, despite agreeing with the voices above, were less comfortable in the position of narrators of the past. Henrique from LUAR, for instance, at a certain point in our conversation became quite introspective and haltingly described his uncertainity about what occurred in the past – '…permanent doubts within each of us, if what we were doing and the sacrifices we demanded of others, were justified or not.' In addition, Henrique also considered that he has a hard time recounting the past, because he is afraid of not being totally loyal to how things happened in reality:

> It is very difficult to contextualize the past. How do I go now… I felt like this or like that, because of this or because of that… I am able to do this exercise, but I am simply suspicious that it was really like that. I'm doing something like… how shall I say it… dealing with a memory, not the reality of that time. In simpler things, in more direct things we can get there, right? But... to know why we did it like this and not like that or why at one point we chose one option instead of another, this is not easy.

In fact what Henrique was doing was reflecting on the fact that, borrowing from Mayer (2014, p.44-45), 'memory itself is not a stable record of what actually happened, but is, rather, a reconstruction in service of our meaning making'. However, such a reconstruction is still valid and valuable, because it is originated by the experiential actor and is expressed in the continuity of his life story (see Andrews, 1991). A good example is the way the Revolution of April 25th is inescapably present in the memories of pre-revolution militants, because it is the event that simultaneously gave them a new life, allowing the end of their violent activism, and validated the difficult choices and commitments made in the past. The descriptions of the Revolution and

the year that followed were adorned by extremely positive expressions and sentiments. Xavier from ARA, for instance, considered April 25th the most important event in his life, because:

> …they knew who I was, and while this regime lasted I could never return to Portugal, nor have a normal life in Portugal. I never visited my mother, I never visited my brothers, we had to hide from friends. Why? It was not because of them, we were not afraid that they would go and report us, but we could not say what we were doing... my mother, my brothers, my sister, my mother suffered a bit with that, she used to say: "While this lasts I cannot see my son. I will die and I will not see my son!" And it wasn't one, there were two, I was fleeing the police and my brother was fleeing the Colonial War. April 25th brought such joy to my mother and to me… it was something that lasted for a while, then everything started to change... we had the most humanistic, most progressive constitution in Europe, but they started to cut, cut... now they already revised it a dozen times. Nevertheless, April 25th was very important in my life.

Not only families were re-united, but the political and social environment, in general, changed in Portugal with the Revolution, at least for a while, according to the perception of Xavier mentioned above and underlined by Ana and Nuno from BR on their joint interview:

> **Ana:** In the beginning we were thrilled! I was really enjoying it.
> **Nuno:** Because, look, in 1975 we did not know where we were going and I was really enjoying it too! There was no established power. Up until 1975 there was no established power, laws were coming out, but people just followed them if they thought they agreed with them.
> **Ana:** And each one of us on our own turf, for example I conducted political activity in the lab where I worked.
> **Nuno:** Because it was already possible to fight differently. Up until 1974 there was no choice to fight but this way [armed struggle], but from 1974 it became possible. Then it decreased, decreased, decreased, decreased... but for years, at least for that year and a half, there is not the slightest doubt that anything was possible. There was no repression.

All these three interviewees described a sense of freedom, of a heavy political yoke that had been lifted, bringing them self-determination and autonomy. They were happy because they could, finally, reap the fruits of their sacrifices and act as free political and social actors. Nevertheless, they also felt that the heyday of freedom did not last forever. Somehow everything that had been achieved with April 25th did slowly fade way. However, in the memory of these militants the recollections of that time are crystallized and result in profound gratification and self-fulfillment of their hopes and ambitions.In addition, memories of isolated events, such as family reunions after the Revolution or changes in the workplace, allow individuals to form meaningful sequences and ordered connections that shape their life story (see Ricoeur, 1981).

Pre-revolution militants: us versus them

For the militants who conducted armed struggle against a dictatorial regime without intentionally making human victims, the identity question was exceptionally relevant. These militants underlined the fact that they vehemently refused terrorism, which for them meant the rejection of targeting human lives, even among their perceived enemies. However, the State of the time insisted on calling them terrorists, which according to Nuno from BR is a strategy aimed to 'scare off possible support that can be given to the struggle' that takes place in unjust societies, because from his perspective 'terrorism is one thing, fighting against an unjust government is quite another'. This was a distinction equally made by Xavier from ARA, who asked me with a sneering grin:

> Have you already talked with people from other groups? Other *terrorist* groups? (laughs) We used to say we were vigilantes! Terrorism is in the blood. Israelites now are more terrorists than the Palestinians, but as the latter wanted independence, they used to be accused of terrorism by the English and by others, who wanted to take control of the territory… so, terrorism depends on your point of view.

Thus, according to the opinion of these militants the label terrorism is used on the one hand for the benefit of those in power, and on the other hand to discredit those fighting for political change; consequently, its nature is extremely volatile and capricious, which is a perspective

shared by the CTS scholars discussed in chapter three. However, it is very interesting to see how militants currently labeled as terrorists were perceived by Xavier in relation to him and to his comrades in the past:

> We were not crazy or fanatical like the guys walking around in the Middle East, no! Those guys intend to die, they are not afraid of death. They have explosives around their waist, it is fanaticism. They aim to go to heaven, but we knew we were not going to heaven! If we died we knew we were going to the ground, we used to joke: 'we have no right to heaven!'

Then Xavier's assessment of Middle Eastern violent militants' strategies equalled CTS no more, but traditional views on the matter – militants' political reasons and grievances are ignored and labels such as 'crazy' and 'fanatical' are applied. Thereby Xavier drew a clear line between *us* – armed militants who did not kill neither others nor themselves in their political struggle – and *them* – armed militants who kill both others and themselves, motivated by 'fanaticism'. And here seems to be the switch button for this interviewee, the perception that Middle Eastern violent militants' motivation is purely religious. This is a motivation that as an atheist (as mentioned earlier in the interview) Xavier is not able to understand. In his mind he cannot imagine committing violent acts in order to go to heaven, because he does not believe in heaven. So, in the absence of a plausible perceived motivation (e.g. political), Xavier follows the traditional views that arrive at his home through the media (see Stohl, 2008) and chooses the 'fanaticism' explanation.

Pre-revolution militants also assessed the violent actions and organisations that took place in Portugal after the Revolution, which in their opinions were absolutely illegitimate. In this militants' views the problem of FP-25, for instance, were not the targets, which in Rui's opinion 'were truly fascists', but the strategy – homicide. As Rui, from ARA, explained:

> FP-25 killed a man in Sacavém. That man was a scoundrel, deserved to die five hundred times, but that operation never should have happened, because it challenged... for the collective consciousness it called into question the nature of a left, which wanted to be necessary, which wanted to be fair and to be ethical. […] That is why Lenin wrote, many

> years ago, a book, which unfortunately many people have not read, called *The Childhood Disease of Communism* about the nonsense committed with the best of intentions, and that sometimes is tragic.

Thus, according to Rui, homicide as a strategy of political struggle only affects the general fight, even if the targets are legitimate; an aspect that he solidifies as an ideological stance that has its origins in the writings of Lenin. On this same topic, Irene from BR also considered that killing factory owners 'cannot be justified in any way, because there was already freedom. People could talk and if someone had to put the man out of there, dead or alive, it was the factory workers, not FP-25.' In this sense, FP-25's actions were not seen as appropriate by pre-revolution militants, who did not agree with their violent strategies in a democratic environment. ELP and MDLP did not escape reproach either, being criticized by Rui for exercising violence, including assassinations, with the support of the Catholic church – 'a bomb in downtown Coimbra, the death of the priest, the church saying: "booo", but with Canon Melo behind the operations with his hands full of blood'.

Pre-revolution militants: continuities and discontinuities

Finally, it is possible to appreciate a coherent continuity between the past and the present of many pre-revolution militants. A continuity that involved similar perceptions of the past and the present self and where changes are considered normal developmental adaptations to new realities, both contextual and personal. In this context, Henrique from LUAR affirmed 'I have great pride in my present, the same or more than in my past', because his life's compass remained the same – 'I still do the same I used to do, not in the same way, but I continue fighting for my goals.' Yet, in his opinion such a position in life is not shared by everyone who got involved in the struggle in the past. At present Henrique considers that some militants feel ashamed 'not about what they did, but maybe about what they did not do', because they participated in a few actions and 'gave up and decided to live their lives'. Nonetheless, what saddens Henrique is not what happened in the past, but the present position of these militants, who do not defend their ideals publicly in order to not 'give concern to their mums anymore' (a Portuguese expression meaning that it is preferable to stay comfortably out of trouble). However, in fact, these militants are also experiencing continuity in their lives – as in the past

they decided to move away from the struggle and invest in their personal lives, in the present they decide to not get involved with political activities that may bring disruption to a contented retirement. Thus, I found that stories of continuity imply the maintenance of core values, attitudes and beliefs that over time, according to Irene from BR, become 'more specific, more elaborated' – 'What I did in the past was me, I mean, it was me with my beliefs, my values and my way of being in the world. And now it is the same, I mean, I strive, I fight for everything I do to be strong, to be true to my beliefs, my values... which have not changed much, they have become more specific, more elaborated...' This was a stance equally defended by Marco from LUAR, who contemplated 'I can never get away from the past', in the sense that he cannot become someone he never was. Like Irene, Marco also believes that his current conceptions are 'a little more worked', however he does not agree with 'some bourgeois who say that when we are 20 years old we are all revolutionaries, when we are 40 years old we are social democrats and when we are 60 years old we are democrat-bourgeois', because his core values remained unmoved – 'My hatred regarding those who abuse others remains the same, including in regard to those who now are misusing others and who in the past said they were against the misusers. Thereby, Marco concluded that 'it would be hypocritical to say 'I think differently today', it would be hypocrisy, because no one can make a break with the past, that's what I think, I don't know.' In this vein, a strong sense of holding the same essential views throughout time, the same self, the same disapproval of social injustices and the same will to keep on defending their ideals in a democratic context, through democratic ways, was portrayed through the accounts of pre-revolution militants. However, simultaneously, it was equally acknowledged that over time there was some adaptation and revision of aims, of social and political analyses, giving militants the impression of having attained a more developed version of themselves (in their own words, as cited above, 'more worked', 'more specific', 'more elaborated'). In this context, Lídia from BR reflected:

> Regarding the interpretation of history and the development of the current moment, of course my view changed, because the circumstances have changed. Now, in recent years, we are talking about the last 40 years... the last 40 years have made us see a lot, right? They were years that made us open our eyes to developments, to the possibility or not of establishing a revolutionary socialism project, which was our idea in the 60s, 70s... the way for this revolutionary socialism must be questioned. Now what I see is

> that the way to get to this more egalitarian, more humane society is complicated. And the ideas we had in mind in the 60's and 70's about the seizure of power and the establishment of a revolutionary program with a grassroots organisation and then a flow of such class organisation for central decisions is something that is very complicated, because it was too simplistic in the 60s and 70's... all this was too simplistic in our heads. We had little regard for what were the circumstances of the defeat of the Russian Revolution and the causes of this defeat, and of the evolution towards Stalinism and of the economic situations in the world... so all this is more complex. On the other hand, the experience of what were grassroots organisations, of what is the human being when stuck in the complexity of power schemes... all this has to be taken into account.

Lídia shared a sense, which is common to a few other militants, that when living and acting in a certain historical moment one is blind to some aspects of the reality. These are aspects that over time gain a different perspective through reflection and acknowledgement of other factors that were also at play, causing the change of personal views, the acceptance of the past and its assimilation into a coherent present. This is a process that is not easy particularly for those who were militants in the 1960's and 1970's (post-revolution militants included), who wished to implement socialism in Portugal, but who recognise that their conceptions and ideals were at times too 'simplistic' to generate social change, and that human beings, including socialists, tend to be lured by 'power schemes' and to lose focus. Therefore, in my analysis, this process contributes to the explanation of why various former political violent militants still hold the same political core ideals, but do not see the need for the same political strategies. For the pre-revolution militants, in particular, there was not a sentiment of defeat running in the background of their narratives, because the April 25th Revolution was seen as their victory, even if not directly related to their action. However, democracy was attained, not socialism, which was at the back of some pre-revolution militants' minds, who kept fighting both legal and illegally after the Revolution. Nonetheless, even these militants, like Lídia, do not defend armed struggle anymore, because the whole of their political reasoning was assessed in relation to other historical events and experiences around the world (e.g. 'the defeat of the Russian Revolution'), which helped to contextualize both their past activism and their present positions, inventing a consistent life story. Thus, individuals look for the insights gained in the past in order to locate themselves in the present and in the future, which is only possible when they have acquired

some distance from past events and are able to perceive their lives as a story with a beginning, middle and eventual end (Randall, 2013). However, as shown by Lídia, this is not an exercise that happens in isolation or that is only based on one's own story. On the contrary, it is a process that involves 'larger stories' (Randall, 2010, p.151), and events stored in the memory of the collective, from which individuals borrow the materials needed to create stories that are meaningful and helpful to move them through life (Selbin, 2010). In this sense, life stories are not only negotiated between individuals and their surrounding social environment, but also between individuals and their larger cultural environment (Wang and Brockmeier, 2002).

Counter-revolution militants: reflections on the past

Despite echoing very similar sentiments and circumstances to pre-revoltuion militants, the reflections on the past of counter-revolution militants were more scarce and contained when compared with the remaining militants. This occurred also in previous topics (e.g. influence of the family in chapter five). From my perspective, counter-revolution militants in comparison with pre- and post-revoltuion militants, are not more superficial or less reflective about their lives, but they were less forthcoming and often preferred to talk about general topics rather than about personal experiences. From my perspective this might be related to the education they received at home, with their military training, and with the unsettled 'truths' about their past involvement in violent acts (a topic discussed in chapter six).

Nonetheless, the same sense of having made the right choices could be found in some counter-revolution militants' personal narratives. Ilídio, for instance, affirmed that 'all actions made sense, all we did was aimed at stopping Communism', which for him was considered 'a natural way' and something 'worth fighting for. This was a certainity that led this interviewee to the perception of a continuity in his character and of a maintenance of the same belief system:

> Ilídio: You know, some things that I did... I think I did very well, it does not mean that I did not have to adapt to certain... but basically I have not changed one centimetre, considering that tactically I could change the way I thought 50 or 60 years ago.
> Raquel: Sure. And why is that? Why didn't you change?
> Ilídio: I don't change because these things are cemented within me and I see no reason to change.

Thus, Ilídio admitted having made some adaptations, but in his perspective what essentially characterises his self remained the same, because these are things 'cemented' within him. This is an interesting word that used in this context represents Ilídio's perception of the hardness of his self, which was moulded on his father's, grandfather's and great grandfather's selves, who all carried the same name and surname and the same rigorous position in life:

> My grandfather refused to follow the republic and was arrested for refusing to take the oath [he worked at the city council]. My great grandfather from my mother's side was also a military man. Once he went with his son to collect some shoes from the shoemaker and the kid brought some nails home, which the shoemaker saw perfectly, but said nothing. When they got home my great-grandfather asked: 'What do you bring in your hand? Where did you steal the nails?'. He forced him to go back and apologize. […] When my father returned from Brazil, he used to tell this with a certain sadness, he had been away 12 years and when he arrived my grandfather received him on the porch reading a newspaper. My father said: 'Good morning, Sir', my grandfather did not stop reading the newspaper and just said: 'Good morning, did you arrive well?' My father felt sad about this episode, but it was an education based on values, you know, values that remained firm within me.

Here again a counter-revolution militant (like Afonso in chapter five) chose to tell a story which locates the origin of his identity and the justification for how he behaves and lives life in his family. For these militants, the influence of their family is an aspect that tends to get storied, because their ancestors' life stories bring meaning to their own stories and inform who they are and what they do. It is also interesting to note that these stories are told and examined in later life (Ilídio was in his late seventies at the time of the interview), which shows how thick and strong they are, having resisted a life time (see Randall, 2012). Therefore, as argued by Randall (2012, p.177), a narrative perspective on how individuals read their lives allows to observe 'the ample opportunity that age itself provides us for deepening and expanding our stories, for gathering them together and preparing to transcend them'.

Within counter-revolution militants' experiences there were also those who evaluated the past with uncertainity, in terms of *what if I had taken another path*. Sérgio, for instance, reflected on the persistent uncertainity about the merit of the path taken in the past, which caused him both professional and personal harm – professionally he fought in the courts for years to see his military career reinstated, which finally happened, and personally he preferred not to say. Such uncertainity becomes stronger when Sérgio compares his choices to those of his peers, who chose to not go through the same ordeals:

> There is a question which is: knowing what I know today, with the knowledge of today, would I have continued to make war and so on... would I have continued to be a fighter, to spend the years of my life, which caused me current problems, others have much bigger problems, stress of war and so on... it is very difficult to answer, right? […] Today, I sometimes think to myself that it would have been better to leave and remain quiet, like others, who maintained their positions and did not get into trouble, do you understand?

On the opposite side there was Daniel, who also considered what his life could have been if he had chosen not to join MDLP, but who was, at the same time, happy with the choice made and the experiences he had at an young age. This theme of his youth seemed quite relevant to Daniel, who relegated his participation in a political violent organisation to a phase in one's life in which such experiences are seen as normative. To this interviewee his activism was a result of youthful idealism, which makes him proud, because he was able to accomplish the ideals of his youth, protecting his country from something he believed to be dreadful:

> I am 63 years old, at the time I was 25. If you ask me if today, with what I know now, maybe I would have gone to Brazil to work as was planned, probably yes. But if I now was 25 I would also probably be doing politics, as I am not. [...] If a person is not an idealist at 25, if we do not fight for what we believe, do not sacrifice our life... I was one of the best students at the law faculty in Coimbra. A professor gave me recommendation letters for the best law firms in Brazil. If I had gone to Brazil at that time, I would have a fantastic life and today I would be Brazilian. I decided to stay and to live almost like a beggar... do you understand what it is to live with my wife and two

> children in a single room? But for idealism, for pure idealism, nothing else. So I think one should have idealism when very young. If I went back, which is the classic question, I would do exactly the same thing. Even knowing what I know today. Because this is one of the things that makes me proud in my life: fighting for what I believed in. Having fought against something that I thought was very dangerous for my country.

Both interviewees considered a range of possible selves, the people they could have become. However, Sérgio still doubts that his choices were the right ones, part of himself seems to be still stuck in the past, he has not yet been able to 'transform adversity into a growth experience and move forward' (Hengudomsub, 2007, p. 115). On the contrary, Daniel equally recognises that his life could have been different, though he is able to see his life 'as an evolving story and to create some distance between self and story by reflecting on it from multiple perspectives' (Ray, 2000, p.29). According to Randall (2013), such distance between self and story is possible through reflecting narratively upon such a story, which allows for the fact that there is a 'healthy strain of irony running through it' (p.9). Such a process, Randall (2013) argues, renders individuals more resilient by increasing their interior complexity and solidifying their sense of self.

Counter-revolution militants: MDLP versus ELP

The opinions shared by counter-revolution militants regarding other armed organisations were only focused on ELP. In Ilídio's opinion ELP was different from MDLP, because ELP's militants 'wanted to return to the previous state of things' [Estado Novo], which this militant considered impossible. Sérgio also considered that ELP was a much smaller and less 'credible' organisation, because they used to insinuate that MDLP's operations had been conducted by themselves. Nonetheless, as mentioned by this interviewee, ELP always occupied a much larger space in the imagination of Portuguese people:

> ELP has, even today, you can still see remnants of ELP on the walls [referring to graffiti]… EPL created a major impact on the Portuguese public opinion, when we were in Spain, having a near zero contribution in terms of execution, right? The psychological part was ELP, ELP, ELP... only the name is beastly sounding, isn't it? Then they made

> a press conference hooded like ETA, which caused a huge impact and made the first page of the newspapers. So, people considered much more ELP than MDLP, do you understand? […] So ELP only served for that, to say 'it was ELP', 'look out, ELP is coming!', and this creates...

Such an assertion was also corroborated by Irene, a pre-revolution militant, who echoed Sérgio's words in the sense that ELP played the bogeyman's role in the popular imagination after April 25th. A role that could not have corresponded to the reality, but that was leveraged by the name of the organisation, which sounding like the English word *help* built an image of a group of people that would save the nation from the communists; and by the media coverage of an organisation that gave a 'press conference hooded like ETA', like a real violent organisation, at least in people's imagination.

Post-revolution militants: reflections on the past

Different post-revolution militants reflected about their past and about the role of their memories. In this context, it is interesting to look at the narrations of the couple Júlia and Jaime, with whom I had separate conversations, but who raised very similar points in their assessment of one another concerning their memories. Jaime cherishes his past memories and enjoys thinking and remembering the period of his political violent activism. He considers that such an exercise provides him 'some sense to position things' in the present, allowing him to remember who he was, what he did and why he did it, because he believes that his core values remained the same over time and still guide his current political self. Thus, according to Jaime:

> If we live in states that are police led, states that suppress people… I usually say… unlike Júlia, who basically does not like to talk about the past, to remember the things that are behind, I happen to like it, I like to remember this route because it is a path that gives me some sense to adjust things. So, when I remember this, I always remember it in the perspective of saying: 'for the better or for worse, I stepped forward, I reached the maximum level of political struggle, because when the political activist uses violence, I think it is the final phase of political struggle. I lost, but the causes that led me, the feeling that led me to this final phase of the political struggle was exactly the

> feeling of being in an unjust society, a society in which those who are unable to defend themselves always end up victimized.

On the contrary, Júlia, as Jaime mentioned, does not feel too drawn into recalling the past, which she explained as follows:

> Sometimes we talk, he talks a lot [Jaime], he remembers every act, every situation, specific situations. I, somehow, blacked out a little bit. Maybe it has to do with what we have been saying: I did not feel like getting too stuck back there, so... I'm no longer a militant of FP-25. I mean ... I know, I know that within me that side exists, but I'm something else. Not that I am no longer a militant because I am ashamed of being one, it's not that. I admit that it was a phase of my political activism and that... my only regret being that it was poorly made, right? But... but, man, I'm almost 55 years old, so I have 30 years on top of many other things I've done. So, when I look at it, it's more like a cloud, and not something concrete. It's a little... I mean... there are many mirrors and many curtains between what I am today and what I was then.

So, Júlia seemed to have made an intentional decision not to stay 'too stuck back there' and to rather focus on the large number of experiences she had after leaving jail. Later on in our conversation Júlia considered that the period in which she was involved in the organisation was 'tremendous' in her life and determined many aspects of it, particularly at the emotional level of her family relationships – '…my relationship with my current partner [Jaime] started within the organisation, the way my children grew up… all that personal level was determined by my involvement in that organisation.' However, simultaneously, Júlia considered that despite having been deeply influenced by her engagement with FP-25, at present 'there are many mirrors and many curtains between what I am today and what I was then.' Júlia explained this by the fact that from her perspective her activism '...resulted primarily from the age I was when the April 25th happened', it resulted from a certain assessment of the social reality that differs from her current ways of perceiving the world. In addition, over time, Júlia developed a highly critical appraisal of the way the organisation was conducted:

> Many years later I tell you that the great mistake of FP-25 was not having realized that they could not be so few. Do you understand? That they had to have found the means to multiply, not in the sense of multiplying the bank robberies, but to multiply in order to present other types of social proposals. [...] And I think that in the 70's and 80's the leftist men and women did not have that perception. We had a macro reading of society, we wanted to make the Revolution and then the rest would come, we were completely wrong, in that sense we were completely wrong. The Revolution has to come from within the collective perception, and therefore the idea of small elites. Not elites in the traditional sense, but small groups that think they can do this process alone... that's what was wrong, I think. And the historical evidence shows that worldwide. [...] We needed to have found a process in closest intersection with the population, to have led people to react more. That could have been through violent processes, but not that violence, done in such an erratic manner, well, this is the way I read the situation today. [...] What was wrong, what we did not realize at the time, was that the struggle must have a broad nature, a truly social nature, and not a group of people on their own that elected themselves as the solution.

Undoubtedly Júlia's current political reasoning is different, caused by a changed interpretation of society, and influencing her views on political activism. While Jaime is focused on his personal involvement with the political struggle, which gives him a sense of self-fulfillment, of someone who fought until the last minute and endured all the consequences of his choices, Júlia is focused on the political mistakes committed by the organisation, but also on the modification of her priorities after leaving prison, which became her three children – in the ten years that followed her time in prison Júlia commited herself to 'strengthening and enhancing' the relationship with her children. For Júlia it was really difficult to realize that she had not taken enough responsibility for her children, and that she had prioritized the political struggle over their care. This was a realization accompanied by guilt, which took many years to fade away, reversing priorities and attitudes towards goals and believes – 'the perception that I had brought three children into the world and had not considered the situation as I should have, it was a very heavy thing for many years, in jail and even after getting out of jail'. Thus, nowadays Júlia considers 'I have a [political] purpose, but it is not the sole purpose, I would never jeopardize my relationship with my children on behalf of a political option', because 'today it's clear to

me that the personal relationships are the key issue to my well-being, and my well-being means the well-being of others and means that I can give something to others'. So, in Júlia's life it is possible to see an evolution from a commited political activist, to someome that despite being still a political player has now different priorities. These priorities were created by the process of ageing and having a family, but also by an evaluation of the past, which led Júlia to conclude: 'Well, I clearly reversed these logics'. Júlia recognizes her past violent activism, does not regret it, but does not see it as her 'medal' either, and does not draw on it to represent her current self. Júlia's identity is clearly not only attached to being a FP-25 militant, but attached to all the experiences she went through in the last thirty years of her life, marked by being a family woman and a political activist, who does not consider political violence anymore, but remains convinced that 'it is worth continuing the search for a path to social change'.

Post-revolution militants: continuities and discontinuities

A few post-revolution militants reflected that there was a certain amount of disappointment and frustration with the achievements of the organisation, and with the fact that everything ended with the imprisonment of the majority of its members. Thus, a recurrent expression in different interviews was: 'we were defeated'. In Bruno's perspective, for instance, FP-25 'did not change anything', because they 'lost' and 'the workers did not assimilate' the reasons for their fight. Thus, frustration, according to Júlia, led many former FP-25 militants to never get involved with any political or social activities, and to simply get on with their own lives – 'I think that all those who were in that group left deeply frustrated and, in most cases, unable to restart. And to the best of my knowledge, I do not know about everyone, but as far as I know most people did not get involved socially, and, therefore, decided to deal with life in a commonplace everyday manner.' However, in my analysis, it was not only frustration that contributed to a discontinuity in terms of political and social activities, but also the fact that after leaving jail, former militants had their lives quite shattered and needed to start again in some way, as already described.

Nonetheless, some former FP-25 militants maintained a continuity between their past and their present in terms of their ideals, beliefs and social activism, particularly in regard to the battle for a fairer and less capitalist society. An example of this circumstance is Humberto, who

considered:

> ...now, for a long time, I have been involved in other type of activities. I keep an identical political stance in relation to that of that time, I mean, I am extremely critical of the social situation, the economy, capitalism, the kind of society in which we live, I have not changed anything. I'm not part of a party, at the time I was already irritated with the parties, can you now imagine if I would go to the Left Bloc or to PCP? I'm not going anywhere, but I try, whether in things that I edit, because we edit some books here, either in social terms, in some social activism.

Another example is Jaime, who maintained both his ideals and political activism, deliberating that otherwise he could not live with himself. He considers that he has a very strong attraction towards social activity and civic participation that does not allow him to be passive. These aspects could not take a different form in the life course of someone who devoted the 'period of greater physical strength' of his life to the political struggle, suffered the consequences with dignity (not requiring an amnesty, but paying his total debt to society), and nowadays is still politically active. Thus, Jaime vehemently affirmed:

> You are facing someone who despite everything, regarding his social, ideological and civic participation maintains the same posture he had 25 years ago. I have this need to feel that I am contributing with whatever I do, be it at local political meetings, at the Left Bloc [political party], at work. I'm a leftist man, I never defended the Soviet Union, I never had the ideological burden of the fall of the Berlin wall. I have very strong convictions about social justice and quality of life, which I have kept intact since I've known myself in the political struggle for 30-odd years, exactly the same thing.

The strong convictions held by Jaime over time also include his radicalised views on how to solve social issues. This can be seen through the following excerpt, which exemplifies Jaime's position in relation to the employment situation in Portugal at the time of our conversation (February 2013):

> Sometimes I ask myself, if I was working for a company in which some agent of the

> capital, be it an administrator or an employer, created a situation of famine and so on... I would have two paths: I could endure the situation... but there would be one path that I personally would never pursue, I would never kill myself. For that he [the administrator or employer] goes first, and then I go. He goes before me, he has to go in front of me, I cannot leave him here, I cannot leave here the person who contributed to my situation. [...] If I had no money to eat or to pay the rent, would I put a rope around my neck? No, before I would put a rope around my neck, I would have to put it around the neck of someone else, this is evident.

In this sense, according to any current counter-terrorist unit, Jaime's views would be still considered a security threat. In fact, Jaime said that a few times, because of some important political event in Portugal, he witnessed the same car, with the same person inside, parked in front of his house. This continued until the day he had had enough and told them to go away, because in his fifties he was not fit anymore to engage in political violence and be able to bypass the police. In sum, Jaime reflected:

> Rewinding what I experienced in the 80's, I do not say that if I was twenty years old today that I would not do the same. Because of my way of seeing society and of being integrated in that society, I am unable to live with injustices, with the arrogance of those who have a uniform or a tie and a pen, I cannot live with it. Now, what will Jaime do? Do you think I'll get away ahead of the police, fifty-seven years old... I can no longer escape. This is something of which I am completely aware. Now, that does not stop me from looking at the situations that I face every day and say: what we need here is the FP-25, or something else, to bring at least some justice regarding what we face every day.

Jaime was not the sole interviewee who shared this kind of thoughts. Mariana also considered that in some sectors of the Portuguese society at present, violence would be still justified. However, like Jaime, she also considered her current age and concluded that it is not up to her anymore. Thus, it is important to note that, as also considered by Horgan (2009), disengagement from a political violent organisation does not always imply a transformation of personal perspectives. In other words, disengagement is not synonymous with deradicalisation, in the

sense that it is possible to come across disengaged individuals like Jaime and Mariana, who despite not committing violent acts anymore, still hold the same perpectives that feed into political violence. Although their bodies no longer allow their personal engagement, at least in physical terms, they consider others who choose such political means as not reproachable.

Finally, it is important to highlight that across the intervieweed FP-25 militants, despite some being more disappointed than others, or more engaged at present with political and social matters than others, nobody regretted the past militancy. In fact, the majority of militants consider that they lived ‘a unique historical moment’ and acted according to what they thought to be best for their society at the time. Thus, according to Mariana:

> It was a great effort... and there's a lot… but I do not have regrets. I did what had to be done, I'm not at all sorry, though. [...] I am the same person, by the way I am still here. I'm not sorry, I got tired, that's different. I'm not sorry, my ideals are the same, my fight is the same.

Throughout this section it was possible to see how entangled identity and life story are. Individuals use their life stories to ‘provide life with unity and purpose’ (McAdams, 1996, p. 132). However, such stories, and consequently identity, are not static: they evolve in accordance with varying spatial, temporal and relational dimensions that individuals inhabit across their lives (see Somers, 1994).

Concluding Reflections: No Longer Violent, But Always Political

In this final chapter the dynamics of disengagement from a political violent organisation were explored, as well as the spheres from which former political violent activists see themselves and narrate their past. In this context I consider that the main message transmitted by the majority of the individuals across different organisations, who acted during different periods of time, and with different aims in mind, is that their politicized identity remained essentially the same over the years; their political strategies and some of their political views are not the same, but this is seen as a consequence of the passing of time that allowed a broader and reflexive knowledge on historical processes and past experiences.

In terms of disengagement from an armed organisation, across the different organisations under analysis there were three main types of triggers: 1) achievement of collective political goals (e.g. overthrow of the government); 2) psychological issues (e.g. disillusionment with the organisation, discordance with decisions made by the leadership or by the majority of comrades, change of personal priorities); and 3) physical hindrance (e.g. imprisonment, escape to another country). The type of trigger and the historical moment in which the action was conducted seemed quite influencial on the reintegration into society of former political violent activists. What I mean is that for the majority of both pre- and counter- revolution militants the achievement of their political goals dictated the dissolution of their respective organisations and the disengagement of its members, which was not followed by a prison sentence, thus facilitating the reintegration into society of these individuals. For pre-revolution militants this was the case, because their acts under a dictatorial regime were considered almost heroic after the Revolution, and the fact that no lives were lost in their struggle contributed to this. For counter-revolution militants, the nebulous circumstances that surrounded their actions, the finger pointing that never revealed the truly guilty, their connections with important political figures of their time and the convulsive political years that followed the Revolution, facilitated their slow return with little consequences suffered. In the case of post-revolution militants, the situation was not so clear, because a democratic regime could not forgive an armed organisation that challenged the government and targeted human lives. Thus, for many of these militants, the fact of having served a prison sentence caused a delay and some difficulties in their reintegration into society.

Finally, there is an implicit sense of *victors*, *vanquished* and *not yet finished* in the narratives of the interviewed individuals. Both pre and counter-revolution militants celebrate the achievement of their political goals, which closed a chapter on their lives. For the former, the Revolution brought the desired democracy and enabled new and legal means of political activism; and for the latter the counter-revolution brought the so desired ‘order’ and put an end to the possible communist invasion, allowing counter-revolution militants to return to their former lives, which did not have much contact with politics. However, for post-revolution militants, on the one hand there was a sense of defeat, because of the arrests that caused the dissolution of the organisation and the subsquent decision of some militants to request an

amnesty while in prison; and, on the other hand, there were also a few individuals for whom the struggle is not yet finished and that are still committed, legally, to the pursuit of social justice.

Above all, the interviews cited in this chapter allowed former political violent activists to rehearse their present selves, giving coherence to who they are and how they wish to be perceived.

PART III

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION

Overview

In this dissertation, I traced the storylines in which former political violent activists in Portugal were moulded as subjects through their interactions with the social and political contexts of their time. Therefore, the examination of interviewees' stories was the focus of this thesis, rather than how things happened exactly in the past. I equally explored the individual journeys of engagement with, life within and disengagement from political violent organisations through the stories told by the actors of violence themselves. In addition, I identified and rigorously analysed the stories that shaped former political violent activists' lives, exploring how such stories impacted their past experiences and choices and how they are put at the service of their present selves. The stories included those of sacrifice for the greater good, ones of political threats that needed to be stopped, and others of fading political promises that needed to be restored. In this closing chapter, I detail the implications of my research in three main areas: empirical, theoretical and methodological.

Empirical Implications

This study is the first to explore empirically the life stories of former political violent activists in Portugal. In addition, it notably extends the findings of studies that equally involve the perspectives of the actors of violence (see, for example, Horgan, 2009b; Toros, 2012; della Porta, 2013). Thus, the empirical contribution of my research concerned my attempt to answer the research question: *how do former political violent activists in Portugal narrate their experiences in terms of engagement with, life within, and disengagement from an armed organisation?* Hence, this dissertation results from the conviction that in order to understand politically motivated violence and its actors, it is better to talk *with them* rather than *about them*. Its starting point, as argued in chapter one and further explored in chapter three, was the belief

that the life stories of former political violent activists can shed light on their decision-making processes which led them to engage with a political violent organisation, to remain a political violent militant for a certain period of time, and to finally disengage from the organisation and from violent struggle in general. This approach allowed the in-depth collection of life stories that compose a very thick description of the experiences of twenty-eight social actors, who at a certain point in time took the leap into political violence, but who are much more than former political violent activists. In this sense, this research attempted to represent both the violent and non-violent facets of these actors' lives, the before and the after of political violent activism, in order to strengthen the argument that nobody is simply a political violent militant, but a social actor who contains various overlapping identities and acts according to his/her contextual circumstances (see Toros and Gunning, 2009; Toros, 2012).

Thus, in order to answer my research question I traced the experiences of former political violent militants according to three distinct moments in their life stories: engagement with, life within, and disengagement from a political violent organisation.

Engagement with a political violent organisation

The stories shared in this dissertation are strongly connected to the social, cultural, political, historical and human contexts that frame the lives of their narrators. Thus, it was possible to see how historical moments and places shaped the political awareness of different individuals, influencing their engagement with a political violent organisation. This finding is supported by the work of della Porta (2013), who considered that individual factors should not be considered in isolation, but in interaction with contextual factors in order to understand individual perceptions of the external reality and subsequent responses. Indeed, this thesis traced the life stories of different individuals and was able to find individual and contextual factors in interaction. For instance, some interviewees born during *Estado Novo* were brought up in a clearly anti-regime environment, populated by oppositional political narratives, but it was only when they were sent to the Colonial War and saw all the atrocities being committed by the regime that they were triggered to engage in politically motivated violence. However, it is extremely important to place this example next to another one that portrays individuals of the same age range that were also sent to the Colonial War, or chose the military career, and decided

to engage in a political violent organisation after the Revolution when the independence was given to the colonies. For these individuals, abandoning the colonies, which were seen as part of the nation, was a crime that questioned their education, ideological principles and moral values. Thus, despite belonging to the same generation, pre- and counter-revolution militants chose to 'work up the material of their common experiences in different and specific ways' (Mannheim, 1952, p.304). Accordingly, both the family and the birthplace of different individuals played a central role in laying down the principles and beliefs individuals lived by. Like everyone else, political violent actors lives are linked to the lives of the people around them who, intentionally or not, influenced the development of their life courses (Elder, 1994), passing on worldviews from generation to generation (De Martini, 1992). Therefore, individuals are strongly influenced by the cultural meanings of their environment, which in turn influence the course of their life stories (Brockmeier, 2009) and craft the episodic particulars of their autobiographical memory which shape their narrative identity (McAdams and McLean, 2013). For instance, various post-revolution militants built a narrative identity through seeing themselves as a 'product' of the Revolution – which happened when they were very young – and of all the intense political activity and political narratives that surrounded it. This, as argued by Andrews (2014, p. 87), is due to the fact that '[f]or individuals, political narratives are the ligaments of identity, revealing how one constructs the boundaries of, and the connections between, the self and the other'. In this sense, these militants in their adolescence used their contextual variables as bricks to form their life stories, shaping their personal narrative according to the moment in history in which they were living (Habermas and Hatiboğlu, 2014).

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, individual factors do not act in isolation, and I argued that times of social turmoil (the final turbulent years of a dictatorial regime, the euphoria of the Revolution and the tense beginning of the democratic process) help the conversion of intergenerational and contextual stimulus into personal agency for social change. Such an argument was first put forward by Andrews (1991, 2007) in her research on political lives and commitment, and extended in this dissertation to the experiences of former political violent activists. In addition, I uncovered the role and importance of narrative imagination in the lives of former political violent activists, who in their teens were thirsty for information about what was happening around the world and in their own country, in order to situate their own personal experiences and ways of acting (see Brockmeier, 2009; Andrews, 2014a). Narrative

imagination led pre-revolution militants, on the one hand, to desire the sort of socio-political transformation that would allow them to live in a country where they did not have to be afraid of speaking their minds, where they could fully 'exist'. Thus, to achieve such ideals they had the option of following the path of other revolutionaries from different geographical locations who inhabited similar socio-political circumstances. In this context, young individuals felt personally responsible to free their nation through the only way that could affect the established repressive power – the armed struggle. On the other hand, narrative imagination led counter-revolution militants to join political violent organisations in order to prevent the implementation of a communist regime in Portugal. These militants feared that after the Revolution the country was vulnerable to go down a path that had been proved disastrous in other realities and that would put the nation and its citizens in a worst position when compared to *Estado Novo*.

Finally, I was able to corroborate the findings of different studies (see, for example, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Ashour, 2009) which consider that the engagement with a political violent organisation involves a complex radicalisation process, where the belief system of individuals changes towards aknowledging the need of violent acts to produce socio-political transformation. Such aknowledgment tends to develop when all sorts of peaceful and legal activities failed to produce results and individuals feel traped in an unjust and oppressive system. Therefore, individuals do not simply engage with a political violent organisation without a past of some sort of socio-political activism. On the contrary, usually one mechanism led to the other, and militants went from legal activities to political violence (McAdam et al., 2001; della Porta, 2009, 2013). Post-revolution militants, for instance, described being somehow politically aware before the Revolution, continued their politicisation afterwards through different political parties and activities, and eventually ending up taking the step into a political violent organisation in the wake of the perceived failures of peaceful strategies. Therefore, militants were acquainted and socialised into violent actions and strategies during periods of social turmoil, in order to attain socio-political transformation (della Porta, 2013).

Life within a political violent organisation

Life within a political violent organisation was highly politicised and shaped individuals' stories, whether they were full-time clandestine militants or if they kept their aboveground lives

and carried out armed actions in secret. Although in most cases such a change was not negatively described, some interviewees recognised that choosing life within a political violent organisation meant that other paths had to be given up (e.g. career, family). These circumstances gave origin to stories portraying 'heroes' and 'martyrs', who sacrificed their own lives (actual lives, or alternative possible life paths) for a cause that would bring a greater good to society in general. In this context, it was possible, once again, to grasp the personal responsibility and sense of duty that various militants felt in past politically troubled contexts to lay down their lives for their ideals, especially because in their view very few individuals would do the same, which strengthened their resolve even further.

Nonetheless, the cases in which militants were able to keep their real identities while working with a clandestine organisation were fewer in comparison with the cases in which militants had to opt for the underground life in order to not be caught by the police. The only exception applied to counter-revolution militants and pre-revolution militants from LUAR who in the majority of cases were based in Spain and France respectively, where the authorities were not actively looking for them. Thus, underground life created specific dynamics and challenges for different organisations. Two types of dynamics presented in the literature by della Porta (2013) are affective and cognitive closure, which in this dissertation were clearly corroborated by the experiences of post-revolution militants, and in a smaller measure by the experiences of pre-revolution militants. Post-revolution militants were the ones who in the majority of cases lived underground and had less direct contact with non-clandestine individuals and non-clandestine life in general. In this sense, their universe was confined to the organisation, its people and its ways of perceiving the world. Consequently, in terms of affective closure it was possible to grasp the existence of deep and intense relationships among post-revolution militants, which increased as actions became more dangerous; as militant casualties started happening (both death and arrest of comrades); and as militants could not imagine their lives differently. In this scenario, they devoted everything they had and were to the organisation. This devotion even prevented some people from leaving the organisation when they saw that its end was near even though they still had the chance to go abroad. However, the conviction that they had to carry on the struggle in memory of the comrades who lost their lives fighting was stronger and made them stay until the end, which they knew could only offer them one of two options: either die or be arrested. This type of dynamic had different proportions for pre-revolution militants, in

the sense that not everyone held a clandestine identity, but in practice similar results were found, which extends della Porta's (2013) findings to political violent activists who keep an aboveground life, and would only carry out specific violent actions and then return to their 'normal' lives. Therefore, a strong solidarity among militants was also found in the case of pre-revolution militants, who chose to risk their lives in the struggle and did it together, forging solid ties and an unshakeable trust in the process. In the case of pre-revolution militants, this affective closure resulted in the near absence of conflicts or disagreements, because militants trusted that the comrades in charge, who were usually clandestine militants, had analysed the circumstances thoroughly and had made the right decision, and in the end everything that could contribute to weaken the dictatorship was good and worth doing. However, in the case of both counter- and post-revolution militants, the interpersonal relationships within the different organisations did not run that smoothly. For counter-revolution militants, who in the majority of cases were former military men, the fact that there were no clear missions and chains of command left them without a strong focus and created frequent interpersonal conflicts and divergences. For post-revolution militants, the grind of the underground life, characterised by a constant lack of material resources, and a relentless avoidance of getting arrested or killed, gave origin to some very tense circumstances among militants, who at times were unable to carry out actions together. Another aspect that contributed to interpersonal conflicts among post-revolution militants was the existence of romantic relationships within the organisation. According to some interviewees such relationships tended to cause skirmishes, because there were very few women, who were desired by too many men.

Meanwhile, in terms of cognitive closure various militants across different periods of time and organisations reflected that their perceptions of the world and of their own behaviour developed in a very constrained setting, which over time became more and more secluded from the aboveground, impacting the narratives and value systems adopted by the militants. Another aspect that contributes to such cognitive closure is related to the fact that militants cannot simply return to their previous life without facing consequences, which causes them to invest further in their revolutionary identity, even if it implies changing the focus from the initially defended political goals to the ends of violence themselves, and to the maintenance of the collective identity (Zwerman et al., 2000), as happened to post-revolution militants.

The participation of women in political violent organisations was equally examined in this dissertation, both from the viewpoint of women themselves and of their male comrades. Almost each organisation under analysis had a different take on the place and role of women in the armed struggle. In the case of pre-revolution militants, BR was undoubtedly the organisation that promoted the participation of women in the armed struggle the most, having clear emancipatory purposes in mind (see Yuval-Davis, 1997; Alison, 2004, 2009). One of BR co-founders and direction members was a woman, and within this organisation women were seen as people, as comrades, who could do anything, independently of their gender. Thus, BR militants perceived their organisation as the vanguard in terms of the participation of women in armed actions and criticised ARA in particular, for not following the same route. However, ARA was closely connected to the PCP at diverse levels, including in regard to the direct participation of women in the armed struggle. Consequently, ARA kept women in the background as wives, partners or simply actresses of the theatre of 'normal life' (see Mahan and Griset, 2008; Jackson et al., 2011). However, in reality, these women were much more than simple pawns lured by their loved ones into the underground life. In the case of the female interviewee from ARA, she made the choice of living underground and working for the PCP even before meeting her future husband (with whom she would found ARA). She was perfectly conscious of and in agreement with the political agenda of her husband, and contributed to the realisation of the different actions whenever she could. In general, pre-revolution militants showed admiration for the participation of women in the armed struggle, independently of their role. In the case of counter-revolution militants, the participation of women in armed actions was non-existent. These militants held conservative views on the role of women in society at the time, and were unable to conceive that women could be participating in violent activities instead of taking care of their family. For counter-revolution militants the armed struggle was a job for men, from which women should be spared. Lastly, among post-revolution militants there were a few women, who were treated differently by different men, in the sense that some accepted them well, whilst others held preconceptions and had difficulty in seeing them as comrades in arms. Accordingly, one of the women interviewed considered that FP-25 was a deeply sexist organisation and that the role of the women within it did not have any impact. However, both women interviewed personally felt that they did what they should have done, following their own political agenda and not that of men's. Thus, my research corroborates the literature that affirms that women's paths into armed organisation are similar to that of men

(Nacos, 2008) and that their political grievances and agendas are the same and as firm as men's (Hamilton, 2007; Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007; Ness, 2008; Alison, 2009).

Finally, the use of violence was greatly dependent on the temporal context of action and on the ideological underpinnings of each organisation studied. For instance, the actions of pre-revolution militants never targeted human lives, which makes them very proud, feeling that they are a rare historical case. This fact also contributes to refute the label of terrorism or terrorists that the state of the time tried to impinge on them. Thus, for pre-revolution militants their violence was a means to demonstrate that the state apparatus should and could be attacked and that anyone was able to do it, having in mind the main goal of raising popular awareness and agency. The violent actions perpetrated by counter-revolution militants were justified by the need to prevent the installation of a communist regime in Portugal. Different interviewees mentioned the attacks against PCP headquarters in different northern towns, though very few interviewees talked about the homicides that occurred during the period in which their organisation acted and that were attributed to the cloud of rightist forces carrying out violent actions after the Revolution (Dâmaso, 1997). When they did, they tended to point the finger among themselves (even within the same organisation), which seemed a product of unsolved past conflicts that resisted the passing of time. Ultimately, counter-revolution militants' stories corroborated the affirmations of Cerqueira (2015), who considers that the Catholic church, Franco's regime in neighbouring Spain, the military who opposed the democratic process and the centre and right-wing parties were the main supporters of the counter-revolutionary struggle that took place in Portugal in the years that followed the Revolution. Lastly, the violent acts carried out by post-revolution militants were motivated by the aspiration of fighting the capitalist system that was being implemented in Portugal when the socialist promises made by the Revolution fade away. In this sense, the majority of the targets of post-revolution militants were individuals who represented the injustices committed against the workers of different factories. In addition, post-revolution militants did not forgive the comrades who decided to cooperate with the police in order to alleviate their prison sentences, equally choosing to kill them. However, the choice to target human lives was widely discussed among post-revolution militants, and did not have the support of all its members. In terms of popular support, post-revolution militants aspired to stimulate workers' reactions against the perceived unjust

capitalist system. However, the escalation of violence, particularly the step into killing people, reduced the popular support and increasingly isolated post-revolution militants.

Disengagement from a political violent organisation

In this dissertation the interviewed individuals disengaged from their respective organisations for three main reasons: 1) achievement of collective political goals; 2) ideological and/or psychological issues; and 3) physical hindrance. These reasons have been previously documented in the literature (see, for example, Horgan, 2009a, 2009c; Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009; Reinares, 2011; Ferguson, 2015), as well as the fact that some individuals despite being disengaged from the armed organisation may still agree and support its cause, representing the important distinction between disengagement and deradicalisation (Reinares, 2011).

The majority of pre-revolution militants disengaged from the organisation right after the Revolution, when their political goals of overthrowing the dictatorial regime, stopping the Colonial War and starting the decolonisation and the democratisation processes were attained. Above all, these militants considered that violent actions did not have a place in a democratic country, where all citizens were free to engage in political activities and work towards socio-political transformation (see Reinares, 2011). However, during the period in which pre-revolution organisations were active, a few militants disengaged from the organisation, some voluntarily, others forcibly by being imprisoned (see Bjørgo and Horgan, 2009). The militants who left the organisation voluntarily before its end were mainly motivated by ideological and/or psychological reasons. They believed that the path taken by the organisation was not related to their own political views anymore, which caused some frustration and disappointment, or considered that the armed struggle did not have a place in their lives any longer, due to change of priorities (e.g. career-wise) (see della Porta, 2013). In the case of counter-revolution militants, disengagement came as a consequence of November 25th (1975), the day of the counter-revolution, which sanitised the radical left and solidified the presence of centre and right-wing parties in power. However, not all militants agreed with such directives that came essentially from above and decided to carry on conducting violent actions (see Ashour, 2009; della Porta, 2013). The reasons for such a choice vary according to different interviewees. The ones who disengaged following the directive of the leadership considered that those who carried

on were motivated by financial gains, while those who carried on considered that there were still issues to be dealt with regarding those responsible for the Revolution, for the PREC (Undergoing Revolutionary Process) and for the consequences of these events. Finally, the majority of post-revolution militants were forced to disengage from the organisation due to being imprisoned, which caused some to never lose their radicalised conceptions (still defended nowadays). Others took advantage of the time in jail to reorganise their lives and belief systems, reflecting that their goals were frustrated and that violence is not the privileged tool at the service of the political struggle that they thought it was (see Ferguson et al., 2015). This latter position resulted in the majority of post-revolution militants imprisoned accepting the amnesty offered by the political establishment of the time. In contrast, the former group chose to remain in jail until the end of their sentences, in order to suffer the consequences of their conscious choices until the end, paying their debt to society in full, from their perspective.

The reintegration into society of former politcal violent activists seems dependent on what triggered the participation in the struggle and on the historical moment in which the action was conducted. In this sense, pre-revolution militants were not imprisoned after the Revolution for their action during the dictatorial period, being considered a marginal part of the opposition to *Estado Novo* (Ferreira, 2015). Thus, their reintegration into society was described as quite uncomplicated, and allowed them to reestablish the contact with family and friends, reenter the job market and, in various cases, carry on peaceful political activities in the developing democratic context. Counter-revolution militants experienced similar circumstances, having avoided, in the majority of cases, imprisonment and slowly returning to Portugal and being reintegrated in society. However, post-revolution militants were generally imprisoned or escaped from the country, which according to their views impacted greatly their reintegration into society. Such impact was due to two main factors: first, they were removed from society for many years, and second, they were former convicts who needed to start all over again, having, in some cases, young children in their charge. Thus, the reintegration into society of militants belonging to organisations operating in different time frames was undoubtly dissimilar. In this context, it is possible to clearly distinguish how different historical and political circumstances gave origin to storylines that in some cases facilitated, and in other cases hindered the reintegration into society of former political violent activists. For intance, the extent to which the labels ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ were applied to the actions carried out by

different organisations and its actors looked quite influential in their reintegration into society. In this sense, such labels are not consensually applied to both pre- and counter-revolution militants and organisations for three main reasons: 1) these organisations acted in turbulent historical periods; 2) pre-revolution militants' actions did not result in the loss of human lives and counter-revolution militants' actions were not directly connected to the loss of lives; and 3) these organisations always had both political parties and popular support. Conversely, in the case of post-revolution militants both party and popular support decreased exponentially when human lives started to be targeted, which contributed to the consensual use of the labels terrorism and terrorist to describe the acts and actors of violence, contributing to a generally more difficult reintegration in society of these militants.

At the time of the interviews, different individuals position themselves differently in terms of both their past actions and present activities and perceptions. In general, interviewees tended to trace their life stories from their early years in terms of who they were, the influences they received from their environment, what they did towards political transformation and why, what were the consequences suffered, and who they became. Thus, their stories cover their political activism, which was both non-violent and violent, and attain meaning to past experiences and coherence to their present selves. In addition, it is important to note that stories are rooted in the place and time in which they exist and in the social relationships in which they are created, repeated and transformed (Frank, 2010). Thus, through stories, individuals attach meanings to episodes stored in their autobiographical memory, which in itself is 'an active construction embedded in a social weave of dialogues that are negotiated not only between an individual and his or her immediate social environment […] but also, equally importantly, between the individual and the larger cultural milieu' (Wang and Brockmeier, 2002, p.47). In this sense, according to Jerome Bruner (2003, p.213), the self relies on selective remembering to 'adjust the past to the demands of the present and the anticipated future', which is corroborated by Elliot Mishler (2004), who considers that the same identity-defining episode may be told very differently in different circumstances, originating multiple life narrative storylines and constructing different identities.

In this context, an important aspect of the present narratives of former political violent activists is the status ascribed to the product of their past participation in the armed struggle: *victors*,

vanquished or *not yet finished*. Therefore, the *victors* see their past activism as totally worthy of all the efforts and consequences suffered, because their goal was achieved. The *vanquished* do not regret their past actions, but do not consider that they contributed to social transformation either, which causes some frustration and disappointment, particularly when the personal psychological and social losses are analysed. The *not yet finished* carry on their peaceful political activity with no retirement plans, hoping that their contribution can still bring about the desired social justice and transformation. Thus, the stories individuals tell about their past experiences are influenced by how they construct their present selves, what narratives they intend to corroborate or oppose, and who is listening (Frank, 2010). Accordingly, stories are narratively performed and portray the meanings attached to past memories which are dialogically used to preserve a valued identity. In this sense, according to Josselson (2009, p. 665), identity is 'a lifelong process of rewriting the texts of one's experiences, assigning different roles to the various aspects of the self'. Andrews (2007, p. 206), remarking on the relationship between political activism and times of social turmoil, says that individuals' 'starting point is always the political narratives they have inherited', which are the stories Somers (1994, p. 619) would call 'public narratives'. Therefore, individuals use their contextual variables as bricks to form their narrative identity, as well as to attain meaning to their past experiences, which are dialogically reconstructed and recounted.

Theoretical and Methodological Implications

The theorisation of the life stories of former political violent activists is a new and desired development in the political violence literature (see Horgan, 2009b; Jackson, et al., 2014). Such life stories were theorised in relation to both narrative and critical theory, adding descriptive depth and conceptual sophistication to existent understandings of political violence represented in the literatures reviewed in chapter three. Therefore, in this thesis I demonstrated the connection between the Portuguese contexts that surrounded the rise of armed organisations and the life stories of former political violent militants, arguing that social actors choose to commit their lives to political transformation through violent means according to the political narratives that inhabit their spatial and temporal coordinates; and that such a choice is mirrored in the stories they tell about their lives. These are stories that offer a new way of thinking about individuals who choose to commit part of their lives to political transformation via violent

means, but who are not simply violent activists, having had previous personal, social and political experiences that make them available to such a choice, and having future aspirations that are not related with politically motivated violence (e.g. a career, a family). This approach to the study of political violence differs from the traditional models on the topic led by mainstream terrorism studies' scholars, who tend to rely on secondary data sources, producing and reproducing flat descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon, ignoring the voices and experiences of the actors of violence. Therefore, in order to tackle these limitations this dissertation brought forward the life stories of former political violent activists, which facilitate the demystification of political violence as a phenomenon isolated from its time and space, through the perspectives, experiences and feelings of its actors (Atran, 2010).

In addition, my theorisation of the three phases in the lifecycle of a former political violent activist (engagement with, life within and disengagement from a political violent organisation) advances the work of Taylor and Horgan (2006) in three distinct analytical aspects: 1) the decisional contexts involved in different moments of time in the life of a political violent activist; 2) the choices made by individuals who have been part of a political violent organisation; and 3) the nature and implications for individuals of different types of political violent organisations, whose existence and structure was closely connected to the socio-political context of their time. Thus, I consider that such a framework to study political violence allows the understanding of the diversity that characterises political violent activists, whose pathways into, within and out of armed organisations vary across their spatial and temporal contexts. Hence, this dissertation highlights the value of developing an interdisciplinary approach for understanding the emergence of politically motivated violence, which is based on sociological, psychological and political science approaches to the life stories of former political violent activists. This allows the study of how contextual, individual and collective factors impinge upon the individual, who has a unique experience which is informed by broader contextual processes. In this sense, analysing political violence in context connects it to the structural violence in which it frequently happens, attaining multiple identities to the actors of violence and refusing the label 'terrorist' as biased, judgmental and of little explanatory value.

The methodological contribution of my research is linked to the work done by CTS scholars since the early 2000s, which has greatly contributed to establishing narrative as an approach to

and introducing the notion of temporality into the study of political violence (Jarvis, 2008; Jackson et al., 2011; Heath-Kelly et al., 2014). However, while these scholars have been mainly focused on the narratives of the 'war on terror' and counterterrorism, there is very little critical research that looks specifically at the life stories of former political violent activists.

Thus, my research question was answered through a critical theory-based approach to political violence, whose underpinnings had been built in previous scholarship (McDonald, 2009; Toros and Gunning, 2009; Toros, 2012). In this sense, ontologically I opted for a self-reflexive minimal foundationalism put forward by some CTS scholars (Toros and Gunning, 2009; Toros, 2012), which has its origins on the Frankfurt School of critical theory and considers that there are different categories of political violence that are historically positioned and change over time (Toros, 2012). Hence, minimal foundationalism allows the investigation of how political violence is narrated by different actors and establishments, keeping a 'category of violence that is malleable but manageable, embedded in its context but nonetheless recognizable and distinct' (Toros, 2012, p. 190). Epistemologically, I approached political violence through constructionism, which is aligned with both CTS and narrative paradigms, highlighting the need for methodological and disciplinary pluralism (Jackson et al., 2011), for countering a-historical and decontextualized analysis (Toros, 2012), for focusing on gender and relational dynamics (Breen-Smyth, 2007), for engaging with the actors of violence (Toros, 2012), and for recognizing that knowledge production is a social process always tied to a particular context and to specific power dynamics (Esin et al., 2013).

Finally, the empirical application of a narrative approach that combined both thematic and dialogical narrative analysis has critical implications for the field of political violence, as a method of social inquiry that has yet to be further explored. This dissertation confirmed how this pioneering methodological approach may be valuable and may produce relevant findings. For instance, the narrative approach used in this research showed that the stories individuals tell about their past experiences are influenced by how they construct their present selves, what narratives they intend to corroborate or oppose, and who is listening. Thus, stories are narratively performed and impacted by others, but they are also actors in people's lives. According to Frank (2010), stories act upon people and for people, triggering decisions and behaviours. For instance, I showed this through the stories of revolutionary relatives that

influenced an early awareness for social injustices and political causes, but also through the different stories instilled in individuals by the Colonial War, which influenced them taking on arms to fight a political establishment perceived as unjust. Consequently, this study contributes to develop the case for understanding the performative abilities of stories in people's lives.

Further Research

I wish to conclude my discussion now by highlighting three key areas in which the above contributions of my thesis could be further explored.

First, a logical extension of the temporal and spatial parameters of my empirical analysis beyond the Portuguese case may prove very productive. In order to offer an exhaustive analysis of the life stories of former political violent activists, my empirical data focused on a particular and necessarily limited historical period and space: exploring three temporal periods and the narratives that emerged within each one of them. In this sense, this same exercise applied to distinct historical moments and/or problematics would not only function to further deepen the analysis presented in my own discussion; it would also facilitate comparative reflection between different locus and dynamics of conflicts: to what extent, for instance, have the different temporal and spatial contexts shaped politically motivated struggles?

A second potentially productive extension of my arguments would involve broadening the range of participants in the study to include the families of former political violent activists, and in particular their children. A few interviewees briefly mentioned the political views and attitudes of their children, who in some cases followed the path of their parents and are closely involved with national politics (e.g. both daughters of one interviewee have seats in the Portuguese parliament since the last election), and in other cases loathe politics due to the consequences they brought to their family. Thus, a thorough analysis of the intergenerational views and attitudes towards politics in general, and political agency in particular, could shed light on how the life stories of parents impact and are connected to the life stories of their children: to what extent, for instance, do parents life stories prompt or inhibit their children's participation in politically motivated violence?

A final area within which the arguments of my research could be extended relates to exploring the role of former political violent activists in countering violent radicalisation. Some interviewees, particularly from pre-revolution organisations, mentioned that they are often invited to talk to children and adolescents about their past struggle against the dictatorship, and they are equally part of a recently created organisation called *Não Apaguem a Memória* (Do not Erase the Memory), which runs various events to keep the past that surrounded the dictatorship and the Revolution alive. Hence, an in-depth analysis of the participation of former political violent activists in this type of events, and in socio-political activities in general, could produce relevant findings regarding how past experiences of involvement with the armed struggle impact the current generation: to what extent, for instance, do stories of former political violent activists prevent the participation in politically motivated violence?

Thus, my theoretical and methodological approach has brought forward a wide range of issues and considerations regarding the way political violence is constructed. It has seriously challenged simplistic conceptualizations of the actors of violence and has brought temporality and context into the study of political violence, showcasing for the first time the Portuguese case. This is undoubtedly a field that needs to be further researched and I hope that my thesis serves to raise such awareness and to inspire other researchers to carry on the conversation in different temporal and spatial cases.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INFORMATION SHEET

My name is Raquel da Silva and I am undertaking a PhD at the University of Birmingham (United Kingdom). My research is about the armed political struggle in Portugal. I am going to give you information and invite you to be part of this research. This consent form may contain words that you do not understand. Please ask me to stop as we go through the information and I will take time to explain. If you have questions later, you can always ask them.

The armed political struggle in Portugal has been, so far, little analysed. Thus, this study aims to shed some light upon the social and political factors involved in why individuals carried out acts of violence and what their objectives were. In this sense, data will be gathered about the experiences and perspectives of the individuals engaged in the armed struggle pre and post 1974's revolution.

You are being invited to take part in this research because I feel that your experience as a former participant in an armed organization can contribute much to my understanding and knowledge of this process in Portugal. Therefore, this research involves your participation in an interview that will take about one and a half hour.

Your participation in this research is entirely voluntary. You may change your mind during or after the interview and stop participating. If you change your mind after the interview you have the right to stop participating up until when the analysis and the writing up of the research findings will have commenced (1st June 2013). If you do not wish to answer any of the questions during the interview, you may say so and I will move on to the next question. The information recorded is confidential, and no one else except me will access to the information documented during your interview. The entire interview will be audio-recorded, but no one will be identified by name on the audio. The audio file will be kept on my personal computer, protected by password. The information recorded is confidential, and no one else except me will have access to the audio file. The audio file will be destroyed after the transcription of the interview.

I am asking you to share with me some very personal and confidential information, and you may feel uncomfortable talking about some of the topics. As stated above you do not have to answer any question or take part in the interview if you don't wish to do so, and that is also fine. You do not have to give me any reason for not responding to any question, or for refusing to take part in the interview.

Nothing that you tell me today will be shared with anybody outside my supervisors, and nothing will be attributed to you by name. The knowledge that I get from this research will be shared with you before it is made widely available to the public. Each participant will receive a summary of the results. Following this, I will publish the results so that other interested people may learn from the research.

If you have any questions, you can ask them now or later. If you wish to ask questions later, you may contact me on the following number or e-mail address: [redacted]/ [redacted]

APPENDIX B

CONSENT FORM

I have read the foregoing information, which informed me about the nature and purpose of the present study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions about it and any questions I have been asked have been answered to my satisfaction. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study. I agree that the interview may be electronically recorded.

Name of Participant_____

Signature of Participant_____

Date_____

I confirm that the participant was given an opportunity to ask questions about the study, and all the questions asked by the participant have been answered correctly and to the best of my ability. I confirm that the individual has not been coerced into giving consent, and the consent has been given freely and voluntarily.

Name of Researcher_____

Signature of Researcher_____

Date_____

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Characterisation of the Organisation

1. Could you start by telling me about [name of the organisation]?
    a. Goals
    b. Ideology and political life
    c. Results/consequences
    d. Were there changes in the social and political milieu? If yes, what changes
    e. Role of the State as prompter and/or inhibitor of the armed action

Characterisation of Participants' Experiences

2. And what about your personal engagement with [name of the organisation], how did it occur? And why?
    a. Recruitment
    b. Political and social awareness / ideology
    c. Why you?
    d. Views on non-violent/violent political expressions/struggle
3. How would you characterize the interpersonal relationships within the organisation?
    a. Ideologues vs. operational people
    b. Conflicts
4. How would you characterize the underground life within [name of the organisation]?
5. How did occur the decision-making process within the organisation?
6. In the past, what were the organisation's justifications assigned to the actions committed? Are they different from your personal justifications / explanations?
7. What is your opinion about the actions that involved serious injuries or the death or other people?
8. What was the role of the women within the organization?
9. How did the organization felt popular support? Did you seek for it?
10. Why did you disengage from the activity?
    a. Disengagement from the activity vs. disengagement from the organisation's ideals

b. Do you still feel that you should be fighting for the organisation's ideals?

11. In the past, how did you perceive the organisation and your comrades? How do you perceive them now?

12. In the past, how did you perceive your actions? How do you perceive them now?

a. What kind of actions made more sense for you in the past? Why?

b. Would you support the same kind of actions in the present?

c. What you did in the past makes sense in the present?

13. Do you see a connection between what you did in the past and the life you have now? This in terms of, for example, your political views and expressions, friendships, life options and so on.

14. Do you see similarities between the social and political factors that Portugal is facing today and the social and political factors faced in the past during the time your organization acted?

a. If yes, what is restraining you or other people with similar points of view to commit violent acts?

REFERENCES

Aboim, S. and Vasconcelos, P. (2013) From political to social generations: a critical reappraisal of Mannheim's classical approach. **European Journal of Social Theory**, 17 (2): 165–183

Albuquerque, A. (1987) **Stress: causas, prevenção e controlo – um guia prático.** Lisboa: Informação e Saúde, Texto Editora

Alison, M. (2004) Women as agents of political violence: gendering security. **Security Dialogue**, 35 (4): 447–463

Alison, M. (2009) **Women and political violence: female combatants in ethno-national conflict**. London: Routledge

Amaro, R. (1982) O salazarismo na lógica do capitalism em Portugal. **Análise Social**, VXIII (72-73-74): 995–1011

Andrews, M. (1991) **Lifetimes of commitment**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Andrews, M. (1997) Life review in the context of acute social transition: the case of East Germany. **British Journal of Social Psychology**, 36 (3): 273–290

Andrews, M. (2002) "Generational consciousness, dialogue, and political engagement." In Edmunds, J. and Turner, B. (eds.) **Generational consciousness, narrative, and politics**. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc

Andrews, M. (2007) **Shapping history: narratives of political change**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Andrews, M. (2013) "Never the last word: revisiting data." In Andrews, M., Squire, C. and Tamboukou, M. (eds.) **Doing narrative research**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage

Andrews, M. (2014a) **Narrative imagination and everyday life**. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Andrews, M. (2014b) "Narrating moments of political change." In Nesbitt-Larking, P., Kinnvall, C., Capelos, T. and Dekker, H. (eds.) **The Palgrave handbook of global political psychology**. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Antunes, C. (1974) **Dossier Brigadas Revolucionárias**. Lisboa: Edições Revolução

Antunes, J. (1995) **A Guerra de África 1961-1974 (Volume I)**. Lisboa: Círculo de Leitores

Antunes, M. (2015) **Regressos quase perfeitos: memórias da guerra em Angola**. Lisboa: Tinta da China

Arena, M. and Arrigo, B. (2005) Social psychology, terrorism, and identity: a preliminary re-examination of theory, culture, self, and society. **Behavioral Sciences & the Law**, 23 (4): 485–506

Arksey, H. and Knight, P. (1999) **Interviewing for social scientists: an introductory resource with examples**. London: Sage

Ashour, O. (2009) **Votes and violence : Islamists and the processes of transformation** [online]. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence. Available from: http://icsr.info/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/1264507559VotesandViolenceIslamistsandtheProcessesofTransformationOmarAshour.pdf [Accessed 9 February 2013]

Atran, S. (2010) **Talking to the enemy: violent extremism, sacred values, and what it means to be human**. London: Penguin Books

Baker, M. (2006) **Translation and conflict: a narrative account**. New York: Routledge

Bakhtin, M. (1981) **The dialogic imagination**. Holquist, M. (ed.). Austin: University of Texas Press

Bandura, A. (1999) Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. **Personality and Social Psychology Review**, 3 (3): 193–209

Barreto, J. (2000) "Tarrafal." In **Dicionário de história de Portugal – suplemento, volume IX**. Porto: Figueirinhas

Bebiano, R. (2006a) Contestação do regime e tentação da luta armada sob o marcelismo. **Revista Portuguesa de História**, 37: 65–104

Bebiano, R. (2006b) "Da desmemória e do seu antídoto." In Cruzeiro, M. and Bebiano, R. (eds.) **Anos inquietos: vozes do movimento estudantil em Coimbra (1961-1974)**. Porto: Edições Afrontamento

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1991) **The social construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge.** London: Penguin

Bhatia, M. (2005) Fighting words: naming terrorists, bandits, rebels and other violent actors. **Third World Quarterly**, 26 (1): 5–22

Bhavnani, K.K. (1990) “What’s power got to do with it? Empowerment and Social Research.” In Parker, I. and Shotter, J. (eds.) **Deconstructing Social Psychology**. London: Routledge

Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (2009) **Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective disengagement**. New York: Routledge

Blakeley, R. (2007) Bringing the State Back Into Terrorism Studies. **European Political Science**, 6 (3): 228–235

Blakeley, R. (2008) The elephant in the room: a reponse to John Horgan and Michael J. Boyle. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 1 (2): 151-165

Blakeley, R. (2009) **State terrorism and neoliberalism: the north in the south**. Abingdon: Routledge

Boyle, M. J. (2012) Progress and pitfalls in the study of political violence. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 24 (4): 527-543

Braga da Cruz, M. (1988) **O partido e o estado no Salazarismo**. Lisboa: Editorial Presença

Breen-Smyth, M. (2007) A critical research agenda for the study of political terror. **European Political Science**, 6 (3): 260–267

Briggs, C. (1986) **Learning how to ask: a sociolinguistic appraisal of the role of the interview in social science research**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Briggs, R. (2010) Community engagement for counterterrorism : lessons from the United Kingdom. **International Affairs**, 86 (4) 971–981

Briggs, R., Fieschi, C. and Lownsbrough, H. (2006) **Bringing it home: community-based approaches to counter-terrorism** [online]. London: Demos. Available from: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Bringing%20it%20Home%20-%20web.pdf [Accessed 2 May 2013]

Brinca, P. (2000) Ocupação de panificação mostra força popular: LUAR assume-se como braço armado do povo [online]. **Diário da Região**. Available from: http://www.setubalnarede.pt/content/index.php?action=articlesDetailFo&rec=5124 [Accessed 10 January 2010]

Brockmeier, J. (2009) Reaching for meaning: human agency and the narrative imagination. **Theory & Psychology**, 19 (2): 213–233

Bruner, J. (1986) **Actual minds, possible worlds**. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Bruner, J. (1987) Life as narrative. **Social Research**, 54: 11-32

Cabrera, A. (2014) A memória e o esquecimento: a censura do Estado Novo em Portugal perante três peças de autores espanhóis [online]. **Revista Eletrónica de Teoria da Literatura e Literatura Comparada**, 10: 89–110. Available from: http://www.452f.com/pdf/numero10/10_452f-mono-ana-cabrera-orgnl.pdf [Accessed 7 April 2013]

Cardina, M. (2010) Política , punição e silenciamento nas oposições radicais ao Estado Novo [online]. **O Cabo dos Trabalhos: Revista Electrónica dos Programas de Mestrado e Doutoramento do CES/ FEUC/ FLUC**, 4: 1-16. Available from: http://cabodostrabalhos/ces.uc.pt/n4/ensaios.php [Accessed 5 May 2013]

Cardina, M. (2011) **Margem de certa maneira: o Maoismo em Portugal (1964-1974)**. Lisboa: Tinta da China

Carmo, I. (1974) A violência no processo revolucionário. **Revolução**, p. 6

Carmo, I. (2012) "As mulheres nas Brigadas Revolucionárias." In Lindim, I. (ed.) **Mulheres de armas: história das Brigadas Revolucionárias - as acções armadas, os riscos, as motivações**. Carnaxide: Editora Objectiva

Carvalho, L. (2009) **O movimento dos capitãos, o MFA e o 25 de Abril: do Marcelismo à queda do Estado Novo.** MA thesis, Universidade Lusófona de Humanidades e Tecnologias

De Cataldo Neuburger, L. and Valentini, T. (1996) **Women and terrorism**. New York: St. Martin's Press

Cerezales, D.P. (2003) Um caso de violência política : o "Verão quente". **Análise Social**, XXXVII (165): 1127–1157

Cerqueira, A. (2015) **Revolução e contra-revolução em Portugal (1974-1975)**. Lisboa: Parsifal

Chase, S. (2005) "Narrative inquiry. Multiple lenses, approaches, voices." In Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.) **The Sage handbook of qualitative research**. 3rd Edition. London: Sage

Chomsky, N. and Herman, E. (1979) **The political economy of human rights, Volume I: the Washington connection and third world fascism**. Nottingham: Spokesman

Cohler, B.J. (1982) “Personal narrative and life course.” In Baltes, P. and Brim, O.G. (eds.) **Life-span development and behaviour (Volume 4)**. New York, NY: Academic Press

Collotti, E. (1989) **Fascismo, fascismi**. Firenze: Sansoni

Colvin, S. (2009) **Ulrike Meinhof and West German terrorism: language, violence, and identity**. New York: Camden House

Cordes, B. (2001) “When terrorists do the talking: reflections on terrorist literature.” In Rapoport, D. (ed.) **Inside terrorist organizations**. 2nd Edition. London: Frank Cass & Co

Costa, J. (2004) **O terrorismo e as FP-25 anos depois**. Lisboa: Edições Colibri

Cox, R.W. (1986) “Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory.” In Keohane, R.O. (ed.) **Neorealism and its critics**. New York: Columbia University Press

Crelinsten, R. (2001) “The internal dynamics of the FLQ during the October crisis of 1970.” In Rapoport, D. (ed.) **Inside terrorist organizations**. 2nd Edition. London: Frank Cass & Co

Crenshaw, M. (2011) The causes of terrorism. **Comparative Politics**, 13 (4): 379–399

Cronin, A. (2009) “How terrorist campaigns end.” In Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (eds.) **Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective disengagement**. New York: Routledge

Cruzeiro, M. (2005) **25 de Novembro: quantos golpes afinal?** [online] Available from: http://www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/wikka.php?wakka=th10 [Accessed 28 June 2013]

Cruzeiro, M. and Bebiano, R. (2006) **Anos inquietos: vozes do movimento estudantil em Coimbra (1961-1974)**. Porto: Edições Afrontamento

Cunliffe, A. L. (2011) Crafting Qualitative Research: Morgan and Smircich 30 Years On. **Organizational Research Methods**, 14 (4): 647–673

Czarniawska, B. (2004) **Narratives in Social Science Research**. London: Sage

Dâmaso, E. (1997) **A invasão Spinolista**. Lisboa: Fenda

Davis, J. (2002) “Narrative and social movements: the power of stories.” In Davis, J. (ed.) **Stories of change: Narrative and Social Movements**. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. pp. 3-29

Denzin, N.K. (1989) **The research act**. 3rd Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall

Dingwall, R. (1980) Ethics and ethnography. **Sociological Review**, 28: 871–891

Dolnik, A. (2011) Conducting field research on terrorism: a brief primer. **Perspectives on Terrorism**, 5(2): 3-35

Dugos, C. (1976) **M.D.L.P. – E.L.P. – O que são?** Lisboa: Edições Acrópole, Lda

Eager, P. (2008) **From freedom fighters to terrorists: women and political violence**. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publications

Elder, G. (1994) Time, human agency and social change: perspectives on the life course. **Social Psychology Quarterly**, 57 (1): 4–15

English, R. (2003) **Armed struggle: the history of the IRA**. Oxford: Oxford University Press

English, R. (2006) **Irish freedom: the history of nationalism in Ireland**. London: Macmillan

English, R. (2009) **Terrorism: how to respond**. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Esin, C., Fathi, M. and Squire, C. (2013) "Narrative analysis: the constructionist approach." In Flick, U. (ed.) **The Sage handbook of qualitative data analysis**. London: Sage Publications

Expert Group on Violent Radicalization (2008) **Radicalisation processes leading to acts of terrorism** [online]. Available from: http://www.rikcoolsaet.be/files/art_ip_wz/Expert Group Report Violent Radicalisation FINAL.pdf [Accessed 30 June 2012]

Feldman, A. (1994) **Formations of violence: the narrative of the body and political terror in Northern Ireland**. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press

Ferguson, N., Burgess, M. and Hollywood, I. (2015) Leaving violence behind: disengaging from politically motivated violence in Northern Ireland. **Political Psychology**, 36 (2): 199–214

Ferreira, A. (2015) "Memória da luta armada durante os 40 anos de democracia." In Loff, M., Soutelo, L. and Piedade, F. (eds.) **Ditaduras e revolução: democracia e políticas da memória**. Coimbra: Almedina

Fine, M. (1992) **Disruptive voices: the possibilities for feminist research**. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press

Fink, N. and Hearne, E. (2008) **Beyond terrorism : deradicalization and disengagement from violent extremism** [online]. International Peace Institute. Available from: http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/beter.pdf [Accessed 30 April 2013]

Fonseca, T. (2005) **"Introdução" a livros proibidos no Estado Novo**. Lisboa: Divisão de Edições da Assembleia da República

Frank, A. (2010) **Letting stories breathe**. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Frank, A. (2012) "Practicing dialogical narrative analysis." In Holstein, J.A. and Gubrium, J.F. (eds.) **Varieties of narrative analysis**. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage

Franks, J. (2009) Rethinking the roots of terrorism: beyond orthodox terrorism theory—a critical research agenda. **Global Society**, 23 (2): 153–176

Freeman, M. (1993) **Rewriting the self: History, memory, narrative**. London: Routledge

Freeman, M. (2003) "Rethinking the fictive, reclaiming the real: Autobiography, narrative time, and the burden of truth." In Fireman, G., McVay, T. and Flanagan, O. (eds.) **Narrative and consciousness: Literature, psychology, and the brain**. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 115–128

Freeman, M. (2010) **Hindsight: The promise and peril of looking backward**. New York: Oxford University Press

Frus, P. (1994) **The Politics and Poetics of Journalistic Narrative: The Timely and the Timeless.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Gama, M. (2008) "Da censura à autocensura no Estado Novo." In Macedo, A. and Keating, A. (eds.) **IX Colóquio de Outono: Censura e Inter/dito**. Braga: Universidade do Minho

Garfinkel, R. (2007) **Personal Transformations: Moving from Violence to Peace** [online]. United States Institute of Peace. Available from: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr186.pdf [Accessed 30 November 2012]

Gentry, C. (2004) The relationship between new social movement theory and terrorism studies: the role of leadership, membership, ideology and gender. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 16 (2): 274–293

Gready, P. (2013) "The public life of narratives: ethics, politics, methods." In Andrews, M., Squire, C. and Tamboukou, M. (eds.) **Doing Narrative Research**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage. pp. 240–254

Mac Ginty, R. (2013) Look who's talking: terrorism, dialogue and conflict transformation. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 6 (1): 216–223

Gold-Biss, M. (1994) **The discourse on terrorism: political violence and subcommittee on security and terrorism 1981-1986**. New York: Peter Lang

Gomez-Cespedes, A. (1999) "Organised crime in Mexico." In Brookman, F., Noaks, L. and Wincup, E. (eds.) **Qualitative research in criminology**. Aldershot: Ashgate Publications

Goulart, P. (2002) **Resistência**. Lisboa: Edições Dinossauro

Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. (2005) "Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences." In Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.) **The Sage handbook of qualitative research**. 3rd Edition. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage

Gubrium, J.F. and Holstein, J.A. (1997) **The new language of qualitative method**. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press

Gunning, J. (2007) A case for critical terrorism studies ? **Government and Opposition**, 42 (3): 363–393

Gunning, J. (2009) "Social movement theory and the study of terrorism." In Jackson, R., Breen-Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds.) **Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda**. London: Routledge

Habermas, T. and Hatiboğlu, N. (2014) Contextualizing the self: the emergence of a biographical understanding in adolescence. **New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development**, (145): 29–41

Habermas, T. and Paha, C. (2001) The development of coherence in adolescents' life narratives. **Narrative Inquiry**, 11: 35–54

Habermas, T. and de Silveira, C. (2008) The development of global coherence in life narratives across adolescence: temporal, causal and thematic aspects. **Developmental Psychology**, 44: 707–721

Hamilton, C. (2007) The gender politics of political violence: women armed activists in ETA. **Feminist Review**, 86 (1): 132–148

Hammack, P.L. (2008) Narrative and the cultural psychology of identity. **Personality and Social Psychology Review**, 12 (3): 222–247

Hastings, A. (1973) **Wiriyamu**. London: Search Press

Heath-Kelly, C., Baker-Beall, C. and Jarvis, L. (2014) "Introduction: counter-radicalisation: critical perspectives." In Heath-Kelly, C., Baker-Beall, C. and Jarvis, L. (eds.) **Counter-radicalisation: critical perspectives**. Abingdon: Routledge

Hengudomsub, P. (2007) Resilience in later life. **Thai Pharmaceutical and Health Science Journal**, 2: 115-123

Herman, E. (1982) **The real terror network: terrorism in fact and propaganda**. Cambridge, MA: South End Press

Herman, E. and O'Sullivan, G. (1989) **The 'terrorisms' industry: the experts and institutions that shape our view of terror**. New York: Columbia University Press

Herring, E. (2008) Critical terrorism studies: an activist scholar perspective. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 1 (2): 197–211

Hoffman, B. (2006) **Inside terrorism**. New York: Columbia University Press

Hoffman, M. (1987) Critical theory and the inter-paradigm debate. **Millenium: Journal of International Studies**, 17 (1): 91–95

Hoffman, R. (1984) **Terrorism: a universal definition**. PhD Thesis, Claremont Graduate University

Holstein, J. A. and Gubrium, J. F. (2000) **The self we live by: Narrative identity in a postmodern world**. New York: Oxford University Press

Holstein, J.A. and Gubrium, J.F. (2004) "Context: working it up, down, and across." In Seale, C., Gobo, G., Gubrium, J.F., et al. (eds.) **Qualitative research practice**. London: Sage

Horgan, J. (2004) "The case for firsthand research." In Silke, A. (ed.) **Research on terrorism: trends achievements and failures**. London: Frank Cass & Co

Horgan, J. (2008) From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: perspectives from psychology on radicalization into terrorism. **The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science**, 618 (1): 80–94

Horgan, J. (2009a) "Individual disengagement: a psychological analysis." In Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (eds.) **Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective disengagement**. New York: Routledge

Horgan, J. (2009b) **Walking away from terrorism: accounts of disengagement from radical and extremist movements**. London: Routledge

Horgan, J. and Boyle, M. J. (2008) A case against critical terrorism studies. **Critical Stuides on Terrorism**, 1 (1): 55-64

Horkheimer, M. (1992) **Eclipse of reason**. New York: Continuum

Hortelão, R., Baêna, L. and Sousa, A. (2012) **Alpoim Calvão: honra e dever**. Porto: Caminhos Romanos

Hulsse, R. and Spencer, A. (2008) The metaphor of terror: terrorism studies and the constructivist turn. **Security Dialogue**, 39 (6): 571–592

Hundeide, K. (2003) Becoming a committed insider. **Culture & Psychology**, 9 (2): 107–127

Hydén, L. (2013) "Bodies, embodiment and stories." In Andrews, M., Squire, C. and Tamboukou, M. (eds.) **Doing narrative research**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage

Jackson, M. (2002) **The politics of storytelling: violence, transgression and intersubjectivity**. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press

Jackson, R. (2005) **Writing the war on terrorism: language, politics and counterterrorism**. Manchester: Manchester University Press

Jackson, R. (2007) The core commitments of critical terrorism studies. **European Political Science**, 6 (3): 244–251

Jackson, R. (2008) An Argument for Terrorism. **Perspectives on Terrorism**, II (2): 25–32

Jackson, R. (2009) "Critical Terrorism Studies : An Explanation , a Defence and a Way Forward." In **BISA Annual Conference. University of Leicester, Leicester, UK, 14-16 December 2009**

Jackson, R. (2015) "Towards critical peace research: lessons from critical terrorism studies." In Tellidis, I. and Toros, H. (eds.) **Researching terrorism, peace and conflict studies: interaction, synthesis and opposition**. London: Routledge

Jackson, R., Jarvis, L., Gunning, J. and Breen-Smyth, M. (2011) **Terrorism: a critical introduction**. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

Jäger, H. (1981) "Die Individuelle dimension terroristischen handelns." In Schmidtchen, G. and Süllwold, L. (eds.) **Lebenslaufanalysen**. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag

Jamieson, A. (1989) **The heart attacked**. New York: Marion Boyars

Jarvis, L. (2008) Times of terror: writing temporality into the war on terror. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 1(2): 245-262

Jarvis, L. (2009) The spaces and faces of critical terrorism studies. **Security Dialogue**, 40 (1): 5–27

Jenkins, B. (1980) **The study of terrorism: definitional problems**. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Jenkins, B. (2006) **The new age of terrorism**. Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Jones, R.L. (2002) "That"s very rude , i shouldn't be telling you that ': older women talking about sex. **Narrative Inquiry**, 12 (1): 121–143

Josselson, R. (2004) The hermeneutics of faith and the hermeneutics of suspicion. **Narrative Inquiry**, 14 (1): 1–28

Josselson, R. (2007) "The ethical attitude in narrative research: principles and practicalities." In Clandinin, D.J. (ed.) **Handbook of narrative inquiry**. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage Publications. pp. 537–566

Josselson, R. (2011) "Bet you think this song is about you": whose narrative is it in narrative research? **Narrative Works: Issues, Investigations & Interventions**, 1 (1): 33–51

Júnior, J. (1999) Bombas contra a guerra colonial. **Visão**, 313: 50–54

Kassimeris, G. (2013) **Inside Greek terrorism**. London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd

Kleinman, S. and Copp, M. (1993) **Emotions and fieldwork**. London: Sage

Kvale, S. (2006) Dominance through interviews and dialogues. **Qualitative Inquiry**, 12 (3): 480–500

Kvale, S. (2007) **Doing interviews**. London: Sage Publications

Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. (2009) **Interviews: learning the craft of qualitative research interviewing**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage Publications

Leach, E. (1977) **Custom, law and terroristic violence**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Leitão, F. and Pina, C. (1975) **LUAR: o que é?** Lisboa: Agência Portuguesa de Revistas

Lindim, I. (2012) **Mulheres de armas: história das Brigadas Revolucionárias - as acções armadas, os riscos, as motivações**. Carnaxide: Editora Objectiva

Loff, M. (2006) "Fim do colonialismo, ruptura política e transformação social em Portugal nos assos setenta." In Loff, M. and Pereira, M. da C.M. (eds.) **Portugal, 30 anos de democracia (1974-2004)**. Porto: Editora da UP

Loff, M. (2014) Dictatorship and revolution: socio-political reconstructions of collective memory in post-authoritarian Portugal. **Culture & History Digital Journal**, 3(2):1-13

Loff, M. (2015) “Estado, democracia e memória: políticas públicas da memória da ditadura portuguesa (1974-2004).” In Loff, M., Soutelo, L. and Piedade, F. (eds.) **Ditaduras e revolução: democracia e políticas da memória**. Coimbra: Almedina

López, A. (2002) “Youth in the 1990s and youth in the 1960s in Spain: intergenerational dialogue and struggle.” In Edmunds, J. and Turner, B. (eds.) **Generational consciousness, narrative, and politics**. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc

Lutz, J. M. (2010) A critical view of critical terrorism studies. **Perspectives on Terrorism**, 4 (6): 31-40

Mahan, S. and Griset, P. (2008) **Terrorism in perspective**. London: Sage

Mahmood, C. (1996) **Fighting for faith and nation: dialogues with Sikh militants**. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press

Mannheim, K. (1952) “The problem of generations.” In Kecskemet, P. (ed.) **Essays on the sociology of knowledge**. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

Marchi, R. (2012) A extrema-direita portuguesa na “Rua”: da transição à democracia (1976-1980). **Locus, Revista de História**, 18 (1):167-186

De Martini, J.R. (1992) Generational relationships and social movement participation. **Sociological Inquiry**, 62 (4): 450–463

Martins, J. and Loureiro, R. (1980) As organizações armadas em Portugal de 1967 a 1974. **História**, 18: 14–26

Mason, J. (2002) **Qualitative researching**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage

Matos, A. (2005) Nomes, siglas e casos para entender um ano decisivo [online]. **Diário de Notícias**. Available from: http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=620611&page=-1 [Accessed 3 March 2013]

Mattoso, J. (1994) **História de Portugal. O Estado Novo (1926-1974)**. Lisboa: Editorial Estampa

Maxwell, K. (1999) **A construção da democracia em Portugal**. Lisboa: Editorial Presença

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. (2001) **Dynamics of contention**. New York: Cambridge University Press

McAdams, D. (1993) **The stories we live by: personal myths and the making of the self**. New York: William Morrow

McAdams, D. (1996) “Narrating the self in adulthood.” In Birren, J., Kenyon, G., Ruth, J.-E., Schroots, J. and Svensson, T. (eds) **Aging and biography: Explorations in adult development**. New York: Springer. pp. 131–148

McAdams, D. (2001) **The person: an integrated introduction to personality psychology**. Third Edition. New York: Harcourt

McAdams, D. (2008) Personal narratives and the life story. In John, O., Robins, R. and Pervin, L. (eds.) **Handbook of personality: theory and research**. 3rd Edition. New York: Guilford Press

McAdams, D.P. and McLean, K.C. (2013) Narrative identity. **Current Directions in Psychological Science**, 22 (3): 233–238

McCauley, C. and Moskalenko, S. (2008) Mechanisms of political radicalization: pathways toward terrorism. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 20 (3): 415–433

McDonald, M. (2007) Emancipation and critical terrorism studies. **European Political Science**, 6(3): 252-259

McDonald, M. (2009) “Emancipation and critical terrorism studies.” In Jackson, R., Breen-Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds.) **Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda**. London: Routledge

Miller, R. (2000) **Researching life stories and family histories**. London: Sage

Miller, D. and Mills, T. (2009) The terror experts and the mainstream media: the expert nexus and its dominance in the news media. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 2 (3): 414–437

Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. (1980) The case for qualitative research. **Academy of Management Review**, 5 (4): 491–500

Mortágua, C. (2013) **Andanças para a liberdade. Volume II: 1961-1974**. Lisboa: Esfera do Caos

Moura, V. (1994) Portugal e o passado. **Diário de Notícias**. Sunday 10th April

Murphy, E. and Dingwall, R. (2002) “The ethics of ethnography.” In Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S., et al. (eds.) **Handbook of Ethnography**. London: Sage. pp. 339–351

Nacos, B. (2008) “The portrayal of female terrorists in the media: similar framing patterns in the news coverage of women in politics and in terrorism.” In Mahan, S. and Griset, P. (eds.) **Terrorism in perspective**. London: Sage Publications

Narciso, R. (2000) **A. R. A. - Acção Revolucionária Armada: a história secreta do braço armado do PCP**. Lisboa: Dom Quixote

Ness, C. (2008) **Female terrorism and militancy: agency, utility and organization**. London: Routledge

Nolte, E. (1966) **The three faces of fascism: Action Française, Italian fascism, National Socialism.** New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston

Nussbaum, M. (1997) **Cultivating humanity**. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Ochs, E. and Capps, L. (1996) Narrating the Self. **Annual Review of Anthropology**, 25 (1): 19–43

Oliveira, C. (1974) **Tarrafal: o pântano da morte**. Lisboa: Editorial República

Oliveira, C. (1990) "A evolução política." In Oliveira Marques, A. and Serrão, J. (eds.) **Nova história de Portugal. Volume XII. Portugal e o Estado Novo (1930-1960)**. Lisboa: Editorial Presença

Oliveira, C. (1993) **Os anos decisivos, Portugal 1962-1985: um testemunho**. Lisboa: Editorial Presença

Oliveira, G. (1987) **Memória viva do Tarrafal**. Lisboa: Edições Avante!

Oliveira, Z. (2012) **Os 63 dias que abalaram o Estado Novo: incursão histórica à crise terminal do regime.** MA thesis, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Oliverio, A. (1998) **The state of terror**. Albany: State University of New York Press

Patai, D. (1991) "US academics and Third World women: is ethical research possible?" In Gluck, S. and Patai, D. (eds.) **Women's Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History**. New York: Routledge. pp. 137–153

Pereira, J.P. (2013) **As armas de papel: publicações periódicas clandestinas e do exílio ligadas a movimentos radicais de esquerda cultural e política (1963-1974)**. Lisboa: Temas e Debates - Círculo de Leitores

Phoenix, A. (2008) "Analyzing narrative contexts." In Andrews, M., Squire, C. and Tamboukou, M. (eds.) **Doing narrative research**. London: Sage Publications. pp. 64–77

Pimentel, I. (2007) "A tortura." In Madeira, J. and Farinha, L. (eds.) **Estado Novo e violência política**. Lisboa: A Esfera dos Livros

Pimentel, I. (2009) **Alguns dados sobre o campo de concentração do Tarrafal** [online]. Available from: http://caminhosdamemoria.wordpress.com/2009/05/13/alguns-dados-sobre-o-campo-de-concentracao-do-tarrafal-1/ [Accessed 4 November 2014]

Pimentel, I. (2011a) A polícia política do Estado Novo Português – PIDE/DGS: história, justiça e memória. **Acervo**, 24 (1): 139–156

Pimentel, I. (2011b) "Prefácio." In Hipólito Santos, J. (ed.) **Felizmente houve a LUAR**. Lisboa: Editora Âncora

Pimentel, I. (2014) **História da oposição à ditadura Portugesa: 1926-1974**. Porto: Figueirinhas

Pinto, C. and Rosas, M. (2009) **O tempo da história**. Lisboa: Porto Editora

Pinto, D. (2010) **Ensaio sobre a evolução política do Estado Novo**. MA thesis, Universidade Fernando Pessoa

Plummer, K. (2002) "The call of life stories in ethnographic research." In Atkinson, P., Coffey, A., Delamont, S., Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. (eds.) **Handbook of ethnography**. London: Sage

Plummer, K. (2017) "Narrative power, sexual stories and the politics of story telling." In Goodson, I., Antikaunen, A., Sikes, P. and Andrews, M. (eds.) **The Routledge international handbook on life history and narratives**. London: Routledge

Polkinghorne, D. (1988) **Narrative knowing and the human sciences**. New York: State University of New York Press

Polletta, F. (2006). **It was like a fever: Storytelling in protest and politics**. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Della Porta, D. (1992) "On individual motivations in underground political organizations." In della Porta, D. (ed.) **Social movements and violence: participation in underground organizations**. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited. pp. 3–28

Della Porta, D. (1995) **Social movements, political violence and the state**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Della Porta, D. (2009) **Social Movement Studies and Political Violence** [online]. Available from: http://cir.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdf-filer/Hæfte_4_Donatella.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2015]

Della Porta, D. (2013) **Clandestine political violence**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Raby, D. (1988) **A resistência antifascista em Portugal: comunistas, democratas e militares em oposição a Salazar, 1941-1974**. Lisboa: Editora Salamandra

Ramsay, G. (2015) Why terrorism can, but should not be defined. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 8 (2): 211–228

Randall, W. and Phoenix, C. (2009) The problem with truth in qualitative interviews: reflections from a narrative perspective. **Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercice**, 1(2): 125-140

Randall, W. (2010) The narrative complexity of our past: in praise of memory's sins. **Theory & Psychology**, 20(2): 147-169

Randall, W. (2012) Positive aging through reading our lives: on the poetics of growing old. **Psychological studies**, 57(2), 172-178

Randall, W. (2013) The importance of being ironic: Narrative openness and personal resilience in later life. **Gerontologist**, 53(1): 9-16

Rashwan, D. (2009) "The renunciation of violence by Egyptian jihadi organizations." In Bjørgo, T. and Horgan, J. (eds.) **Leaving terrorism behind: individual and collective disengagement**. New York: Routledge

Ray, R. (2000) **Beyond nostalgia: aging and life-story writing**. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia

Reinares, F. (2011) Exit from terrorism: a qualitative empirical study on disengagement and deradicalization among members of ETA. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 23 (5): 780–803

Renzetti, C. and Lee, R. (1993) **Researching sensitive topics**. Newbury Park: Sage

Rezola, M. (2007) **25 de Abril: mitos de uma revolução**. Lisboa: Esfera dos Livros

Rice, J. S. (2002) "Getting our stories straight: culture, narrative, and identity in the self-help movement." In Davis, J. (ed.) **Stories of change: Narrative and Social Movements**. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. pp. 79-99

Richardson, L. (2000) "Writing: a method of inquiry." In N. Denzin, and Y. Lincoln (eds.) **Handbook of qualitative research**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage. pp. 923–948

Ricoeur, P. (1981) **Hermeneutics and the human sciences: essays on language, action and interpretation.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ricoeur, P. (1984) **Time and narrative**. Volume 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press

Ricoeur, P. (1992) **Oneself as Another**. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Ricoeur, P. (1996) "Reflections on a new ethos for Europe." In Kearney, R. (ed.) **Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action**. London: Sage. pp. 3-13

Riessman, C. (2008) **Narrative methods for the human sciences**. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage Publications

Robben, A. (1995) "The politics of truth and emotion among victims and perpetrators of violence." In Nordstrom, C. and Robben, A. (eds.) **Fieldwork under fire: contemporary studies of violence and survival**. California: California University Press. pp. 81–103

Robben, A. and Nordstrom, C. (1995) "The antropology and ethnography of violence and sociopolitical conflict." In Nordstrom, C. and Robben, A. (eds.) **Fieldwork under fire: contemporary studies of violence and survival**. Berkeley: University of California Press

Rosas, F. (1992) "As grandes linhas da evolução institucional." In Serrão, J. and Oliveira Marques, A. (eds.) **Nova história de Portugal, vol. XII, Portugal e o Estado Novo 1930-1960**. Lisboa: Editorial Presença

Rosas, F. (2001) O salazarismo e o homem novo: Ensaio sobre o Estado Novo e a quest??o do totalitarismo. **Análise Social**, 35 (157): 1031–1054

Rosas, F. and Brito, J. (1996) **Dicionário de história do Estado Novo**. Vendas Nova: Bertrand Editora

Rubin, D. (1996) "Introduction." In Rubin, D. (ed.) **Remembering our past: Studies in autobiographical memory**. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1–15

Salazar, A. (1936) "As grandes certezas da revolução nacional." In **Discursos e notas políticas (1935-1937) Volume II**. 5th Edition. Coimbra: Coimbra Editora

Santos, J. (2011) **Felizmente houve a LUAR**. Lisboa: Editora Âncora

Saraiva, J. (1993) **História de Portugal**. Mem Martins: Publicações Europa América

Sarbin, T. (1986) "The narrative as root metaphor for psychology." In Sarbin, T. (ed.) **Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct**. New York: Praeger

Schacter, D. (1996) **Searching for memory: The brain, the mind, and the past**. New York: Basic Books

Schmid, A. (2004) Terrorism: the difenitional problem. **Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law**, 36 (375): 375–420

Schmid, A. and Jongman, A. (1988) **Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories and literature**. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishers Company

Serra, J. (1999) **As explosões que abalaram o fascismo: o que foi a ARA**. Lisboa: Edições Avante!

Selbin, E. (2010) **Revolution, rebellion, resistance: the power of story**. London: Zed Books

Silke, A. (2001) The devil you know : continuing problems with research on terrorism. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 13 (4): 1–14

Silva, D. (2000) **A ética da resistência: os exilados anti-salazaristas do "Portugal Democrático" (1956-1975)**. Universidade de Campinas

Da Silva, R. (2010) **O envolvimento na luta armada política em Portugal : a perspectiva dos seus actores**. MA thesis, Universidade do Minho

Simons, H. (2009) **Case study: research in practice**. London: Sage

Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. (2007) **Mothers, monsters, whores: women's violence in global politics**. London: Zed

Sluka, J. (1989) **Hearts and minds, water and fish: support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish ghetto**. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press

Sluka, J. (2009) "The contribution of anthropology to critical terrorism studies." In Jackson, R., Breen-Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds.) **Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda**. London: Routledge

Smith, B. (2013) Disability, sport and men's narratives of health: a qualitative study. **Health psychology**, 32 (1): 110–9

Smith, B. (in press) "Narrative analysis." In Lyons, E. and Coyle, A. (eds.) **Analysing qualitative data in psychology**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage Publications

Smith, B., and Caddick, N. (2012) Qualitative methods in sport: a concise overview for guiding social scientific sport research. **Asia Pacific Journal of Sport and Social Science**, 1:60-73

Smith, J., and Deemer, D. (2000) "The problem of criteria in the age of relativism." In N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds.) **Handbook of qualitative research**. 2nd Edition. London: Sage. pp. 877-896

Soares, M. (1994) A superioridade moral da democracia. **Público**. Friday 22nd April

Somers, M. (1992) Narrativity, narrative identity, and social action: rethinking english working-class formation. **Social Science History**, 16(4): 591-630

Somers, M. (1994) The narrative construction of identity: a relational and network approach. **Theory and Society**, 23: 605-649

Somers, M. (1997) "Deconstructing and reconstructing class formation theory: narrativity, relational analysis, and social theory." In Hall, J. (ed.) **Reworking class**. Ithaca NY and London: Cornell University Press. pp. 73-105

Somers, M. and Gibson, G. (1994) "Reclaiming the epistemological 'other': narrative and the social constitution of identity." In Calhoun, C. (ed.) **Social theory and the politics of identity**. Cambridge MA and Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 37-99

Sousa, J. (2006) **Os movimentos de libertação face à perspectiva de uma revolução em Portugal ainda nos anos 60** [online]. Available from: http://www1.ci.uc.pt/cd25a/wikka.php?wakka=th9 [Accessed 25 November 2014]

Sousa, M. (1992) **Guerrilha no asfalto: as FP-25 e o tempo português**. Lisboa: Fora do Texto

Spalek, B. (2008) Muslim communities post-9/11 – citizenship, security and social justice. **International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice**, 36 (4): 211–214

Sparkes, A. and Smith, B. (2008) "Narrative constructionist inquiry." In Holstein, J. and Gubrium, J. (eds.) **Handbook of constructionist research**. London: Guilford Publications

Sparkes, A. (2002) **Telling tales in sport and physical activity: a qualitative journey**. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics Press

Sparkes, A. and Smith, B. (2014) **Qualitative research methods in sport, exercise and health: from process to product**. London: Routledge

Sparkes, A. C., Smith, B., and Caddick, N. (2014) "Judging qualitative research." In L. Nelson, R. Groom and P. Potrac (eds.) **Research methods in sports coaching**. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 192-201

Spector-Mersel, G. (2010) Narrative research: time for a paradigm shift. **Narrative Inquiry**, 20 (1): 204–224

Spence, D. (1982) **Narrative truth and historical truth: meaning and interpretation in psychoanalysis**. New York: W. W. Norton

Spínola, A. (1974) **Portugal e o futuro**. 2nd Edition. Lisboa: Arcádia

Stark, L. and Hedgecoe, A. (2004) “A practical guide to research ethics.” In Bourgeault, I., Dingwall, R. and De Vries, R. (eds.) **The Sage handbook of qualitative methods in health research**. London: Sage Publications

Van Stekelenburg, J. and Klandermans, B. (2013) The Social Psychology of Protest. **Current Sociology**, 61:886-905

Stern, J. (1999) **The ultimate terrorists**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Stohl, M. (2008) Old myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities of terrorism. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 1 (1): 5–16

Stokes, D. (2005) **America’s other war: terrorising Colombia**. London: Zed Books

Sugarman, L. (2001) **Life-span development: frameworks, accounts and strategies**. 2nd Edition. New York: Taylor and Francis

Sylvester, C. and Parashar, S. (2009) “The contemporary “Mahabharata” and the many “Draupadis”: bringing gender to critical terrorism studies.” In Jackson, R., Gunning, J. and Breen Smyth, M. (eds.) **Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda**. Abingdon: Routledge.

Tamboukou, M. (2003) **Women, education, and the self: a foucauldian perspective**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Tamboukou, M. (2008) “A Foucauldian approach to narratives.” In Andrews, M., Squire, C. and Tamboukou, M. (eds.) **Doing narrative research**. London: Sage Publications.

Taylor, M. and Horgan, J. (2012) “A conceptual framework for addressing psychological process in the development of the terrorists.” In Horgan, J. and Braddock, K. (eds.) **Terrorism studies: a reader**. London: Routledge

Taylor, S. (2012) ’One participant said…’: the implications of quotations from biographical talk. **Qualitative Research**, 12 (4): 388–401

Temple, B. (2005) **Nice and tidy: translation and representation**. [online]. Available from: http://www.socresonline.org.uk/10/2/temple.html [Accessed 21 August 2015]

Thompson, P. (2014) **Armed groups: the 21st century threat**. London: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc

Tololyan, K. (2001) “Cultural narrative and the motivation of the terrorist.” In Rapoport, D. (ed.) **Inside terrorist organizations**. 2nd Edition. London: Frank Cass & Co

Toros, H. (2008) `We don’t negotiate with terrorists!': legitimacy and complexity in terrorist conflicts. **Security Dialogue**, 39 (4): 407–426

Toros, H. (2012) **Terrorism, talking and transformation: a critical approach**. Abingdon: Routledge

Toros, H. and Gunning, J. (2009) "Exploring a critical theory approach to terrorism studies." In Jackson, R., Breen-Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds.) **Critical terrorism studies: a new research agenda**. London: Routledge

Townshend, C. (1983) **Political violence in Ireland: government and resistance since 1948**. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Townshend, C. (2002) **Terrorism: a short introduction**. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Tschuggnall, K. and Welzer, H. (2002) Rewriting memories: family recollections of the national socialist past in germany. **Culture & Psychology**, 8 (1): 130–145

Turk, A.T. (2004) Sociology of terrorism. **Annual Review of Sociology**, 30 (1): 271–286.

Ventura, J. and Nascimento, J. (2001) Violência, terrorismo e psicologia: uma abordagem exploratória. **Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Criminal**, 4: 633–698

Vidino, L. (2011) The Buccinasco Pentiti: a unique case study of radicalization. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 23(3):398-418

Vilela, A. (2005) **Viver e morrer em nome das FP-25**. Lisboa: Casa das Letras

Wang, Q. and Brockmeier, J. (2002) Autobiographical remembering as cultural practice: understanding the interplay between memory, self and culture. **Culture & Psychology**, 8 (1): 45–64

Weinberg, L., Pedahzur, A. and Hirsch-Hoefler, S. (2004) The challenges of conceptualizing terrorism. **Terrorism and Political Violence**, 16 (4): 777–794

Whitebrook, M. (2001) **Identity, narrative and politics**. London and New York: Routledge

Wilkinson, P. (1986) **Terrorism and the liberal state**. New York: New York University Press

Wolf, M. (1996) "Afterword: musing from an old gray wolf." In Wolf, D. (ed.) **Feminist Dilemmas in Filedwork**. Oxford: Westview Press. pp. 215–221

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) **Gender and nation**. London: Sage

Yuval-Davis, N. (2006) Belonging and the politics of belonging. **Patterns of Prejudice**, 40(3): 197–214

Zulaika, J. (1988) **Basque violence: metaphor and sacrament**. Reno, NA: University of Nevada Press

Zulaika, J. and Douglass, W. (1996) **Terror and taboo: the follies, fables and faces of terrorism**. London: Routledge

Zulaika, J. and Douglass, W. a. (2008) The terrorist subject: terrorism studies and the absent subjectivity. **Critical Studies on Terrorism**, 1 (1): 27–36.

Zwerman, G., Steinhoff, P.G. and Porta, D. (2000) Disappearing social movements: clandestinity in the cycle of new left protest in the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Italy. **Mobilization: An International Journal**, 5 (1): 85–104