POLITICAL MUSIC GENRES IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA, 1960-2013

by

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Abstract

This thesis attempts an intervention in popular music classification. It argues that popular musicians do not only choose the titles to their works, but go further to define the genres of these works. The dynamic at play is such that most popular musicians claim to produce works of different and new genres with each new work they create. By engaging with the works of a selection of Nigerian popular musicians, the thesis demonstrates that the disorderliness in popular music branding can be restricted. Through a critical discourse analysis of the textual elements of the material and of 'alternative' audience contributions, the thesis advocates a new genre of popular music, namely the genre of 'political music'. This distinctive genre is extractable from the otherwise conventional genres of popular music, and is composed of three comprehensible subgenres namely protest political music, unity political music and terrestrial praise political music. The investigation further shows how politicians attempt to co-opt popular musicians in Nigeria, and how certain musicians attempt to have it both ways, retaining their credibility as rebels while also singing politicians' praises - and how the political slant of the music can be tagged to particular moments in the electoral cycle. The study's selection is made of popular music material from hip hop, reggae, afro-beat, and juju genres. They are delivered in popular Nigerian languages ranging between Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, English and Pidgin English.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A discovery of this study has been the unravelling of Nigerian popular music as an incredibly dynamic terrain. Karin Barber denounces the notion that some works of popular arts are political while others aren't, insisting that 'we respect and pay attention to [the] very conservatism and misogyny' of the 'people's arts' 'if we are to understand why and how people collaborate in their own oppression' (1987: 7). To this extent, any afrobeat, hip-hop, reggae, R&B, love, wedding, motivational, or lamenting song may very well be a political song. However, the postmodern condition is such that the mass media and indeed music industries across the world have laboured to no avail to distinguish popular musicians and their works from one another in terms of genres. The indistinct, overlapping, yet inconsistent sounds of most popular musicians tend to make this cumbersome. Some of these popular musicians have in turn taken advantage of the confusion to the extent that there are now those who proclaim their own names prefixing '-music' as the genre of music they make when asked. It thus behoves questioning why it is the responsibility of popular musicians to define the genre of popular music they believe they produce. This research argues against the disorderliness in popular music branding, and consequently advocates a genre of 'political music'.

Barber cites the liberation wars in Eastern Africa, the Mau Mau songs from Kenya, the Chimurenga songs from Zimbabwe, and the songs and poetry from Mozambique; as instances across Africa wherein the radical art instigated by highly conscious cadres seeking to mobilize the ordinary people, was appropriated by the latter 'and made…part of their own repertoire' (1987: 7). Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, the founder of the Afro-beat genre of music,

in a conversation with Gary Stewart said: "…I don't want to make African music a fashion. I just want people to know African music as African music, full stop, because African music is so diverse. So to call it afro-beat is retrogressive in a way if it's gonna be serious…" (Stewart, 1992: 121) The fluidity of popular musicians' genres has been an accepted practice for several decades. A good number of popular musicians in Nigeria have since imbibed this instruction on the flexibility of African music and are defining the genres of their art as genre-specificities continue to matter less. A profile on Sound Sultan, one of contemporary Nigeria's better known conscious musicians reads: '[Sound Sultan] believes that genre isn't a criterion for judging an artist, rather the form of message that is conveyed in the music is what matters' (All Nigeria Info, 2015). Oftentimes, it is a specific work that determines its own genre. These popular musicians are hardly categorised within the framework of a specific genre of music since his/her next work could be of a far-fetched genre to his/her last or present works. Whereas this flexibility of the genre to which an artist belongs could be considered harmless and in fact progressive, this thesis argues that it cannot be the prerogative of popular musicians to assign genre-tags to the works they produce let alone to themselves.

The indiscriminate appropriation of genres by these popular musicians has triggered disorderliness in popular music classification. In Nigeria, the scenario is typified by appraising a cross-section of contemporary popular musicians: Innocent Ujah Idibia (better known as Tuface) is an A-list Nigerian popular musician. He has described his genre specialty as 'R&B' which is his short for 'Reggae & Blues'. Alfred Inetimi Odon (otherwise known as Timaya) is another A-list Nigerian popular musician. Timaya has termed his art as 'Timaya music'. Oladapo Daniel Oyebanjo (better known as D'banj) is yet another. D'banj is on record to have described his genre inclination to be 'Afropean' – a fusion of African and

European elements. The works of David Adeleke (also known as Davido) have dominated the airwaves in the African continent for a few years. Whereas he rose to fame as an essentially 'Afro hip-hop' artist, he released a single to the accompaniment of his twenty-second birthday celebrations which he termed 'an Afro-house single' in advance. It is seen that the foregoing genres are as diverse and multiple as the works and labels of the popular musicians named.

Following an MA programme in Communication, Culture, and Media wherein my dissertation was 'an analysis of the effects - on the electorate - of the novel television debates at the 2010 United Kingdom general elections in the West Midlands County'; I was struck soon afterwards by the distinct nature of Nigerian popular culture and the unique schedule of popular culture producers in the run-up to Nigeria's 2011 general elections. It dawned on me that it was possible to equate the 'television debates' preceding the UK general elections to the 'produce of popular culture' preceding and accompanying the general elections in Nigeria. In the end, these two were both seasonal. As such, I wrote a proposal to engage with the unique culture and cultural produce in election seasons in Nigeria titled 'Popular culture in electoral Nigeria: a gaze into the Fourth Republic' (2011).

Over the past four years, however, studies have informed that the initial proposal's music component comes within the purview of only a third of the political music genre; a genre which this study advocates for its robust coverage and meaningfulness. The study's primary mission is to initiate some order in the presently disorderly system of popular music classification. There has been an over-reliance on sound in the appropriation of titles for naming genres. This thesis aims to curb the classification haemorrhage that popular music presently faces by insisting on a more critical rationale for appropriating genres. It proposes

a distinct and comprehensible genre of 'political music' which is extractable by paying attention to the texts and contexts of popular music by aid of a politically disposed and astute variant of critical discourse analysis.

1.1 Background to Study: Conceptual Definitions, Adaptations and Literature Review

Barber (1987) alerts her readers to the possibility of discussing "popular arts genre by genre, region by region" (Barber, 1987: 25). She adds that "a comparative approach to the popular arts might start from a consideration of the precise ways in which tradition provides underlying parameters for popular creativity in different cultures" (Barber, 1987: 39). Precisely because there has been a lot of disagreement in the abiding debate of what constitutes what, and what doesn't; it is necessary to include in this background a few thoughts and operational appropriations as adopted by the present study.

A scrutiny of existing literature on colonial struggle music in Africa readily reveals that the abundance of the art in the southern region of the continent is starkly contrasted by a dearth of similar material in the subject of this thesis – Nigeria. In order to properly situate this observation, it is essential to be imbued with some notions from the revolutionary French-Algerian psychiatrist, Frantz Fanon (1925–1961). In his influential manifesto on decolonization, *The Wretched of the Earth* (a title derived from the opening lyrics of the Left Wing 19th century anthem, *The Internationale*), Fanon offers what is in effect a standard staple for understanding how former colonies differ from one another as post-colonies depending on the 'violence' or the 'negotiations' with which the transition from colony to post-colony had transpired.

On the efficacy of violence, Fanon posits;

> Colonialism only loosens its hold when the knife is at its throat… colonialism is not a machine capable of thinking, a body endowed with reason. It is naked violence and only gives in when confronted with greater violence (Fanon, 1961: 23).

On negotiations, Fanon's irritability is palpable:

> From the negotiating table emerges then the political agenda that authorizes Monsieur M'ba, president of the Republic of Gabon, to very solemnly declare on his arrival for an official visit to Paris: "Gabon is an independent country, but nothing has changed between Gabon and France, the status quo continues." In fact the only change is that Monsieur M'ba is president of the Republic of Gabon, and he is the guest of the president of the French Republic (*ibid*.: 28).

Very easily and quite accurately, Nigeria and Britain could respectively substitute Gabon and France within Fanon's foregoing submissions. Ditto Nnamdi Azikiwe in place of Monsieur M'ba. It is perhaps no coincidence that Gabon, like Nigeria, is a West African nation. The key point to be made is that, in Fanon's understanding, non-violent approaches to undoing an otherwise violent colonialism never resulted in a generally beneficial and authentic decolonization because colonialism is only made possible through extreme violence and intimidation. Fanon ridicules the notion of formal independence *granted* through peaceful handovers: Negotiation is no substitute for capitulation, and does not bring about effective decolonization. Indeed, the philosopher observes that the only elements of colonization that change as a result of the negotiating table are formalities.

As is seen, Gabon gained a black, national-bourgeois president who was thereafter received as the guest of the president of French Republic; but within Gabon the status quo realized under French colonialism continued (*ibid.*). In climes as these, the national bourgeoisie rather than pursue effective decolonization wished to gain access to the wealth and social status that had previously been commandeered by the colonists. The bourgeoisie

was preoccupied with draining the peasant masses and natural resources for their selfish benefit just as the colonizers did (Fanon, 1961: 53). This socio-economic imperative of the national bourgeoisie, who founded the political parties from where the country's future leaders and those that negotiated the terms of decolonization with the colonists sprang, prevents them from supporting a violent insurrection. The chants and melodies of struggle music which ought to accompany violent insurrection are thus absent. Considering the extremely peaceful nature of Nigeria's assumption of an 'independent state' from Britain, it is little wonder literature on colonial struggle music in Nigeria is as meagre as they come.

That was to change following independence as Nigeria's national bourgeoisie and their military accomplices began to implode. In just seven years of self-governance, a civil war materialized. The non-violent decolonization was taking its toll as the colonial Frankenstein unleashed violence on its people. Fanon's position is echoed by Odumegwu Ojukwu, leader of the Biafran forces which moved for secession thus necessitating the civil war. In the Ahiara declaration – a speech he delivered on June 1, 1969 – Ojukwu managed to revisit some of the flaws of Nigeria's decolonization thus:

> Nigeria was a classic example of a neo-colonialist state…The militant nationalism of the late forties and early fifties had caught the British imperialists unawares. They hurried to accommodate it by installing the ignorant, decadent and feudalistic Hausa-Fulani oligarchy in power. For the British, the credentials of the Hausa-Fulani were that not having emerged from the Middle Ages they knew nothing about the modern state and the powerful forces that now rule men's minds. Owing their position to the British, they were servile and submissive. The result was that while Nigerians lived in the illusion of independence, they were still in fact being ruled from Number 10 Downing Street. The British still enjoyed a stranglehold on their economy (Ojukwu, 1969).

One must refrain from digressing, lest the political music concern of the thesis is obfuscated. The civil war ended in 1970, but self-rule continued to overwhelm Nigeria. Then, there was

protest political music, but only long after other genres of music. It should be noted that whereas Fela Anikulapo-Kuti is considered the pioneer of protest political music in Nigeria, he only took to political music through a unity political song 'Viva Nigeria'.

> The politics of popular culture...can only be understood in conjunction with some account of how it animates feelings and thoughts. One way to think about this is to consider how popular culture becomes part of an identity. After all, identity is the key factor in culture's politics [:] the identity being appealed to by nationalism (Street, 2004: 310)

The confusion over what constitutes 'popular' in global communications may be ordered by a happy consensus to understand 'popular' as 'national'. I cite a vivid illustration: A 59-year-old aunt asked me on an impromptu appearance at her Lagos home: "So Garhe tell me, what is your research about?" [Observe her role as interviewer as against interviewee]. And after I inform her in summary appropriating 'popular' in classification, she responds: "...But it depends on what you mean and who you are asking. For instance, what is popular to me isn't what is popular to my children…" (RP[1] family, February 2014). After all, "to study popular culture we must first confront the difficulty posed by the term itself...popular culture is in *effect* an empty conceptual category, one which can be filled in a wide variety of often conflicting ways, depending on the context of use (Storey, 2006: 1). The emptiness of this conceptual category is certainly of little utilitarian value. Nationalism offers a truly attractive application of basic popular culture so much so that for each of the protest, unity, and terrestrial praise political music subgenres, nationalism may be appropriated.

Read this way, the links between cultural realities and 'identities' of subcultures as subcultures, and of music as music genres unravel. 'Subculture as subculture' represents the

[1] Note that this thesis identifies the interviewees and audience contributors as Research Participants (RPs). Labelled between RP1 and RP20, there are also characterized RPs. For example: RP family, RP feminist, RP academic, and RP politician etc.

idea of a peopled and moveable group occurring in space and at a specific point in time – history. 'Music as music genre or music subgenre', on the other hand, is the liberal yet ordered classification, even to the extent of the genre known as 'electoral music genre', as with 'Christmas music genre', 'valentine music genre' etc. Evaluating how these associate with the effects of the consciousness of these events or dates on the identity of the music makers and users at the corresponding points in time presents an excellent medium through which that specific culture and its history can be studied. It becomes apparent how 'national, 'nationality' and 'nationalism' may equate to 'popular', 'popularity' and '*popularism*' respectively.

Most scholars on Nigeria's popular music have ascribed two major line of influences on the development of modern popular music in Nigeria: The Islamic influence and the Christian influence (Euba 1989, Omojola 1995, Waterman 1990, Barber and Waterman 1995, Adeogun 2006). While the effects of Christianity have aided the formulation of a musical idiom like jùjú that greatly borrowed from church music among other forms of sycretism, the Islamic influence resulted in the birth of fújì music that came out of the Muslim wéré or ajísààrì music.

1.1.1 Political Music: Delineating a Genre

Drawing from the culture industry perspective of Barber *et al*. (1997): "Popular is what is produced and/or consumed by the people as opposed to the wealthy and well educated elites" (xviii); Adewale Adedeji defines popular music as that "which is produced, packaged and targeted for the consumption of the generality of the people, the common man or woman in the urban setting, which by extension reflects the consumer's daily life, and concerns as well as fulfilling their cravings for pleasure and entertainment" (Adedeji, 2010:

38). The foregoing definitions are limited to the extent that the term 'popular' cannot correctly exclude the wealthy and well-educated masses, at least not in contemporary Nigeria. Equally problematic is Adedeji's compulsive appropriation of the term 'urban setting' which is misleading to say the least. Might one then understand 'popular music' to connote an exclusively urban culture?

There are several communities – termed 'rural' within present-day Nigeria for example - where there is a vibrant following of the very corpus of music that thrive in the urban areas. It is perhaps because of these limitations that Adedeji soon offers a revised definition of popular music as proffered by Omibiyi (1981: 151-152) thus: "music which is widely accepted and commonly liked by the masses while its popular acceptance is usually overtly demonstrated by large scale participation. It is usually created specifically for commercial purposes but with the objective of providing entertainment" (Adedeji, 2010: 38-39). At any rate, the masses referred to in the abovementioned definition may not be restricted to those in the urban areas. The popular music corpus that the present study analyses in order to illustrate the arguments thus explore the research questions, are those that are not only widely accepted and commercially successfully, but those with at least a national i.e. inter-state reach.

Barber's model (1987: 13) advocates that modern popular music has the capacity to transcend geographical, ethnic, and even national boundaries. This popular music exploits technological advancement and has been transmitted by radio, television, record, cassette tape, compact discs, digitally as well as through the World Wide Web. In the application of this thesis, 'popular culture' subsumes mass and oppositional cultures which have appropriated various technologies towards commercialization.




Figure 1.1: A chart for the political music genre of popular music showing the three subgenres

Ekeh (1975) begins his 'Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa' with an operational definition of politics as "…the activities of individuals insofar as they impinge on the public realm made up of the collective interests of the citizenry…The distinction between the private realm and the public realm delimits the scope of politics. Not all the everyday activities of an individual are political. To the extent that he acts in his household or practices his religion in his home, he is acting in the private realm" (*ibid*: 91). It is essential to note that nowhere is mention made of the musical component of the colonial struggle in Ekeh's context of Nigeria.

It is beneficial to contrast Ekeh's forty-year-old definition with a contemporary definition, perhaps of a western orientation. Aristotle described man as a political animal by nature. Drawing from Aristotle, Heywood (2007) offered that "politics is the activity through which people make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live" (Heywood, 2007: 4). The obvious contradiction between Ekeh's and Heywood's positions lie

in the fact that people do in fact 'make, preserve and amend the general rules under which they live' through activities that merely 'impinge on the private realm'. What is political is therefore subject to contexts and operationalized appropriations at different points in time. Indeed, a love song could very well be a political song.

For the purposes of this study, a political song is defined as a song concerned with or targeted at the state. The mass communication of such a song ensures that it impinges on the public realm, and as such it is political to the song maker and to the song's audiences, their position on the song notwithstanding. Over time, several scholars have made seminal contributions towards the understanding of popular music and popular songs. It is essential to note that this study defines a song as the written and spoken text of music which is the arranged overall outcome. As such confusion over the sameness or differences of 'song' and 'music' need not arise.

One of the scholars who have written on 'music' is Lydia Goehr who in 1994 published an extensive article titled 'Political music and the politics of music'. Goehr's extensive critique centres on Hanns Eisler; indeed, on the composer's conviction of 'music as inseparable from politics' (Goehr, 1994: 99). The composer of East Germany's national anthem famously wrote that "The history of music will be written by Marxists…and whoever does not understand that, is a blockhead" (Eisler, in *ibid*.: 100: 'A Rebel in music', 1978: 197).

Goehr writes that Eisler condemned the view that music be used like a narcotic, offered to audiences to produce "effects." Instead, music should transform the consciousness of an active community of people. By rejecting the traditional format of the concert, insisting that performers did beyond interpreting music to which listeners became participatory audiences, Eisler was to transform the bourgeois musical concert into a

political meeting. Having experimented with new media and technology in order to produce 'useful' music accessible to every level of society, Eisler maintained that his development of a truly political music required the purification of musical language for, otherwise, truth would be in danger of succumbing to ideology. Truthful and sincere communication is the essential function of music. Truthful music hides neither behind ornament and complexity, nor behind a denial of the political. In his defence at the 1974 hearing of the Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Eisler offered that "I made no objection if somebody wanted to play my music" (Goehr, 1994: 100). He claimed that he was responsible only for the music and could not be blamed for the words; which weren't his words: 'this is poetry, not reality' he had said.

Goehr further submits that "to understand music in all its dimensions…it no longer suffices to analyse the form and content of musical works in isolation; we must investigate as well the institutional context in which the composition, performance, and reception, the production, exchange, and distribution of works take place - the context in which the works assume their full meanings. In fact…it is only by describing this context, that one can actually show how musical works that have no audible, apparent, or explicit political or social content can still be seen to have a political or social character" (Goehr, 1994: 101).

In another publication Robin Balliger, a cultural anthropologist, writing from a Caribbean and Latin American perspective, defines political songs as "songs which either serve or struggle against dominant institutions like the state and economic system" (Balliger, 2003: 57). This definition implies that a song could be political once it is sponsored by a prominent institution. The same can be said of songs which connote ideologies that are contrary to those of these institutions. To this extent, a song that serves or protests against the media for example is political. In light of this subsuming tendency of political music, I re-

emphasize that the political songs with which this study is concerned are those that either serve or struggle against **the state**. The collective of these works as well as their applications are what this study terms as 'political music' - a distinctive and comprehensible genre of popular music that is extractable from the otherwise traditional genres of popular music. By subjecting popular songs to textual and contextual analyses, this study extracts politically salient texts domiciling in Nigerian popular music (songs) through the postcolonial years of the Nigerian nation.

The political music genre advocated here comprises three subgenres. These are 'protest political music' (a collection of the songs protesting against the state), 'unity political music' (a collection of the songs emphasizing nationhood, togetherness etc.), and 'terrestrial praise political music' (a collection of the songs singing the praises of political leaders). Perhaps the most dominant of the subgenres is 'protest political music'; that is, the collection of protest songs against the political leadership of a given national space. Protest political songs could be aimed at criticizing the state as constituted by the status quo, or at criticizing the idea of nationhood in its entirety. The protest political music subgenre is so popular that there are popular musicians whose sole or main forte is in the subgenre. The second subgenre of unity political music is recorded in order to celebrate nationhood. Unity political songs can either be sponsored by the state or, in some instances, sung innocuously. However, there is a third subgenre particularly predominant in Africa and which is hardly ever innocuous – terrestrial praise political songs. They are either recorded following state sponsorship, or done with the intent to court the state's attention. The songs in this category are usually very pre-occupied with gratifying the ego of a political office holder or aspirant so much so that there is little room for celebrating nationhood therein. Unlike with protest political music, available evidence suggests that there is hardly any popular musician

whose main concentration is in either unity political music or in terrestrial praise political music.

It is necessary, meanwhile, to note why the study has settled for the choice of nomenclature of 'political music'. Indeed, whereas the term 'political' is a hugely appropriated term whose continued adoption may be confusing, it is very fitting in this instance on considering that the term 'state addressed popular music' may convey the subgenres of protest political music and terrestrial praise political music; the unity political music subgenre does not necessarily address the state nor is it always produced at the instance of the state. The term 'political music' as a key genre of popular music is settled for advisedly.

1.1.2 Why a political music genre?

At last count, Allmusic.com[2] had recorded over a thousand genres and subgenres of popular music across the globe. So postmodernist has humanity become, we have the 'jazz rap' genre separate from the 'Afro-hip hop' genre. Popular music genres can be said to have become agents of information pollution. In his *Cybernetics or Control and Communications in the Animal and Machine*, Norbert Wiener posits that "just as the amount of information in a system is the measure of its degree of organization, so the entropy of a system is a measure of its degree of disorganization; and the one is simply the negative of the other" (1948: 11). The doctrine of honesty suggests that we admit that popular music branding

[2] "Visiting AllMusic for the first time, one is struck by the apparent audacity of the online record guide's ambitious title. More striking still is the subsequent realization that the claim is well substantiated. Within several clicks of the homepage, users might encounter detailed biographies of artists…Several moments later the same users might find themselves comparing a pair of well-informed genre overviews detailing the differences between "neo-traditionalist country" and "new traditionalist country." The site's primary mission has always been to aid the casual listener in the process of musical exploration, but its broad scope – providing accurate biographical information and editorial reviews on artists from virtually every milieu of commercial music – makes the site an invaluable springboard for researchers and a convenient demonstrational tool for educators" – Andre Mount (2013: 1).

faces a crisis of entropy. While music makers are entitled to appropriate whatever tag they deem fit for their works, the indiscriminate practice of proliferating popular music genres to suit the whims of individual popular musicians is hard to sustain.

As the essence of scholarship is to bring order where there is disorder, and towards the necessary organization at popular music's branding site, this thesis argues that the 'political music' genre is a distinctive and comprehensible genre extractable from the multitude of genres of popular music; by aid of textual, contextual, and audience critical discourse analyses. It advances that the 'political music' genre holds the ethos to foreground the organization of the 'disorganized system' that is 'popular music genres'. Since "political songs are songs which either serve or struggle against dominant institutions like the state and economic system" (Balliger, 2003: 57), there is the appealing implication of telling the context's history in the frankest possible light by chronicling political music texts and reception over a defined period. More than this, the essential element in this thesis is that before now, no research work has set out to define or contribute a genre in popular music studies as this does. The endeavour's materialization is a recommendation to have other countries' histories told through each country's political music, conjecturing that a profound understanding of a people's political history is obtainable this way.

1.1.3 Precursory Studies

The complementary argument made by the study is steeped along historical lines: that a chronicle of political music culture in a defined context e.g. postcolonial Nigeria, simultaneously achieves a document of the context's history. Historically, perhaps the most remarkable academic landmark in setting the grounds for the possibility of this contribution to the global field of popular music is a geographical forerunner. Onookome Okome and

Stephanie Newell sum up Karin Barber's 'Popular Arts in Africa' (1987) stating that: "It brought order and…respectability to the study of African popular performance in its broadest sense" (Okome and Newell, 2012: viii). In the celebrated essay, Barber argued "that this very flexibility and elusiveness [of African popular arts] is a potential strength, containing within it elements from which a theory of popular arts might be constructed" (Barber 1987: 5); as the present study buttresses. The essay demanded that attention shift to cultural consumers – the audience - away from the media's fixation on political gladiators and cultural producers. Indeed, the author decried how "ordinary people tend to be invisible and inaudible [while] numerically tiny elites…consume a vastly disproportionate share of the national wealth [and] take up all the light" (*ibid*.: 2) in Africa. As such, this thesis goes beyond propounding a 'political music' genre to stimulate order in popular music classification and discourses; it also integrates 'ordinary people', the audiences. It integrates audiences not as mere informants, but as will be seen, actual analysts.

Before now, other Africanists have beamed the searchlights on the politics of popular music. Susan Shepler's study 'Youth music and politics in post-war Sierra Leone' (2010), sets its gaze on the subaltern agency apparent in election-focused songs of youths in Sierra-Leone following an eleven-year civil war. The notion of the 'African youth' from Shepler's work is applied in initiating discussions on 'Electoral campaigns and associated music in post-1999 Nigeria': part three. Joyce Nyairo and James Ogude's 'Popular music, popular politics: *Unbwogable* and the idioms of freedom in Kenyan popular music' (2005) highlights how a popular song, 'Unbwogable' (2002), metamorphosed to become a national slogan through Kenya's December 2002 general election having been appropriated by a political party. The analytical method of Nyairo and Ogude (2005) informs sections of the present study. So does Birgit Englert's 'Ambiguous Relationships: youths, popular music and

politics in contemporary Tanzania' (2008) which focuses on how Tanzanian Bongo Flava musicians started to challenge the conventional, hierarchical ways of Tanzanian politics which used to be dominated by the older generation. Englert's outlining of how young "underground" musicians perceive contemporary Tanzanian politics and how this influences their own strategies in musical production also informs the analytical technique adopted in engaging with the three subgenres of political music. Francis Nyamnjoh and Jude Fokwang's 'Entertaining Repression: Music and Politics in postcolonial Cameroon' (2005) and Wiseman Chirwa's 'Dancing towards dictatorship: political songs and popular culture in Malawi' (2001) decry the use of popular music in entrenching oppressive political cultures in Cameroon and Malawi respectively; the former offering evidence that the fortunes and statuses of musicians have been transformed with changing political regimes and notions of politics. John Lwanda's 'history of popular music in Malawi 1891 to 2001: a preliminary communication' (2008) is, as the title suggests, merely preliminary. The study's broad scope meant that it had to employ a broad periodization and also had to draw on a multitude of brushed upon themes that did little in terms of order. The present study adopts a more precise scope thus a more manageable periodization and clearly defined themes.

A number of African oriented publications however stand out as trendsetters in exploring popular music's utilitarian value, from which the present study draws. These include 'Popular music as journalism in Zimbabwe' (Mano, 2007), 'Popular music as journalism in Africa: issues and contexts' (Mano, 2011) and '"Mr. President": Musical Open Letters as Political Commentary in Africa' (Künzler and Reuster-Jahn, 2012). The point, however, is that these studies have been preoccupied solely with explorations of protest political music. In fact, there is such a strong emphasis on protest political music culture in the literature of popular music in Africa that for many popular music researchers across the

globe, the term ‘political music’ is synonymous with protest political music culture. The rewiring of this narrow view through an illustration of the width of the political music genre which comprises three subgenres one of which is the protest political music culture constitutes part of the charter of this thesis. Protest political music culture is the most studied of the three subgenres precisely because of the erroneous belief that ‘political music’ is tantamount to the notion of radical or protest. Terrestrial praise political music culture, on the other hand, has largely been studied as ‘praise music’ and is rarely considered to be ‘political’ owing to its non-radical and non-protest disposition. But what becomes of the political components of this subgenre? It is true that the patrons of terrestrial praise political music are not so much the addressees of these performances as politicians are the addressees of protest political music, however, whether for electoral purposes or merely celebratory praise, terrestrial praise political songs are political to the extent that their subjects are political. So also are unity political songs which speak of nationhood. It does not matter if a unity political song is conceived by the political class or by a popular musician; the subject being nationhood is political. As such, the widely held idiosyncrasy of equating protest political music as what is political in popular music must be discarded for what it is in the abyss of an ignorant and mistaken past in Africa. The title to Anne Schumann’s ‘Music at war: reggae musicians as political actors in the Ivorian crisis’ (2015) is in fact informed by the author’s shock in discovering the simultaneous appropriation of reggae music – a traditionally ‘radical’ music genre – for both criticism and support of political figures in the Ivory Coast.

Until now, no larger empirical study has focused on political music as a specific genre (or subgenre) for its being ‘popular’ enough to include the works of all known conventional genres; nor in terms of ‘genre-switching’: the actual suddenness of the emergence of a

politically (or electorally) suggestive act (piece/work) by an artiste; nor the inherent ad hoc contractual pattern i.e. music as a direct consequence of elections, or music for the sake of elections in Nigeria. Indeed, this work proposes that popular music in Nigeria stands the risk of becoming a 'state-owned' media form as against being an 'independent' cultural art considering the spate of electoral music production in the country. Strikingly, no project has examined popular music either in pre-1999 or in post-1999 Nigeria on a time-specific, date-factored scale as this one sets out to do. Most research relevant to political music culture approached aspects like 'Popular music and youth empowerment' (Emielu, 2008); 'Use of music to create political awareness and mobilization: A case study of two Nigerian musicians Fela Anikulapo-Kuti and Sonny Okosun' (Shekwo, 1986); 'Popular music in Nigeria: Patronising attitude or benign complacency?' (Okafor, 1998); 'Musical revolution in contemporary Christianity' (Adedeji, 2010); 'Message music, political repression and the power of hip-hop in Nigeria' (Akpan, 2006); 'The musician as archivist: An example of Nigeria's Lagbaja' (Adegoju, 2009); 'Yabis: A phenomenon in contemporary Nigerian music' (Olatunji, 2007); 'Multimedia and popular music in Nigeria' (Onyeji, 2005); 'Crossing over: The influence of black American female representation on Nigerian films and music videos' (Arachie, 2010); 'Globalization impacts on highlife music in Nigeria' (Okoro, 2010); 'The African composer as a social critic' (Ofosu, 2010); 'Rethinking militancy and environmental justice: The politics of oil and violence in Nigerian popular music' (Okuyade, 2011); 'Black President: the art and legacy of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti' (Schoonmaker, 2003); 'Afrobeat, Fela and beyond: scenes, style and ideology' (Dosunmu, 2011); 'A study of music and social criticism of African musician Fela Anikulapo-Kuti' (Coker, 2004) and several other studies on the foremost African music icon.

It is particularly striking that across the literature on African popular music – the main host of political music in its outlined triad form - and African political music more precisely; there has been an ultra-specialization of sorts by scholars of African popular music which leaves research on the genre guilty of concentration to a fault. In simpler terms, there hasn't been any sizeable study that has sought to compare the three subgenres of political music – not even their blossoming existence across Africa has yet to trigger such a comparative study. Nor has any research to date by a music Africanist focussed on the unity political music subgenre. The present study represents the first academic attempt to appreciate each of the three subgenres with the accord each deserves. In so doing, it offers a subtle comparative of the three subgenres by the style adopted through their analysis. More recently, popular music studies in Africa have broadened their scope and research tools. However, the studies on social-, protest political-, and terrestrial praise political music continue to be construed within the confines of language, hip hop, and global youth culture (e.g. Okuyade, 2011; Adedeji, 2013; Inyabri, 2013; Fasan, 2015). None of these studies have yet to call for some order in this increasingly chaotic system whose scholarly attention and research may be equally chaotic.

Overall though, it is seen that whereas several scholars have been preoccupied with the study of 'protest political music' or 'terrestrial praise political music', none has yet to study the subgenres together or comparatively. Nor has any African popular music researcher been keen enough to extend some literature to the subgenre in-between the former duo: 'unity political music'. *Political music genres in postcolonial Nigeria, 1960-2013* is thus further refreshing for its depth and breadth in establishing the three variants of 'political music' as independent yet complementary socio-political practices.

1.2 Aim and Purpose of Research

This research aims at establishing a means through which the disorderliness in popular music classification may be ordered. Specifically, the research is preoccupied with extracting a distinct and comprehensible genre of 'political music' from the otherwise traditional genres of popular music. The study will put forward Political Musicology as a discipline through which state-concerned music is appreciated. The research is further concerned with establishing that the 'political music' genre has the capacity to foreground a re-ordering of the disorderly system of popular music classification by delineating three distinct and comprehensible subgenres of 'political music' identified as 'protest political music', 'unity political music', and 'terrestrial praise political music'. The research also aims to ascertain that there are specific economically and socio-politically crucial moments which trigger the songs in each of the subgenres. Finally, the study is concerned with popular music audiences as relating to audiences' astuteness in making out 'political music' from non-political music. More particularly, the study aims to establish the extent to which electorates (electoral audiences) get sold on the election campaign jingles - a variant of terrestrial praise political music – that precede elections. I hope this work will contribute new knowledge in popular music studies and provide a foundation for further research in such fields as media and communication studies, modern history, anthropology, and political science.

1.3 Scope of Research

The scope of Nigerian popular music and performance is wide with styles ranging from the indigenous to the intercultural genres. This thesis will focus on popular music evidence through postcolonial Nigeria. Beyond this, the actual scope of this study is in how social anthropologists and other scholars throughout the world use the word 'political' to cover all

institutions concerned with the conduct of public affairs, the preservation of public order and relations between communities. As such, whereas Political Science is the study of the nature and function of the state; Political Musicology is the study of the nature and function of state-concerned music.

Historically the state has existed in forms as diverse as the extremely tyrannous and the altruistically welfarist. Political musicology therefore makes it feasible to study political music material as one or a combination of protest political music, unity political music, and terrestrial praise political music; depending on the critical discourse perspective a given songwriter chooses to adopt. The political music genre is capacitated to interrogate the state as an organized power with potentialities for evil and good.

The study of the state's indispensability, its perfectibility, its corruptibility and the relations between these three elements of the state is the primary task of the discipline of Political Science. The utility of Political Musicology is in its capacity to reflect these three elements of the state through music. Indeed, the indispensability of nationhood is the charter of unity political music while terrestrial praise political music is preoccupied with propagating its conviction of the perfectibility of its patrons who are politicians in power or politicians vying for power.

The third element of the state – its corruptibility – is perhaps the most indulged. Indispensability and perfectibility are Utopian in the end because humans are generally dispensable and imperfect. However, since humans are prone to corruption, there is a prevalence of protest political music – a subgenre which addresses the state's corruptibility and tyrannical capacities. When a political music singer addresses the state in a manner that is disapproving, confrontational or derogatory; chances are that the song is question is a protest political song.

In an instance where a singer's subject is in solidarity with nationhood, maintained status quo ante bellum and perhaps appealing for continued togetherness owing to 'the strength in diversity', 'better together' or similar hackneyed slogans; the song in question would be a unity political song. Man's capacity for the praise of his fellow man and the commercialization of this practice has witnessed many turns through history. In music, man has proven to be particularly prolific in praise. As such a 'terrestrial praise political music' subgenre has been marked out to cater for all musical endorsements, appeal for votes, and the general praise-singing of politicians. Terrestrial praise political music is a deliberate onomatopoeic play on celestial praise music. It is striking that the Church is pivotal to the development of both music and the state.

Music and the state represent the two terminals of Political Musicology which is an interdisciplinary conception that makes an invaluable companion for an education in disciplines covering Political Science, Communication, Anthropology, Sociology, History and Music among others. Political Musicology is easily a branch of modern Political Science. The political communication conveyed through music is a subject yet to be properly analyzed in isolation. Communication Studies would be well served with Political Musicology as a lead. It is needless to rehash the self-evidence of Political Musicology's relevance to the disciplines of Anthropology, Sociology, History or Music.

1.4 Research Questions

1. Owing to the indiscriminate appropriation of genres by popular music practitioners, is there disorderliness in the system of popular music classification? If so, what may be done to re-order the system?

2. Is it feasible to extract, textually, a distinct and comprehensible genre of 'political music' from the otherwise traditional genres of popular music, in a given context?
3. Is it plausible to delineate three equally distinct and comprehensible subgenres of 'political music' identified as 'protest political music', 'unity political music', and 'terrestrial praise political music'?
4. Are there specific economically and socio-politically crucial moments which trigger the creation of each of the subgenres? If so, to what extent do the intended audiences of 'political music' comprehend and imbibe the import of this music?
5. More particularly, to what extent do electorates (electoral audiences) get sold on the election songs - campaign jingles: a variant of terrestrial praise political music – that characterizes political campaigns?

1.5 Preview of Chapters

In ten chapters, this thesis makes a preliminary contribution to the field of political music culture as a popular music genre. The thesis attempts a comprehensive documentation of the genre by focusing on each of the three subgenres systematically across the chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the background to the study and offers a presentation of the research justification to the complement of research questions. Chapter 2 presents a profile of Nigeria which is the geographical location for the study. It traces the historical background of the political music genre with respect to circumstance, culture, arts and language. Indeed, the chapter provides an overview of the Nigerian media and summarises the main themes of pre-1999 postcolonial Nigerian music and post-1999 Nigerian music. The socio-economic and political consensus on Nigeria's time as an independent nation is presented critically. Chapter 3 delineates and justifies the combination of methods – con-textual analysis, critical

discourse analysis and audience (quantitative and qualitative) analysis – employed through the thesis. Chapter 4 is a dedication to the theoretical premises upon which research into political music culture is based.

Chapter 5 centres on an alternative discourse of protest political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria. In spite an abundance of studies into the works of Fela, none has yet illustrated the significance of his music within the context of contemporary political discourse. Studies have also been reticent in appreciating the works of his son, Femi; within a framework of the post-1999 Nigeria equivalent of Fela's which constituted a major alternative voice in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria. Chapter 5 is an attempt to fill these gaps along with alternative audience views. The paper complements the foregoing with a political discourse analysis of selected works from four other alternative popular musicians of postcolonial Nigeria hitherto ignored by the academy. These are Osayomore Joseph and Victor Essiet (pre-1999) and Blackface and Mr Raw (post-1999).

The Occupy Nigeria 2012 protests are re-considered through popular music in chapter 6. The chapter draws from an amalgam of the use of the 'alternative'. The first and predominant application of the 'alternative' in chapter 6 is from the theory of the alternative media in the sense of offering a means for democratic communication to people who are normally excluded. The second and less pronounced appropriation is with the alternative as constituted by 'the-people-formerly-known-as-the-audience'. Specifically, chapter 6 borrows from a study, similarly centred on Occupy Nigeria, which appraised the hegemonic practice by mainstream media of aligning with social ('alternative') media machinations at the protests. The opportunism of the alternative popular music reporting at the protests is laid bare in that these musical reporters are the mainstream at any other time. The chapter finds that the Occupy Nigeria protests were at best entrepreneurial

ventures for various segments of the protesters, and at worst the results of an over-politicized government. Chapter 6 concludes that both the government and the interest-driven protesters played out their whims at the expense of the Nigerian masses.

Unity political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria takes up chapter 7 which chronicles the category through the Nigerian post-colony. By aid of a political discourse analysis of a selection of works by Nigerian popular musicians, chapter 7 demonstrates the authenticity of the subgenre. Of the three subgenres of political music, unity political music has received the least attention. Whereas literature abounds on the cultures of protest and praise political music across Africa, the unity political music subgenre has been curiously treated to scholarly oblivion. Chapter 7 is an attempt to establish the subgenre in academic consciousness by illustrating the commonalities between various works from different artists that come within the purview of the musical category. In doing this, the chapter strives to highlight the function of these works in sustaining the unity of the Nigerian nation.

Chapter 8 is focused on terrestrial praise political music. Whereas much has been written on the praise practice of both oral traditions and popular music genres in Africa, no study has yet considered the practice of praising politicians as a genus in its own right. Chapter 8 attempts to blur the unexplored vacuum between oral poetic forms and musically accompanied praise. It adds to the growing body of work on popular music reclassification by building on the conceptualization of the terrestrial praise political music category as one of three subgenres of political music. The chapter shows that political leaders have procured popular musicians since independence through military rule and now; thus sustaining the subgenre. A synthesis of the origins of the terrestrial praise political music species precedes a discussion of contemporary practices etched on insights from interviews with Nigerians in

music and in politics. In presenting the evidence, verbatim quotes are deployed extensively in order to sift the influence of personal bias.

In Chapter 9, the study's research tool assumes a fully quantitative dynamic towards the appreciation and appraisal of audiences. More specifically, this chapter is situated within the broader framework of the electoral process. The electoral process in Nigeria can be conceived of as having four major dimensions. One is the Registration of voters by the federal electoral commission. The second is the nomination of candidates by political parties for the purpose of contesting elections. The third dimension has to do with campaigning and campaign strategies that parties direct toward mass electorates. The fourth dimension is that of voting behavior which of course provides and decides the ultimate outcome of the elections. Chapter 9 focuses on the last dimension (voting behavior) which depends very much on the three earlier dimensions.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTEXT: NIGERIA

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an introduction to Nigeria. It conveys a map of the country, demographics, information on the national literacy rates and details on the media landscape. It goes on to offer an articulation of the socio-political and economic problems in the country before and after democratization in 1999. The chapter also gives a brief background and basic familiarization with the nation's popular music culture and development, as well as an insight into the languages of the people of Nigeria and how the development of languages has been reflected in the country's popular music.

2.2 A Profile of Nigeria

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is the 17th African colonial creation to gain independence. Nigeria is also the world's most populous black nation. The geographical location of what is presently known as Nigeria is bound to the west by the Republic of Benin, to the east by Cameroon, to the north by Niger Republic, and bound to the south by the Atlantic Ocean. As such, Nigeria lies on the shores of the Bight of Benin and Biafra, and on the Gulf of Guinea. The country has a considerable amount of land mass covering some 356,668 square miles. The population of Nigeria stands at approximately 174 million (All Nigeria Info, 2015) making Nigeria the most populous African country and the seventh by world comparison. A former British colony, Nigeria gained independence on October 1st 1960. It became a republic in 1963 and assumed the full name 'Federal Republic of Nigeria'. The country is presently

administered through thirty-six states and the federal capital territory, Abuja. Lagos was the capital from 1914 after the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria by the British until 1991. The monetary unit is the Nigerian Naira (NGN) made up of 100 kobo and at the time of this research £1 exchanges for 312 NGN.

Nigeria's economy (GDP), worth more than $500 billion and $1 trillion in terms of nominal GDP and purchasing power parity respectively is the largest in Africa. This followed the re-basing of the GDP for the first time since 1993 to become the world's 21st (nominal) and 20th (PPP) largest economy in 2015. Nigeria is currently the top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. Nigeria is an emerging market and a member of the MINT group of countries and is also listed among the "Next Eleven" economies. Nigeria is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the African Union, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the United Nations among other international organizations. Christianity and Islam are the two dominant religions in Nigeria; with the south and middle belt predominantly Christian while the north is predominantly Muslim (*ibid.*). Agriculture and allied industry have been the major occupation of the Nigerian people and has been the basis of Nigeria's economic activities with major agricultural exports being cocoa, timber, groundnut and palm oil prior to the discovery and expansion of crude oil exploration. However, since the 1970s crude oil ensured that Nigeria became a mono-product economy as oil presently accounts for over ninety percent of the country's export earnings and seventy-five percent of public revenue (Falola and Heaton, 2008).

Prior to the amalgamation of the southern and northern protectorates as evidenced by the advent of British rule in 1914, the inhabitants of the present-day Nigerian space were

subject to different systems of governance, with varieties of culture and languages within their individual pre-colonial kingdoms. The predominant roles of ethnicity, religion and loyalty to regional interest in the post-independence politics of Nigeria can be understood against this backdrop. In fifty-four years of existence as an independent country Nigeria has been ruled for more than twenty-eight years by the military which has left an indelible mark on the country's socio-economic and cultural history. The spread of thirty-three administrative states and the Federal Capital Territory are mainly products of the military, as is the country's practiced Constitution.




Figure 2.1: Map of Nigeria showing the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory

(New World Encyclopedia, 2015)

Nigeria is the most linguistically diverse country in the world with an estimated figure of between 400 and 600 languages. In this multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-lingual country, the major ethnic groups are the Hausa/Fulani, the Ibo and the Yorùbá. The minority groups are the Ijaw, Edo, Urhobo, Efik, Ogoni, Idoma, Igala, Jukun, Tiv and Fulfulde among others. In terms of the geographical locations and proportions of major ethnicities, the Hausa and Fulani located in the Northern Savannah account for roughly 21% of the population, the Yorùbá located in the south western part of the country make up 16%, and the Igbo of the south east make up some 14% leaving about 50 percent to the rest of the over 400 minority groups. Admitting that its figures were merely estimates which could be way off the mark owing to the inefficient statistical gathering techniques available in Nigeria, a report on demographics in Nigeria ranked some other ethnic groups as follows: Edo 12.5%, Urhobo 6.7%, Ijaw 6.5%, Yakurr 4%, Ibibio 4.5%, Kanuri 4%, Annang 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%, Efik 2% (Otedo, 2012).

A 2012 survey estimated that the median age in the country was 19.2 years, while the average birth and death rates were put at 39.32 births/1000 population units and 13.48 deaths/1000 population units respectively. The same survey put infant mortality rate at 94.35 deaths/1000 live births and the life expectancy (at birth) at 52.05 years. It is instructive that the total fertility rate was put at 5.38 children born/woman thus accounting somewhat for the nation's overall population (Otedo, 2012). Having defined literacy as 'the entire population of all ages who can read and write in any language' (*ibid.*), the National Literacy Survey conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics estimated that the literacy rate amongst the female population stood at 72.65% while that of the male population was put at 84.35%. As such, the

average literacy rate of the total population amounted to 78.6% based on the National Literacy Survey of 2010 (Otedo, 2012).

2.3 The Nigerian Media

Okafor (2014) traces the history of newspaper publications in Nigeria. He is convinced that Reverend Henry Townsend's Anglican mission in Abeokuta pioneered the print media in Nigeria by floating a 'vernacular' newspaper known as 'Iwe Iroyin' as far back as 1859. Other newspaper titles including the Anglo African, Lagos Times, Gold Coast Colony Advertiser, Observer and Lagos Weekly Record etc. established by educated Africans like Robert Campbell, Richard Beale Blaize, John Payne Jackson etc. only came after the 'Iwe Iroyin' (Okafor, 2014; Omu, 1978). Okafor's tracing of the history of the media in Nigeria continues as the author locates a second set of key media owners in the colonial days. These were mainly foreigners who immigrated to Nigeria from Sierra Leone and Liberia. It was after the influx of these western educated West Africans into the Nigerian newspaper landscape that notable Nigerians including Herbert Macaulay, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo took to the news publishing business with titles like the West African Pilot, the Daily Times, and the Nigerian Tribune. According to Okafor, as of 1937, Nigerian newsstands were hosts to at least 51 newspapers; representing the first indigenous industrial enterprise.

Beyond print, Okafor's study references the setting up of redistribution centres by the British colonial government to rebroadcast programmes of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) for the enjoyment of Her Majesty the Queen's employees in the West African coast in the 19th century. Further than this, Okafor reports that the 1950s saw the establishment of radio and television stations in the western region of Nigeria. This was followed a few years later by

an equivalent establishment in the eastern region of the country (Okafor, 2014). At present, the media landscape in Nigeria is host to scores of newspapers, magazines, radio, television and the new media outlets. Nigeria currently has more than 150 radio and television stations publicly and privately owned. A portion of the television stations are on the satellite and are thus watched beyond the shores of the country. Quite a number of the television and radio stations that broadcast on the terrestrial space are available online and could be accessed wherever there is broadband Internet access. The issue of media ownership presents an interesting dimension in Nigeria. Under the National Broadcasting Commission Act, religious bodies and political parties are specifically precluded from owning broadcast media. Foreign ownership of broadcast media is also restricted, resulting in very little foreign investment in the Nigerian media (Okafor, 2014).

> It is important to note at this point that the sourcing of news and information in the Nigerian media has its peculiarities. These peculiarities render it incorrect to argue that issues canvassed in the Nigerian media and discussed in the Nigerian public sphere is the agenda of the media. Much of the local news and/or information disseminated in the Nigerian media originate from the ruling class who are referred to in the Nigerian media parlance as "news sources". News sources in Nigeria are dominated by the ruling class or petty bourgeois who are tagged "news makers". This class of individuals includes politicians, business executives, captains of industry, top civil servants and other influential members of the ruling elite whose views and opinions dominate daily news and public information in Nigeria. Interestingly, much of the news content and other media information in Nigeria are mostly populated with the views and opinions of the ruling class tagged "news makers". Consequently, the level of media control by the ruling elite, the emergence of news commercialisation, and the concept of "news making" in Nigeria raises the question, whose agenda is the Nigerian media agenda (Okafor, 2014: 37).

The media in Nigeria has always been characterised by two major forms of ownership, those owned by the government (the federal government's Nigeria Television Authority NTA, Radio

Nigeria and the state governments' equivalents and newspapers etc) and those owned by private individuals (The News, AIT, TV Continental, Channels TV, The Sun, This Day, www.premiumtimesng.com etc). These two forms of media ownership are driven by separate agenda. The government media houses are used mainly as instruments of propaganda for the government while the private media owners are driven by different motives, which could be profit making, agenda setting, to win influence which can be later translated into political and business gains etc. The late Bashorun M.K.O Abiola did run the Concord group of newspapers. More recently, notable politicians such as James Ibori, Orji Uzor Kalu, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, and Atiku Abubakar have set up media institutions ranging between newspaper houses and broadcast outlets in the radio, TV and online variants. These broad media businesses contribute to the enlivening of the socio-political debate and providing alternative viewpoints. They also provide jobs to journalists and all other service providers such as vendors, printers and other sundry staff such as cleaners and security staff etc. Naturally, just as the state owned media houses are designed to serve the government's whims, so also are the private media houses not expected to criticise their owners. It should be noted that whereas private newspapers have always dominated Nigerian newsstands, the private broadcast houses only emerged as a recent phenomenon with the abrogation of a decree which hitherto outlawed this. As such, privately owned broadcast-media outlets are mainly a post-1999 Nigeria occurrence.

The Nigerian media landscape has generally followed global trends, at least by third world standards. The post-industrial information age led to a society that depended more and was enhanced by the use of the computer, the Internet and cyberspace technologies. Although

not a pacesetter nor by any means a quick aligner, postcolonial Nigeria slowly evolved into a space where the demand for services caught up rapidly with the demand for labour. As such, the need for a computer literate population to run the late twentieth and twenty first century demands of technological advancement became paramount in Nigeria. Of course, the Nigerian print media – vibrant since inception – briskly took to the changes leading to a scenario where a significant proportion of jobs are white-collar requiring professionals with a predilection for planning and organization. As with the rest of the world, Nigeria presently places a high premium on information and knowledge by professionals charged with the responsibility to run key service sectors (Afolabi, 2014). Strikingly, Nigeria is presently home to the largest Internet population in Africa and amongst the top ten Internet consumer nations in the world. The Internet penetration rate as of June 2012 was estimated at 28.4% of the Nigerian population (*ibid*.) It is prudent to assume that this has no doubt grown significantly in the last couple of years. As a former and three-time presidential aide Ken Saro-Wiwa puts it "Nigeria is the seventh-largest country in the world and that statistic is almost mirrored online. At the millennium, there were just 200,000 internet users in Nigeria, but by [2014] that figure had already reached 70 million" (Saro-Wiwa, 2015).

Media censorship is a practice that has been witnessed through postcolonial Nigeria. In fact, the colonial government in place before Nigeria's independence in 1960 began the idea of implementing policies that restrained press freedom. It is therefore unsurprising to find that the various military and civilian governments constituted by the national bourgeoisie also adopted censorship measures to various degrees. This desire by different governments to exercise some control over the media has involved all manner of strategies including the

deliberate denial of advertising revenue to non-conformist media firms, the killing, maiming, harassment, detention, and jailing of several journalists, as well as the promulgation of repressive laws and decrees designed to curtail the media. Further measures of government control include denying journalists access to places and persons of information and the outright refusal to give government advertisements to certain media (preferring to patronize pro-government newspapers) together with the dubious labeling of documents containing valuable information. Okafor (2014) argues that the British colonial administration in Nigeria was the least repressive in comparison to the postcolonial governments. Nonetheless Okafor places the responsibility of setting in motion many of the repressive press laws existing in postcolonial Nigeria with the colonial administration. He further observes that the different measures and obnoxious media laws and decrees give government officials the legal backing to prosecute, fine, detain and imprison journalists, as well as proscribe media houses. For instance, Decree No. 4 of 1984 criminalized press reports and proscribed written statements that exposed an officer of the military government to ridicule. Also cited in Okafor's study is the Offensive Publications (Proscription) Decree 35 of 1993 which made it possible for the then government to clamp down on six media houses across the nation. The same Decree gave credence to the action of the Nigerian government to close down 17 newspapers and magazines and one broadcasting station in one single day in July 1993 (Okafor, 2014).

According to Okafor (2014), military rule in Nigeria was tantamount to the worst forms of media emasculation in the country's media history. Indeed, as earlier noted, military dictatorships were characterized by arbitrary arrests and detentions, extrajudicial killings, corruption, excessive use of force, torture of detainees, harassment of journalists and

democratic activists and arson attacks on media houses. The families of targeted journalists were not spared of arrest, detention, brutalization and harassment in many instances. The period also witnessed the abrupt sack and dismissal of non-conformist journalists. Beyond the government control of the media through laws, decrees and the courts, other means of control exist which obstruct freedom of expression. One of such other means of control is what is commonly referred to as *co-opting.* The government uses certain preferential treatments to buy the most influential journalists in the country... appointing these influential critics in the media to top posts within the government. 'Co-opting' of journalists ensures that they are reduced to being mere stooges of government officials. This approach was begun during the many years of military dictatorship in Nigeria (*ibid*.).

Furthermore, regulatory bodies set up by the government can be a source of media control. Where there are defects or loopholes in the decree that set up such regulatory bodies, these can be used for repressing freedom of expression. It is thought that government may intentionally leave loopholes in laws and decrees so as to exploit such in silencing any opposition. Media scholars believe that one pitfall in the decree that set up the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) is the power given to the commission to revoke the licenses of stations which do not operate in accordance with the code and in the public interest. The decree did not specify either how to seek redress or what the public interest is, as in the American Federal Communication Commission. Thus the decree allows the NBC to provide licenses in perpetuity only to withdraw them at whim. In addition, the influence of government is seen in the unflinching support government media organizations give the government of the day. Government officials do not hesitate to remove anyone in charge who fails to offer

unquestioned support. An 'erring' official risks being sacked with 'immediate effect' or faces other punishments for such 'heinous' acts. In one instance, within one year of an elected civilian government assuming office, no less than ten chief executive officers of state-owned broadcasting stations were sacked. This approach is replicated in the private media practice in Nigeria wherein the proprietors exert significant control over their firms. Proprietors have been known to demand self-censorship by their editors. The proprietors expect those working in their media organizations to understand and protect their interests. Often a proprietor's economic and/or political interests are very influential in how they want their papers and reporting to relate to the government of the day. Media practitioners have never failed to denounce these controls, except for journalists who have been 'co-opted'. There have been instances when the government has been taken to court. In 1975, a reporter was arrested, flogged and his hair and beard shaved on the orders of a military government who found his articles offensive. The reporter instituted a court action and won, and the government was asked to pay him damage (Okafor, 2014).

> The media sets the agenda of public discussion, and determines what people will think and talk about; an authority usually reserved for tyrants, parties and priests in other nations. Again, after the annulment of what most observers and participants saw as the [fairest and the freest] election ever held in Nigeria in 1993, the media went to town agitating for the de-annulment and revalidation of the elections. That particular media agenda appears to coincide with the agenda of majority of Nigerians. Ngoa (2006) argues that the agenda-setting theory of mass communication seems to have manifested in the unanimity among the media in Nigeria, with the agenda of pursuing from office the then military ruler, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida who nullified the collective will of Nigerians through the annulment of the election of Mr Abiola as President (Okafor, 2014: 40).

For most part of postcolonial Nigerian history, it has been the culture that the most current analysis of politics, economics, health, religion, sports, psychological and emotional issues, music, theatre, television, the fine arts, and even comics are covered by Newspapers.

2.4 A socio-political account of postcolonial Nigeria

A review of popular music culture in postcolonial Nigeria as this relates to political consciousness in the country cannot be complete without a thorough appraisal of each of protest-, unity- and terrestrial praise- political music. Indeed, these brands of music span across systems of governments as well as various regimes and administrations; whether military, democratic or civil. In Nigeria, each of these three systems has been experienced. Today, however, the Nigerian nation is nurturing a democratic system of government inaugurated in 1999 as the Fourth Republic. Sixteen years on, the Fourth Republic represents the longest spell of democratic governance in the nation's history. Global trends suggest that the present Fourth Republic is unlikely to be interrupted as were the previous three by military coups d'état and election annulment. Gaining her independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria only became a Republic in 1963.

The inaugural intervention by the military in postcolonial Nigeria's politics occurred in 1966 truncating the First Republic which came into being in 1963 following the attainment of Nigeria's independence in 1960. This first military regime summarily imposed a ban on political parties and all ethnic and cultural organizations with political undertones. The bans remained operative for 12 years until September 1978 when the General Obasanjo led military regime removed the ban on political parties and party politics in order to pave the way for the Second Republic and the return of civilian rule in 1979 (Nwankwo, 1982). Considering that almost every

military coup d'état through postcolonial Nigeria has been met with substantial celebrations, it is deducible that these banned political parties engaged in brazen abuse of power and office. Furthermore, Nwankwo (1982) engages with how the interests of the British colonial administration in pre-independence Nigeria and those of the emerging political parties were in conflict. Whereas the former was interested in perpetuating the colonial regime, the latter were interested in the early end to colonial rule in the country. Consequently, the Constitutions of 1946 and 1951 were promulgated by the colonial government without consultation with existing political parties. This meant that the place of parties in the Nigerian political system was taken for granted, and their role and functions remained conventional rather than constitutional in form. There was no definition of political parties in these Constitutions.

The military regimes in Nigeria that followed in succession after the 1966 intervention each viewed the activities of political parties in the country as dysfunctional to the working of the political system. This poor image of political parties grew out of the widespread opinion that intra- and inter-party conflicts, along with corruption and ethnicity were responsible for the demise of the post-independence civilian regime. So entrenched was this poor image of political parties that the Obasanjo-led regime which eventually returned the country to civilian rule was still concerned about this disillusion with party politics in the past. Thus the regime expressed a desire for an alternative form of civilian government and entreated the 1979 Constitution Drafting Committee to discover some means by which government can be formed without the involvement of political parties (Nwankwo, 1982). Nonetheless, unlike previously, the 1979 Constitution did have a definition and role for political parties. The subsequent formation and consequent dissolution of several national electoral bodies by different

administrations equally points to a general dissatisfaction with the conduct of political activities in the country: The Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) was reconstituted as NEC (National Electoral Commission). NEC then became National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) which itself was later constituted as The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).

Oshodi (2007) chronicles the process of Nigeria's return to civilian rule with the national elections of 1999, 2003 and the 2007 civilian-to-civilian transitional exercise, arguing that "after many years of military rule" (Oshodi, 2007: 618) the challenges for democracy in today's Nigeria are immense. He explains that Nigeria's path towards democratic rule has been fraught with electoral problems and adds that Nigeria's record of economic development and political stability has been slow and jagged. He avers that "It is necessary to imbibe a culture of the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, a free press, an informed populace, and the conducting of free and fair elections while honouring majority rule and accepting minority rights" (*ibid*: 617). He notes that "the initial jubilation of a change in government through violent means is almost synonymous with African politics" (*ibid*: 618) irrespective of the colouration of the emerging leaders. Nigerians have celebrated the political ascendancy of military regimes in succession even at the expense of elected civilian rule. "All Nigerian elections marked important thresholds in the country's history" (*ibid*: 618) as "Each election can be categorized as a 'first', whether it was the independence election, the first post-independence election, the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power, the first military-to-civilian election, or the first civilian administration to pass to a different civilian administration, [or the first civilian administration to pass to a different civilian administration from an opposition party]" (*ibid*: 618).

In locating the June 12 question within the nation's re-democratization of 1999, the author offers that "The 1999 election…marked the return to democratic rule after 16 years of military rule and it was the election that every section of the Nigerian population desperately wanted" (*ibid*: 618). Oshodi perceived the denial of Chief Abiola's electoral mandate as accruable to the powerful northern Hausa/Fulani political establishment. Abiola's kin (the Yoruba) were thus granted the seemingly exclusive right to compete for the office of the presidency in 1999 as a gesture ostensibly used to appease the Yoruba of the south-western part of the country and to ensure the continued unity of the country: "The annulled 1993 election, which preceded the 1999 exercise, established a deeper-rooted mistrust of the military rulers and caused major domestic upheaval and international isolation…Abacha's arrival as leader erased any semblance of democracy that had existed in the country. International pressure was placed on him to restart his own transition, a lengthy and vague process towards democratic rule of some sort, and return power to the civilians. There was a general impression that Abacha wanted to hand over power to himself through some electoral means" (*ibid*: 618). Strikingly "Babangida has been described as initiating one of the most ambitious, imaginative, complex and expensive transitions from authoritarian rule that has ever been attempted anywhere in the world, the ultimate futility of which is highlighted by the fact that he annulled the only election that eventually emerged from this process of perpetual transition" (*ibid*: 619).

Oshodi proceeds to consider the Babangida and Abacha years within the context of the 1999 Nigerian elections. He highlights the completion of the transition to fourth republic in the period of eight months, noting however that the fatigue and disillusionment of the electorate

from “the botched 1993 election exercise, and the half-hearted Abacha-administered elections of 1998” led to a very low turnout of voters on 27 February, 1999. Oshodi observes that in spite of the ‘success’ of the Abubakar-run 1999 election, a majority of election observer groups still made their reservations on the process. Nonetheless he offers that “the 1999 elections turned out not only to be a watershed but a meaningful achievement vis-a`-vis subsequent elections in the country” (Oshodi, 2007: 619).

Adebanwi and Obadare (2010) emphasize the notion behind the cliché ‘As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa’ in framing the socio-historical and political trajectory of Nigeria while examining the many dimensions of the critical choices Nigeria has made as an independent nation. The duo chronicles the scholarship that have attempted to capture and explain the totality of the postcolony, its specific and critical aspects, the historical approaches, as well as those that locate the postcolonial crisis within the structures and strictures of globalisation, neoliberalism, the Cold War, imperialism, and colonialism. They cite the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the General Ibrahim Babangida administration as one of many neoliberal policy approaches in Africa that result from both the ideological and theoretical debates over the previous two centuries in the modern Euro-American world and contrast with the supposedly liberal-radical investments of civil society practices as manifested in social forces such as labour, youth, student movements and women (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2010: 386).

Continuing with their theme of postcolonial Africa’s efforts at solving its problems, the authors list the (African) ‘home-grown’ Utopias, including partnerships with other global bodies such as the Lagos Plan of Action (for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000) and the

Lome Convention of 1975 to the rechristened African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and United States of Africa (USA) discourses. They proceed to the "several lay approaches" by past African leaders including Nigeria's Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe "to understand the bases or foundation of Africa's condition with matching ideological-political proposals on 'what is to be done'" (*ibid*: 386). Not even the argument by Kwame Nkrumah that colonialism was the last stage of imperialism and his accompanying prescription of conscientism as a method of African national liberation nor Julius Nyerere's 'Ujamaa' (African socialism) have been adequate in actually liberating the continent and its postcolonial states. Contemporary Africa, in the words of the authors, was in a 'sorry' state. What with the avalanche of ills spanning "civil wars, armed conflicts, different forms of social violence, subhuman poverty, famine, the ravages of diseases, including AIDS-HIV, cholera, malaria fever, polio, etc, economic crises and collapse, political crises, including the uses of democratic means for autocratic ends, travesties of all forms in the name of elections, the crisis of citizenship and indigeneity, inter-faith and inter-ethnic and inter-racial violence, lack of access to basic modern amenities by the largest proportion of populations within the different national boundaries" (*ibid*: 387) among others.

The authors contend that "we cannot give in to what has been described as 'Afropessimism', or 'the nihilism of despair and surrender' which homogenises the 'postcolonial space as one uniform site of dysfunctionality'… [instead] we need to pay attention to the eclectic particularities of the postcolonial experience in Africa, discern its specificities in different polities and regions, and identify the mixes, paradoxes and contradictions that these (re)produce in the context of Africa's insertion in the global order" (*ibid*: 387). Subsequently

they list 'prebendalism' (Joseph 1987), 'the politics of the belly' (Bayart 1993), 'predation' (Lewis 1996), 'disorder as political instrument' (Chabal and Daloz 1999), 'the criminalisation of the state' (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999), 'resource curse' (Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007), 'the politics of suffering and smiling' (Chabal 2009), and 'the perils of belonging' (Geschiere 2009) amongst scholarly identification of continental patterns which cannot be dismissed (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2010). In fact, the authors concede that the result of the struggle of social forces committed to the transformation (or reformation) of the continent has not been visible, and as such less than satisfactory. Drawing from their operational cliché, 'As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa', the authors wind up stating that "Nigeria is a great template for examining some of these challenges and the failures of ameliorative, reformist or transformational politics" (*ibid*: 387).

The authors proceed to evaluate the violent-to-peaceful dynamic of Nigeria's colonial-to-postcolonial reality (Fanon, 1961) and locate the nation's woes as a consequence of: "The structural inequities, injustices and fatal errors that were inherent in this colonial project as part of the divide-and-rule tactics and the strategies of domination of imperial Britain became fundamental challenges that Nigeria would not recover from for almost a century after the amalgamation and five decades after independence was achieved" (*ibid*: 389). Following through, Adebanwi and Obadare write: "From the decolonisation period when Nigeria's many ethno-linguistic groups, forced to operate under the shadows of a tripartite ethno-regional groupings (Hausa-Fulani in the Northern Region, Igbo in the Eastern Region, and Yoruba in the Western Region), started the struggle for ascendancy and/or accommodation, the question of power has remained central to understanding the crisis of the invented nation-state, Nigeria.

Since then, there have been different attempts to re-write and right Nigeria's history against the backdrop of its colonial inheritances and imbalances" (*ibid*: 389-390). Tracing the ethnic centered bias of the emerging Nigeria, they contend that: "Despite the tensions, broadly cast along northern (largely Islamic, 'traditional') bloc against southern (largely, Christian, 'modern') bloc, or western (Yoruba) versus eastern (Igbo) regions, the British and the emergent leaders of the key regions managed to ensure a precarious balance" (*ibid*: 390).

The authors sum up the circumstances of Nigeria's immediate post-independence years noting that the dearth of balance that was reached at independence produced a federal government that was an alliance between the dominant party in the northern region (Northern People's Congress, NPC) as the senior partner, and the dominant party in the eastern region (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, NCNC), as the junior partner. "The NCNC, which had started as the most pan-Nigerian, and the most ideologically radical, had ended up as the 'junior' partner to the last party to be formed, and the least eager for independence. It was a contradiction that would become a permanent reflection of Nigeria's deep political flaws…In less than two years after independence, the tenuous agreements designed to craft a national understanding could no longer sustain the strain" (*ibid*: 390).

In spite of several military coups and counter coups, "attempts to violently reconstitute and/or de-constitute Nigeria have always failed. Yet, civil reformative efforts have consistently nudged the country towards a fairer and more just system more than every such violent challenge to the status quo" (*ibid*: 391). This study aims to highlight some of the attempts through popular music to 're-write and right Nigeria's history' by its delineation of terrestrial praise political music, unity political music and protest political music cultures in postcolonial

Nigeria. Like the rest of Africa, Nigeria 'has long been saddled with a poor, even malevolent, leadership: predatory kleptocrats, military-installed autocrats, economic illiterates, and puffed-up posturers' (Rotberg 2004, 14). Under these leaders, Rotberg advances:

> Infrastructure…has fallen into disrepair, currencies have depreciated, and real prices have inflated dramatically, while job availability, health care, education standards, and life expectancy have declined. Ordinary life had become beleaguered: general security has deteriorated, crime and corruption have increased, much needed public funds have flowed into hidden bank accounts, and officially sanctioned ethnic discrimination - sometimes resulting in civil war - has become prevalent (*ibid*: cited in Adebanwi and Obadare, 2010: 393-4).

2.5 Popular music in postcolonial Nigeria

Available data suggests that it is uncertain if there was recorded music by a Nigerian as at the time of the amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates in 1914. Evergreen Musical Company Limited (EMCL) is a pro-highlife music firm. The company oversaw the compilation of 110 evergreen popular Nigerian songs towards the country's centenary celebrations in 2014. The Chief Executive Officer of EMCL, Femi Esho believes that Nigerian musicians had composed songs and were singing before the amalgamation of 1914. These compositions are however unrecorded outside of oral traditions and successions owing to the prevalent technological dearth at the time. Esho is however certain that as of 1919, five years after amalgamation, the duo of Irenle Denge and Atari Ajanaku had music material in actual recorded form (Thisday Live, 2014). The centenary compilation by EMCL included the first work by a Nigerian musician to be celebrated internationally 'Eroya' by Ambrose Campbell which came much later after 1919 (*ibid.*).

The Nigerian Music Industry is controlled by the Copyright Act enforced by the Nigerian Copyright Commission (NCC) who monitors all goings on of the industry. The Nigerian music industry comprises music publishing companies and collecting societies such as the Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON) who perform duties under Section 39 (1) of the Copyright Act on behalf of record companies and artists who are the copyright owners of the recorded music. Such duties which include the monitoring of how the recorded music of the owners of the copyright is used; entering into negotiations with prospective users of such works (companies who want to use the work as a soundtrack to their film or TV show or to endorse their products); granting of licenses on the grounds of fees pre-arranged; and the collection of licensing fees and the payment of these to the various copyright owners of such rights (African Examiner, 2014).

2.5.1 Popular music in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria

Tony Okoroji (2009) writes of the internationally recognized drummer Ginger Baker who collaborated and recorded frequently with Fela Anikulapo-Kuti in the 1970s. Baker set up a 16 ARC studio in Ikeja which was later acquired by Phonogram in the early 1980s. Structures as these were responsible for the thriving music industry and the accompanying developments of popular musicians in Nigeria following independence. In fact, after the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70, there was a host of multi-national recording companies doing business in Nigeria. Okoroji writes of the dominant record labels which included Philips (later Phonogram), Polygram and Decca (later Afrodisia). The 1980s in Nigeria, according to Okoroji, was characterized by healthy investment into music by local investors like Chief GAD Tabansi through his Tabansi Records, Haruna Ishola's Phonodisk, Roger All Stars (RAS) Records in

eastern Nigeria and CBS Records (previously distributed in Nigeria through a partnership with EMI) set up offices also in Ikeja, Lagos (Okoroji, 2009).

It was the healthy investment into a thriving industry that was responsible for the successes of several of postcolonial Nigeria's popular musicians: Fela, Sonny Okosuns and Onyeka Onwenu found substantial fame and fortune through the stables of EMI; Chief I. K. Dairo and Ebenezer Obey were signed to Decca at some point; Sir Shina Peters, Adewale Ayuba, and Majek Fashek were clients of CBS and later of Sony Music; Ras Kimono, Blackky, Oritz Williki, Evi Edna Ogoli, Victor Essiet and The Mandators, as well as Femi Kuti constituted an impressive ensemble signed on Polygram. The aforementioned artists are evidences of a proper music structure obtainable in Nigeria between the 1970s and the early 1990s. Coups d'état and counter coups d'état by successive military regimes coupled with inconsistent policies imposed an unbearable business environment on these recording companies who could no longer bear the brunt of instability. One particularly unbearable policy of the Nigerian government at this time was the Nigerianization policy which was anything but friendly to multinational recording labels. And so, one after the other, the exodus of these recording companies transpired. The exit of Polygram Records in 1989 which had to be sold to Premier music signaled the end of major labels' operations in Nigeria. Mediocrity then took root and piracy festered.

2.5.2 Popular music in post-1999 Nigeria

"With liberalization and globalization, new ideas, concepts, and models of urban youth identity became more easily accessible to African youth, who creatively appropriated some of them and developed African rap music and local forms of hip-hop culture" (Künzler and Reuster-Jahn,

2012: 90). It is against this backdrop that the post-1999 Nigeria popular music culture may be understood. The exit of major labels as explored through pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria meant that several artists departed the country as well. One such example who is still an active musician is Victor Essiet who granted me an interview via Skype from his present base in the USA where he is self-exiled. As such, the artists who grew up following the exit of these labels met no structures on the ground. Nonetheless, "the 1990s…witnessed the development of computer-aided music production and its incursion into Nigeria made it easy and cheap to make music. [Youth] with budding musical talents but no recording companies around to develop them, resorted to making music digitally and cutting promotional CDs for radio stations and DJs. The common social experience for young people during this period was a mounting frustration caused by the harsh socio-economic situation, which…produced social tension in both rural and urban settings" (Adedeji, 2013: 2).

Beyond the Do-It-Yourself dynamic at play, a few indigenous record labels were also beginning to spring up in sync with the nation's democratization, although these were set up in such a way that the labels made profit at the expense of the signed artists who were severely exploited. One such notable label is Kennis Music – a label that has signed on artists since the late 1990s and early 2000s many of whom are not well off presently. But beyond the exploitation of artists by labels, Adedeji (2010) delineates three major challenges plaguing the Nigerian music industry in contemporary times. He lists these as Piracy /copyright issue and the 'Alaba Marketers', lack of official government policy, as well as a lack of proper understanding of the music industry by artists (*ibid*: 255). Adedeji speaks of the informal and unquantified nature of Nigerian popular music as well as an availability of really dismal sales' figures and data

which portray the country in a consumer rather than a productive light. Noting that piracy is a global affliction, Adedeji is of the view that its Nigerian variant is nonetheless characterized by utter openness and a bizarre impunity. Okoroji (2009) traces the roots of piracy in postcolonial Nigeria to the introduction of the cassette technology globally. He observes that because the Nigerian music sector was slow to catch up with the global trend, the pirates moved in and produced pirate versions even before the official release of some records.

According to Adedeji, this continued with the introduction of optical technology for music dissemination in the 1990s which made piracy even easier and copying faster and more accessible once a computer and a blank CD-R were available. He notes that piracy in Nigeria continued to rise steadily and peaked at 95 per cent level for records and music in 2006 which resulted in an estimated loss of US$119 million in music and allied industries according to the IIPA[1] reports of 2007. Adedeji proceeds to locate the proliferation of piracy and abuse of intellectual property rights in the vacuum that resulted with the exodus of major labels in the 1980s. These labels dealt with qualified agents and networks in the distribution of music. Presently, however, music marketers based mainly at the Alaba International market, in Ojoo, Lagos have usurped the role of these agents unchallenged. Adedeji observes that these marketers were once electronics and spare parts dealers who imported their source of trade from countries like Singapore and China, explaining how they rapidly got into the CD replication process to become the heart of the piracy operation in Nigeria.

[1] IIPA is an acronym for the International Intellectual Property Alliance. Its report on Nigeria is available from: <http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2007/2007SPEC301NIGERIA.pdf>

2Shotz, a notable Nigerian hip hop act and pioneer, meanwhile, wrote and dedicated his very successful and suggestively named duo of albums *Pirated Copy* (2004) and *Original Copy* (2007) to the pirates eating into the industry wherein he continuously referenced the 'Alaba Boys'. Adedeji's and Okoroji's concerns are thus confirmed through the creative work of a contemporary practitioner. Yet there have been more voices committed against piracy coming from the ranks of popular musicians through post-1999 Nigeria. Adedeji's study enumerates several strategies aimed at combating piracy which were at the behest of the Nigerian government in alliance with concerned practitioners. Some of these strategies include those launched by the Nigerian Copyrights Commission like the Strategy Against Piracy (STRAP, 2005). In spite of these efforts, Adedeji notes a stark inadequacy with the measures. On 4 February, 2015, the United States Chamber of Commerce's Global Intellectual Property Center (GIPC) released its 2015 International Intellectual Property Index. The Index showed that for the second year in a row, Nigeria maintained its dismal overall percentage score of 9.8 out of 30, placing Nigeria in the 25th position out of 30 countries assessed (Global Intellectual Property Center – US Chamber of Commerce, 2015).

It thus becomes a function of time to ascertain if the recently inaugurated COSON is better equipped to deal with the issues of piracy thus create an environment where musical artists could reap the dividends of their creative works. Indeed, only recently, COSON set aside the first of September to celebrate No Music Day in Nigeria. The annual celebration is aimed at drawing attention to the widespread of copyright as it affects the rights of performers, bands, music composers, recording artists, song writers, music publishers and other creative people in the music industry. The mode of marking the day follows the Nigerian Music Industry

Coalition's request that all broadcast and radio stations across the country not broadcast music between the hour of 9am and 10am every 1st of September. Instead stations were encouraged to employ the hour for discussions, debates, interviews and documentaries on the state of intellectual property rights and the rights of creative people in Nigeria. Newspapers and magazines are not left out as they have been encouraged to do special features to mark the day. There is also a bonfire of pirated materials at COSON headquarters on the day (Nigerian Law Intellectual Property Watch, 2014).

The barrage of challenges nonetheless, post-1999 Nigerian popular music has shown itself to be resilient against the odds. In fact, the music of Nigerian popular musicians is highly appreciated and well regarded across the African continent and beyond. In a recent interview with the popular Nigerian Tabloid, The Sun, a leading Ghanaian hip-life musician, Okyeama Kwame (also known as the 'Rap Docter') shed light on the growth of Nigerian popular music and demonstrated the source of its foremost position in the continent. Kwame told his interviewer: "I like Nigerian music because it is a fusion of urban popular culture and the indigenous Nigerian traditional music. It has identity, a form and absolute shape, vibrant and very Nigerian. Most rappers, sometimes when we try to be urban, we drift away from our African self and become Americanized. Nigerian music has identity – from the accents, to the philosophy, to the rhythm. Nigerian songs are original. That is why they have taken over African music scene" (The Sun, 2015). Notably "It would seem that multimedia [has] contributed to the low number of live performances in Nigeria and to a decrease in the importance of acquiring instrumental skills among pop musicians there" (Onyeji, 2005: 23).

2.6 The languages of popular music culture through postcolonial Nigeria

Rotimi Fasan in his impressive study ‘‘Wetin dey happen?’: Wazobia, popular arts and nationhood’ (2015) traces the origins of the use of the English language in Nigeria. Fasan’s opening sentence is striking to the following extent: “English was not just a means of communication between the colonialists and the various peoples that would become part of an amalgamated Nigeria in 1914, it was also a sign, more appropriately, a social semiosis of both acceptance[s] into the dominant world of British rule and all it promised, as well as a mark of superiority over the indigenous population” (Fasan, 2015: 7). His is, as he puts it, “an exploration of this phenomenon, detailing the rise of English in Nigeria, the simultaneous relegation of the indigenous languages, and the transgressive role of hip-hop in the discursive practice of oppositionality that the vernacular languages now pose to English” (i*bid*: 8).

Fasan proceeds to detail the adverse effects which resulted from the imposition of English language in Nigeria which included the psychological blow on users of the indigenous languages. In fact, the people’s original languages became known as ‘vernaculars’ – a testament to the cultural usurpation which colonialism and the English language served to represent. As such, a myriad of arts and practices steeped in cultures and languages indigenous to the Nigerian nation-space lost their prestige as they were considered inferior to the English language and culture. This second-fiddle predicament continued into the nation’s postcolonial phase as Nigeria gained political independence without commensurate economic and cultural independence. It therefore turned out that this de-indigenization of Nigerian culture through English went beyond official government circles and the educational system and into its dominance in the mass media ranging from print, broadcast and popular music.

Fasan's work is thorough enough to synthesize a historical overview of the English language in Nigeria which was already the dominant medium – in its pidgin form - of communication before colonialism. According to Fasan, the pidgin form of English had served mercantile uses along the West African coast from as early as the seventeenth century. This English agenda was sustained by missionaries who, in the second half of the nineteenth century, recruited natives to be conversant with the Bible and to interpret the English text to the local population. Fasan reports that at this time, the indigenous languages flourished without hindrance while English was taught through dictation, reading, writing, grammar, and composition. The launching of the assault on the indigenous languages was carried out through an Ordinance enacted in 1882 which made English the language of instruction in schools. The simultaneous exclusion of the indigenous languages meant English assumed a position of superiority to the indigenous languages. The colonial administration in fact matched talk with deed by ensuring that schools only got funded only if English was the medium of instruction. It wasn't until an Ordinance in 1887 that anti-colonial agitations yielded some dividends and made the administration concede to the use of the indigenous languages alongside English as means of instruction in schools.

In spite of this, English language proficiency was what was valued the most. A mandatory requirement for the position of a clerk – which was the sole white-collar job available to the natives in the colonial civil service – was this proficiency. The agenda continued to flourish with the pronouncement in the postcolonial constitutions of 1979 and 1999 that English language was one of Nigeria's official languages. "[In] the absence of a lingua franca based on any of the country's indigenous languages, English would assume a pervasive role in

virtually every aspect of interpersonal communication in Nigeria" (Fasan, 2015: 9). Fasan's concern is with how the use of English through Nigeria's history led to a "bifurcation of cultural behaviour into 'high' and 'low' culture where English represents high culture and the indigenous languages low culture" (*ibid*: 8). But more so with the competition among the various ethnic groups in the country that effectively put paid to any possibility of making any of the indigenous languages the country's lingua franca. The official language adopted on independence in 1960 was English, a legacy of the British, even though there was a move to develop an official language(s) out of the indigenous ones to create and foster a truly Nigerian identity, but the issue of language(s) and the need to adopt one or more official language(s) in Nigeria has been a sensitive one due to ethnic rivalry and its effects in politics. In fact, it had been considered and thought a prudent option to relegate the indigenous languages to the superiority of the official English owing to tensions stemming from inter-ethnic relations. Nonetheless the three major languages of Hausa, Yorùbá and Igbo were given better prominence and recognized nationally as the main indigenous languages because of the population of their users. Additionally, the Nigerian Pidgin remains widely spoken.

It is arguable that 1999 was an approximate date wherein the tremendous esteem accorded to the English language in Nigeria began to gradually lose its hold. That the much celebrated democratization also took off in 1999 is no coincidence. One of the dividends of democracy was the realization of a freedom of expression by the Nigerian population. As the liberalization in the electronic media engendered an unprecedented growth in the broadcast industry with numerous radio and television interests acquiring licenses to be on air, thus compete the hitherto monopoly of the state-owned broadcast houses; so did the average

Nigerian gain what could be termed a deregulation of the utterance culture. Within popular music, hip-hop became an increasingly expressive tool which soon got indigenized as Afro hip-hop. Rapping in the English language became increasingly isolated as those artists who performed in Pidgin English and the indigenous languages began to dominate the scene. Fasan's bleakly painted scenario wherein English assumed significance that was inversely proportional to the significance of the indigenous languages in the everyday activities of the people waned as other genres including juju and fuji regained their prestige in a phenomenon which Fasan terms a transition from post-Nigerian to pan-Naija.

A striking feature through the texts of Fela's music is the language of communication. It is seen that Fela employs code-switching in various degrees with respect to his base language: Pidgin English. The evidence of a predominance of Pidgin English through the texts of his music is nonetheless a given, and this has been developed by other musicians across the country to date. Fasan (2015) offers that the indigenization or domestication of the linguistic space in Nigeria did not begin with Fela citing the initial efforts of other Western-trained indigenous music practitioners like Mojola Agbebi, Fela Sowande, and Akin Euba among others who made conscious attempts to 'nativise' Nigerian musicology (*ibid*: 10). *The pidginization of the airwaves* is such that in 2001 Olatunji wrote: "Many popular musicians have used Pidgin in their composition and performances to be able to reach a wide audience...In the search for a common identity; musical compositions in Pidgin English might be the answer to giving Nigerians a sense of shared heritage" (Olatunji, 2001). Indeed the place of Pidgin English in contemporary popular music in the continent is illustrated by the observation that as of 2nd January, 2014, 'Africa 10' – a musical countdown on *Trace Urban* - had eight of the top ten

tracks in the continent employ code-switching, seven of which included some Pidgin English. The same weekend, precisely on 3rd January, 2014, the popular Nigerian-based music channel *Sound City* aired its inaugural 'Top Ten Nigeria Countdown' for 2014. Nine of the ten tracks on the countdown of 2014's opening weekend used Pidgin English. Pidgin English is without doubt the staple language of Anglophone Africa. This is better appreciated on noting that both countdown-shows referenced base their decisions on audience votes.

Gary Stewart, meanwhile, documents how the Nigerian civil war of 1967 – 70 "killed highlife and fostered the popularity of ethnic styles like juju" (Stewart, 1992: 102) adding that the war "seriously affected the music scene [wherein] highlife bands, which generally tended to reflect the country's diverse ethnic mixture, suddenly lost their Igbo members, who retreated to the east" (*ibid*: 125). The implication of the civil war on the Nigerian music scene becomes apparent on noting the dearth of popular music material released in the country through the period. As Stewart observes, "…nightlife was radically curtailed by blackouts and the ranks of musicians thinned by conscription" (*ibid*: 125). This is palpable through political music material.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has offered a critical understanding of Nigeria. The country's economic, geographical, social, and political profile constitutes demographics through which the chapter discusses the media industry. This is followed by a discussion of studies focused on the country's political and electoral challenges. The working environment with which popular music thrives is assessed in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria and in post-1999 Nigeria. Issues discussed through these periods include censorship, piracy, globalization, record labels' exodus; and digitalization. The metamorphosis of language in Nigerian popular music through the years

completes a chapter which sets the agenda as the context for the texts subsequently read through critical discourse analysis.

CHAPTER THREE

THE METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology adopted by this research. The thesis engages an amalgam of methods comprising critical discourse analysis, con-textual analysis, and an assortment of qualitative and quantitative audience contributory approaches in isolating a 'political music' genre. Data for this research was gathered and obtained from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources were drawn from my fieldwork on Nigeria's popular music and popular music audiences conducted between 2012 and 2014 in the cities of Lagos, Bayelsa, and Adamawa. Musicians, disc jockeys, politicians, journalists, academics, and students are among the contributions to the analyses of popular political music works. This methodological undertaking in reception theory is bolstered by the imperative to avoid the pit of blandly chronicling a culture. In presenting the evidence, there is a conscious effort to provide verbatim quotes in order to filter possible influence of personal bias in the way evidence is used to analyze the situation.

Further sources for the study include works that gave historical and background information. This includes books, journals, newspapers, magazines, thesis and dissertation materials as well as the internet. Recorded music in terms of CDs, music videos and documentaries were also consulted and analysed while television programmes and interviews on popular music also served as part of my secondary sources. In the course of the fieldwork I did need the use of letters of introduction which my supervisor had prepared for me in order to engage with discussants. Most of my subjects were happy for me to

inform them verbally about my research and none actually requested to sign the consent form as they gave their consent verbally, though I still followed the requirements of research ethics by letting them understand their rights as regards information and materials provided.

On ethical considerations, I have had to deal with two key issues in this regard. The first regards my own personal dimension and interest in this research, which admittedly precedes the research itself. This is a matter of reflexivity, that is, the self-awareness of the place of the researcher in every research. This is a particularly important concept for all critical research methods, one of which is used here. As an interdisciplinary researcher my persuasions and research interests lie across the broad areas of intersection between political science, media and communication studies, particularly within the Nigerian system to which I am most familiar. Thus, it is this interest that draws me to the topic in the first place. The second regards my compelling interest in popular music and its potentials for a given society like postcolonial Nigeria. I am an ardent follower of popular music and popular music discourses. The critical analysis of the political music genre advocated by this thesis has not necessarily changed that. Finally, there is the basic and standard ethical consideration of all researches: academic honesty and integrity. In this regard, I declare that all sources used or quoted in this study have been properly acknowledged and documented within the main research itself and in the bibliography, to the best of my knowledge.

The permission to quote popular music lyrics through postcolonial Nigeria was sought and obtained from the Copyright Society of Nigeria (COSON) which is the sole collective management organisation (CMO) approved by the Nigerian Copyright Commission

(NCC) to act on behalf of authors, composers, performers, publishers of Musical works and owners of sound recordings in Nigeria.

3.2 Con-textual Analysis

Norman Fairclough opens his 'Critical Discourse Analysis as a Method in Social Scientific Research' (2001) by declaring certain reservations about the concept of 'method'. Fairclough is of the view that the temptation to consider a 'method' some sort of transferable skill is very high once such a 'method' is understood to be a technique; "a tool in a box of tools, which can be resorted to when needed and then returned to the box" (*ibid*: 121) as he puts it. Instead, insists Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is as much theory as method. This theory and method, according to Fairclough, is in a dialogical relationship with other social theories and methods with which it ought to engage with in a way that isn't merely interdisciplinary but trandisciplinary. By this, Fairclough refers to the ways in which the particular co-engagements on particular aspects of the social process may yield "developments of theory and method which shift the boundaries between theories and methods" (Fairclough, 2001: 121-122). That is: each method and theory ought to be open to the theoretical logics of others, open to internalizing them in a way which can transform the relationships between them (*ibid*).

Based on the extent to which this researcher imbibes Fairclough's foregoing concern, the subsequent analysis of the subgenres shall proceed freely. The analysis of political music texts of postcolonial Nigeria shall be inferred to naturally connote a cultural grounding which is accessible through a discussion of CDA. The present chapter's discussion of the subject should suffice. The analysis which is to follow is therefore free of CDA registers of 'power', 'history', 'and ideology'. The section would instead simply show that popular

musicians through postcolonial Nigeria possessed sensibilities to produce protest political music whose texts are accessible as an alternative form of popular music. The discussion of alternative media in Chapter 4 should suffice as that of CDA in chapter 3. As such, the duo of textual and contextual analyses, in this instance, represent the "other social theories and methods" (Fairclough, 2001: 121-122) in a dialogical and transdisciplinary relationship with CDA. The chapters on the subgenres each find that political music texts of pre-1999 Nigeria have informed political sound bites of the post-1999 years. Yet pre-2004 political music texts, for example, continue to inform present day sound bites in this language recycle. All of these demonstrate the efficacy of CDA as practical theory.

Bearing the contexts of postcolonial Nigeria and time/date, political music texts are carefully extracted from various repositories of popular music materials of postcolonial Nigeria. The import of this subtle textual-contextual link is in comprehending a given song's texts with a sense of the presented political reality in the country at the time of the song's production. The study proceeded to interact with a number of Nigerian popular musicians and politicians in order to obtain a first-hand grasp of the relationships between the ordinarily separate and distinct constituencies. And while this episode of the larger field component of this document was relatively successful, it did not bear discursive fruits to best equate with the primary mandate of the study: to define an empirical theory of the relationships between political music production, appropriation, and consumption in postcolonial Nigeria.

Principally, I was based at the American University of Nigeria (AUN), Yola, Adamawa state, between January 2013 and April 2014 where I was engaged in the dual roles of 'Publications Manager' at the institution's Office of Communications, as well as of 'Instructor' for 'Feature Writing', 'Advanced News Writing' and 'Principles of Public

Relations'. The engagement afforded an exposure to various categories of audiences including students, staff, and faculty members. Indeed, students of the departments of 'Communications and Multimedia Design' and of 'International and Comparative Politics' were significant to the methodical approach. Equally crucial was the leeway the former engagement provided in meeting and discussing with a number of Nigerian popular cultural producers ranging between comedians, actors, and musicians. Through the fieldwork in Yola, I interviewed Nigerian popular musicians including Eva Alordiah, Pryse, Timaya, Jesse Jagz, Black Magic, and Iyanya. I also interacted with several upcoming acts amongst the university student body and the local community. Broadway's Adesola Osakalumi was the lead act on Nigeria's 53rd anniversary (Independence Day celebration: 1st October, 2013) at AUN. Osakalumi, along with a host of AUN students he coached, delivered a memorable performance of Fela's *Zombie* on the occasion. Following a mix of observations made at the interviews conducted with various cultural acts, I constituted the interviews as performances through study. After all, interviews have increasingly become performances for many a commercial and political act in recent times. The rule of the *horse's mouth reigning supreme* is thus curtailed critically throughout the research project.

Outside of the principal location of Adamawa, I sought empirical data in other Nigerian states comprising Delta, Edo, Nasarawa, Niger, Bayelsa, Lagos, and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. Outside Adamawa, interview performances were obtained from Nigerian popular musicians including Victor Essiet of the Mandators, Charles 'Charly Boy' Oputa, the Mamuzee twins, Raw Nwanne, Samklef, Chris Mba, and Ras Kimono; academics - including the head of department, Theatre and Cultural Studies at the Nasarawa State University, Keffi; the erstwhile Director General of the Nigerian Film Institute, Jos and erstwhile head of the department, Theatre Arts, University of Ibadan. Other academics

whose perspectives were sought in the course of the study include a burgeoning political communications scholar at the Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida University, Lapai, Niger State; a senior lecturer at the department of English, University of Lagos; an assistant professor of journalism at the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa; a reader in cultural theory at Coventry University, United Kingdom as well as several professors and instructors at AUN, Yola – the principal base for the study. Inputs were also sought from several officers at the Musical Copyright Society of Nigeria (MCSN) and National Council for Arts and Culture (NCAC) key of which were the latter's Director for Research and Documentation as well as the former's chief executive. Politically, the Director General of the National Orientation Agency; the Executive Governor of Bayelsa state; the senior special assistant on e-governance to the Bayelsa state government; the deputy chief of staff and the commissioner for information and strategy at the Lagos state government house, Alausa-Ikeja formed the core of resource persons' performances of the study.

Noteworthy are the circumstances of time, record-keeping imperfections and the people's value and maintenance structures which ensure that there are popular songs whose lyrics exist mainly in audiences' memories (hearts and mouths). The study found that the state of Nigerian cultural archives guarantees that if the nation's musical tradition isn't to erode, recourse to oral culture is the one means through which some of these 'extinct' materials can be accessed and restored. In spite of a long, patient, painstaking and consolidated search through television and radio houses, the archives of the MCSN, of the NCAC, and of the Federal Ministry of Information, not all of the mainstream political music materials through postcolonial Nigeria were accessed. The study has had to rely on audiences' memories to make documentation possible sometimes; for whereas I am versed

in English, Pidgin English, and Yoruba languages; popular political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria has employed more languages in lyrical delivery. The latitude of material available ensured that the study looked closely and attentively at the music texts of a number of leading music stars. After all, “through the interrogation of the philosophical sources of the idea of meaning, or, “presence,” in metaphysics, politics will be transformed” (Rothman, 1996: 235). The result is a political music journal of postcolonial Nigeria whose chronology is historically and politically meaningful.

3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Political texts draw from many fields of social life and activity outside of politics itself. This implies that political texts are never value free statements drawn together to appeal to an audience, rather, they are constructed by a careful articulation of the ideological values and discourses that are dominant and therefore generally acceptable within the society. In order to deconstruct political texts as narrations within recognizable ideological values and discourses, Critical Discourse Analysis is a method of analysing texts and talk developed by Norman Fairclough, Teun van Dijk and others. The method involves the use of relevant critical theories in the social sciences and humanities to analyse many kinds of texts. Critical Discourse Analysis is an open political agenda, and as such is concerned with analysing, by criticising, how unequal power relations and ideologies are legitimated and naturalised in all kinds of text and talk, such as news, speeches, documents, conversation, interviews, images, books, texts of comedy, advertorials as well as music as in the present study. Where Critical Discourse Analysis is used to analyse a political text e.g. political music texts, it is called political discourse analysis. It is commonly known by the acronym CDA, or PDA in the latter instance.

3.3.1 CDA: Theory of the 'Discourse' and of the 'Critical'

CDA refers to a set of theories that are diverse, and a set of research methods - e.g. textual and context analyses - that underline these theories. It therefore defies any other definition, although there is an agreement amongst academics and researchers that deal with CDA on two important elements; CDA focuses on 'discourse' in terms of 'text' and it analyses it in a 'critical' format. Researching discourse is also critical as it engages the workings of discourse in the interest of power by trying to expose the connections between the use of language and other elements that relates to social life; but most importantly, because it focuses on the discursiveness of social problems (van Dijk, 2008; Fairclough, 2001). In addition, CDA is critical because it assumes that "all thought is fundamentally mediated by power relations that are socially and historically situated and that mainstream research practices are generally implicated in the reproduction of systems of class, race and gender oppression" (Locke, 2004: 25-26). Critical discourse analysis therefore approaches the object of its enquiry by engaging with it through a set of normative assumptions which influence the entire topic, including the kind of research questions asked, the method of analysis and the interpretation of answers.

Several conceptions of discourse with wide-ranging implications have been adduced to Michel Foucault. These definitions are all involved with the constructionist theory of meaning and representation. Foucault once remarked that:

> ...instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the word 'discourse', I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements (- Michel Foucault; in Mills, 1997:6).

Generally, Foucault holds that the term discourse is a representation which provides for us a

way of communicating the knowledge about any topic or object at any given time. In other words, “discourse is the production of knowledge through language” (Hall, 2001: 72). What is said to be the "truth" at any given instance, what is said, what is not said as well as what is/can be thought about are determined by the discourse around them. According to Foucault, reality may exist in the external world, however, our knowledge and understanding of it is based on the rules of discourse and the discursive structures it produces. With this connection, it is obvious that discourse determines the knowledge we have of ourselves and of other people and the world in general. For meaning revolves around discourse. Discourse regulates conducts and institutional practices and therefore it is impossible to separate it from power (Hall, 2001; Mills, 1997; McHoul and Grace, 1993).

Indeed, other critical discourse analysts have found Foucault’s discourse theory useful, they nonetheless more usually analyse it from a narrower linguistic perspective of “patterns of language in use” (Taylor, 2001: 6) that is as a process of “meaning making in social life” (Wetherell et al., 2001: 3), or “diverse representations of social life which are inherently positioned. Thus different social actors see and represent social life in different ways, as discourses” (Fairclough, 2001: 235). In summary, it can be said that the theoretical backgrounds for critical discourse analysis are wide ranging and complex; therefore, reinforcing the analytical tool it uses.

3.3.2 CDA: Linking Theory to Method

CDA has both a theoretical and practical motive. It is used for analysing the ways in which discourses structure power relations among various social actors and the ways in which such relations foster dominance and inequality in society. Luke (2002: 96) explains that CDA is “an explicitly normative analysis of how texts and discourses work in ideological interests

with powerful political consequences". CDA's main concern is with social issues and problems, thus attempts to understand how language (discourse) figures in social interactions on the assumptions that language use is socially determined and therefore very well connected to relations of power. It argues that power relations are discursive; that discourse serves ideological and hegemonic purposes and hence mediates the link between text and society. In the words of Norman Fairclogh, CDA aims:

> ...to make visible, through analysis, and to criticize, connections between properties of texts and social processes and relations which are generally not obvious to people who produce and interpret those texts, and whose effectiveness depends on this opacity (Fairclough, 2010: 132).

As a result of this, what is most important to CDA include concepts and issues of this kind of power, ideology and history and with these we draw that the main commitment is for justice and social equality. It is therefore in this sense that CDA can be said to be multidisciplinary in its theoretical sources, areas of research and methodological tools; hence its use in many research areas from literary studies, media and cultural studies, education, linguistics, social psychology to economic and political analysis (Fairclough, 2001; 2010; van Dijk, 2008; 2009; Wodak, 2001; Resigl and Wodak, 2009).

Theoretically, CDA originates from various works and ideas that fall mainly with the "critical" tradition of scholarship that can be traced as far back as Karl Marx. It draws from the Frankfurt School that cultural processes have important consequences and effects on the character and structure of society in their own right; hence it cannot be merely regarded as a true reflection of the economic systems assumed by classical Marxism. Jurgen Habermas communicative theory and his conception of discourse as an ideal liberation for democratic societies are remarkably noteworthy here. Also, the Neo-Marxist has critiqued the ideology and hegemony in the works of Stuart Hall, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser

- each influential in the theoretical advancement of CDA. Also, we cannot leave out Foucault's notion on the connection between knowledge, power and social subject (Fairclough, 2001). Most directly, CDA has been associated with United Kingdom scholars since the late 1970s and early 1980s in the form of critical linguistics. To mention a few; it can be noticed in the works of Roger Fowler, Gunther Kress, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Theo van Leeuwen, and Ruth Wodak, to mention a few (Fairclough, 2001; Wodak, 2001; Luke, 2002). Certainly CDA is now commonly associated with this later group of scholars and each of them have their own different approach to CDA both theoretically and methodologically.

3.3.3 Three Models of CDA Theory and Practice

Whereas there are several versions of CDA, three of the more established forms are considered in the present study. The first is the **discourse-cognition-society** approach that is associated with Teun van Dijk. van Dijk is concerned with the study of the relations between power, discourse, social dominance and inequality. According to his view of CDA, it is the concept of 'power' which has the ability for groups to exercise control over the minds and behaviours of other groups in the society. However, social cognition becomes fundamental to the critical analysis of discourse and communication because of the system with which power is usually validated; through persuasion and discursive practices. In other words, social power is produced and reproduced through the ways in which the discourses of dominant groups in society shape social knowledge (van Dijk, 2001a; 2001b; 2008; 2009). Hence, the practice of CDA should focus on both *contextual and discursive* structures of texts by inquiring into how powerful groups control public discourse, how such discourse control and influence the minds or actions of less powerful groups, and most significantly

the consequences of all these on social justice and equality (van Dijk, 2008).

The **discourse-historical approach** is associated with Ruth Wodak. She develops her theory out of 'linguistic activity' in sociolinguistics which holds that every linguistic activity, such as speech, writing or music, is influenced by extra-linguistic factors, sociological variables and psychological determinants such as the status of the participants, the setting and time and place, age, gender, and experience etc. (Titscher *et al*., 2000). For Ruth Wodak, social-psychological, cognitive and linguistic dimensions of text production are all important in the process of text production because the things people say in an instance of discursive interaction is shaped by certain frames and schemata that they acquired during socialisation which influences the way they perceive reality. Therefore, critical analysis of texts and discourses requires a scrutiny of the historical and socio-cognitive processes by which individuals socialise by aiming to "integrate a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive events are embedded" (Wodak, 2001: 65).

Discourse-relational approach to CDA that is associated with the works of Norman Fairclough is possibly the best developed and widely used version of CDA in literature (Luke, 2002). According to Fairclough (2010) one cannot separate the ways one sees or speaks from discourse, ideology or hegemony because these things are determined by the individual's social location.

> There is a dual relationship of discourse to hegemony in that hegemonic practice and struggle take the form of discursive practice in spoken and written communication. On the other hand, discourse is itself a sphere of cultural hegemony which in general shapes discursive practices and orders of discourse (*ibid*: 130).

Therefore, in an attempt to explain the hegemonic interests of dominant groups in societies,

we need to take these aspects into focus especially how discourses are articulated. For Fairclough, doing CDA of texts involves three stages. The first is the *linguistic/semiotic analysis* of the text where the analyst pays attention to semiotic and linguistic features of the text, the second stage is the interdiscursive analysis of the text where the identification and analyses of the intertextual features of the text and the way they are articulated are scrutinised. The last stage is the *social analysis* phase where the previous 2 phases are compared to a network of social practices in the aim of identification of instances and the use of language with respect to social relations of power and equality (Fairclough, 2010; 2009; 2001a).

It is obvious that the various types of CDA examined above are similar to the common concern with questions relating to power and ideology and their hegemonic legitimisation through discourse. Also, we can observe the critical theory tradition of various forms amongst various disciplines within their theoretical background. Lastly, the practical steps in analysing each of them involve the examination of both contextual and textual properties of the text.

3.3.4 PDA: A CDA of Political Text

Political Discourse Analysis is the application of CDA to political texts in the various formats in which they exist (Fairclough, 2010; 2001a; 2000; van Dijk, 1997). A good number of the topics that have formed the subject of most CDA research are social and political issues hence the texts examined are usually in different forms of political discourse such as policy documents, parliamentary debates, media interviews with political leaders, political speeches of various kinds, and often political advertisements (*ibid*). The present study makes an addition of political music to the growing list. For Fairclough (2010), meanwhile,

much CDA research on political discourse has focused attention on questions of legitimation, manipulation, ideology, and identity. For example, Fairclough studies political discourse through the analysis of the political style of former Prime Minister Tony Blair through his many texts which include his speeches, newspaper articles and policy documents (Fairclough, 2010; 2001a; 2000). Fairclough finds that the language of New Labour under Blair is a form of political discourse which attempts to harmonise or even deny the serious ideological conflicts between the political Left and Right in order to disguise the fact that the Labour Party was actually tilting towards the Right in order to appeal to the middle and upper middle sections of the British public, as against the working classes to which the Labour party had been ideologically associated.

This kind of study or political discourse using CDA gives insightful information for the political and social consequences of the ideological work of different kinds of discourse in the society through the media, political system and education. This is why this method is useful in studying political music discourse forms such as protest political music, unity political music and terrestrial praise political music. Firstly, political songs are themselves discursive practices and processes during which highly ideological discourses, often masked in vague and opaque language of professional political editors and music executives, which are presented to the popular music public in order to build consent over how their lives have been and or ought to be governed during a specified period of time. This implies that political songs are potential fora for political manipulation, manufacturing consent and legitimating ideologies of politicians, especially taking into account the unequal relations of power between the politicians, political musicians and the broad audiences of these two categories. Secondly, it is very useful to critically analyse the text and style of popular musicians relevant in the protest political music subgenre at times of crises just as it is useful

to understand the text and style of popular musicians relevant in the terrestrial praise political music subgenre at elections when politicians are occupied with election campaigns and offering patronage to popular musicians.

3.3.5 Data, Data Selection and Analytical Tool

The object of CDA research is discourse, whether it is political social, economic or even academic discourse. However, on its own, discourse is generated in text and talk in social intercourse in fields like government, politics, education, commerce and everyday life. All of these constitute data for doing CDA research. The data I am dealing with here are the political music manifestations and texts of Nigerian popular musicians through the nation's postcolonial history. Most of these are available in tape, compact discs, music videos and audio recordings such as YouTube and naijapals.com. The political music material of postcolonial Nigeria can be considered to have commenced with a 1969 recording by Fela Anikulapo-Kuti following Nigeria's independence in 1960 and the subsequent civil war of 1967-70. As such, the period being reviewed here covers some four to five decades of postcolonial Nigeria's political life. Surely, as popular musicians in a country as vast and frequently troubled as Nigeria, the intuition and inspiration to write and produce political music must be intense. The population for this study is constituted by these popular musicians and their political music works (Deacon *et al*., 2009). I have selected the works of a number of popular musicians from this population on the basis of purposive sampling method, a technique often used for selecting material for qualitative research where elements are selected based on their perceived importance to the event being studied (Deacon *et al*., 2009). These are six popular musicians with works in the protest political music subgenre – Fela Anikulapo-Kuti, Victor Essiet, Osayomore Joseph (pre-1999 Nigeria),

and Femi Kuti, Blackface, Mr Raw Nwanne (post-1999 Nigeria); an array of popular musicians with works in the unity political music subgenre – King Sunny Ade, Sonny Okosuns, Onyeka Onwenu, Veno Marioghae, Funmi Adams, Bongos Ikwue (pre-1999 Nigeria), and Lagbaja, KUSH, Tony Tetuila, Sammy Okposo, Julius Agwu, Banky W, Timi Dakolo (post-1999 Nigeria), and select popular musicians for the terrestrial praise political music subgenre. Each of the subgenres of protest political music, unity political music and terrestrial praise political music represent crucial modes of conveyance for the pre-1999 and post-1999 challenges of postcolonial Nigeria's nationhood. All of these provide justification for the 'purposive' selection.

It has been established that the analytical tool used here is Fairclough's analytical model of CDA as outlined above. This involves analysing the text through three stages:

- Linguistic/Semiotic Analysis of the Text: This opening stage comprises the analysis of meaning making aspects of the text including whole-text organization (narrative, argumentative, structure, etc.); clause combination (phrases or sentences that may signal discursive language use); words (denotative and connotative meanings, collocations; patterns of usage etc); rhetorical strategies (arrangement of words, sentences etc. for persuasive purposes); and all other semiotic aspects of the text (body language, images, setting, visuals, etc.).

- Interdiscursive Analysis of the Text: This stage involves identifying the genres, discourses and styles that are within the text and analysing the articulation of the texts under study. The speculation here is that all texts are intertextual. Therefore, this stage deals with the categorisation of the genres where political songs constitute one of protest political music, unity political music, or terrestrial praise political music.

- Social Analysis of the Text: This final stage requires the above analysis within historical and

social contexts in order to reveal how these discursive practises relate to other social elements and relations. The years of release of the selection of the political songs in the study are thus crucial bearing the prevailing situation in Nigeria at the time. Broadly put, this has been delineated into two political historical periods namely pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria and post-1999 Nigeria.

3.3.6 Data Analysis and Discussion

PDA is a CDA of political texts. PDA holds that politics is an arena of social life therefore, its texts and talk are enclosed within ideological discourses that are strongly connected to social practices and its relations of power that work in the favour of certain dominant groups in the society. Furthermore, the connections between texts and broader social practices and relations of power are not readily apparent to people who produce the texts or those who interpret them, essentially because of the power of discourse in producing knowledge and meaning; hence the need for CDA of political texts (Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 2008). It is from this perspective that this research regards the political songs performed by popular musicians through postcolonial Nigeria as forms of political discourse, in much the same way as news is discourse, most appropriately understood through critical analysis. The principal aim of this analysis is to identify and critique how discourses and the ideological elements that they signify are articulated in the songs, thereby making the popular musicians' political communication acceptable to Nigerians. The theoretical assumption here is that, as Nigerian popular musicians, works of protest political, unity political and terrestrial praise political music may speak only *within* the prevailing discourses in Nigerian and global society in order for their political communication to make sense and be persuasive. This is presupposed on the Foucauldian notion of discourse determining the

kind of statements that can be said and not said in any society at any historical period. Likewise, crises periods, tragic events and election campaigns are direct avenues for disseminating and legitimating the ideological discourses by which political elites secure and maintain the consent of the governed in a democratic society (cited in Hall, 1995). Therefore, the main objectives of this research include determining the persuasive strategies used by popular musicians within their political songs as manifested in language use in these works through words, phrases, sentences and other symbolic portions of the text; to determine how these instances of language use are related to the prevailing discourses within the Nigerian society in past (pre-1999) and contemporary (post-1999) postcolonial times; and to discern how these popular musicians negotiate their own personal dimensions such as identity within those discourses. All these make Fairclough's method of analysing CDA relevant to this research whereby I begin with identifying the elements of intertextuality in the text. In this instance, intertextuality refers to the various ways of writing and singing that are associated with certain areas of social life (Fairclough, 2010). For example, a political music text may borrow the narrative style of a novel, the argumentative style of a debate or the conversational style of everyday interpersonal communication, etc. Finally, I attempt to connect analysis of the text to broader social, political, economic and cultural elements in the postcolonial Nigerian society, by drawing from relevant strands of critical theory in the social sciences and humanities in order to enhance a critical understanding of the songs as a whole. Thus, the analysis proceeds thematically across all of the three subgenres and over the ideological discourses identified to be common to them. The justification is that all the songs of each subgenre are all part of postcolonial Nigeria's political communication presented to the same Nigerian audience for the same purpose and therefore reflecting the same core messages. As such, the contents

will have a lot in common and are being analysed thematically. Throughout the analysis, the aim is to examine the relationship between protest, unity and praise discourses as these relate to questions of social inequality, ideological legitimation, and identity which are among the most important issues of interest to CDA in general and PDA in particular (Fairclough, 2010; van Dijk, 2008; 1997).

3.4 Audience Analysis

The third issue of the 67th volume of the journal of the International African Institute Africa (1997) was an issue dedicated to and themed on 'Audiences in action'. In the preliminary commentary of the issue – aptly titled 'Preliminary notes on audiences in Africa' (347-362) - Karin Barber is preoccupied with demonstrating the dynamic nature of audiences across place and time on the one hand, while also engaging with the "perception that what creates an audience is the listeners' intentional orientation towards the speaker is the starting point of a far-reaching development in performance and media studies which focuses on the activity and creativity of the audience" (Barber, 1997: 347). Barber is concerned that in uncovering the histories of consciousness in Africa, cultural historians ignore the active role of audiences in constituting performance at their own peril; even through African popular arts. Barber shows that there is a multitude of ways of experiencing reception which can be grouped into two broad senses: collective reception and individual reception i.e. audiences in dispersal. She is convinced that specific African audiences have distinctive, conventional modes and styles of making meaning just as performers; and as such Africanists had a duty to investigate how these audiences do their work of interpretation with empirical evidence (Barber, 1997).

Following from the foregoing injunction, Catherine Cole in her contribution to the issue – ‘‘This is actually a good interpretation of modern civilisation’: popular theatre and the social imaginary in Ghana, 1946–66’ (363-388) – accounts for the historical change within the Ghanaian concert party between 1946 and 1966; or “in the volatile years from the end of World War II through the early years of [Ghana’s] independence” (Cole, 1997: 363), as she puts it. Interrogated within the broader framework of West African popular theatre, Cole’s study documents the profound transformations in form, content, production and strikingly consumption as experienced in the Ghanaian concert party through the period under review. Cole writes that the widespread popularity of the mobile genre endeared it as a primary tool in the transformation of public consciousness among a largely non-literate population during Ghana’s transition from colonialism to modern nation state. Cole’s work goes further to interpret the generic conventions through which the concert party convened and constituted its new public in a period of nationally tumultuous history (Cole, 1997).

Through the same issue, a seminal study on readership in Ghana made its foray into academic consciousness. Stephanie Newell’s ‘Making up their own minds: readers, interpretations and the difference of view in Ghanaian popular narratives’ (1997, 389-405) places reading in the context of prior ‘assumptions about language and meaning’ which condition an individual's interpretations before turning the first page of a popular novel (Newell, 1997: 389). Newell engages with this culturally specific receptive position of the average reader and its accompanying preconception on the function of literature in discussing West African popular narratives. Particularly, Newell’s study complements the ‘straight’ literary analysis of novels by taking on a reader-centred perspective to which end she concludes that West African popular fiction is nothing without the interpretive input of readers. Indeed, Newell cites authors’ acknowledgements of the readership’s participation

in the co-creation of novels, to such an extent that plots themselves may be transformed or extended in response to letters from readers. It is these dynamics which buoy up readers' active, self-interested reconstructions of themselves that draws Newell into submitting that audiences of West African fiction – just as several others - are not homogenous single species (Newell, 1997).

Brian Larkin's 'Indian films and Nigerian lovers: media and the creation of parallel modernities' (1997: 406-440) is the first of two studies within the issue centred on Muslim audiences. As the title suggests, Larkin's work focuses on an intriguing segment of the transnational flow of culture. Indeed, on the "intra-Third World circulation of Indian film [offering] Hausa viewers a way of imaginatively engaging with forms of tradition different from their own at the same time as conceiving of a modernity that comes without the political and ideological significance of that of the West" (Larkin, 1997: 406). As with Newell's work, Larkin's study adopts audiences' narratives as a mode of social inquiry. Particularly, the study interrogates the 'active audience' production of Hausa love stories (soyayya) which draw from Indian films and how these primary and secondary cultures are appropriated by their Hausa audiences. Amongst the many heterogeneities of everyday life, Larkin's work engages these audiences through their cultural responses to the cinematic dominance of India and Indian films; thereby conceptualizing this patronage as an alternative to the pervasive influence of the otherwise dominant and secular west. Larkin's work further gives insight into the local reworking and indigenising of transnational media flows that take place within and between Third World countries, disrupting the dichotomies between West and non-West, coloniser and colonised, modernity and tradition, in order to see how media creates parallel modernities (Larkin, 1997).

The second study on Muslim audiences from the same issue of Africa (1997, 67: 3) was conducted by Robert Launay and set in Cote d'Ivoire. As his apt title suggests – 'Spirit media: the electronic media and Islam among the Dyula of northern Côte d'Ivoire' (441-453) – Launay's study is concerned with a period through Ivorian history wherein a shift from radio and film to television and cassettes brought religion more fully into the forefront of the electronic media. Launay therefore engages with Muslim audiences for whom religious cassettes consisted of sermons or 'recitations' in Dyula. But more than this, Launay's work is a subtle comparative between non-commercial records of entertaining sermons taped by individual members of the audience, and television broadcast sermons by young Saudi-oriented clerics who must follow a script so as not to betray a commercial imperative. Launay's finding is that both these genres coexist side by side for these Muslim audiences in spite of the sharp differences in their styles, conceptions and delivery (Launay, 1997).

Another study within the purview of 'Audiences in action' (1997) is Olatunde Lawuyi's 'The political economy of video marketing in Ogbomọṣọ, Nigeria' which set out to examine the character of Yoruba video viewers, the style of marketing and the politics of choice in the itinerant trading community of Ogbomọṣọ, a Nigerian town on the northern fringe of Ọyọ State. Lawuyi communicates the reality of Ogbomoso as a place where production is not the source of wealth; instead, big wealth is always repatriated from outside, raising a doubt, stemming from its largely invisible productive base, about human ability and achievements. Lawuyi's argument is etched upon the premise that a local ideology of marketing promotes the sale of videos in their productive contexts and that those who buy them within those contexts act within the framework of the same ideology. Strikingly, Lawuyi's study places the commodities as an illusion for audiences who read registers of progress within (Lawuyi, 1997).

The last research article in the issue is the sole piece concerned with music. Deborah James' ''Music of origin': class, social category and the performers and audience of kiba, a South African migrant genre' (454-475) attempts to illuminate relevant theoretical ideas on the role of performers and audiences, and in so doing offers a critical perspective on the way in which the concept of class has been conceptualised in some studies within the same context. James examines the contention of performance theory that cultural expression does not merely reflect the predilections of established groupings of people but may provide a focus for the consolidation and identity of new ones (James, 1997).

In the conclusion to the preliminary notes on the issue, Barber writes that coming from different methodological perspectives, the foregoing studies "help to develop an inquiry into modern African audiences which is long overdue" (Barber, 1997: 360). In spite of such focus on audiences as is the charter of the issue, it is seen that research into popular music audiences in Africa remains extremely slim. The present study sets out to explore popular music audiences through two broad approaches: qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. These approaches are primarily guided by the submission that "The question of the extent to which an audience agrees upon work's meaning can be posed in two ways. One can ask to what extent the known or projected audience is homogenous – in class, culture, language, outlook – and one can also ask more specifically how in any given case the audience's interpretation corresponds to the author's or the text's apparent intention" (Barber, 1987: 52). Qualitatively and quantitatively, the study takes strands from both ways mentioned. Qualitatively, the study's method asks how the audience's interpretation goes contrary or is alternative to the author's or the text's apparent intentions. To be sure, "there are...cases where it seems to be the audience which renders a

text ambiguous, or even subverts it altogether, by reading it in a manner totally at odds with the author's and the text's apparent intentions" (*ibid*: 52-3).

Particularly, the qualitative analysis bit draws from and expands on a more recent study by Motilola Akinfemisoye which appropriates 'the-people-formerly-known-as-the-audience' as an 'alternative' to hegemonic media practices in contemporary Nigeria using the Occupy Nigeria 2012 protests as a point in note (Akinfemisoye, 2013). In his book *Radical media: Rebellious communication and social movements* (2001) John Downing describes the audience as "sometimes resistant commercial targets", "as the necessary "reality-check" on supposed media impact" and "as joint architects of cultural production" (Downing, 2001: 3). He further states that "radical alternative media constitute the most active form of the active audience and express oppositional strands, overt and covert, within popular cultures" (*ibid*). For Downing, "a sharp division between radical media expression and other forms of oppositional cultural expression makes little sense" (*ibid*: 4). The active audience, meanwhile, is that audience that is conceived as working on and molding media products rather than passively soaking up their messages (Downing, 2001: 7).

Audiences are engaged through various stages of involvement beyond interviews and questionnaires: members of the audience double as research participants (RPs) through the study. Qualitatively, 'the-people-formerly-known-as-the-audience' are active as the alternative. As such, the audience contributions through this study have been selected advisedly. In making the cut, audience contributions have been distilled in order to sustain a discussion by virtue of the alternative (unusual) characteristics of these contributions from individual audiences. The qualitative audience analysis of the present study combines the

approach of 'the audience as the alternative' with the notion of 'the alternative as oppositional to the mainstream'.

The focus, in this sense, shifts to a selection of users' perceptions of these songs. The thesis recognises that the identity of music reception is no less important to cultural studies than the identity of a music maker. The livelihood of music is in its utility. The research thus engaged audiences through each of the aforementioned Nigerian cities where participants listened to music at sessions, thought through the texts, and did critiques aided by varying degrees of experience (audiences' ages/segmentation) and material (oral or written critique et al.). In addition, defined audiences were interviewed specifically on the Occupy Nigeria protests. Also, while instructing on 'Feature Writing' at AUN, Yola, features on the protests were requested and obtained from a number of Communications' students. Quantitatively, Bayelsa and Lagos were hosts to the on-the-ground audience study wherein responses to 402 questionnaires completed by actual voters at the 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria are comparatively analysed towards establishing a basis for understanding electoral music applications of the distinct electorates in both states.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has enumerated the methodological undertakings appropriated by the thesis. The study's methodology of CDA (or PDA) through the con-textual analysis of political music texts appropriates two theoretical frameworks and assumptions. First, it assumes that any political music communication would necessarily be conducted within the prevailing discourses of a particular society at any given time; such that the persuasiveness of a song would depend on the extent to which the performing musician successfully articulates those prevailing discourses, rather than just the rhetorical or rhythmic style of the popular

musician. Secondly, it is assumed that nation spaces are themselves contexts bearing contests of ideologies and discourses among dominant groups in society who are vying for power, such that the campaign communication of politicians (and the alternative to these) would necessarily draw upon those ideologies and discourses that have emerged hegemonic over time and thus, the entire process is itself a means of reinforcing or legitimating those ideologies in order to manufacture and secure the consent of the governed. These two theoretical positions form the background with which I examine the political music genre of popular musicians through postcolonial Nigeria.

CHAPTER FOUR

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1 Introduction

This section provides the theoretical framework on which the research is based. This comprises the adaptation of the theory of alternative media in the discussion of protest political music culture; the application of the theory of the people's arts in Africa as cultural hybrids towards enriching the discourse of unity political music culture; and the explorations of Michel Foucault's and Michael Mann's positions on 'power, influence, and effects' in the discussion of terrestrial praise political music culture. These discussions are undertaken as the abovementioned conceptions relate to the three subgenres of political music in Nigeria.

4.2 Protest political music culture as the alternative

Alternative media have been discussed and theorized variously within the broader framework of media and communications studies. It is possible to apply the theory of the alternative media (discussed forthwith) to the entire 'political music' genre in its relationship to the wider popular music family. In such a sense, one must assume that 'political music' in any of its three variants is produced by alternative artists, i.e. artists contrary to the mainstream. The availability of the genre, however, to any artist who courts popular appeal, makes such a conceptualization redundant. Indeed, political music texts in Nigeria exist alongside works of R&B, love, party, and celestial genres within the catalogues of most of the political music makers. The dearth of specialization in the political music space which informs the study's alert on popular music in Nigeria becoming a 'state-owned' media form as against being an 'independent' cultural art

considering the spate of electoral music and government-funded unity political songs in the country. Since being in the alternative, as far as popular music's relationship to the state goes, has become somewhat unfashionable and marginal; it is not surprising that one encounters some hardship in appropriating the theory of alternative media in an analysis of Nigerian popular music. The genre of political music is only readable as the alternative to the 'people's music' (Barber, 1987) were one to view the genre as a narcissistic one wherein any sort of relationship/address with the state – be it protest, unity, or terrestrial praise – is considered alternative to the banality of the people's popular music. However, this is not the case. This study therefore appropriates the protest political music subgenre exclusively as an alternative popular music.

Furthermore, because the popular music family in Nigeria is a scene[1] and not an industry (Adedeji: Cabasa, 2012), where the structures as commensurate with an industry are blatantly absent, and artists have to take on multi-tasking roles associated with self-management, self-marketing, self-styling, self-writing and self-performing; it is completely redundant in a way to attempt to conceptualize any segment or genre of popular music as an alternative as far as means of production go in Nigeria. Alternative to what might that be? Apparently, in a mere popular music scene, everyone is in the struggle. The remainder manner through which the theory of the alternative media may be applied to Nigerian popular music is through the texts and contexts of protest political music production. Be it in moments or from a prolifically protest prone artist, these materials are very readable in terms of being an

[1] "I don't think we have an industry, for you to have an industry, the industry must be defined, and you must have a structure… a point where stakeholders will come together, and there's nothing like that, there is no functional process for an artist, like artist and producers being demarcated from being a singer to promoter, whatever we have is a music scene that is gradually developing to become probably an industry" (ID Cabasa – Nigerian popular music producer; in an interview with Adedeji, A. 2008).

alternative popular music through the lenses of the alternative media. Whereas it would be neater to find the relevance of the theory of the alternative media to the press/broadcast media in Nigeria - wherein the state owned practically all of the mainstream media until the wave of democratization and broadcasting liberalization in the 1990s – it falls short in this regard in the popular music category. Indeed, the state has been known to sponsor or support the production of specific forms of music be it propaganda (as in some unity songs) or outright hogwash (as in most terrestrial praise political songs). However, the state in Nigeria is yet to own record labels or to be in a position to oversee every piece of music of a popular musician or a group of popular musicians. To this extent, the popular music category in contemporary Nigeria cannot be analysed along state-recognized or otherwise notions. Democracy's liberalization ensures that popular musicians who are in the mainstream automatically become mainstream to the state as well. This much is evidenced in the nature of patronage of popular musicians by state governments and political parties.

In engaging with the community, the contrary and the subversive; Chris Atton (2006) concerns his critical work on alternative media with the ways in which mass media techniques are adapted in pursuing an alternative agenda, from the fringes in relation to the applicable mainstream. Early on, Atton describes the experience in the marking out of what constitutes alternative media as a very cumbersome task; and cites the example of the fanzine – an integral part of the late 1970s punk subculture – whose rise "was instrumental in generating a second wave of underground-like publications that dealt as much with the politics of liberation, direct action and anarchism as they did with popular music" (Atton, 2006: 1). Atton's study whose focus begins with the alternative media of the 1990s proposes a theoretical and methodological

framework to defining alternative media by incorporating the content of such media and "their capacity to generate non-standard, often infractory, methods of creation, production and distribution" (*ibid*: 4). Consequently, Atton argues that alternative media offer the means for democratic communication to people who are normally excluded from media production; insisting that alternative media organize media along lines that enable participation and reflexivity. Drawing from Enzensberger's politically emancipatory use of media and McQuail's 'democratic-participant' model, Atton articulates a theory of alternative and radical media that is not limited to political and 'resistance' media; but is applicable to artistic and literary media including music.

> In a media culture that appears less and less interested in in-depth investigative reporting, alternative media provide information about and interpretations of the world which we might not otherwise see and information about the world that we simply will not find anywhere else. Alternative publications are at bottom more interested in the free flow of ideas than in profit (Atton, 2006: 11-12).

Whereas the foregoing descriptions of alternative media are laudable, Atton's submissions cannot be applied entirely to the protest political music scene in Nigeria; particularly in the bit that they are 'more interested in the free flow of ideas than in profit'. Popular musicians irrespective of their preferred genre – do music fundamentally for profit. Robin Balliger addresses this when she writes: "…while the power of mass political music appears undeniable, some would argue that when radical artists achieve mass popularity, it actually means they have been co-opted or brought under control by the very institutions they are fighting. The entertainment industry makes money when artists sell, no matter what the message, so even radical artists participate in a broader system of exploitation. These negative views about mass

culture have led some to conclude that the only possible site for cultural resistance exists at the margins of society" (Balliger, 2003: 61). The foregoing underlies the frictions inherent in the applicability of Atton's theory of the alternative media to protest political or radical popular music particularly in a context such as postcolonial Nigeria where the means of production involved in protest political (alternative) music making is one and the same with mainstream (non-alternative) popular music.

Atton cites two American studies that demonstrate the significance of alternative media for radical or unconventional content particularly with how these media generate a current of thought and set the agenda of societal discourse. The first is Patricia Glass Schuman's 1982 study which showed how rape as a social issue was first constructed as a 'sex crime' by an alternative press publication - a full year before the *New York Times* identified it as such, and four years before a major book publisher tackled the subject (Atton, 2006). Atton informs that "[the] alternative media employ methods of production and distribution, allied to an activist philosophy of creating 'information for action' timeously and rapidly. As such, they can deal with emerging issues. It is in the nature of such media to have these emerging issues at their very heart, since it is in the nature of activism to respond to social issues as they emerge" (Atton, 2006: 12). Whereas, in this instance, Atton writes about an alternative press, there is nonetheless a sense in which popular music in Nigeria – even when it functions as journalism (Mano, 2011) – does not constitute an appropriate fit for Atton's theory of the alternative media.

Indeed Atton soon presents three elements of the definition of the alternative press as proposed by the Royal Commission on the Press (RCP) and immediately finds the first element - An alternative publication deals with the opinions of small minorities – contentious! Atton argues that "the size of minority audiences is debatable" (*ibid*: 12) insisting that for mass protest movements, the jury was out as to whether the views propounded in the alternative media are not in fact 'widely-held' (Atton, 2006). He highlights this position in order to show the contrast with the second element of the RCP's definition which reads that "[the alternative press] expresses attitudes 'hostile to widely-held beliefs'" (*ibid*: 13). These provide useful insights for evaluating the distance of protest political music from the theory of the alternative media (press) as presently constituted. As if to emphasize this, Atton's next subject matter is with the 'editors of *Alternatives in Print* (the major current bibliographical reference work in this field)'. The editors present three simple criteria against which to ascertain that a publisher is alternative if it meets at least one of the three criteria. Again, Atton finds these to be patently problematic.

It is reasonable to subsume the problem with the first criterion which reads - 'The publisher has to be non-commercial, demonstrating that a basic concern for ideas, not the concern for profit, is the motivation for publication' – amongst the concerns mentioned hitherto on popular musicians' primary profit motivation. On the second criterion which reads that 'the subject matter of their publications should focus on social responsibility or creative expression, or usually a combination of both', one wonders whether there are no alternative popular musicians whose social responsibility coefficient are not less than the social responsibility coefficient of mainstream popular musicians. The term 'creative expression' is

certainly subject to individual appropriations, and as such triggers problems. The third and final criterion – it is enough for publishers to define themselves as alternative publishers - is even more problematic. Atton's dismissal to the third criterion as hardly needing comment is understandable on the one hand. However, it shows the limitations of Atton's theory to protest political or radical popular music especially in the Nigerian context. While Atton asks that 'If they cannot even define what they do, why should they be considered as the special cases they so clearly see themselves to be?' (Atton, 2006: 14); it behooves on this critique to engage this issue more critically.

A contextual substitution of the third criterion in this instance would read: 'it is enough for popular musicians to define themselves as protest political or alternative popular musicians'. Were this the case, the situation may still be manageable i.e. in an instance where a musician has done radical work that is contrary to what obtains in the mainstream, it is okay for such a musician to emphasize such. However, what obtains in the popular music scene today is a lot more chaotic than the arguably simple instance of genre-switching and counter-moment (Akpan, 2006)[2] described above. Indeed what obtains may read instead as 'it is enough for popular musicians to define themselves as x, y, or z genre popular musicians depending on his/her instantaneous personal whim'! Strikingly, in the preliminaries of his 'Approaching alternative media: theory and methodology', Atton had attested "to the difficulty of defining

[2] "[We] can tell when fundamental changes are occurring in the lyrical/message fabric of popular music, and can identify the kinds of pressures that (can) compel a change in this idiom. Focusing on the lyrical/message fabric…allows us to identify…'moments' and 'counter-moments' within an artist's creative career" (Akpan, 2006: 93).

alternative media and to the dangers of over-hasty categorization" (Atton, 2006: 6). This is the subject at the heart of this thesis.

Atton goes on to offer that "a constructive definition of alternative media can begin with the presence of radical content, most often allied to the promotion of social change" (*ibid*: 14) and adds the position of some regarding Noam Chomsky's political writings at any branch of Waterstone's which "proves that we simply do not need alternative media for the transmission of radical ideas" (*ibid*). The foregoing duo indeed begin to wholly accommodate protest political music in postcolonial Nigeria wherein radical ideas are transmitted via the same means as the people's (mainstream) ideas; and in many instances by the same musicians who sing (propagate) the mainstream ideas. The process of production continues to constitute an Achilles ill with regard to how the theory of alternative media may account for protest political music in postcolonial Nigeria. Atton notes Tim O'Sullivan's introduction of the notion of 'radical' social change as a primary aim of 'alternative' media which are "committed to innovation in form and content" (*ibid*: 15-6). This set of aims, writes Atton, takes into consideration not only content, but presentation and organizational procedures. Drawing from these, Atton engages with Michael Traber's notion of alternative media.

Traber's forte on the subject is with the fulfillment of the simple man and woman as total human beings. He disapproves of the conventions of the mass media which marginalize the roles of common people – reduced to observers or marginal commentators - and instead foreground the rich, the powerful and the glamorous. Traber advocates equity for this marginalized class who only assume prominence in conflicts or the bizarre; consequently

dividing alternative media into two sectors of advocacy media and grassroots media. Whereas the former introduce 'alternative social actors' as the main subject of news, it is the latter sector which Traber sees as offering the most thorough version of alternative news values in that they are produced by the same people whose concerns are reported. The perspectives which Traber puts forward are drawn from his journalism experiences in India, Zambia and Zimbabwe; yet his categorization finds subtle fitting in present-day postcolonial Nigeria where there exists an arguably higher degree of penetration of the mass media. In Atton's words, "Traber is arguing that when media production is placed in the hands of ordinary people the types of news and the style in which it is presented will be more relevant, more 'useful' and more appropriate to the communities in which such news is produced and distributed" (Atton, 2006: 16-7). Although not a perfect fit, protest political music in postcolonial Nigeria constitutes such news.

Atton, however, takes this model of community media forward citing the springing up of alternative community newspapers in the early 1970s throughout Britain. He highlights how the Liverpool Free Press, contrary to the mass media, emphasized a not-for-profit ethos in order to prevent the imperative to serve financiers' interests. Indeed the publicity material for the newspaper identified three prime elements that it shared with many alternative media ventures namely: "commercial independence (anti-commerciality, even) and the journalistic freedom this was felt to bring; editorial independence from political parties and other organizations; and the empowerment of specific communities of interest" (*ibid*.: 17). These elements present a forum with which to engage the concern of the present study. The first element cannot hold with popular music since musicians are fundamentally for-profit cultural

producers. On the issue of independence from political parties, Nyamnjoh and Fokwang (2005) write that "It remains possible to investigate not only the ways in which musicians have used their songs in order to achieve personal and collective identities that are of political significance, but also the ways in which political power in Africa has responded" (*ibid*.: 253).

Political power in postcolonial Nigeria has traditionally invested patronage in pro-terrestrial praise popular musicians although that is not to absorb protest political musicians of political patronage entirely. It is plausible to argue that political power in postcolonial Nigeria has tried to heed the messages of protest political music with minimal results; while ensuring to eschew the patronage of these whistle-blowers in the main. Meanwhile Atton soon turns to Stephen Duncombe, explaining the latter's position that it is not simply the content of a text that is evidence of its radical nature; instead it is the position of the work with respect to the relations of production that gives it its power; i.e. a productive context that can be the radical equal of content in pursuit of social change (Atton, 2006). What the foregoing highlights is that there are no fine-line demarcations between protest political music and non-protest political music (apolitical, even). The absence of a 'black-and-white' scenario in the means of production of popular music in postcolonial Nigeria suggests that there is more to 'the alternative' than can be ordinarily accessed. Put simply though, were protest political music in postcolonial Nigeria assessed through its means of production; it would not satisfactorily constitute the alternative.

In his conclusion to the section 'Towards a Model of Alternative and Radical Media', Atton writes that "we need to be alert to historical and geographical contingency: the absence of radicality in any dimension may not limit a medium's revolutionary potential: the dimension

may not be 'available for radicalization at that time or place, or in that culture. The authorship need not be concerned solely with political radicality, but equally or instead with cultural content" (*ibid*: 29). Atton had earlier stated that a model of alternative and radical media must account, among others, for active audiences in the Fiskean sense of creating 'oppositional readings' of mainstream media products (Atton, 2006). The present study adopts active audiences in this Fiskean sense as part of an overall methodological approach.

4.3 Unity political music culture as the cultural hybrid

In the opening frames of her 'Popular Arts and People's Experience in Africa', which introduces Karin Barber's 'Popular Arts in Africa' (1987), the author references an art form which is staunchly equated by unity political music culture. This is more so considering the 'abandonment' altogether suffered by the subgenre in scholarship. Although the principal expertise of unity political music makers continues to lie in some 'better-established' genre, a distinctive and comprehensible forum (as a political music subgenre) has emerged from a time when unity political songs were merely asides. Indeed, for the unity political music subgenre, "it seems the right time to set out the scope and possibilities of [the] field, and to lay claim to a central position for it in [popular music discourses and in] the humanities and social sciences" (Barber, 1987: 1).

The most obvious reason for giving serious attention to the unity political songs is their sheer undeniable assertive presence as social facts. They loudly proclaim their own significance in the lives of large numbers of popular music audiences. However, it cannot be said that they flourish without encouragement or recognition from official cultural bodies, let alone in defiance of them. In fact, these official bodies are their very source of inspiration and creativity.

Popular musicians, sometimes bereft of creativity, do find an outlet in appealing to nationhood. Were unity political songs in Nigeria to be taken simply as social facts, and the network of relations through which they are produced and consumed are examined, important but hitherto unnoticed aspects of the Nigerian society where they flourish, would certainly be uncovered. Chapter seven traces the links and convergences within unity political music and thus shows patterns of relationships in how they penetrate and are penetrated by political, economic, and religious institutions.

Strikingly, Barber's first example is popular music in West Africa: Thomas Sankara, the then President of Burkina Faso, who founded and equipped a number of popular bands to "sing the praises of the revolution". Contextualizing unity political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria, therefore, within the corresponding notions by Barber is apt. In an attempt to highlight 'the public' as a neglected aspect of West African political life, Barber takes into account the links in "West Africa between popular music, football, and political rallies" for which she emphasizes a common location for each to transpire. In spite of Barber's distinct context and distinct motive, it is of the essence that the present study has found a fine fitting of her writings with the unity political music subgenre. It is, of course, impossible to transpose in totality each of her submissions in the hope of achieving a theoretically perfect fit with the subgenre; and this becomes apparent when she writes of "the frequency with which [popular arts] are repressed" (Barber, 1987: 2).

The unity political music subgenre is by far the least repressed of the political music family. It enjoys more consensus encouragement than either of protest political music or

terrestrial praise political music. Whereas examples abound of how the establishment in several nations censor the former category, the notion that 'one man's praise is another's protest (undoing)' accounts for the repression suffered by works of the latter group. The sole kind of repression which songs of the unity political music subgenre may face would come from somewhat extremist groups whose forte is based on the dissolution of unity and nationhood. Barber argues that interpreting what art forms in Africa say is of vital importance because these art forms represent the only channel of public communication available to the invisible, inaudible and all together ignored masses. She cites a shift in emphasis wherein the study of African history, political science and the social sciences generally began to move its focus to the common people, with the heralding work of Terence Ranger (1975). This eye-opening shift in emphasis meant that Africanists since began to consider the experiences of the common people as "history in their own right" (Barber, 1987: 3) which was crucial to making the history of the leaders intelligible. This perspective, Barber writes, involves coming to grips with questions of the people's consciousness, the people's habits and the people's ideological dispositions. In spite of this four-decade-old eye-opener, it is curious that there has been hardly any scholarly searchlight into unity political music culture which has constituted a habit somewhat for popular musicians in postcolonial Nigeria.

In reading Barber's notion on the difficulty involved in interpreting popular art forms, where she states that "they do undoubtedly talk about what the people themselves think is important – in their own vocabulary, and through the form they feel to be appropriate" (*ibid*.: 3), there is a feeling received that Barber is presenting the African artist as almost infallible or beyond human opportunism. Indeed, she presents the makers of these art forms, in a sense, as

the people's ideal representatives, but seems to realize this when she soon writes of the 'partial and cryptic' clues derivable from the memories 'formulated' by the very same artists. In Nigeria, for the unity political music subgenre, which is a category that has the artist necessarily bearing a diplomatic license in order to reserve all seen ills while speaking of the nation solely in positive light, it is extremely difficult to appreciate a scenario of 'text surplus' "never wholly under the artist's control [which could] pick up subterranean currents of thought that society itself may be unaware of" (Barber, 1987: 3-4).

In the Nigerian experience, unity political songs only serve as "important means through which consciousness is articulated and communicated" (*ibid*: 4) when the audience is an outsider or perhaps a youngster in a bid to learn of his country. It is essential to understand the materialization and growth of the subgenre in postcolonial Nigeria against the backdrop of the country as a colonial enterprise which dates back before the amalgamation of protectorates to 'unite' Nigeria in 1914. As such, because of the artificiality at the core of the union, there has been a need for successive postcolonial governments and citizens alike to continually manufacture and sustain consent of nationhood. As if to buttress the foregoing, Barber concludes the introduction by stating thus: "Whether the researcher's ultimate aim is to approach social reality through the arts, or to approach the arts through their social context, the procedure must be the same. In either case, the arts cannot be "read" without both comprehending their nature as aesthetic constructs with their own principles and conventions, and locating them in the specific social universe which is the grounds of their existence…We need to ask by whom and by what means, in what circumstances, under what constraints, in

whose interests, and in accordance with what conventions, these arts are produced" (Barber, 1987: 4).

The present study intends to approach the unity political music subgenre as an art form through its social context in order to contribute to the theoretical construction of the subgenre and to grant its proper place as an object of investigation. In the following section themed 'Towards the construction of a model of "popular" African arts', Barber describes popular arts as a "fugitive category, seemingly ubiquitous and yet always fading as one tries to grasp it" (*ibid*: 5). Whereas this is not an apt conveyance of the fate of the unity political music subgenre as an art form in Africa, it does perhaps provide a workable basis for the understanding of this fate. If unity political music is created by popular musicians, as the present study has established, it becomes redundant to speak of flexibility or an elusiveness being a potential strength. The unity political music subgenre has hitherto undergone a similar fate as the Ghanaian corrupt elite who were unnamed until the masses of the people rallied around the catchphrase 'Ebi Te Yie', a very successful highlife song by the African Brothers band. More plausibly, the nomenclature 'unity political music' appropriately 'renames' a group of songs which were otherwise categorized as works of the predominating genre of works by the popular musician responsible for each. This factor of naming is a primary step in theorizing the subgenre all together evaded by scholarship or 'protected from examination', hitherto.

Unity political music as with other forms of popular art in postcolonial Nigeria may be situated within a loose model in which a traditional rural folk culture is in a continual union with a mass culture created not by the Industrial Revolution, but by a combination of

(de)colonization and democratization. In this sense, mass are not counterposed to folk culture, but rather are applied to unearth a hybrid. Indeed, the continuity here is underlined in Barber's submission that the so-called traditional culture in Africa is far from dead, and blossoms alongside the creation of urban masses. In engaging with the "people's" and the "popular" (*ibid*: 6), Barber begins by shedding light on the small but significant body of opinion that considers 'popular art' to be art which furthers the cause of the people, "conscientizes" them and prepares them to take radical and progressive action (*ibid*: 6). It is safe to state that protest political music (the alternative) in postcolonial Nigeria comes within the purview of this small but significant appropriation of 'popular art'. In this view, any art that isn't eye-opening to the people is considered the "people's" art which is a hegemonic tool of the ruling class used in perpetuating the people's blind followership.

Barber is concerned with an effect of the radical perspective which is "the dismissal of the more common people's arts which play so large a role in the lives of the majority" (*ibid*: 7). She captures the quandary in which one finds the entire unity political music subgenre by stating that "[because] they are identified as vehicles of false consciousness they are written off altogether…This type of criticism manifests itself more in silence rather than indictments. Radical intellectuals naturally give more prominence in their writing to the work they themselves believe in" (*ibid*: 7). Therein lies the fundamental basis for unity political music being condemned to silence hitherto. Whereas many radical scholars have celebrated the works of protest political musicians as is seen in the vast literature on the works of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti for instance, others have criticized terrestrial praise political musicians for endorsing a debilitating status quo. Unity political music, which on the surface has nationhood

as its client, has however evaded scholarship entirely. It is this gap that this study aims to fill through a theorization of the subgenre as a hybrid form of the people's arts.

Perhaps it is more appropriate to proceed through a conceptualization of unity political music as a form of popular art "emanating from" or "belonging to" the people, which is Barber's second and main forte. This way, the subgenre is accorded its proper place "as a social practice which is effectual and which therefore has consequences…for the class or community to which it pertains" (Barber, 1987: 7). By taking unity political songs in postcolonial Nigeria "seriously as statements about society and as a means to confront and work through intractable social experience" (*ibid*.), the people's thoughts, beliefs and aspirations can be understood within a specific postcolonial Nigerian circumstance. By not deciding too hastily to which subgenre a particular song belongs, and through a critical discourse analysis of the texts of popular songs of postcolonial Nigeria, "[concealed] criticisms of, or reservations about, the status quo" (*ibid*.) may be unraveled. For "[the] most important question of all is the question of the vision of the world that a work of art [individually] proposes" (*ibid*: 8).

In engaging with the 'traditional, popular, elite' model, Barber is struck by the realization that rather than a tripartite, the model is actually composed of only two positive terms, with a fluctuating, undefined, and shapeless space between them. 'Popular art' here is defined in terms of what it is not: being neither traditional art originating from a pre-colonial past nor elite art of the privileged. Exploring this category further, Barber draws from Ulli Beier's 1962 article on contemporary visual arts in Nigeria. Having established the differences in traditional and elite art, Barber quotes what she terms a caricature of the prevalent view: that

popular art is “profane, carefree and abandoned; for the Nigerian [popular] artist is not burdened by metaphysical speculation; he has no problems to solve” (Barber, 1987: 9). The application of this ‘prevalent view’ to postcolonial Nigerian popular art and artists presents a problematic fit, for such cannot describe the works of art which dominate the shapeless category of popular presently.

Unsurprisingly, Barber absolves most Africanists from sharing this view, offering that most people have been able to conceive of popular only in terms of its difference from two other terms, beginning her description with the dominant standpoint of the traditional. In this sense, popular is seen in terms of their deviation from traditional conventions, through the incorporation of new, usually foreign, elements. In Barber’s words, “popular arts are seen as a hybrid, distinguishable from traditional arts by their syncretism. Those most readily recognized as popular are those which are so *radically* syncretic as to constitute a new form” (*ibid*: 9). She proceeds to quote John Collins’ 1986 definition of a popular syncretic art form as one “which has continuity with traditional life and which has assimilated ideas creatively from the West resulting in a *qualitatively novel phenomenon*” (*ibid*: 9). The foregoing formulations hold accurate for contemporary Nigerian popular culture, but more than this, Barber’s italicization of the closing phrase suggests a category that can hold its own. The present study sets out to discuss the unity political music form of popular art as a recognized object of study in its own right.

The unity political music subgenre provides what is perhaps an ‘ideal’ category for challenging the ‘unofficial’/‘official’ dichotomy of arts in Africa. On the one hand, the subgenre

fits nicely as a hybrid deriving from the traditional form; but is it accurate to say that it is unofficial or unrecognized by formal official institutions? Postmodernism has altered the perception of the 'hybrid' category. But even more so for the unity political music subgenre is that it is a subgenre dedicated to propagating the very livewire of the formal official institutions of the ruling class, namely nationhood. Barber's conception of popular emerging from the elite led her to state that "both elite and traditional arts are…symbolic capital highly valued by the ruling classes – the former as evidence of progress and enlightenment, the latter as evidence of a rich historical cultural heritage. They are therefore sponsored by the government and publicized through its official organs. Popular arts are not" (*ibid*: 10).

Barber's writing spoke to a 1980s Africa from whence a lot has changed. Presently, not only are the popular arts highly valued by the ruling classes, they are in fact patronized at the expense of the traditional and elite arts by the ruling class. These modern African expressive forms, undefined, fluid, changeable, and endlessly evasive have indeed found for themselves an official position from its unofficial beginnings. Barber seemed to have been prepared for this as she offered:

> What gave them their claim to novelty…is principally their incorporation of elements not previously present in the indigenous traditions — that is, elements imported from other cultures…We have already seen that when popular arts are defined against the traditional arts, what makes people see them as popular is their syncretism. This identification is so strong that anything syncretic almost automatically qualifies as popular…The exuberance of the popular arts suggests the liberating and energizing possibilities of this terrain…The syncretism of the popular arts is actively and selectively sought; the effect of newness positively embraced. It is these qualities that make it possible to think of African popular arts as a distinctive field (*ibid*: 11).

The conceptualization of unity political music culture is as a non-perishing art which thrives on an active exploitation of its unofficial yet official status; produced by a situation of independent nationhood and addressed to it. Whereas modern African popular arts constitutes a field where "artists are able to ignore totally the restrictions of both the traditional and the elite spheres" (*ibid*: 15-16), CDA informs that popular musicians do still conform to certain conventions which make the delineation of the three subgenres of political music possible. For the unity political music subgenre, it follows that it serves the purposes of both 'art produced and consumed by the people' and 'art produced but not consumed by the people' depending on what it is appropriated for. It has been shown that works of the unity political music subgenre serve very well in showing off the nation's 'rich cultural heritage and togetherness' to foreigners. These two kinds of relationship between the unity political music subgenre and its consumers are true for both commercial and non-commercial senses as enumerated by Barber (*ibid*: 21-25). Yet the subgenre is not entirely immune from a conceptualization as 'art consumed but not produced by the people: non-commercial'. With its strongly overlapping tendencies, it is seen that unity political music is a defiant art which renders inconclusive, dependable theoretical notions.

Barber's dissolution of the shaky foundation of divisions between the 'traditional' (folk), the 'popular' and the 'elite' (high) arts has led to a consensus conclusion among scholars that African popular arts are indeed elastic, considering their sameness, which sometimes makes them taxonomically supple. However, the foregoing analysis has shown that categories and (sub) genres still do thrive within the overall framework of the 'popular' as a cultural hybrid. Unity political music culture, for one, has been shown as being characteristic "of the post-colonial regime" (Barber, 1987: 31) wherein the subgenre's degree of support and sponsorship

establishes its continued production in Nigeria. Barber avers that the difficulty inherent in apprehending conventions in unofficial arts is a consequence of the perhaps inconspicuous conventions of the official canons which are consistent, stable and publicly recognized. Would it suffice therefore to posit that because the underlying principles governing the mode of expression of political music culture are publicly legitimated and affirmed, the genre may be categorized as an official art form? Perhaps what is happening in the popular music industry in Nigeria is a refinement of the arts and the artists; that is, there is a blurring of the traditional, the popular, and the elite that it becomes somewhat redundant to insist on boundaries.

Unity political music culture is one culture which, as new art, has caught on and has been, and is being imitated. As Barber puts it, "What is needed…is an approach that recognizes that popular arts have their own conventions through which real experience is transformed, articulated, and made communicable…if they use elements from the established traditions, they do so in accordance with their own principles in order to construct their own meanings in their own way" (*ibid*: 35). Barber turns to Collins' and Richards' 1982 article on West African popular music wherein the authors show their perspective on the propensity to innovation as a widespread feature of traditional West African cultures, and one which renders redundant the characterization of popular arts as syncretic because, after all, all the arts of these cultures are syncretic. While Barber disagrees with Collins and Richards on this view, she is prudent enough to draw an important point from the duo such that she advocates a comparative approach to dealing with popular culture in Africa: "A comparative approach to the popular arts might start from a consideration of the precise ways in which tradition provides underlying parameters for popular creativity in different cultures" (Barber, 1987: 39). The foregoing refers to the different

cultures or peoples of Africa. However, this critique is in the process of a comparative approach to the different modes of culture of a people: the three subgenres of political music.

4.4 Terrestrial praise political music culture through power, influence, effects

Terrestrial praise political music is a subgenre that has been severally studied as 'praise music' through its aesthetic dimension and its patron-client mode of transpiring. As such, beyond Barber's popular culture approach (terrestrial praise political music culture can hardly be theorized as the alternative), possible approaches would include the adoption of existing relevant themes like 'the politics of the belly' (Bayart 1993), 'disorder as political instrument' (Chabal and Daloz 1999) and 'prebendalism' (Joseph 1987). Indeed, one or all of the foregoing ought to suffice in establishing a theoretical framework for the terrestrial praise political music subgenre. After all, they "capture specific aspects of the totality of the contemporary African formation" (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2010: 387). Adebanwi and Obadare, however, go on to align with several African/ist scholars who construe the abovementioned themes as improperly historicized notions insufficiently "recognized as critical dimensions of a global-local and historical-structural totality" (*ibid*: 387). In the authors' reading, these perspectives' absence of sophistication in describing contemporary Africa's actualities within the fundaments of the ideological-historical-practical capacities for social transformation render them weak for constructing an outline with which African formation – the dynamics inherent in terrestrial praise political music inclusive - may be understood.

Kedmon Hungwe and Chipo Hungwe open their review of Patrick Chabal's and Jean-Pascal Daloz's, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (1999) by drawing on the observation that 'Institutional structures are the result of political choices of politicised actors…

[It is therefore] pointless and perhaps harmful to maintain the myth of administrative neutrality. Rather, the issue is and must be 'who gets what' from the political system' (Knott and Miller, 1987: 255-257). Hungwe and Hungwe demonstrate the problematic nature of Chabal and Daloz's proposition stating that 'their rhetoric serves to conceal/mask the role of hegemonic politics where particular interests are dominant, not only in Africa, but in industrialised countries' (Hungwe and Hungwe, 2000: 3). In spite of several scathing criticisms of their work, Chabal and Daloz's conceptualization of the *instrumentalization of disorder* in sub-Saharan Africa presents a paradigm with which to approach an understanding of the sudden materialization of otherwise celestial praise musicians as terrestrial praise musicians. Indeed, the indiscriminate appropriation of artists from across a broad range of genres portends a veritable instrument in disordered governance.

Chabal and Daloz opine that Africa's institutions are in a state of 'disorder' owing to ineffective institutions and prevalent corruption. However, this state of disorder, according to the duo, is functional and is indicative of a uniquely African developmental path where [almost] everyone is a participant, and [almost] everyone has something to gain from corrupt practices. The authors lament that '[Africanists] have confused development and Westernization, thus making it difficult to grasp the singularity of what is taking place on the continent in terms of modernisation. Not only have we been prone to explaining current events in Africa as a process of 'backwardness', but we have been slow to understand the complex ways in which political change is taking place in Africa' (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 50). Soon, they provoke an ambiguity when they note that 'It is difficult to conceive of what a non-Western, particularly 'African' path to modernisation is, both because we live in a Western world and because historically, the West

modernised first' (*ibid.*). The ambiguities notwithstanding, Chabal and Daloz's three main premises of pervasive corruption and ineffective institutions; a unique culture and mind-set of the African; as well as the functional disorder inherent each bear relevance to the indiscriminate appropriation of music styles for campaigns in Nigeria.

Richard Joseph develops an epilogue from his influential book *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic* (1987)[3] titled 'Prebendalism and Dysfunctionality in Nigeria' (2013). Therein he quotes Francis Fukuyama's conviction that: "…the most universal form of human political interaction is a patron-client relationship in which a leader exchanges favours in return for support from a group of followers" (Joseph, 2013: Fukuyama, 2011: 453). The foregoing submission is universal to the extent that such has constituted political interaction through postcolonial Nigeria. It is long established that prebendalism constitutes part of Nigerian culture. In pondering how the legacy may be uprooted, therefore, Joseph reckons that "Nigerians are inveterate innovators…who will have to design ingenious responses" (Joseph, 2013).

In spite of this, he offers suggestions some of which, to my mind, may only nurture more prebendalism. For instance, he counsels that: "…federal, state and local governments, and non-governmental institutions, should…sponsor activities aimed at promoting non-prebendal attitudes and behaviours" (*ibid*.) and wonders if the difference between prebendal and non-

[3] Originally published in 1987, this book examines the relationship between the pattern of party formation in Nigeria and a mode of social, political and economic behaviour Richard Joseph terms 'prebendalism'. He demonstrates the centrality in the Nigerian polity of the struggle to control and exploit public office and argues that state power is usually viewed by Nigerians as an array of prebends, the appropriation of which provides access to the state treasury and to control over remunerative licenses and contracts…By exploring the ways in which individuals at all social levels contribute to the maintenance of these practices, the book provides an analysis of the impediments to constitutional democracy that is also relevant to the study of other nations.

prebendal administrative systems could be incorporated into academic curriculum. Urging Nigerians to "call on all the necessary human and material resources", Joseph is of the view that models can be copied and adapted from across the world. Invariably, there is a telling contradiction with his suggestion of an 'ingenious response designed by Nigerians' when he advises that "expertise can be contracted from any nation in which prebendalism is not the default administrative system" (*ibid*.)! Terrestrial praise political music culture highlights yet another flaw in prebendalism as conceived. The indiscriminate appropriation of the genus through patrons of several genres suggests that the ethnic thrust of existing literature on prebendalism cannot hold and needs to be reconsidered. After all, politicians vying for national offices do in fact require and solicit the services of musicians outside their own ethnic groups. This critical grasp of the relevant Africanist literature guided the theoretical amalgam consequently adopted. The issues of power, influence, and effects as pertains to the terrestrial praise political music subgenre ought to be approached through much more balanced notions.

In their analysis of Tanzanian and Nigerian musical open letters (a variant of the protest political music subgenre), Kunzler and Reuster-Jahn (2012) show the central characteristic of the subgenre to be the parrhesia on the part of the musicians. The duo sustains the discussion with guidance from the thoughts of Michel Foucault who described parrhesia as "a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help [himself and] other people" (Kunzler and Reuster-Jahn, 2012: 101). Foucault adduces five main traits of parrhesia namely frankness, truth, danger, criticism, and duty. The terrestrial praise political music subgenre offers a category wherein the aforementioned traits are appropriated in contrast.

Foucault, a French postmodernist, wrote extensively on power. As opposed to the general notion of power being all centered on a sovereign, authoritative body, Foucault explains that power is what makes us what we are. Power cannot be segregated to a group of people or to a particular culture. However, power can be seen in our day to day relations. 'Power is everywhere', diffused and embodied in discourse, knowledge and 'regimes of truth' (Powercube: Foucault, 1991; Rabinow, 1991). As for truth, it cannot be absolute. According to the take on John Caputo "the truth is that there is no truth." Truth is different at different times, circumstances and especially events. The "certainty" of "truth" can only be determined by faith and hope (Gustafson: 4). Foucault explains "If I tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I am constituted as a subject across a number of power relations which are exerted over me and which I exert over others" (Gustafson: PPC, 39).

As long as there is a relationship, there is power. Power is not held by a sovereign body, power cannot be centralized or attributed to one person or group, "Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be delved into. Power is only a certain type of relation between individuals" (Gustafson: PPC, 83). Foucault sees power as a relationship, the fact that a person relates with another person, simply means that both have power over one and another. The Government has power over the people, the people have power over the government, the musicians are the people therefore there is a relationship between the people, the musicians and the government. Hence power existing at every phase of the relationship. Even though Foucault acknowledges that power is seen in our day to day relationship, he does not exactly believe in the term that power is knowledge. "You must understand that is a part of the destiny common to all problems once they are posed: they

degenerate into slogans…you have to understand that when I read- and I know it has been attributed to me- the thesis, “Knowledge is power,” or “Power is knowledge,” I begin to laugh, since studying their relation is precisely my problem. If they were identical, I would not have to study them and I would be spared a lot of fatigue as a result. The very fact that I pose the question of their relation proves clearly that I do not [equate] them” (Gustafson: PPC, 43).

Foucault has been mistaken to assume that power is knowledge. Foucault further explains his theory that power is everywhere and can be held by anybody by analyzing the prisons in the late 18th century, the panopticon (Mason, 2015). The panopticon was designed by philosopher Jeremy Bentham. Instead of using violent means of conducting prisoners, prisoners were locked in cells. Not being able to communicate or interact with other prisoners. Guards could watch them through watchmen towers which can be substituted for surveillance cameras these days and they were used in observing the prisoners. The idea for Bentham was that “power should be visible but unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so” (Foucault, 1977). The prisoners were conscious of the fact that they were being monitored. Force was no longer needed to be used to produce good behaviour, all that was needed was a surveillance system where they could be seen but could not see the observer. In which case the observer can be anybody, it could be a fellow guard, a school kid, and it could be a philosopher, musician. It does not matter, as long as the “observed” knows that someone is watching, that alone can bring about order. The panopticon gave Foucault an opportunity to analyze the systems of social control and the power-knowledge concept

(Foucault, 1977). For Foucault, power and knowledge are generated from observation of other people. The panopticon gives us a clear view. Control can be exerted without recourse to force; the mere knowledge that one is being watched generates suitable behaviour. “The more one watches and observes the more powerful one can become” (Foucault, 1977). Foucault says that the combination of power and knowledge makes the two forces reinforced “by being combined and generalized, they attain a level at which the formation of knowledge and the increase in power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process” (Foucault, 1977).

Whereas Foucault explained that power obtained everywhere; and not necessarily being held by a structure or an institution which exists in every interaction (Shad, 1989: 119); Michael Mann a sociologist, believes that there is no such thing as society and there is no definite “totality” (Lodemann, 2015: 1). Mann explains society as “a network of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment (Lodemann, 2015: Mann, 1986):

> Mann points to the diversity of goals humans have (and the resulting inability to build a theory on this). Power is a ‘generalized means’ (Parson as cited in Mann, 1986) for reaching these goals. People need to enter power relations with each other to push their goals but the different networks do not add up to a kind of ‘social totality’ that one might be able to theorize; Mann (1986) claims that “societies are much messier than our theories of them (Lodemann, 2015: 2)

For Mann, power needs to be in an organization. He groups power into 4 organizational networks which is called the IEMP Model; Ideology, economic, military and political. (Domhoff, 2005) This model is not stated in accordance of importance. The effectiveness of the combinations of these organizations “will depend on continuous interaction between what

power configurations are historically given and what emerges within and among them" (Lodemann, 2015: Mann, 1993)

Ideological power relations are explained as "the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices" (Lodemann, 2015: Mann 1993). Economical power derives "from the satisfaction of subsistence needs through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, and consumption of the objects of nature. A grouping formed around these tasks is called a class" (Mann, 1986: 24). Economic power according to Mann affects everyday life much more than ideological power relations as it seems to be based on one's livelihood. …Because markets and companies are not restricted to national boundaries "economic power may transcend national boundaries, though not as easily as ideological power" (Lodemann, 2015: 3). Military power "derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggression. It has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns questions of life and death, as well as the organization of defense and offense in large geographical and social" (Mann, 1986: 25). Unlike economic power, Mann claims that military power does not affect everyday lives especially when there is peace. Similar to military power, political power is based on "authoritative regulation". It "derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations. I am not defining it in purely "functional" terms, in terms of judicial regulation backed by coercion. Such functions can be possessed by any power organization - ideological, economic, military, as well as states. I restrict it to regulations and coercion centrally administered and territorially bounded - that is, to state power" (Lodemann, 2015: 3).

It is in the foregoing respects wherein 'power' enjoys an unrestricted license that this study aims to appraise the power at play with respect to terrestrial praise political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria. Politicians as patrons wield power. Popular musicians as producers wield power. The electorate as audience and consumer wield power. Chapters 8 and 9 are qualitative and quantitative analyses of the terrestrial praise political music subgenre in Nigeria respectively. The power, influence and effects dynamic as construed through the subgenre is unraveled in ideological, economic, military and political discourse analyses.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to isolate theoretical notions most applicable to the practice of terrestrial praise political music culture. The first section discusses the appropriateness and limits of the theory of the alternative media (a western conception) to the protest political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria. While there was fitting as regards the contents (texts) of the protest political music material with the notions on alternative radical media, it did not go as much as to find any sort of aptness with respect to distribution. The distribution of alternative popular music would appear to be similar if not one and the same with the distribution of mainstream popular music in Nigeria. In the following section, a critical appraisal of the conception of the cultural hybrid is conducted on the unstudied unity political music subgenre yielding useful results. The final section accounts for the exploratory discussion of two Africanist theories – disorder as instrument and prebendal politics – which culminated in the engagement of 'power' through Foucault and Mann.

CHAPTER FIVE

PROTEST POLITICAL MUSIC CULTURE IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA

5.1 Introduction

Across Africa and beyond, the term 'political music' usually denotes 'protest music' or 'political protest music'. This chapter draws attention to the limitation of this view by exploring 'protest political music' as one of three subgenres of 'political music'. The chapter assesses protest political music culture in Nigeria as an alternative through the lenses of critical discourse analysis. The resulting political discourse analysis shows that popular musicians deploy conventions which pay attention to contextual and political realities in order to appeal and be accepted by their audience. The chapter provides illustrations of how protest political music texts have constituted political sound bites amongst the audience – a constituency broad enough to entail alternative voices also.

Scholarship on African popular music has been characterized by volumes of written material on the life and works of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti owing to his enigma and profoundly radical art. Whereas there has been much talk about the timelessness of his works such that they remain relevant in the present-day, no study has yet to illustrate this relevance within the context of contemporary politics in Africa. This chapter is an attempt to fill this gap. But more than that, the chapter is a political discourse analysis of selected works of two other alternative popular musicians of pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria who have hitherto eluded scholarship. Further, it is arguable that as Fela is to pre-1999 postcolonial Nigerian music, so is Femi Kuti to post-1999 Nigerian music. As such, the works of two more unstudied post-1999 Nigerian alternative popular music voices complement Kuti's in the second stanza of

the chapter. The study confirms that popular musicians are adept in employing contextually recognizable narratives in their delivery irrespective of an oppositional or radical charter.

5.2 Protest political music in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria

This section focuses on the alternative popular music in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria. It begins by engaging with a key work of Fela Anikulapo-Kuti as it relates to political realities as at the time of composing and subsequently attempts an application of this work's texts to democratic (post-1999) Nigerian political culture. The section proceeds to conduct a critical discourse analysis on selected texts from the music of Victor Essiet and The Mandators as well as the music of Osayomore Joseph; two other pre-1999 protest political music singers.

> The 'meaning' [of a song] is not confined to the intentions and ideology of its maker... the meanings attached to culture [are] not inscribed in the product, but [are] created by the users (Street, 2004: 304-308).

Indeed, meaning is contingent upon the context and conditions in which culture is consumed. Without an iota of doubt, Fela's contributions to political consciousness in Nigeria through music are unrivalled. A charismatic performer, keyboard player, saxophonist and composer, Fela's influences extend outside the limits of rhythm and melody, as he used his music as a platform with which to reject the imperial trappings of power. It is noteworthy that Fela pioneered the culture of Nigerian entertainers partaking in actual politics by founding a political party 'The Movement of the People (MOP)' towards contesting the 1979 and 1983 presidential elections in Nigeria (Veal, 2000; Olaniyan, 2009; Dosunmu, 2010 etc.). Born 15 October, 1938, Fela led a maverick and activist life until his death on 2 August, 1997. Pan-Africanist and libertarian, he represented Black Africa's uprising, both politically and musically. He was not only the most celebrated African

musician and composer of his time, but a revolutionary, cultural and political symbol whose contributions were often overlooked in the Western world. The African rhythms of his music were profoundly influenced by the sounds of Jazz icons Charlie Parker, John Coltrane, Mile Davis, but equally by the Jamaican Reggae of Bob Marley, Peter Tosh, and Burning Spear, forming a new musical style: Afro-beat. Fela was a musician, a politician, a spiritual chief, and an agitator all at once, but however one views the man, he was undeniably a symbolic icon of struggle and revolution, as well as one of the most beloved men in Africa. In Nigeria, he claimed that he was better known than the President, and this was probably true (*ibid*.).

Fela was undoubtedly the best chronicler of Nigeria's political history, a strong pan-Africanist, social critic, and fearless advocate of social justice and democracy (Ihonvbere and Shaw, 1998). However, precisely because there is a mass of existing scholarly work on Fela, it is needless to rehash well-documented knowledge on him. What this section proposes to do instead is to engage the works of Fela in a novel fashion by highlighting the influence of his music's texts on contemporary Nigerian political life. An example from the electioneering process of 2011 would suffice. The selected example is demonstrative of Fela's contributions to the historical foundations of political culture in Nigeria.

As of 1986, when the legend wrote the incredibly sarcastic song *Look and Laugh*, he was living a life of a recluse. The otherwise extrovert who loved to be in public places and clubs was always found sleeping or playing with his saxophone at home in the company of women, or performing at the Africa Shrine which he built. His old attitude of keeping abreast of events, giving lectures at universities and institutions of higher learning stopped. He rarely gave press conferences or press releases, like he used to. He therefore wrote the

song *Look and Laugh* (1986) to explain what was going on with him (Fela.net, 2011). In opening, Fela admitted that he hadn't made a record in a long while:

> '...Since long time I neva write new tune, long time I neva sing new song
>
> Long-time I neva write new tune, long time I neva sing new song'

He followed by expressing his awareness of his audience's wonder over his uncharacteristic un-productivity, and explained that it wasn't his intention to be quiet or to deprive his listeners of his thought-provoking and happiness-infusing music. He was barely observing events in the country and laughing; asking rhetorically if the things happening in the country weren't sufficient for one to look and laugh. Fela lamented how he had hitherto invested his music in correcting the ills of the country only to be charged with 'armed robbery' before going on to explain the countless beatings and arrest by the Nigerian police and army. But despite his sacrifices and sufferings like millions of other Africans, it was obvious that things were not getting better for the average man on the street. There is still injustice everywhere, no freedom, no happiness. All these made him feel disillusioned and all he could do about the situation was to look and laugh (Fela.net, 2011). In verse two, Fela described the shambolic second republic for which he places blame squarely on Obasanjo who handed over power in 1979 to Shagari who himself proclaimed 'the economy of the country is collapsing' (Fela, 1986). In verse three, Fela pondered how a contractor in agreement with a minister or commissioner to construct a road suddenly announced that the state of the economy had taken its toll on the cost such that the previous budget needed a review. The government on its own part made a case of lack of funds such that the contractor is disengaged. Of this scenario, Fela wondered the rationale for the continued stay of such government and retorted:

'…Shey that one no reach to laff?'

Fela is overcome by emotion as he recalled the burning of Kalakuta, the severe beatings he suffered, his mother's murder; indeed, his endless ordeals through his music career; each sponsored by the military. In the subsequent verse, Kuti took a swipe at the media in Nigeria over its complicity in the state of the nation:

'...Look at our television and listen to our radio in Nigeria

When dem do dem nonsense finish, newspaper sef go join

...No plan, no set, no ideas inside dem, dem go dey copy overseas dey go'

- *Look and Laugh* (1986)

Kuti's *Look and Laugh* (1986) is essential to this study for two main reasons. The first is the relevance of its texts to political matters in Nigeria, while the second is less obvious yet all too pertinent: In the run-up to the April 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria, the sitting President Goodluck Jonathan announced his candidature to run for the office on the banner of the ruling PDP. This did not go down well with a section of senior members of the party, particularly those of northern Nigeria extraction, who insisted that the office of President had been zoned to the north for the period of 2007 to 2015. In what was popularly referred to as the *PDP's gentleman agreement*, the claim was that party bigwigs had reached such an understanding as a logical sequel to General Obasanjo's eight-year tenure between 1999 and 2007 following the return to civil rule. After all, if Yar'Adua, Obasanjo's successor, had not passed away, he would have gotten the party's nod for a second term in most likelihood. This way power would have remained in the north, the reasoning went.

It was on this score, therefore, that party stalwarts from northern Nigeria opted to produce a consensus candidate from the quartet of northern aspirants in order to wrestle Jonathan from a common front. From a list parading former Head of State, General Ibrahim Babangida; ex Vice President, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar; the then outgoing Kwara State Governor, Dr Bukola Saraki and National Security Adviser in the Obasanjo administration, General Aliyu Gusau; members of the Northern Political Leaders Forum (NPLF) tasked themselves with selecting a candidate from the pool based on a schedule of criteria. At the end of the proceedings, the NPLF reached a decision and anointed Obasanjo's erstwhile deputy and arch-rival Atiku Abubakar as the consensus candidate. Abubakar had thereby emerged the northern alternative to Jonathan (Obasanjo's political godson) winning the party's ticket. As expected, Obasanjo's reaction to this was swift and profound. With the media eager to have the ex-president's thoughts on the development, Obasanjo told his interviewer: "I dey laugh o!" (Thisday, 2010)

In order to best grasp the conditions and implications of the abovementioned famous remark, it is necessary to put a few issues in proper perspective. At the twilight of Obasanjo's first-term of office (1999-2003), Abubakar expressed interest in his boss' office and wanted Obasanjo to adopt the Mandela option: that is, spend one term in office, so he Abubakar, could take over as President. As leader of the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), machinery inherited from his godfather and mentor: the late General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, Abubakar was a powerful force within the PDP. The PDM had many incumbent PDP Governors as members such that Abubakar almost scuttled Obasanjo's re-election bid. Obasanjo had to practically plead with Abubakar and his supporters to eventually emerge as the PDP's presidential flag-bearer at the 2003 elections. And so the unforgiving Obasanjo

went on to win the election and immediately embarked on a revenge mission against Abubakar for daring to outshine the boss (Abati, 2010).

To begin with, the Vice Presidency which had been hitherto powerful was rendered ineffective by Obasanjo. Abubakar, in their first term of office, had been charged with overseeing the country's economic team; he also ran a very influential media apparatus: Obasanjo withdrew all his powers as the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in use does not give any specific powers or relevance to the office of the Vice President. Abubakar's media team was summarily decimated, being staff of the Presidency which Obasanjo was determined to wholly control. Obviously, Obasanjo's game plan was to frustrate Abubakar out of the Presidency, but the latter stayed on, deciding to fight rather than oblige his boss's bid. After all, he was party to the mandate. His open quest for the number-one office of the land notwithstanding, Obasanjo had famously assured Abubakar that he would not succeed him. In fact, by 2006, when Obasanjo and his strategists wanted to impose a third term agenda on Nigerians, Abubakar and his supporters joined the struggle and helped to stop the illegal proposal (*ibid.*).

This infuriated Obasanjo the more; and soon Abubakar was charged with counts of corruption. An administrative panel of enquiry was set up to confirm this through a formal indictment, based on accusations that Abubakar had stolen funds belonging to the Petroleum Development Trust Fund (PTDF). A defiant Abubakar went to the courts to clear his name and every step of the way, he won. At this time, Obasanjo expelled Abubakar from the ruling PDP which meant that he had to find succour with the opposition Action Congress (AC). Expectedly, Abubakar emerged as the presidential candidate of the AC but stood no chance at the polls given his late entry into the race as a consequence of Obasanjo's efforts

through the electoral commission to prevent Abubakar from running (*ibid*.). In effect therefore, although Obasanjo had his way by sponsoring the candidature of the late Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua on the PDP ticket and eventually election victory as President, Abubakar had refused to be intimidated, denying Obasanjo his much craved total satisfaction over the matter. There was absolutely *no love lost* between both men.

The media's manner in linking Obasanjo's comment with the grudge between both men and no more is therefore understandable. But then, could it be that Obasanjo retorted "I dey laugh o" (*ibid*.) as a signal of his own helplessness (like Fela's in *Look and Laugh*, 1986) in the face of the NPLF's *gerontocratic* methods which threw up Abubakar? Fela (1986) sang "Wetin man go dey do when na for him eye Obasanjo pass government to Shagari o?" [What else can one do (beyond looking and laughing) when it is under one's eye Obasanjo handed power over to Shagari?!] Obasanjo's present day 'I dey laugh o' is referent of his helplessness as the NPLF took a step closer to having Abubakar (like Shagari in 1979) head of government. Obasanjo's disapproval of Abubakar is synonymous with Fela's disapproval of Shagari; hence the 'laugh'. While Obasanjo was President, he had publicly vowed that Abubakar would never become President (Abati, 2010). Alas, Abubakar appeared to be getting closer to the nation's top job. The utterance 'I dey laugh o' at a time Abubakar was named the NPLF's candidate, showed Obasanjo's grasp of the position he now occupied regarding the nation's governance: one synonymous with Fela's in 1986 when he performed 'Look and Laugh'. The thread of 'look and laugh', 'I dey laugh o', 'Siddon look'[1] *et al*. is almost inexhaustible, but the common signifier is a context where the one who voices 'look and laugh' disapproves of goings-on but can do nothing; hence takes the look and laugh posture. The words of General

[1] 'Siddon look' is a Pidgin phrase for 'sit down and look'. It refers to a helpless condition wherein one is incapable of affecting an undesirable reality. Politically, the phrase 'siddon look' gained wide popularity when the late foremost Awoist and Attorney General of Nigeria Chief Bola Ige expressed it.

Obasanjo elucidate a clear link between the texts of pre-1999 protest political music in Nigeria and political sound bites of the post-1999 years.

The attempt to synthesise a relationship between Obasanjo's "I dey laugh o" (Obasanjo, 2010) and Fela's *Look and Laugh* (1986) may come across as somewhat conjectural, yet there is a sense in which neglecting the possible connection is parallel to the Nigerian media's conveyance of Obasanjo's remark in its hollowness. The media had examined his statement in an approach that isolated it completely from influences outside the feud that existed between both men. Across the media, no analysis managed to report that *Obasanjo did a Fela on Abubakar*. At best, reviews centred on the aesthetics of laughter and on possible provocations as of the time of Obasanjo's comment. Fela probably had a point when he sang of the Nigerian media: "...*no plan, no set, no ideas inside dem*" (1986). In an article[2] dedicated to Obasanjo's utterance, Reuben Abati wrote: "But why should Obasanjo laugh at anybody at this time? We expect him to be a good student of history" (Abati, 2010). In retrospect, Obasanjo is a great student of Fela's music: an indication of Obasanjo's good grasp of history. I intend to interpret these cultural texts freely and creatively - unlike the Nigerian media - in the manner endorsed by Roland Barthes (*Mythologies*, 1972), and it is on account of this that 'I dey laugh o' serves as primary illustration of the link between pre-1999 political music texts and post-1999 political commentary through postcolonial Nigeria; the impressions of Fela's music on electoral Nigeria sound bites.

Meanwhile, RP1, a 35-year-old postgraduate male student, holds an alternative view towards the mass reverence of Fela:

[2] The said article was penned while Reuben Abati was the Chairman of the editorial board of The Guardian – one of Nigeria's leading Newspapers.

…What Fela was doing was no different from what the political class were doing. Fela saw an opening with a hopeless people and exploited it to his own benefit. I saw Fela alive on two occasions; once at the Kalakuta Republic. He lived as a mini tyrant. There used to be demarcations with warnings that 'Make nobody pass here o!' [Nobody must breach this line]

Don't you ever wonder how come no one is yet to better his genius as far as afro-beat is concerned? Fela was a scope man having his pleasures at the people's expense. And he was just as detached from his 'people' as the politicians he attacked were.

To buttress the point that Fela was a public crusader for private pleasures, his music can be said as having no effect on the Nigerian political and cultural spaces. I love the presentation and jazzy feel of Fela's songs, but the lyrics merely echoed what everyone in the society already knew. Music shouldn't be for reiterating the known. Music ought to be fresh, make you think, proffer solutions. That Fela sang about the poor infrastructure like electricity and roads, hasn't translated into good roads and sufficient electricity in Nigeria. Fela's music has proffered no solutions to the idea of Nigeria (RP1, Lagos: May, 2013).

It is difficult to disagree with the views of RP1 however damning they may be of Fela. RP1's submissions demonstrate the sheer complexity of music audiences. It is in this sense of alternatives to dominant discourses that audiences are appropriated through the thesis.

Victor Essiet and The Mandators was a reggae group whose music dominated the Nigerian airwaves through the 1980s and 1990s. In 1987, two years into General Babangida's eight-year 'presidency', Essiet and The Mandators released the very successful album *Crisis* which comprised several songs protesting the social, political and economic situation in Nigeria. In 'Survival', Essiet offers that '*The strength of currency is the pride of any nation*' (1987) referencing the fall in the value of naira as well as highlighting the

unbecoming inflation in the land: The Mandators also recorded 'Inflation'. Citing the masses and how '*the chances for survival were getting slimmer*', The Mandators get into a chorus that asks '*Where is survival?*' severally. The first verse mocks the various leaders Nigeria had had since the eruption of the First Republic who enjoyed riding on the idea of being '*the saviour*' or '*a messiah*' only to loot the commonwealth. '*Where are we going now? Where are we going Lord?*' ask the singers.

They continue '*Oh the more you work the less pay you get*' attributing this to the trickery of the political class whom the nation's 'forefathers' had warned, and who '*we the children are now warning*'. This is followed by an aphorism: '*Strong people make strong nation/Weak people make weak nation*' (*ibid*.). The duo takes a swipe at the peculiar Nigerian condition wherein climbing higher made life 'hotter' rather than 'cooler' as obtained outside of Nigeria. The final verse dedicates the piece to '*them sufferers in the town; we the street people; and to them sufferers in the city*' (*ibid*.).

The exit of major labels from the country ensured that the group was disbanded and Essiet had to relocate to the USA from where he granted me an interview on some of his political performances:

Songs like 'Rise to the top' and 'Love your nation' conveyed lyrics that resonated with the people. As such, there was no need to write fresh lyrics through the MKO Abiola campaign of 1992/93 where we performed these songs nationwide. The June 12, 1993 election of Chief Abiola was the best election conducted in the country's history...It is only criminal elements that perform or write songs for money. When I performed for Abiola, I did it on a conviction because I knew the man. I had met several beneficiaries of his scholarships and generosity from across the country. There were mosques and churches for which Abiola became the

building committee chairman because of his philanthropic work. Because I knew him, campaigning for him was not a function of financial remuneration[3]

Essiet's point is that although his group provided interlude through Chief MKO Abiola's presidential campaign bid, it was done at no extra cost to the politician. According to Essiet, the group believed that Abiola's candidature epitomised the message of the two unity political songs ('Rise to the top' and 'Love your country') referenced as having been performed through the campaigns. As such, these songs met the needs of the context. For Essiet, the question of writing a distinct piece tailored to endorse/praise the politician did not arise. As he put it, 'only criminal elements write songs for money'.

A scrutiny of the body of work by Victor Essiet and The Mandators shows that 'Rise to the top' and 'Love your country' are moments amongst songs which belong in the protest political music subgenre. Yet another protest political song by the group worth assessing is 'Injustice' (1987). In 'Injustice', The Mandators open by lamenting on behalf of '*Our people in the street/Struggling to earn their daily bread/Day in and day out*' (The Mandators, 1987). They continue:

'Upper classes have squandered and destroyed our riches

They want to be millionaires

The more they get the more they want

…Our society has made us the way we are…'

[3] Personal Interview with Victor Essiet, November 2012.

The chorus follows with an elaborate encore of the words: '*No justice no equal rights/Injustice in every way*' (*ibid*.). Soon there's a similarly repeated interlude to the effect that '*What goes around comes around/what goes up surely comes down*' subtly referencing the inevitability of doomsday for the nation's exploiters. The Mandators speak of the poor commoners who bear the brunt of the decadent society where '*innocent ones are dying*' and '*guilty ones are going free*'. In closing, they turn to the police who '*stop [citizens] at the road block asking what*[4] *[they've] got for them*', with dire consequences awaiting those who fail to oblige.

Another protest political musician is 'Ambassador' Osayomore Joseph, born in the late 1940s close to Benin City in Edo State, Nigeria. He is an animist with faith in the Benin pantheon spirits. Owing to his courage to speak openly against injustice and the false Nigerian democracy, he is somewhat considered a successor of Fela's. The messages in most of his songs however risk being confined in the area of his own ethnic group due to the Edo language he utilizes in singing more often. Joseph has been charged to court and imprisoned severally for issues bordering on his cheeky music renowned for ridiculing the authorities (Biography, 2010).

'...We choose our president, he turn am upside down (2ce)

We choose our head-of-state, he turn am upside down'

- *Baba Na Wah!* (1996)

[4] Nigerian policemen are renowned for requesting financial inducements (bribes) from motorists. Motorists who fail to part with this 'incentive' face brutalization of various degrees. Police high-handedness has been a major socio-political challenge through Nigeria's postcolonial history; and a section in part two focuses on this.

To the Nigerian historian, the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election intended at ushering in the Third Republic President is General Babangida's greatest undoing as the country's leader. *Baba Na Wah!* is a mockery of Babangida's stewardship, delivered mostly in Pidgin English, and released some three years into General Abacha's five-year dictatorship. The song clamoured for the actualisation of the mandate of Chief Abiola who won the annulled June 12 presidential election. Of Babangida, Joseph began:

'…Me I know him face long, long time ago

…When I sing and cry, nobody care to hear

...Na now uhna know say na animal in uniform…'

Before *Baba Na Wah!* Joseph had done songs critical of Babangida which were barely received. Humouring the masses (audience) for the country's precarious state, having not heeded his warnings hitherto thus seemed justified. *Baba Na Wah!* conveyed unprecedented venom and bitterness directed at Babangida. The source of Joseph's scorn isn't farfetched as he utters a veiled threat to the Abacha junta of the day:

'[…June 12, 1993 was the day we chose our president]

[June 12 united the whole country Nigeria]

[It is that same June 12 that will scatter Nigeria if the rightful winner is not installed]'

More than these, *Baba Na Wah!* was a befitting rejoinder to Babangida's valedictory speech wherein he stated that he was deciding to "...voluntarily step aside..."! To this, Joseph retorted in the opening verse:

'…Oga dictator! He no want to go again

…He sit down for power, begin to manipulate

He sit down gbe-gbe-gbe like say na him father house

…Offer to **step aside** like say na him birth right (2ce)'

Joseph engages Babangida belligerently; reeling out ill after ill that was associated with the latter's eight-year management of government. Joseph details the 'freedom of the press' mantra which ironically entailed the letter-bomb murder of leading journalist Dele Giwa; the fact that Babangida oversaw the formation of the two political parties – SDP and NRC – and '*designed their logos and manifestoes*'! Joseph proceeds lamenting that Nigerian national football teams never won any international competitions during Babangida's rule and contrasts this with the quick victories the teams recorded once he left power: The African Nations Cup in 1994 hosted in Tunisia as well as the football gold medal title at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta. He continues:

'…Oh you father of all disaster

It is in your time

We witnessed the greatest military air disaster

That claimed the lives of our young military officers

Leaving their wives to be widows and uncared for today'

Joseph decries how Babangida cancelled the 'war against indiscipline' which the preceding Buhari-Idiagbon regime had inaugurated and pursued. Joseph insists that before

Babangida's forceful ascension, Nigerian streets had no litter just as every household had a culture of planting trees. Christening Babangida 'the grandfather of settlement and gross indiscipline', Joseph ties the closure of schools from elementary to tertiary levels to the ex-president's legacy. At this stage, Joseph references the Francis Arthur Nzeribe-led 'Association of Better Nigeria' as 'Association of bad and bitter Nigeria' whose charter it was to 'destroy our free and fair election/Won by a great son of this country'. He describes Babangida as the catalyst for the judges' abuse that came to characterize the judiciary before entering a penultimate theme: 'the devil men' Babangida collected 'that helped to destroy Nigeria before'. He lists some of these IBB boys: Chukwumerije, Akpamgbo, Justice Ikpeme, and Professor Okon Uyah. The song copiously documents the culture of using 'portfolio for settlement' and its strenuous effects on the economy as Babangida's legacy to Nigeria.

Joseph salutes those he considers to 'love democracy and peace'. Amongst this group, he mentions Gani Fawehinmi, Femi Falana and Beko Kuti. He pleads with all those in the struggle for democracy not to tire; before closing by assertively assuring the Vice President-elect of the June 12, 1993 election, Ambassador Babagana Kingibe that it "is you and no one else". In essence thereof, Joseph had managed to accomplish both 'protest' and 'praise' music in a single recording scoop – some feat.

Meanwhile, if Joseph's lampoon was intended as farewell to Babangida - who patently left Nigeria far worse off than the country was when he came to power - the General did not heed, or he simply did not get the message. In 2006 (preparatory to the 2007 election), Babangida stormed the PDP headquarters in Abuja to purchase the party's presidential aspirants' form before withdrawing his application in the light of Yar'Adua's

candidature whom the former had described as his brother. Again, in 2010 (preparatory to the 2011 election), following Yar'Adua's demise and the zoning arrangement, Babangida declared his presidential ambition amidst amplified pomp and pageantry at the Eagle Square, Abuja. In an apt and illuminating electorally motivated act, on April 14, 2010, *Baba Na Wah!* (1996) was published on the popular website Youtube by anti-Babangida-for-President concerns with the caption: "*Spread this! Babangida is Evil!*" (Youtube, 2010) accompanying some telling visuals. The airplay for the song at this time generated freshly profound meanings to Joseph's work; especially from the following wordplay:

'...Babangida nko? He dey for him Minna (2ce)

Iminna for Bini, na when you dey dream

Na true word be dat o, Babangida dey dream o... (2ce)

Eh, eh, eh, gida na wah o! Baba na wah...'

Assuming the exhumation of *Baba Na Wah!* (1996) in April 2010 was insufficient appeal for Babangida to abandon his 2011 presidential ambition, the NPLF spared him the bleak electoral prospect by declaring Atiku Abubakar its consensus candidate in November of 2010.

5.3 Protest political music in post-1999 Nigeria

This section focuses on alternative popular music in post-1999 Nigeria. It begins by engaging key works of Femi Anikulapo-Kuti as these relate to political realities as at the time of composing. The section proceeds to duplicate the aforementioned analytical procedure on relevant texts from the music of Blackface and the music of Mr. Raw Nwanne.

Femi Kuti is the eldest son and undisputed inheritor of the genius of Fela. In present-day Nigeria, he carries the banner of protest political music; confronting governments and speaking against societal ills. He continues to play at the shrine as his father did and is currently one of Africa's most recognizable voices. Before democratization in 1999, Femi Kuti had recorded successes with protest political music material, thus making him one of very few Nigerian popular musicians to enjoy relevance across both pre-1999 and post-1999 postcolonial Nigeria. Kuti began a diligent apprentice when he played as a member of his father's band as a saxophonist for many years before eventually carving his own, yet evidently connecting niche. Indeed, he played for his father between the years of 1978 and 1989. It was in 1989 that he released his debut album titled *No Cause for Alarm?* He would go on to release its successor two years later in the shape of *Mind Your Own Business* (1991). The two albums ensured Kuti was widely regarded in the shadows of his father's brilliance prompting the former to take time out in order to look inwards, subsequently announcing his identity in the eponymous album *Femi Kuti* in 1995.

Released at the heart of General Abacha's stranglehold of the nation, *Femi Kuti* (1995) could hardly have been timelier considering the country's state at the time. In 'Wonder, Wonder', Kuti's concern is with Kwame Nkrumah's vision to unite Africa in the 'early sixties' in order that the continent be strong, yet Africans have no direction more than thirty years on. In effect, Kuti wonders 'Will Africa ever unite?' In 'Plenty Nonsense' Kuti lambasts figures including Chief Moshood Abiola over his support for General Babangida's rule wherein the former enjoyed numerous government contracts; Alhaji Lateef Jakande – Second Republic Governor of Lagos state considered a democrat who had accepted to serve the Abacha government to the dismay of many, and over the shabby nature of the schools

he built as Governor; and General Babangida who had by now 'stepped aside' over how he got the country to the brink of collapse. In 'Nawa' meanwhile, Kuti takes a swipe at ex-heads-of-state, Alhaji Shehu Shagari and General Obasanjo over how both men cornered the commonwealth and succeeded in acquiring mega-sized farm lands for themselves in the name of *Green Revolution* and *Operation Feed the Nation* respectively. And so as not to omit the sitting military leader from the album, Kuti reserves mention of General Abacha for the song 'Stubborn Problem'.

Following his father's passing in 1997, Kuti signed a deal with MCA who oversaw the release of *Shoki Shoki* (1998). The album won him critical acclaim around the world for being much more assured in its focus and delivery of inherent socio-political themes. *Shoki Shoki* included the striking track 'What will Tomorrow Bring?' through which it is evident that Kuti bore a considerable measure of pessimism for the country's immediate future: concern perhaps over the General Abdulsalami Abubakar-supervised programme for the nation's transition into the Fourth Republic. Hence Kuti's realism in "...tomorrow na result of things wey happen today" [tomorrow is the result of things that happen today] (Kuti, 1998). This intrinsic message is perchance amplified in 'Sorry Sorry' where Kuti communicates his astonishment from the methods of the Nigerian state, and his sympathy for the long suffering people. He begins by humouring the situation wherein "politicians and soldiers make meeting" to repair Nigeria as though both constituencies were unaware they were complicit in destroying the country thus far! Of the masses, he decries how they enjoy a herd ('zombie') followership of leaders who were the people's enemies in actual fact.

> [We] need to be aware of the conditions that make it possible for artists to become politically salient figures. The ability to speak politically is partly a matter of genre – of what the conventions allow you to say, of what the audience expects (Street, 2004: 304).

Following the album *Shoki Shoki* (1998), Femi Kuti returned to the studio after Nigeria's return to democratic rule in 1999 to record a fitting sequel in the form of the album *Fight to Win*. Released in mid-October 2001, *Fight to Win* would seem to have been politically mild considering the extent of criticism knowledgeable audiences expected from a Kuti album. Yet, appreciating that the album was released merely seventeen months after the nation's return to civil rule on May 29, 1999, the toning of the album may have been advisedly done. For although *Fight to Win* (2001) contained little with respect to critiquing the immediate seating political class, the album played host to sensitive and sensitizing tunes like 'Do Your Best', 'Stop AIDS', 'Alkebu-Lan' (Cradle of Civilization), 'Walk on the Right Side', 'Eko Lagos' as well as the very touching and hugely impressive Fela tribute ''97'. More than these, the title track 'Fight to Win' is as good as any resistance song an oppressed people are likely to get. Despite the palpable richness of the album, Kuti nonetheless manages to make room for the song 'Traitors of Africa' (2001) wherein he shows his skill of satire in projecting General Ibrahim Babangida as the grand traitor of the black continent. Yet, a Communications Professor offered:

I know to some extent that he stepped into his father's shoes, but to some extent, he is yet to have an identity of his own. It's still his father that has overwhelming identity. Take his father away from him, Femi might not be known. And I think if he really wants to make something for himself, he should be original. For now, he is just keeping the family tradition. He has no identity, to me, other than his father's identity...he dances, he plays like his father, so who is he, the son of the father, simple (RP2, June 2013).

Asked to suggest what Femi Kuti could do to get his own identity, the Professor responded:

He has to branch off his father's way, but even in his father's way, he has only been able to get into his father's way through the melody, not the lyrics. He plays the pattern of music of the father, but he doesn't use the words. He doesn't attack the government as the father did. So if he really wants to get into his father's way, so that we know that it's his father that is continuing, let him do the things that his father did, and even do much more: Punch the Governors, punch the Senators, punch the Lagos State Government, punch all those people there, the elders that are doing some silly things that they shouldn't be doing. That's when we'll know that this is the true son of Fela. For now, he is just a half son (ibid.)

A study of the works of Femi Kuti suggests a stark mockery of some notions from the Professor referenced above. This scenario finely highlights the dangers in relying on supposed 'authoritative' voices. Ordinary members of the audience without grand sounding titles may well serve better in grasping popular music and the dynamics inherent.

Kuti will return after *Fight to Win* (2001) with the smash production *African Shrine* in 2004 which was a 14-track album performed live and recorded entirely at the African Shrine in Lagos. With songs like 'Dem Bobo', 'Oyimbo', 'I Wanna Be Free', 'Yeparipa', 'Can't Buy Me', and 'Bring Me the Man Now'; Kuti's *African Shrine* (2004) was a compelling cry on the limitations of democracy; with Nigeria having democratized its political organs in 1999. While his lyrics in all of these songs were mainly informed by the Nigerian condition, the song '1, 2, 3, 4' which was the seventh on the album speaks to democracy at a global scale and context. Essentially, '1, 2, 3, 4' mocks the idea of the predominant two-term of four years each which has become a global doctrine of democracy. This is eloquently transmitted in the chorus where Kuti laments the speed of time in a democracy and how this time is wasted by politicians which in turn 'wastes away the lives' of the masses. The second verse

speaks to the insincerity of the political class who are versed in making grandiose promises when seeking votes only to lose steam and begin conspiring once they have a mandate. Verse one is the summation of the invariable vanity of politics and economic structures throughout the world: “Everywhere I go, I see injustice/In form of government and them nonsense policies/Marxism, socialism, call it what you want/Capitalism, na the same oppression dey/Injustice, misuse of power na them specialty/Always pretending that they want to help the human race”.

Ahmedu Augustine Obiabo, Blackface, is without doubt a notable political voice of post-1999 Nigeria. ‘Hard life’ (2004) is perhaps his most famous work to date. Blackface was a member of the now defunct R&B band Plantashun Boyz. Along with Tuface Idibia and Faze, the three created a formidable music blend and were the leading band in Nigeria through the early 2000s, reeling out love-themed songs in conjunction with producer Nelson Brown. Having parted ways in 2004, each of the three pursued solo careers. While Tuface and Faze largely stayed true to R&B which the Plantashun Boyz were renowned for, Blackface released the ultra-conscious album *Ghetto Child* (2004). The album comprised tracks like ‘E dey pain me’, ‘Prepare me’, ‘Show me’, ‘Why oh why’, and ‘Oh Nigeria’.

After experiencing a career low following a string of indifferent albums subsequently, Blackface returned to protest political music with a 2012 single ‘Music in my system’ featuring Marvellous Benji. For the purposes of this critique, however, ‘Hard Life’ and ‘Carry Us’, from Blackface’s debut solo album *Ghetto Child* are engaged:

The chorus to ‘Hard life’ highlights the practice by the political class of exploiting the Nigerian people’s resources only to go acquire property and make investments abroad. Verse one toes the message from the chorus, only there is now the leveller wherein the

oppressed lets the oppressor (looting government officials) into the 'supposed secret' which is that the oppressed are well-aware of the corrupt practices of the ruling class. Blackface proceeds attempting to make mockery of the proliferation of siren-use by government officials as of 2004 Nigeria. Questioning why people's lives in Nigeria ought to be so bitter, he details pains comprising bad roads, prevalent children's suffering, failed promises made the more awful by a worse off reality than that as of the time promises were made.

He wonders the rationale for authorities in Nigeria to insist on marijuana – 'j' is appropriated here as some form of oppressed masses' opium necessary for their enlightenment/uplifting - being illegal whereas the very modus operandi of these individuals who occupy law-making offices leave much to be legally desired. In frustration, he ponders 'what sort of life this is?' where people work daily but have no earnings to show for it. He proceeds to insist on the present government's rot by highlighting the perpetuity of strikes by the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU: equally a source of popular burlesque as an acronym for Academic Strike Union of Universities) which had kept a sizeable population of youths at home in redundancy.

Verse two reiterates the insulting effrontery of any member of the looting class to attempt to promulgate laws intended for adherence by law abiding citizens. It also reiterates the circumstances of work without pay, poor housing and transportation for the generality of Nigerians, corruption as a synonym for the country's name, fuel scarcity and the inherent diplomatic untidiness, and again the practice of public officials embezzling funds only to conspicuously consume these monies while looking down on the masses. Soon he finds succour for the oppressed when he utters: 'Fire burn them; All of them one'

(Blackface, 2004: 'Hard life') obviously invoking the doctrine of repercussion on the looters of public treasury.

There is palpable *breath-of-fresh-air* when Blackface continues in verse three:

'I say the youths

[This is the time to win]

For we to take the lead, not mislead your black family'

Verse three culminates in a cry cum reason for this call on Nigerian youths:

'Just for them to give we the basic amenities'

Blackface makes the case that no government ought to be as unconcerned enough as to deprive the general population the basic necessities of life. In this thinking, Blackface is subtly conveying an abiding Nigerian refrain that 'the people are not asking for too much' hence governments need to prioritize and provide the basics.

Fela's 'Alagbon Close' (1974) and 'Confusion' (1974), The Mandators' 'Injustice' (1987), and Majek Fashek's 'Police Brutality' (1988), amongst other pre-1999 protest songs addressed the Nigerian military and the Nigerian police over their modes of operation. The trend-setting credential of these songs is reflected in the number of musical hits that have addressed police high-handedness and rascality in post-1999 Nigeria. Perhaps one of these protest cries against the unbecoming culture of police brutality in Nigeria is Blackface's conscientious representation of the scourge in the texts of 'Carry Us' (2004) – a danceable song whose three verses and chorus are dedicated to the Nigerian Police:

Chorus

'[That was how they took us to prison]

[Before we knew it, they ordered us into the back of the vehicle]

[We did nothing, but we still had to tell them 'please']

[We did nothing, but we still had to beg]'

Following the opening chorus, Blackface begins his documentation of three scenarios of personal encounters with the Nigeria Police in verse one where he tells the story of a road trip he made from Uyo, Akwa Ibom state. As the bus developed a fault and broke down a short while after departure, he Blackface – as his emotion would have audiences believe - had gone to help himself to some refreshment. The relevance of that piece of information and its correlation with the lyrics which directly follow is subject to interpretation; however, he continues his narration of how a police escort besieged him in the bus because his phone had been ringing! The policeman 'slams' Blackface's phone and immediately corks his gun before taking a mean pose. Blackface is pained by the 'armed robber' tag handed him by the police and his subsequent arrival at the police station. Blackface shows he's bewildered at the police's posture of a lack/inability to differentiate a phone from a gun.

The second verse of 'Carry Us' (2004) is set on the road at a time when Blackface needed to drive to a show at the MUSON Centre in Lagos Island from Lagos mainland. The drama of the verse begins when he meets a police checkpoint at Apongbon. Here, he observes uniformed mobile policemen with guns doing a compulsory search on every passing car. When it's the turn of his car, the following demand from the checking officer ensues:

‘The MOPOL say “hold up, wait

Your inner light

Your particulars

Your licence

[I want to see the proof of ownership for the shirt you have on]

Your MOT

Your ECMR

[I want to see the insurance of the radio and speaker in your car]

…park well

[Why are your eyes swollen?]

[I can tell you have been smoking]”

[That’s how the mobile policeman locked me up in a cell]

[Thinking I would not yell being a citizen?!]’

And so Blackface yells through the song ‘Carry Us’ at the unbecoming police culture of harassing citizens who have committed no crime except being considered suitable for monetary extortion. Blackface dedicates verse three to a pleading conversation with a policeman. Describing the road blocks in the country presently (2004) as insane, he wonders why the police had resolved to oppress innocent people even though some may be celebrities like himself. The absence of police protection in the midst of several policemen

makes Blackface describe his country as ‘drowning in the sea’. He soon turns his critique to the President resident at Aso Rock lamenting that he cared less about the poor oppressed masses who hang in buses and lack basic ‘social amenities’. Yet corruption continues to grow daily, he sings. As he is unable to offer any reasons why things are in such comatose state, he concludes verse three by recommending emigration to the USA!

Like Blackface, but to much less a degree, Mr Raw Nwanne is a protest political musician amongst Nigerian music audiences. The chorus to his debut single ‘Obodo’ (2004) is delivered by Klint da Drunk who is best known for his comedy which has the distinction of being performed in drunken attire and mannerisms. The main thrust of the chorus ‘Obodo delugo’ (which is uttered thrice in the chorus) loosely translates as ‘the city has ripened the mire’. It is a metaphor which implies a clarion call on everyone that the time has come to do something about the status quo - status quo being the state of social and political affairs in the Nigerian nation.

For Raw Nwanne, also known as Mr Raw and formerly Nigga Raw, ‘Obodo’ (2004) served as his entry into the popular hip-hop scene in Nigeria. Mr Raw has not rescinded since then recording conscious hits along with hits of other styles. Appropriately, the first verse of Mr Raw’s ‘Obodo’ is dedicated to a self-introduction:

‘…I'm from Umuesere Amabor Okokitem in Abia State’

Soon, he adds that he is of a broke financial background before calling on his fellow kinsmen and women of Igbo extraction:

‘Ndi Igbo kwenu – Heee! (2ce)

Igbo kwezuenu – Heeeeeee!’

Insisting that enough was enough, he references the sufferings of King Jaja of Opobo in his rise from slavery to become merchant prince, head of the Ama Pepple family and founder of the city-state of Opobo. Basically, Raw seems to imply that the late Jaja's legacy would have stood for nothing if his descendants (Jaja of Opobo was born in Igbo-land and was christened Jubo Jubogha) didn't rise to 'help this obodo and our naira and kobo'. In an instance of referencing the nation's currency, Raw immediately captures the economic consciousness of his audience. Condemning the cold nature of the rich towards the poor in society, he draws attention to the ill, destructive, and wasteful culture of the same rich at parties and ceremonies where cash spraying is the norm.

Raw reminds Nigeria of her previous position as 'giant of Africa' and narrates the pro-western phantasmagoria of the country's people and leaders who have yearned for and effected states' creation which results in non-indigene marginalisation between states in the country. In spite of the 'austerity measures' most Nigerians are undertaking, Raw is astounded at those public officials out for the public till; he yells:

'Begin dey loot our treasure - under pressure, we say we under pressure'

{Ras Kimono's pre-1999 protest hit is titled 'Under Pressure'}

In verse two, Raw engages the microphone and his audience from a trance of personalized optimism: uttering that 'a stitch in time saves nine' and somehow tying the idea of his impending break to Nigeria's independence in 1960 which had produced disgraceful national telephone and electricity operators. In a palpably pained and confused verse, Raw returns to a scene where he is harassed by the police after he had bought a cup of the staple garri at a cost of 20 naira which was exorbitant. By subsuming the paramilitary outfits, mobile police, and Bakassi boys; he essentially mocks the methods of each as having no defined limits. The following line 'Because e be like say una dey envy my Versace' suggests

that the policemen who have no case on a citizen may create a pseudo-case out of envy for the citizen's status, position, or possession.

The details of the ordeal which followed his outburst at the policemen soon turn uncomfortably graphic. He continues that his protest was borne out of Nigeria being his nation, but that he was unaware that his rights were not in the constitution – hence the police could have no knowledge even when they studied the constitution. He was consequently badly assaulted by the policemen using guns, boots, and slaps. He adds that the policemen made away with his shoes, wristwatch, and cash. Raw contrasts his ordeal as an ordinary citizen with events if he were a relative of the President. In the end, he gives God the glory referencing a favourite phrase of former President Obasanjo: 'I still dey kampe' [I am very fine].

In 2007, Mr Raw returned to the music stores with a new album. His come-back single 'Ko gbadun' is an electorally salient track which featured Duncan Mighty on the chorus. The striking bit from the song 'Ko gbadun' is that whereas it is delivered in Igbo and Pidgin English, the title 'Ko gbadun' is a Yoruba phrase translating loosely as 'disapproving' or 'not happy with' or 'don't like'. Raw adopts this title perhaps owing to the scope of usage the phrase enjoyed in Nigeria then; yet Mighty's delivery of the chorus is firm where he essentially sings: 'You leaders/officials will kill someone; the way you folks are running this country isn't something I enjoy'. Verse one follows with Raw's critique of Nigerian politicians who, according to him, treat the population as property and ensure that poverty is the common binder for the population. But he refrains from exonerating the population who he describes as subsisting in an economy on the 'somersault' yet the people fail to defend their votes at elections. Referring to elections in Nigeria as a centre for endless disputes, he

wonders how come poverty was so palpable in the country in spite of the wealth of a nation almost five decades old (Nigeria turned 47 in 2007 when the song was released).

Verse two deals with the culture of politicians making grandiose promises before elections, only to emerge victorious and deploy bacchanal celebrations away from the electorate. Raw paints a picture suggesting that the style of governance from these politicians usually toed the methods employed at the victory parties – governance is conducted away from the 'governed'. Soon he references those who believe that Nigeria is home to the 'best armed forces in Africa' and also home to numerous mineral resources. He contrasts this with the unjust reality where doctors and nurses are yet to be paid for services rendered; stating that the masses still broke down like 'molue buses'. Molue buses are an age-long transportation phenomenon in Lagos State, the nation's commercial capital. Generally, these buses are considered to be too old for dignified human carriage and too unfriendly to the human health – yet they subsist as a very popular means of transportation. This is before he turns to Ekiti State where several people – including ambitious politicians – were killed as elections drew nigh. To this, Raw offers: 'We need peace and unity, job opportunity, in our community'.

5.4 Conclusion

Research into protest political music culture in Nigeria has privileged the values and outlook of a particular practitioner over and above all others. This reverence to the works of Fela is perhaps deserved if only it did not permit the consideration of the works of others in the shadows of his, at best. However, the making of protest political music consciousness is the collective achievement of its various practitioners. This chapter has reconsidered the notion of regarding other protest political musicians in postcolonial Nigerian history whom

previous studies have silently regarded as lesser than the enigma of Fela. The obsessive disposition with the works of Fela which offers a background to this relegation is abridged. What results is a broader understanding of the subgenre through an appreciation of the uniqueness of each protest political musician considered. The chapter has discussed protest political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria as a subgenre of political music. Through a political discourse analysis of the texts of the selected songs, the chapter has located protest political music texts within the political circumstances and manifestations in postcolonial Nigeria. Whereas 'I dey laugh o' and 'Look and laugh' were applied in illustrating how pre-1999 musical texts have informed political sound bites of the post-1999 years (just as 'June 12' remains a staple referent of current day Nigerian politics etc.), this observation can only be further demonstrated through subsequent analysis of the language of Nigerian politics. The study confirms that popular musicians are adept in employing contextually recognizable narratives in their delivery irrespective of an oppositional or radical charter.

CHAPTER SIX

ALTERNATIVE POPULAR MUSIC REPORTING AT THE OCCUPY NIGERIA 2012 PROTESTS

6.1 Introduction

The right to peaceful protest is a constitutional relative of the right to vote. This chapter is necessitated by the January 2012 protests by Nigerians, of the federal government's oil-subsidy removal policy and the accompanying 120% increase in the unit pump-price of premium motor spirit (PMS), made effective on January 1, 2012. The chapter is premised on the notion of popular music as journalism in Africa. 'Occupy Nigeria' as the protests came to be known took off in the early hours of January 2, 2012 whence some of Nigeria's popular culture acts including several musicians joined workers' unions to enhance the spectacle of the protests. The chapter conceptualizes the musical constituents of 'Occupy Nigeria' as antithetical to the musical chants that endorsed the Goodluck Jonathan presidential bid en route the April 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria. Having been elected President with substantial backing from entertainment practitioners, and sworn-in on May 29, 2011; Jonathan faced perhaps his greatest test through the subsidy removal and its accompanying struggle-s. 'Occupy Nigeria' would in turn become a partisan measurement wherein Jonathan's 2011 electoral endorsers were studiedly mute and invisible. Whereas "when life is good, it is known that African musicians sing the praises of those in power, but when life is not so good for the ordinary people, the very same musicians voice people's concerns to the establishment" (Mano, 2011: 94); the increment in petroleum pump prices in January 2012 ensured that 'the very same musicians' who had sang the President's praises at the April 2011 elections lost any moral authority to voice the ordinary people's concerns. That task

was left, in the main, to popular musicians who played no part during the President's campaigns.

Table 6.1 is developed from a piece titled 'This is why we need to fight this fuel hike' (Ikeji, 2012). From a Nigerian standpoint, the table's content is as precarious as its implication. Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer, yet she still imports refined petrol. The country produces about 2.4 million barrels of crude oil daily which is exported to be refined abroad! Owing to years of a corruption-induced neglect, the domestic refineries are inoperative. As a consequence, Nigeria imports 70% of its gasoline (about 250,000 barrels per day of petroleum products) into the country for sale to its citizens (CNN.com, 2012; Reuters.com, 2012). Nigerian governments reportedly offset the cost of this process by paying a subsidy on the product. However, on January 1, 2012, the federal government effected a subsidy removal, and the price of petrol was increased from 65 naira per litre to at least 141 naira in filling stations; and from 100 naira to at least 200 naira on the black market, from where many Nigerians buy their fuel (*ibid*.). With the majority of Nigerians living on less than $2 per day (Reuters.com, 2012), a relatively low-priced petrol is viewed by many Nigerians as the only tangible benefit they receive from the state, hence the widespread disapproval of the 'inhumane' New Year's Day gift. In addition, the economy is heavily reliant on crude oil (amongst other reasons, due to absence of essential infrastructure and services such as stable electricity). A consequence of this is that other seemingly unrelated items are tied to the price of fuel, as has occurred from previous price hikes. Due to the dearth of steady electricity, gasoline generators are a common energy alternative for small businesses and residences. With each hike, there is a commensurate rise in the cost of production of goods and services which would be transferred on to the consumers, leading to widespread inflation. Unfortunately, even when fuel price hikes were

reversed in the past, the increase in the cost of goods and services (inflationary reaction) usually remained.

Table 6.1

OPEC member nations	**PMS price/litre (Nigerian naira)**	**National minimum wage (Nigerian naira)**
Venezuela	3.61	95,369
Kuwait	34.54	161,461
Saudi Arabia	25.12	99,237
Iran	102.05	86,585
Qatar	34.54	101,250
United Arab Emirates	78.18	
Algeria	63.55	55,597
Libya	26.69	23,813
Iraq	59.66	25,813
Nigeria	*≥ 140.00*	*18,000*
Non OPEC nations	**PMS price/litre (Nigerian naira)**	**National minimum wage (Nigerian naira)**
United States of America	157	197,296
United Kingdom	334.41	295,644
Oman	48.67	91,583

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

The removal of the subsidy which was announced by the Executive Secretary of the Petroleum Product Pricing Regulatory Agency (PPPRA) was all the more unpalatable to the Nigerian people owing to a series of infuriating information in the public domain. For instance, it remains mysterious how the cost of subsidy shot up to 1.3 trillion naira in just

one year of the Jonathan administration, especially since ex-President Obasanjo's administration spent 300 billion naira yearly on subsidizing the same product. Indeed, there are insinuations that the said funds went into Jonathan's 2011 election campaigns. When the Obasanjo government left power in 2007, meanwhile, the country was no longer in debt as the 30-billion-dollar foreign debt that Obasanjo met when he came to power in 1999 was fully paid off. Two years into the administration of Jonathan, the country owed debt to the tune of over 40 billion dollars and was still borrowing (Fani-Kayode, 2012). What confounded Nigerians was that in the midst of these, the leadership had mischievously gone ahead to share some huge funds in the name of excess crude revenue when it should have stored it up for the coming year. Also, foreign reserves had been depleted from 80 billion dollars during the Obasanjo administration to 33 billion dollars under the administration of President Jonathan (*ibid.*). It was reported that when the Obasanjo administration left power in 2007, 23 billion dollars was left in the Excess Crude Account after he built it up from nothing in 1999; by January 2012 the account was empty because the money had been "squandered and the account scrapped" (Fani-Kayode, 2012).

Table 6.1 is perhaps more eloquent on the crude situation in Nigeria particularly as this compares with other nations; and the media explored this quite tellingly. A return to the musical accompaniments of Occupy Nigeria 2012 shall follow an overview of the coverage of the activities of 'alternative' journalism practitioners during the protests.

6.2 Occupy Nigeria: People power or media phenomenon?

The phenomenon to which this subtitle refers is one which manifested through the January 2012 Occupy protests. Firstly, it is observed that the appropriation of the theory of alternative media (Atton, 2006) in exploring protest political music culture is apt for the

Occupy Nigeria protests. But more than this, the protests also spurred on an unlikely union: one wherein the mainstream media entered a partnership with an alternative media. It is perhaps necessary at this point to note a flaw in the application of the theory of alternative media herewith. The theory of the alternative media has yet to give account for the possibility that an alternative media could and also does constitute a mainstream audience. This much is evidenced from the events of Occupy Nigeria 2012 where mainstream newspapers reported in consonance with alternative voices on alternative platforms; as of content, as of means of production (transmission). In exploring Downing's principle of 'rebellious communication' (2001), Atton comes to a high point and draws attention to resonances between the principle and the Radical reformist papers that flourished in England from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Amongst these, Atton lists "developing a close relationship with readers - to the extent where many papers were supplied with reports written by readers" (Atton, 2006: 22) as well as "close links with radical organizations, highlighting the value of 'combination' and organized action" (*ibid*.).

Drawing from Stuart Hall (1990), Atton engages with the political, historical and cultural contingencies of alternative practices: "Social relations, forms of technology and styles of discourse...and their combination are likely to be 'available' for transformation within alternative media at particular places and times" (Atton, 2006: 22). He avers that when dealing empirically, scholars of the alternative media must not forget to re-couple the category with history and culture (Atton, 2006). Motilola Akinfemisoye, meanwhile, in her 'Challenging hegemonic media practices: Of 'alternative' media and Nigeria's democracy' (2013) employs the Occupy Nigeria protests in gauging shifts in the balance of power as created by 'alternative' (audience) journalisms on professional journalism in Nigeria. She reports that "Citizen engagement during the protests was not merely about Nigerians

finding their 'voice' as citizens in a democratic dispensation; rather, the mainstream media viewed citizens' engagement with social media and other 'alternative' platforms as a commodity to be 'marketised'" (Akinfemisoye, 2013: 13). She shares the following contribution by an editor at *The Guardian* newspaper – a mainstream Nigerian newspaper outfit:

> The Occupy Nigeria protests provided an opportunity for us as a newspaper organisation to include the audience in our coverage. Dedicating an entire page to publish the views of our readers during the fuel subsidy removal meant that many of them not only bought copies of our newspaper but also told their friends to. We saw this inclusion as a way of widening the gates and giving our readers a sense of belonging. Our coverage of the Occupy protests took a 'newszine' format which made it more interesting and appealing for people to read (*ibid*.: 13)

And another by a senior journalist at *The Punch* newspaper – also a mainstream Nigerian newspaper:

> New media has opened up new frontiers and has made us as journalists more aware that the audience is very much interested in understanding Nigeria's political situation. During the Occupy Nigeria protests, I sent out journalists to various 'squares' where the protests were taking place. They spoke with the protesters and that served as a scoop for us to do more interpretive journalism. That resulted into more sales for our newspaper because many people wanted to understand why the government decided to remove the fuel subsidy (*ibid*.: 13).

Akinfemisoye argues that the mainstream media in Nigeria continues to shape the country's democracy and that there is evidence – in the way local newspapers covered the protests - that the disposition of journalists tilts more towards the political economy of their employers. Meanwhile, a political communications scholar – in conversation with me - expresses his reservation on the gulf between political realities and media reports in

Nigeria. He insists that the local media engages in no form of investigative journalism, concentrating its 'functions' on reporting only as presented. He adds that the media has grossly promoted ignorance amongst the citizenry. He informs me that the protests of January 2012 were populated mainly by people with no idea of the real issues involved, beyond the 'information' peddled through media representations. According to him, the Occupy Nigeria protests were motivated by a copycat culture which has deeply permeated the generality of the Nigerian population. In nomenclature, the phrase 'Occupy Nigeria' is an attempted re-creation of several previous Occupy- events in cities and nations across the world. In terms of execution, considering that the Arab Spring had transpired in the Maghreb only a while before – beginning specifically on 4th January, 2011 with the death of Mohammed Bouazizi whose frustration led to his self-immolation - the participants were driven by an 'Arab Spring complex' wherein they tried to reproduce the kind of radicalism that they had witnessed through access to international media platforms. As a consequence, the Occupy Nigeria protests were given a coloration that superseded mere protests over the petrol price hike. During the January 2012 protests, media watchers were of the belief that the leadership status quo in Nigeria was being challenged in its modes of emergence and in its methods. However, with the protests now quelled and with status quo maintained, it is clear that the Occupy Nigeria protests were more of a media occurrence than anything truly concrete. Indeed, whereas the Tunisian resistance refused to abate in spite of the sweeping reforms made by the then President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the pseudo replica in Nigeria succumbed after the new pump price suffered a mere 33% reduction.

The core of my key discussant's submissions is in tandem with the media exposition of Akinfemisoye's study hitherto explored. The media on its part took advantage not just of

the 'Arab Spring complex' of Nigerians in the moment, but also – as is seen in the newspaper extracts – the excitement for the ordinary social media citizen, of appearing in traditional media. This in turn was an attempt by these traditional media brands to maintain their status quo as hegemonic media custodians. A Nigerian historian who monitored the January 2012 protests across media speaks of the "serious protests only in Lagos and Abuja" (Historian, 2014). This is of course at variance with the reports across traditional local media particularly on considering that deaths were reported – the first in Ilorin - outside both cities during the period; although it is unclear if all of these deaths were necessarily linked with the protests or some insurgent group. It becomes apparent nonetheless that the traditional media were interested in maintaining the momentum of the protests for reasons beyond objective reporting. A 31-year-old Accountant responds to my inquiry on his whereabouts during the Occupy Nigeria protests thus: "What is Occupy Nigeria?" (RP Occupy Nigeria –RPON-, 2014). Further investigation revealed that although he was conversant with the protests of January 2012, his shocking question was not a function of a memory lapse. Indeed, he heard the phrase for the first time from my inquiry. This reinforces the observation that most of the components of the protests including its nomenclature existed mainly in the media without necessarily inhering in the people[1]:

> …People don't know that even the subsidy removal in Nigeria was an IMF arm-twisting policy of our government; and it's just a shame that it's easy to twist the arms of African governments. The President

[1] Certain interests took advantage of the protests to address their separate grouses with the government. Nothing perhaps illustrates this better than a comment made by Clarion Chukwura-Abiola, Nollywood actress, while addressing an army of protesters: "The President used 200 million dollars as a bait to make Nigerian entertainers endorse him, so that you Nigerians can vote for him. The 200 million dollars does not exist. The 200 million dollars does not exist. Where does that happen in any country of the world? The President will be answerable for such a scam. The President must answer to Nigerians for this '200 million dollars' which was why you people followed your entertainers en masse to vote for him…" To this, one might ask: what has the foregoing got to do with protesting a subsidy removal?

> of IMF was in Nigeria in December [2013] to push for more austerity measures (Seun Kuti, on the foundation of his single *IMF*, 2014).

In Lagos, in addition to the accustomed 'indefinite nationwide strikes' announced by the main trade unions like the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) and Trade Union Congress (TUC) in sequel to petrol price increases, civil rights activists and celebrities were at the forefront of what would later be tagged 'Occupy Lagos'. Of these celebrities, Femi and Seun Kuti, Eedris Abdulkareem, Banky W and Sound Sultan represented the popular music constituency. Sound Sultan had on the same day the increase was announced released a protest cry across social media titled 'Temporary turn permanent' (2012). With such popular music presence at the rallies, it is little wonder the protests in Lagos were accompanied by loud audio applications of protest songs recorded through postcolonial Nigeria. But more, the protests inspired fresh works; four of which are assessed in the subsequent section.

The history of civil rights movements by Africans can be traced to a key period in American history wherein African Americans in the southern states of America suffered disenfranchisement, segregation and various forms of oppression, including race-inspired violence. So excruciating were the segregating measures that Black, at the local and state levels, were barred from classrooms, bathrooms, theatres and train cars, and from juries and legislatures. Since then, civil rights activists across the world have continued to use nonviolent protest and civil disobedience to bring about change. The prominence enjoyed in the Civil Rights era in America by the likes of Martin Luther King, Jr., Rosa Parks, Malcolm X, and Andrew Goodman – both in life and in death – owing to their roles therein is something of legend. In contemporary Nigeria, the 'celebrity' culture is experiencing some growth. The increased interest of the common people in the country's political nerve has made politics

or the 'political' a fine platform for self-proclamation and promotion. The struggle for media space therefore by Nollywood actors and actresses and by popular musicians at the Occupy Nigeria protests – beyond the quest for change in the pump price – was to advertise their political ethos. The following section focuses on journalistic music reporting at the protests; it is conceivable that the voices with the ethos to speak then were in the alternative to the government's 'mainstream' position. After all, democracy, according to Olusegun Obasanjo, an ex-Nigerian leader, guarantees a forum wherein the majority (alternative in this instance) would have its say but the minority will have its way; as happened at the closure of the Occupy protests.

6.3 Popular music at the Occupy Nigeria 2012 protests

> All those musicians wey don collect money from Jonathan hand dey sing say 'I go sing for Goodluck Jona', na God go punish you (Eedris Abdulkareem in 'Subsidy' by Tha Suspect, 2012)

The foregoing which translates as "All those musicians that have collected money from President Jonathan to sing 'I go sing for Goodluck Jona', may God punish you" is an utterance by Eedris Abdulkareem at the Gani Fawehinmi park – the melting spot of the protests in Lagos. He was referring to the electoral campaign music service providers of the Goodluck Jonathan 2011 campaign train. The video of Tha Suspect's Occupy Nigeria inspired single 'Subsidy' (2012) adopts Abdulkareem's utterance as one of a few sound bites. Thanks to Occupy Nigeria, Abdulkareem himself overcame a creativity block from protest political music and wrote the song 'Jaga jaga Part 2' (2012) some eight years after his best known work 'Jaga jaga' (2004). Before engaging with Abdulkareem's protest political music resurrection, Aduke's 'Hear the Voice' (2012), Tha Suspect's 'Subsidy' (2012) and Flavour Nabania's 'Ebezina' (2012) – all written and recorded during Occupy Nigeria – are assessed forthwith:

'Hear the voice' (2012) by Aduke:

Intro

'Give us light, water

Good roads to waka

Awa la teka

Allow us to live better'

Chorus

'Hear the voice of the wailing masses

They are wailing for food, they are wailing for water

Hear the voice of the wailing masses

They are wailing for light; they are wailing for shelter'

- Aduke, from the song *Hear the voice* (2012)

Aduke's opening and chorus could hardly be clearer. In line three of her Intro, *"Awa la teka"* (We are the ones who voted), she draws the attention of the government of the day to the fact that the masses whom it now wishes to subject to a 120% rise in fuel prices were the same masses that constituted the electorate hence electoral mandate with which it now governs. Verse one is a cry over the syndrome of blind followership wherein the direction of the leadership is unknown, with a confident rejoinder: "Today-today e go end" [It must end today!]. "Omo alaso ton wo akisa" [The child of a cloth merchant who wears rags] applies

the allegorical power of irony in communicating the lived experience wherein citizens of an oil-producing nation suffer hardship on account of oil.

In verse two, Aduke berates the stagnant reality of epileptic power supply in the country from her childhood up to the present day. She shares the abiding metaphor of the masses drinking garri but can hardly afford groundnuts and sugar with which to enrich the staple. In closing the second stanza, she cries out thus: “I weep when I see what my children may face” (Aduke, 2012). In the penultimate verse, she calls out for a revolution having seen the revelation of the insensitivity of the nation’s leaders before closing in verse four by reiterating her demands in the chorus, although not before she addresses the national minimum wage which she reasons is no more than pittance. “Give us food; Give us jobs; Shelter and security; Healthcare!” she wails.

Tha Suspect’s aptly named song ‘Subsidy’ is the second of four Occupy Nigeria inspired works assessed here. It opens with an intro where a famous Yoruba tune is adopted in communicating that President Jonathan resigns over the increase in fuel prices. In verse one, Tha Suspect, like Aduke, laments whilst hastening to remind the government that those protesters – including those who had died - constituted members of the electorate whose mandate the government rode on. Soon, he sings: “Musician go dey campaign for President, e go pretend; When everything e don sour, na there he go regret; My people for Naija, dem too dey forget” [A musician campaigns for the President in pretence; But the musician soon regrets when the President’s ill-policies begin to tell on those he supposedly governs; Nigerians are too forgetful]. Closing the verse, Tha Suspect insists that the government has the wherewithal to construct functional refineries. Only, officials were

more interested in privately owned refineries abroad and in fact owned private refineries overseas.

The chorus of 'Subsidy' is apt: "Subsidy matter, na for your pocket; House allowance matter, na for your pocket" [The issue of subsidy is yours to ponder; the issue of house allowance is yours to ponder]. Tha Suspect's allegory is unmistakable to the Nigerian ear for while the matter of the day was with fuel subsidy, his inclusion of 'house allowance' was at once a mockery as it was a cry. The import was clearly that since the people had no say in the government's disbursement of house allowances to its officials, the people also needed not have a say in the government's decision in removing fuel subsidy. Since house allowances were not available to the masses, subsidizing fuel, Tha Suspect reasons, should not be the masses lot also. As such, for Tha suspect, subsidy or no subsidy, the people must not be subjected to pay more for any of the petroleum products.

In the second and final verse, Tha Suspect is at his mocking best when he references details from the national budget released to the national legislature a few weeks earlier. He asks if the President owned the "garden of Eden" which required 200 million naira for its annual maintenance. He proceeds to ask if the President wished to win an Olympic medal with the 1 billion naira budgeted for the Presidency's annual feeding. And then the ultimate: Tha Suspect calls for those musicians who campaigned for and endorsed the President towards the April 2011 elections. Sarcastically, he adds: "I want the situation whereby these musicians go come back…Come address the nation the same way dem address the nation when we dey try to vote for those chameleons" [I want a situation whereby the musicians who addressed the nation by singing the praises and endorsing presidential candidate Jonathan before the elections, would return to address the nation now as they did then].

The connection between Jonathan's electoral endorsers and the Occupy Nigeria protests needs not be overemphasized.

Like Aduke's 'Hear the voice' and Tha Suspect's 'Subsidy', the recording and release of 'Ebezina' (2012) by Flavour Nabania was elicited by the increase in the pump price of petroleum products on January 1, 2012. However, 'Ebezina' is unique to the extent that its lyrics are neither as bare nor as confrontational as the prior duo. In fact, rather than being an alternative (oppositional) voice to the pro-subsidy class of the central government, 'Ebezina' (2012) somewhat approaches the issues as though the government and its pro-subsidy lieutenants were lost causes from which Nigerians needed to move on. To a large extent, 'Ebezina' would qualify as a celestial plea song based on its gospel lyrics which ask Nigerians to turn to the creator for succour in the light of the government's indifference. As far as Flavour was concerned in 'Ebezina', the fuel price hike was merely the latest in a series of insensitive actions and policies of a government that never pretended to care for the citizens even previously. As such, Flavour in the song delivered entirely in Igbo does not reference the government; not even once.

Eedris Turayo Abdulkareem Ajenifuja, was a member of the pop/hip hop group, The Remedies, along with the duo of Tony Tetuila and Eddy Montana. With evergreen hits like 'Shakomo' (1998), the trio were a formidable force in Nigerian music through the late 1990s. Being the rap voice of the group, Abdulkareem naturally veered fully into rap when the group parted ways in a celebrated break up melodiously documented in Tony Tetuila's 'Omode meta' (1999) which featured Black face, Tuface Idibia and the group Ruff, Rugged and Raw.

Although Abdulkareem's first solo album 'P.A.S.S' (2002) included the first ever dis-song by a Nigerian rapper 'Wackawickee MCs', many believe his ultimate musical direction was the result of yet another dis-song 'Ehen' by Ruggedman featuring Nomoreloss where Abdulkareem's rap credentials were mocked as outright meaningless. Abdulkareem demonstrated he had a listening ear and essentially gave up rap for conscious music. This much is evidenced in his two subsequent albums 'Mr Lecturer' (2002) and 'Jaga jaga' (2004) whose title tracks were received with critical acclaim. The duo of Abdulkareem and Ruggedman would later collaborate to record the reactive song 'Koleyewon' (2007).

Yet reference to Abdulkareem as a Nigerian music legend today is adducible mainly to the people's acceptance of 'Mr Lecturer' and 'Jaga jaga'. While 'Mr Lecturer' addressed the social problem of male lecturers exploiting female students and requesting sex and or money in exchange for good grades; as well as students employing cash and sex to solicit higher grades in Nigerian colleges and universities, 'Jaga jaga' is a protest song rendered in a manner that would have the father of protest political music in Nigeria, Fela Anikulapo-Kuti,[2] quite proud. The altercation that resulted between Abdulkareem and the then President Olusegun Obasanjo over the song underscores this point. In his reaction and defence, Abdulkareem stated:

> ...With due respect to the President and the people of Nigeria 'jaga jaga' is not an abusive word. [It] has just pinpointed what is happening in our democracy, in our environment, in our society, and put it back to our people. Many people are not educated in Nigeria: what is the percentage of education in Nigeria? Four per cent or six per cent! So this is what I'm talking about. How many kids out there who hawk banana and groundnut, gala, know what HIV/AIDS is all about? Jaga jaga is talking about what is

[2] Abdulkareem later featured Femi Kuti in a song dedicated to the latter's father titled 'FELA' (2013).

> going on in our society and I'm putting it back to the people. So you can look at it and you watch it, and you know it's true. I didn't say 'Nigeria jaga jaga' means that I've cursed Nigeria! I mean this is what I see in my hood, this is what I see; this is what is happening to the people. And I have to put it back into music and give it back to them because that's what I do. If I don't do that, and God will ask me: why wouldn't I do that? So 'jaga jaga' Mr President is not an abusive word. It has just pinpointed the ills in the society, and let's see how we can improve it, and that's what it means. So don't get me wrong Nigerians. Nigeria jaga jaga now" – Eedris Abdulkareem, in response to President Obasanjo's comments "your papa jaga jaga" on listening to the song.

As shall be seen, 'Jaga jaga' reinforces the submission that 'ridicule has emerged as a means through which people attempt to deconstruct and construct meaning out of a reality that is decidedly surreal' (Obadare, 2009: 245): verse one is a satirical narrative of the rare occurrence when 'armed robbers' visited a neighbourhood, yet took nothing but a life! Abdulkareem wonders how armed robbers could come to a house and not 'take money' or 'rape your wife'; instead 'went straight up to your bedside' and fired shots that guaranteed the target was 'six feet down'. He asks which armed robber does not want money nor want to enjoy the good life which a financial heist can obtain. There, he answers his question by stating that such an armed robber is a 'political armed robber' which in his view was the phenomenon destroying Nigeria.[3]

Verse two documents contemporary popular theatre in the arena of political leaders and the judiciary. Humouring the spate of the growth of popular lawyer Festus Keyamo's beard while he was jailed in Abuja, Abdulkareem expresses shock at his realization that a fellow prisoner of means - Ade Bendel - was responsible for Keyamo's as well as several other prisoners' feeding. To this, he sings of the Nigerian prison service being microcosmic

[3] There is an ad-lib referencing 'the January 27, 2002 bomb blast' at a military installation in Ikeja, Lagos. The episode is now popularly known as The Lagos armoury explosion.

of Nigeria where 'everything scatter-scatter'. Verse three begins with an inquiry through an ad-lib 'Eedris, what about COJA now?' To this, he responds that the organizing committee of the 8th All Africa Games, Abuja 2003 (COJA) had absconded with the wealth of the Nigerian people. On the rise in transportation costs, he illustrates this with the ridiculousness of paying a hundred naira for a bus ride between Agege and Ikeja. Describing as 'popular', fuel scarcity in Nigeria, Abdulkareem soon takes his Nigerian critique international once he states 'Action film for Nigeria', and again there's the ad-lib inquiring: 'Eedris where Charles Taylor dey now?' [Eedris where is Charles Taylor now?]. To this, he responds:

'[He's living a big life]

[He bought an estate in Calabar]

[That is a Liberian mafia]

[In Nigeria]

Everything jaga jaga'

- *Jaga Jaga* (2004)

In a sense, the song 'Jaga jaga' (2004) was beginning to seem like a *one hit wonder* as far as protest political music goes. Indeed, it is still considered as such by many. So it was relief for Abdulkareem when Occupy Nigeria presented itself with a cross-section of popular musicians appropriating the protests to register their alternative voices. It has been necessary to explore the protest political music career of Abdulkareem prior to Occupy Nigeria in order to highlight his opportunism as well as those of the other three popular musicians whose Occupy Nigeria inspired songs have been assessed above. It should be

noted that each of Aduke, Tha Suspect, and Flavour N'abania made a foray into protest political music at Occupy Nigeria. The idiom of their music had never been associated with protest political before the Occupy Nigeria 2012 protests. The opportunism at play is thus glaring.

Meanwhile Abdulkareem's Occupy Nigeria resurgence is emphasised in his title choice of 'Naija My Country: Jaga jaga part 2' (2012). The inclusion of 'Jaga jaga part 2' as a subtitle demonstrates the artist's recognition of 'Jaga jaga' (2004) as his best known work. He thus exploited this leverage in the promotion of his own 'new' Occupy Nigeria dependent work. 'Naija My Country: Jaga jaga part 2' (2012) opens with a youngster announcing in town crier fashion: 'Nigerians, we are one. Christians, Muslims, traditional rulers, men of God, civilians, Nigerian students; let us stand up for Nigeria/We are children and future of Nigeria, stop the bomb blasts, please let us unite' (Abdulkareem, 2012). Abdulkareem takes up the song's chorus in Pidgin English from this point referencing 'Nigeria is our country, Baba God we are pleading, bomb blasts are blasting everywhere; innocent children are dying like birds'. He continues in the second stanza of the chorus: 'Nigeria is our own; my people, it is sweet; In Allah's name, In Jesus name, fire will burn bad leaders'. There is a third stanza within the same chorus to accommodate the 'jaga jaga' term wherein Abdulkareem sings: 'Na jaga jaga be that o' (4ce) and then 'Na yama yama be that o' (4ce).

It is seen from the opening recitation and the chorus that Abdulkareem's core concern in 'Naija My Country: Jaga jaga part 2' (2012) is neither the fuel subsidy removal nor the fuel price increase by the federal government. Instead his lyrics show that as at the time of writing the song, Abdulkareem's primary preoccupation was with the incessant bomb

blasts in parts of the country for which the dreaded terrorist group Boko Haram built a reputation and continually took responsibility. It thus behoves reasoning that Abdulkareem had written the song – or at least part of it – in the middle of the bomb blasts by Boko Haram before the Occupy Nigeria protests began in January of 2012. Further analysis of 'Naija My Country: Jaga jaga part 2' (2012) should confirm or dispel the foregoing observation.

In continuation of the delivery in Pidgin English, verse one has Abdulkareem perform some greetings to his audience by stating: 'Nigeria, long time no see, your boy is back again; NASU is on strike again, Nigeria is still the same just like yesterday, nothing has changed; There is no water, there is no electricity, there is no security, kidnapping is reigning, money is not circulating, poverty is elevating, children graduate from tertiary and technical institutions to meet unemployment; Let us pray for today: Nigeria let us pray tonight, fire will burn bad people tonight' (Abdulkareem, 2012).

In verse two, Abdulkareem opens by stating 'we are going spiritual' and continues by calling on a number of citizens who are regarded as religious (or spiritual) leaders to reach the President so he could regulate the fuel prices so that he may 'put his name on the golden plate' (ibid.). They include the Sultan of Sokoto (Abdulkareem utters the title and withholds the Sultan's name); the General Overseer of the Redeemed Christian Church of God, Pastor Enoch Adeboye; the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor; and founder of the Church of God Mission International, the late Archbishop Benson Idahosa who incidentally passed on in 1998 (some fourteen years before Abdulkareem's curious call on him to appeal to the President over subsidy). Abdulkareem closes the verse by calling for dialogue between Boko Haram and the federal government.

In the closing verse, Abdulkareem curses at 'whoever does not love his motherland Nigeria' to burn by the 'fire of the holy ghost'. He reiterates his call on the aforementioned influential groups and persons to 'stand up and protect our citizens from dying'. In his closing, he specifically mentions the 'traditional rulers, religious leaders, Nigerian students' and each of the pastors hitherto referenced. However, the name 'Idahosa' is conspicuously absent in the final verse. Instead Abdulkareem includes a call to the then Catholic Archbishop of Lagos State Cardinal Olubunmi Okojie. Abdulkareem's final line in the song reads: 'Boko Haram we are begging you please' (*ibid*.). With his theme of calls on religious leaders and the sect Boko Haram, it is clear that the song was not originally intended as an anti-subsidy removal one; it merely appropriates the protests opportunistically and was rushed for release on January 5, 2012 – in the centre of the Occupy Nigeria protests – with an aesthetically discombobulating outcome.

Nonetheless, this study's premise is not to decide too hastily that works of art propagated on mixed or unclear consciousness are completely and impenetrably so. The revelation from Abdulkareem's 'Naija My Country: Jaga jaga part 2' (2012) is one of doubts and anxieties stemming from his consciousness of the genocide addicted religious sect Boko Haram in the midst of a nationwide protests against the pump price increase in petroleum products. So whereas, it was Occupy Nigeria, and indeed an opportunity to record a fashionable song, an attentive reading of the song's texts has led to a point from which a more progressive alternative to the federal government's Occupy Nigeria 2012 gaffe might be construed. Such is the charter of the chapter's following section.

6.4 An alternative reading of the federal government's Occupy Nigeria 2012 gaffe

> Politicians have long discussed ending the subsidy, but no one expected it to happen when and how it did. There was something frightening about the abruptness of such a dramatic change, a sense of lurching; a violent uncertainty that captured the general mood in Nigeria…The message sent to Nigerians is this: You don't matter. We don't value you (Adichie, 2012).

It is essential to comprehend the foregoing extract bearing in mind that Nigerian government officials do not live in a separate time zone from the generality of the Nigerian people. They know Nigeria and Nigerians very well; and they cannot be said to be thoughtless. This section aims to synthesise an understanding of the circumstances leading to the 'abruptness' to which Adichie refers.




Figure 6.4.1: a representation of the April 2011 presidential election results in Nigeria

(Image culled from Nigerian Muse, 2011)

Figure 6.4.1 is an immensely powerful conveyance of the Nigerian dilemma of the politics of division that characterized the country once President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua took ill and passed on in May 2010. The red and blue portions of the figure represent the electoral victory patterns in the various states at the April 2011 presidential election of the PDP's

Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian Southerner) and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)'s Muhammadu Buhari (a Muslim Northerner) respectively. The division is unmistakable. A round of violent riots took off in northern states immediately the election results were announced. The riots were in protest of the results that had returned a Southern Christian as winner after the people of the north had voted massively for the CPC's Northern Muslim. Thus following his swearing-in on May 29, 2011, the nation witnessed an unprecedented spate of bomb blasts for which responsibility has usually been claimed by the northern religious sect Boko Haram.[4]

Hansen and Aliyu Musa (2013: 282) "think simply branding *Boko Haram* members as demonic terrorists, pre-occupied with a fanatic religious delirium as the Nigerian authorities have done, does not explain a great deal. Perhaps it tells us more about the nature of the Nigerian state and the predator class that dominates it than it does about *Boko Haram*". They add that "Nigerian authorities try to blame everything from global warming and HIV/AIDS to bank robberies, kidnappings and squabbles between neighbors, to post-election violence on *Boko Haram* – anything to deflect scrutiny from their own malfeasance, culpability and venality" (Hansen and Aliyu Musa, 2013: 290). It is something of an open secret that the Jonathan administration, for much of its existence, considered the opposition as one and the same with the Islamic sect. As such, the sect was not decisively dealt with as purely and simply a terrorist group as supposed by Hansen and Aliyu Musa (2013). Instead the administration viewed the insurgency as a revolt against a Christian Southerner being the President of Nigeria (Union Mail 2014). An aide of President

[4] '*Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati wal-Jihad* (People for the Propagation of the Teachings of the Prophet and Jihad), popularly known as *Boko Haram*, is…traditionalist, exclusivist, millenarian and fanatically theocratic. Its conception of the future ideal society is a return to an entirely imagined, 7th century (CE) desert, Arab theocracy' (Hansen and Aliyu Musa, 2013: 282)

Jonathan's later wrote: "We in the presidency failed to anticipate that a campaign to highlight the plight of the Chibok girls [the 276 students abducted by the sect] would ignite a social media bush fire that went all the way to the White House and back, to eventually consume President Goodluck Jonathan's administration in electoral defeat" (Saro-Wiwa, 2015). This (false) consciousness and politicization of terrorism by the Jonathan government culminated in its loss of the 2015 general elections. Whereas suggestions that the sect's actions had nothing to do with a grouse over the Jonathan presidency had always been rife, the subsequent figure shows Nigerian states that implement some form of Sharia law (in green). It is necessary to gauge the mindset of the Jonathan administration following its April 2011 electoral victory:



Figure 6.4.2: a representation of Nigerian states that implement the Sharia law

(Image culled from Nairaland, 2014)

A casual look at figures 6.4.1 and 6.4.2[5] shows that blue = green i.e. the CPC whose candidate - Muhammadu Buhari – is a Moslem of northern extraction won in each of the twelve states where the Sharia law is in practice. The spokesman of the now defunct CPC Rotimi Fashakin is on record to have stated that the violence in northern states after the 2011 presidential elections were due to the inflation of PDP voting figures in certain northern states in order to achieve the mandatory voting mark in at least two-thirds majority comprising twenty-four of the thirty-six states of the federation for the then incumbent candidate Goodluck Jonathan, so as to be elected President at the first ballot (Channels TV, 2012). Considering that one of the key objectives of the Boko Haram sect is to establish Sharia law across the country and effectively make Nigeria an Islamic state (Aljazeera, 2011), it is not beyond the realm of possibility to make sense of the voting patterns at the 2011 presidential elections or the CPC's reasoned claims for electoral malpractice by the PDP. Whatever the case may be, there had been at least a dozen attacks across some northern states, snatching countless lives, for which the dreaded *Boko Haram* announced responsibility between September 2010 and January 2012 alone – a period during which Goodluck Jonathan, a Southern Christian, had campaigned, contested election, won and been President of Nigeria.

The 'to-take-off-with-immediate-effect' announcement of January 1, 2012 for the increase in fuel pump prices across Nigeria was widely lampooned for its insensitivity in timing. This comes across as a reasonable reaction, yet there is the need to probe deeper in order to understand the government's 'masterstroke' of manufacturing consent for the increase whilst shifting the debate to one of timing. As such, I asked RP Occupy Nigeria what

[5] "This sharia issue is the single most important event that has happened to Nigeria's politics since 1999" – RP final; Niger (November, 2012).

he thought of the government's course of action emphasizing the peculiar Nigerian cultural context being a people who travel for Christmas with accompanying budgets. Having spent the holidays with the extended family, an individual or family could have been stranded – as many were (Adichie, 2012) – following the abrupt announcement and its toll on transport costs. He responded thus:

January is the beginning of a year. A government and everybody make a resolution, a personal resolution every beginning of the year. Organisations make resolutions – change of vision, objectives, aims to break even, to meet up with certain projects. So if the government had decided that 1st January this policy will be implemented, and they have done that; they have reasons for doing that. They have a timeframe, they want to get it from here January to December – let's see twelve calendar months is complete, 365 days okay, how much is realized by this subsidy removal, how much is at hand, how much is actually used, how many months, there could be reasons they put in place. Not considering whether there are people who travelled for Xmas ceremonial period! What of people that did not travel? What of people that travelled and decide not to come back? Will they be waiting for them to come back before government go on with the policy that will affect the lives of common masses as they plan? So they have planned that they want to get it right from January to December or January till June – six months – most organisations, private sector, individual and governments use January to December fiscal year…" (RPON, Adamawa; April 2014)

What is one to make of this particularly as I later observed that RPON is an ardent supporter/admirer of President Jonathan (see interview)? His infamous response to my inquiry as to his whereabouts during the protests – "What is Occupy Nigeria" – hence betrays his psychological predisposition as one in whose eyes the president's government

can do no wrong. Indeed, the full excerpts of the interview show that he came across as a self-appointed spokesperson of the government willing to defend the government's every action and rationalize any apparent shortcomings. His glorification of the 'Subsidy Reinvestment and Empowerment Programme' (SURE-P) in spite of my queries on the aim in removing subsidy only to return to the administrative rigour of reinvesting begged the question rather than answer it. Throughout the conversation, RPON was unwilling to think critically about the policies of the government. He would praise and praise, defend and defend, rationalize and rationalize. I thus needed to find answers elsewhere:

In the wake of the increased tribal and religious tensions in the country therefore, the need for the government's introduction of a subsidy removal policy could not have been addressed in isolation. Could it be then that the abruptness of the policy announcement was a carefully considered approach by the government? Throughout post-military governed Nigeria, fuel price increases have always resulted in protests by labour and trade unions. Indeed, between 1999 and 2007, the Obasanjo government became notorious for announcing new pump prices only to cut down on same after some days of strike action. In essence therefore, it is logical to assert that the 120% increase by the Jonathan administration on January 1, 2012 was never meant to be final. The government must have envisaged the strike action and had a pump-price in mind. Further than that, only on Christmas Day, 2011 – a week to the announcement – there had been lives lost in a bomb blast by the Boko Haram sect. The religious/tribal tensions of the country have been such that the myriad of labour protests over fuel-price increases have typified the people's oneness more than anything else in Fourth Republic Nigeria. The government's January 1 announcement could thus have been aimed at distracting the divisions, indeed at quelling

the momentum of the bombing sects since a protest over fuel has no religious connotation. Besides, the government would have managed to switch the population's grouse from one of 'price increment' to one of 'timing insensitivity' and invariably win plaudits, as it did, for reviewing the rate to a pre-conceived figure.

6.5 The people's verdict: Jo o!!!

> Every schoolboy negotiator knows that if you are foolish enough to travel into someone's territory for negotiations, you have already absorbed half of the defeat. But our labour leaders, easily outmanoeuvred, went posing for pictures in Aso Rock wearing rock star smiles where grins of granite were required. In a contest in which the entire farm was on the line and lives were being lost, they seemed delighted Aso Rock had merely opened the gates (Olumhense, 2012).

The proper import and outcome of the *Occupy Nigeria* 2012 protests are succinctly captured in the foregoing words by Sonala Olumhense. Nonetheless, the media has been complicit in presenting an outcome of success from the protests such that an informant who admits to being indoors throughout the protests alludes to how he was struck by his discovery that Nigerians still had it in them to fight for themselves. Asked if the enthusiasm of Nigerians at the protests was not merely a reflection of the scare a 120% fuel price hike had on individual pockets, he retorted: 'Do Nigerians fight for themselves, usually?' So although the government had its way with the policy when the Labour leaders to whom Olumhense refers agreed to a rate of 97 naira per litre of PMS, sections of the media have continued to delight in overstating the implications of the January 2012 protests. Foremost poet Niyi Osundare reinforces this near-delusional victory of Occupy Nigeria in the opening to his keynote address at the 'Save Nigeria Group' inaugural lecture: "Something happened in this country in the very first week of [the year 2012] that we can never forget: Nigeria's civil society rose with one voice, one vision, one purpose, one agenda fuelled by extraordinary

patriotism and irrepressible anger…To protest the price hike, a coalition of Civil Society groups and the Nigerian Labour Congress called out a strike that shut down the country for a whole week, finally exacting a 33% climb-down in the decreed price. That reduction may look small, but the pressure and organization that brought it about, and even more important, the consciousness and will power generated by it, total up to an impressive chapter in the annals of Nigeria's civil society organization" (Osundare, 2012).

In order to better grasp the manner behind the *Occupy Nigeria* protests, reference is made to a middle-aged male research informant. Lamenting various difficulties faced by Nigerians and the dismal minimum wage which many state governments were barely able to pay, he got lost in emotion and suddenly switched from the original template of communication adopted in the interview (English language) and bellowed in Yoruba: "*Jonathan! So fe pa wa ni? Jo o!*" His was a loaded exclamation which translates as "Jonathan! Do you want to kill us? Please oh!" In fitting mode, this chapter closes with an appreciation of the song 'Jo o' Remix (2011) by hip hop act Jahbless. After all, "rather than forcing popular music into predefined politics of resistance or domination, a situated analysis of popular music consumption aids in defining "politics" in [a] historical moment" (Balliger, 2003: 68). It features fellow rappers Reminisce, Ice-prince, Durella, Ruggedman and eLDee. The constituents of the song's texts together with the abiding sound bite 'Jo o' which translates as 'Please oh!' are pertinent to understanding the subtext of exchanges between the generality of the Nigerian population, on the one hand, and a government apparently bent on spreading hardship, on the other.

This 'Jo o' stand by the people in response to what amounts to a 'suggestion of impossibility' (the hike in pump prices in spite of harshening realities) would go on to yield

dividends primarily in the form of the Federal House of Representatives' probe panel and report on subsidy. In what turned out to be an expose on the sorts of dirty dealings which take place between shady business interests and otherwise 'masses' representatives'; the face of a once revered Integrity Group, Honourable Farouk Lawan, and oil tycoon Femi Otedola made for high calibre drama in the months of May and June 2012 (The Vanguard, 2012). But the chapter ought not to deviate any further. Instead the chapter turns to 'Jo o' Remix (2010) which this study appropriates as Occupy Nigeria's unofficial yet writ large abiding hymn. To the federal government's 'suggestion' of a 120% increase in fuel prices while status quo is maintained on corruption, a dismal minimum wage and comatose refineries; the Nigerian people would seem to have responded in unison: 'Jo o!!!' Nonetheless, to the sustained protests and civil disobedience, while the government offered only a 33% reduction, the people responded similarly: 'Jo o!!!' Unlike the Tunisians' resolve a year earlier, Nigerians and their labour leaders couldn't keep up the tempo to even insist on the restoration of status quo in fuel prices. They had tired of the protests and craved 'normalcy'.

The government had its way as the present pump-price of 97 naira is certainly no less than the government pre-envisaged. In spite of the media's delusion and the attempt by some to manufacture a revolution off it, Occupy Nigeria isn't as memorable as they would have one believe. Indeed, the protests were of no consequence beyond the previous fuel price increase tussles through Fourth Republic Nigeria. The following is the conclusion to my conversation with a 40 year-old Nigerian historian:

Interviewer: Would you say the Occupy Nigeria protests were a failure for the Nigerian people?

RP historian: Yes, solidly so.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has traced the events leading up to the Occupy Nigeria protests which took off in the early hours of January 2, 2012. The chapter appraised the justification for the protests by the protesting population, and proceeded to define its appropriation of the term 'alternative'. The 'marketisation' of the alternative media (audiences on social media platforms) by the mainstream media in Nigeria during the protests is duly accounted for as the convergence between the theory of the alternative media and the alternative manifestations at Occupy Nigeria are highlighted. This led to a focus on popular music. In particular, the works of alternative voices emanating from Nigerian popular musicians were critically discussed with respect to the situation in the country as at that period in time. In the end, the chapter found that just as the mainstream media had opportunistically aligned with the dissenting audience, so also had the popular musicians resorted to alternative positions. As no tangible outcome came from the protests, these musicians and their ilk had succeeded in only enhancing their reputation as 'progressives' who had the capacity to oppose government policies and positions. Opinions were sought amongst segments of the population. This served to confirm the divergence of views as regards why the government took such an ill-timed and inhumane policy step.

CHAPTER SEVEN

UNITY POLITICAL MUSIC CULTURE IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA

7.1 Introduction

In her *Popular Arts in Africa*, Barber offers "the clue to popular style" (1987: 40) under the subsection 'A Popular Style?' Therein the focus is on the straightforward characteristic of popular art forms owing to "their urban audience [which] is ethnically and educationally mixed. To be accessible to them, the art has to appeal to a lowest common denominator of comprehension" (*ibid*.). Unity political music is a grossly unstudied subgenre, and is given some attention here. As stated in the study's introduction, the unity political music subgenre is made up of unity political songs, that is, songs written and recorded in order to project and to celebrate the idea of nationhood. In Nigeria before now, these unity political songs were categorised based on the affiliation of an individual song's sounds (instrumentals or beats) to a well-known genre. More particularly, unity political songs were hitherto subsumed within the dominant genres of the overall works of the songs' singers. As such, if a popular musician renowned for his R&B works, for instance, were to record a unity political song, such a song was easily – all be it erroneously – termed a song in the R&B genre.

It has also been stated that the works of popular music generally, and the works of political music particularly, are written and recorded at key corresponding moments. Indeed, most protest political songs are usually motivated at times when there are tangible grievances with a policy or practice by the state such that the audience in such a context can easily relate with the protest political song in question; even if its lyrics aren't explicitly

directed at the state nor its unpopular practice or position on a subject. The point to be made is that an audience easily deciphers the point of protest political music because of the context in which they are produced. In a separate context from that where the issue being protested obtains, audiences are likely to be at a loss with the message of such a song or adduce completely different meanings to what is being sang.

As with protest political music culture, the scenario of key corresponding moments is similar with unity political music culture. However, precisely because it is widely known and accepted that it is the responsibility of the state to protect the citizenry whilst pursuing the welfare and wellbeing of this citizenry, there is a case whereby there are multiples of protest political songs for every unity political song; at least such has been the experience in Nigeria's postcolonial existence. Indeed, the protest political music genre is so dominant to the extent that appellations such as 'protest musician' and 'conscious musician' for popular musicians are commonplace in Nigeria. This is because there is a trend, in many instances, of popular musicians recording protest political song after protest political song. Not so in the unity political music culture domain. For most popular musicians through Nigeria's postcolonial history, a unity political song is a break from the norm; a moment in a career dominated by non-unity popular music material. As such, there is a dearth of unity political music material relative to the protest political music subgenre which has offered a specialty for a good number of popular musicians in Nigeria through the nation's postcolonial history. Contrarily, there is no known popular musician in Nigeria whose specialty is in recording unity political songs.

7.2 Before Democratization: Unity political music in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria

When Fela sang "...I remember the slogan to 'keep Nigeria one, the task that must be done'!" (Just Like That, 1989), he was mocking the Nigerian military government of General Yakubu Gowon which held sway through the civil war of 1967-70. But more, Fela was referring to the broader Nigerian ruling establishment since independence. In a bid to attain legitimacy, each government that emerged at the centre has been accused of employing propaganda measures of which music is one. In effect, although unity political music was a well engaged genre in pre-1999 Nigeria, each unity political song released had to contend with an accompanying suspicion of government patronage to the extent of becoming the natural expectation. Considering the dearth of legitimacy of the governments formed by each military junta that assumed leadership on the back of a coup d'état, appropriating popular music and popular musicians in order to manufacture consent through unity political music production becomes understandable. That said; this section shall illustrate the foregoing observation by examining a number of unity political songs that celebrated or promoted Nigeria between independence and democratization in 1999.

It is fitting that Fela's first work of political music was a unity political song titled 'Viva Nigeria' (1969). 'Viva Nigeria' was written and performed by Fela in the thick of the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70 wherein Fela calls for the country's oneness. Olaniyan (2009) reports that Fela later expressed regret about recording the song which had conveyed a message contrary to his deeper convictions at the time: that Biafra was right to secede. Nonetheless it is pertinent to appraise 'Viva Nigeria' as the earliest unity political song of postcolonial Nigeria other than the country's first national anthem. It is important to note, meanwhile, that in 1978, the composition for the second and present national anthem was

undertaken by the Nigerian Police Band led by its then Director of Music, Benedict Odiase. Naturally, the national anthem constitutes a primary unity political music document.

Delivered entirely in English language, Fela begins his message in 'Viva Nigeria' (1969) effectively in line 5 wherein he states: 'every country has its own problems; so has Nigeria, so has Africa'. He advises: 'let us bind our wounds and live together in peace; Nigeria, one nation indivisible; long live Nigeria, viva Africa.' Fela continues, instructing that the history of mankind is full of turning points and significant events. As such, he cautions that 'though tongue and tribe may differ, we are all Nigerians; we are all Africans, war is not the answer; it has never been the answer, and it will never be the answer fighting amongst each other'. He then pleads with the warring nation: 'let's live together in peace' and attempts to appeal to a national nostalgia which Nigerians share when he speaks 'let's eat together like we used to eat; let's plan together like we used to plan; sing together like we used to sing; dance together like we used to dance'. He soon adds the slogan: 'United we stand, divide we fall'.

Continuing, Fela turns to a theme of lessons and healing for the African continent when he offers: 'Let us bind our wounds and live together in peace; Nigeria one nation indivisible; Long live Nigeria, viva Africa; Brothers and sisters in Africa; Never should we learn to wage war against each other; Let Nigeria be a lesson to all; We have more to learn towards building than destroying'. He soon engages with some realism and communicates the effects of the civil war in a palpable manner when he states: 'our people can't afford any more sufferings; let's join hands Africa; we have nothing to lose; but a lot to gain' (Fela, 1969). Whereas the civil war raged between Nigeria and Biafra on Nigerian territory, Fela's invocation of 'brothers and sisters in Africa' and 'viva Africa' is emblematic of the emerging

narrative following Nigeria's attainment of independence that Nigeria was the giant of Africa and the hope of the black world. As such, Fela attempts to imply that a warring and broken Nigeria was only a precursor to a warring and broken Africa.

> "When I released 'Which way Nigeria'," Okosuns says, "the whole radio stations refused to play it. They said I was directing the song to Shagari and his government." When three months after the start of his second term Shagari was overthrown by the military, "Which way Nigeria" suddenly found favour, "and the Minister of Information then used that record as a slogan [to explain] why they took over the government" (Stewart, 1992: 128-9)

The extract illustrates how popular music materials can assume meanings while nourishing the impulses of audiences. It is striking that these audiences include media organisations and public officials. As such, the analysis of Okosuns' 'Which way Nigeria' (1984) relies chiefly on its text and context. Indeed, as with Marioghae's 'Nigeria go survive', it has the markings of a propaganda initiative by government particularly in verse two where Okosuns sings:

'Every little thing that goes wrong

We start to blame the government

We know everything that goes wrong

Because we're part of the government'

Whereas he may have secured some ambiguity in the minds of his listeners through the following verse;

'Inefficiency and indiscipline is ruining the country now

Corruption here, there, and everywhere

Inflation is soaring high'

It isn't beyond a government to blame inflation on the citizenry as easily as it could indiscipline, inefficiency, or corruption. It was Fela who mocked the Nigerian government for uttering: 'My people are useless; my people are senseless; my people are indiscipline-d' (Beasts of no nation, 1989) under the banner of the War against Indiscipline (WAI).

Okosuns propagates this ambiguity through another verse where he speaks of the mistakes made during the oil boom, and the doom of a few haves accompanied by many have-nots. In verse five, Okosuns is as pro-government as any government official of the day:

'Green Revolution is a reality

Let's give it a chance to grow

Let's join our hands to barn the lawn

So we can have enough food to show'

This advisory trend is followed through the next verse wherein Okosuns speaks of how citizens' ambitions "to be millionaires is running the country down" before sloganeering in verse seven:

'Remember that a simple step is the beginning of a million miles…'

And as Fela observes to be customary of Nigerian governments, religion is Okosuns forte in the eighth and final verse: "Heaven and earth will pass away; It is written in the book of

God; the good people will surely find their way; and the meek will inherit the world; let's save Nigeria, so Nigeria won't die!"

A middle-aged female caterer conveys her thoughts of the unity political song 'Nigeria my beloved country' (1985) by Funmi Adams to me:

It is near impossible to conceive that such patriotism would ever be a hit presently. In fact since that time no singer has put 'Nigeria' and 'Beloved' in the same line (RP5: middle-aged female caterer, Delta; November, 2011).

Whereas RP5's observation is rather profound and possibly evocative of genuine nostalgia, it hardly absorbs the unity political song of the 'government-influenced' label which songs in the category were particularly susceptible to in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria. A critical evaluation of the song's texts suggests precisely that. Adams opens by announcing that she is very knowledgeable about her country and people because she cares. The chorus centres on "working together is the key" and closes on the future being "you and me". Verse two references how 'Nigeria' is known around the world as a "land of iron and gold; agriculture, oil and coal"! The last line of the final verse reads "trusting God to be our guide". Overall, there is a strong suggestion that Adams' piece was government-sponsored owing to its extensive exploitation of sound-bites.

Veno Marioghae music was an audience favourite through the 1980s. It is a testament to the calibre of her work that her 1984 'Nigeria Go Survive' was remade in 2010 by DM Squared and J'odie. Nevertheless Marioghae's remains unmistakably evergreen. Marioghae begins the infectious unity song[1] leaving no one in doubt as to her optimism in

[1] The song 'Nigeria Go Survive' was written by the late Professor Soni Oti of the Theatre Arts Department, University of Jos.

the survival of the Nigerian project irrespective of what the plunderers attempt. She hinges this on ancestors who wouldn't lie by and watch before invoking 'the god of thunder and lightning'! In verse two, Marioghae appeals to citizens who may be contemplating exiting the country as a referential of the mass exodus of Nigerians in the period. She beseeches: "Andrew no check out o" arguing that if Andrew did his bit in the task of nation-building, rather than emigrate, Nigeria would be better for it. Andrew, meanwhile, is a famous character of Nigerian lore that famously "checked out" in 1984 over the tragic failures of the Nigerian state including the dearth of electricity, water and good roads. As if to assure Andrew of hope therefore, in the closing verse, Marioghae enumerates the spread of vast resources across the nation's regions: 'cocoa in the west', 'rubber in Bendel', 'palm oil in the east', 'timber in Sapele', 'cotton and groundnut in the north', 'rice in Benue', and 'hides and skin'. Marioghae faced criticism on the count of being a mouthpiece for the government. Some saw her as a diversion set up by the government, when there were mounting pressures on the government to better the lives of Nigerians (360nobs, 2011).

Onyeka Onwenu is perhaps the only Nigerian woman to span the popular music scene through the second and fourth republics – a space upwards of three decades. Her talents are visible also as an actress and as a politician. A member of Nigeria's erstwhile ruling PDP, Onwenu sang General Abacha's praises through the infamous million man march intended to perpetuate the latter in office. She was an ardent supporter of General Obasanjo's presidency (1999-2007) and in 2010 recorded 'Run Goodluck run' towards Goodluck Jonathan's election campaign. Considering Onwenu's establishment credentials, it is difficult to detach her pre-1999 unity political music material from government patronage.

One Love:

…I can't help but wonder if this is really a love song or Onyeka simply reaching out to Nigerians; reminding Nigerians that life is hard enough and if our politicians are not going to do anything regarding our problems, loving one another would be a great start to solving our problems.

Peace song:

I cannot help but pay attention to the first line of the song "we are women…peace is what we preach…we are children of Nigeria…peace is what we preach…." Why did Onyeka deem it fit to conveniently omit men?

Men are only known for causing wars? Or women are the only ones with the ability to bring peace. From a few articles I have read, Onyeka is referred to as one of the leading feminists but this song does not quite tell that. I really don't like the one sidedness of the song. If you are fighting for peace and using the word "we" you might as well mention men too… (RP feminist, 21 year-old Software Engineering graduate, Lagos; May 2014)

Indeed while RP feminist's analysis of 'One Love' barely highlights government influence, her position on 'Peace song' with the sensitivity of a feminist gives it away as an unmistakable government project wherein Onwenu is tasked with reaching out to women.

The culture of recording unity songs at the behest of governments becomes rather fascinating when circumstances ensure the music is no longer extant. The following conversation transpired between me and RP1:

Interviewer: I got in contact with Chris Mba and he promised to write me the lyrics to his song 'We need each other'.

RP1: Why does he have to write it? Can't he get you a record of it?

Interviewer: I don't think he's got one. He specifically offered to write them. He's not the first I'd requested send me his music texts. Victor Essiet and Mr Raw graciously did same.

RP1: Interesting! I guess this goes to show who the true musicians are. These guys who cannot write their own songs are mere propagandists. These guys are no musicians. They are not the sorts of people to carry out research on.

The simple import from RP1's comments is that contractual music could be susceptible to oblivion.

The foregoing is however not the case with Bongos Ikwue's 'Nigeria is 25' which I could not access in record either. Indeed a member of the audience was happy to recite:

'…We work so hard to make the honey flow

But not without the use of the hoe

Arise salute the nation; come join the celebration

…Nigeria is 25 (2ce)'

The foregoing rendition is by a Lecturer of English at a Nigerian university whose nostalgic excitement on recalling "*the philosopher's unique musical talents*" (RP recital, 2012) was palpable. It may be worthwhile to report that this part-rendition of a song recorded to mark Nigeria's 25th Independence anniversary produced the most memorable live-rendition by any member of the audience through the course of the study.

In tandem with 'keeping Nigeria one', it is significant to assess the offshoot of King Sunny Ade's (KSA) assembly of an unprecedentedly large collection of Nigerian musicians of various tribes and regions to record the unity song 'The Way Forward' in 1994 at the height

of palpable tension during General Abacha's reign. The song's verses were in various Nigerian languages performed by correspondingly diverse acts:

> In 1994, [King Sunny Adé] brought together over 32 Nigerian musicians/actors (Kemi Akanni, Dele Abiodun, Dr Orlando Owoh, Bola Abimbola, Charley Boy Oputa, Segun Arinze, Telemi, Alarm Bloo, Tony Ukate, Orits Wiliki, Alh Malik Showman, Prince Actor Alile, Wale Thompson, Bhola Eberiga, Chris Mba, Zakky Azay, Felix & Moses, Pascal, Alh Rasheed Adio, Daddy Showkey, Papa T, Lady D, Teddy Allan, De Witze, Bunmi Sanya, Shedriak John, Micho Ade etc) to record a record against ethnic violence called "The Way Forward"(360nobs' Nigeria's top 50 songs, 2013)

"We sung it in different languages," said Adé, and continued: "We have over 220 languages in Nigeria, so we synthesized the English and surrounded it with Hausa from the north, Yoruba from the west, Ibo from the east, and other languages. We said, 'This Nigeria belongs to us. We need to salvage it together. It's me and you who fought [for] this independence. So why are we now fighting each other'"" (*ibid*.)? A well-choreographed video to the song was regularly broadcast on national television to drive home the message of living in peace and harmony in Nigeria irrespective of tribe and religion. 'The Way Forward' was an unmistakable prescription for Nigeria's stability following the all too glaring diagnosis of the nation's condition by the powers that were.

'The Way Forward' is a call on Nigerian citizens to be conscious of the fact that the country Nigeria is for every Nigerian. Ade opens this song by making this point abundantly clear when he sings the intro in Yoruba: 'This Nigeria is for all of us; we must not allow it to be destroyed; because there is no other land we Nigerians can migrate to; after all overseas cannot be like home; let us come together and support the progress of this country; you raise the nation by doing your bit while I also raise her by doing my bit' (Ade, 1994). He continues his advisory charter in verse one stating that inter-tribal conflicts are of no

positive consequence. As such, he appeals to the three major ethnic groups Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba to come together and eschew the bitterness of war which is of the devil. Verse two veers into a teachable moment through the analogy of a mother and child. The import of this teachable moment for his audience is for citizens to see their relationship with the motherland as a mother and child relationship wherein both parties coexist with love and care. Love and care for country is Ade's topic sentence in 'The Way Forward' which relies on a catchy hook that translates as 'Lift her, I too will lift her, together we will lift our nation' (KSA *et al*., 1994).

The following verse is delivered in Pidgin English by the first of several artists featured by Ade. His message is as follows: 'My brothers and sisters, your indifferent attitude towards your country isn't right; you ought to think about it carefully because even Andrew who checked out is still Nigerian' before reiterating the inter-tribal unity of the three major ethnic groups considered essential to the nation's progress and development. Another adds that great nations including Britain, the USA, France and Germany were at one point or the other ravaged by socio-economic challenges; but hard work and sincerity saw these countries through to become the power nations that they are. There is a call on Nigerians who have emigrated and clamour to be citizens of these nations, urging Nigerians not to give up on the understanding that if today is bitter, tomorrow would be better. Together, the artists insist that their submissions represent the way forward for Nigeria adding that we sow what we reap. There are subsequent verses in Hausa, Igbo, Urhobo, Edo, amongst other artist-relevant languages essentially reiterating the messages at the core of 'The Way Forward'. Drawing from the famous words of J. F. Kennedy who said 'ask not what your country can do for you; instead ask what you can do for your country', one of

the featured artists offered in his verse: 'I owe this country a lot; you owe this country a lot' (KSA *et al*., 1994) repetitively.

It is necessary to mention here that it is perhaps no coincidence that it was KSA who convened the ensemble of popular musicians who wrote and performed 'The Way Forward' (1994). In fact, ten years prior to the release of 'The Way Forward', KSA recorded a masterly unity political song which doubled as a celestial plea song in his native Yoruba titled 'Togetherness' (1984). 'Togetherness' is a song in recognition of the struggles being experienced by the generality of the Nigerian population as of its time of conception in 1984. As such, KSA begins by pleading to God, the Almighty, that he might be merciful to this Nigeria. He calls on his fellow citizens to open hands in prayers that Nigeria may be peaceful and easy for the populace to live in. He continues that by the power of the lord, the end will be good and that the good tidings of the lord will abide with Nigerians; noting that it is forgiveness and togetherness that make the world.

In the following stanza, KSA pleads with the Nigerian government while encouraging the government of the lord's availability, readiness and capacity help the government with the task at hand. He proceeds with the government plea urging that the government be merciful to the poor and the downtrodden, as well as to the rich and to the unemployed. KSA soon quotes a bible passage off I Corinthians chapter 13, verse 13: "Faith, Hope and Love exist. However, the greatest of these is Love". He opines that once there is love, it is possible to know people's mindsets; counselling that it is the body of human beings that is most often known with no inclination as to people's mindsets. For KSA, it is proper for us to know both the body and mind of ourselves as compatriots. He continues through a call on the young and old "that we do it together" (KSA, 1984) by joining hands to pool the

collective knowledge and use it to rebuild Nigeria in order that the glory of Nigeria may be witnessed.

Proceeding, KSA advises Nigerians, particularly the political class, to forget politics and instead join hands to change Nigeria for the better. He adds that if Nigeria is peaceful for Nigerians, it is towards the happiness of Nigerians. According to KSA, it is to the benefit and happiness of Nigerians if Nigeria is peaceful. Once Nigerians are alive to their responsibilities, it is for their happiness and that of the Nigerian government. He notes that Nigeria is a rich and famous country which won't be destroyed during "our own time" (KSA, 1984). The national prayer continues with KSA pleading to the creator on behalf of Nigerians against hunger because when hunger comes, the hands will be crippled. When hunger comes, the legs will be crippled. A blind cannot see; a deaf cannot hear "excuse me". Hungry man cannot listen to sermon.

In closing, KSA calls on the two main separate classes of religious belief in Nigeria. He urges Christians to plead with God that Nigeria may be peaceful and that it may be comfortable for Nigerians to inhabit. To Muslims, he asks that they prepare and call the name of God in order that Nigerians may not go hungry. To the initiated and uninitiated, KSA tasks to prepare their plea so that it can be peaceful for the nation (KSA, 1984).

The eclectic use of languages through the just assessed unity political songs of pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria underscores the cultural hybridity (Barber, 1987) at play through most of the unity political works as with several other works by popular musicians in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria (Fasan, 2015).

7.3 After Democratization: Unity political music in post-1999 Nigeria

Nigeria's democracy following the military handover in 1999 had implications for the unity political music culture in the country. Whereas the subgenre, pre-1999, was a veritable propaganda tool for illegitimate military regimes to attempt an approach at legitimacy, it naturally became less fancied by the democratically elected ruling class that began to emerge legitimately in 1999. Campaign jingles, categorised here within the terrestrial praise political music subgenre, were employed by politicians through Nigeria's second and third Republics. The birth of the Fourth Republic with democratization in 1999 meant that the politicians got back in the habit. The patronage of unity political music makers made way for the more explicit propaganda brand of terrestrial praise political music. However this was not absolute as Nigeria's post-1999 popular music class got ingenious on the subgenre and ensured that unity political music lives.

Mr Mike Omeri was the Director of Research and Strategy at the Goodluck/Sambo campaign organisation which oversaw the 2011 presidential election campaign of Nigeria's erstwhile ruling PDP (1999-2015). Following the PDP's victory in 2011, Omeri was appointed the Director General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA). I sought audience with the NOA Director General at his office in an hour-long interview. His position on political music culture in Nigeria and indeed on the contemporary methods of the political class in exploiting both unity political music and terrestrial praise political music are deducible from the extract below:

The content of the music of some of the musicians we work with is suggestive of a desire to progress, to make meaningful contribution. Some of the songs are calling for unity, for progress, for development, love of country and patriotism. So these are ideals of any country

[such that] once you see musicians gravitating towards that agenda, you tend to want to work with them to further convey the message beyond the frontiers of only those who listen to them; but with the aim to get more people. Essentially they become advocates of the values of a country, the values of a political candidate, and all of those... Music is a powerful tool if used well. And that is why authorities generally should try to engage musicians so that musical content should be for development, and if it is properly used it can aid the progress of nations…Governments should engage musicians to discuss content. It's [been] done before. Forget the freedom of expression, freedom of ideas and all of those. If you need to convey particular messages, if you need to galvanise society, and this popular culture industry is, as it were, a veritable tool, why don't you engage them? Put them together and say 'okay this phase in the history of our country desires provision of infrastructure, or love for country, or national integration. Make sure contents of your music reflect these'. So if every musician is singing around these popular themes, and government is also working with them, complementing each other towards achieving that; it makes it easier […] Musicians don't operate in a vacuum, they need the people to listen to their music; they need the people to buy their music. So if you are a successful musician and then your country is at war, who will sit down to listen to your music? By cooperating you can get the infrastructure that will further improve your music and presentation (Omeri, 2012)[2]

The culture of unity political music is seen to have been sustained in post-1999 Nigeria. Also striking is the observation of an increasing blur between the unity political music form and the terrestrial praise political music variant. Hear Omeri: "The peace song was meant to galvanise support for the presidential candidate. Because we said 'peace song'; idea is for the first time, Jonathan is coming to contest [as a presidential candidate],

[2] Personal Interview with Mike Omeri, Director General of the National Orientation Agency

and there are people who are threatening fire, brimstone and all of those. So we say 'give peace a chance, let Nigeria be Nigeria'. That was the essence of the neighbour-to-neighbour peace song…" (*ibid*) In spite of such rationalizations, it is clear that the government of the day used one tool in achieving two objectives. Yet there was an unprecedented scale of terrestrial praise music production for the 2011 presidential election campaign of Omeri's boss! But one must refrain from digressing. The present section centres on post-1999 Nigeria unity political songs many of which are at the instance of the singers rather than of politicians' patronage. Unlike in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria, unity music in post-1999 Nigeria became more of a medium to court political attention and national relevance. There are nonetheless a few post-1999 Nigeria unity political songs which were not recorded to court attention and relevance as illustrated by the duo of 'Suuru lere' (2001) by Lagbaja and 'Let's live together' (2002) by KUSH:

Bisade Ologunde, better known as Lagbaja, or simply 'the masked one', emerged in the Nigerian music scene rather uniquely in 1993 with a faceless entry as 'somebody, nobody, anybody or everybody' (Lagbaja.com) in order to depict the anonymity of the 'common man' with a mask essentially symbolizing the voiceless in society. 'Naija must sweet again' (1993) was a notable protest epistle from Lagbaja's debut album. Lagbaja would return with a more compelling and successful album entitled *C' est Un African Thing* (1996)[3] which included the satirical effort 'Bad Leadership'. It would take some four years before *Abami*, a four-track album which paid tribute to the Abami Eda Fela, was released. Through the album, Lagbaja manages a blend of his own largely drum-based Afro-beat with samples of Fela's works. The resulting fusion is best left to individual tastes. A year later,

[3] It is noteworthy that 'Naija must sweet again' (1993) as well as 'Bad Leadership' (1996) are popular protest songs recorded and released during the military junta of General Sani Abacha; thus adding to the swelling list of protest music in the repressive days of pre-1999 Nigeria.

Lagbaja recorded 'Suuru Lere' complete with an animation video. The song enjoyed overwhelming acceptance and remains an iconic reference material for Nigeria's historical-political culture. And it's easy to see why:

'Suuru lere' (2001) has all the trappings of a genuine protest song with its humorous yet scathing critique of Nigeria and its metamorphosis in nationhood. Delivered mainly in Yoruba, Lagbaja begins in verse one with a subtle reference of the proliferation of military coups since independence. Soon he wonders how come democracy rather than bring progress had merely brought about warring factions. It is at the point where Lagbaja recommends 'patience' for democracy to work that the listener begins to sense a remedial, rather than a protest theme from the singer: 'Suuru to lojo/Suuru lere o' [patience ought to be timely; patience is profitable] meaning essentially that Nigerians eager for democratic dividends had to take things easy and be patient with the process. He calls on the traditionally impatient military who might nurse ambitions of power through another coup d'état as well as like-minded politicians to embrace patience in order not to jeopardize the joy that democracy otherwise guarantees if patiently struck and administered.

Subtly referencing politicians whose obsession with a bite at the cherry of democratic ethos had compelled into certificate forgery, Lagbaja invites his audience to take such as part of the overall lessons of democracy. The chorus themed on 'ki la wa se' [what did we come and do?] and the need for the populace to be patient follows. "However, Lagbaja does not place blame on any group or political class for all the woes in the past. In his judgment: 'If we search ourselves nobody innocent; everybody guilty; nobody dey innocent'. This position of compromise becomes necessary in order to heal the wounds of the past, and to allow Nigerian people to come together with one mission: to protect

democracy known as 'ohun elege' (namely, a fragile entity)" (Adegoju, 2009: 14). In prescribing patience, Lagbaja is careful to remind his audience of the importance of vigilance; before he enters an incantation-filled mood in the following verse insisting that if the nation's fourth republic was truncated as the previous three, Nigerians may well wave a final goodbye to nationhood in its entirety. Warning that 'Ka ma se bi omuti; to muti gbagba ise o' [let's not act like drunks who drink so much as to forget the job at hand]. In Lagbaja's reckoning, the task of nation-building in a democracy is everyone's; hence this collective responsibility mustn't be jeopardized.

'Let's live together' enjoys the singular preserve of being a song that incorporates individual verses in all five Nigerian major languages: Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, English and Pidgin English. The piece is a call on all the regions of the country to explore the strength in diversity. RP8, a 26 year-old female student of French, and fluent in all five languages mentioned above, contributes a short biography[4] of KUSH as well as translations of the song's multilingual texts:

(Yoruba)

'Come let's live together

Why are we killing ourselves?

[4] "KUSH (Kinetically Ushering Salvation into Homes), was a quartet of three ladies and a guy - Emem Ema (Mem'O), Lara George, Toyin Sokefun (TY Bello) and Dapo Torimiro. Their debut album which was released by DKG Music in 2002 (It sadly remains their only album) was titled "The Experience" and it received critical reviews. Their style of music was a radical departure from what obtained on the Nigerian Gospel Music scene. Lara's sultry voice, Ty's sassy hair style and Emem's rap lyrics gave the group a good mix of talents.
KUSH was a gospel group that was international in outlook, yet Nigerian enough not to be dismissed as an African-American initiative…The group broke up around 2004 for reasons not officially disclosed, but fans of KUSH (myself included) were not happy about the break up. I believe the urban gospel group should have stuck together and would have made much impact over the years, than what they are achieving individually at the moment.
Lara George is doing great as a solo gospel artist, so is TY. Emem created and runs a pioneer creative arts management company called ONE Integrated management. Dapo on the other hand is now a music producer"

There's really nowhere else we can go

Our strength is in our diversity'

(Igbo)

'Come let's live together

I'm calling on all my brothers and relatives

What's the problem, why are we fighting?

Our strength is our diversity

(Hausa)

'Come my brothers, let's stay together

Let's be one and hear ourselves out

Let it be strong

Hold my hand let's stay together

Let's love each other

Come let's stay together'

(RP8, Lagos; January, 2012)

The remainder of this section is constituted by the analyses of unity songs that come across as opportunistic and relevance-seeking. The deliveries of these songs lack the conviction of the previous two:

In his prime, Anthony Olanrewaju Awotoye (also known as Tony Tetuila) was fondly referred to as the 'golden boy of African music' through his short-lived but effective reign. Along with Eedris Abdulkareem and Eddy Montana, Tetuila was a member of the now defunct Afro hip-hop group The Remedies, which dominated airwaves in Nigeria in the early 2000s. Following the group's split, Tetuila enjoyed success with hits like 'Omode meta', 'My kind of woman', 'Morning Time', 'Fefe nefe', and 'Two women' to his credit in a solo career that has witnessed substantial album releases and sales. Yet, it was the hit 'My Car' which threw Tetuila to the summit of African music.

The hugely successful album *My Car* was succeeded by a rather unusual hope song in the mould of 'E go better' (2004) – a pidgin phrase for 'It will get better' - which forms the heart of this critique. The first line of the song, '*People dey hussle dey run go America*' is a reference to the many emigrants fleeing the shores of the country to the west in search of greener pastures, even as of 2004. '*Our future leader dey clear from Africa/Wetin be dis continental confusion?*' sees Tetuila addressing the issue of the brain drain wherein the best minds, who otherwise should be leaders, had emigrated. Tetuila continues:

'People dey blame the government of our nation

I want to know the price of democracy

Somebody tell me before I go crazy

Which one be dis our people dey suffer?

Na only God fit clear dis palaver'

Preceding the chorus where Tetuila urges everyone to tell their families '*e go better*' and to '*say a prayer for our nation*', adding that this is '*the message from Tony Tetuila*'. The subsequent verse begins on the protest note on which the first ended:

'No food for stomach

Poverty dey spread o

Dis no be joke o

Dem talk am for radio

People dey dream, dem dey run after luxury'

Soon, he proffers an alternative:

'E go better if we build our country

E ja ka so wopo to help our government

Ko le better for our private betterment

Cast your vote for the capable leader

…Run for those who be serious pretender[5]

Translation

'It would be better if we build our country

Let's put hands together to help our government

[5] Tetuila references 'those' who disguise as being concerned and sensitive to the people urging the latter (his audience) to flee from such 'politicians'.

So it can be better for our own private betterment...

The following chorus is re-worked to include state governors and the president as addressees of the message from Tetuila: 'E go better'. Verse three opens with Tetuila noting that education is the best way to success, yet;

'After graduation, na fighting to progress

No work to do after so many book oh

Pray to God make you no just dey look oh

Na only God oh fit clear this palaver

Moni Baba lo ke oh lo ma clear this palaver oh

Translation

'Graduating from the university doesn't guarantee progress

Unemployment remains the bane in spite of acquired skills

Pray to God so you escape the jobless train

It's God alone who can undo this mess

I say it's God alone who can undo this mess'

Through the final chorus, Tetuila continues what he began in the song 'My car', wherein he fondly refers to the then Governor of Lagos state. Only here, he includes the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, who is called 'Baba Iyabo' connoting 'the father of Iyabo' in Yoruba parlance:

'Tell Baba Iyabo and Mr. Asiwaju

E go better'

In closing, Tetuila assembles actual members of different groupings in society – primary and secondary school pupils, university students, and various workers - to recite the 'e go better' refrain. Overall, 'E go better' (2004) is an optimistic track which protests against many ills, but goes further to assure that the celestial being will make it alright.

In his subsequent album *Free Soldier* (2006), Tetuila attempts to keep to tradition by including yet another unity political song in the ten track compilation. Titled 'Pray for Nigeria', Tetuila raises the celestial injunction he summoned for the country from the earlier 'E go better' (2004). 'Prayer for Nigeria' (2006) as the title suggests is a prayer for Nigeria. As such, Tetuila opens with the lines: 'Nigeria my country, we no go fall, just dey grow higher'. In the first verse, Tetuila sings in a fashion to make the country come across as a humble servant beseeching the creator not to look at the many flaws of the country. Tetuila, in this song, is magnanimous enough to admit to the lowly state of affairs in the country before urging his Nigerian audience to join hands to make Nigeria great. He subtly admonishes the critical spectators amongst the citizenry, advising that the government could not do everything for the people.

In verse two, Tetuila lists some ills associated with nationhood since independence in 1960. These include 419 (stealing and obtaining by false pretence), armed robbery and corruption. To these he asks 'na wetin we go do?' [What would we do?], and responds instantly: 'na to pray to God oh' [It is to pray to God]. Verse three is a powerful invocation of the chants 'By the grace of God, Nigeria no go dabaru, no go destroy, no go fall down/By the

grace of God, Nigeria no go shake o, no go break o, no go go down' just after he implores that the children of today are the future who should be taught all the good things of life since discouraging them with Nigeria's woes served no useful purpose. There is a sense in which his message for children i.e. posterity can be construed as Tetuila being defensive over the nature of the song 'E go better' (2004) where his reference to the then Nigerian President and Governor of Lagos State conveyed the song as a terrestrial praise political song.

The third verse and closing continues with Tetuila trying to keep the prayerful intensity as he utters: '...let's pray for Nigeria now; we are growing, higher, higher, we shall grow/ we are growing, higher, higher, we shall grow, higher, higher...' (Tetuila, 2006) Towards the 2015 general elections in Nigeria, Tetuila was on the campaign train as he ran for the Irepodun Local Government Area seat in his native Kwara State House of Assembly. In the midst of the campaigns, Tetuila told an interviewer "If you know songs like 'Prayer for Nigeria' and 'E go better', you will see that we [musicians] only complain but we don't do anything about the suffering" (Abuja Media, 2014).

> The future is not a time zone that is yet to come. The future is everything that we can be but have not yet become. The future is everything that we can do but have not yet done. The future is here. The future is now (Fela Durotoye, in closing 'The Future' by TY Bello, 2010).

RP8 offers a biography of the now disbanded gospel outfit KUSH wherein she expresses her unhappiness with the group's break up before she informs that of the quartet, two – Lara George and TY Bello – were enjoying careers as solo artists. What RP8 did not add is that Toyin Sokefun alias TY Bello had also pursued a career as a photographer, and her photography work presently enjoys the patronage of the Nigerian presidency. But to digress

is needless for the concern here is with her 2010 song 'The future'. Targeted at the young but inclusive of the old, Bello's 'The future' conveys the striking lines: '...We are the future; we are the dream; we are the nation; we are part of this; yes we are so amazing; that's the least we shall be; at the heart of the nation changing history' with which she opens.

Onto a bridge, she insists that the nation is not finished: how with committed citizens of her ilk whose only country is Nigeria? Thus she addresses non-progressives to 'get out of the way of the land of our dreams' insisting 'We are the nation, we are part of this…' The chorus follows: "**…**Carry the song; Carry the sound; the future is here; ...goodbye yesterday; tomorrow is now for the taking; the future is here…" (Bello, 2010)

In verse two, Bello personalises the message inviting her audience to do same:

'I am the future

I am the dream

I am the nation

I am part of this

Yes I am so amazing

That's the least l shall be

At the heart of the nation changing history'

An elaborate rendition of the above-stated lines continues accompanied by the chorus before Bello concludes sonorously that the '…The future has come...'

Sammy Okposo is a popular musician whose primary forte is gospel music. He is reputed for popularizing scenes of high drama through the videos of his usually spiritually charged songs. He has enjoyed successes with songs like 'Wellu Wellu', 'Oruko Jesu' and 'Addicted'. Lyrically and melodically, 'Naija dey bam' (2010) could pass as a standard spiritually uplifting song. Yet it is clear that it represents a break from his norm, steeped as it is in such a telling period of Nigeria's history that one cannot but appreciate it as an attempt to court political attention.

Okposo recorded and performed campaign jingles for the re-election bid of the immediate past Governor of Delta State, Emmanuel Uduaghan, and has enjoyed consistent patronage at state functions ever since. In 2015, he was particularly active in the unsuccessful re-election campaign of former President Goodluck Jonathan for which he altered the texts of gospel hymns to suit his context. Okposo is generally regarded as a pro-establishment performer who is willing to sing the praises of whoever meets his wage bill.

Indeed the hollowness of 'Naija dey bam' ['Nigeria is in excellent shape'] is immediately evident: following a quotation singing of the title four times, representing the song's chorus, verse one opens:

'For this Naija, no matter our language, we are one family

Anywhere you look, anywhere you go, blessings and riches are all you see'

Soon the actual reality which hides behind the now familiar 'God factor' follows:

'We have been through many trials; thank God we still dey together

No matter wetin try to put us asunder, lie-lie-o, Naija no go scatter'

The second verse suggests an escalation in Okposo's delusion:

'We are not moved by the things we see or hear

We move by purpose and vision

United we are, we stand tall, we are strong

We live in love, peace and harmony…'

Verse three is more sordid as Okposo attempts to force the farce of 'Naija dey bam' on his audience by employing a mix of tunes from past popular anthems of others to convey some message, and concludes thus:

'…Tell them say: We no go tire (we no go tire)

We are on fire (we're on fire)

We're going higher (Naija dey go)

We no go scatter (lie –lie-o)

We will rule and show the world say Naija dey bam-bam…'

An official rebranding campaign of Nigeria was launched nationally in 2009 with the selected slogan *Good People, Great Nation* (Nworah, 2009). Barely a year later Julius d' genius Agwu hurried to appropriate the rebranding slogan as a title to a song. Agwu had become a household name as one of the nation's frontline comedians. His subsequent entry into music is a move seen by many of his followers to be of as much comical value as his stand-up. 'Good people great nation' (2010) is as bizarre a song as one is likely to encounter owing to the flagrant opportunism with which it is titled and performed. Within the song, the

phrase ‘Good people great nation’ is said rather than sang at the chorus’s end depicting its forced and opportunistic usage. The rebranding theme had been unveiled at a well-attended ceremony at the International Conference Centre, Abuja. As with most Nigerian talk-shops, various individuals representing civil society, labour, the private sector, students, etc. took turns to speak glowingly of the slogan and of the nation. This, in spite of the wariness of the generality of Nigerians towards successive governments following a fashion of designing a new national ethos by placing emphasis on some nomenclature while the way of doing things stayed the same. Surely, the Good People, Great Nation campaign (2009) could be no different from the grandstanding central government’s culture.

Agwu’s theme in the song meanwhile is evidenced from the intro wherein he states: ‘This is my special dedication/To all those who struggled for the emancipation/Liberation/Of this great nation/…My heroes and heroines’ (Agwu, 2010). Through verses one to three, Agwu mentions a long list of famous people including past and present leaders in remembrance. They are Tafawa Balewa, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Aguiyi Ironsi, Adekunle Fajuyi, Murtala Muhammed, Obafemi Awolowo, Ahmadu Bello, Aminu Kano, Margaret Ekpo, Tai Solarin, Fred Rewane, KO Mbadiwe, Sam Mbakwe, Sam Akintola, and Shehu Musa Yar’Adua. Others mentioned are Dele Giwa, Saro Wiwa, MKO Abiola, Kudirat Abola, Marshall Harry, Gani Fawehinmi, and Umaru Musa Yar’Adua.

Meanwhile one of those who spoke at the unveiling ceremony of the rebranding campaign was the then Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, who represented the President. In his speech, he urged Nigerians to support the campaign through value reorientation pointing out that nation rebranding should not be seen as a one event affair (Nworah, 2009). In conclusion to the song, Agwu adds that ‘[the] song is also a dedication to all

Nigerians all over the world/seeking for a better Nigeria', listing 'No to corruption/good education/good electricity/employment/social stability/security/peace and harmony' as steps 'to reach the promise land'. The use of the slogan 'Good People Great Nation' by Agwu, in naming his nostalgic tribute to Nigerian political heroes is perhaps the artist's heeding of the President's appeal to Nigerians to ensure that nation rebranding isn't a one-event affair.

Olubankole Wellington (Banky W) and rapper Jude Abaga, Mr Incredible (MI), together perform what is the post-1999 Nigeria equivalent of Bongos Ikwue's 'Nigeria is 25' (1985). 'Still together' (2010) was recorded to coincide with Nigeria's attainment of the landmark age of 50 years since independence. Following an introduction by a young child's recitation of the national pledge, Wellington opens in verse one by referencing his memory of independence and the 'freedom we received'! This calibre of memory could be said to be laughable since he was born some twenty years after Nigeria's independence. Following this, Wellington sings of a 'call to fight for unity' and 'the vision [he] believes'. Proceeding, he sings that 'fifty years have gone by quickly' amidst 'laughter, joy, and pain'. Wellington compels the critic to ponder how these three distinct emotions could have been combined in 'fifty quick years'?

He continues: '…But our future is united; And the faith and hope remain; So we sing...' and enters a chorus which seems to force the point of togetherness more than express a reality with emphasis on 'still rising', 'still fighting', and 'still moving' together. He completes the chorus with that familiar Nigerian comment: 'We rise when we fall…' insisting that Nigeria would overcome any challenges.

In verse two, Wellington engages with some specific things:

‘Hausa, Yoruba, still together

Ibo, Calabar, still together

Muslims, Christians, still together

Brothers, sisters, still together now

Ijaw, South-South, still together

Edo, Delta, still together

Middle-belt, Fulani, still together

All of Naija still together now’

In a discussion on ‘Still Together’ with a member of the popular music audience in Nigeria, the discussant was of the opinion that the emphasis on togetherness in the song pointed to the fact that the country is not together after all, as he cited the sharp differences in the ways of thinking and in customs, norms and traditions amongst Nigerians. Wellington, meanwhile, offers an explanation on why an increasing number of popular musicians have only one political song through a career of several years and many songs. Wellington explains that because Nigeria is now practising a democracy, the ills obtainable under military rule have been drastically mitigated. As such, there is a reduced need to write protest political and unity political songs. Wellington’s position is to be understood against the backdrop of dedicated protest political musicians who still exist and continue to make music in spite of Nigeria’s democratization. Their prolificacy within the subgenre points to the fact that democracy in Nigeria has not completely evaporated the country’s socio-political challenges. Where challenges have been overcome, new ones have emerged.

A popular Nigerian blogger Ene Adasen conveys her exhaustion with unity political music clichés through an article on Timi Dakolo's 'Great nation' (2012). Dakolo won the first season of the *Idols West Africa* held in 2007. His stake in the Nigerian popular music scene has been rather mixed since then. However, he experienced a break during the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan – Dakolo's kinsman. Particularly, the song 'Great nation' was appropriated by the Jonathan presidency to such an extent that Dakolo was invited to be part of the President's entourage to the 2013 World Economic Summit in Davos, Switzerland where Dakolo performed the song to a Nigerian gathering with whom the President met. Dakolo might have come through strongly in the song, and the President might have been so moved as to compel invocations of leading a 'great nation'; however several Nigerians like Adasen were hardly moved by the song.

Adasen writes: "I bought into this cliché as a child but not anymore. Long years of total neglect and complete disregard for Nigerian citizens by the governments including the present, has opened my eyes to the truth and killed the innocence that was in me all those years to believe that no matter how corrupt our leaders got, that no matter how irresponsible, irresponsive and insensitive they got, we still had a united Nigeria. This is not the case anymore" (Adasen, 2012). Dakolo's 'Great nation' (2012) describes the people of Nigeria as "a people with one song, with one voice...a nation undivided and poised...a people with one heart, for one cause" (Dakolo, 2012). The chorus is preoccupied with the notion of believing in the nation and the confidence of getting 'there'. It continues with chants about the promise the country holds and the conviction that "one day we'll shine like the sun" (*ibid*.). Dakolo closes the chorus with what sounds like a reassurance to his

audience: “we are a great nation”. The following verse vindicates Adasen’s criticism so vividly because of Dakolo’s resort to lines from perennial Nigerian clichés:

‘Though we are many people

Different tribes, different tongues

We’re united in our strength and resolve

To uphold the honour of our land

And for generations to come’

- Timi Dakolo, *Great nation* (2012)

Unsurprisingly, Adasen’s parting shot to the singer reads: “...Mr. Timi Dakolo...enough with emotional and psychological blackmail” (Adasen, 2012). Indeed, not a few among the Nigerian popular music audience would infer that several protest political songs by Fela and others resonate among the people as uniting symbols. How much unity a unity political song invariably conveys appears inversely proportional to the compulsion that goes into its making. Other songs not of the political music stalk have also bore more uniting tendencies for Nigerians than many unity political songs. What with ‘Sweet Mother’ (Prince Nico Mbarga), ‘Seun rere’ (Christy Essien Igbokwe), ‘Originality’ (Faze), and ‘Stylee’ (Jimmy Jatt) etc.?

Indeed, massively popular and abiding tunes like ‘Dem no know you again’ (Tony One-week) have served to represent the sorts of notions with which Nigerians have viewed and dealt with themselves inter-ethnically while ‘Dem Bobo’ (Femi Kuti) serves to illustrate the stark distrust the people hold the ruling class in. Considering the anthem credentials of

these two songs, one then wonders why the songs assessed through this chapter constitute unity political songs even whilst their reach and lifespan remain low.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that it is feasible to delineate a distinctive and comprehensible subgenre of unity political music by employing the methods of critical discourse, con-textual, and audience analyses. The chapter traced the evolution of unity political music culture in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria from Fela's 'Viva Nigeria' (1969) to King Sunny Ade's 'The way Forward' (1994). Through this, the subgenre was unravelled as a propaganda tool for successive military regimes in a bid to play up nationhood while downplaying their own illegitimacy. With the advent of democracy in 1999, the unity political music subgenre remained popular as several artists appropriated populist slogans ranging between 'E go better' (2004) and 'Good people great nation' (2010) in order to court political relevance. Following democratization, unity political music became vehicles for artists who, in order to court relevance, emphasized the beauty and appeal of nationhood. In a democratically governed country, it seems, it has become exceedingly popular to make music expressing the nation's continued oneness.

CHAPTER EIGHT

TERRESTRIAL PRAISE POLITICAL MUSIC CULTURE IN POSTCOLONIAL NIGERIA

8.1 Introduction

In contemporary times, gospel songs are otherwise referred to as celestial praise songs which belong in the body of celestial praise music. The import of this is that gospel songs are songs written and composed in praise of a celestial being. The hymns of the Christian faithful are examples of what may constitute celestial praise music. In Africa, celestial praise music formed a core component of the arrival of religious missionaries despatched to spread the message. Before this time, the locals certainly engaged in the praise and worship of celestial beings through singing. As such, they also sang celestial praise songs. The term 'gospel music' may therefore be better understood as only one category of celestial praise music because celestial praise songs may not necessarily be 'gospel' songs. Having established this, this study on terrestrial praise political music must refrain from digressing.

Let us start by losing 'political'. The resulting term of 'terrestrial praise music' can be used in direct contrast to 'celestial praise music'. Put simply, while the latter is made of music that endorses and extols a celestial being, the former is made of music that endorses and extols a terrestrial being. However, the word 'terrestrial' means earthly, worldly, or global. Hence it is essential to point out that the term 'terrestrial praise music' activates the word 'terrestrial' to mean 'human'. The purpose of the nomenclatural choice of 'terrestrial praise music' is so as to aid in its depiction as the exact opposite of 'celestial praise music'. It does for man that which 'celestial praise music' does for the celestials and for the creator of man. The coinage is appropriated onomatopoeically.

There are several ways and contexts in which terrestrial praise music is deployed. Human culture is fraught with all manner of patronage and the display of love, affection and appreciation. Popular music has been known to convey human feelings and expression better than any other known media. As such, popular musicians have written tribute songs, love songs, and appreciative songs in praise of their recipients (addressees). These songs praise humans who are terrestrial beings, and as such are terrestrial praise songs. The category known as 'terrestrial praise music' covers all known forms of human praise conveyed through music. The category also covers the entirety of human history such that it cannot be said to have been relevant in one century, place or the other. The term, like 'celestial praise music', is meant to be all-encompassing.

Let us now re-introduce the isolated 'political' in 'terrestrial praise political music'. Terrestrial praise political music is simply terrestrial praise music that is associated with politicians, or that extols and endorses a political office holder or aspirant. Together with protest political music and unity political music, terrestrial praise political music completes a triumvirate of the political music genre. Terrestrial praise political music is predominant in Africa. Terrestrial praise political songs are either recorded following state (politicians') sponsorship or done with the intent to court the addressees' attention. They are usually very pre-occupied with gratifying the ego of an addressee that there is little room for celebrating nationhood therein. Terrestrial praise political music accounts for the brand of musical activity that does not necessarily celebrate nationhood but sings the praises of present-day leaders.

The subgenre is an outgrowth of the acts of panegyrising and eulogizing that have been part of African culture even before colonialism. With Independence came an official variant of this praise culture enjoyed by public officials and politicians as the Nigerian

Republic engaged in a series of relationships with military and elected civil rule between 1963 and 1999. By May 29, 1999 – a date now observed yearly as Democracy Day across the country – Nigeria had again democratized its political organs and its people embraced democracy in what is in practice today, the Fourth Republic. The present-day global mood and the near consensus of anathematizing military rule have made analysts to forecast overwhelmingly that military authority over political structures is a practice of the past in Nigeria. Terrestrial praise political music will therefore be courted by democrats henceforth. Democracy has come to stay. With democracy come elections, and with elections come campaigns. Campaigns are characterized by applications of political communication. Campaign jingles or electoral songs are recorded and used to convey messages to mass audiences. This is the story so far in summary.

This chapter will feature the practice of pre-colonial griots and oral artists while highlighting the similarities and the points of departure between their practice and present-day terrestrial praise political music culture. In doing this the chapter will briefly transverse the terrestrial praise political music scene of post-independence Nigeria. This will precede the main focus of the study which is the hydra headed dynamics inherent in the terrestrial praise political music of post-1999 Nigeria. How does this political music subgenre relate to capitalist persuasions in the contemporary world? What are its indications, effects and limitations? These form the core of the ensuing discussion which centres on a frank interview granted by a contemporary Nigerian oral/verbal artist.

8.2 The Griot: From the pre-colonial to post-colony

Vidal (1988) qualifies the griot as those through whose musical expressions, rulers re-affirm their sovereignty; communities preserve their history for posterity while the young are

socialized into the values of the society. Fofana (2011: 255) avers that '[the] origin of storytelling is to be traced back to the beginning of social life, at a time that no memory recalls. In other words, storytelling is as old as society itself and its origin impossible to know with precision'. The roles of the griot have evolved through pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial African societies. The importance of the griot in African societies through these periods has nevertheless been sustained for a number of reasons which Vidal (1988) conveys thus: "music is an important mode of communication that contributes to the maintenance and persistence of the religious, political and social systems of which it is a part…the African musician is a singer of deeds and a praiser of action" (*ibid*.: 147).

In Nigeria, historically, literature suggests that perhaps the most dominant form of praise singing is the Yoruba oral poetry known as Oriki. It is a dynamic verbal art that is very much centred on a recipient's lineage and the accompanying antecedents. The genre is such that each piece gravitates into another, but never deviates from the ancestry or the actions of its subject. It is arguably a form of terrestrial praise singing at its purest. "It is meant to be sung, chanted or intoned in performance in the presence of an audience… [It] like all oral works of art exists and is transmitted and perpetuated in performance. That is, without performance, or for want of performance, a Yoruba oral poem has no means of existence…Its performance requires two basic things. First there should be a need for it, and secondly there should be someone, or some people wanting it" (Olajubu, 1981: 72).

Olukotun (2002) writes of how the Oriki genre, because of how its systems and codes of discourse derive meaning, began to reflect changes when "colonial economics and politics introduced basic changes which affected indigenous media forms" (*ibid*: 197) during the colonial era in Nigeria. Similarly, Fofana observes that the physical collapse of

colonialism debased and devalued the role of griots whilst their function of providing narratives was being usurped by western media. The alternative, therefore, for the griot in a cash economy, was to flatter their patrons in order to maintain their customer base (Fofana, 2011). Olukotun, meanwhile, informs that the mobility within the colonial bureaucracy and the emergent commercial network opened up the Yoruba cities of Ibadan and Lagos to sources of wealth and prestige. He adds that "Christianity and periodic Islamic revivals took their toll on the indigenous world view which constituted the substructure of the media forms. The chiefs no longer owned the land, and merchants, emergent nationalist politicians, civil servants and clerks became the new players" (Olukotun, 2002: 197).

The identification of griots in various African societies is of interest. Vidal's study, for example, includes information on how the *jali* of the Madinka, the *Maroka* of the Hausa, and the *Onirara* of the Yoruba function variously as the historian, genealogist and the bard in their various communities. This is hardly at variance with Kaschula (1999) in his comparative analysis of oral poetics in Southern and West Africa wherein he identifies and lists West African griots as *gewel, gawl, jali, jeli,* and *mabo* amongst others (*ibid*: 55). More importantly, Kaschula's study asks to what extent political influences are brought to bear on these griots' performances before drawing "a distinction between the more laudatory praises produced by 'popular' or less formal performers, and the performances of the more traditional poets who draw more extensively on history and genealogy" (Kaschula, 1999: 58).

Barber (1987: 12), meanwhile, notes some traditional genres predisposed to the incorporation of novelties, adding that "some oral poetic genres like Yoruba oriki were...constituted according to the principle of openness and boundarilessness, constantly

incorporating new elements – from other oriki, from other genres, or from the poet's own invention" (*ibid.*). Ewi is a modern genre of Yoruba poetry that freely draws on the vast repertoire of traditional oral literary forms and inhabits the intersection between the written and the oral. A contemporary poet notable for his modernization of the ewi – indeed for raising it from mere mendicancy to professionalism - is Lanrewaju Adepoju. According to Okunoye (2011: 180) "...the vision that pervades [Adepoju's] work constantly shifts between the Islamic and the ecumenical, blending Christian, Islamic and traditional Yoruba outlooks. This suggests...a deliberate strategy aimed at popularity and relevance in a multi-religious society. His *Oriki Olodumare* [Celebration of the Supreme Being] (2000) – a work that conceptually integrates Islamic, Christian and traditional Yoruba theistic visions, testifies to this."

Okunoye (2011) bears Adepoju's sympathy for the commercialization of ewi in order to make the poet a publicist for government, media organizations, advertising firms, and for individuals. This mandate of the modern Yoruba poet is hinged on the unjustifiable vision of the artist as an implacable critic. In Adepoju's words, "an akewi[1] does not have to be an opposition party to all programmes and activities. As he is able to rebuke where people misbehave, he should also acknowledge good things and virtues in some decent politicians where such occur...If one continues only to see the ugly side of people, everybody will lose respect for one" (Okunoye, 2011: 182).

However laudable and balanced Adepoju's submission, Okunoye cites an Adepoju critic who drew a connection between the commercialization of ewi and the waning

[1] An akewi is a poet who mirrors the society, using events around him to create imagery for entertainment, information, education and admonition as well as counselling, as the case may be...He must not sit down and watch complacently when things are not normal in the society

popularity of Adepoju's poetry. Adeyinka Folorunsho likens Adepoju's praise-singing tendencies to the oral mode of performance by court bards in Oyo and notes that the praise-songs composed by Adepoju during the political struggle in Nigeria in 1983 led to a loss of confidence and respect by the people he was supposed to serve. Okunoye adds that "Many of Adepoju's fans cite the effort of the poet to present the position of the Babangida government in *Alaye Ijoba* [*Government's explanation*], which came out as a sequel to *Nibo la n lo?*[2] [*Where are we going?*] in 1987 as the very act that made him lose the confidence of many of his admirers" (*ibid*: 182).

Okunoye describes "a new phase in the development of Adepọjụ's work, starting from the 2000s" (*ibid*: 183) which has seen him deploy his poetry to the praise of political leaders in democratic Nigeria; particularly Yoruba leaders in the country's southwest. For Adepoju, the business of government is important enough to attract the attention of poets. Okunoye quotes Adepoju's preface to *Ijoba Gbenga Daniel* [Gbenga Daniel's[3] Administration] which translates thus: [We cannot discountenance our leaders in ewì/There is hardly any policy that they promote that does not concern us/It is necessary to show concern/About how they manage public resources/That's the way we will know the difference between constructive politicians/And mere riders on the gravy train/So as to dispel lies and reveal the truth] (Okunoye, 2011: 184). The piece itself conveys lines such as "[As far as governance is concerned, the administration of Olugbenga is a model]" (*ibid*.)

[2] *Nibo la n lo?* presents the poet as a fearless advocate of the masses while its sequel presents him as an intimidated and harassed apologist of the same government that the earlier work criticized

[3] Gbenga Daniel was the Governor of Ogun State, southwest Nigeria between 2003 and 2011

while in *Ìjoba Tinúbú* [Tinubu's[4] Administration], the poet offers "[Tinubu is far from being an empty barrel/Because he excellently executes good jobs with a sound mind]" (*ibid*.).

Adepoju's claim is that in praising his political patrons, his impressions have been verified through personal investigations. As such, he merely communicates facts to members of the public without access to published documents on the track records of governments. Okunoye avers that Adepoju applies his poetry in propagating partisan political causes more than any other modern Yoruba poet and cites Adepoju's work on Obafemi Awolowo[5] which went beyond endorsing the politician to demonize his opponents towards the 1979 presidential election in Nigeria. Adepoju had threatened the Yoruba electorate that failure to vote for Awolowo was a recipe for confining their children in bondage forever (Okunoye, 2011)!

Adepoju's audience reach can be described as national having extended beyond the frontiers of his native Yoruba; indeed, he did deploy his art to the presidential ambition of Atiku Abubakar (a non-Yoruba). "The role of the poet...to educate and create public awareness, to monitor political promises and their implementation [and] to remind the public office holders to be alive to their responsibilities" (Adepoju, 2006; cited in Okunoye, 2011: 181) is demonstrated through Adepoju's works. Indeed, under military rule, Adepoju engaged with the military in order to defend the interest of the people. The annulment of the 12 June 1993 presidential election is a point in note where Adepoju sent poetic scorn to power's way. While Adepoju eliminated musical accompaniment from his art in 1997 because, according to him, it impedes the discursive import of his poetry, his political praise

[4] Bola Tinubu was the Governor of Lagos State, southwest Nigeria between 1999 and 2007
[5] Awolowo's political project inspired a pan-Yoruba political consciousness presently known as Awoism

chants remain under the purview of terrestrial praise political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria. This is so because political music is deciphered essentially through its texts.

A contemporary popular musician whose style and work also draws from the oriki traditional form is D'banj. His music could be described as having an international reach owing to his accomplishments across the African continent. Towards the 2011 presidential election, D'banj was drafted to the Goodluck Jonathan campaign organization for which he wrote and performed 'I go vote for Goodluck' (2010). Unlike Adepoju, however, D'banj had never been a people/masses crusader at any point in his music career. Whereas there is a balance between political praise and political criticism in the former's career, the same cannot be said of the latter. Nor can his praise of Goodluck Jonathan be a consequence of his personal verification. How did terrestrial praise political music culture get here such that even the highly regarded film industry's Nollywood sang in separate groups and factions for the incumbent presidency?

> In order to understand the function and form of contemporaneous African oral poetry, it is important to have some historical perspective on how the tradition operated in past times. But it is equally important to locate the tradition within a contemporary environment, lest the tradition be romanticized, or relegated to the annals of history and studied as a dead tradition (Kaschula, 1999: 59-60).

Beyond Adepoju, Juju music's King Sunny Ade is perhaps the most prominent figure to do terrestrial praise of political leaders in pre-1999 post-independence Nigeria. It is noteworthy that several musicians, particularly of the Yoruba ethnic group, specialized in singing the praises of businessmen following independence in 1960 e.g. Chief Ebenezer Obey and Sikiru Ayinde Barrister (Olukotun, 2002). However, Ade's posthumous tribute to the late Nigerian Head of State, Major General Murtala Mohammed stands out as it celebrated a leader, who

had just passed-on following Mohammed's brutal murder on 13th February, 1976. The unambiguous piece was also an unsolicited terrestrial praise political song.

Ade also recorded and performed 'MKO Abiola'. The song offers an interesting dynamic as to the fluidity of texts. As of its release, when the subject was only a wealthy businessman, the song 'MKO Abiola' was predominantly a 'gospel' piece. Therein Ade beseeched the creator to "make him successful just like MKO Abiola".[6] However, with Abiola's involvement in Nigerian politics through the years, the song has become more of a political tribute over the feelings it evokes in contemporary usage. These feelings centre mainly on 'June 12': MKO Abiola is best known for his June 12, 1993 mandate. How this hitherto gospel song is appropriated post-1993 has little correlation with gospel music. How then is one to firmly categorise the song considering its celestial-terrestrial audience dynamic? The subsequent section looks at this dynamic in further depth.

Meanwhile, the two-million-man march campaigning for the self-succession of General Sani Abacha was a defining moment in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria. Of the event, Olukotun (2002) writes that: "The state's use of the traditional media…cut across Nigeria's geo-ethnic groups, in order to create a 'national' platform" (*ibid*: 208). Olukotun soon lists the partaking entertainers mobilized to sing the glories of General Abacha on the historic occasion of 3rd and 4th March, 1998. They include popular musicians Sir Shina Peters, Wasiu Alabi, Christy Essien Igbokwe, Onyeka Owenu, Dan Maraya Jos, Charles 'Charly Boy' Oputa and Salawi Abeni. Others are ace broadcasters and professional masters of ceremony Bisi Olatilo, Sunny Irabor, Ralph Obiora, Ernest Ifejiku, and Ikenna Ndaguba. The comedians

[6] As translated from Yoruba. Excerpts reverberate: 'Baba je n so rire, bi ti MKO Abiola…'

Baba Aluwe, Mohammed Danjuma, Usman Baba Pategi (Samanja), and Jide Kosoko were also in attendance.[7]

A full album titled 'Democracy' in support of General Abacha and his self-succession bid was recorded by the late highlife colossus King (Dr) Oliver de Coque. Poorly engineered discs of the album 'Democracy' described as the most sycophantic musical document in Nigeria's history are available in some stores. Though Oliver de Coque is of the Igbo ethnic group in southeast Nigeria, he manages to communicate Abacha's legacies in a multilingual method in the album 'Democracy'. The rhetoric and discourse deployed in this album is worth some excerpts:

Who will rule Nigeria and make it better? Democracy is what we are looking for, I am saying that Abacha should rule, if it is to vote, I will vote for Abacha. Sani Abacha will lead Nigeria for it to be a better place for us all. If Abacha leads us the country will be beautiful.

My people what I am telling you is what comes from the heart, we have shot guns, fought and quarrelled over our country Nigeria, brothers do not know their brothers again, friends do not know their friends again, what's really happening? Is it not democracy we are looking for? Let's forget the past my dear Ibo brothers, it has come to a time when we need to ask ourselves questions, the democracy we are looking for is one that will be good for us, that will bring us peace and love, we don't want democracy that is imported, from air or from the sea. Why will they bring democracy that will cause us discomfort? God willing, we will have good democracy, which will stop high blood pressure and brief illness. Will some leave where they are having a chieftaincy ceremony to go to a place where thugs are fighting? Let's support Sani Abacha as better democracy has come

(Oliver de Coque; translated/transcribed)

With the nature of praise deployed here, one would be pardoned for mistaken the album for a posthumous tribute to modern Nigeria's engineer and oracle of democracy. Yet,

[7] "Sunny Ade hastily arranged an overseas trip ostensibly on medical grounds, in order to provide himself with a decent escape" (Olukotun, 2002: 209) from performing at the two-million-man march.

startlingly, to date, the only posthumous tributes available to Nigeria's political consciousness are those by King Sunny Ade and Chief Ebenezer Obey[8] for Murtala Mohammed and Obafemi Awolowo respectively. Both came in pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria. Yet Oliver de Coque's inimitable collection offers a pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria precedence to the political music practices of post-1999 Nigeria. The ample illustration of the epic work above is advisedly done as a testament to the continuing effects of power and influence from a popular music point of view. What this portends for the post-1999 successors of 'Democracy' is the concern of the subsequent section. What is certain already is that the collection of terrestrial praise political music in post-1999 Nigeria barely has the forbearance for post-mortems.

8.3 Terrestrial praise political music culture in post-1999 Nigeria

The terrestrial praise political singing trend of pre-1999 postcolonial Nigeria has been sturdily sustained through post-1999 Nigeria. Between 1999 and 2007, and between 2007 and 2010 when Olusegun Obasanjo and Umaru Musa Yar'Adua served as President of Nigeria respectively, the procurement of popular musicians to record terrestrial praise political songs for both men was marginal at the national level. As such, the analysis in this section would commence with the 2011 presidential elections which witnessed the co-optation of a vast array of popular musicians to record terrestrial praise political songs (campaign jingles) for the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan. Among others, the key campaign jingles recorded were by Dekunle Fuji (campaign song in Yoruba language), Zaaki Azzay (campaign song in Hausa language), 2Shotz (campaign song in Igbo language), Mamuzee twins (campaign song in Ijaw language – Jonathan's kin), Onyeka Onwenu

[8] Chief Ebenezer Obey, a popular Juju musician turned gospel-singer, recorded many praise songs in honour of the Yoruba business elite. He also produced pro-government albums such as *Operation Feed the Nation* and *Right Hand Drive*, designed to mobilize people in support of new policies of the state.

(campaign song in English language), Nollywood actors and actresses (campaign song in English language), and D'banj (campaign song in Pidgin English).

Mr Mike Omeri was the Director of Research and Strategy at the Goodluck/Sambo campaign organisation which oversaw the 2011 presidential election campaign of Nigeria's erstwhile ruling PDP[9] (1999-2015). Following the PDP's victory in 2011, Omeri was appointed the Director General of the National Orientation Agency (NOA). It was fitting that I sought audience with Mr Omeri who explained that:

…Because we had already moved far and were faster, most of the other candidates couldn't get the popular musicians who could appeal, to sing for them because they were already in the group working for Jonathan. So what they decided to do was to sit there to criticize the acts. To say for instance: 'Country, we are thinking of serious things, and you people are busy dancing. So if you want to dance, go and join those people. If you want to be serious about the country come and work with us.' But then the message still didn't sink because we now replied that 'our country needs to engage everyone. The musicians are also contributing to the process of development, and some of the popular themes for development can also be captured in music'…So we said all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy. And we are not saying we are coming to be dancing every day, but we are using this medium to convey a message

The foregoing underscores the sheer weight and momentum behind the machinery known as incumbency in Nigeria's Fourth Republic political theatre. In a country with as vast a population as Nigeria's, and as rich and competitive the popular music industry, it is the stuff of titans to find that a single presidential candidate representing one party in a multi-

[9] People's Democratic Party

party democracy had appropriated every "popular musician who could appeal". The concentration of popular musicians in campaigning for the incumbent camp ensured that popular music application by other candidates at the 2011 presidential election was marginal. Mr Omeri's submission nevertheless emphasizes the fluidity of political praise (electoral campaign) music co-optation. Every popular musician who can appeal – irrespective of his or her primary genre persuasion – had been co-opted by an incumbent machine determined to secure electoral victory.

It is necessary to note that the confusion over which genres are traditionally pro-praise or pro-protest need not arise as the popular music scene in Nigeria since *sailed the ship* of genres as contested spaces. Genre-specificities began to matter less since the democratization of the country's political organs in 1999. As such, it has become near impossible to completely categorise any one popular musician under one genre of popular music. Market survival considerations together with the democratic dividend of the freedom of expression ensured that popular musicians began to *spread their tentacles* in order to explore a broad range of genres. This meant that albums became more balanced and catered for "important" needs as a 'wedding song', a 'party song', a 'love song', a 'street song' etc. In essence, most popular musicians found the need to also record one 'protest political song' or one 'praise political song' whether or not such musicians had (pronounced) political persuasions. In several instances, these combination of song types belonged in one single album.

The co-optation, therefore, of various popular musicians to record campaign jingles paying little attention to neither these musicians' previous political capital nor the need to assemble a somewhat equivalent group become comprehensible. After all, no one musician

or group of musicians had a semblance of what could be termed a monopoly of the political. Afro-beat, which is a genre popularized and given a radical colouration by the late Fela Anikulapo-Kuti has in recent years become an all-comers genre such that it has lost any radical recognisability except where Fela's sons Femi and Seun are playing. Yet, the genre survives and has in fact grown by leaps and bounds due to the attractiveness of Afro-beat's instrumental deployment and arrangement. Lyrically, however, Afro-beat has left much to be desired in the hands of the non-protesting, possibly love-, sex-, money-, or praise-singing artist in contemporary Nigeria.

As it is with Afro-beat, so it is with other traditional genres: malleable and accommodative of any sonorous combination of lyrics. Dekunle Fuji, for example, who recorded and performed the Goodluck Jonathan campaign jingle in Yoruba, is traditionally identified or at least referred to as a gospel fuji musician; that is, a musician gifted in the fuji tradition who records celestial praise songs. His electoral jingle for the Goodluck Jonathan campaign in Yoruba thus presents a complex case of musical classification. Being that 'gospel fuji' is 'celestial praise fuji', could the jingle then be termed 'terrestrial praise fuji'? Perhaps; but that would be a 'terrestrial praise fuji mono-moment' in a career dominated by 'celestial praise fuji' material. However, by virtue of his electoral jingle mono-moment, Dekunle Fuji has shed any tag of being a 'political music neophyte'. After all, "many performers see their ability to perform as a gift from a higher power. But this does not mean that this art is used purely for religious purpose" (Kaschula, 1999: 70). Even so "there is no doubt that religion continues to have a profound influence on African oral poetry and how it functions" (*ibid*.)

8.3.1 Terrestrial praise political music as a site of economic resistance

The foregoing section has demonstrated that unlike the traditional griot, whose role as memory of society is culturally assigned, the terrestrial praise political singer becomes by virtue of his popularity and following. Fofana (2011) captures the disparity succinctly when he offers that "the historical relationship of "natural" or blood connection among caste, family pride, and profession has been dismantled, and now, being a griot is a way of making money…Any person can fall into this category, regardless of caste…being a griot is no longer the result of heredity; it is behavioural, and the behaviour is dictated by the socio-economic conditions of the individual. In other words, being a griot is a sort of last resort for those who have no alternative, no answer to the financial demands of daily life. It is also for those who opt for the "easier" way of making a living" (*ibid*.).

Femi Kuti[10] speaks to the inducement culture that has come to characterize political endorsement and support in Nigeria and reinforces the proposition that terrestrial praise political music has a competitive advantage over other popular music forms in Nigeria; when he said that "The music industry in Nigeria is such that you can't make money selling your albums. The artist must make money singing politicians' praises. I won't be one to criticise young boys and girls who have to survive. If they have to survive this way instead of being criminals, I will support them (Hip TV Interview, 2011). Drawing from Kuti, it becomes arguable that the state is steadily appropriating popular music and stripping it of its independence owing of the genre's inherent perks.

[10] Femi Kuti disclosed in the same interview that he received an invitation for Abacha's two million man march which he declined to honour owing to his father's incarceration at the time. Equivocations about Kuti's position were clarified when he politely refused to perform during Babatunde Fashola's gubernatorial re-election bid in Lagos in 2011

In spite of public pronouncements such as Kuti's above, blatant and bitter denials have continued to characterize most interview sessions of popular artists once questions or insinuations of remuneration from politicians are alluded to. In a particular celebrated case, D'banj, the prime chorister (wrote the campaign jingle in Pidgin English) for the Goodluck Jonathan 2011 presidential campaign, offered that "…In terms of money, I think people can say anything. Understand? But we all know that the President cannot even give me money. It is not okay for that kind of thing to happen…The President has not given me any money before and I did not collect any money from the President" (Sahara TV Interview, 2012). Strikingly, these artists are usually very comfortable flaunting whatever largesse they earn from commercial interests they endorse. Not so in the political theatre. But why is this so?

Olaolu Olawale Ladeinde is a 28 year-old Lagos-based electro-pop-trance-house singer, songwriter, Twitter personality, and actor. Ladeinde's strong opinions have triggered the fan base he commands on Twitter and other social networks. His singles 'Cosmic Love' (2012) and 'Don't kill the disco' (2013) have enjoyed positive reception from the youth in Nigeria amongst whom his popularity soars. Apart from political leaders, Ladeinde's 5000-strong Twitter followership represents the highest for anyone in the north-east of the country where he studied for a degree in Business at AUN, Yola (AUN, 2014). In approaching a deeper understanding of the terrestrial praise political music culture in Nigeria, I engaged Ladeinde who is yet to be approached to do electoral jingles or any sort of political praise song. His suitability is all the more apparent as he admits that he would record electoral praise music at the right price. The need to be politically correct and the commercial imperative to offer 'public relations' savvy' responses to sensitive questions have become the hallmarks of interviews (performances) in recent times. Ladeinde agreed to grant me an interview wherein he would proffer uncoated responses – as against a performance - to my

inquiries without the need for secrecy which is characteristic of the culture in certain regards. I began by asking Ladeinde (OL) what he thought of the patronage of popular musicians by politicians and how this patronage resulted in advantages for popular musicians. His response is transcribed below:

OL: Singing politicians' praises offers an access to favours, not just for the now but also for the future. Whereas if I were to release an album now in my traditional genre; its success would have to follow a process. However if I were to do a praise song or praise album, I would receive a cheque even before its release in most cases. There's also a sense of being involved. Sort of like: I'm part of the system. I mean if I'm singing supporting the President, then I'm not a small boy anymore. It can be very empowering for a musician that you use your music to make things happen. It gives a musician a sense of authority that you are a part of the process of the people's reality. As a musician, you want to use your music to make things happen. An artist that does this is seen as a worthy enough figure. I mean even the President sees that. So it does increase the artist's worth.

I followed by asking how he could decipher in order not to support candidates who don't eventually 'make things happen'. To this, he responded that since a musician has agreed to it in the first place means that such a musician is open to making change. So whether or not the candidate wins is immaterial. Just the idea is enough. Ladeinde's illumination of the subject assumes clarity on reflection of some excerpts from my interview with Mr Omeri who offered some experiential comprehension of the campaign/allegiance psyche of the Nigerian popular musician thus:

Zaaki Azzay went and performed at the launch of Babangida's declaration. It wasn't too good because having endorsed [President Jonathan], even if it was not an endorsement; the

fact that he sang here, we felt he should remain here. But he said: well, he was being paid so he went to collect his money and came back. As far as he was concerned, he saw it as entertainment; providing interlude for that person. But immediately he finished, he came back and continued working with us… (Omeri, 2012)

Zaaki Azzay is a Nigerian popular musician who recorded and performed the Hausa electoral song for the Goodluck Jonathan campaign team at the 2011 presidential election. He hosts an interview show called 'True Nigerian' aired on several Nigerian television stations. The foregoing submission by Mr Omeri underscores the case for the average popular musician in Nigeria for whom relevance is the unmistakable motivation. It does not matter that one candidate got a musician to endorse him; such musician is under no obligation whatsoever that prevents him from endorsing another politician. Survival is the name of the game, and it is simply and plainly just business. As it is with corporate endorsements where a celebrity endorser need not be passionate about a product he/she endorses, political performances by popular musicians do not imply that the entertainers are sympathetic to the political causes for which they perform.

8.3.2 Contrasting terrestrial praise political music with celebrity brand endorsements

An interesting scenario unravels on contrasting political performances with what obtains in corporate endorsements wherein contractual ties check 'celebrity-cross-carpeting'[11]; but not without criticism: "Artistes must be free to attend other shows of competing brands as long as they don't endorse the sponsoring brand nor endorse their own brand in such shows. Harmony is needed. The entertainment industry should not be cannon fodder for

[11] 'Cross-carpeting is a term popularized by Nigeria's political lexicon. It refers to inter- (and intra-) party switching of allegiances of politicians whose primary ideology resides with whichever party seems likeliest to procure him office and power.

the corporate wars" (Novia, 2014). The climax of the foregoing is the realization that the political industry in Nigeria has since attained the much needed harmony which the entertainment industry still covets. It is worth pondering how the behaviour of politicians (e.g. as regards cross-carpeting) influences the behaviour of popular musicians and indeed the behaviour of the entire citizenry.

On the music industry playing (or not playing) 'cannon fodder for political wars', I asked Ladeinde's understanding of how political patronage intersects with commercial patronage. To this, he responded:

OL: I think it is leading. I think that political patronage leads to commercial patronage because corporate bodies like banks have more faith or confidence in you because you've represented a particular government or a particular cause at some point in time. So, I think they intersect in the way that the companies feel that okay…first of all, that you're open to the idea of even doing it, of being political, being a political musician – that's number one. And number two, you've done it before in that if a country, or if a politician, or if a party has faith in you; it implies that perhaps there is something special in you that they could also get advantage from. But first of all it shows that you are open to support a cause as a musician.

[…] D'banj is a perfect example. He supported Goodluck Jonathan and has since enjoyed a lot of other endorsements and other sorts of corporate backing. He got a lot of commercial patronage after he campaigned for the president which is kind of proof that he is a worthy figure who can be trusted to carry out a cause, and he also has the influence to carry people along and to make them believe in something.

Musicians like Ebenezer Obey, Sunny Ade, and recently Wizkid have included names of political figures and big people in songs without political causes. In such instances, musicians

could just do it to have some relationship with figures that are usually very rich. It is not necessarily political.

With such a telling response, I asked Ladeinde what he thought of the relationship between political praise and advertising. To this, he responded swiftly: "Political praise is advertising". Unsatisfied, I retorted by asking for whom political praise constituted advertising.

OL: It is advertising for both parties. It is advertising for the political candidates, and it is advertising for the praise-singers as it opens them to new audiences. For instance, if an artist was not known by a listener who likes the political candidate being praised, such listener may begin to listen to this artist who supports the listener's preferred candidate. New audiences may then discover that 'oh, this guy is not bad after all'.

Late capitalism suggests that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate local corporations from local politics and regulations. I thought it necessary to sustain the discussion with a sense of this reality and chose to gauge Ladeinde's perspectives on endorsement synergy for celebrities. I asked him if he thought that politics has a link with the corporate world such that could influence a synergy of both constituencies' clients. He responded that it did, adding that endorsements of any kind put the endorsing artist on the map so that other people notice them beyond what was the case before. Having discussed the issue of synergy within the practices of commercial brand endorsements and political praise music, it followed that the nature of endorser for these two practices be assessed. Here is how Ladeinde responded to my question on what he reckoned political and commercial interests look out for in artists to support their causes:

OL: I think the politicians look at influence, how big the artist is, how much he has been able to influence people, how much they talk about him, how many hits he has been able to churn out over the years, and also how much people are into him. Because don't forget that the more people that he influences and that are into that artist transfer to that government if the artist were to endorse it. So it's all about influence, it's all about power, it's all about how big the artist is, it's all about how much influence he has.

Ladeinde however added that there is a considerable difference between what political interests look out for and what appeals to commerce. He reasons that what commercial interests look out for depends on the particular characteristic of corporate organisations. He makes this contrast by noting that a political party trying to get an artist for endorsement doesn't care about what the artist looks like, the political party cares about whom that artist is, how much influence the artist has; whereas some corporations for example a cosmetic company or an energy drink producer would look at physical appearance as well.

8.3.3 The imperatives and implicit morality of terrestrial praise political music

Having explored the dynamics involved in the political patronage and in the corporate patronage of celebrities so candidly, I figured it was appropriate to hear from Ladeinde on the subject of morals:

Interviewer: You have commented on physicality, how about morality for example; how does this tally with political cum commercial patronage?

OL: That plays a part in the sense that the artist has to be presentable in the relevant sense, particularly if the artist portrays that which the government is looking for: sort of like a model citizen; and no obvious criminal record. But truth is a lot of big artists these days do a

lot of things that people don't find to be morally upright. In the process of trying to express yourself and create your art, artists are prone to overlap moral boundaries.

It follows that the definition of morality may have become somewhat elastic, but within the Nigerian cultural context, confines still do exist. I cited the example of D'banj who is the koko master and basically stands for the idea of indiscriminate sexual activity. There's also the Rivers State governor Rotimi Amaechi who contracted the services of Kelly Hansome who is renowned for his big single 'Maga don pay'[12]. These two tie nicely with traditional immorality in the Nigerian sense. As such, I asked my interviewee what he felt this says of our politics: is it a clear case of our politics lacking morals hence naturally get the services of artists who represent immorality in our own terms? Did he think it has any bearing on the fact that the government or politicians feel okay going after the services of such artists, or not:

OL: Politicians want someone that is influential to the public. They want an artist that people actually like. So a lot of artists that get these large followings are not very moral; which is why people like them sometimes. People can relate to and like the idea of 'maga don pay' or the idea of 'yahoo yahoo boy'…So there's always that thing where politicians want someone who can get the attention of the people but then again they might have represented some immorality in their art. So I would say that it's not a direct commentary on what the character of the government is. They might just want that person that has a large attention of people.

[12] 'Maga don pay' is a popular Nigerian phrase that references advanced fee fraud and cybercrime particularly of an international scale. Kelly Hansome's 2008 hit celebrates the practice for the lifestyle it assures its practitioners who are 'Yahoo-yahoo boys'. 'Yahoozee' (2007) is a hit by Olu Maintain with a similar message. An antithetical single 'Maga No Need Pay' (2010) was recorded to discourage youths from the practice by a collaboration of artists comprising Banky W, Bez, Cobhams Asuquo, MI, Modele, Omawumi, Rooftop MCs, and Wordsmith.

Also, in the event that the government really plans to do something good or something grand and wants to win to do it, they might use the artist that is not so morally upright but can get the people they need to win to make the change.

There is a *school of thought* that holds strongly to the view that people deserve the leaders they get. This idea implies essentially that leaders and mentors – be political-, academic-, social-, or indeed musical-; are a reflection of the people they lead, or a representation of the people for whom they serve as mentors. I adjusted my inquiry as such:

Interviewer: So considering that those who woo the masses are these people who basically stand for some form of immorality, what does that say of the masses? Indeed we have every right as a people to be moved by gospel musicians – nothing stops that from happening. How come then we are moved by 'yahoo yahoo' musicians and koko[13] musicians such that politicians are forced to go to these people who have enormous influence on the huge populations?

OL: I think that that is just how people are. People listen to music and a lot of people stand for fun, a lot of people stand for sex, a lot of people stand for drugs. I think it's the state of mind of the people and I think people generally just like to have fun and they like some mischief. Artists capitalise on that. If you check anywhere else in the world, you would see that secular artists sell more, and have bigger following, and even make more money than gospel artists. So there's this need for freedom and to express yourself and just be loose and not tied. I think that a lot of what is going on in the country is that majority of people want

[13] 'Koko' is a term made popular by D'banj following his debut album in 2004. Although the artist has defined the 'koko' as "anything people derive pleasure from" (BET Interview, 2011), an accompanying koko pose ensures that the 'koko' is generally decoded as having an objectifying sexual connotation.

to have fun, they want to listen to people smoking weed or people engaging in sexual activities because it's just some sort of freedom.

Also, that they are doing these things themselves and they can relate. A lot of people are curious about the issue of sex, people growing up hear the song and are inspired by it; there's a lot of parties where people smoke weed and all that stuff. And there are people also doing 'yahoo yahoo' who can relate to this guy talking about it. Or maybe they are even giving him some incentive in some way or helping support him. All these things are tied to the audiences' state of mind.

Interviewer: How do you mean when you say that 'maybe they are giving him some form of incentive'?

OL: For example we know that musicians would mention some names in their works or would talk about the idea of 'yahoo yahoo' and stuff because they have gotten some form of support for that video, or for that song, or for any monetary support to be who they are, and to be where they are. Sometimes it's a form of appreciation to praise the people that have supported them in order to inflate their ego.

Interviewer: How do you think these audiences who want to have fun, who do these things themselves, are able to internalise the works of these same artists – who they love because of their fun music – when these artists begin to convey electoral messages?

OL: These artists are idols of these people. They are people that they look up to. If you are trying to do 'yahoo yahoo' and you listen to 'Maga don pay' by Kelly Hansome; he's your hero, or you want to be like him, or he's saying something that you relate with. If he endorses a political party, you might be sort of influenced to join that party as well because

although the artist stands for progress and change, he is also like you: fun loving and he also wants to make a change and cares about this. So I think it just gears them towards voting or supporting the political party that the artist supports.

Interviewer: Would you say that everything you have described now is just a means to an end for the politicians?

OL: Yes, I think that the goal is to win. Who is going to help you get there? It's the people that have the most following, people that have the most influence on a very large audience. So you don't particularly care about what they've said or what they've done in the past. What you care about is winning. And these people have the audience to help you achieve your goal. At the end of the day, I do think it's about the goal and they tend to overlook these other things.

Interviewer: Would you agree that terrestrial praise music has a competitive advantage over other genres in Nigeria?

OL: Yes, I'd agree in the sense that when an artist endorses a political party or candidate, this artist gets a lot of attention as regards to 'who is this guy?' and 'why is this guy doing that?' You get people to listen to what you have to say whether they like your music or not when you are supporting a particular political party. Whereas when you are just singing for fun, people tend to judge you based on the sound or what you've done before – 'would I like to listen to this person?', 'did I like what he did before?' or stuff like that. Your fans would listen to you as well as people who are not your fans just because they want to get something from what you said or why you said it. Also, musicians generally want their music to get through to a large audience. So I think it has a competitive advantage in the sense

that even people that are not your fans want to find out what you are saying and why…This makes people talk about and buy your work or at least stop and listen to it; whereas they wouldn't have done that otherwise.

[…] So the advantage lies in increased sales, a larger audience – more people get to listen to you – or it can just be that people want to find out why you did it – 'what's in it for you?' That is; the gossip value as well.

Interviewer: How would you say this genre of terrestrial praise music plays out on things like sponsorships and advertising contracts?

OL: There's definitely a relationship here in the sense that you do get a lot of deals from doing that. The key question is 'who are these people [being praised]? So if you're praising someone that is wealthy, you would get the favour of the people that are affiliated: perhaps one of their companies. Indeed these people have various establishments and you might get favours from any of them. Or people that work in affiliates with this person: companies he has invested in or companies that he has some business dealings with would want to endorse you because of that.

8.3.4 The mystery, effects and limitations of terrestrial praise political music

Interviewer: Although the legendary Afro-beat act Femi Kuti has stated that in Nigeria, musicians only make money singing politicians' praises, many musicians have nonetheless insisted that they took no dime from politicians they have supported. How do you react to this?

OL: I don't think I believe them {interjecting with laughter}. And I don't think that they would publicly admit if they collected and how much. That would spark a lot of debate. It's going to

act on their value: 'how much did they collect?', 'Was it a hundred million?', 'It's too expensive', 'It's too cheap' and stuff like that. So firstly, I think that claim could be false.

Secondly, if they are not getting money, they are getting other favours for doing that in some ways that also lead to monetary value. So in one way or the other, I think they are getting something.

Interviewer: Femi Kuti's comment is obviously exaggerated. What he's saying is that musicians make more money singing politicians' praises. Do you agree with that?

OL: Yes, I do. I mean these are people that have looted lots and lots of money to give away, they have a goal that they are trying to achieve, and they will drop almost about anything to achieve it; the goal being to win in order to get power. And these musicians have the key to it.

I sought Ladeinde's knowledge on the effects of terrestrial praise political music: What is the effect of a campaign song on the electorate in Nigeria? The satisfaction derived by the singers in that they are able to use their music for political messages is clear. What isn't as clear is if these works are appreciated as mere interlude, or if they do actually inspire political choices:

Interviewer: Do you really believe that there are people out there who idolise these musicians, who actually go on to cast their votes as a consequence of listening to praise or compelling electoral songs by these musicians?

OL: Yes, I think there are a lot of people that would do that. I very much think so.

Interviewer: Can you please shed light on that: how would that work? How do I get up to go vote for Goodluck Jonathan to be president, or for Raji Fashola to be governor, or for Rotimi Amaechi to be governor, or for Seriake Dickson to be governor; because a musician I idolise is singing that I should go vote for any of these people?

OL: It's because these musicians are their idols, they are people they listen to and love. So there is a part of them that believes that they are doing the right thing, and this is sort of like the right way to go. It still boils down to the influence that they have and that's specifically why the politicians and the political parties are doing that; because they are aware of the influence that these people have. I think that there is a very-very strong connection; people will actually get up to vote because they love D'banj and he is voting for Goodluck.

Interviewer: What do you think is the relationship of this power of music with the power of icons in literature, economics, fashion or other spheres? How does D'banj singing that 'we should vote for Goodluck' tally with say Emeka Anyaoku or Wole Soyinka or a beauty queen or indeed Nollywood acts endorsing a candidate? How would you rate these areas in terms of influencing the electorate vote?

OL: I think that there are other strategies that political parties try to use. Goodluck did not only use [musical] celebrities to win. Endorsement by musicians was just an aspect of his election strategy. I think that he did whatever he did [with D'banj] aimed at young audiences. My mum isn't going to go and vote for Goodluck because D'banj says so. But I probably will or my friend will. So I think his aim was to appeal to younger audiences. There are many young people in Nigeria that could make a lot of difference. And the use of [musical] celebrity and social media was all a strategy to get a lot of young people to vote.

Interviewer: Do you think that there was any component of Goodluck Jonathan's campaign strategy that did not hinge on the authority of icons and celebrities? I mean would you say that he lured any sections of the population on his own steam without using someone else?

OL: There are definitely some things he did without using someone else. Those things I don't know about, but I don't think he was only using people. But I think using people whether it be political icons or celebrities or public figures was a very-very important and essential part of his strategy.

Interviewer: How about the idea of his speeches? Do you think that they were designed to lure certain people? For example, there was the popular line about 'he had to trek to school without sandals but he never despaired'.

OL: Yes, exactly. That could be some other things. He is trying to be relatable, or he is trying to be somewhat charismatic which I think he fails woefully at that. But yes, I think those are other things he is trying to relate.

Interviewer: Do you think the sandal thing got people to vote?

OL: I think so. I think it definitely got people's attention. Because like I said, it made him like relate to other people. So people were like 'oh this person was once like me'. So yes that was another strategy he used in trying to relate with people…

In concluding the 75 minute discussion, I sought further frankness from Ladeinde on the financial motive behind most musicians' decisions to sing the praises of politicians. Particularly, I asked him what this implied for popular musicians' understanding of Nigerian politics

OL: To be honest I don't think they really care as long as they are getting the money. But they have an image to protect, they have to look like they care and understand. If the money wasn't involved a lot of them would not even do it. A lot of them will not say...'Forget about the money I am supporting this candidate because I really believe they can deliver'. It's most times about the cash; a lot will vote for the wrong person if the money is good. They understand what is going on and they know what needs to be done. But they have to eat.

Interviewer: Can this be a sign of some disillusionment with Nigerian politics?

OL: When someone hands you a good pay cheque you are likely to believe them and see some potential. However, some are aware that a candidate is incompetent; they supported that candidate because the money was good. So they are not necessarily disappointed when the performance isn't up to par because they had no expectation. Having said this, it is possible that they collected these funds but also believed that the candidate will perform. After all it is possible for a politician to convince both using incentives and using words.

Interviewer: Okay. Do you think that the musicians are the way they are because they have accepted that Nigeria can only work for the unprincipled and corrupt? Sort of like 'joining in chopping' since you can't beat them?

OL: What we know is the decision they are making right now, we don't know if they would be different if the country was different. And we cannot assume that they are only chopping because they see it as the norm. What of if some are actually as corrupt and greedy as these politicians. It can be argued that they have the 'if you can't beat them join them attitude' and they might. But it's essential that we look at the other side as well, if they are so quick to join them, maybe that's actually who they are.

Music is supposed to be a passion and something they love to do. However, they have discovered that with fame comes influence and they now know how much power they have over their audience. The politicians know it that's why they use them to get acceptance with the public. Before, a lot of them just wanted to be successful as musicians and sell albums. But over time they have discovered they can use their fame for much more than that.

Interviewer: So is music merely another way of making a living?

OL: Yes, it is

8.4 Conclusion

In furtherance of the fostering of some order in an increasingly disorderly system of popular music classification, this chapter has outlined a category of terrestrial praise music to subsume the practices of oral and verbal praise of humans. The political variant, or rather; the variant of these expressions which serve the purpose of politicians and of elective office aspirants constitutes a third of the political music genre. The chapter's opening section engages with the rationale for the term 'terrestrial praise political music'. As the focus of the study is on contemporary Nigeria, the analysis of terrestrial praise political music culture in post-1999 Nigeria is sustained on an interview with a budding Nigerian music artist. Through the ensuing discussion, terrestrial praise political music in contemporary Nigeria is discussed through the analytical lenses of economic resistance, imperatives, implicit morality, mystery, effects, and limitations. It is also contrasted with celebrity brand endorsements.

CHAPTER NINE

A COMPARATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL MUSIC RECEPTION AMONGST THE ELECTORAL AUDIENCES (ELECTORATES) OF LAGOS AND BAYELSA STATES

9.1 Introduction

The run-up to the April 16th 2011 presidential election in Nigeria was characterized by a few firsts; indeed, it was the first time that an ensemble of popular musicians and a core majority of entertainment practitioners had actively campaigned for a presidential candidate at such scale in Fourth Republic Nigeria. More than that, it was the first time a major political party in Nigeria was fielding a 'minority' – one, neither of the Yoruba, Hausa, or Igbo ethnic majorities - as its presidential flag-bearer. This chapter centres on the analyses of audience-based studies in the Nigerian states of Lagos and Bayelsa. The studies were conducted quantitatively between April and September 2012 to measure the effects of the unprecedented musical frenzy on voting patterns at the April 2011 elections. The methodology was characterized by a survey of sampled populations of at least suffrage age within select areas of Lagos and Bayelsa states.[1] The investigation sought to know how well actual voters at the elections took to the accompanying endorsement chants and how these contributed to choice-making at the ballot.

[1] It is essential to note that since the inception of democracy in 1999, Lagos state has been governed by the opposition (Alliance for Democracy: 1999-2006; Action Congress/Action Congress of Nigeria: 2006-2013; and All Progressives Congress: 2013-Date). Bayelsa on the other hand has been a stronghold of the ruling PDP throughout Nigeria's Fourth Republic. At the 2011 elections under review, the PDP's Goodluck Jonathan recorded 504, 811 votes in Bayelsa representing 99.83% of the total votes cast in his home state. In Lagos where voter turnout was a dismal 31.84% (the third lowest in the federation after Ogun and Ondo states, also in the southwest), Jonathan polled 1, 281, 688 votes representing 65.90% of the total votes cast in the state (Nigeria Elections Coalition, 2011).

Lagos is the nation's former capital city; it was not until 1991 when it was replaced by Abuja. In spite of this, Lagos remains Nigeria's melting pot: the heart of commerce and most cosmopolitan city. Bayelsa, on the other hand, is one of the newest created states[2] in the country. It is populated by some two million inhabitants and urbanization is only gradually taking off. Bayelsa is home to Goodluck Jonathan, President, and correspondingly the 'minority' referenced above. Jonathan is not only the first Bayelsan indigene to be President; he is also the first President from the Niger Delta region in south-south Nigeria. Since independence, Nigeria's ethnic majorities have rotated the position of head of government amongst themselves with leaders from the Hausa/Fulani north predominating. Olusegun Obasanjo's combined 11-year stint as Nigeria's leader together with the three-month interim national government of Ernest Shonekan puts the southwest in second. The Igbo of the southeast have had representation on the top job through Nnamdi Azikiwe and Major General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi. The best the minorities of the south-south got was the position of vice: Admirals Augustus Aikhomu and Mike Akhigbe – both 'minorities' from Edo state – were second in command to Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Abdulsalami Abubakar respectively (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Jonathan's emergence therefore as the vice presidential candidate of the ruling PDP at the 2007 general election was no novelty. However, it was ground-breaking to the extent that hitherto, major political parties fielded presidential and vice presidential candidates to reflect the ethnic majorities in Nigeria. Indeed, it was considered *suicidal* to field a 'minority' in a contest where the votes of the ethnic majorities are vital. This sudden recognition of

[2] It is one of the states created by the military regime of General Sani Abacha on 1st October, 1996. Prior to this time, the state was under the administration of Rivers state. The name Bayelsa is an acronym of three former local government areas in Rivers state, Brass (BALGA), Yenagoa (YELGA) and Sagbama (SALGA) - Bayelsa.gov.ng (2014)

'minorities' is clearly a response to the long yearning and years of clamour by the people of the Niger Delta from where over 90% of the nation's subsistence has been drawn from through the decades.

Bayelsa state plays a significant role in the oil producing venture of Nigeria. Crude oil, which is the main drive of the Nigerian economy, was first discovered in Oloibiri in Ogbia local government area of today's Bayelsa state in 1956. The state is responsible for about 30-40% of Nigeria's oil production; making it the largest crude oil reserve in the oil-rich Niger Delta (Bayelsa.gov.ng, 2014). The people of the region have protested the protracted material and infrastructural neglect under successive governments. Due to the activities of onshore and offshore crude oil exploration, the region suffers a myriad of degradation which grossly inhibits agricultural opportunities which are otherwise the stock-in-trade for the locals. These realities have led to campaigns for resource control and or a better derivation formula through incessant negotiations with the federal government over percentages on revenue allocation which currently sits at 13%. Other palliatives by the central government including the establishments of the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 and the Niger Delta Ministry (2008) have done little to address the damage done to the region through exploratory activities of the past half a century. Bayelsa state is bound on the west by Rivers state, on the east and south by the Atlantic Ocean, and on the north by Delta state. A lot of her communities are almost - and in some cases completely - surrounded by water, making these communities inaccessible by road. The emergence of a *son-of-the-soil* in the person of Goodluck Jonathan as presidential flag-bearer of the ruling PDP at the 2011 elections triggered more hope amongst the people than lucid prose can effectively communicate.

9.2 An account of popular music audience studies before now

Keith Negus follows the introduction to *Popular Music in Theory* (1996) with 'Audiences' – a chapter wherein the author's main concern is "with how the audiences for music have been theorized in the years since the development of modern recording technology… [and] with the issue of 'reception' – that is, with how people receive, interpret and use music as a cultural form while engaging in specific social activities" (Negus, 1996: 7-8). Negus opens the chapter by providing details on Theodor Adorno's critique of popular music listening by "recounting a tale about an increasingly 'active' audience" (*ibid*: 8). As such, he sheds light on the before when audiences were made to adopt a 'musical children's language' – wherein different works are listened to as if the symphony were structurally the same as a ballad – because of the deliberate nature of music production to promote distracted audience activity. Referencing a 'soporific effect' which is the resultant of sounds made up of the most familiar harmonies, rhythms and melodies; Negus closes the opening section of the chapter by citing Adorno's disapproval of music which "prevented people from reflecting on their position in the world" (*ibid*: 10). This 'temporary escape' and passive kind of music could not engender audiences to think critically about the world, thus only maintained status quo.

In the subsequent section, Negus's focus is on the 'two types' of music listener that Adorno identified: 'lost in the crowd' – the type of human being easily manipulated by the communality; and 'the obsessive individual' who is alienated from the people around them and not fully integrated into social life. Having reviewed these types and highlighted their similarities with other "despairing and…condescending views of the social activities that accompany the reception of popular music" (*ibid*: 12), Negus turns to theories about the

'active' reception of music that challenged Adorno's listeners' model with a less manipulative construct of popular music consumption. Indeed, in the third section, Negus summarises David Riesman's enduring majority/minority teenage comparative study in Chicago noting the addition it made to the 'passive, undiscriminating and conformist majority' Adorno had decried. Of this active, hip and rebellious minority which Riesman observed; Negus cited their technical discussions about the composition and performance of music, their dislike for the big name bands and big stars, as well as their dismissive disposition to most of the music that could be heard on radio. The preference of this minority group was with 'uncommercialized', unadvertised less-known bands about which they developed a 'private language' which constantly evolved once the majority began to adopt the inherent vocabulary and music.

Negus's fourth section in the composite chapter centres on the 'creative minority' writings of Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel (1964) wherein the duo offers that the 'younger generation' within the social structure of British society comprised "those who had come into their teens during the late 1950s and early 1960s" (Negus, 1996: 13). It was this audience of folk, blues and rock music that constituted a 'subculture' that combined new attitudes to sexual relationships and linked this to various expressions of anti-establishment radicalism. Observing a tension between manipulative commercial interests and self-expressive teenage culture, Hall and Whannel highlighted the contradictory combination of the 'manufactured' and the 'authentic' noting that whereas a spirit of rebellion and independence subsisted with the young minority, it also offered a "lush grazing pasture for commercial providers" (*ibid*.: 14: Hall and Whannel, 1964: 276). This distinction between an active young minority who were creating a 'subculture' and a passive older conservative majority would later be integrated into a more

theoretically developed subcultural theory. Indeed, Negus re-asserts Raymond Williams' overarching conception of culture as 'ordinary' before focusing on the seminal book by Dick Hebdige *Subcultures* (1967). Of the term, he offers: "[In] British subcultural theory, the term [subculture refers] to groupings within subordinate cultures. Like other subcultural theorists (Clarke *et al*., 1981; Hall and Jefferson, 1976; Willis, 1977) Hebdige stressed that there was not simply one 'culture' in Britain. An individual's social experience, and hence their cultural activities, was shaped by a variety of specific factors, such as gender, ethnicity and age, with class being the most significant mediating influence…cultural life could be thought of as composed of a number of 'cultural configurations' which do not hold equal status and in which dominant and subordinate cultures are created along the broad divisions of class" (Negus, 1996: 15).

The foregoing extract finds ample pertinence in the present study of popular political music culture in postcolonial Nigeria in that it somewhat provides appropriate context for the three subgenres of protest political, unity political, and terrestrial praise political music. Certain youth subcultures which emerged in 'response' to subordinate social class positions feathered the nest of the argument that "subcultures developed as a means by which groups in a subordinate class position attempted to contest the dominant system of values. Youth subcultures appeared as an attempt, through ritual and style (rather than conventional political activity), to resolve the problems and dilemmas that were encountered as a result of being in an inferior social class position" (*ibid*, 16). The question thus arises: how much of popular political music – of any of the three subgenres – consumed by relevant subcultures in postcolonial Nigeria are products of ritual and style rather than conventional political activity?

In this regard, Hebdige's distinction between subcultural styles and the styles of the 'mainstream' is principally striking on considering the overlapping structure inherent in the consumption of products from 'subcultural styles' which are also to be found in the 'mainstream'. Put simply, Hebdige's theory – perhaps not surprisingly considering its date of conception - comes across as rather simplistic thus inadequate in explaining postcolonial Nigeria's popular political music realities. For one, examples abound of members of the otherwise dominant and privileged class recording protest political music which appealed to subordinate groups, yet such productions resulted through ritual and style. Fela Anikulapo-Kuti readily comes to mind. So do his sons Femi and Seun. The trio cannot be said to have been members of the subordinate in society at any stage in their lives, yet the dominant class constitute a meagre fraction of their overall audiences.

Indeed, following a three-and-a-half page appraisal of Hebdige's work, Negus soon introduces four key criticisms of the former's subcultural approach to music audiences. These are namely: 'its male bias'; 'its elitism'; 'the issue of the mainstream'; and 'the problem of homology'. On the first, Negus centres his critique on feminist writer Angela McRobbie's observation that subcultural theory had disregarded the cultural activities of girls and women; hence the supposed anti-status quo 'subcultures' were not quite so 'oppositional' in respect of gender. On subculture theory's elitism, Negus initially turns to Gary Clarke who argued that by "setting up a distinction between an active subculture and the undifferentiated passive mainstream, the practices of the vast majority of people who listen to popular music were dismissed" (Negus, 1996: 19). He highlights this by noting that the focus of Hebdige's subcultural theory was restricted – perilously - to the 'art' and aesthetic strategies of the

members of subordinate classes rather than any explicitly political activities where 'opposition' actually resided. Citing Gilroy (1987) and Widgery (1986), Negus observes that many punk artists and their audiences were active within a contradictory array of anarchist and socialist political organizations, and frequently participated in anti-racist struggles that outstripped Hebdige's portrayal of 'symbolic resistance'. One such notable struggle was the Rock Against Racism movement – a political activity not to be read through the elitist and aesthetic lens which Hebdige had offered.

Following a review of Gary Clarke's and Dave Laing's critique of Hebdige's theory which pronounced punk as a subculture rather than a music genre, Negus soon interrogates the issue of an 'undifferentiated mainstream'. A key antagonist of the notion is Sarah Thornton whose case study of British rave clubs in the late 1980s and early 1990s spurred her to argue that audiences are not spontaneous subcultures. Describing these club crowds as pre-sorted and pre-selected, Thornton contends that the activities of young clubbers consist in acquiring various media products and accumulating cultural knowledge and applying these as a form of 'subcultural capital' (an analogous concept drawn from Pierre Bourdieu's economic capital). A contemporary rejoinder to this perspective would be to raise questions as to whether clubs necessarily play a genre of music suited to the class of their 'pre-sorted and pre-selected' audiences all night long. According to Thornton, subcultural capital is used by aspiring youth groups as a way of gaining status and to differentiate their own preferences and activities from those of other social groups. Negus names a number of theorists who have put forth similar arguments offering that "patterns of music purchasing and listening vary from place to place and according to education, social class, race, gender and age" (Negus, 1996: 21). Noting that

these activities involve a more conformist struggle for status seeking and recognition rather than any alternative gestures of opposition or resistance, Negus's readers are inundated on the all too familiar fact that musical preferences amongst audiences are usually no more than superficial markers of distinction adopted as a way of indicating a sense of affiliation to and distance from other individuals, peer groups and classes. In moving from subcultures, Negus cites the concept of the 'music scene' – an alternative perspective developed by Will Straw (1991). In arguing against the idea of a musical 'community' that is stable and rooted in a specific place, Straw describes a scene as "that cultural space in which a range of musical practices coexist, interacting with each other within a variety of processes of differentiation, and according to widely varying trajectories of change and cross-fertilization" (Negus, 1996: Straw, 1991: 273).

Negus's final criticism of Hebdige's subcultural theory meanwhile is to do with the subject of homology – the idea that all of the parts that go to make up a style (e.g. dress, dancing, and music) form a unity that expresses the 'whole way of life' of the subcultural group (Hebdige, 1979; Willis, 1990). Negus is quick to inform that Straw's concept of the scene is a challenge to the notion of homology and to the idea that musical consumption necessarily has a relationship with social location which Hebdige's overall argument hinges on: punk culture emerged as a response to very specific social circumstances. Negus tenders a two-fold deconstruction to the problems posed by Hebdige's theory under the heading 'Homology and the internationalization of subcultural styles' (Negus, 1996: 23-25). Firstly, he highlighted how Hebdige neglected the way that 'texts construct their own appropriate audiences' (*ibid*: Grossman, 192: 41) while he – Hebdige – emphasized how audiences reconstructed punk texts

through clothing, music, and body movements. Describing this as a 'one-sided causal theory of homology', Negus turned to Dave Laing's argument about punk rock: that it was first and foremost a music genre rather than a subculture and that it was not outside a mainstream. Laing would further challenge Hebdige's prescription of the direction of causality in this homology by arguing that the activities of punk fans and performers were shaped by its character as a music genre rather than a subculture. He would add that rather than subcultures spontaneously generating their own sounds and visual conventions, the emergence of a new music genre can create the conditions for subcultural activity. In essence, it is the music that provides the impetus for groupings of people actively to come together and create a style (as with electoral music) in contrast to Hebdige's account of subcultural style which treated the music as a mere component.

In the second stanza of his deconstruction, Negus poses a number of questions regarding punk: "how are we to make sense of the internationalization of this particular way of dressing, dancing and making noise? What does a subcultural style mean as it has moved from its authentic point of origin and been adopted in different parts of the world? What do the sounds and visuals of punk style mean as they are exhibited in the clubs of San Francisco, on the streets of Tokyo or on the beaches of Rio?" (Negus, 1996: 25) In responding to these posers, Negus gazes with the lenses of commerce and mimicry before stating: "…the punk style and way of making music has also been adopted to register similar forms of social disaffiliation and to disrupt dominant conventions in comparable, but more politically charged ways to those described by Hebdige. The sounds and images of punk were transformed and re-appropriated by many musicians and audience members in the Stalinist states of Eastern and Central Europe

during the 1980s. Punk noises and visuals were used to register a sense of distance from and opposition to political repression and to challenge state-promoted culture. Punk styles of music and dress were adopted to register opposition in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the German Democratic Republic. These were often greeted with censorship, physical assault, sanction and detention, (Ryback, 1990) – a historical echo that is not too far away from the actions of local government during the 1970s in Britain which banned particular artists from performing, audiences from meeting, and recording studios from distribution (Savage, 1991; Cloonan, 1993)"

"The sounds, words, and images that have been distributed via the media and music industries can be used in different ways and provide possibilities for a variety of conformist or oppositional activities. But they are not necessarily always going to take on the same form or fit neatly into subcultural categories. There is, then, more than a 'homology' connecting social experience and musical expression" (Negus, 1996: 25). Negus soon proceeds to a review of the theorizing of 'active audiences' opening with Lisa Lewis's study of MTV viewers and the activities of fans at concerts and at various public 'fan events' (1990). Negus informs of how Lewis – through her own work and by drawing together writers for a collection of articles (1992) – has thoroughly challenged the types of listeners identified by Adorno and the focus on hip minorities by subcultural theorists. Suggesting that fans are neither regressive, obsessed, alienated individuals nor a manipulated collective mass; Lewis argued that fans are imaginative, discriminating people who are capable of making a number of fine distinctions and who actively participate in creating the meanings that become associated with popular music. According to Lewis, fans contribute an integral element to how we understand popular music and particular

artists. They create communities with a collective shared sense of identity that is built around their appreciation of particular performers. Important 'reservoirs of knowledge' that contribute directly to the meanings attributed to performers are thus produced in the process (Negus, 1996).

Another theorist whose work can be read as a refutation of Adorno's thesis that the activities of listeners can be explained as manipulated by the recording industry is Iain Chambers (1985, 1994). He argued that record companies, radio stations, and the music press are unable to control the meanings of the texts and technologies that they produce and distribute. Indeed that while the industries might have a direct impact on how music is produced, they are unable to control the ways it is used by audiences. Chambers further observes the 'active transformation' of music by various groups and individuals who appropriate this in expressing individual identities, symbolic resistance, leisure pursuits and forms of collective and democratic musical creativity in everyday life. Negus labels Chambers' work the "complete antithesis of Adorno's model of passive easy listening, individual alienation, and mass manipulation" (Negus, 1996: 27) describing it instead as "a theory about diversity, plurality and the active individual and collective participation in musical practices – a social activity during which the texts and technologies of popular music continually provide opportunities for a wide range of people to participate in aesthetic, political and cultural activity" (*ibid*.). Chambers emphasizes the 'polysemanticism' of popular music wherein many possibilities of meanings are made available at the same time, with audiences' abilities to appropriate these determining the meanings that predominate.

In closing the chapter on 'Audiences' Negus draws on notions from David Morley and Stuart Hall, and posits that: "…being active is not the same as having power and influence. Theories about the active audience tend to evade the issue of how the activities of consumption might be shaped by the industries involved, how musical products and visual styles are made available for 'appropriation' in the first place and how they may limit the opportunities for creative use and interpretation available at any one time" (Negus, 1996: 35). The theories to which Negus referred include those advanced from research by Celia von Feilitzen and Keith Roe in Sweden (1990) – wherein home and domestic contexts of music listening by young people aged between three and 24 years old were studied; Ruth Finnegan in Milton Keynes, England (1989) – wherein the consumption patterns of amateur musicians were found to be central to the way they created their own identities and sounds by imitating and learning from existing recordings. Others are: Sara Cohen in Liverpool, England (1991, 1995) – wherein the concept of 'music circles' is applied in showing how music can be closely connected to personal memories of events and to historical memories of various strands of belonging; Susan D. Crafts, Daniel Cavicchi and Charles Keil in Music in Daily life Project (1993) – where it is shown that "people listen across the spectrum of genre categories, and very few individuals identify themselves as interested only in one kind of music" (*ibid*.: xiii: George Lipsitz, in the foreword); and Jocelyne Guilbault in the Caribbean (1993) – wherein zouk musical meanings are analysed along various geographical, generational, gender and class divisions. Prior to his assertion on page 35, Negus had stated: "The activities associated with 'consumption' and the idea of the audience is by no means straightforward. The practices of musicians are those of both 'consumers' and 'producers'…The audiences for music are composed of more than just

young people…The activity of music audiences does not fit neatly into any theoretical models or commercial music marketing categories…The same musical genre or piece of music may be enjoyed and engaged with in completely different ways" (Negus, 1996: 32).

Karin Barber, meanwhile, in her 'Preliminary notes to audiences in Africa' (1997) draws from Deborah James work ''Music of origin': class, social category and the performers and audience of *kiba*, a South African migrant genre' in arguing that "audiences themselves, by choosing to participate, constitute themselves as members of a collectivity [and] thus be active participants in the emergence of new alignments" (Barber, 1997: 355). She describes *kiba* performances, which are adaptations of an old *Sotho* (oriented and 'white'-oriented people) oral genre, as a central means of signalling alignment with the people of the nation or traditional belief, although these alignments meant different things in different contexts. Barber goes on to show the significance of James' study in how audiences constitute themselves around *kiba* thus affirming the things they have in common with the performers. As a powerful active organising principle in different people's experience, the *kiba* became a focus of patronage from the national elite of South Africa's ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). The key concern for the present study is the realization that James' work is as far as studies into popular music audiences have gone in Africa. The present study is a quantitatively based analysis of electoral audiences in Africa's largest democracy comprising Lagos.

9.3 The Music

The campaign machinery for the presidential election bid of Goodluck Jonathan was immense to the extent that campaign songs were made by popular musicians in the following distribution:

- the Mamuzee twins – campaign song in Ijaw
- Zaaki Azzay – campaign song in Hausa
- Dekunle Fuji – campaign song in Yoruba
- 2Shotz – campaign song in Igbo
- Onyeka Onwenu – campaign song in English
- Nollywood actors and actresses – campaign song in English
- D'banj – campaign song in Pidgin English

The foregoing is not exhaustive as there were several performances by other artists in various dialects. However, the foregoing were significant in the sense that the major ethnic groups were catered for together with the Ijaw – Jonathan's kin and fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria. The official languages of English and Pidgin English were not left out. Due to the national outlook of the thesis, these three electoral songs form the core of this study's musical appraisal. These are 'Run, Goodluck run' (2010) by Onyeka Onwenu; 'I believe in Goodluck' (2010) by Nollywood acts; and 'I go vote for Goodluck' (2010) by D'banj.

The research questionnaire was designed taking into account the instruction that:

…to observe and analyse the composition of audiences is only a first stage. The main issue is what the cultural experience gives to those people...any account of the politics of popular culture must address the way that culture works on those who hear or see it (Street, 2004: 310-11).

9.4 Instrumentation: The Questionnaire

Popular music and elections in Nigeria

This Questionnaire will take you approximately 10 minutes to complete. It is part of an on-going doctoral research at the Centre of West African Studies, University of Birmingham, aimed at determining the influence of popular music and musicians on the outcome of 2011 Presidential Elections in Nigeria.

Please state how much you think music – either sung at rallies or recorded specifically for campaigns and aired on television, radio or over the internet - affected your choice at the election. Responses will be used for research analysis only. Individual answers will not be revealed.

There are no right or wrong answers. Please respond freely according to your thoughts on the subject.

Please place a tick [√] as appropriate:

Section A

1. Age of Respondent: 18-25 [ ] 26-40 [ ] 40-60 [ ] 61 and above [ ]

2. Sex of Respondent: Male [ ] Female [ ]

3. Highest Education Level: Primary School [ ] Secondary School [ ] Bachelor's Degree [ ] Postgraduate Degree [ ] Other Qualifications [ ] Please Specify_____

4. Are you a registered voter: Yes [ ] or No [ ]

5. Did you vote in the 2011 presidential election: Yes [ ] or No [ ]

Section B

(The following questions 6 – 8 relate to the 2011 general elections).

6. In the run-up to the 2011 presidential election, did you watch or attend any of the campaign rallies?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

7. Which of these campaign rallies did you watch or attend during the period?

i. The Goodluck Jonathan declaration ceremony held at the Eagles Square, Abuja:

Yes [ ] No [ ]

ii. The Goodluck/Sambo 'Youth for Transformation Rally' held at the Eagles Square, Abuja:

Yes [ ] No [ ]

iii. The Goodluck Jonathan presidential bid concert held at the MUSON centre, Lagos:

Yes [ ] No [ ]

8. Please indicate as appropriate: I watched or listened to the electoral campaign performances of these musicians and/ or musical group in the course of the 2011 election campaigns:

a. D'banj: Yes [ ] No [ ]

b. Onyeka Onwenu: Yes [ ] No [ ]

c. Nollywood singers: Yes [ ] No [ ]

d. Please list other(s) _____

9. Please tick a √ in the relevant box:

	Yes	No
a. Did you choose your candidate on account of the information from the source in (6), (7) and (8) above?		
b. Do you think that your political opinions are shaped by the campaign rallies you attended or watched?		
c. Do you think that your opinion about party programmes/ideologies or lack of it was shaped by campaign rallies?		
d. Do you think that your opinion about quality of representation (credible representative) might have been shaped by the campaign rallies?		
e. Would you say an issue of significant interest to you was addressed by any musician at the campaign rally and hence influenced your choice of candidate?		

Your time and thoughts are well appreciated.

9.5 The Results' Analysis

> In elections especially, the media do not cover the campaign; they are the campaign. We must ask how, not whether, the media matter (Harrop, 1987: 46).

The design enabled me to investigate the role of the three selected electoral campaign songs in mounting opinion and voter behaviour during the 2011 presidential election. The choice of the design was informed by the nature of the questionnaire's content and the issue being investigated.

The population for the study comprised registered persons of voting age in selected communities within various local government areas of Bayelsa and Lagos states, specifically those who were able to vote at the 2011 presidential election. This includes members of staff and students of the Niger Delta University, Yenagoa Campus and those of the Lagos State University, Ojo Campus. Other locations sampled were private and public establishments – specific addresses cannot be disclosed due to issues of ethics and confidentiality – across both states.

By applying a simple random technique, the research sampled a total of 638 people from these areas. The respondents were made up of males and females, students and workers, as well as young and old adults. In order to give equal representation to gender, efforts were made to draw an approximately equal number of male and female respondents from each of the sampling sites.

Data Analysis, Interpretation and Discussion of Findings:

A frequency-count of responses was done in order to find answers to the research questions. These questions and findings are presented one after the other coupled by the necessary interpretations. The data are presented in tabular form for clarity and to highlight relationships.

Of the 638 questionnaires administered, a total of 402 questionnaires were returned and found useful for analysis. The figure of 402 eliminates respondents who did not register to vote and those who registered but could not vote. A breakdown of the distribution of the voter-respondents across gender in the two states assessed follows:

States	**Total number of respondents (402)**	**Male (215)**	**Female (187)**
Bayelsa	188	114	74
Lagos	214	101	113

Table 9.5.1: Distribution of respondents who voted – location and gender

Research Question: 'To what extent do the voters believe that their political opinions are shaped by relevant campaign songs?'

In order to answer the above question, the responses to questions 7, 8, and 9 of the questionnaire need to be analysed. The questions dealt with listenership of the various election jingles and the influences of these on respondents' voting choices. The results of the analysis follow:

Campaign songs/rallies	**Yes**	**No**	**% Yes**	**% No**
The Declaration Ceremony, Abuja	176	12	93.6	6.4
The 'Youth for Transformation Rally', Abuja	135	53	71.8	28.2
Presidential Bid Concert, Lagos	139	49	73.9	26.1
D'banj electoral performance	169	19	89.9	10.1
Onyeka Onwenu electoral performance	144	44	76.6	23.4
When Nollywood Sang	180	8	95.7	4.3

Table 9.5.2: Distribution of voting respondents who listened to campaign songs and attended/watched rallies (Bayelsa)

Campaign songs/rallies	Yes	No	% Yes	% No
The Declaration Ceremony, Abuja	186	28	86.9	13.1
The 'Youth for Transformation Rally', Abuja	112	102	52.3	47.7
Presidential Bid Concert, Lagos	140	74	65.4	34.6
D'banj electoral performance	189	25	88.3	11.7
Onyeka Onwenu electoral performance	157	57	73.4	26.6
When Nollywood Sang	163	51	76.2	23.8

Table 9.5.3: Distribution of voting respondents who listened to campaign songs and attended/watched rallies (Lagos)

A breakdown of tables 9.5.2 and 9.5.3 shows that the campaign rallies and accompanying music performances were well followed in both states reviewed. The following notwithstanding, it is particularly instructive that respondents in Bayelsa state recorded an even higher patronage of the electoral activities leading up to the April 2011 presidential elections, and this is evidenced in each of the variables from the questionnaire.

Indeed, a staggering 93.6% of the respondents in Bayelsa said that they either attended or watched the Goodluck Jonathan declaration ceremony held at the Eagles Square, Abuja. The figure of 86.9% obtained in the same inquiry from the respondents in Lagos confirms the huge following the declaration ceremony enjoyed. Similarly, whereas 71.8% of the respondents in Bayelsa ticked yes to either watching or attending the Goodluck/Sambo 'Youth for Transformation Rally' held at the Eagles Square, Abuja; a reduced total of 52.3% expressed the same in Lagos. Perhaps the most striking feature of this comparative appraisal is seen in how 73.9% of the respondents in Bayelsa as against 65.4% of those in Lagos agreed to at least watching the Goodluck Jonathan presidential bid concert held at the MUSON centre, Lagos! While the presidential bid concert was broadcast on national television and other media, recording a higher percentage of respondents who followed in Bayelsa than in Lagos where the concert held presents an interesting issue for questionnaire-data.

It is true that certain events have a tendency to saturate television and radio programming as with newspapers in Nigeria. In such a sports loving country, spectacles such as the Olympics and Commonwealth Games, the World Cup of any cadre to which the nation has sent a participating team to represent her; usually command a sizeable following from citizens who trail the broadcast of the performances on radio and television. In similar vein, political events such as campaign speeches and rallies have in recent time caught the attention of the core of the Nigerian people. This increased interest explains why non-partisan interests ensure that events such as political debates are broadcast on national television and radio. Add to this the sponsored broadcast of the events by different political parties, and the political saturation of the media in election seasons in Nigeria becomes comprehensible. That a segment of the

population may not own television and radio sets deviates only negligibly from the followership of these events owing to the active interest of viewing/listening centres which typically double as eateries and pubs.

On question 8 which pertains to watching or listening to specific campaign performances by musicians in the run up to the 2011 presidential election, respondents in Bayelsa indicated 89.9%, 76.6% and 95.7% awareness of D'banj's 'I go vote for Goodluck', Onwenu's 'Run Goodluck run' and Nollywood's 'I believe in Goodluck' respectively. The figures from Lagos on the same performances showed 88.3%, 73.4% and 76.2% as shown in table 9.5.3.

Further responses to the research question can be read in table 9.5.4:

Relevant items (Question 9 a-e of the study questionnaire)	**Responses**		
	Yes	No	% Yes
Did you choose your candidate on account of the information from the source in (7) and (8) above?	162	26	86.2
Do you think that your political opinions are shaped by the campaign rallies you attended or watched?	128	60	68.1
Do you think that your opinion about party programmes/ideologies or lack of it was shaped by campaign rallies?	136	52	72.3
Do you think that your opinion about quality of representation (credible representative) might have been shaped by the campaign rallies?	93	95	49.5
Would you say an issue of significant interest to you was addressed by any musician at the campaign rally and hence influenced your choice of candidate?	163	25	86.7

Table 9.5.4: The influence of campaign music/rallies on voting choices (Bayelsa)

It is needless to rehash the results of the questionnaire analysis for purposes of presentation here as table 9.5.4 shows that of the total 188 respondents assessed by the study in Bayelsa, 72.6% (the average of the five figures from the a-e variables of question 9) stated that they had made voting choices based on campaign rallies and music. This is all the more blatant on considering that the average of the same variables from respondents in Lagos resulted in approximately 29%!

However, the population of voters in both states suggests that the scale of the survey is barely representative. As such, proffering explanations to the trend of results from the questionnaire analysis requires the focus to change to the 'Bayelsan' identity of Goodluck Jonathan. How is a shared identity expressed by Bayelsans, and how dispassionate are Lagosians in responding to questions about a non-Lagosian?

Manuel Castells in the inaugural volume of *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture* offers to illuminate the idea of identity's influences:

> Identity has been at the roots of meaning since the dawn of human society. It is becoming the main, and sometimes the only, source of meaning in a historical period characterized by widespread destructuring of organizations, delegitimation of institutions, fading away of major social movements; and ephemeral cultural expressions. People increasingly organize their meaning not around what they do but on the basis of what they are, or believe they are (Castells, 2002: 3).

The anomalies deduced from the data analysis of Bayelsa and Lagos states, thus have to be understood in line with the role that identity plays. The presidential bid concert held in Lagos yet followed by a higher percentage of respondents in Bayelsa than in Lagos offers a basis for

arguing that the identity of respondents surely effects on the nature of responses on matters to do with like or unlike identities:

> In a consumer society, all [information] have cultural as well as functional values...In order to be popular, then, cultural commodities have to meet quite contradictory needs…If a particular commodity is to be made part of popular culture, it must offer opportunities for resisting or evasive uses or readings, and these opportunities must be accepted (Fiske, 2000: 283, 287).

Indeed, the cultural commodity as represented by the popular campaign music component of the 2011 presidential bid of a Bayelsan must be accepted as offering opportunities for resisting or evasive uses or readings by audiences of Bayelsan and Lagosian identities.

Invariably yet;

> I was aware of the fact that identity is an invention from the very beginning...Identity is formed at the unstable point where the 'unspeakable' stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of a culture...I believe it is an immensely important gain when one recognizes that all identity is constructed across difference and begins to live with the politics of difference...Potentially, discourse is endless: the infinite semiosis of meaning (Hall, 1996: 115-7).

On considering that "the average man from northern Nigeria has had no concrete material benefit to show for the period his kinsmen have been in charge of governance in Nigeria at the central level" (RPfinal, 2012), it is evident that the Bayelsan respondents of this study and their ilk do not necessarily expect to fare better than their northern compatriots regarding rewards-through-a-kinsman-in-power. The sway of affection and emotion towards legitimizing a kinsman by the notion of "I voted for Goodluck, and not the PDP" (several RPs, 2012-13), and

effectively the findings of the study are therefore borne out of a communal sense of shared identity (heritage, stories etc.) with the Goodluck candidature as at the time of campaigns and voting, and now for the Goodluck presidency. The Bayelsan respondents of this study have not overwhelmingly voted 'yes' out of an expectation that the Goodluck presidency will necessarily improve theirs and the people's lot. They have done so on the basis of solidarity for the kinsman at the top.[3] The fascination behind the man's name, his actual good luck and fortune in the terrain of politics also constitute discursive areas with which to theorise the continued appeal of the Goodluck personality.

Duncan Mighty's proxy-campaign hit single 'Good Luck Jonathan' (2010) – which averaged the highest frequency in respondents' responses to Question 8d - sums up the state with which most Nigerians of South-South extraction and sympathies took to the idea of the possibility that a 'minority' was to be elected President of Nigeria. 'Good Luck Jonathan' is the twelfth track of the 2010 album *Legacy* described as 'the best Nigerian album of 2010' by several listeners. Indeed, Mighty began the hit by uttering: "*This is miracle; In fact it's wonderful*..." (Mighty, 2010)

He continues by asserting that Goodluck Jonathan's emergence meant that Nigeria had attained stability, adding "I am proud to be Niger Delta" through a chorus signifying that a non-majority and a Niger Deltan for that matter as President ensured national equity. He continues after lavishly greeting President Jonathan, his "*beautiful wife and all your children*" with a call on legislators to enact laws for "equal rights" as to how Nigeria is governed. What is sauce for the Yoruba, the Igbo and the Hausa majority ethnic groups should be sauce for the Ijaw and

[3] See section on Results' Indication next.

other minority ethnic groups. This way, a better Nigeria will emerge wherein the people come together and live together. It is noteworthy that at the time of writing the song, Goodluck Jonathan was at the difficult point of pushing his candidature through the PDP channel which had the office zoned to the North. It is therefore easy to understand Mighty's negotiations on why the notion of 'equal rights' had to supersede any existing zoning arrangement.

Mighty does not shy away from highlighting some pertinent sentiments behind having a Niger Deltan as President owing to the resources the region possesses. In addition to crude oil, he lists water, rubber, fish, peace, city, and offshore! Severally, he queries 'Ogini?' which is Igbo and translates as 'what else, what is it?' In essence, Mighty brags on behalf of the Niger Delta 'nation' insisting that the region was not merely a major part of the country's economic prosperity over the years, but also *had it all*.

Mighty soon orders: "*I say everybody, demonstrate…We have to celebrate…If you like, make you pop champagne or rose*…" In doing the chorus following the second verse meanwhile, Mighty is heard in deep emotion chanting "*I am so proud*" (2ce) before reeling out – in verse three - the names of State Governors mainly from the Niger Delta who had announced their backing of President Jonathan for victory at the April 2011 polls. He began by mentioning the goodwill message from Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers State. He follows with Emmanuel Uduaghan of Delta, Adams Oshiomole of Edo, Godswill Akpabio of Akwa Ibom, Liyel Imoke of Cross River, Babatunde Fashola of Lagos, and Olusegun Mimiko of Ondo State.

Considering the interesting link between the Goodluck Jonathan story and the equation of this possibility with what it means to be Niger Deltan since the Cinderella emergence of Jonathan on the political milieu in Nigeria, it is clear that the issue of 'identity' was central to

votes cast just as it was to the questionnaires completed. The Goodluck identity was – and continues to be - a definite rallying point in the Niger Delta, perhaps nowhere better pronounced than in his home state of Bayelsa.

9.6 Results' Indication

> [Popular music] may make little difference to the way [people] vote, but votes make little difference to the way politicians behave (Street, 1986: 3)

Pius Adesanmi in the essay *2015: I Endorse You Spectocrat* (2013) posits that in political discourse, Nigeria ranks as the world's largest spectocracy. By 'spectocrat' and 'spectocracy', Adesanmi refers to the scenario wherein the validity and legitimacy of the country's political process do not inhere in the voters' choices. He argues that rather than an electorate, Nigeria is home to a 'spectocrate' where those who should constitute the former have no say whatsoever in who contests and wins elections in the country. By and large, ethnic and religious politicking is extensively employed in exploiting the sentiments of the population towards determining those who run for a position on the various party platforms. The ultimate contests – council, gubernatorial, senatorial and presidential elections - are barely exercises decided by the people as they played no parts in the emergence of the candidates in the first instance. With such spectatorship credential of an electorate, it is little wonder the choices before voters at elections in Nigeria are reduced to 'voting candidates of my ethnic group', 'voting candidates of my religious persuasion', and as the Bayelsa-Lagos survey has shown, 'justifying the methods of emergence of my kinsman'!

Meanwhile, Joseph (2013) observes that "…state offices are…appropriated by officeholders, who use them to generate material benefits for themselves and their

constituents and kin groups…" and cites the inherent feature of "allocations patterned by ethnically-delineated patron-client networks" (Lewis, 1996: 80). He continues: "Babangida and Abacha carried the personalizing of supreme power…to an extreme level using the control over, and selective distribution of, petroleum-derived resources. Yet, under them, and at all levels of the federation, the prebendal use of offices, and the ethno-regional clientelism that sustain it, persisted […] As the once excluded minorities of the oil-producing states of the Nigerian Delta and contiguous areas corral central positions in the federal government, contemporary descriptions of the political economy echo what I wrote three decades ago: "The pervasive normative expectations…that the struggle for a share of public goods will be conducted and assessed along ethnic and other sectional lines…"" (Joseph, 2013) Joseph proceeds to an appraisal of the essay '*Meet the New Boss. Same as the Old Boss?*' by Nicolas van de Walle wherein the author demonstrates how a leader forges alliances among the political elite by the use of 'prebendally' acquired offices for "the mobilizing of ethnic constituencies" and how ethno-clientelistic systems encouraged citizens "to vote for members of their own ethnic group…"

While the accuracy of the foregoing submissions is not in doubt, it is necessary to re-examine the appropriation of 'ethnicity' within prebendal discourses. Indeed, the long years of neglect and marginalization of the Niger Delta could understandably weigh on the nature of desperation for the nation's top job by people from the region. The unprecedented approaches of the Jonathan presidential campaign illustrate this. However, a deeper and proper grasp of the ethnic/kin dynamics as far as material distribution goes is essential. Beyond perspectives nurtured from personal observation, various respondents including RPfinal - who remarked that

"the average man from northern Nigeria has had no concrete material benefit to show for the period his kinsmen have been in charge of governance in Nigeria at the central level" - would differ markedly from the overstated role of ethnicity in Joseph's prebendal texts. Not only is the idea that an ethnic/religious divide obtains in Nigeria (an impression actively sold by the Nigerian elite) false, the impression equally blurs the observation of the existence of a well-oiled elite-masses class divide. The long years of psychological battering suffered by the people of the Niger Delta may have gotten most carried away by the possibility of a President from the region such that a mirage of personal and communal Eldorado materialized. The truth however is that such has never been the trend in Nigeria.

Several tales abide on the many Presidents from the north who in spite of them and their personal wealth retire to villages ravaged by poverty. Olusegun Obasanjo, the President from the southwest, is perpetually scolded for not managing to construct the road leading to his retirement home. A similar narrative abounds with lesser public office holders across the nation. Where then lays the ethno-jingoism of public office as is commonly portrayed? It certainly comes nowhere close to what obtains amongst members of the elite class. Indeed, cronies of public office holders usually have a lot of material derivations to point to, including of course support to attain public office themselves. It is a fact of statistics that the gap between the rich and the poor has continually widened through post-independence Nigeria. If the prebendal nature of Nigeria's leaders over this period were as ethnically driven as claimed, perhaps there might have been at least one ethnic group that is tangibly better off than others.

> I don't want a President from my village. I want a President who will develop my village […] A president from my village who has no agenda for development will cripple all of us here and that is what has happened to the North (Labaran Maku, Nigeria's Information Minister, *The Nigerian Voice*, 2010).

Whereas the excerpt above conveys the markings of campaign rhetoric, it nonetheless deconstructs the ethnic inclinations of prebendal literature in a subtle yet profound manner. Were the pro-ethnicity of Nigerian leaders, as depicted in writings on prebendalism anything to go by, then surely commentaries as these would be written off and might have faded into oblivion by now. However, such positions subsist particularly amongst a critical bloc and continue to catch on owing to the prevalence of class-prebendalism over a much maligned ethnic sort. The intention here is not to proffer solutions to the concept of prebendalism, nor is it to offer palliatives to problems in Nigeria's leadership.

Nonetheless;

> [Ministers] are appointed by the president, but we are described as, not 'ministers of the president', we are described as 'ministers of the Federal Republic' and 'members of the Federal Executive Council'…The president has no choice…on the issue of how many ministers he will appoint, because the constitution makes it mandatory that there must be at least one minister from a state…The president may like you, and think you should be his…minister, but in appointing you he recognizes the fact that you are from a [particular] state (Ojo Madwekwe, Nigeria's High Commissioner to Canada, speaking in 2010 as Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs; *Sahara Reporters*, 2010)

The foregoing barely critiques any positions on ethnic-prebendalism, but it at least draws attention to the fact that in the Nigerian context, if a president were of a prebendal disposition, such president is likely to fulfil that 'obligation' by primarily according his 'class kin' across

ethnic groups from each state. Trickles of what obtains in the constitution regarding executive appointments in government continue to the states and local governments. Indeed, at gubernatorial elections, there is hardly a party candidature where both aspirants for governor and deputy governor hail from one local government area of the state. And such considerations are explored in appointing state government commissioners as well. The well-known formula of 'quota system' has been heavily criticized for placing emphasis on regional representation as against ability. Drawing from these, there is a need to revisit prebendal literature's own emphasis on 'ethnic-' and propose an analysis that is vigilant on the 'class-' front. In this sense, it is worth reflecting on the transformation of Nigeria's spectocrate into a genuine electorate such that class-dominated politics is undone from beneath.

A focus group of postgraduate researchers of Bayelsan origin which I convened reached a consensus on a number of themes on the issue; including:

- *Colonial Legacy*: the colonialists set the notion of ethnic-prebendalism in place in Nigeria by favouring the North on the country's self-governance. This in turn became a culture which other ethnic groups inculcated. As such, Nigeria is a country where citizens are predominantly citizens of their ethnic groups first before they are citizens of Nigeria!

- *Individualization of the commonweal*: Prebendalism involves a complex dynamic wherein the system builds powerful individuals rather than strong institutions. In this thought-process, class-prebendalism occurs in order to maintain a hold on the various ethnic groups whose

masses kowtow to the empowered individuals[4] within their kin. This is a tool of maintaining loyalty and order.

- *The way it is*: It would appear that the average Nigerian enjoys this approach of empowering certain select individuals rather than attempting to build institutions. The catch here is two-pronged: (i) there is a likelihood of direct personal benefit for the average citizen if he/she is related/affiliated to an 'empowered individual' (ii) an attempt (or claim) to build institutions has lost any manner of credibility in the Nigerian scene such that there exists ultra-cynicism on that. Indeed, these attempts or claims are deemed as tools of marginalization employed by other 'empowered individuals' who are not open to patronize one – depending on which side one is.

It is true that sentiments over voting for candidates from one's own ethnic group are strong in Nigeria – as with many other multi-ethnic societies where the presidential system of governance obtains. Prebendal literature as presently constituted, arguably, permits such sentiments. Indeed, it would be incorrect to assert that each of the 504, 811 people – 99.83% of the total votes cast – who voted for Goodluck Jonathan in Bayelsa (a state of several ethnic groups) did so out of a conviction that he would perform well in office. Similarly, it would be incorrect to state that each of these voters did so owing to sentiments to do with being somehow ethnically or regionally affiliated to Jonathan. Therein – beyond the music - lies a morass which future research on political/electoral culture may appropriate.

[4] It is noteworthy that the contracting of select popular musicians across various ethnic groups by the Jonathan Campaign Organization equates nicely with this notion; i.e. the select contracted artists represent 'empowered individuals' at the expense of the commonweal.

9.7 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to fill the gap in research into audiences in Africa. It has provided a contextualisation for the circumstances surrounding the candidature of Goodluck Jonathan for the 2011 presidential election in Nigeria. The chapter's rigor comprised a synopsis of global research into popular music audiences before now wherein several notions from popular music theorists were juxtaposed with the electorates' experiences in Bayelsa and Lagos states. The chapter drew from relevant interviewees particularly the Director of Research and Strategy for the 2011 Goodluck Presidential Campaign Organization. More importantly, the chapter interrogated the results of the survey which showed an overwhelming majority – based on the sample - of the Bayelsan electorate as motivated to vote by music, with a thin equivalent for the Lagos electorate. The chapter conceptualized the results, however flawed, as the machinations of identity and as solidarity for the Bayelsan electorate's kinsman. There was in fact musical evidence to show that for the average Bayelsan voter, what mattered most at the election and subsequently, was the reality of a Bayelsan as President. The Lagos voters, on their part, showed indifference at best towards the 2011 presidential election while the outcome of the 2015 presidential election confirmed the Lagos electorate as somewhat unsentimental; although that may only be proven when a study with an indigene of Lagos as candidate is carried out.

Conclusion

Research into political music culture be it the protest-, unity-, or terrestrial praise- variant; is an under-investigated area in the academy. As such, in this thesis, I have sought to bridge the gap by documenting illustrations of the three subgenres of the political music genre. Indeed, before now, the unity political music subgenre had never been explored through scholarly inquiry of any form. The unity political music subgenre had hitherto been subsumed somewhat with the concepts of praise, propaganda, and governments' patronage. This thesis has apprehended this erroneous and slothful line of thought by delineating a distinctive and comprehensible subgenre of unity political music through a chronicle of singular unity political music creations by several popular musicians. The unity political music subgenre is discussed alongside Karin Barber's theoretical notion of the cultural hybrid.

The thesis successfully encapsulates all the three known subgenres of the political music genre simultaneously. Otherwise useful studies have been understandably preoccupied with this or that particular side of political music culture, sacrificing a more robust assessment as a result. Previous studies have, for the purposes of orderliness and more, restricted their inquiries to one of the three subgenres at a time. This pattern has had its effects by defining research paths for the concerned popular music scholars thereafter. Each of the previously studied subgenres – protest political music and terrestrial praise political music – covers an interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary space expansive enough to accommodate career-long studies. Hence this thesis puts forward a popular music genre while also realizing a comparative assessment of the three subgenres. A critical appraisal of protest political music in postcolonial

Nigeria is undertaken by appropriating Chris Atton's theory of the alternative media which he develops from John Downing's model of radical and alternative media. The thesis highlights the shortcomings of applying the theory of alternative media across contexts, for while the texts of protest political music in Nigeria are clearly oppositional to the extent of assuming the society's alternative discourse; it becomes redundant on considering that the singers of these protest political messages are the very ones writing and performing the mainstream, non-alternative, and regular sounds of contemporary Nigerian society. Specifically, the thesis borrows from a study, similarly centered on Occupy Nigeria, which appraised the practice by mainstream media of aligning with social ('alternative') media machinations at the protests. The opportunism of the alternative popular music reporting at the protests is laid bare in that these musical reporters are the mainstream at any other time. The thesis finds that the Occupy Nigeria protests were at best entrepreneurial ventures for various segments of the protesters, and at worst the results of an over-politicized government. The thesis concludes that both the government and the interest-driven protesters played out their whims at the expense of the Nigerian masses.

Guided by Michel Foucault's and Michael Mann's thoughts on power, the thesis interrogates the prebendal relationships within terrestrial praise political music culture supported by excerpts from an extended interview. The thesis adopts an amalgamation of methods comprising critical discourse, con-textual, and audience analyses. The first bit of the audience analysis draws from a selection of alternative readings from audiences through the thesis. The Occupy Nigeria 2012 protests is assessed as an alternative movement wherein alternative reporting and alternative popular music challenged and arguably usurped the

mainstream owing to the realization of the latter that it had become overwhelmingly fashionable to be in the alternative. The thesis considered the oil-subsidy issue at the heart of the protests and attempted to place the federal government's position over the subsidy implementation in perspective. Electoral music audiences were the subjects of a quantitatively conducted comparative content experiment to test the hypothesis that electoral music constitutes pollution in the Nigerian political space. The ensuing analysis disproved the assumption and evolved to reassess the overriding thrust on ethnicity within the existing literature of prebendalism.

Through the subgenres of political music, I hope that "readers and listeners [are prompted to] make sense of [popular music texts as they now] know, or guess, what kind of text it is, and [that] this shapes…the way they interpret the words" (Barber, 2007: 33). Each of protest political music culture, unity political music culture, and terrestrial praise political music culture covers a vast disciplinary ground. It is indeed difficult to fathom a discipline in the Humanities and Social Sciences, particularly any linked with cultural studies, which would proceed conveniently without a need to explore any of political music's subgenres. The interdisciplinary/trans-disciplinary relevance of this thesis represents an ethos with which this work foregrounds the political music genre of popular music. More importantly, this thesis has, through its analysis of a distinctive and comprehensible political music genre, offered academic discourse a means to forestall the disorder in popular music classification across media. In doing so, Political Musicology presents a discipline through which the political class of popular music is better understood. Future research could focus on the international dimension of political music e.g. the body of music concerned with apartheid and those created towards

abating disasters. Also, it may be worthwhile for subsequent studies to consider the relationship between the political music genre and the celestial praise/plea music category; particularly in overly religious spaces like Nigeria.

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Ben-Iheanacho Elizabeth, National Council for Arts and Culture (NCAC) Director Research and Documentation, Abuja.

Essiet Victor, Performing Artist, Los Angeles

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Koinyan Ekpolador-ebi, Government of Bayelsa State e-Governance Senior Special Assistant, Yenagoa.

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