BEYOND BINARY OPPOSITION: HYBRIDITY AND RECONCILIATION IN THE CONTEXT OF HONG KONG

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A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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2014

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Abstract

After 171 years of British colonial rule, Hong Kong has developed its distinct identity, with a laissez-faire economy, freedom of the individual, and the rule of law, in contrast with the historical experience of mainland China. Combined with the tragic experience of the Cultural Revolution and the Tiananmen crackdown in 1989, this led the people of Hong Kong to the fear of reintegration, creating a mindset of 'binary opposition' among the people of Hong Kong. The contested identities destabilise mutual trust and encourage local resistance against the 'encroachment' from China.

This thesis looks beyond the identity of binary opposition and argues that to resist China's re-absorption is not necessary to take the form of antagonism. The mode of hybridity is not only a useful strategy to resist national assimilation, but also creates the necessary space for the possibility of cultural reconciliation. Christian churches, part of the ambiguous colonial tradition and recent opposition, could become such a space for reconciliation if they can learn from the Biblical experience as well as contextual theologies in other parts of Asia.

Acknowledgement

My deepest gratitude is extended to my supervisor, Prof. Edmond Tang, for his invaluable guidance and comments, without which this thesis would have been impossible to complete. I also thank Dr. Alexander Chow for reading the proofs.

Many thanks to the Most Revd. Kwong, the Rt. Revd. Andrew Chan, and the Rt. Revd. Thomas Soo for their encouragements and support, which has enabled me to pursue this research at the University of Birmingham.

Lastly, I am particularly grateful to my wife (Daisy) and my two sons (Samuel and Matthew) for their support and for patiently bearing our separation in the periods of my studies in England.

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List of Abbreviation

CCP: Chinese Communist Party

CISJD: Christian Institute for the Study of Justice & Development

CCA: Christian Conference of Asia

CFA: Court of Final Appeal

CPPCC: Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

DPP: Democratic Progressive Party

DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

HKCC: The Hong Kong Christian Council

HKCCCU: The Hong Kong Chinese Christian Churches Union

HKSAR: Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

ICAC: Independent Commission Against Corruption

ICNDK: International Christian Network for Democracy in Korea

KNCC: National Council of Churches of Christ in Korea

KMT: Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)

NGO: Non-government Organisation

NPCSC: National People's Congress Standing Committee's

PCT: Presbyterian Church in Taiwan

PRC: People's Republic of China

ROC: Republic of China

SAR: Special Administrative Region

SEZs: Special Economic Zones

TIM: Taiwan Independence Movement

UN: United Nations

US: United States

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WCC: World Council of Churches

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1. Background

'1997' is a year of significance for Hong Kong. With the change of flag at the handover ceremony on 1 July of that year, Hong Kong ceased to be a British Colony, and was returned to its motherland as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC). China's policy toward Hong Kong is based on the concept of "one country, two systems" which allows the people of Hong Kong to rule the territory, allowing existing legal, economic and social systems to be preserved for fifty years until 2047. China is only responsible for the external defence and foreign affairs of Hong Kong. In other words, the present capitalist-oriented lifestyle of Hong Kong is allowed to continue for at least fifty years. This city enjoys a high degree of autonomy and its people are to take up the responsibility of ruling the territory.[1]

A year after handover, Anson Chan, Chief Secretary of Hong Kong SAR (HKSAR) made the remark that "[the] real transition has been much more complex, subtle and profound … That is because the real transition is about identity and not sovereignty".[2] The quotation revealed that the issue of Hong Kong identity lurked below the surface. The people of Hong Kong have long been facing an uncertainty about their identities and their belongings to the territory. Before 1997, the people of Hong Kong were dominated by the 'in-group' identity that was superior to the mainland Chinese - mainland China was politically conservative, economically backward, and socially corrupted while Hong Kong was democratic, advanced, and civilised. This 'simple

1 Article 12 & 13, *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administration Religion and of the People's Republic of China*. http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf
2 A report on Chan's talk, *South China Morning Post*, July 1, 1998

dichotomy' or 'binary opposition' identity was not constructed overnight but by a century and a half of colonialism and separate societal development from its motherland.

In 1842, Britain took over Hong Kong and built up its Colony in the territory where there was no settled population with the exception of a tiny population scattered in the countryside. Basically**,** Hong Kong was a society made up of immigrants with a refugee or sojourner mentality. Both Europeans and Chinese in the last century came to the territory mainly to make fast and easy money. Once they achieved their goals, they would either return to their motherland or emigrate to other countries. Few considered Hong Kong as their permanent home. Strictly speaking, there was no indigenous Hong Kong culture.[3]

In 1949, as China turned to communism and later initiated the Cultural Revolution, hundreds of thousands of mainlanders fled from the turmoil of communist rule and went to Hong Kong with their money and their Chinese culture.[4] At that time, many did not consider Hong Kong as their permanent home and were preparing to immigrate to other non-communist countries or return to their motherland once the communist rule had collapsed. They saw Hong Kong simply as a place for earning money or as a steppingstone to go to other countries. Owing to the large number of refugees, the Colonial government was both unwilling and unable to take care of their needs. The refugees had to rely on the support of their families or kinsfolk. The mentality of

[3] Leung, B.K.P. *Perspectives on Hong Kong Society* (England: OUP, 1996), pp10-11

[4] "As many as 100,000 people fled to Hong Kong each month under the new regime, many of whom were rich farmers and capitalists who brought with them management experience. By the mid-1950s, Hong Kong had increased its population to a staggering 2.2 million." in "1950s in Hong Kong" Wikipedia: *The Free Encyclopedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1950s_in_Hong_Kong#Population 20 Sept.2013

refugees and the lack of support from the Colonial government made the people of Hong Kong feel that their identities could no longer be adequately understood in terms of place or fixed boundaries. Instead, they considered themselves as a dispersed network of ethnically and culturally related Chinese. They did not have identification with the Chinese authorities of the communist party, nor did they have the sense of belonging to the place of Hong Kong. The refugees from mainland China witnessed the disorder of its motherland and found that the Colonial government provided not only a stable environment for business, but also a protected area from being influenced by the communist party. Although the majority of the local Chinese in Hong Kong were excluded from the participation in Colonial policy-making, they accepted this political reality and fully supported the Colonial government because their purpose in coming to Hong Kong was to make a living and to flee China's politics or poverty.

Without the threat of strong indigenous resistance, the British felt more relaxed and were more willing to exercise an enlightened rule over the people of Hong Kong. In addition**,** Hong Kong is a place without natural resources that the British could exploit for economic benefits. In order for the Colonial government to survive, Hong Kong had to attract investment and people. To achieve these purposes, the British established a system in which people could enjoy a decent level of political freedom and human rights protection. With full support from the local Chinese, the British government felt more comfortable to undertake a policy of "counsel direct but light Colonial governance."[5] This meant that the Colonial bureaucracy was in charge of directly administering the territory, but undertook non-intervention in society and the economy.

[5] Lau, S.K. *Decolonisation Without Independence and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: HKIAPS; 1990), pp.3-4

The mode of co-operation and the policy of ‘light Colonial governance’ allowed the coloniser and the colonised to co-exist peacefully, and created Hong Kong as a financial and commercial centre which is so different from other Third World Colonies in Asia, such as Korea, India, Singapore, and Malaysia.

Without a doubt, leading up to 1997, Hong Kong’s pride of economic achievement and enjoyment of political freedom were the major reasons to strengthen its local identity that was superior to mainland China. Particularly, the Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989 reflected the authoritarian government which was politically different from Hong Kong. This reaffirmed the identity that Hong Kong people are ‘similar to Chinese, but not the same’ – the people of Hong Kong considered themselves as ethnically the same, belonging to the same Chinese people, but not politically conservative nor economically backward. The binary opposition of ‘other’ versus ‘us’ led them to fear the return to mainland China and even to consider the reclaiming of Hong Kong as a kind of invasion. Much evidence for this can be found in the transitional period. In one instance, during the Sino-British negotiations, the uncertain future of the territory caused a severe problem of confidence among the people of Hong Kong. Many doubted the ability of Britain and China to reach a workable agreement. The problem of confidence was reflected in the 1983 financial crisis, when Hong Kong people reacted to the lack of progress in the negotiations by determinedly selling Hong Kong dollars. There was a financial crisis which at one point nearly brought down the whole economic system of Hong Kong. In another instance, many Hong Kong people emigrated to other non-communist countries. According to the official estimates of emigration, the number of emigrants rose from an average figure around 20,000 per annum in the early 1980s to

30,000 in 1987. Since then, the outflow of people increased to 45,800 in 1988 and 66,000 (about 1% of the total population) in 1992.[6] The rising number of emigrants reflected not just a political psychology of anxiety, but also the lack of belonging to its motherland. The choice to leave can be seen as a kind of resistance to the integration with China.

The fear of mainland China deepened the binary opposition between the local of Hong Kong and the national of Beijing. The ideology of polarisation extended to different sectors of society. Politically, Hong Kong was split into two main camps. One camp was in favour of British governor Chris Patten's reforms, which called for dramatic changes in the current system in order to bring about more democracy. They believed that only democracy could defend the local autonomy of Hong Kong. However, this camp had to take the risk of confronting the Chinese authorities. The Other was in favour of sticking to the 1984 Sino-British agreement that sought to introduce democracy gradually. This camp included many businessmen and a large portion of the Basic Law drafters from Hong Kong. They took a non-confrontational approach toward China based on the belief that political disputes with the central authorities would not serve the best interests of Hong Kong. The split of the society made the public opinion become more polarizing. Archie Lee, a local theologian, gave this explanation:

> It is easy to see that the Chinese tactics are to identify and reward people who go along with Chinese policy and who are in sympathy with the Chinese way of dealing with Hong Kong. Those who hold contrary views feel the pressure of intimidation and isolation. Public opinion in the territory

[6] Skeldon, R. 'Emigration from Hong Kong, 1945-1994: the demographic lead-up to 1997' in Skeldon. R. (ed.) *Emigration from Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press*, 1995), p.57

> is being polarised, and many people simply feel it is safer to keep silent.[7]

The fear of reversion destabilised not only the unity of the politics, but also the Christian churches. In colonial time, most mainline churches took a collaboration approach with the Hong Kong government and had heavy involvement with both education and social services. In order to resist the intervention of its future master, some local theologians shared the binary opposition of liberation theology and considered collaboration with the power as 'the unholy alliance' with evil.[8] Nay-wang Kwok made this remark:

> The Church in Hong Kong must relearn how to confront the rich and the powerful, for the powerful Chinese regime will assume responsibility for Hong Kong in 1997. Like any other regime, it will use 'divide and rule' tactics … As a whole; the Church in Hong Kong must maintain a distance from the rich and the powerful.[9]

Similarly, Mary Yuan[10], a member of a Catholic social activist group, and Ka-wai Chan [11], a member of the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee, both insisted that churches must withdraw from the establishment and put pressure on the government to strive for a rapid development of democracy.

The above description on searching Hong Kong identity before 1997 was dominated by the narrative of binary opposition, partly because of the distinct differences between

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7 Lee, A.C.C. 'Exile and Return in the Perspective of 1997,' *This Place: Social Location and Biblical Interpretation in Global Perspective*, Vol.2., F.Segovia and M. Tolbert (eds), (Minneapolis, Minnesota 1995), pp. 99-100

8 Kwok, N.W. 1997: *Hong Kong's Struggle for Selfhood* (Hong Kong: DAGA Press, 1996), p.96

9 Ibid., pp.102-103

10 Yuen, M. "Hong Kong Catholic's Recent Participation in Social Movement," in Sophia Woodman (ed.) *Hong Kong's Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* (Hong Kong: July 1 Link & Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), p.123

11, Chan, K..W. "Hong Kong's Protestant Social Movement," in Sophia Woodman (ed.) *Hong Kong's Social Movements: Forces from the Margins* (Hong Kong: July 1 Link & Hong Kong Women Christian Council, 1997), p.111

Hong Kong and mainland China in terms of economics and politics, and partly because most Christians and politicians failed to realise that the mode of hybridity or collaboration can be a form of resistance and transformation. The perspective of binary opposition made the transitional narrative one-sided and presumed that the people of Hong Kong had a uniform response to the reunification with mainland China in that most would emigrate to the Western democracies if they could. They interpreted the rising emigration simply as a kind of resistant strategy for the people of Hong Kong to confront reversion. Two scholars, Janet Salaff and Siu-lun Wong, gave a presentation at the "Hong Kong in Transition" Conference held in Chatham House, London, 15th December, 1997. They questioned the assumption that migration was simply due to the fear of reversing to China. Instead, they believe that many circumstances could give rise to the decision to emigrate such as early childhood values and circumstances, a history of family migration and location of kin abroad. In social network theory, "the location of their kin shape people's identities as well as their desire to move." [12]

Based on the above theory, they went further and classified four types of identification with Hong Kong in transition and their implications for views of reversion to China, namely, "China loyalists", "Hong Kong Locals", "Waverers" and "Class Enemies of China". "China loyalists" are mainly made up of individuals from the working and lower-middle class. They have closer kin in the mainland and build a local identity upon their Chinese roots. "Hong Kong Locals" view themselves as Hong Kong locals due to having more close kin in Hong Kong. They struggle with emigration. "Waverers" are mixed in class, but all presume that the Chinese government will act in Hong Kong

[12] Salaff, J & Wong, S.L, "Migration and Identities in Hong Kong's Transition", in Hook, F.A.B. and Porter, R. (eds.) *Hong Kong in Transition: The Handover Years*. (London: Macmillan, 2000), p248

as it does in China. They recognise few mainland kin and nearly all of them had applied to emigrate. "Class Enemies of China" have upper-class backgrounds and networks located in diverse places. They have more cosmopolitan identities. Their close family members suffered deeply in the Cultural Revolution and fled to Hong Kong for British protection. Most of them applied to emigrate.[13]

Salaff & Wong's research discovered that the people of Hong Kong do not have a homogenous response to reversion. Instead, their responses are rather diverse, depending on their backgrounds. All these led the scholars to conclude that "identities are dynamic and changeable, but are deeply grounded in lived experiences, in structured socio-economies, and networks."14 They believe that where assimilation is difficult, Hong Kong people would "adopt 'intermediate' identities. They hold 'layered' identities that shift with their social roles and stress different identities for different purposes".15

Similarly, in response to the reunification, Hong Kong Christians were not simply divided into two main camps – confrontation and cooperation. There was another group of theologians (such as Archie Lee, Wa-ching Wong, Shui-man Kwan and Paul Kwong) proposing hybridity as a mode of dealing with reunification. Archie Lee suggested that Hong Kong identity must persevere to affirm its cultural link with both China and its colonial past, to embrace its present prosperity, and to open up to the challenge of

[13] Ibid. pp. 250-261
[14] Ibid.pp..263-264.
[15] Ibid. p. 264

reversion.[16] Wai-ching Wong presented hybridity as a strategy of resistance against the "grand, national narrative of one 'Chineseness'".[17] Siu-man Kwan shared these views and argued that collaboration can be a form of resistance.[18] Paul Kwong argued that the shared identity of Hong Kong Christians, in terms of culture and religion, with mainland China can empower the people of Hong Kong to embrace the differences of the Other without having to make a choice for one among the many. [19]

The diverse response to the reunification indicated that the tool of binary opposition was not adequate to analyze the multiple dimensions of Hong Kong's society. More importantly, Janet Salaff and Siu-lun Wong highlight that identities should not be seen as static and fixed. Rather, we should treat identities as dynamic and changeable. For example, after fifteen years of reunification, the economic context of Hong Kong has rapidly changed. Before 1997, China earned one-third of its foreign exchange from Hong Kong, which also acted as a key entry port and centre of expertise. According to Chinese official statistics, Hong Kong ranked either first or second in foreign trade and direct foreign investment of each of China's thirty provinces and municipalities.[20] Economically, China's benefits from Hong Kong could not be measured. However, the economy in mainland China has rapidly developed in the past fifteen years. Not only has the gap been narrowed between HKSAR and the mainland in terms of rich/poor or advanced/backward, but also many Special Economic Zones, like Shanghai and

[16] Lee, A. "Returning to China: Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong," *Biblical Interpretation* 7.2 (1999), pp.156-173

[17] Wong, W.C. "Asian Theology in a Changing Asia: Towards an Asian Theological Agenda for the 21st Century," *CTC Bulletin* 1 (November 1997), p.37

[18] Kwan S.M. *Collaboration as an Alternative of Anti-colonialist Resistant a Postcolonial of Asia-West*,PhD thesis, (Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999).

[19] Kwong, P. *"Identity in Community" a quest for an authentic theological agenda for Hon g Kong*. PhD thesis, (University of Birmingham, 2008); *Identity in Community: Toward a Theological Agenda for the Hong Kong SAR*, (Germany:LIT, 2008)

[20] Yahuda, M. *Hong Kong: China's Challenge* (London: Routledge,1996), pp.23-24

Shenzhen, have challenged the leading status of HKSAR as an international city. The people of Hong Kong can no longer identify themselves as superior to the mainlanders. However, the rapid economic growth of China and the process of reunification have not stopped the people of Hong Kong from putting up defences for their distinctive identities. A survey conducted by Hong Kong University on "Hong Kong people's ethnic identity" [21] indicated that 21.3% of the people of Hong Kong identified themselves with 'Chinese' in 2012, an increase of 2.7% from 1997. The dual category, 'Hong Kong Chinese' or 'Chinese Hong Kong identity' has increased from 44.9% in 1997 to 49.2% in 2012. In contrast with both of these, 27.2% of the population considered themselves as 'Hong Kongese' in 2012 – a drop of 7.7%.

The results of the survey imply that the identification with 'Hong Kongese' is on the decline. This does not reflect that the people of Hong Kong have lowered its boundary of local identity. Rather, it is only a reflection that they have gradually accepted the reunification with mainland China as a political fact. The slight increase of identification with 'Chinese' (still 5.9% lower than the identity of Hong Kongese) indicates that the people of Hong Kong is still reluctant to be assimilated into the national culture, particularly, the singularity of nationality. The expanding of the dual category of 'Hong Kong Chinese' identity, which is much higher than the single identities, reaffirms the argument of Janet Salaff and Siu-lun Wong that the people of Hong Kong construct their identities not on a simple dichotomy of 'Chinese' versus 'Hong Kongese' or a binary opposition of 'other' versus ' us'. Rather, they build their

[21] The Public Opinion Programme of the University of Hong Kong released its latest survey on Hong Kong people's ethnic identity on 20 June 2013, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html 12 September2013

local identities in a complicated and multiple layers to encounter the socio-political changes.

The dual or hybrid identities of Hong Kong people reflect a complex sense of belonging and the mixed feeling about reunification. Such feelings could provoke fear and anxiety causing people to have difficulty attaching themselves to their motherland. Also, it would make the imagined Hong Kong identity become fragile and pose a problem for nation building. After a year of smooth transition, the problem of contested identity has gradually emerged and been reflected in political and economic issues. The Asian financial crisis in 1998 triggered a stock market crash, negative equity, and high unemployment rate. The new HKSAR government was accused of lacking British wisdom for the financial crisis. The survey on identity in 1998 indicated that 28.8% of Hong Kong people identified themselves with 'Hong Kongese', a 5.6% increase in comparison with that of 1997.[22] In 1999, Beijing re-interpreted a ruling of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal on giving the right of residence to mainland-born children with a parent permanently residing in the HKSAR. This was considered the reversal of the Court's ruling, seriously undermining the judicial independence of the territory. In the following years, Beijing rejected any political reforms that would allow for the Chief Executive and legislature to be directly elected after 2007. The control of the democratic development in the SAR by Beijing further destabilised the mutual trust between the national and the local. In addition, the HKSAR government was inexperienced in handling various crises, such as the bird flu epidemic, education and housing reform, and Article 23 of the Basic Law anti-subversion legislation. Over a half

[22] The statistics done by Centre for Communication Research, School of Journalism and Communication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006, found in www.com.cuhk.edu.hk/cuccr/b5/result_3.htm 15November,2009.

million people took to the streets to express their deep misgivings about the Chinese Authorities and the HKSAR government.

Research Question

The contested identities triggered the local resistance against encroachment of the national and destabilised the unity of HKSAR. In response to this difficult situation, 178 Christian churches signed a mission statement and published in Ming Pao (a Hong Kong newspaper) on July 12, 2004, seeking for cultural reconciliation with Beijing.[23] This aroused my interest in discovering the form or mode which would be a viable means to achieve the ideal of cultural reconciliation between Beijing and Hong Kong. The mode of 'binary opposition' appears to expose the partiality of Hong Kong identity. It is not wide enough to embrace the multiple layers of Hong Kong identities and the diverse attitudes towards nation building. Thus, this research addresses the question of whether the mode of hybridity is the best strategy for the churches of Hong Kong to resist China's colonial re-absorption under the policy of "one country, two systems", and to build reconciliation with Beijing.

The thesis sets out to answer the key research question by arguing that the reality of hybridity is increasingly becoming a new framework for doing local theology in a pluralistic society. The hybridised form is to challenge the old Kiplingesque paradigm of simple dichotomy, "East is East and West is West, with no possibility of the two meeting, no possibilities of weaving the religious and cultural traditions from home into

[23] Chan S.H. "Church-State Relations: Criticism and Communication Characterise Relationship with the Government," *Hong Kong Christian Institute Newsletter* no. 226 (July 2007), p 2.

the complex and varied culture of the host country."[24] Although the notion of hybridity is not intended to dissolve the differences, it aims to negotiate the structure of power built on differences. This approach allows different parties to have interaction. Resistance does not necessarily take an oppositional form or negate the content of another culture, as a difference once perceived. Rather, we can take a form of collaboration/reconciliation and allow hybridity to produce something new. Living in this pluralistic and globalized society, the modes of hybridity, in theory and in practice, would be necessary mediations for theologians to deal with the forces of uniformity, fixity and domination.

2. Structure of the thesis

The structure of the thesis is divided into three main parts. Part one is a contextual mediation and consists of four chapters. Chapter One is to identify the research question and the academic significance. Chapter Two is entitled 'Methodology Consideration', and locates the mode of hybridity in the centrality of the contemporary culture (interconnected with postcolonial, postmodern, and globalized studies) and in the performing practice of practical theology. Chapter Three aims at methodology deconstruction, attempting to argue that the antagonistic identities between mainland China and HKSAR were constructed by binary opposition discourse, which is only one particular narrative framework among a given discursive community. To recover the diverse discourses on handover is to challenge the grand narrative and to reveal the contested site of the hybrid identity of Hong Kong, which was not made overnight. Rather, it is a unique attempt at striking the balance between different dynamics:

[24] Sugirtharajah, R.S. *Postcolonial Criticism and Biblical Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p30

between two worlds – the Chinese and the British communities; between two Chinese regimes – the communist on the Chinese mainland and the Kuomintang on Taiwan; between Western and Chinese cultures; between the global and the local. The people of Hong Kong do not have the strong anti-British feeling of anti-imperialism or being colonised. The hybrid site of Hong Kong makes it different from the Third World countries, in which they construct their identities with the language of 'binary opposition' or with the form of antagonism, for example, anti-colonialist resistance. Chapter Four is to examine the changing context of Hong Kong and mainland China after 1997, and to identify the negotiation between the local and the national. Also, our attention will be given to the force of global capitalism, which undermines the autonomy of not just Hong Kong but also of China. This creates a new process for the people of Hong Kong to rethink the global identity and its sovereign autonomy and the relationship with its motherland if China itself is also subordinated to the conventions and regulations of transnational governing bodies such as the WTO and the World Bank.

Part two examines the contributions of Christian churches to reunification/reconciliation, and to identify different modes of resistance against oppression and assimilation. Two chapters will be included in this part. Chapter Five argues that the mode of collaboration can be considered another form of resistance, contributing to a successful story of Hong Kong and the modernisation of mainland China. Chapter Six looks into two cross-regional cases (Taiwan and South Korea) to identify diverse modes of resistance that have been put into practice in different contexts, such as the mode of binary-opposition, subversion, and transformation. Putting the two different contexts or modalities together in comparison with Hong Kong,

our horizon will be widened and our imagination will be expanded to move toward the final part of making a pastoral decision and taking action in seeking for cultural reconciliation.

Part three moves from reflecting on the insights of the above theological discussions towards a transforming practice of cultural reconciliation. The key to this part is how the churches in Hong Kong as social agencies can increase the chances of seeking cultural reconciliation with Beijing. The main focus of this part is to reconstruct an alternative narrative framework and to build up a hybridised church in the Third Space based on the theology of reconciliation. This kind of church is not a monolithic voice in relation to other groups. Rather, it is in multiple and varied voices. This identity is hybridised and mixed in ways in which resistance and subordination take place at the same time. This can remove antagonistic resistance and allow an effective negotiation based on respect and trust. More importantly, this hybridised identity allows different groups with various traditions to work together to build up a better society and to seek cultural reconciliation with China.

3. Academic significance

Using hybridity as a framework to explore local theology is not new to academic studies. However, the decolonisation experience of Hong Kong is unprecedented and is not familiar to those who are in Third Word or the First World, because the territory was not granted independence but handed over from one coloniser to another. The hybridised form is not simply to resist the former coloniser, but also to resist the new

master. The unprecedented collected concerns with the historical and cultural specificity of Hong Kong has made the territory become a subject in the theological academy and a significant reference for those who do not share the similar post/colonial experiences of Hong Kong. Although there are several local theologians introducing the concept of hybridity into the situation of Hong Kong such as Archie Lee, Wong Wai-ching, Kwan Shui Man, their focuses are mainly on postcolonial theory, the shared vision, and the understanding of the collaboration mode. Little attention has been given to the transforming practice and the new emergence of globalisation. Several essential global themes have been neglected such as the influence of the residue of Cold War mentality, the global capitalism, and other global values. Moreover, 'hybridity' is emerging from the disciplines of cultural studies and anthropology and is becoming a new framework for doing theology. However, this new framework has faced a question whether it is viable or not. The contribution of this thesis attempts not only to provide a different way of seeing hybridity, but also to demonstrate that the hybridised form is an indispensable framework for seeking cultural reconciliation.

CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATION & LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

With a British colonial past of over 150 years and having been handed over to its motherland in 1997, Hong Kong has since been going through a process of reintegration with Mainland China. However, the long period of separation has created the contested identity between the local Hong Kong and the national Mainland, constantly exaggerating the difference and the otherness. The contested identity is complicated by the narrative frameworks of essentialising and demonising the Other – Mainland China is framed as an essentialised Other, who is democratically underdeveloped when compared with Hong Kong. The Chinese authority is demonised as an authoritarian government that suppresses the freedom of Hong Kong. The binary assumption and narrative frameworks are developed from the pattern of suspicion, fear, hostility, and misunderstanding. All these eventually lead to an antagonistic identity and a damaged relationship. In order to repair the relationship, a safe space is needed in which the people of Hong Kong are allowed to take part in the political process - their preferred ways of life voiced on the future structures so they can be listened to and respected by the Chinese authorities. The creation of such a space is an essential element of reconciliation.

Definition of hybridity

In this thesis, the writer proposes that the notion of hybridity can create such a space for the people of Hong Kong and Mainland China to resolve the impasse of the two polarising views and to seek for reconciliation. Hybridity refers in its most basic sense to mixture. The term originates from biology and was subsequently employed in racial narrative, in which the mixed race was treated as the most inferior kind of race in modern narrative. In recent linguistic and cultural theories, hybridity has been described as a positive concept – rejecting the idea of so-called pure race or culture without any form of hybridity and destabilising the very idea of a bounded/homogenous culture. As the mixing together of two different/separated cultures would blur the established cultural boundaries in the process of fusion or realization, it helps not only to recognise a hybrid or shared identity with Mainland China (e.g. communism mixing with a capitalist economic ideology and practice), but also to destabilise the dualism/essentialism/binary opposition.

The concept of hybridity goes beyond the basic sense of a simple mixture of two cultures (the coloniser and the colonised). It is not the case of simple co-existence that the Communist China and the Capitalist Hong Kong are being brought together, but remain separated in binary opposition to one another. Hybridity highlights the interaction between two cultures and the cross-cultural producing of a Third Space which allows conflicted cultures to negotiate, not to undermine one another, but to creating new hybrid narratives and identities, neither the one nor the Other. Owing to the process of interaction involving the factors of resistance and dissonance, hybridity helps destruct the Chinese authorities' domination and modify it to depict the mutuality

of the local Hong Kong and the national China - both of them are incomplete and are mutually dependent in constructing a shared culture.

The interaction with different cultures creates a liminal space which refers to an in-between state of permanent movement (including different forms of resistances – binary opposition or collaboration), challenging the stereotyped image of the Other or the belief of unchanging culture. The permanent movement allows the old certainty of belief or the dominant narrative (such as the two distinct and irreconcilable cultural traditions of Capitalist Hong Kong and Communist China) to open for re-negotiation and imagination. The liminal space can also be seen as a transitional and a temporary stage that is a non-final reconciliation. Rather, it is a reconciling process of engaging dialogue with ambiguous views, paradoxical perspectives, and conflicted values. In order to avoid absolutism, judgementalism or totalism in light of encountering the Other, hybridity intentionally makes space for complexity and ambiguity, paradoxality, and multiplicity.

Liminality can create a listening space which enables the dialogue to happen and produces a significant amount of resources – an overview of the reflection on the controversial issue can take place. This can inform and encourage in-depth discussion and transformation. As long as both sides are willing to move away from intransigence that our own interpretation is "the whole truth and the only right one"[25], there is a hope

[25] Found in *The Windsor Continuation Group Report to the Archbishop of Canterbury*, http://www.anglicancommunion.org/commission/windsor_continuation/WCG_Report.cfm#sthash.CRYWRMh3.dpuf, 7 December, 2013. p.5

to resolve dilemmas that seem to threaten the very future of the unity. In other words, hybridity, in truth-finding, rejects meta/grand-narrative or objectivity, but promotes multiple-narratives and subjectivity. Basically, hybridity does not destroy particularity. Rather, it refers to a mingling, exposure to the other, dialogue with the other, interaction with the other, and learning from the other. This encounter does not leave the other unchanged. Eventually, it produces a Third Space that brings forth a new reconciling identity.

To sum up, the definition of hybridity in this thesis is that the Self (the people of Hong Kong) is prepared to make space for receiving the narratives of the Other into itself and undertake a fusion of its identity in light of the difference of the Other. The notion of hybridity highlights the non-final reconciliation that is transitional and temporal and liminal. These allow the ambiguous, paradoxical, and conflicted narratives to negotiate. As a result, hybridity helps us to a process from minimalist narrative of the self and the Other to maximalist narratives, from a single-narrative to multiple-narratives, from exclusive narrative to inclusive narrative and hopefully from partial narrative to fully narrative, from demonising narrative to humanising narrative. This is the vision of hybridity developing the self to the full in light of the Other's alterity (a maximalist identity/a new identity) - more than a Hong Kongese, but a Hong Kong Chinese to put the narrative of the Other into the self without compromising our particularity.

Literature research

In this thesis, the writer will use literature research to explore the topic or to give answers to the research question. This means that the research will be examining the data or research that already exists in this topic from other scholarly researchers or writers. At the beginning, the writer did consider conducting fieldwork or in-depth interviews to collect a variety of empirical materials and information to support the research hypothesis. This would help the writer to develop interpretations to the particular issue and to uncover patterns or theories that help explain a phenomenon of interest.

However, after a year of literature review, it was recognised that many other researchers and writers have already done a fair amount of qualitative and quantitative research on the topic of Hong Kong's reunification with Mainland China. In quantitative research, the University of Hong Kong has developed the Public Opinion Programme since 1991 and has annually conducted a survey to collect/study public opinion on topics (e.g. the dichotomy of Hong Kong identity versus Chinese identity). The sample size is over one thousand.[26] The survey provides a large amount of objective data for testing hypotheses, but appears insufficient to reveal contextual detail.

Newspapers can be seen as good complementary references. It significantly reflects the socio-political and cultural history of the city, because many life stories, in-depth

[26] http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release884.html. 16th Nov.,2013

interviews, and narratives exist across newspapers. More importantly, newspapers represent a way of looking at the value that newspapers provide - individual newspapers choose to report some news which others may totally ignore. A variety of local, national and global newspapers narrating the daily life of Hong Kong reunification have provided diverse perspectives to understand the complexity of the Hong Kong context. In Chapter three, a study of four media systems reporting on the Hong Kong handover story will demonstrate that a newspaper's narrative is not often involved in finding out the authenticity of the happenings, but in revealing the historical significance to their readers. A newspaper has already recorded plenty of material which help us to see how the reporters and the readers view themselves - the activation of schematic knowledge shared among their readers' community as a narrative background in the form of common-sense assumption and supposition. A newspaper's analysis can meet the demand of qualitative research – taking context seriously, reflecting complex issue, taking into account personal experiences, and uncovering patterns or theories that help explain a phenomenon of interest.

In addition to the extensive survey data and the variety of newspaper records, many local and foreign theologians have already done a lot of research and theological reflection on the issue of Hong Kong's reunification - a binary approach from foreign academics (Deborah Ann Brown and Stephen Carl Pavy) and local theologian (Nai-wang Kwok) and a hybridized view (Archie Lee, Arnold Yeung, Siu-man Kwan, Wai-ching Wong, and Paul Kwong). The existing materials related to my research question already sufficiently uncover the multiple and hybridized views embedded in the particular context of Hong Kong culture. To conduct additional fieldwork or interviews

on my topic would be redundant with their findings. As my research focuses on the deconstruction of the meta-narrative on antagonistic identity between the local Hong Kong and the national mainland China, the analysis and critique of existing narratives across newspapers, survey report or the said literatures would provide the necessary background to understand my research, to run counter to my hypothesis, to overcome the bias of my research, and to add dimension to insight and strategies that are not available in the existing literature or research.

2.2 The significance of hybridity for understanding this pluralistic world, created by the three existing forces of postmodernism, postcolonialism, and globalisation

2.2.1 Hybridity and post/modern narrative

The notion of hybridity can be seen not just as a mode of resisting colonialism, but also as a counter-trend against the "binary opposition" of Western modernism. The rise of science and technology brought the West (mainly from Europe and North America) into a new era of modernity. The formation of modernity was complex and philosophical processes, which interwove political and intellectual revolutions with technological innovation and massive social change. Barbara Marshall, based on Marx's observation, gave a brief summary:

> Modernity is associated with the release of the individual from the bonds of tradition, with the progressive differentiation of society, with the emergence of civil society, with social equality, with innovation and change. All of these accomplishments are associated with capitalism, industrialism, secularization, urbanization and rationalization.[27]

[27] Marshall, B. *Engendering Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 1994), p.7

Modernists originally rejected universalism founded on God, but they, on the other hand, seek for "the activity of the universal laws that governed the entire cosmos."[28] Based on universal law, they constructed their societies by a framework of rule-governed and ordered activities that ignored the diversity of individuals. Such a system or bureaucracy rested on fixed and stable authorities. Max Weber considered this system as the "iron cage" of material "progress" which excluded individual self-expression and spiritual value.[29]

Following the belief of universal laws, modernists held a belief of certainty and optimism that the power of science, rationality, and industry would transform our world for better. In light of this belief, they "posit the uniformity and universality of human nature as axiomatic."[30] The vision of modernism was to free human beings from all forms of captivities. Thus, individuals are free to pursue their ways of lives, provided that they respect the same freedom in others. Freedom, in modernist concept, implies that that "human dignity is respected and justice for all is upheld."[31] When this freedom is either denied by an autocratic government or restrained by a dominant culture, we describe the situation as oppression; when the oppressed situation is emancipated, we call it liberation. The pursuit of universal emancipation/liberation and freedom

[28] Ibid., p.16
[29] Weber, M. *Max Weber: Selection in Translation*, edited by W.G. Runciman and translated by E. Matthews. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)p.30
[30] Graham, 1996, p.27
[31] Volf, M. *Exclusion & Embrace: A Theology Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and Reconciliation*. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1996) p. 101

gradually developed a dominant culture and become a grand narrative in Europe.[32] Lyotard points out that the grand narrative is framed in quite different ways:

> The Christian narrative of the redemption of original sin through love; the Aufklarer narrative of emancipation from ignorance and servitude through knowledge and egalitarianism; …the Marxist narrative of emancipation from exploitation and alienation through the socialisation of work; the capitalist narrative of emancipation from poverty through technological development. Between these narratives there are grounds for litigation and even for difference. But in all of them, the givens arising from events are situated in the course of a history whose end, even if it remains beyond reach, is called universal freedom, the fulfilment of all humanity.[33]

The quotation helps us to identify the failure of modernism in two ways. Firstly, the universality of the grand narrative sets up a particular method of emancipation as the only way to acquire freedom. For example, Marxist narrative claims that "all the proletarians were communists and all the communists were proletarians, but the tanks… in Beijing (1989) prove the opposite."[34] Secondly, the modernists constructed the vision based on particular sectional interests of a small group of people such as White, male, powerful, rich, and educated. Once this small group of people in the West had seizure of power over other peoples and continents by means of science and technology, they made themselves as determining subjects[35] and extended their so called "vision" to the different parts of the world. This produced a negative effect of the dehumanization of modernism, such as the spread of Western imperialism, a power structure of dominance and subordination, and a binary opposition of cultural values – superiority and inferiority, white and other colours. The break out of the Second World War and the

[32] "The thought and action of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are governed by … the idea of emancipation" quoted from Lyotard, J.F. *The Postmodern Explained: Correspondence 1982-1985,* translated by Don Barry et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993) p.24
[33] Ibid.
[34] Volf. p.106
[35] Moltmann, J. *God for a Secular Society: The Public Relevance of Theology*, p.7

incidents of genocide had seriously shaken the modern perceptions of certainty, progress, rationality, universalism, and binary opposition.

Postmodernism is a revolutionary movement that subverts the modernist single grand narrative of human experience. Instead, postmodernism chooses to embrace the concept of multi-narratives in explaining human phenomena. Hybridity can be seen as a hallmark of postmodern "language games" – intrinsically plural, heterogeneous, and incommensurable. However, the grand narrative attempts to have a final reconciliation of the plurality/diversity and totalise language games into real unity. As a result, it presses the multi-narratives/small narratives into a single voice and suppresses the richness of language games.[36]

Postmodernism has a suspicion of the grand narrative of modernism on progress, reason, freedom and emancipation. It attempts to break the Self (Euro-centric single narrative on moral action and human emancipation) in order to make space for receiving the Other's narratives into the Self. The encounter between the Self and the Other will create a permanent movement (liminal space) to undertake a readjustment of its narrative or identity in the light of the difference of the Other. This is the notion of hybridity highlighting the non-final reconciliation that is transitional and temporal and liminal. These allow the ambiguous, paradoxical, and conflicted narratives to negotiate.

[36] Lyotard, J-F. *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, translated by G. Bennington and B. Massumi. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984) p.81

The writer will go further to illustrate the said features of hybridity within the language game in terms of sign and meaning, power and knowledge, truth and performance. Regarding sign and meaning, Jacques Derrida can be seen as a representative in postmodernity. He draws on Ferdinand de Saussure's view that meaning is generated from a system of "similarity and difference". Derrida goes further and argues that there is no original meaning outside of signs,[37] because language is a self-referential system in which words do not refer to any fixed transcendental meaning or any independent object world. Since writers cannot succeed in pinning down exact meanings, production of meaning becomes continually deferred and supplemented by the meanings of other words. In this sense, meaning of words is just a mixture of "difference and deferral" or the identity of words is never to have fixed meanings. Owing to the instability of meaning in language, we can move into a more specific consideration of the role of narrative in the context of cultural performance. It is in the context that hybridity enters the narrative as a necessary requirement for the production of meaning – that is ambivalent. Bhabha makes this point clear:

> The linguistic difference that informs any cultural performance is dramatised in the common semiotic account of the disjuncture between the subject of proposition.. and the subject of enunciation, which is not represented in the statement but which is the acknowledgement of its discursive embeddedness and address, its cultural positionality, its reference to a present time and a specific space …The production of meaning requires that these two places be mobilised in the passage through a Third Space, which represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implication of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot 'itself' be conscious. What this unconscious relation introduces in an ambivalence in the act of the interpretation.[38]

[37] Derrida, J, *Of Grammatology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University press, 1976), p.50
[38] Bhabha, H.K. *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.36

Thus, the Third Space hybridity can enter into a particular relationship between "the general conditions of language" and "the specific implication of the utterance" in a performative strategy of which it cannot "in itself" be conscious.[39] The intervention of the Third Space hybridity of enunciation makes the structure of meaning and reference an ambivalent process, challenging "our sense of historical identity of culture of homogenising, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, kept alive in the national tradition of the People."[40] In other words, the key cultural category "identities" no longer have essential universal meanings, but are a "social construction of language."[41]

Unlike Derrida, Michel Foucault does not focus on meaning which has the potential to proliferate into infinity. Rather, he is concentrated on how meanings are temporarily stabilized or regulated into a narrative. He rejects the claim of modernism that reason and knowledge are innocent and purely objectified. Instead, he believes that the ordering of meaning is regulated by the operation of power in the process of social practice.[42] In studying modernist systems on crime and punishment, sexuality, and madness, Foucault develops his concept of narrative, which provides ways of talking about a particular topic based on the systems of representation. In this process, certain meanings are rendered "truth." Foucault clearly points out the mutual relationship between power and knowledge. This allows some people to have more influence than others on deciding which cultural practices are civilised/uncivilised, normal/abnormal,

[39] Schulze-Engler, F. "Transcultural Negotiation: Third Spaces in Modern Times" in Ikas, K & Wagner. G (eds.) *Communicating in the Third Space*. (New York: Routledge, 2009) p.150
[40] Bhabha, 1994, p.37
[41] Baker, C. R. "'hybridity' and Practical Theology: In Praise of Blurred Encounters." *Contact Journal*. (Jan. 2003), p.100
[42] Foucault, M. *Discipline and Punish* (London: Allen Lane, 1977)

good/bad, or included/excluded. More importantly, Foucault sees power's oppression not just from the above, but also from different aspects of our daily life. This means that identities are subject to review and are temporarily stabilized.[43]

Alongside with Foucault, Richard Rorty rejects the meta-language that all things can be represented. For Rorty, "no linguistic items represent any non-linguistic items."[44] This means that language is not adequate to represent the rest of the material universe. Similarly, science cannot fully reflect the objective reality, because it is related to human narrative – natural and social, fact and value, knowledge and opinion.[45] Having denied representationism and foundationalism, Rorty goes further to argue that "truth" is not an epistemological term referring to the relationship between language and reality. Rather, it is just a consensual term built on a political action in a particular time, space, and culture. If truth, knowledge, and understanding are articulated within particular language games, then truth can be seen as the result of our particular form of acculturation.[46] If there is no universal foundation to validate our narrative, we have to open ourselves to different descriptions of the world. For Rorty, to transcend our acculturation is to "be brought up in a culture which prides itself on not being monolithic – on its tolerance for a plurality of subcultures and its willingness to listen to neighbouring cultures."[47] In brief, Rorty disagrees to have a final vocabulary of language that is "true," fully describing the reality. Our vocabularies can be final only in the sense of being current without tenable challenge. Thus, to consider what culture

[43] Foucault, M. *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980)
[44] Rorty, R. *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Vol.1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.2
[45] Rorty, R. *Consequences of Pragmatism*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980)
[46] Rorty, R. 1991, pp.13-14
[47] Ibid.

is best for us depends not on universal foundation, but on the desirability of our pragmatic consequences judged in relation with our own tradition or values. That is merely "temporary resting places constructed for specific utilitarian ends…"[48]

Having reviewed the language games in sign and meaning, power and knowledge, truth and performance, we realise that postmodernism attempts to guard the hybridity of language games. Through the practice of narrative's encounter within the liminal space of permanent movement, we recognise that every dominant narrative or culture remain fluid, never final and universal, always temporal and local. Thus, hybridity allows a dialogical/reconciling space to re-emerge from a situation in which the contested parties have reached an impasse in the negotiations.

2.2.2 Hybridity and postcolonial narrative

With the departure of the British coloniser, the colonised of HKSAR is supposed to enter into a postcolonial era. However, colonialism dominates not only geographically in history, but also continuously and ideologically constituting the everyday culture and value of the territory.[49] To examine the postcolonial context of HKSAR should not be limited to changes in power structure after the official end of colonialism, but also attention should be paid to colonialism's continuing effects. In one instance, colonial ideologies are often informed by "theories concerning the innate superiority of Western culture, the Western male as subject, and the natives, heathens, women, black, indigenous people, as the Other, needing to be controlled and subjugated. It is based on

[48] Rorty, 1980, p.xli
[49] Chow, R. *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studie*s (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 10

the desire for power/domination."[50] Therefore, colonial ideology continues to influence the formerly colonised people through different practices. In another instance, the departure of an external colonial power of Britain can bring about a process of internal colonisation. When the British colonisers have left, the politically superior mainland China intentionally or unintentionally proceeds to behave like the British coloniser in transforming a postcolonial city into an opportunity for internal colonisation, because it is an easy way to control the territory and it is tempted to dominate "the politically weaker part of its country, Hong Kong, which has a population size of only half of most of their middle size cities."[51]

The two instances reveal that postcolonialism is not simply a physical expulsion of imperial powers. Rather, it is a wholesale critique of imperial or Western structures of knowledge and power.[52] Sugirtharajah makes it clear that Postcolonialism is "an active confrontation with the dominant system of thought, its lopsidedness and inadequacies, and underlines its unsuitability for us."[53] Sugirtharajah goes further to argue that, neo-colonialism, in postcolonial writing, is seen as a form of discursive practice which is ordered and carried out not only on something visible, but also on something invisible such as an idea, custom, or culture.[54] The identity between the coloniser and the colonised cannot be developed simply in a binary way. Rather, it is formed in the process of hybridity. Ashis Nandy (1983), in *The Intimate Enemy*[55], clearly explains the insufficiency of a binary way by using the Indian case of Rudyard Kipling as an

50 Sugirtharajah, R.S. (ed.) The Postcolonial Bible (Sheffield: Academic Press, 1998), p.15
51 Chia, P., "Postcolonisation and Recolonisation," *Biblical Interpretation* 7.2 (1999): p.177
52 Wong, W. C. "Asian Theologian between East and West: A Postcolonial Self-understanding," *Jian Da*o 8 (1997): p.91
53 Sugirtharajah, R.S. (ed.) *The Postcolonial Bible* (Sheffield: Academic Press,1998), p.93
54 Sugirtharajah, R.S. *Asian Biblical Hermeneutics and Postcolonialism: Contesting the Interpretations* (New York: Oribis Books, 1998), p.17
55 Nandy, A. *The Intimate Enemy* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983)

illustration. Kipling was a victim of colonialism and opted for an absolute choice, either Western or Indian. There is no reconciliation between 'West' and 'East'. Nandy described that "the victim's life Kipling lived and hated living." He could never reconcile both his Western and his Indian selves. "He did not have any compassion for the victims of the world; he did not have any compassion for a part of himself either."[56] Nandy points out that the 'West' and the 'East' in everyday life did bind together in the syncretic processes which constructed an Indian Identity. Nandy's illustration echoes the above Sugirtharajuah's argument that a Kiplingesque paradigim of simple dichotomy was unable to keep the complex culture in play and to create a new identity in dissolving the differences.

Ashis Nandy constructs a hybridised form on cultural co-optation, to resist the ideology of colonialism, the kiplingesque paradigm of simple dichotomy, or the method of 'binary opposition'. For Stuart Hall, cultural identity is always hybrid and is determined by specific historical and cultural contexts. The process of social transformation is never constructed either an absolutist oppositionality or a neat succession, with each stage being a clean break from the one before. Rather, it is an interaction among different ideas, world-views, and material forces. Also, hybridity allows the margins to challenge the centre in different levels.[57] Hall considers a hybrid identity as a contested ground and an unfinished product. This anti-essentialist perspective opens up a mode for understanding identity which is contingent and which is paradoxically both inclusive and specific.

56 Ibid., p.68

[57] Hall, S. 'Old and New Identities, Old and New Ethnicities' in A. King (ed.) *Culture, Globalisation, and the world-System.* (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.35

Homi Bhabha is the scholar who coined the term hybridity to describe the products of the colonial relationship in ways that challenge the Western production and implementation of certain 'binary oppositions'. This includes centre/margin, civilised/savage, and enlightened/ignorant. Unlike Edward Said's emphasis on the coloniser and Frantz Fanon's on the colonised, Bhabha attempts to strike the balance between the two scholars and takes a kind of deconstructionist approach to post-colonialism. Also, Bhabha's theory of hybridity is distinct from Nandy's concept of co-optation. Drawing on the Baktinain idea of subversive and dialogical forces of hybridity on to the ambivalence in the colonial encounter, Bhabha gives new meaning on the hybridity. The interaction between two cultures (the coloniser and the colonised) often does not produce the culture expected by the coloniser, because the process involves the factors of resistance and dissonance. This tension allows a 'third space' to emerge - the first space (the indigenous) to the second space (the colonial) as an opposition that is similar to the asymmetrical power relations in the colonies. The Third Space is "a space of translation: a place of hybridity" which allows conflicted cultures to negotiate, not for undermining one another, but for creating new hybrid narratives and identities, neither the one nor the Other – "something else besides, which contests the terms and territories of both".[58] This quotation indicates that hybridity is not the case of simple mixing that the coloniser and the colonised are being brought together, but remain separated in the condition of binary opposition to each other. Rather, hybridity is something like a cross-breeding to produce a third species. He employs this idea of hybridity and modifies it to depict the mutuality of the coloniser and the colonised – both of them are incomplete and the cultural mixture will produce something new.

[58] Bhabha, 1994, p. 28

Bhabha's Third Space helps destruct the antagonistic Manichean framework of colonial narrative. For him, human identities are always hybrid and constructed 'in-between' time and space, interacting with different cultures. In order to understand this difference, we have to move to the "beyond" which does not refer to the jargon of our times (post), indicating sequentiality (after). Instead, "beyond" is the "in-between" space that allows you to return to the political conditions of the present, travelling between past and future.[59] It is just like a Museum stairwell as a liminal space, a pathway between the upper and lower levels.[60] In this sense, the pathway represents ethnic groups free from being fixed into organic polar entities, and free to move between cultures.

Ashis Nandy, Stuart Hall, and Homi Bhabha, can be seen as authorizing hybrid identities in post-colonial writings. Taken their views together, we have a clear picture that the mode of hybridity can minimize the dark sides of modernism such as hegemony, simple dichotomy, antagonistic binarisms, and totalisation. However, on the other hand, it can maximize the advantages of postmodernism, such as to recapture the neglected areas in the process of negotiation and resistance, to retrieve the silent voices in the name of a grand narrative, to appreciate one's own unique identities, to respect and celebrate the differences.

[59] Ibid., p.3
[60] Ibid.

2.2.3 Hybridity and Global narrative

Globalisation theory is another main resource of the social sciences being drawn on in this research. Globalisation and hybridity are intersecting. Neither can be understood without the Other. As discussed earlier, globalisation has its origins in European modernism which created colonialism, totalism, and antagonism. Today, globalisation studies are related to restructuring the larger economies of the world, and to the power of globalizing forces to homogenize culture, politics, and social life in general. Thus, globalisation, on the one hand, can be seen as the continuation of modernisation. On the other hand, the institution of modernity can be regarded as inherently globalizing.[61] If the emergence of hybridity is to resist the 'binary opposition' of modernism and homogenization of globalisation, the concept of hybridity can be considered as a product made within and by globalizing narratives.

The process of globalisation and hybridity share a lot of similarities, such as a model of social change, an analytical tool for cultural identities, a challenge to the method of 'binary opposition' – centre/periphery, coloniser/colonised, and pure/mixed. More importantly, globalisation provides a wider perspective for us to "weave the local and global together in myriad patterns and configuration."[62] For an example, globalisation intensifies the compression of the world and increases our consciousness of the world. The compression of time and space accelerates global cultural flows which do not just reconfigure local cultures in the periphery, but also destabilise "the cultural certainties and fixities of the metropole." [63] However, globalisation is not constituted by a

[61] Giddens, A, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press,1990)
[62] Haggis, J. Haggis, & Suzanne S. *Culture and Development*. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), p.66
[63] Gupta, A & Ferguson, J. 'Culture, Power, Place: ethnography at the end of an era' in A. Gupta and J. Ferguson (eds), *Culture, Power, Place. Exploration in Critical Anthropology* (Durham, NC: Duke

monolithic one-way flow from the West to the East. Rather, it is a two-way flow, more than just a simple process of homogenisation, because the forces of hybridity are equally strong, for example, nationalism. The complex cultural flows not only undermine the concept of culture as a distinct, bounded, and fixed entity, but also allow local, national, and global identities to co-exist with culture as a 'translocal learning process.' [64] Thus, culture becomes "more accurately conceived as complex and multidirectional cultural interactions and re-combinations, weaving the local and global together in myriad patterns and configuration."[65]

Global-local encounters create a site where resistance is taking place through various processes such as exclusion, inclusion, condensation, and the like. This site can also be related to Bhabha's terms of 'the third space', which are flexible and able to capture what is actually a constantly shifting and changing milieu of ideas, events, appearances and meanings. It produces the hybrid identity based on negotiation of difference between each other.

To sum up, our contemporary era has been strongly influenced by the three existing forces of post/modern, postcolonial and globalized narratives. No longer do we speak of universal truth, meta-narrative, or unity. Instead, we allow particular history, culture, and community to interpret God's revelation and to formulate their own principles to deal with their particular situations. This creates an era of hybridity (pluralism,

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University Press, 1997), pp.1-29

[64] Pieterse, J. 'Globalisation as Hybridization' in M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R. Roberston (eds) *Global Modernities* (London and Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1995)

[65] Schech, S & Haggis, J op cit, pp.65-66

relativism and diversity) in which Christian churches have to face a conflict of values, a paradox of interpretations, and a text of negotiation. The changing cultural context brings us to a central question of how to reconcile the conflicts among different traditions, disciplines, and theories. Particularly, the contemporary situation, where universal truth and meta-narratives are considered impossible, makes the reconciliation more complicated. Related to the situation of HKSAR, the policy of "one country, two systems" is still under the test. How could the two systems (socialist and capitalist) co-exist without undermining one another? HKSAR's reintegration with China implies that the territory is no longer untouched by the Chinese authorities. There is an enormous pressure pushing HKSAR toward a certain homogenization with the motherland. The intense interaction with China cannot avoid destabilizing once tranquil conditions. On the other hand, under the policy of "one country, two systems", the territory is expected to retain its particularity which produces a fragmentation and pluralism that can also create instability. This is a complex issue that is not easily addressed. To live and act in the ambiguous dynamics of this situation will require the Christian churches to engage with them as part of its theological task and even to look for new theories of interpretation. Contemporary theologians believe that practical theology provides a possible way to deal with this challenge, particularly, the mode of narrative.

2.3 Practical theology[66]

Don S. Browning has been considered as the key international figure in the revival of practical theology in the second half of the twentieth century. Browning in 1980

[66] The section of Practical theology is building on the arguments in my M.Phil. thesis. Kwok, C. P. *The Pastoral Care Perspective on Politics: The Case of Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui (Anglican Church), M.Phil. Thesis*. (Canterbury: University of Kent, 2003) pp.152-190

published a first series of essays on practical theology in which he made his observations: there seemed to be "a growing hunger to make theology in general more relevant to guidance of action and to bridge the gap between theory and practice, thought and life, the classic theological disciplines and practical theology."[67] James Fowler (1983) adopts a similar understanding to Browning's analysis of practical theology, but adds an important dimension. For him, "practical theology is theological reflection and construction arising out of and giving guidance to a community of faith in the praxis of its mission."[68] Apart from the dialectical nature, Fowler highlights the ecclesial character of practical theology which begins in a community of faith, engages in theological reflection, and is completed in the right action of the Church in light of the critical reflection of its mission. Browning further defines it as "critical reflection on the church's dialogue with Christian sources and other communities of experience and interpretation with the aim of guiding its action toward social individual transformation."[69]

The above quotations reveal several features which help us to explore the scope of practical theology. Firstly, practical theology is a process of theological reflection based on attending to the Church's dialogue with different sources of information such as the Christian tradition (Scripture and the history of the Christian Church) and the context (experience and culture). Secondly, the main concern of practical theology is not only with listening and interpreting different sources of information. Rather, it is intent on maintaining the tension between various polarities such as theory and practice, classic

[67] Browning, D.S. *Practical Theology* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), p.3
[68] Fowler. "Practical Methodology and the Shaping Christian of Christian Lives," in S.D. Browning (ed) *Practical Theology* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), p.153
[69] Browning, D. S. *A Fundamental Practical Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), p.36

texts and the texts of contemporary reality, local and global, the community of the Christian faith and the communities of other faiths. The polarities are used to clarify, challenge, and purify the insights and limits of one another.[70] This method of correlation involves human powers of reasoning to find a balance between different sources and to move toward a pastoral decision. Thirdly, practical theology is committed not just to seeing the world in a different way, but also to guiding Church actions toward social and individual transformation.[71]

Since practical theology is a complex phenomenon, our attention in this section is only given to the two features which are relevant for our exploration of themes in the mode of hybridity and the transformative practice of cultural reconciliation. The focus of this thesis is how the Christian churches of HKSAR can reconcile the cultural differences between the local of HKSAR and the national of mainland China without losing its distinctive ethic.

2.3.1 The mode of practical reason

For Browning, Christian churches as communities of moral agents and moral interpreters have a responsibility to forge a distinctive rationale for Christian practice in the loss of public moral consensus. He proposes a model that is developed from what he calls practical reason. For him, there are three types of reason.[72] The first is theoretical reason (*theoria*), which is concerned with the objective scientific knowledge or the nature of things. The second one is technical reason (*techne*), which is to apply the

70 Whitehead, J.D. & Whitehead, E. E. *Method in Ministry* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981), p.2
71 Browning, D.S. 1996, p.36
72 Browning, D.S., 1996, p.44

findings of the sciences to the solution of human problems. Its main concern is the effective means to a given end. The final one is practical reason (*phronesis*), which is related to wisdom. Browning claims that, "practical reason has an overall dynamic, an outer envelope, and an inner core."[73] He locates the theological task at the centre of the social context, where the Church mediates the Christian tradition from the centre. This mediation is not a kind of stimulus-and-response reaction. Rather, it is a kind of action that is self-reflecting as it relates to the context of the action, the traditional and theological underpinnings of the faith-community and the justification of the action. The centre lies in the "inner core," where experience and culture raise questions like "What should we do?" or "How should we live?" Based on this understanding, we can move out from the centre toward an "outer envelope".[74]

Browning describes the outer envelope of practical reason as "its fund of inherited narratives and practices that tradition has delivered to us and that always surrounds our practical thinking."[75] This means that practical reason is always tradition-saturated and is surrounded by interpretive paradigms, experimental probes, historical consciousness and communities of memory. This explanation illustrates that the components of the two envelopes are so similar and so difficult to distinguish. Perhaps, the main difference between the two envelopes is that the inner core begins with action-reflection prompted by a critical incident while the outer envelope is to respond to the demanded action and theological reflection from the inner envelope. Browning gives this explanation:

[73] Ibid., p.10
[74] Ibid., pp.10-11; Anderson, R.S. *The Shape of Practical Theology* (Downers Grove: IVP, 2001) p.27
[75] Browning, D.S. 1996, p.11

> By focusing on practical reason, I mean to point to the use of reason to answer the questions, what should we do? And how should we live? The inner core functions within a narrative about God's creation, governance, and redemption of the world. It also functions within a narrative that tells how the life and death of Jesus Christ further God's plans for the world. This narrative is the outer envelope of practical reason. It constitutes the vision that animates, informs, and provides the ontological context for practical reason.[76]

The quotation indicates that practical reason or practical theology must always be related to the inner core of experience and culture. If the Church cannot respond to the questions "What should we do?" and "How should we live?" theological reflection remains operating only in the outer envelope. Browning, then, presents five levels of practical moral reasoning to further control the process of critical theological reflection on the three sources of information. Ray Anderson gives a good summary of the five levels of practical moral reasoning.

> 1) vision: a new or amended understanding of a person or community, 2) obligational: a new integration of old traditions and practices, 3) tendency-need: a more explicit way to allow people to deal with their needs in a conscious and intentional way, 4) environmental-social: a transformation of the community or the environment to more deliberately reflect theological convictions, 5) rules and roles: concrete patterns of living are changed.[77]

Browning's method in dealing with the three sources of information requires both the hermeneutical and the radical empirical perspectives. He argues that we always interpret experience from the perspective of our foreknowledge, but experience can talk back. For instance, images of justice are greatly shaped by their narrative tradition. However, our ongoing brute experiences of other people's claims and needs provide

[76] Ibid., pp.10-11
[77] Anderson, R.S., p.28

new knowledge for us to reshape our concepts of justice. Likewise, "we interpret our human tendencies and needs first by inherited narrative traditions. Yet the brute reality and the ongoing experience of our human nature do at times intrude and teach us nuances about ourselves."[78] For Browning, radical empiricism's view of experience does not deny the narrative view. Rather, it makes the narrative view less rigid and shows how "experience, as well as narrative, informs both our principles of obligation and our perception of human needs and tendencies."[79]

Thus, Browning develops his critical dialogue between religio-ethical convictions and cultural expressions which is called 'revised correlation method'. His method is intentionally critical, public, and centreed in theological ethics. By critical, he means that the method begins in the faith formed by a community of believers and yet it develops through intentional reflection searching for reasons for its practical actions.[80] In other words, we have to maintain a critical dialogue with different sources. Although theology can always start with faith or tradition, it must go beyond an unreflective attitude and seek understanding and reasons, especially for its practical reason. In this process, conflicts may be found between the different sources. Nevertheless, the ongoing dialogue with different sources based on practical reason can provide stabilizing insights and test the adequacy of our positions. By public, he means that the Church must relate the Christian message not only to the Christian community, but also to the public world in all its pluralistic nature. Thus, the Bible needs constant reinterpretation in order to make it relevant to contemporary society and Christian faith

[78] Browning, D.S. 1996, p.180
[79] Ibid., p.180
[80] Browning, D. "Practical Theology and Religious Education," in L.S. Mudge and J.N. Poling (eds.), *Formation and Reflection* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), p.80

has to be philosophical enough to demonstrate its validity alongside all other claims according to public criteria. It is ethical in the way that Browning treats theological ethics as the centre of the practical theological disciplines. He writes, "It is the discipline that most self-consciously concerns itself with both the norms of human action and the norms of human fulfillment."[81] On the whole, Browning's method can bring the different sources of information into a critical dialogue. Particularly, his five-dimensional understanding of practical moral reasoning can prevent theologians from limiting themselves to one or two of these dimensions but ignoring the Others.

2.3.2 The mode of narrative

Browning's writing is rather ethical. Not every practical theologian shares his view that practical theology is mainly related to ethics. Charles Gerkin sees practical theology as a critical, exploratory, and dialogical process which explores and creates meanings and is also in some ways aesthetic. For him, practical theology is much looser, softer-edged, and more diverse than it is for Browning. Nevertheless, he does not ignore the ethical dimension in pastoral care.

Gerkin holds the view that the Church is serving not only a minority of philosophical persons, but also a majority of ordinary persons who do not live primarily by the rule of reason narrowly conceived or by means of a logical process that can best be described as practical moral reasoning.[82] This means that pastoral care is to discern the presence of normative issues as they appear in ordinary human language such as image,

[81] Ibid., pp.81-82
[82] Gerkin, V.C. *Prophetic Pastoral Practice a Christian Vision of life together* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1991) p.21

metaphor, and story. As we discussed earlier, no one can escape the influence of tradition. The Christian communities are often unaware of their norms which have been constituted by the Judeo-Christian tradition of the West. Thus, to be faithful to our tradition is to bring the preunderstanding of our tradition into dialogue with the realities of life at the present time. This allows other horizons to speak to us and offers their alternative ways of seeing the world. It is through "the fusion of horizon made possible by such dialogue that a transformation of our understanding of our situation and the way ahead out of that situation may be found."[83] Gerkin uses the feminist biblical scholar Phyllis Trible's book *Texts of Terror* as an example to illustrate this point. In the book, Trible presents a critique of patriarchy and challenges the sexism of scripture. She not only points out that the Church should be careful to "reexamine the sacred texts of the Christian tradition", but also expresses in a most positive way the intentionality behind such efforts at reinterpretation. It is an effort to "redeem the time," and to search for new norms in contemporary Western culture.[84]

Gerkin continues to criticize the practical moral reasoning by using Gadamer's concept of common sense. For Gadamer, it is common that people are not based upon the ability to "judge particulars under universal viewpoints."[85] This means that, "people are not necessarily based upon some carefully constructed logic grounded in universal principles of ethics and values."[86] Rather, they often judge particulars based on what is right or wrong within a particular cultural tradition or context. Thus, theological

[83] Ibid., p.47
[84] Ibid., p.45
[85] Gadamer, H.G. *Truth & Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1982) p.31
[86] Gerkin, 1991, p.45

reflection on concrete situations is not to find out what the universal principles of ethics and values are, but to find out what is common sense in their socio-cultural world.

There are three key concepts of common sense: Hans-George Gadamer's aesthetic taste, Richard Niebuhr's fitting response, and Stanley Hauerwas' moral self within the community. For Gadamer, to understand the truth or normativity may not be dependent on an empirical universality, the complete unanimity of the judgments of others. It can depend on the sense of what is true because it is beautiful. This refers to the idea of taste or aesthetic with which everything that is beautiful must harmonize. It does not require that everyone will agree with one's judgment, but that they should agree with it. Gadamer gives an example to explain this point.

Against the tyranny exercised by fashion, sure taste preserves a specific freedom and superiority. This is its real normative power, which is peculiar to it alone, the knowledge that is certain of the agreement of an ideal community. In contrast to the ruling of taste by fashion, we see here the ideality of good taste. It follows that taste makes an act of knowledge – in a manner, it is true, which cannot be separated from the concrete situation on which it operates and cannot be reduced to rules and concepts.[87]

Gadamer's illustration reveals what is commonly understood as good and true to be so for a cultural community and recognition of a normativity that transcends commonly held ideals. Gadamer's explication of aesthetic judgment has traditionally included an

[87] Gadamer, H.G., 1982 p.36; Gerkin, 1991, pp.54-55

understanding of what is 'fitting.' Richard Niebuhr believes that the appropriate ethical question is not whether an action is good or right, but whether it is fitting. A fitting action is dependent on both a process of interpretation of one's particular situation and on an interpretation of the fitting response to the Christian tradition. In other words, a fitting action is able to respond to the context in which we find ourselves and to the ultimate context in which God acts in creation and in history.[88]

For the ethics of character, Stanley Hauerwas criticizes ethicists for being focused too much on atomistic decisions, and for ignoring the nature and development of the Self and community. He believes that what is moral is the development of a moral self within the community. For instance, the Christian life is not made up of one isolated 'loving' act added to another. Instead, it should be the progressive growth of the Self into the fuller reality of God's action in Christ, which reveals what the ethics of character is. In other words, we do not ask about ethics in isolated contexts, but in stories of communities.[89]

Based on the above understanding, Gerkin believes that the cultural-linguistic theology of George Lindbeck is more adequate to deal with the polarities of different sources, particularly, in the age of pluralism. For Lindbeck, the doctrine of the Church is communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs and practices, which are considered essential to the identity of the group.[90] He identifies three ways of

[88] Niebuhr, R.H. *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) p.43
[89] Hauerwas, S. *Vision and Virtue* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) pp 49-67
[90] Lindbeck, G. *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Doctrine in a Postliberal Age* (London: SPCK, 1984) p.74

understanding doctrine, namely, propositional, experiential-expressive, and cultural linguistic. The first is to accept the truth of certain theological propositions which are applicable to "the situation at hand in the expectation that the hearer will accept and believe it."[91] In other words, this model is focused on a cognitive mindset, based on a foundational faith. The second one is rooted "in the assumption of a common core of human religious experience that may have diverse forms of expression in various contexts."[92] This model is concentrated on experiential-expressivism on the inner life and its intuitive links with symbolism. Its main concern is about human experiences in search of the answer to existential questions and for "something in the theological tradition which confirms the experience."[93]

The last one is a cultural-linguistic model which is considered "intellectually and empirically the most adequate" of the three approaches.[94] This model lays its emphasis on "those respects in which religions resemble language together with their correlative forms of life and are thus similar to cultures."[95] Gerkin interprets this model as "the attempt to objectify a particular religious culture and its embodiment in narrative and ritual."[96]

Lindbeck has a preference to the cultural-linguistic model due to the fact that there are certain problems with the Other two models. Firstly, Lindbeck acknowledges the importance of Scripture, but he believes that "the propositionalist ways of appropriating

[91] Gerkin, G., *An Introduction to Pastoral Care* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1997), p.106
[92] Ibid.
[93] Lyall, D., *Integrity of Pastoral Care* (London: SPCK, 2001), p.59
[94] Lindbeck, G. p.30
[95] Ibid., pp.17-18
[96] Gerkin, G. 1997 p.108

the Bible are based on outdated philosophical notions."[97] Secondly, he challenges the experiential-expressivist assumption that there is "a common, universal core of experience that grounds and shapes the questions of religious experience" in this pluralistic age.[98] Moreover, he disagrees with the experiential-expressivist belief that "religious experience begins inside the individual and then moves out in search of a community."[99] For Lindbeck, the answer is the other way round. Religious experience is communal rather than individualistic. In other words, "belonging to a community constituted by a story takes precedence over believing the story itself."[100]

Gerkin draws on Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model, aimed at promoting the dialogue between "the communal story of the Christian community and the many life stories of many people who are in some way related to the Christian community."[101] Gerkin's approach widens the Church's horizons to reconsider the care of the Christian community and the tradition that gives the community its identity. In other words, a pastoral care which finds its identity rooted in biblical narratives can provide people with a storied context of ultimate meaning for their lives. "To the degree that this storied context maintains its connection with all the varied stories of individual, family and community life in the world, it can provide a meaning-filled nesting place and thus provide the most elementary context of care."[102] For Gerkin, the recovery of identity in practical theology is essentially a task of retrieving the narrative roots of the theological tradition. The Church is called to employ narrative and interpretative techniques in

[97] Ibid., p.109
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Lyall, D., 2001, p.60
[101] Gerkin, G., 1997, p.110
[102] Lyall,D., 200, p61

order to help form and nurture fundamental identity, meaning, and purpose in this pluralistic society.

2.3.3 Narrative as an action of transformative practice

Fundamentally, practical theology is concerned with transformative practice and brings practical concern/action to it from the very beginning. The narrative approach does not limit itself to interpreting/analysing the written texts, but also considers human action as a text (Boisen's 'Living Human Document' and Gerkin's 'people being the text'). For the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, both the text and the human action have a meaning that goes beyond the meaning intended by the author. Also, they provide a more objective meaning which goes beyond the original intentions or the original situations of their authors. The process of interpreting the text is basically the same as the interpretation of a concrete pastoral act. Donald Capps takes up Ricoeur's view that texts and meaningful actions have similar characteristics, and he applies these characteristics to pastoral actions. Let us summarize their similarities in four main points:

1. Like written texts, meaningful action leaves its mark. The written texts not only have a content that can be reinterpreted, but also have an influence on their readers' behavior. Similarly, meaningful actions also have content and impact.[103]
2. Like written texts, meaningful action has unintended consequences. Anything that is written has meanings and effects which its author did not intend and could not have intended. Similarly, a pastoral action also has meanings and effects that the agent did not intend..
3. Like written texts, meaningful action creates a world. A dialogue refers to the situation of the partners in the discourse. However, the written text is directed

[103] Capps, D. *Pastoral Care and Hermeneutics* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984) P.38

to whoever wants to read it. Dialogue is replaced by understanding. The relation of writing and reading is different from that of speaking and hearing. In this sense, a written text not only opens a situation, but also refers to "a world that is free from the narrowness or limits of the original dialogical situation."[104] Similarly, meaningful action is no longer just a transaction in the given situation. Rather, it can provide a new dimension of our being-in-the world.

4. Like written texts, meaningful action is always open to interpretation. Since written texts are free from the limits of the original dialogical situation, anyone who can read may discover new meanings in the texts. Likewise, the meaningful action no longer lies in the intention of the agent who executed the action but in the action itself. In other words, meaningful action is also accessible to those who were not present at the time the action took place. "These new 'readers' may discover meanings in the action that were not seen by the original agent or those who were not actually present."[105] Thus, past actions are open to fresh interpretation or to a practical interpretation within the current praxis.

The main concern of Capps' work is about the pastoral action addressing the problem of false consciousness. In the twentieth century, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud are three great thinkers who criticize the Christian community for being built upon false perceptions of reality such as the inconsistency between doing and being, the discrepancy between what a person says and means, and the difference between the intention and the appropriateness of the pastoral action in terms of meeting real needs. In order to end this false consciousness, Capps is locating pastoral integrity in the congruence between the pastoral intentionality, pastoral action, and pastoral effectiveness (to meet real human needs).[106]

If action is linked to understanding the intention and motivation of the action, one must deal with the relation between the 'what' and the 'why' of an action. Meaningful

[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid., p.39
[106] Ibid., 58-9; Lyall, D. *Integrity of Pastoral Care* (London: SPCK, 2001), p.53

actions require not only a motive as cause, but also as reason for. In other words, before one understands an action, one must seek what motivates people and why they do what they do in this particular way. This allows one to move from understanding and explanation, and then to change. The three perspectives (understanding, explanation, and change) can be further developed into three stages for structuring this thesis.

In the initial stage of understanding action, this thesis will focus on attending and analyzing to the world behind the text 'living human document' consisting of the contexts, events, and narrator's meaning communication to audience. The action of narrative becomes relatively independent from the narrator and the original setting. This becomes open to reinterpretation by the audience.[107] If the narrative approach constructs our experience in storylike forms which include all forms of representations of real or fictional situationals, this approach would "move away from the modernist view of knowledge as the direct representation of an objective external reality."[108] If the understanding of knowledge and context is a human product of narratives, the theological reflection must be done more in terms of an activity, process, and a way of living. Gerkin believes that carefully listening and deep reflection on a retelling of the human story could "expand social horizons and liberate persons from oppressive forms of consciousness and destructive patterns of interpersonal relationship."[109]

[107] Ganzevoort, R.R. 'Narrative Approaches'. In Miller-McLemore, B.J. (ed.) *Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Practical Theology*. (Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p.216
[108] Ibid. p.217
[109] Couture, P.D. & Hunter, R.J. (eds.) *Pastoral Care and Social Conflict* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995), p.9

The second stage of explaining action aims toward a 'fusion of horizons' of the text (Scripture and the history of the Christian Church) and the context (the contemporary experiences and culture). Gadamer's concept of 'the fusion of horizons' is rather complicated and deserves further explanation. He holds the view that our present historical consciousness or common sense is largely a product of the past.[110] It is because living with tradition is not something one chooses to do or not to do. Fundamentally, humans who live in a culture are shaped by that culture's tradition. In other words, the tradition does not just die and exist as a frozen body which is unable to constitute present events. Rather, the tradition lives in the present and often shapes our fore-understandings in seeing and comprehending the world. This is to say that when we interpret the contemporary situation, we should not ignore the culture and the tradition which shape present historical consciousness. This is what Gadamer called "a fusion of the whole of the past with the present".[111] Gadamer's theory points out that our understanding of a text or a context requires a certain bias. This is due to the fact that our understanding of the text and application of it to our concrete situation are in part determined by our own experiences, by our own cultures, and by our own traditions within the group to which we belong. Thus, our theological reflection must acknowledge the bias, or the prejudging, determined by historical and sociological factors. This involves a dialogue between different interpretations of information (Christian stories and various other human stories) so as "to clarify, challenge, and purify the insights and limits of each."[112] This is a method of correlation, which involves human powers of reasoning to find a balance between different sources and to give explanation to different actions.

[110] Gadamer, H.G. *Truth & Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 273
[111] Ibid., p.273
[112] Whitehead, J.D. & Whitehead, E. E., p.75

The final stage is the action of decision and committing in transformative practice. This stage is the fruits of the earlier stages and is the action of bringing those fruits back into contact with the challenge of the concrete situation.[113] The object of this stage is concerned with the development of action strategies for social and individual transformation (change). This involves "the ability to generate alternatives, to choose among the partial solutions, and to keep choices accountable to the larger vision."[114] The choice of an appropriate strategy is of great importance in practical theology.

2.4 Conclusion

The narrative approach helps us understand that human narratives, emerging from different communities and different traditions are neither uniform in form nor equal in status. Instead they are culturally differentiated, mutually competing, and diversely interpreted. Although the Western form of speaking about narratives has been dominated by the Enlightenment or Euro-centric modernism, the meta-narratives are no longer adequate to respond to the cultural shift or the cultural diversity created by postmodernism, postcolonialism, and globalisation. In other words, the notion of narrative is a contested one, and local cultural realities and peculiarities must be taken into consideration in any adequate understanding. Following the logic of diversity, the understanding of the particular issue (such as democracy, truth, and justice) can also be perceived through different, incompatible, and even antagonistic narratives. However, certain narratives are restricted to particular communities/groups and unheard to the

[113] Ibid., p.24
[114] Ibid., p.25

Other due to the inequality of the power relation. Our research must go beyond attending to the particular narratives at the centre or the top, and move forward to expanding our horizon to include those narratives which have been repressed at the periphery and the bottom.

Human narratives are not fixed or natural. Rather, they are culturally and historically constructed. Human groups and communities do not speak the same across history. Their narratives evolve and often become discontinued through time. More importantly, human communities and their narratives have "the intrinsic critical consciousness to re-emerge from history and create historically better or preferred visions of reality and ways of acting."[115] Thus, it is possible that members of cultures can reflexively and actively reorient and transform their own narratives, such as cultural prejudice, domination, or alienation. Also, it is possible to recover or reconstruct a new narrative of cultural diversity, tolerance, and reconciliation. If narrative is saturated with culture and cultural contestation in particular, we should try our best to avoid reproducing dominant/repressive language and to adopt a culturally hybridised/inclusive form of narrative.

[115] Shi-xu (ed.) *Discourse as Cultural struggle* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), p.7

CHAPTER THREE
HONG KONG'S CONTEXT:
SITE OF HYBRIDITY IN COLONIAL PERIOD

3.1 Introduction

As we mentioned in the last chapter, the fear of reintegration is due to the presupposition that the two distinct cultural traditions between mainland China and Hong Kong appear to have their own static entities which are fundamentally incompatible and irreconcilable. Such a simplistically dichotomous narrative is mainly due to the cultural biases of scholars, whose arguments are built on the methodology of binary opposition, in a grand narrative in which cultural practice can be classified as good/bad, civilised/uncivilised, developed/underdeveloped, included/excluded, or normal/abnormal. This one-sided narrative considers cultural differences as a cultural clash or irreconcilable conflicts and cultural mixing as an undesirable consequence of cultural destruction.

This chapter will argue that cultural identity does not have an 'absolute existence' which we can discover, but is a mode of narrative about ourselves. In this sense, the contested identities between Hong Kong and mainland China are not static or fixed, but are historically constructed in the process of acculturalisation and socialization in a given time and space.[116] More importantly, identity is more than just a cultural product or a wholly narrative construction, but also a subject (the people of Hong Kong), a social agent which has the ability to resist and to change the social order. If the formation of identity involves a subject interacting or negotiating with different

[116] Giddens, A *The Constitution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), pp.282-3

elements (such as between self and other, social agency and external forces), the fixed identities between Hong Kong and mainland China and the language of enemy-and-us dichotomy would be destabilised and would be opened to change. The cultural reconciliation between two places becomes possible and feasible.

The fear of China is due to a mindset that has been dominated by a Eurocentric narrative which has been operating in Hong Kong society. There is therefore a need to unmake these textual codes and symbolic practices which the West constructed in its domination of colonial subjects. Hong Kong's narrative on China is a re-production of Western modernism and a collective identity. As the people of Hong Kong have recognised Britain to be a benefactor that brought liberation and modernisation, they began to imitate and internalize the culture of the West. They began to be objectified themselves by formulating their subjective consciousness based on Western modernity through the British Empire. Cultural dependence was much strengthened by native intellectuals who passionately learn English and Western culture. Such extreme inflow of Western culture has been confronted with cultural nationalism which has a tendency to divide us by essentialising and totalising them. In this chapter, we will expose how Eurocentrism has been operating within the narrative of the handover event. The attempt is to open a way to re-valorise the various and multiple voices which have been sealed.

This chapter will demonstrate how meaning is constructed through systems of representation. Deconstruction is the term applied to the process of revealing the ways in which particular meanings are constructed through specific systems of representation

or narrative.[117] In terms of the handover narrative is to challenge 'the taken-for-grantedness' of the narrative by revealing the links "between the words, the practices and the institutional expressions of the past and the future of Hong Kong; between the relations of power and domination that order the world and words and images that represent those worlds"[118]. This is a move beyond a binary narrative centreed on local experiences and knowledge. Local narrative serves as a counter-narrative of binary opposition. The hybrid identity of Hong Kong people is not simply a colonial product, but also an act of the people who choose the mode of collaboration to resist colonisers and to transform the city.

If the formation of identity involves a process of interaction or negotiation with different elements (such as between self and other, social agency and external forces), it would be difficult to envisage a culture that is not hybrid or multi-layered. If we consider identities as narrative, performative, and historical constructions, the interpretation of this city will be under the interaction among three existing forces of postmodernism, postcolonial and global theories. This is intended to portray the pluralistic picture of forms of resistance that already exist to interrogate hegemonies of two Masters (Britain and mainland China) and two regimes (mainland China and Taiwan). The mode of hybridity is not only used as an analytical tool to deconstruct the cultural past, but also a new identity we can identify with and a new space which allows other positions to emerge and makes cultural reconciliation feasible.

[117] "Narrative includes all forms of representation of real or fictional situations in a time sequence. This sequence connects events into patterns of causality, desirability, development, and meaning" quoted from Ganzevoort, R.R. "Narrative Approach", Miller-Mclemore (ed.) *Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Practical Theology*. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) p216

[118] Crush, J, (ed.) *Power of Development* (London: Routledge,1995) p.6

I argue that a one-dimensional narrative with this issue conceals a much more fundamental source of culture that contributes to the diversity of Hong Kong. However, if we take a different lens to examine a culture in a community, we will realise that the same community (e.g. Britain in imperial period) can be described as an invader who exploited underdeveloped countries or as a benevolent agent who brought civilisation to the barbaric. In other words, good or bad culture depends on the lens you use. Thus, this chapter aims at a methodological reconstruction, attempting to employ the mode of hybridity as a tool to take a new look at the relationship between Hong Kong identity and colonial narrative.

3.2 Narrative of handover

Identity is "the Self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography."[119] This implies that identity is a mode of thinking about ourselves or a matter of selfhood. Since identity is social and cultural in character, what we think we are is dialogically and culturally constructed. In this sense, the contested identities between Hong Kong and mainland China cannot fully reflect the objective reality, because it is related to human narrative – natural and social, fact and value, knowledge and opinion.[120] As discussed in the methodology consideration, Derrida sees the identity of words to be without fixed meaning[121] while Foucault considers the ordering of meaning as the operation of power in the process of social practice.[122] Similarly, Rorty views any epistemological term as a consensual term built on a political action in

[119] Giddens, A *Modernity and Self-identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), P.53
[120] Rorty, R. *Consequences of Pragmatism*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980)
[121] Baker, 2003, p.100
[122] Foucault, M. *Discipline and Punish* (London: Allen Lane, 1977)

a particular time, space, and culture. If truth, knowledge, and understanding are articulated within particular language games, then truth can be seen as the result of our particular form of acculturation.[123] All in all, identities are subject to review and are temporarily stabilized. [124] Any single narrative on identity would appear highly inadequate to reflect the reality of Hong Kong. Based on this concern, media narratives of the handover of Hong Kong are a good starting point to analyze the context of Hong Kong. Other reasons are put forward to further support this selection. Firstly, the event of the handover is a drawing line between British colonial rule and Hong Kong people's rule of the territory under the Chinese policy of "one country, two systems". From this line, we can trace back the colonial past and explore the possibility of cultural reconciliation after the reunification.

Secondly, the handover ceremony in 1997 drew over 8,000 journalists from different parts of the world to come to Hong Kong to cover the event. The significance of this global event went beyond the local event or handover itself. Qing Cao, Senior Lecturer in Chinese International School, Liverpool John Moores University, pointed out that Hong Kong, in this historic moment, became "a site of struggles among various 'narrative communities' for dominance over meanings."[125] Narrative community refers to a group of people sharing a framework of interpretation and a set of common conventions to construct their own narratives for readers. [126] From the narrative communities, we can see "how through such story-telling, each society or culture

123 Rorty, R. 1991, pp.13-14
124 Foucault, M. *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980)
125 Qing Cao, "Signification of Hong Kong's Handover: the case of the British Press," *Journal of International Communication* 6.2 (1999): p.71
126 Pan Z., et al., "One event, three stories: media narratives of the Handover of Hong Kong in cultural China." *Gazette*, 61, No. 2, 1999, p.99

reassesses itself and copes with potential tensions to achieve internal coherence in the face of globalisation. This is the essential tension between globalisation and localization."[127]

Thirdly, this section seeks to analyze how the media from Britain and the mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong constructed their respective narratives about the handover of Hong Kong. The media from Britain, mainland China, and Taiwan constructed the event based on the method of binary opposition and their imagination about fundamental clashes such as colonialism versus nationalism, capitalism versus communism, and East versus West, national versus regional. The analysis reveals how the handover was perceived by these media systems and made sense to their readers, but not to the people of Hong Kong. The selection of media for this analysis is based on Fowler's belief that "news is a representation of the world in language. It imposes a structure of values, assumptions and belief on what is represented. Like every narrative, it constructively patterns that of which it speaks. Differences in expression carry ideological distinctions and thus differences in representation. The content of newspapers therefore is not facts about the world, but ideas, beliefs, values, theories and ideology."[128] This is similar to Foucault's concept of narrative that knowledge is not purely objective, but is regulated by the operation of power in the process of social practice.[129] In this sense, the news reporting the handover of Hong Kong is not to reveal the 'whole truth' or 'facts'. Rather, it is a mediation from a producer (journalist or editor) or a receiver of the event (the reader at home). The producer presents the event based on a particular framework among a given narrative community. Thus, to analyze

[127] Ibid. p.12
[128] Fowler, R. *Language in the news: narrative and ideology in the press*. (London: Routledge, 1990)
[129] Foucault, M. *Discipline and Punish* (London: Allen Lane, 1977)

their narratives on handover will help us to find out not only their narrative formation, but also "the construction of social reality, the exercise and distribution of power, and the dissemination of ideology, and the reproduction of social identity."[130]

Finally, the analysis aims at uncovering the unique context of Hong Kong which is a site of contestation or hybridity, torn between two Masters (Britain and China), and between two Chinese regimes (the communist on the Chinese mainland and the Kuomintang on Taiwan), between national and local (mainland China and Hong Kong), and between global and local (international and Hong Kong). In order to survive in these dynamics, Hong Kong people take the identity of hybridity or mode of collaboration to turn the territory from a barren fishing village to an open and rich international city.

The West framed China and Hong Kong as the Other, the object of study, where otherness (non-West) often supposed inferiority of the object – a mindset applied to all Third World countries. They justified the main tenets of colonial capitalism as the antidote to the 'primitivism.' They believed in a linear and predictable progress of history. They brought technology, civilised culture, democracy, and economics to the East. It is a heroic and rationalistic view of history and historicism, a grand narrative of nineteenth-century colonialization predicated on evolutionism. They function in a monopolistic way of choosing an unnecessarily stark and binary analysis of indigenous histories.

[130] Qing, p.73

3.2.1 British Press

This research is greatly indebted to Qing Cao and Pan, et. el., who have provided a substantial amount of material and in-depth analyses of media reports on the event of the handover. The latter chose the biggest three mainland Chinese media outlets for discussion, namely, *Central Television* (CCTV), *the People's Daily* and *Xinhua News Agency*. The former selected five broadsheet and four daily newspapers in the United Kingdom for the analysis of the British narrative on the handover event, namely the broadsheet newspapers the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Guardian*, the *Independent*, the *Times*, and the *Financial Times*, and the daily newspapers the *Daily Mail*, the *Mirror*, the *Express*, and the *Sun*.[131] The data for analysis will focus on the date of handover, but related materials will also be examined before and after the ceremony.

Regarding the historical background, British media did not mention too much about the Opium War and China being forced to sign the 'unequal treaties' to cede Hong Kong to her. Instead, British media showed a strong sense of 'imperial nostalgia' and highlighted how Britain had brought civilisation to Hong Kong and left good legacy in the territory. The overwhelming theme of the handover reporting in the British press was the loss of empire. [132] The nostalgia was around the sentimental ceremonies of Chris Patten as the last governor and his fight for democracy for the people of Hong Kong over the preceding five years.[133] Apart from the sentimental sadness of leaving

[131] Ibid., p.72

[132] The headlines and leads of British newspapers on the 1st of July 1997 showed this point clearly: "Britain's farewell to empire" (*Daily Telegraph*); "A last hurrah and an empire closes down" (*The Guardian*); "Farewell to my Empire" (*The Mirror*);

[133] "A tearful salute to the last jewel in the crown" (*Daily Mail*); "Leaving on a point of honour" (*The Daily*

the territory, British media portrayed nostalgic celebrations on why Britain should be proud of its empire's legacy, such as the success of laissez-faire economy, the introduction of democracy, freedom of the individual, and the rule of law.

In order to unite the historical past and present with coherence, we can find that the British press adopted the strategies which are 'active forgetting'/ 'selective memory' and the creation of a new myth. Combined with the absence of the invasion of China and the early history of Hong Kong, they focused on presenting the historical present of the colonial success in terms of economics and politics. This created a new identity or myth that the British Empire is good for all people and is able to change the world for the better. The *Daily Telegraph* made this comment "Britannia sails into the night as the flag of freedom is lowered forever."[134] This echoes a local British scholar's assumption that "the post-imperial world order is less just, less stable and less civilised than what it succeeded."[135]

3.2.2 PRC Press (mainland China)

Unlike Britain, the PRC media did not forget the historical past and marked the Opium War as the beginning of national humiliation and imperialist exploitation of China's weakness. They united the historical past and present by presenting linearly from weak China losing its territory to strong China washing away past humiliation. They articulated the CCP (the Chinese Community Party) leaders as heroes to save China

telegraph); "A time for tears" (*The Daily Telegraph*)

[134] *The Daily Telegraph* (1997), p.2-3, 1 July

[135] Quoted from John Casey, fellow of Gouville and Caius College at Cambridge University, found in The 'A time for tears' *Daily Telegraph* (1997), p. 18, 30June.

both in terms of nation and states. At the opening paragraph of the *People's Daily* editorial on 30 June, the theme was to praise the CCP's leadership and their correct decision to reunite Hong Kong.

> Tomorrow, 1 July, is the 76th anniversary of the Chinese Community Party, also the happy day of Hong Kong's reunification with the motherland to wash away 100 years of national humiliation. Having two celebrations in one day is a rare moment in our country's political life. All Party comrades and people of different ethnics groups with unparalleled excitement, warmly celebrate the reunification of Hong Kong and praise our great Party![136]

Apart from celebrating the national achievement and the success of CCP leadership, the PRC media also attempted to recreate a highly politicized myth of the Chinese as a nation-family. National festivity being a family affair, expression of patriotic feelings was mingled with the rituals of ancestral worship. On the eve of the handover, for example, a CCTV programme featured a family memorial of Lin Zexu, an official who ordered the burning of confiscated British opium and triggered the Opium War in 1840. The caption read, 'The family commemorating the ancestor and welcoming Hong Kong's return'. After a high-ranking official and the most senior member of the family clan read a eulogy in a hometown gathering, 300 descendants recited a pledge of patriotism to their distinguished ancestor. Similarly, CCTV and *the People's Daily* repeatedly quoted jubilant citizens as saying that all 'children of the Yellow Emperor' who should be united as closely as 'flesh and bones' in the 'big motherland family'. In order to have a geographical balance and to create a global appearance, *the People's Daily* interviewed various overseas Chinese communities honouring Hong Kong's return, from London, Washington, Tokyo, Melbourne, Johannesburg, etc. This was

[136] *People's Daily* editorial 30 June 1997

intended to "construct a mythical concept of 'Chinese' that transcended spatial divide."[137]

3.2.3 Kumintang Press (Taiwan)

In contrast to Beijing's 'national-family celebration', the Taiwan media did not credit Hong Kong's return to the CCP. Rather, they welcomed Hong Kong's reintegration with the Chinese people – *our* Chinese nation, not *your* communist family. Regarding the historical past, the Kuomintang government argued that they, not the communists, were the real heroes to defeat the Japanese invasion and brought the country to international prominence. They displayed the original copy of the Nanjing Treaty which ceded Hong Kong to Britain. This indicated that the nation is the Republic of China, which held "historical continuity to the history of the Chinese nation," and which had "an identity larger than the PRC."[138] In this sense, Vice President Zhan Lian argued, "Taiwan is a part of China, but not part of PRC."[139]

Taiwan's media reflected a suspicion of Beijing's "one country, two systems" and wondered whether the Chinese authorities would honour this policy that whole-heartedly allowed Hong Kong people to rule Hong Kong. The head of Taiwan's mainland Affairs Committee announced that they expressed appreciation of Hong Kong's return to 'the Chinese nation', but would not accept a local government status under the PRC's "one country, two systems" policy.[140] The pro-independence media

[137] Pan, et al, p.104
[138] Ibid., p.105
[139] *China Times*, 22 June 1997
[140] "One country, two systems" should not be imposed in Taiwan, *Central Daily*, 1 July 1997, p.2

even went further and treated China and Taiwan as two separate entities. In the *Liberty Times* on 29 June, the headline was "Say No to China" and "Opposing China Annexation," reflecting the wishes of Taiwan.[141] Most of Taiwan's media shared the official position that "one China (as a nation) with a divided sovereignty enjoyed equally by two separate governments (as sovereign states)".[142]

3.2.4 Hong Kong media

Unlike British, PRC and KMT presses, most of Hong Kong's media did not take a binary opposition approach to construct their respective narratives about the handover. Rather, the media coverage displayed four narrative packages: mixed feeling about the reversion, the nostalgia of British legacy, the quest for democracy, and the suspicion of "one country, two systems" mode. Apart from recording the 'Song and Dance' in the handover ceremony, Hong Kong's media focused on capturing the 'public mood' which was ambivalent, uncertain, and confused about the reintegration.[143] Regarding Hong Kong's history, Hong Kong's media did not get involved in the arguments of the colonial past. They presented Hong Kong as a cultural meeting point of the East and the West. The success of the city was due to the people of Hong Kong who were hardworking and were able to survive in the dynamics between two countries (Britain and China), and between two Chinese Regimes (the Communists on the Chinese mainland and the Kuomintang on Taiwan). Striking the balance between different dynamics was the essential element to turn the territory from a barren fishing village to an open and rich international metropolis. Although Hong Kong had been a British colony for over 150 years, the people of Hong Kong did not have grudging feelings

[141] *Liberty Times,* 24 June, 1997
[142] Pan, et al, p.105
[143] *Ming Pao*, 1 July,1997

about any colonial exploitation or imperialist purges. Instead, many of them praised British legacies, such as the rule of law, freedom of speech, and economic development. Ironically, a columnist in *Apple Daily*, one of the most popular newspapers in Hong Kong, expressed his view on Opium War in this way:

> We have to thank the Opium War. Without this war … it would have been impossible for Hong Kong's public opinion to monitor China's power all these years. It may not be appropriate to 'thank the Opium War', but to say 'thank you' to what the colonial rule has brought to Hong Kong is consistent with facts.[144]

This quotation reflected that colonial rule was not seen as something vicious. In contrast, the return to the motherland was viewed as not glorious. Six hours after the handover ceremony, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops, which signified the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China (PRC), entered the New SAR in Hong Kong. This was supposed to be joyful and to have deserved a hero's welcome. However, it was reported that only a handful of people wanted to see what the PLA soldiers really looked like, because they were associated with the military crackdown on China's pro-democracy movement in 1989. In fact, the people of Hong Kong would like the PLA soldiers to keep a low profile and to be symbolic rather than practical.[145] This sentiment reflected that the return to mainland China was considered a source of disturbance or a threat to Hong Kong's progress. Thus, another main concern of local media was whether the Chinese authorities would honour its promise of "one country, two systems" without interfering with the freedom of Hong Kong. The South China Morning Post ran the full text of President Ze-min Jiang's speech at the handover ceremony. The headline read, "Pledge on Rights and Non-Interference". At the centre of the page was a massive

[144] *Apple Daily*, 28 June
[145] *Hong Kong Standard*, 2 July,1997

close-up shot of Jiang juxtaposed with photos of other world leaders and their brief greetings, as if to convey that the 'whole world is watching'. The mass-circulation *Apple Daily* also designed a striking front-page, taken up by a picture of Chinese and Hong Kong SAR flags being hoisted up. It ran a caption in huge bold-face that expressed a mixture of hope and fear: 'Hong Kong should have tomorrow'. Even *Ming Pao*, which had been accused of accommodating to Beijing for years, placed on its 1 July front-page a story quoting the inaugural speech by the newly installed Chief Executive to say that Hong Kong would enjoy an 'unparalleled amount autonomy'.

Despite the efforts of the mainland Chinese leaders and the Chief Executive of the SAR to try to put away the worries of an uncertain future and repeatedly pledged non-interference in Hong Kong's autonomy, 'the public mood' captured by the local media remained with a deep-seated suspicion of "one country, two systems"[146] and a pessimistic about freedom in Hong Kong. In order to defend local autonomy, some of Hong Kong's media held the belief that the rapid development of democracy was an alternative to resist communist interference. *South China Morning Post*'s editorial urged China to leave Hong Kong alone and extensively reported in the second page about various protests organized by the democratic legislators and other voices of dissent.[147] The Hong Kong Standard newspaper highlighted a mixture of celebration and protests, demanding for democracy on the first day of the new HKSAR.[148]

[146] *Ming Pao* and the *Apple Daily*, 1st July, 1997
[147] *South China Morning Post*, 1st July, 1997
[148] *Hong Kong Standard*, 1st July, 1997

3.2.5 Summary

Culture and identity are intrinsic to how we look at ourselves and the Other. The same community (Britain) can be described as imperialists who exploited the weak and took over Hong Kong or as heroes who brought civilisation and prosperity to Hong Kong. The narrative depends on the cultural lenses or tools one employs. The diverse narratives on the handover event challenge the grand narrative which was based on binary opposition.

The significance of the handover ceremony on the 30th June, 1997 went beyond the changing of sovereignty between Britain and China. The media used this event as a global issue to construct their own narratives with a presupposition of their home readers. Hong Kong became a site of contestation among various narrative communities for dominance over meaning of reintegration. It is common that media can easily transform a regional or local issue into global media event, but the global event of the Hong Kong handover was still being interpreted through domestic lenses, based on their prevailing ideology. The re-examination of the handover narrative will help us to see how the people of Hong Kong reassesses itself and deals with potential tensions to achieve internal coherence in the face of globalisation.

The above four media systems have brought different versions of the Hong Kong handover story. They were not involved in arguing about the authenticity of the happenings. Rather, they were concerned about the historical significance to their readers at home. The news reporting of the handover of Hong Kong is not a value-free

reflection of the historical facts, but is filtered through the activation of schematic knowledge shared among their home community as a narrative background in the form of common-sense assumption and supposition. In this sense, the way Hong Kong's media portrayed the handover event, to a large extent, represents the ideology of the territory, because the report is largely drawn from socially approved assumptions, with which solidarity can be derived from the home reader. Based on this assumption, we can conclude that the narrative of binary opposition on handover did expose the partiality of Hong Kong's reality, but was not wide enough to embrace the mixed feelings of Hong Kong people about the reversion. The Hong Kong media made it clear that the people of Hong Kong did not take a binary opposition approach to handle the dynamics between Britain and China, between China and Taiwan and between the local Hong Kong SAR and the national Beijing. In one instance, Hong Kong's media did not get into the historical controversies of the colonial past and did not follow the PRC's and Taiwan's reporters to condemn Britain to exploit China's weakness in Opium War. Rather, Hong Kong's media were forward looking and were concerned about who would defend the British legacy of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. In another instance, the PRC media attempted to construct a great Chinese 'Nation-Family' celebration based on mythical blood and ancestral ties, while Taiwan media rejected this integration and drew different boundaries from the PRC. The Hong Kong media, on the one hand, recognised the PRC's status and the central authorities, but on the other hand they tried to distinguish the uniqueness of Hong Kong from China in terms of ideology and values. In other words, the people of Hong Kong were ethnically identified as Chinese, but politically and culturally found it hard to admit the Chinese identity which is represented by the communist party of the PRC. These are the reasons

why the people of Hong Kong have had mixed feeling about the reversion and the multiple layers of their identities.

3.3 The formation of the hybrid identity in the Colonial period

In the previous discussion, we realise that the contested identities between mainland China and HKSAR were products created by narrative communities who held a presupposition of binary opposition. It seemed that Hong Kong had been an alienable part of China and had excluded the possibility of reconciliation with its motherland. In contrast, this section will argue that although Hong Kong had developed as a distinct region from its counterparts in mainland China, its roles and identity were not one-sided, fixed or static. Instead, they were multi-layered, dynamic, and changeable. They held 'layered' identities that shifted with their social roles and stress different identities for different purposes or for different socio-political contexts. Particularly, the people of Hong Kong had played an important role in civilising and developing modern China. This would minimize the historical tension between China and Hong Kong in the colonial period.

The hybrid identity of Hong Kong people and the contested site of the territory were not contingent features just before handover, but the formation of these features had been going on for much longer. To trace back the colonial history and rediscover the hybrid identity would throw a new light on cultural contestation, destabilise the conflicted identities, minimize the historical tension, seek for cultural reconciliation, and help Hong Kong to construct a new identity with its motherland.

3.3.1 Hong Kong's role in China's nation building

Many scholars have often described Hong Kong[149] as a capitalist paradise without its own history and indigenous culture. The territory was made up of immigrants with a refugee or sojourner mentality. Both Europeans and Chinese in the last century came to Hong Kong mainly for making fast or easy money. Once their goals were achieved, they would leave the place. Hong Kong became "a place where the only political values are pragmatism and apathy; and a sojourner and refugee haven with only a temporary identity."[150] Such interpretations ignored how Hong Kong had already constructed its own place at the very beginning of British colonial time, with its own class of bicultural elites who relied on their connections with China and Britain. There are three main areas in which Hong Kong Chinese have contributed to the development of Modern China, namely, finance, education, and Western values (including capitalism, freedom, rule of law, and human rights)

a) Financial contribution

At the beginning of British rule in Hong Kong, the Qing government considered the colony and its Chinese residents with suspicion of their collaboration with British occupation. The overseas Chinese communities in Hong Kong were viewed as dens of traitors, criminals, and deserters.[151] However, the negative images did not stop many Chinese from choosing to live and to develop business under the British rule in a colony. With their fortunes made from working in a British colony, Chinese merchants did not

[149] Ackbar Abbas, *Hong Kong: The Culture of Disappearance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p.4
[150] Carroll, J.M. "Colonial Hong Kong as a cultural-Historical place," *Modern Asian Studies* 40.2 (2006), p.518
[151] Yen Ching-hwang "Ch'ing Chaning Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644-1912), *Modern Asian Studies* 15.2 (1981) p. 276-279

forget their own identity and were willing to provide financial support to their motherland, such as contributing money for famine and flood relief, buying official degrees and tittles to show their allegiance.[152] Gradually, the Qing realised that overseas Chinese could be of use to the empire and a lucrative source of funding. The Qing government began to refer to overseas Chinese as "Chinese Subjects" instead of "Chinese traitors." Hong Kong was also redefined on the map as "a place where Chinese could live under foreign rule yet help rebuild China."[153]

Apart from contributions to various relief projects in the late 1800s, many Chinese preferred contributing money to rebuild their native districts through large charitable associations such as the Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk. "Some founded free schools, libraries, hospitals and charitable organisations." [154] Those charitable organisations were known for subsidizing the building of bridges in their native districts and for caring for new immigrants to Hong Kong. In brief, the Hong Kong Chinese community had established an extensive network of charitable services and were enabled to give financial support to their countrymen, whether in Hong Kong or in the mainland. These networks later became more important to finance political movements, such as overthrowing the Qing government in 1900s, supporting Yat-sen Sun and Chiang Kai-Shek to defeat the warlords and to unify China, and helping China during the Japanese occupation in the late 1930s and the early 1940s. Carroll gives a good summary in that period:

[152] Yen Ching-hwang, "Ch'ing's Sale of Honours and the Chinese Leadership in Singapore and Malaya (1877-1912)," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1.2 (September 1970), p.21
[153] Carroll, J.M., p.525
[154] Carroll, J.M., Ibid.

> Hong Kong's role in China's development depended on the colony not being part of China justified the fact that these Hong Kong Chinese were living in a British colony. The colony's political stability had helped Chinese in Hong Kong prosper, thereby allowing them to contribute even more fully to rebuilding China.[155]

b) Education contribution

Apart from financial contribution, Hong Kong Chinese also played an important role in bringing Western education to China. As a British Colony, Hong Kong served as a great beacon of Western learning and British culture. In the 1900s, the petition for building an English school exclusively for Hong Kong Chinese is a good example to illustrate this theme. Many Chinese businessmen and professionals in Hong Kong considered themselves as a special conscious group in a special place. In 1901, a group of Hong Kong Chinese bourgeoisie requested Governor Henry Blake to establish an English government school exclusively for their children. Most of them were important and influential people in the Chinese community. Their petitions were based on the rapid increase of the Chinese population of a higher social status and permanently residing in Hong Kong. Apart from the growth of the Chinese population, they also pointed out that the new school would not only educate the new generations with more open minds, but also "result in the more cordial co-operation of the British and Chinese nations and closer intercourse between them."[156] This quotation highlights the importance of the school in building closer ties between China and Britain, indicating that the petitioners were committed in developing modern China and in building up Hong Kong as their permanent home that was different from their counterparts on the Chinese mainland.[157] For Britain, the establishment of the new school was essential, not just for the

[155] Carroll, J.M., p.527
[156] Great Britain, Colonial Office, Original Correspondence: Hong Kong, 1841-1951, series 129 (CO 129), Public Record Office, London, CO 129/306/380, 24 September 1901, Blake to Chamberlain, 672-674., as quoted from Carroll, p.527
[157] Carroll, J.M., p.522

preservation of Chinese elites of Hong Kong, but also for the development of China. Colonial Inspector E. A. Irving gave the following advice to the government: the approval of building this new school was to help Chinese children "not more for their own sakes than for the benefit we shall receive in later years from their influence over their countrymen."[158] Similarly, Governor Blake held the view that "if we can secure the attendance of the children of the Chinese upper classes, many of whom if the schools succeed come down from China, and some of whom will probably form part of the official class of the future, the consequences may be far-reaching and the benefit to this country may amply repay the small outlay that the scheme demands."[159] Owing to the far-reaching benefits to the local Chinese, the future of China and the colonial government, the new school, St. Stephen's College, was approved to be built in 1902.[160]

With continuous efforts in providing good education for every generation, Hong Kong has produced many Chinese elites serving the Chinese government and all over the world. There were two well-known men: "the father of tropical medicine, Patrick Manson, and his pupil, the emancipator of one-fifth of mankind, one of the greatest champions for the cause of Democracy, and Founder of the Chinese Republic, the deathless Dr. Yat-sen Sun."[161]

To sum up, Hong Kong's role in civilising and developing modern China not only minimized the historical tensions, but also improved the relationship between the two

[158] Blake to Chamberlain, 679.
[159] Blake to Chamberlain, 671; also in Hong Kong legislative Council Sessional Papers, 1902,13
[160] Carroll, J.M. ,p.523
[161] Carroll, J.M., p.527

places. More importantly, the special role of the territory helped the Hong Kong Chinese distinguish themselves as a special group of Chinese different from their counterparts on the mainland. In this sense, the distinctive identity of Hong Kong Chinese began to emerge in the late 19th century. This distinctiveness was not necessary to create a barrier blocking the territory to have a good relationship with its motherland. Rather, this special group of Chinese, in the historical review, demonstrated their commitment to China and their contributions minimizing the historical tension between two places. By contrasting Hong Kong's development and progress with that of the mainland, they recognised their special identity which is hybrid – Chinese, but not the same as the counterparts on the mainland.

3.3.2 China's modernisation depended on Hong Kong within British global empire

Hong Kong's success in helping China's modernisation depended very much on the strategic position at the edge of the Chinese and British governments, particularly, being part of the British global empire. Hong Kong is a very small city of about 400 square miles, with largely unusable land of granite mountains, and does not have many natural resources. Before 1842, Hong Kong had just been a barren rock inhabited by a tiny population of fishermen. After the British occupation, Hong Kong had been transformed into a British centre for advancing and safeguarding its economic interests in the Far East, especially, in China. In addition, Hong Kong had been used as a base for those who wanted to trade with China, but were reluctant to subject themselves to the arbitrary Chinese laws.[162] Owing to the strategic position of Hong Kong, Britain

[162] Lau, S.K. *Decolonisation Without Independence and the Poverty of Political Leaders in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: HKIAPS; 1990), P.3-4

built up good legal and government systems to attract merchants and investors from different part of the world.

a) Legal system

Under the Letters Patten and Royal Instructions, the constitution of the British colony, the Governor of Hong Kong was appointed by the British Crown and maintained exclusive powers over the Executive and Legislative Councils, which were only advisory bodies to the Governor. It seemed that the colony's government was largely authoritarian. However, Hong Kong's legal system has been built on the British Common Law system that "plays an important role in providing checks and balance against certain acts of individuals and against the arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the government. The judiciary, appointed by the Governor but on recommendation of an independent Judicial Service Commission, has been considered independent of government influence."[163] In other words, the legal system of Hong Kong had been firmly based on the rule of law and the independence of judiciary. The rule of law provided security and equal opportunities for the people of Hong Kong. Although Hong Kong did not have a democratic government in colonial times, the people of Hong Kong enjoyed a high degree of socio-political freedom. For example, freedom of the media has been well respected in the territory.[164] The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is independent of the civil service, in which its Commissioner was directly responsible to the Governor and, after 1997, to the Chief Executive of the SAR. The commission fought corruption through investigation, prevention and education. In the past thirty years, ICAC had been committed to fighting corruption in every area of

[163] Enright, M. et al. *The Hong Kong advantage* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1997), P.282
[164] Wang & Wong *Hong Kong in the Asia-Pacific Region: Rising to the New Challenges* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press; 1997), P.19

public and private life. Despite keeping corruption under control, it provided a fair, just, and attractive environment for the investors and the people of Hong Kong.

b) Policy on building up an entrepot

Owing to the strategic position of Hong Kong, the British government decided to develop Hong Kong as an entrepot and a commercial centre, instead of an industrial region even though it had been highly developed before 1949. This significant decision not only paved the way for developing Hong Kong into a global city, but also benefited three governments in the colonial period – China, Britain, and Hong Kong. For Britain, the entrepot could advance its economic interests in China, and safeguard its global status in Far East.

For Hong Kong, building on the British government system in terms of an impartial legal systems and good policy on an enptrepot, the colony had gradually transformed from a tiny fishing-port into "the leading financial, industrial, trading, and communication centre of Asia… and is a world leader in many areas"[165] before 1997. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et. al., put forward evidence to support this point:

> The port of Hong Kong is the world's busiest container port. It handles more containers than the whole of Britain.... Hong Kong is the world's eighth-largest trading entity.... It has the second-largest stock market outside Japan in Asia and the sixth-largest overall in the world... the presence of more than 80 of the world's top 100 banks makes Hong Kong a world-class international financial centre.... Per capita income exceeds $25,000, placing Hong Kong in the top ten countries in the world...Foreign currency assets of the Exchange Fund exceed $50 billion. Per

[165] Bruce Bueno De Mesquite et al. *Red Flag Over Hong Kong* (New Jersey: Chatham House Publisher 1996), P.26

> capita, Hong Kong ranks second in the world...During 1993; Hong Kong became the first major city in the world to have a completely digital telecommunications network. It has the second-highest rate of mobile phone use in the world...etc.[166]

For China, the political stability and economic success of the colony enabled Chinese in Hong Kong to prosper and contribute even more fully to rebuilding its motherland. It was believed that Hong Kong's importance to China had escalated since 1949. During the Maoist period from 1949 to 1976, China used Hong Kong as its main port of access to the capitalist world.[167] In 1978, China started the policies of economic reform and promoted 'four modernisations'. Hong Kong became more important to China's engagement with the international economy. China earned one-third of its foreign exchange from Hong Kong, which also acted as a key entry port and centre of expertise. Three of China's four newly-established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were located near Hong Kong and Macao, in order to attract investment from the two cities. The most notable of these was Shenzhen, across the border from the British colony, which obtained foreign investment mainly from Hong Kong. According to Chinese official statistics, Hong Kong ranked either first or second in the foreign trade and direct foreign investment of each of China's thirty provinces and municipalities.[168] Economically, China's benefits from Hong Kong could not be measured. It seemed that the SEZs depended very much on Hong Kong as a free port and a free trading area, as well as a financial centre and a place which was under a common law system. Although Hong Kong is a city dominated by an ethnic Chinese majority, the British legal system and colonial policy had constructed the territory as a global city which was not only different from its motherland, but also helping China to fit into the international community.

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[166] Ibid., P.25
[167] Yahuda, M. *Hong Kong: China's Challenge* (London: Routledge,1996), P.23
[168] Ibid., P.24

In brief, the British system and the entrepot policy transformed a colony into a global city, a meeting place of different parts of the world, a window through which goods and capitals flowed in and out of China, and a co-operation centre which diverted political/ideological warfare into economic development. The floating and transient characters of an entrepot weakened the fixed identity of being Chinese, and the Western values broadened the meaning of the hybrid identity of being Hong Kong Chinese which is more than a Chinese, more open to Western values, and more ready to integrate with global community.

3.3.3 Hong Kong's success built on the mode of collaboration and hybridization

Hong Kong's success was paradoxically constructed by its position within the British global empire, by the colony's relationship with China, and by its hybrid role making the Chinese in Hong Kong prosper and contribute to the modernisation of China. More importantly, the success of Hong Kong was not simply the product of colonialism. Rather, it was the people of Hong Kong, a social agent, who had the ability to resist and the wisdom to choose the mode of collaboration working alongside with British government to handle the dynamics between Britain and China, between the Communists on the mainland and the Kumintang on Taiwan, between global and local issues.

Britain built up its colony in Hong Kong where there was no settled population, except a tiny population scattered in the New Territories. This meant that the British were not

under the threat of strong indigenous leaders who might mobilize the masses to overthrow its rule. To those Chinese who later moved to the territory expected to be ruled under the Colonial systems. Apart from not posing any threat to the colonial government, the Hong Kong Chinese took a collaboration approach to make the colony become an active member of British global empire by taking part "in events such as jubilees, royal visits and empire trade exhibitions."[169] Bernard Cohn, in his book called *Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, indicated that those events were used as rituals or ceremonies to demonstrate British power, to inspire loyalty, and to validate the subject's role in the preservation of the British Empire.[170] For the colonised, the active participation in those events implied that the Hong Kong Chinese were loyal to British rule and made them feel more relaxed and were more willing to exercise an enlightened rule over the people of Hong Kong.

Celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's coronation in 1887 is a good example to illustrate this point. Chinese merchants organized a series of events: bonfires on the hilltops, millions of lanterns hanging everywhere, four miles of Chinese day procession including four dragons, each over 100 feet long, and one mile of dragons lit up from inside. Governor Des Voeux gave this comment in his annual report:

> The British Community fell short of no other in its outward expression of loyalty; but the most striking feature of the occasion was the heartiness with which the Chinese took part in it, and the very large expense, estimated as exceeding $100,000, which they incurred for processions and illuminations in honor of the event. There can scarcely be better proof that they are, on the whole, satisfied with the rule, of which they have now had some 45 years'

[169] Carroll, J.M., p.530
[170] Bernard S. Cohn, *Colonialism and Its Form of Knowledge: The British in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p.3, 125

experience.[171]

Regarding donations, Hong Kong Chinese merchants were generous to contribute funds to the British war effort in South Africa during the First World War. Owing to their sizable contributions, some of them received recognitions and special appointments. Their collaboration changed Britain's attitude toward the people of Hong Kong. In the early years, the colonial government considered Chinese in Hong Kong as the 'scum of Canton,' but in the latter years of the 19th century, the Hong Kong Chinese were viewed as "allies in the struggle for order and stability, in Hong Kong, in South China, and in the British Empire." [172] In addition, the recognition within the British Empire distinguished the Hong Kong Chinese merchants from those of mainland China – not just Chinese, but elite Hong Kong Chinese in the global context.

In the 1940s, the Chinese civil war split the country into two resulting in the Communists on the Chinese mainland and the Kuomintang on Taiwan. They used Hong Kong as "a base in their efforts to undermine the other side, not least by propaganda attacks and by winning or intimidating the hearts and minds of the Chinese in Hong Kong."[173] During these years, Hong Kong became a battlefield for contesting the national identities of the PRC in mainland China and the ROC in Taiwan. In order to avoid being sucked into the politics between the two rival Chinese regimes, the colonial government adopted a policy of strict political neutrality and established the rule of law in Hong Kong. This implied that both the pro-communist and the pro-Kuomintang press

[171] *Hong Kong Annual Report*, 1889, p.26; found in Carroll, J.M., p531
[172] Carroll, J.M., p532
[173] Tsang, S. (ed.) *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government & Politics* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), p.241

were free to publish anything, provided the local laws and order were not disturbed as a result. The policy on freedom of speech won general support from the local Chinese, because they were in a political predicament, "generally preferred to avoid taking sides and stay out of politics altogether."[174]

The people of Hong Kong were cool on political involvement. It was not because they did not care, but because they somehow felt that "now is not the time".[175] One reason was that they witnessed the increasing appearance of disorder after the rapid changes in many Asian countries. The second was that the communist party in the Cultural Revolution brought a disaster to mainland China. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese fled from the mainland to Hong Kong. Besides, the communist party intended to expand its control to include Hong Kong. If the people of Hong Kong did not fully support the colonial government, this would "provide an opportunity for communist party infiltration, rock the present stable political situation and cause social unrest."[176]

The third reason was that the colonial government was capable. It was not only able to defend the territory from being influenced by the communist party, but also provided a harmonious and stable environment for business. Owing to the Hong Kong Chinese's 'collaboration attitude', the British colonial policy was reaffirmed and its regime was strengthened. Against such a background, the British adopted a policy that was "counsel direct but light Colonial governance."[177] This meant that the colonial bureaucracy was

[174] Ibid., p.243
[175] Ibid., p.244
[176] Ibid., p.245
[177] Ibid., p.4

in charge of directly administering the territory, but undertook a policy of non-intervention in society and the economy. This policy allowed the Chinese community to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, a decent level of political freedom and human rights, and a respect of Chinese culture.

In addition, this colonial policy not only allowed two communities (British and Hong Kong Chinese) to co-exist peacefully, but also deepened the hybrid culture in Hong Kong, such as having two official languages (English and Chinese), the observance of both Chinese and Western holidays, the use of bilingual teaching in schools, the freedom afforded to mainland Chinese to come and go to the colony, and the upholding of an English legal system in a predominantly Chinese city. The hybrid culture did not create conflicts between Hong Kong Chinese and British communities. Instead, it enabled the city to become more inclusive to absorb different dynamics, to embrace western and Chinese cultures, and to move toward a global city.

Conclusion

The above discussion indicated that the contested identities between Hong Kong and mainland China were constructed by the binary opposition narrative, which was one-sided and only a partial reflection of the colonial context. The previous discussion revealed that any narrative analysis should not be one narrative. The diverse narratives helped rediscover that Hong Kong's identity is not fixed or static. Instead, it is multi-layered, dynamic and changeable based on the historical construction.

The hybrid identity of Hong Kong was constructed in a contesting process, which helped the people of the territory recognise their multi-layered identities that shift their social roles in different purposes or in different political situations. This allowed Hong Kong to preserve its cultural link with both China and Britain, to develop a global city in prosperity, and to contribute to the modernisation of China. The historical tension between Hong Kong and mainland China can, thus, be minimized. In other words, the success story of Hong Kong was built on the social agent of Hong Kong people who chose the mode of collaboration, rather than binary opposition, as a strategy to resist colonisers, to minimize tension, and to transform the city. In this sense, the mode of collaboration can be seen an alternative strategy to resist and to transform the order of society.

CHAPTER FOUR
STRUGGLE FOR LOCAL IDENTITY IN POSTCOLONIAL ERA

4.1 Introduction

The last chapter identifies the binary narrative on Hong Kong handover, between British and Chinese presses. Britain was described by the mainland Chinese media as an invader who exploited the colony while mainland China was portrayed by the Western media as a new authoritarian coloniser which can potentially undermine the autonomy of a once 'free' city and even dismantle a colonial, capitalist system. The binary narrative, built on two centres and constrained by the language of centrism (enemy-and-us), did not fully reflect the unique situation of Hong Kong, where the people's experiences went beyond the simple dichotomy and were reluctant to adopt the language of binary opposition. The local media clearly revealed that the Hong Kong people's feeling of reintegration with China was ambivalent rather than antagonistic. Such an articulation indicates a more nuanced narrative, which is moving from binaristic centres toward a multicentrism, even the decentring of every centre.

In this chapter, the thesis will continue to use the concept of hybridity, drawn on the theories of postmodernism, postcolonialism and globalisation, to narrate the city of Hong Kong's evolvement after 1997. To examine postcolonial Hong Kong is not about historical stages or periodisation. Neither is it about lowering the British colonial flag and entering a completely new era of neo-coloniality. Rather, it is about its representation and identity emerging among the former experiences of colonialism. There are three attempts in this chapter. Firstly, we will explore how the Western

narrative on the future of HKSAR is a preordained masterplan, the 'pure teleological of analysis'[178] – for example, HKSAR's autonomy will be undermined by the authoritarian China. The thesis will argue that history is open to "a space of translation: a place of hybridity,"[179] allowing conflicted cultures to negotiate, not for undermining one another, but for creating new hybrid narratives and identities. Secondly, the limitation of the Western narrative is mainly due to its basic assumption of seeing both HKSAR and China as unchanged objects. This assumption leads them to delineate the binary cultures between HKSAR and mainland China. The former is modern, developed, liberal, and capitalist while the latter is backward, underdeveloped, autocratic and socialist. This chapter will attempt to break the binary stereotypes into new and liberating identities, by arguing that the Other is no longer willing to be stereotyped by the West as a static object. Rather, the Other has become the historical subject to create its own self-liberating story. Thirdly, the concern of this chapter is not just about the melting away of the difference between 'us' and 'them' or East and West. Our attention will also be given to the force of global capitalism in undermining the autonomy of not just HKSAR but also China. This creates a new process for the people of Hong Kong to rethink the global values and its sovereign autonomy and the relationship with its motherland if China itself is also subordinated to the conventions and regulations of transnational governing bodies such as the WTO and the World Bank.

4.2 Decolonisation and Recolonisation

After the handover of 1997, Hong Kong returned to its motherland and was supposed to enter an era of decolonisation, in which people were expected to have a clean break

178 Bhabha 1994, p.27
179 Ibid., p. 25

from all forms of colonial control and to enjoy a high degree of autonomy. However, the postcolonial condition often appears paradoxical and gets entangled in the situation that colonial discontinuity and continuity, past and present, are intertwined, where there is a co-existence of opposites without undermining one another. The paradoxical condition reveals that time is not necessarily linear nor is it a singular unidirectional movement. It may have two sets of time: one remained fixed while the Other continued to move forward.[180] This is the common phenomenon of 'the postcolonial time of entanglement,'[181] a condition where discontinuity and continuity are interwoven with the coalescence of multiple temporalities. The context of Hong Kong after 1997 will be used to illustrate this postcolonial phenomenon.

4.2.1 The temporal logic of political structure

From the temporal logic of political structure, the HKSAR is not free from colonial domination after 1997 and remains in colonial infrastructure. Particularly, Hong Kong is so different from other cases of decolonisation. The departure of British rule did not mean that the city of Hong Kong was decolonised into political independence, like Singapore, Thailand, and other Asian regions. Instead, Hong Kong was handed over from a Western sovereign (capitalist-oriented lifestyle and an advocated democracy) to an authoritarian state (communist-oriented lifestyle and a single party's domination). The politically superior mainland China intentionally proceeded to behave like the

180 Choi,W.K. "(Post)coloniality as a Chinese State of Exception," *Postcolonial Studies* 10.4. (2007), p.395

181 Mbembe, A. On the postcolony, (Berkeley: University of California press, 2001), p. 16-17. The writer uses the experience of postcolonial Africa to illustrate the concept of multiple temporalities embedded in the condition of entanglement. From the temporal logic of political ritual, the countries in postcolonial Africa has marked the end of colonial rule and has moved into a new era of independence, in terms of having their own political power. However, from the temporal logic of political power, the postcolonial African countries continue colonial practice and remained in colonial past of injustice.

British coloniser in transforming a postcolonial city into an opportunity for internal colonisation, because it was an easy way to control the territory and it is tempted to dominate "the politically weaker part of its country, HKSAR, which has a population size of only half of most of their middle size cities."[182] In appearance, there are several indications that mainland China had a tendency to recolonise Hong Kong before and after 1997, namely, 'one country, two systems,' exclusion from the participation in the negotiation and transitional process, the election of the SAR Chief Executive, and the tight control of democratic development.

After the reunification with mainland China, the HKSAR has been established on the policy of "one country, two systems" to develop a high degree of self-governing/autonomous city. Under this policy, HKSAR would continue its existing legal, economic and social systems until 2047 while China would remain a socialist system with the centrally-controlled government structure. Capitalism and socialism would coexist, with mutual respect and non-interference. In other words, the Chinese government, from the very beginning, had no intention to turn the HKSAR into another Chinese city or eradicate the colonial governance system. Contrarily, Beijing found that the British colonial governance structure – the executive-led political structure, collaborating with elites, the polity, and business sectors without universal suffrage – was effective and easier to control the territory in the postcolonial era. Every effort was made to retain the colonial system rather than to replace it. This reflects clearly in Hong Kong Basic Law which was issued, under the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, to codify existing legal practices in the colonial Hong Kong for the future. For example,

[182] Hong Kong's population was approximately 7.15 million, found in http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/facts.htm, 13 December, 2013.

the chief executive should be appointed by the central government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations, and the principal officials should be nominated by the chief executive for appointments by the central government. Apart from retaining the colonial infrastructure, the Basic Law has restricted the HKSAR to develop a fully democratic government. The Basic Law states that Beijing authorities, the political elite, and the economic establishment all have a controlling hand in the choice of the Chief Executive of the Special Administrative Region through the Election Committee, and that for the first term (1997-2003) the Legislative Council will be formed in accordance with the "decision of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China." The degree of self-government has been very limited from the beginning, and more measures of self-government will slowly evolve. For the second term (2003-2010), 30 out of the 60-member Legislative Council were replaced by functional constituencies, 6 by the Election Committee and 24 through direct election by geographical constituencies. For the third term (2010), the Legislative Councillors were returned half-and-half, by functional constituencies and geographical constituencies. So well into the 21st century, the degree of self-government for the Special Administrative Region still remains rather 'low.'

China's intention to recolonise Hong Kong is reflected not only in her written legislation, but also in her political actions. Firstly, in the transitional period, Hong Kong people were excluded from the negotiation process of changing sovereignty. For China, the arrangement of reversion was a bilateral business between the two countries - China and Britain. Hong Kong was not considered as an independent official party to take part in the negotiation. After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Britain attempted to

introduce a rapid development of democratic reforms in Hong Kong so as to restore the confidence of the people and to defend the autonomy of the territory. China was angry with British abandonment on the policy of convergence in handling the arrangements in the transition, and decided to build up a Provisional Legislative Council, the so-called 'second stove,' to replace the existing one upon the transfer of sovereignty. Moreover, China took an active role in political development and pursued a policy of direct control over the shaping of Hong Kong's political framework.[183] China's strong position to handle the transitional period further marginalized the role of Hong Kong people in constructing a blueprint for their own political future.

A second example of mainland China's attempt to recolonise HKSAR was in the selection of the SAR Chief Executive. The Chinese authority was accused of interfering with the first two elections by giving preference to the selected candidate, Chee-hwa Tung. Apart from the small size of the 800-member selection committee of HKSAR elites and appointments by the central government, the Chinese President Jiang Ze-min searched for Chee-hwa Tung to shake hands with him at the Preparatory Committee inauguration ceremony in 1996. This implied that Mr. Tung was the handpicked HKSAR Chief Executive by the Chinese leaders. In the second term of the election, the Chinese authority also made a similar indication that Mr. Tung was their only choice for the HKSAR's Chief Executive, even though "polls showed that 60 per cent of Hong Kong people wanted to get rid of Mr. Tung." [184]

[183] Lee, *China's Hong Kong Policy*, p.33
[184] *The Telegraph*, "The Beacon of Prosperity Loses Its Glow", 29 June 2002

Thirdly, with regards to direct elections of the legislators and the Chief Executive, Hong Kong people fought for a definite timetable. However, a number of mainland officials challenged Hong Kong people for not following the Basic Law – gradually and orderly developing a democracy. Bangguo Wu, the Chairman of the National People's Congress even gave a warning that "there is a limit to Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy and that the city has only as much power as given by the central government." This implied that political future of the Hong Kong depends entirely on Beijing's discretion.

4.2.2 The temporal logic of political rituals

From the temporal logic of political rituals, the handover ceremony in 1997 signified the discontinuity of British control and the colony moving towards a new stage of 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong' under the Chinese policy of "one country, two systems". The global media highlighted the icons of changing sovereignty, such as the hoisting of the Chinese flag to replace the Union Jack, the stationing of the People's Liberation Army to take over British soldiers, and the appointing of a Chinese Chief Executive to replace the British governor. The Chinese Media (PRC) narrated the historical past with the Opium War indicating national humiliation and the British exploitation of China's weakness (see Chapter Two, section 2.2.2). All these icons and narratives represented the triumph of the Chinese nation-state to resume Hong Kong to its motherland and to symbolise the end the national insult of the past. More importantly, these cultural icons and narratives bombarded the local media throughout the handover ceremony, brought the people of Hong Kong in 'liminal moments' which created a collective memory for all Chinese, shook loose Hong Kong Chinese from

their identification with the colonial government, and constructed a new identity with the motherland.[185]

After the reversion, the local media continued to pour out national narratives to strengthen sinicisation and to help Hong Kong people fit into the PRC by regularly airing on TV Chinese cultural icons (e.g., the Great Wall which represents the Chinese historical culture of over 5,000 years), national icons (e.g., the National Flag, the national song of China, and the emblem of the SAR), and military icons (e.g., the People's Liberation Army). Anthony Fung, a Chinese cultural scholar, points out that since identities are constructed around such icons embedded in media narrative, they serve as "emotional anchors as well as indicators of cultural identification."[186] The strong proliferation of national icons and narrative in media had an effect of rendering Hong Kong a feeling of ambivalence. On the one hand, Hong Kong people still found themselves superior to the mainlanders in terms of economy, rule of law, freedom, and lifestyle. They were reluctant to identify themselves as 'Chinese'. Instead, they put up defence for their distinctive label of 'Hong Kongese'. However, on the other hand, the political rituals (national icons and narrative) made it clear that the reintegration with mainland China is a *fait accompli*, whether the people of Hong Kong like it or not. Moreover, the resumption of Hong Kong to China symbolised the end of unequal treaties and national insult. As culturally or ethnically identified with Chinese, the people of Hong Kong had no reason to justify their preservation of the colonial culture. According to Anthony Fung's research findings, there was a significant surge in

185 ForDayan and Katz (1992) 'Liminal moments' refers to "collectively reflected, idealized and authenticated a reality or a version of society for the public"

186 Fung, A. "What makes the local? A Brief Consideration of the Rejuvenation of Hong Kong Identity" *Cultural Studies* 15.3-4 (2001): p.597

emotive feeling toward nationalism in the year of 1997.[187] Fung believed that the political ritual accelerated mainland-blending into Hong Kong cultural milieu and appeared to have an effect of suppressing the continuity of colonial or local identity. However, this effect was only temporal and superficial. Once the overwhelming events of 1997 were over, Hong Kong people were allowed to have the spatial and temporal room to re-articulate their own identity. The statistics indicated that more locals re-defended their own identity as 'Hong Kongese' immediately after the changing sovereignty. The statistics revealed that the boundary between 'Hong Kongese' and 'Chinese' became less precise. The expanding of the dual category of 'Hong Kong Chinese' identity, which was much higher than the single identity, implied that the people of Hong Kong do not construct their identity on a simply dichotomy of 'Chinese' versus 'Hong Kongese'. Rather, they articulate their local identity in complicated and multiple layers to engage the socio-political change. Although the political ritual and national narrative imposed new definitions of local culture and identity, the 'liminal moments' were not powerful enough to produce a strong desire for renationalization. This reflected that the formation of a new identity is a dynamic process involving the colonial continuity and discontinuity, the continuous domination and resistance.

4.3 Domination and Resistance

In facing the continuity of the British legacy and the discontinuity of the Chinese rule, the people of Hong Kong as historical subjects are not entirely dominated by the two colonisers. Being given a high degree of autonomy, postcolonial Hong Kong is striving for its own subjectivity and cultural distinctiveness by distancing itself from cities in the

[187] Ibid., p.596

mainland and by retaining itself as an exception in the country. The people of Hong Kong reconstruct the region's subjectivity in a far more complicated manner than the neat dichotomy of powerful-coloniser versus powerless-colonised. As a power relationship is often a webbing condition, in which both the powerful and the powerless are caught, the people of Hong Kong resist the domination in a way of ambivalence. Bhabha's concept of ambivalence is highly relevant to the postcolonial Hong Kong and deserves a brief review before relating it to the situation of the territory.

For Homi Bhabha, the interaction between two cultures (the coloniser and the colonised) often does not produce the culture expected by the coloniser, because the process involves the factors of resistance and dissonance.[188] The usual way of the colonised resistance to domination is not a practice of confronting the coloniser directly. Instead, they pretend to follow the coloniser's instruction partially, but in fact do so in their own ways. Since the imitation of the colonised is only partial, the subjectivity of the colonised would not be fully identified with those of the colonisers. Bhabha calls this 'mimicry',[189] which highlights an ambivalent condition that complicity and resistance exist in fluctuating relations within the colonial subject. Mimicry becomes at once resemblance and menace. This destabilises the coloniser's narrative on the colonised as the absolute object which is fixed and unchanged. In other words, this allows the Other (the colonised) as a subject of a difference that is "almost the same, but not quite." The stereotype between the subjects of the coloniser and the object of the colonised is at the same time blurred and diluted. Therefore, the subjectivity, produced by mimicry, is always an ambivalent site. Bhabha's concept of 'ambivalence' is taken from Sigmund

[188] Bhabha 1994. p89
[189] Ibid., p86

Freud's idea that ambivalence involves the co-existence of two opposite instincts – the sexual instincts (*Eros*) and the death instinct (*Thanatos*). Applied to the colonial narrative, Bhabha points out that ambivalence allows imitation and resistance to simultaneously co-exist. This produces an effect of mimicry (the colonised who are almost the same as the coloniser, but not quite) and an effect of menace (that is, it destabilises the subject of the coloniser who cannot replicate itself fully). In this sense, resistance cannot be seen as "an oppositional act of political intention", but as "the effect of an ambivalence produced within the rules of recognition of dominating narratives".[190] The effect of ambivalence, thus, constructs a hybrid identity. Based on the Bhabha's concept of ambivalence, the following section examines how the people of Hong Kong use hybridised resistance against the domination of the central authorities to negotiate its identity between the national and the local.

4.3.1 Local and national negotiation

For Beijing, the reunification is more than just the resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, but also to win over the hearts of Hong Kong people who had been under the British colonial rule for over one and a half centuries. Xiaoping Deng, the former Chinese Premier, expected the people of Hong Kong to become patriots after the reversion. A patriot is "… one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. It doesn't matter whether they believe in

[190] Bhabha 1995, p.153

capitalism, feudalism or even slavery."[191] Deng's definition requires the people of Hong Kong to respect the Chinese authorities as a first priority.

In order to achieve Deng's spirit of a complete reunification, the Chinese authorities have employed the tool of cultural affiliation to appeal to Hong Kong people's loyalty to their original ancestries and blood ties. For example, 'Children of the Yellow Emperor' should be united as closely as 'flesh and bones' in the 'big motherland family'. Beijing's cultural appeal is not confined to the people of Hong Kong, but also to Taiwan and Macau as well. Particularly, the policy of "one country, two systems" was originally designed by Xiaoping Deng as a framework for solving the reunification of Taiwan with mainland. Hong Kong was considered as a model to convince Taiwan to return and embrace mainland China. Therefore, China's actions and policies towards Hong Kong can influence mainland China's actions with Taiwan. Vice versa is also true. Further discussion on the case of Taiwan will shed light on Beijing's attitude towards the development of the Hong Kong local identity.

Beijing has adopted the same method of cultural appeal to the Taiwan masses by claiming that reunification with mainland China is a "common aspiration of all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation both at home and abroad."[192] This appeal highlights the importance of returning to "their original Chinese identity and China as nation."[193] However, local Taiwanese seriously criticized the appeal for a common national

[191] 'One country, two systems' only solution to reunification', *China Daily*, 19 February, 2004.
[192] Ze-min Jiang's Reports at the 16th Party Congress on 18 June 2003, 'One country, two systems and Complete National Reunification'
[193] Wong, J & Poon, A. "Struggling for Democracy Under China: The Implications of a Politicized Hong Kongese Identity," *Civic Exchange Internship* (Summer 2004): p. 10. www.civic-exchange.org. [assessed 20 August,2008]

identity as interfering with their autonomy. Particularly, the Democratic Progress Party, in favour of Taiwanese independence, appealed for a distinct 'Taiwanese identity' as opposed to a mainland Chinese national identity. Shui-bian Chen ran his Presidential Campaign in 2004 by designing himself as the 'son of Taiwan.' He asked voters to choose their identity by saying "If you are Taiwanese vote for me, if you are Chinese vote for them."[194] As a result, Cheng won the second term Presidential election, which indicated the sense of Taiwanese identity rooted in the hearts of most Taiwan people. This implied that the increase in local identity would fuel Taiwan's sentiment for independence and create a big barrier for reunification with Taiwan.

The case of Taiwan alerted the Chinese authority that to allow HKSAR to develop a local and distinct identity would follow the steps of Taiwan moving towards separation from national unity. For Beijing, the demand for the rapid development of democracy would foster the growth of a local identity and would make HKSAR further alienated from its counterparts in China. The complete reunification with the mainland China has always been considered a high priority in China's policy-making towards the HKSAR and as the criterion to justify political actions against the territory. This explains why China continues to intervene in the local political reform such as the reinterpretation of the basic law and the timetable of universal suffrage.

[194] Sense of national identity established after March 20 election, *Central News Agency* – Taiwan, May 26, 2004

The co-existence of two distinctive cultural identities

For the people of Hong Kong, the label 'Hong Kongese' signifies a distinctive identity of which the local majority is proud. The label is a cultural identification which is more than a geographical containment of a local populace or a commitment to the place. Many Hong Kong émigrés who left for the fear of communist rule still call themselves 'Hong Kongese'. Likewise, those who hold foreign passports living in the territory also claim themselves as 'Hong Kongese'. In other words, the local identity of 'Hong Kongese' goes beyond the boundary of their original place and is related to a set of shared values or ideology or customs – such as the rule of law, liberty, and conscience of the June Fourth Tiananmen incident.

Over 90% of Hong Kong people are Chinese, who share the same cultural and ethnic roots as their mainland Chinese counterparts. Being part of a British colony for over 150 years, Hong Kong had been cultivated by the Western culture and developed its own distinctive 'Hong Kongese' identity. However, this unique local identity was not simply a colonial product, but also a consequence of the negative feeling of Hong Kong people towards the Chinese communist government.[195] As mentioned in the previous chapter, the communist party in the Cultural Revolution and the power struggles in the 1960s and 1970s brought a disaster to mainland China, in which hundreds of thousands of Chinese fled from the political persecution and economic hardship to the colony forming a substantial portion of the Hong Kong's population. Together with the crackdown of the democratic movement on 4th June, 1989, the Hong Kong Chinese had

[195] Wong, J & Poon, A. "Struggling for Democracy Under China," p. 4

strong sentiments against the Chinese authority, particularly, feelings of mistrust and fear of Beijing's infringements on the Hong Kong's liberty. Owing to the fear of the communist party, the people of Hong Kong calls for full democracy in order to defend its local identity. The greater the call for political reform or local identity results in a higher level of distrust between Beijing and Hong Kong. The politics and the identity of Hong Kong are becoming increasingly linked and entangled. The following political incidents reveal how 'Hong Kongese' negotiate their identity in the process of resistance and domination.

Resistance within the rules of recognition of Chinese dominating narratives

Despite the signs of recolonisation by the PRC over HKSAR, within the first five years of the Hong Kong returning to mainland China, Beijing seemed to have kept its promise to give the people of Hong Kong freedom to govern the territory by emphasising its trust in the HKSAR government. The first major event that provoked reconsideration of the contest between Hong Kongese identity and Chinese national identity was Beijing re-interpreted a ruling of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in 1999 which gave the right of residence to mainland-born children with at least one parent permanently residing in the territory. It was believed that the Beijing court's reversal of the Hong Kong court's ruling seriously undermined the judicial independence of the HKSAR, and the HKSAR government was blamed for referring the case to Beijing for a decision. However, the CFA recognised its limitation that the National People's Congress Standing Committee's (NPCSC) power to interpret the Basic Law conferred by Article 158 (1) of that law "is in general and unqualified terms", while "the Region's courts are authorized to interpret on their own in adjudicating cases the provisions

within the limits of the Region's autonomy".[196] On the whole, the NPCSC always kept silent on decisions made by the CFA. There was no sign that Beijing meant to intervene in local politics in the first five years.

The turning point of Beijing becoming more active in running the territory came in July 1, 2003. Half a million people took to the street to protest against the security legislation proposed under the Article 23 of the Basic Law, which required the HKSAR "to enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government" and other political offences. There is no doubt that the Article 23 was not the only issue leading to the massive demonstration. It was also linked to the people with pent-up frustrations such as the failing in Asian financial crisis, the handling of the SARS epidemic, and the perceived shortcomings of the Chee-hwa Tung (HKSAR Chief Executive) leadership.

The massive expression of resentment caused the SAR government to put aside its pending National Security Ordinance, the resignations of Regina Ip (the Secretary of Security) and Eng-kiong Yeoh (the Health Secretary responsible for mishandling the SARS epidemic), Beijing's awareness of Tung's poor government administration, and Tung's early retirement. In the event of July 1st 2003 demonstration, Hong Kong people became aware that they could exercise their power through collective action. Originally, the date of July 1st is the anniversary of Hong Kong's transition, but now it has become a day where the people of Hong Kong march in the streets displaying the 'Hong Kongese' challenge to the local and national governments. The full emergence

[196] "The story of a new policy", 17th November 2009, *Weblog* , http://climbuptreestolookforfish.xanga.com

of a collective stance on a better administered HKSAR has become integrated into the local identity which is a postcolonial exception within China – protests against local and national governments are legitimized in the Basic Law under the policy of "one country, two systems". This exception allows the people of Hong Kong to take part in the June 4th candlelight vigil which is not only in commemoration of those who fought and died for democracy in Tiananmen Square, but also a statement to the international community and Chinese government about HKSAR's personal struggles with a high degree of autonomy and the people of Hong Kong governing Hong Kong. The massive turnout in the June 4th candlelight vigil is the conscience of 'Hong Kongese' and a testament of Hong Kongese faith in their struggle for democracy. Also, the challenge of the people of Hong Hong against Beijing authorities can be viewed as a sign of preserving their own existing freedom and their subjects' autonomy.[197]

The provision for the development of a democratic government in the HKSAR is a promise from the Chinese authority and is also laid down in the Basic Law. Therefore, the essence of the political reality of the territory lies not on the issue of whether to have democracy, but on the pace of the development of democracy; not on the issue of 'authoritarianism versus democracy', but rather a balance between the central authority and the local autonomy. The massive protest in 2003 raised Beijing's awareness that the strong resentment was not just targeting the local government, but also the central authority. In addition to the massive turnout for the June 4th vigil, Beijing realises that if they are not ready for a dissident to run the HKSAR or the territory in confrontation with the central authority, they must control the pace of democratic development in the HKSAR.

[197] *Ming Pao*, an article by Louis Cha. 1 July 1997

The Basic Law allowed the HKSAR to institute democratic reforms after 2007 to bring about a system based upon universal suffrage. This was understood to mean that the HKSAR could move to a fully elected legislature without Beijing's explicit approval, but this right was denied by Beijing when Qi-chen Qian, the Vice-Premier, shortly before the fifth anniversary of the handover, insisted that the current system should remain unchanged. An official decision was made in 2004 by Beijing to block any reforms that would allow for the Chief Executive and legislature to be directly elected after 2007. This indicated that, in terms of democratic aspirations, the HKSAR and Beijing seemed further apart than at any time since 1997. The control of the pace of democratisation in the territory by Beijing is believed to have affected the performance of the HKSAR government. Ever since the change of sovereignty, the HKSAR government has experienced an endemic lack of public trust. Critics believe the main reason for this lay in the fact that the Chief Executive was not elected by universal suffrage. The incumbent, Chee-hwa Tung, whom Beijing handpicked for the job before the handover, was "re-elected" for a second term unopposed in 2002 by the 800-strong, pro-Beijing "election committee". The public considered the election process undemocratic and unrepresentative because only a small number of people, most of whom were primarily pro-Beijing, were allowed to participate in it.

Mimicry effects

China's hardline stance on the pace of democracy and the support for Tung's second-term administration have attacked the emotion of the people, having vented their frustration with the Tung administration, which resulted in cries to replace Tung. This

unique experience has led to the creation of a negative understanding of democracy, a hybrid identity of Hong Kong Chinese in HKSAR.

Negative understanding of democracy

The fundamental belief of democracy is a government whose system is built on people's freedom and equality, and is elected by the people themselves.[198] For the people of Hong Kong, democracy is important to defend themselves from China's intervention in the local autonomy and to legally protect the people's rights and freedom.[199] In this sense, democracy is downgraded to the role of checks and balances in political authorities, and of being a safety net that protects their local identity – liberty, freedom of speech, rule of law, and the conscience of June 4th incident.

The hybrid identity of 'Hong Kong Chinese'

In facing Beijing's suppression of local identity, the people of Hong Kong have developed a hybrid identity 'Hong Kong Chinese' as a resistance against domination. This identity implies: the people of Hong Kong are no longer part of a British colony, but they share many British global values such as freedom, the rule of law, and a conscience of human rights; the people of Hong Kong have returned to its motherland being part of mainland China and have had a sense of Chinese cultural affection, but are reluctant to be described as having any 'Chineseness'. Rather, they feel more comfortable for being labelled 'Hong Kong Chinese' – 'we are similar, but not the same'. The following example supports this claim.

[198] *Cambridge Dictionary*
[199] Wong & Liu, "Morality, Class, And the Hong Kong Way of Life," in Liu Siu Kai (ed.), *Social Development and Political Change in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000) p.11

In the domain of language policy, Hong Kong has reintegrated with mainland China and has been expected to strengthen its national identity by promoting Chinese language (either national Mandarin or local Cantonese) in place of colonial language (English) – this is the common practice of most postcolonial states to resist the continuity of colonial influence, such as Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and so on. According to Hong Kong Basic Law, Article 9 indicates that "in addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official language by the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary". This clause gives Chinese higher status, but nevertheless makes English an official language. After 1997, the postcolonial government, based on political concerns[200], has launched a new policy on using English as the medium of instruction by screening the secondary schools' ability to teach in English (primary schools are not included, because the majority of them are already using Chinese as the medium of instruction). As a result, only one quarter of government and government-aided schools would be permitted to retain English teaching. Such a policy has encountered strong opposition. Since most parents prefer their children studying in English-medium schools rather than Chinese ones, international schools and English-medium schools have become popular and have been described as 'Band One' or better schools. In order to gain exemption from the requirement of teaching Chinese as the medium of instruction, a growing number of schools have given up the fully aided status and joined the Direct Subsidy Scheme which will receive less government subsidies.[201] Facing the strong resistance against Chinese as the teaching medium, the SAR government has softened its stance and introduced a fine-tuned teaching medium

[200] Lai, P. S. & Byram, M. "The politics of bilingualism: a reproduction analysis of the policy of mother tongue education in Hong Kong after 1997", *Compare*, 33(3), 2003, p315

[201] Bray and Koo, "Postcolonial patterns and paradoxes:language and education in Hong Kong and Macao." *Comparative Education, Vol. 40, No. 2, May 2004*, p.228

policy in 2009 which empowers the school to have full discretion to determine the medium of instruction arrangement. This means that the school can choose "the most appropriate medium of instruction arrangement by class, by group, by subject and by session arrangements, or a combination of forms, having regard to its own circumstances."[202]

For the people of Hong Kong, English is more than a colonial language. It is related to its identity and self-determination. The high demand for English in HKSAR has two main reasons. Firstly, English is widely viewed as an international language through which the people of Hong Kong can communicate with people in the global community. Secondly, language has its function of cultural identity. As Hong Kong witnessed rapid growth economically and politically in its colonial past, and English has been seen as a means of opening up to the West and to the prosperity. Since the transfer of sovereignty, the people of Hong Kong have experienced an economic downturn. This experience has made the people dissatisfied with their own government and less with Chinese culture. The proficiency of using English and the identification with Western culture become a local identity – we are similar to the Chinese, but not the same, because we identity with global values and culture.

4.3.2 Global and local negotiation

Globalisation stepped up the process and the scale of the hybridization of cultural production and added or promoted certain new dimensions, but it has not changed the

[202] "Fine-tuned teaching medium policy to launch", May 29, 2009 Education Bureau, www. news.gov.hk

nature of the process. The contest of identity between HKSAR and mainland cities has also carried over into economic development, and shortly after the handover, Hong Kong, always proud of its economic invincibility, was on the brink of its own nemesis. The Asian financial crisis in 1998 triggered a stock market crash, a fall in property prices, the stagnation of retail prices, rising unemployment and negative growth. About 8% of homeowners found themselves with negative equity with no end in sight, and the tally of bankruptcies significantly increased.[203] However, the root of the economic difficulties was far more serious than it appeared. The crisis was compounded by three main devastating factors: 1) the painful and long-term fundamental economic restructuring that had been unfolding since 1980s; 2) the effects of the recent global fallout triggered by the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001; and 3) the rapid economic growth of China.

The Western narrative on the distinctive/static differences between HKSAR and mainland China is seriously challenged by the changing context of the postcolonial Hong Kong. As mentioned in the last chapter, British media's report on the event of handover had predicted that the territory of Hong Kong would cease to be a vibrant global city when China resumed sovereignty over Hong Kong, assuming that the British legacy would become less just, less stable, and less civilised than what it had succeeded.[204] This assumption more or less derived from the Western-centric discursive framework which delineated China as different object – stating in the repository of tradition, essentially outside of modernity. Such an assumption also dominated most of Hong Kong people's thinking about China before 1997, particularly, those who

[203] In 1997, 679 people were declared bankrupt; in 2001 the number had risen to 9,151; by the end of October of 2002 the figure was 20,204, the vast majority because of their inability to pay credit card bills. Ibid.
[204] Refer to Chapter Two, John Casey's quotation, p. 9

identified with the British legacy in ways which alienated themselves from China and its culture.[205] However, China turned out to be not a 'despotic coloniser' as stereotyped by British and Hong Kong media. Contrarily, China's modernisation has made impressive progress since 1997, in terms of economic boom (foreign exchange reserves up to US$2.13 trillion)[206], the rise of national power[207], and international image (hosting the 2008 Olympic Games). All these challenge the Western narrative on China and Hong Kong as an unchanged object, and lead us to reconsider the Other (China) as a subject which has its own self-liberating story.

Since Hong Kong reverted to Chinese rule in 1997, the capitalist economy of the city and the high degree of freedom remain unchanged – with the exception of China's tight control on the democratic development. The rise of China, both in economics and politics, is changing HKSAR far more than the people had expected, particularly in its role in helping China modernize and the livelihood of the city having undergone a comparable transformation. In the past, Hong Kong used to be China's gateway to access the capitalist world, to earn foreign exchange, to seek expertise, and to engage in international community (see Chapter Two, section 2.3.2.b). As mainland Chinese cities like Shanghai and Guangzhou have rapidly developed, the unique role of HKSAR has to be reduced and to compete with the rest of the country for prosperity. According to a recent survey of business executives by the private Better HKSAR Foundation, "Shanghai is fast narrowing the gap with Hong Kong in terms of investment

[205] Refer to Chapter Two, *Hong Kong press.*

[206] No other country has ever had such huge reserves. Though the financial tsunami has triggered a global economic downturn, China's fore reserves have kept growing. Editorial, News. *MingPao*.com. 17 July, 2009

[207] "China becomes a benevolent global power in the eyes of many Asian, African, Arab and Latin American nations, by emphasizing its peaceful development, and by wooing other countries with its soft power, economic incentive and diplomacy." Lo & Pang, Postcolonial Studies, 2007, p. 349

environment and as a base of operation. In the first quarter of the year, Shanghai's container port eclipsed Hong Kong as the world's busiest."[208] Besides, Hong Kong used to be the major source to fuel the economic boom in China, but now the city's prosperity depends very much on China's economic growth. In one instance, mainland visitors have become a major source of tourism dollars in the city. In another instance, mainland companies have held half of the city's stock market's capitalization, up from 16 percent in 1997.[209]

As China's economic system becomes more capitalist-oriented and more open to the global market, the HKSAR's unique role as China's gateway to assess international community is breaking up. In addition to the keen competition with other mainland Chinese cities in the global market, the HKSAR becomes aware of the changing context and gradually transforms the postcolonial territory into a 'global city'. Choi Wai-kit, in an article on Hong Kong's rise as a global city entitled "(Post)coloniality as a Chinese state of exception," defines the type of global city to which the HKSAR is moving forward. Unlike Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, Hong Kong past colonial government did not invest enough money on technological innovation and made Hong Kong locked into "the low-technology and low value-added niche".[210] Thus, the postcolonial Hong Kong finds it hard to compete with the said Asian countries in the field of high-technological manufacturing. Neither is the HKSAR able to develop low valued manufacturing, because mainland China's labour cost is much lower.

[208] Bayon, H. "As Hong Kong Enters Second Decade Under China, City Ponders Place in Economic Giant" www. VoaNews.com. 25 June 2007, Hong Kong
[209] Ibid.
[210] Choi, K.W. "(Post)coloniality as a Chinese state of exception" *Postcolonial Studies* 10.4 (2007): p. 397

Since the early 1980s, Hong Kong has become de-industrialized, and since the 1990s, Hong Kong has been transformed from an export-led manufacturing platform to a global city facilitating the transnational flow of finance capital. Colonial Hong Kong was once the example China followed to grope its way towards capitalism, and postcolonial Hong Kong, though increasingly dependent upon China for its economic boost, continues to assert itself as occupying a positive exemplary role for China's capitalist development, because of the city's strong foundation on the rule of law, effective monetary policy, respect for intellectual property rights, and professionalism in many fields.

The colonial/Western legal system and its adoption of an 'international' standard of practice in business and social administration is a key attraction to multinational corporations. A Hong Kong Trade Development Council's report indicated that "most of the leading Hong Kong-based professionals are employed by foreign headquartered financial institutions.... In financial services, Hong Kong's three note-issuing banks are all headquartered outside of Hong Kong.... All the major international management consultancy firms have a strong presence in the Hong Kong as do many of the world's leading international law firms."[211]

The continuity of Colonial legal systems and international business practices paved the way for the HKSAR to become a global city. Certainly, mainland China also contributes to the city's transformation by excluding the SAR from China's macro-

[211] Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Research Development, Hong Kong's Competitiveness Beyond the Asian Crisis: An Overview, 1999, p.21

economic control and maintaining the city's exceptional status. But distinction between exception and rule, or between what is outside and what is inside is always blurred in postcolonial Hong Kong. Lo & Pang give an example: "the mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA, a free-trade agreement giving Hong Kong companies preferential access to the mainland market) and other economic privileges such as the exclusive mandates for offshore yuan banking and other mainland-related financial business are the special advantages bestowed by Beijing upon Hong Kong."[212] These privileged deals could not be seen as pure gifts given by the Chinese authorities mainly for transforming HKSAR into a global city. Mainland China can also benefit from these arrangements such as the inward transfer of capital, expertise and experience. Transformation into a global city, HKSAR's sovereign autonomy has become compromised as the city's subordination to the transnational governing structure of global capitalism. The economic and juridical subordination to the forces of global capitalism might also undermine the autonomy and weaken China's domination. All these indicate that colonialism is persisting in postcolonial Hong Kong while all these features render HKSAR an exception from mainland Chinese cities. On the handover event, the Western narrative worried that the HKSAR's autonomy would be interfered with by autocratic China. However, in the postcolonial era, HKSAR's sovereign power is increasingly absorbed into the supranational juridical-economic structure. Moreover, in economic terms, there is a clear tendency toward the blurring of the boundaries or distinctive differences between HKSAR and the mainland.

Although Beijing has cultivated the HKSAR by granting economic privileges in the mainland, the demand for democracy and local identity does not lessen. The people of

[212] Lo, K.C. & Pang, L.K. "Hong Kong: Ten Years After Colonialism," p.350

Hong Kong have to negotiate their identity in the dynamics between HKSAR's inclusion and exclusion by China. HKSAR is included as a postcolonised exception, a city colonised by multinational corporations and transnational governing bodies dominated by the global capitalism. The city's inclusion is also exclusion since it is excluded from China's legal system and has its own judiciary orders. This hybrid structure, on the one hand, allows the HKSAR to develop a global city, but, on the other hand, weakens the city's autonomy and Beijing's sovereignty. It is hoped that through the participation in global capitalism, China would become more open and the features of communist dictatorship will become more diluted. The dynamics between the local and the national identities can be minimized

CHAPTER FIVE
COLLABORATION AS A MODE OF RESISTANCE AGAINST DOMINATION: THE ROLE OF HONG KONG CHURCHES IN COLONIAL PERIOD

5.1 Introduction

The last two chapters have interrogated the Eurocentric narrative on China in the handover event, unmasked colonial epistemological frameworks in British legacy, and examined the force of globalisation in weakening the HKSAR's autonomy and Beijing's sovereignty. The competing narratives have revealed that the contested identities between HKSAR and mainland China are no longer a case of essentialism, primordial unity and fixity. Rather, it is multi-layered, dynamic, and hybrid. This helps us recognise that Hong Kong identity is a historical construction, an outcome of interaction among local history, national context, and global linkage. To explore the future development of HKSAR requires being sensitive to this contextual complexity and not to be homogenized by the narratives on the complicated colonial experiences. If the denial of essentialism and polarity on cultural identity is accepted, a new space would emerge for Hong Kong churches to recognise their hybridity in their new identity and to seek for a new role/new knowledge capacity to negotiate the cultural divide with mainland China.

Hong Kong Christian churches, as mentioned in the Introduction, have an intention to take up a new role of seeking cultural reconciliation with mainland China. However, talk of reconciliation is shallow and fruitless without a careful investigation of the difference that divided church and state in the past. For example, Hong Kong churches,

in the eyes of communists, were depicted as ‘running dog of imperialism’ while in the eyes of Hong Kong people, as ‘the unholy alliance of colonial rule’. Such a narrative would create a suspicion and a barrier for bridging the divide unless we are able to overcome the embeddedness of past antagonisms. For this reason, this chapter attempts to destabilise the historical tension and the stereotype of the church’s image by revisiting the collaborative power relationship between Hong Kong churches and the colonial government. It will argue that the mode of collaboration adopted by Hong Kong churches was an alternative way to resist imperialism and British colonial rule in order to civilise and transform both a modern China and a prosperous Hong Kong. This revisit continues our trend to critique the methodological insufficiency of binary opposition that has a tendency to put imperialism/colonialism (Hong Kong local identity) as standing in opposition to nationalism (Chinese identity). The problem of the binary approach is to take both nationalism and colonialism out of the historical context of Hong Kong, falling into the pitfall of a homogeneous narrative and cultural essentialism – identifying Hong Kong with a pre-established origin or pre-existent belongings. Little space allows the different forms of Chinese identity to be constituted and negotiated. In other words, this chapter is to identify collaboration as another form of resistance developed from a hybrid context and to harmonize the dynamics between nationalism and colonialism/imperialism by considering the collaborative approach of the Christian church as a means to develop Hong Kong’s progress and China’s modernisation in the colonial period, and as an alternative mode of seeking reconciliation with mainland China in postcolonial Hong Kong.

5.2 Locate the mode of collaboration in colonial narrative

Hong Kong's success story, from a 'barren-rock-turned-capitalist paradise', has often been associated with the good policy of British colonial rule such as laissez-faire economics, non-intervention in society, rule of law, and benevolent governance. However, looking back to British imperialism in the last century, many countries had experienced brutal colonial domination and radical resistance. Some of them have still been struggling hard to catch up in modernisation. It appears that British colonial policy did not guarantee harmony, prosperity and stability to her territories. In other words, Hong Kong's success has something that is essentially different from other colonies and goes beyond treating the coloniser as the centre fully responsible for the success of a colony. It is believed that collaboration is the key element to make the difference.[213]

The meaning of the word 'collaboration' in several dictionaries refers to an act of cooperating traitorously with an enemy that is occupying one's country.[214] This explanation reflects the view of the Chinese (Qing) government, at the beginning of British rule in Hong Kong, that the Chinese residents in the colony were considered collaborators with imperialism and dens of traitors, criminals, and deserters.[215] The binary stereotype between British imperial repression and Chinese national resistance, between mainland Chinese (nationalists) and Hong Kong Chinese (collaborators/traitors) has long been established and had become the dominant narrative in the early colonial period. However, the collaborators' contribution to the national building had often been neglected, because their events or activities did not fit into the binary nationalist

[213] Law, W.S. *Collaborative Colonial Power: the making of the Hong Kong Chinese*, (Hong Kong: HKUP, 2009); Kwan Shui.Man (1999). Wong Wai-ching (1997)
[214] Audio English.net,, www.audioenglish.net
[215] Yen Ching-hwang "Ch'ing Chaning Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644-1912)," *Modern Asian Studies* 15.2 (1981): p. 276-279

paradigm. As a matter of fact, colonial history is multi-layered and more than one single cultural resistance against British colonial assimilation. There are numerous neglected but successful experiences of Hong Kong collaborators and collaborative institutions working together with the colonial government to build up modern China and prosperous Hong Kong, such as education, social service and financial contributions. Such a neglected area of the cultural experience of colonialism was closely related to the subsequent politics of Chinese Hong Kong identities.

As discussed in chapter one's discussion of methodological considerations, Bhabha identifies the mode of collaboration emerged from in-between/ambivalent spaces where it provides a spatial politics of inclusion rather than exclusion. He uses Lacan's psychoanalysis of identification to illustrate the mutual dependence between the Self (the coloniser) and the Other (the colonised) in the process of colonial identification[216]; Lacan's "doubling signifiers" contributes to "cutting across the boundaries of master (the coloniser) and slave (the colonised)."[217] In other words, colonial identities always lie between the colonisers and the colonised. Bhabha's concept of collaboration helps us to look beyond the dichotomy between the colonial government and the people of Hong Kong, and to recognise mutual dependence as the key to understand the evolution of the collaborative power structure and the story of colonial success.

[216] Bhabha, H. 1994, op cit., p.45
[217] Bhabha, H. 1994, p.55

Bhabha also uses Freud's psychoanalysis on 'fable of fetishism'[218] to demonstrate an ambivalence inscribed in colonial narrative. Both the coloniser and the colonised construct their identity in the midst of encountering with the Other and recognizing their differences/lack. The recognition of difference creates a defence for the disavowal of the differences and also a desire for finding the substitute for the lacks. This ambivalence produces colonial mimicry (see chapter three) which is treated as the strategy of the colonised to resist (defence) against and to adapt (desire to be included) to the domination of the coloniser. This kind of anti-colonialist resistance can be seen as a mode of collaboration that comes from within and does not put into oppositional act against the coloniser. Bhabha's concept of collaboration stresses the function of mimicry to undermine colonial authority, the 'strategic reversal' of the power-bearing gaze, and the retroactive effects of the authorless reiteration of colonial narrative. The mode of collaboration seems to be a case of passive ambivalence, or a discursive form of unconscious**,** subjectless subversion. Bhabha downplays the subjectivity of the collaborator and overlooks the 'strategic redirection' of the process of domination. In this chapter, I will argue that the colonised, in particular, the collaborators (the Hong Kong elites) were not passive or unconscious to resist the British colonial domination. Rather, they take advantages of this collaboration, to develop their subjectivities/ distinctive identities through the process of conscious intervention, to enrich the coloniser's governing, to develop Hong Kong's progress, and to build up China's modernisation.

[218] Bhabha, H. 1994, p.76

5.3 Church's role in minimizing historical tension

As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong was a place of making fast money and became a place where the people only had a temporary identity."[219] The negative images (Hong Kong Chinese labelled as collaborators and traitors) did not stop many Chinese from choosing to live in the territory, because the British Empire provided international trading and job opportunities for Chinese merchants and labourers. For this reason, the Hong Kong population had been growing quickly from 25,000 in 1845 to 250,000 at the turn of the 19th century.[220] The increased population of the migrating Chinese contributed significantly to the economic development in the territory particularly by providing compradors/middlemen in facilitating trade between foreigners and China, and cheap labour for building up the infrastructure. Against this background, the Christian Church fitted into the picture of colonial development, cultivating the elite, providing social/medical services, and expanding the imperialism of Christian kingdom.

5.3.1 Create a hybrid class – Hong Kong elites

In the Qing dynasty, Christian missionaries found it difficult to gain access to China. Often, they worked for British merchants in the East India Company as translators to mediate trade between British and Chinese. They were the first middlemen or compradors. In 1842, Britain took over Hong Kong and invited missionaries to serve the spiritual needs of the British as well as the education of their children. In return, missionaries were granted land for building churches and administrative power to oversee all educational matters and "controlled all of Hong Kong's Chinese village

[219] Carroll, J.M. "Colonial Hong Kong as a cultural-Historical place," *Modern Asian Studies* 40.2 (2006) p. 517 (UK: Cambridge University Press)
[220] Hong Kong Government Gazette, May 1841, cited in G.B. Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong, Hong* Kong: Oxford University Press, 1973, 2nd edition, p. 65.

schools." A good example was that the Anglican Bishop of Victoria in Hong Kong was appointed the chairman of the Education Committee and the overall superintendent of schools.[221] The partnership relations between Christian churches and the colonial government can be seen from the very beginning of the colony. Apart from serving the foreign population, missionaries and Christian churches were more concerned about their mission of evangelising and civilising the Chinese empire. Their pastoral ministries were, thus, focused on running schools to equip local Chinese to become church leaders and missionaries. Owing to their teaching in Western methodology and English as a medium, missionary education for the Chinese produced a group of students who stood between two cultures, neither wholly Chinese nor Western. For Carl Smith, "this dual aspect of his thought and outlook" enabled them "to fill a needed place in the meeting of the Chinese nation with foreigners promoting trade and commerce." [222] Eventually, few of these students became missionaries or church ministers, but the majority became interpreters, compradors, or middlemen operating between the British and the Chinese, "advisors to officials and government as well as various professions."[223] This group of middlemen played an important role in bridging the business between the European and the Chinese, the communication between the colonial government and the local Chinese. Gradually, they developed a new class of bicultural elites who depended on their connections with China and Britain. Apart from the missionary schools that provided the upward mobility for the Chinese elites, the British global empire also produced another groups of elites based on wealth rather than knowledge. During the colonial expansion in Asia, European powers did not dominate the whole China, but only confined in the coastal areas. In order to further develop their

[221] Law, W.S. op cit., p.34.
[222] Smith, C. *Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong*, (Hong Kong: OUP, 1985), pp.10-11
[223] Ibid.

business into the inland market, they had to rely on Chinese merchants as collaborators because they were familiar with Chinese customs and would not stir up any anti-colonial sentiments. The hybrid roles of Chinese merchant collaborators took advantage of this opportunity to get rich through European and Chinese connections. Without the collaboration of middlemen and Chinese merchants, Britain would hardly have been able to expand its trading into the inland of China and to develop the economy of Hong Kong. In other words, collaborative colonial formation has "a significant theoretical effect on our understanding of the global history of imperialism and colonialism."[224]

The missionary schools failed to recruit the new generation to become missionaries, but they succeeded in producing a large numbers of middlemen who shared a Western system embodied in a colonial system, and who could serve a form of colonial governance that would not depend on direct rule, but through different local functionaries. In other words, missionary education helped to form individuals who would collaborate with the colonial power structure – a social, economic, and political configuration called "Hong Kong."[225]

5.3.2 Multi-layered identities and shifting social roles

The class of middlemen or elite appeared to be just a group of mimic men uncritically accepting colonial values and submissively serving the imperialist coloniser. They were labelled as the running dogs of imperialism and the collaborators of colonialism. However, if we look into the details, we would recognise that they held multi-layered

[224] Law, W.S., p.13
[225] Pavey, S. C., *Envisioning/Embodying Christianity in Hong Kong: Theology of Power and Crisis.* (PhD: University of Kentucky, 2005), p 92

identities (Chinese, Hong Kongese, and elite) which allowed them to shift with their social roles and used different identities for different purposes. This section attempts to demonstrate how the elites used their multi-layered identities or roles to harmonize the tension between nationalism and localism, between the coloniser and the colonised.

a) English education enlightening China

The British coloniser held a position of superiority, understanding that Western culture was more civilised because its underlying principles manifested in its scientific mind and moral ideals. Imperialism was considered a civilising mission that was to free the colonised from ignorance and captivity. Missionaries reaffirmed the superiority of Western culture, because the Enlightenment had already been proceeding in the history of Christianity. For missionaries, God manifested his love to the Chinese, not just bringing them into Christian faith, but also incorporating them into a "higher civilisation."[226] Based on this belief, James Legge, sent by the London Missionary Society, was a representative from Christian circles to develop a joint venture between missionaries and the colonial government to civilise the Chinese and to make the English language necessary for enlightening in Hong Kong.

For the coloniser, English was their own language, upholding British domination and functional values – facilitating communication and commercial convenience. In addition to this view of an innate superiority of Western culture, arrogant Britain as coloniser/subject considered Chinese as colonised/other, which needed to be controlled and subjugated. According to Bhabha's theory on Freud's fetishism and Lacan's double signifiers, the coloniser unconsciously intended to convert the Other to be similar to

[226] Pfister, L.F. "Some New dimensions in the Study of the Works of James Legge (1815-1897): Part 1', *Sino-Western Cultural Relation (16th-18th centuries)*,12, 1990. P.80; Law, W.S. p.41

them – that would help them to trace themselves in the colonised to stabilize the coloniser's self and its authority. Civilising the Other was the common practice in the colonial project. For example, Britain declared a civilising policy in India as follows: "English education in India should create a class of persons, the colonised in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect."[227] Mimicry of coloniser's language became a necessary means for social mobility and a sign of subjection.

However, Hong Kong elites and Chinese reformists did not see learning English as a simple stereotype of the domination of the coloniser and the humiliation/subjection of the colonised. Rather, they considered the value of English language as multi-layered. For Hong Kong elites, the language of English helped them seek further education, better job opportunities, and social differentiation among the Chinese – a special and privileged class.[228] Being Chinese, they did not blame the British invasion in China. Rather, they criticized the Qing government for corruption and weakness. To save the nation, China had to learn from the West in order to subdue the West. English language was means to access Western learning. This belief was shared by Chinese reformists who launched The self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) soon after the Taiping Rebellion to adopt Western scientific knowledge, military technology, and training techniques for diplomatic personnel. They established translation bureaus, and new

[227] T.B. Macaulay, 'Minute on education', in W. Theodore de Bary (ed.) *Sources of Indian Tradition, Vol.II* (New York: Columbia University Press,1958) p.49; Bhabha, H. 1994, p.87
[228] Law, W. S. p.32

foreign language and technology schools to transform the landscape of the Qing's education.[229]

The early missionaries in the colony saw civilisation as equated with Christianity while the Chinese considered missionary schools and churches as a beacon for Western learning. Ho Ka was a typical Hong Kong elite who held multi-layered identities: Chinese identity (his family were settlers from Guangdong, the southern part of China and his father, Ho Fuk Tong, the first ordained Chinese pastor of the London Missionary Society led by James Legge), British Hong Kong identity (he was born and educated in a Hong Kong elite school, and then trained in England as financier, physician, and barrister), and class identity (elite, businessmen, and community leader). He saw himself as a 'collaborationist patriot' and did not choose to identify with the simply dichotomy between nationalist and colonist. He believed that his Chinese nationalism developed in the colonial context – "what was good for Hong Kong was good for China. The key to a strong China was a commercially vibrant China."[230] He seriously criticized the self-Strengthening Movement for a "symbolic turning point in the reform movement". He advocated "using Western ideals of democracy to accelerate China's reform movement". He believed that the missionaries' civilising-Chinese projects fitted into the Qing imperial restoration programme. He advocated for capitalism and for democracy, which harmonized the dynamics between the nationalist and the colonialist. Also, he influenced the political ideas of Yat-sen Sun, the father of

[229] Ibid., p43
[230] Carroll, J. M., *Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites & British Colonials in Hong Kong* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), p.108

the Chinese Republic, who was educated in Hong Kong (Diocesan Boys' School and University of Hong Kong) and who was familiar with Ho's theories.[231]

b) Charity and national reform

The case of Ho Ka revealed that the elite class was more than just a tool of the coloniser. The elite recognised their multi-layered identities and their different responsibilities. Apart from sustaining the stability of the British colonial rule, they were also concerned about the welfare of the Chinese and the development of modern China.

The early colonial government adopted a policy of 'racial and cultural segregation' to rule Hong Kong. Chinese were not given equal rights as Europeans to build houses, to receive education, and to enjoy social welfare/medical services. In one instance, the Peak Residence Ordinance restricted the Chinese residents to live on the Peak, which was located close to the central area for trading and business.[232] In other instances, missionaries fully controlled education, only accessible to a minority of the population, while churches and other charitable institutions provided medical services. The segregation policy deepened the gulf between Chinese and Europeans, and produced complicated dynamics between the coloniser and the colonised. This reflected the colonial ignorance, indifference, and incompetence in governing the colony. Also, the insufficiency of the colonial government created a demand for services that the group of elites were in a special position to offer. Owing to the absence of government aids in medical and social services, they were working alongside with wealthy Chinese

[231] Ibid, p.109
[232] Hugh D. R. Baker, "Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man," *The China Quarterly* 95 (1983): p. 469.

businessmen to form several kinds of charitable organisations to support the local Chinese who were in need and in crisis, such as Tung Wah hospital and Po Leung Ko.

Owing to the different legal system in the colony, local Chinese handling conflicts preferred to "keep to themselves and avoid dealings with the British administration as much as possible."[233] Through the charitable works, these organisations earned the trust from the local Chinese and helped them resolve both their civil and commercial conflicts. By offering such services, this group of elites gradually established their special status and their leadership roles in the Chinese community. Eventually, they were further incorporated into the colonial power structure – the appointment of the Chinese elites to the Executive council in 1891. Hong Kong's stability depended not on the colonial government alone. In the prolonged encounter with the Chinese, the colonial government readjusted their policy to leave Chinese business for the Chinese elite. The charitable organisations further developed as informal government organisations to fill the gap between the government and the governed.

This group of elites (including wealthy Chinese businessmen) did not forget their own identity and were willing to provide financial support to their motherland, such as contributing money for famine and flood relief, and buying official degrees and titles to show their allegiance.[234] Gradually, the Qing realised that overseas Chinese could be of use to the empire and a lucrative source of funding. The Qing government began to refer to overseas Chinese as "Chinese Subjects" instead of "Chinese traitors." Also,

[233] Carroll, J. M. 2005, p.60

[234] Yen Ching-hwang, "Ch'ing's Sale of Honours and the Chinese Leadership in Singapore and Malaya (1877-1912)," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1.2 (September 1970): 21.

Hong Kong was redefined on the map as "a place where Chinese could live under foreign rule yet help rebuild China."[235]

Apart from the contribution to various relief projects in the late 1800s, many Chinese preferred contributing money to rebuild their native districts through large charitable associations such as the Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk. "Some founded free schools, libraries, hospitals and charitable organisations." [236] Those charitable organisations were known for subsidizing to build bridges in their native district and also for caring for new immigrants to Hong Kong. In brief, the Hong Kong Chinese community had established an extensive network of charitable services and enabled local Chinese to give financial support to their countrymen either in Hong Kong or in the mainland. These networks later became more important to finance political movements, such as overthrowing the Qing government in the 1900s, supporting Yat-sen Sun and Kai-Shek Chiang to defeat the warlords and to unify China, and helping China during the Japanese occupation in the late 1930s and the early 1940s. Carroll gives a good summary to that period.

> Hong Kong's role in China's development depended on the colony not being part of China justified the fact that these Hong Kong Chinese were living in a British colony. The colony's political stability had helped Chinese in Hong Kong prosper, thereby allowing them to contribute even more fully to rebuilding China.[237]

[235] Carroll, J.M., p.525
[236] Carroll, J.M., p.525
[237] Carroll, J.M., p.527

5.4 'Strategic reversal' helped redefine coloniser's policy and missionaries' attitude

The multi-layered identities of Hong Kong elites helped not only minimize the historical tension between Chinese nationalists and Hong Kong Chinese colonist, but also redefine the coloniser's policy and understanding of the colonised. This is the 'strategic reversal' of the power-bearing gaze, and the retroactive effects of the authorless reiteration of colonial narrative. The success of Hong Kong was not simply a colonial product or a coloniser's good policy. As a matter of fact, the colonial government adopted a segregated policy which was clearly not benevolent or fair to the people of Hong Kong. What made the difference were the elites who led the people of Hong Kong to choose the mode of collaboration working alongside with British government to handle the dynamics between Britain and China, between the Communists on mainland China and the Kuomintang on Taiwan, between global and local issues. The British coloniser changed its policy or attitude towards the colonised due to the prolonged interaction with the people of Hong Kong. This experience of interaction was unique, exclusively different from other British colonies.

5.4.1 Church's role in defending Hong Kong from Communism

The hybrid roles of Hong Kong elites contributed to harmonizing the historical tensions among imperialism, colonialism and nationalism in the early period of colonial rule. However, to embrace the differences had never been easy, particularly, in facing the new challenge of global politics – particularly, the Cold War which deeply divided the world into political polarity, leftist and rightist wings. In 1949, Mao Zedong defeated the Kuomintang and established the People's Republic of China in the

mainland. A few years later, the Korean War broke out and communist China's support of North Korea led to the Cold War confrontation with the United States. Britain, as the traditional ally of the United States, had no choice but to form a united front with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to eradicate communism.[238] Since the communist party took over mainland China, she reclaimed all treaty ports and coastal concessions except Hong Kong. The exception was due to the fact that China had to rely on "Hong Kong's free-port status to break the US-imposed trade embargo and acquire foreign exchange vital for the new regime's survival."[239] The global politics suspended Hong Kong's decolonisation, but turned it into a Cold War battle zone.

As Hong Kong was located on the edge of South China, the British government was so worried that the territory might become a communist subversive base, particularly, the infiltration of communist ideology into the colonial educational system. A letter to the Secretary of State for the colonies from the Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Grantham expressed this concern as follows:

> The efforts of the Chinese Communists and pseudo-communists in the Territory are being directed at the Young and comprise not merely indoctrination but actual recruitment for service with real organisations and forces in South China.[240]

In 1952, the Hong Kong colonial government passed a new ordinance on education to empower the Director of Education to close down any school which was believed to be

[238] Leung, B. & Chan S.H p.25
[239] Law, W.S. p.131
[240] Sir Alexander Grantham to Secretary of State for the Colonies, British Government, 1103 top secret, 30 November 1948, quoted by Sweeting (1993, 199); Leung, B. & Chan S.H. p.25

manipulated by communists. In searching for partners to support the development of education and social services, the colonial government became suspicious of the local Chinese charitable organisations and traditional associations which worked too closely with the Chinese government. Instead, the British government found mainline churches more reliable because they shared a colonial ideology of cultural civilisation and the expansion of Christendom. Moreover, communism's atheist ideology reinforced Christian churches to support the colonial government's anti-communist policy. Owing to the suppression of Christian activities in the communist mainland, many missions groups had to move their bases to Hong Kong and divert their relief service fund, used for project in China, to the colony to help the flood of Chinese migrants escaping from political prosecution. In facing the lack of resources, the colonial government wholeheartedly welcomed the Christian churches as its partner to handle the refugee crisis. The already close relationship between the government and the church became more exclusive from other local Chinese organisations. This situation can be seen clearly from a letter written by Anglican Bishop Hall to the secretary of the Board of Education in 1959. He states:

> My concern is with the use of Christian churches by subsidy in primary education. The government both in the UK and its colonial policy recognises that by-in-large only religion can resist Communism and that non-religious primary education on a large scale will produce an atheistic proletariat as prepared ground for communist sowing. I very much hope that the Roman Catholic Church will, with encouragement from the department, strengthen and enlarge their primary school work.[241]

[241] 'Letter of Bishop R.O. Hall, Bishop of Hong Kong and South China to the Secretary of the Board of Education. 16 September 1950'. *Hong Kong Record Series*, 147 2/2 (1), 119, Hong Kong Public Records Office.;Leung, B. & Chan S.H. pp26-27

Bishop's Hall's view was endorsed in the reply letter by G.P. Ferguson Secretary of the Board of Education.

> I agree entirely with your view in your penultimate paragraph. I consider myself that religion should play a more and more important part in school since it is the very essence of cultured civilisation.[242]

In the 1950s and 1960s, Bishop Hall was a non-governmental leading figure in the organisation of relief projects and in forming welfare councils, along with other church people, both Catholic and Protestant.[243] However, the refugees poured into Hong Kong by the thousands every day. The churches with their own resources and foreign donations were no longer able to cope with such a large number of refugees, especially when a huge fire on Christmas day 1953 left hundreds of thousands as squatter dwellers. Bishop Hall, as the Colonial Bishop, took the initiative to seek help from the colonial government and succeeded in convincing the government to build resettlement estates for the homeless.

The church wished to care for the needs of the newly arrived refugees while the government wished to stabilize society and to prevent communist infiltration. Thus, the church and the government entered into a new era of cooperation to help those who were in trouble and in need. The spirit of cooperation between Christian churches and the government was high. Colonial financial aid in social services and education was exclusively given to mainline churches. Until the end of 1967 pro-China riot, the threat

[242] 'Letter of Secretary of Board of Education to the Rt. Rev. R.O.Hall, the Bishop of Hong Kong , Ref. E.D. 3/2106/45'. Hong Kong Record Series, 147 2/2 (1), 120, Hong Kong Public Records Office;
[243] Lee, P.K.H. "Bishop Ronald Hall: A Man Ahead of this Time." *Ching Feng* 29 (March 1986): P.46

of communist infiltration was removed and the government funding began to be made available for other Chinese social service associations such as Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk and Kaifong Associations[244]

With the exclusive financial aid from the colonial government in the 1950s to the 1970s, the church rapidly expanded its educational and social services. Up to the 1990s, Christian churches provided 60% of social services, 50% of the secondary schools, 40% of the primary schools, 30% of the kindergartens, and 20% of its hospitals.[245] Anglican and Catholic churches were the two main contributors to education and social services. From the 1960s onwards, evangelical, mainline protestant and Catholic churches all grew significantly in terms of members, institutions and material resources. Mainland churches dominated Hong Kong education and social welfare services. Christian churches were considered a place for social upward mobility or for producing middle classes and Hong Kong elites. Although Christian churches were accused of attracting a great numbers of 'rice Christians', they did offer security to refugees who were uprooted from their homeland, and provided new values to those whose traditional values were no longer adequate for them to fit into the colonial structure. In other words, the church played an important role not only to channel the elites, but also the general public (the group of misfits) into the colonial collaborative system.

In order to support such a great number of schools and social services, Christian churches have gradually become more dependent on governmental financial aid. To

[244] Leung, B. & Chan S.H p.28
[245] Kwok N.W, the Hong Kong Christian Institute, 1997, p.3

secure the funding, Christian churches have had to maintain the operative relationship with the government, and have followed government policy rather than pushed the government for social reform. Also, the more the Christian churches were subsidized by the government, the less the churches had influence on its education and social policy. For example, Christians should not have priority in being appointed to church schools and social welfare centres.

In a partnership with the colonial government, churches are able to penetrate the non-Christian Chinese community on different levels. In return, the churches are absorbed into the government system to maintain social stability and to conform to colonial rule. Both sides are satisfied with such a co-operative relationship. However, in such a mutually beneficial relationship, Christian churches had to sacrifice their prophetic voices. The Catholic Church's proposal of being in dialogue with the communists is a good example to illustrate this point. In the early 1970s, the Catholic Church in Hong Kong followed Vatican II's recommendation to combine faith and daily life. A delegated group was appointed to evaluate the socio-political situation of Hong Kong and to draft the document 'Social Outlook of the Church'. The delegates recommended the Church to "take a more positive attitude to understand and to dialogue" with the communist China, because there is a great possibility that the people of Hong Kong would live under its rule. To take an attitude of antagonism is far from proper.[246] The media and the Hong Kong government severely criticized this recommendation for betraying the church's religious roots in proposing a dialogue with the communists. To avoid the conflicts with the Hong Kong government, Bishop Hsu gave in and removed the key recommendations "moving toward initial understanding of the PRC, and

[246] "Jiaohui Zhi Shehui guang", *the Social Outlook of the Church, pp 9-10; Beatrice. & Chan Shun-hing,* p36

holding dialogues with Communists in Hong Kong."[247] This event reflected that the sentiment of antagonism against communism was not homogenous in the Christian circle, but the coloniser's resource control suppressed these alternative voices.

The above discussion indicated that the Cold War divided the world into two antagonistic camps – leftist and rightist. Together with the contesting national identities between the PRC in mainland China and ROC in Taiwan, Hong Kong was used as "a base in their efforts to undermine the other side, not least by propaganda attacks and by winning or intimidating the hearts and minds of the Chinese in Hong Kong."[248] During these years, communist China was depicted as an Other and an enemy by the colonial government who walked alongside with mainline churches to defend communist infiltration into the colony. However, most of Hong Kong Chinese did not treat communist China as a total other. Rather, they shared with the Catholic dialogue recommendation that it would be far from proper to take an attitude of antagonism and fear towards communist China, because the mainland was Hong Kong's cultural origin and the Beijing authority would most likely be its future master. The Cold War's polarisation did not strengthen the anti-communist tendency already there among the refugees from mainland. Rather, it aroused the people of Hong Kong to reconsider their own identities in relation to membership in a Chinese community, including mainland China and Taiwan. The people of Hong Kong recognised that we are Chinese, but not the same as mainlanders or Taiwanese. The recognition of ambivalent identities (Hong Kong Chinese subjectivities) made them feel secured to stay out of politics.[249] Without

[247] Leung, B. & Chan S.H. p36
[248] Tsang, S. (ed.) *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government & Politics* (Hong Kong: HKUP, 1995), P.241
[249] Ibid.,P.243

taking sides, the people of Hong Kong could avoid being sucked into the antagonistic politics, among communists, the Kuomintang, and the colonial government. The choice of political neutrality within the Hong Kong Chinese community made the political situation less complicated and the coloniser feel more relaxed from the threat of communism or international uprisings. Eventually, the attitude of Hong Kong people made the colonial government change the antagonistic policy against communism into strict political neutrality, and to establish the rule of law in the territory. This meant that not only the pro-communist and the pro-Kuomintang press were free to publish anything, but also local editorialist calling for an Overseas China[250] (a Third Way beyond the KMT and the CCP) were allowed to make publications, provided that the local laws and order were not disturbed as a result. 'The rule of law' policy directly appealed to the freedom of speech rather than argued from any political position. This redefined policy helped the colony build up a good reputation that Hong Kong is the only place within the Chinese soil where the citizens could breathe 'free air' – freedom of speech, education, and business.[251]

[250] "Ever since the communist takeover of the mainland, twenty million (overseas Chinese) have been treated merely as a moving property of the communists in foreign countries…Taiwan authorities are deeply fearful of communist infiltration…all the Chinese living overseas are no more than 'people who hold Chinese passports without the right to go to Taiwan…One hundred percent of Chinese (except Taiwanese) were born in mainland China. We cannot recognise ourselves as Taiwanese…in all honesty, in the eyes of the overseas, Taiwan is just the familiar name of a geographical area and is not even as much of home as Hong Kong or Macau are. How can they whole-heartedly support a country without feelings…So, why, can't we organize an Overseas China? Neither the CCP nor the KMT can do anything to us. (Zhan 1968) founded in Law W.S., 2009, p.135

[251] Law, W.S. p.144

5.4.2 The Church's social conscience was conditioned by socio-political cultural context.

The collaborative relationship between the mainline churches[252] and the colonial government had often been attributed to the dependency syndrome of running education and social services. The more mainline churches became involved, the more dependent it became on government aid. In order to secure government support, they refrained from criticising the unjust government policy. This is the reason why mainline churches have often been accused of an 'unholy alliance' with the colonial rule. Such an accusation overlooks the complexities of a socio-political cultural context in which the attitude of the Hong Kong people had a reverse effect both to the government and the Christian churches.

China's political factor

The secret to Hong Kong's success was China's political failure[253]: its inability to provide a sound economic environment and a stable political condition for its people. The people of Hong Kong consciously chose to collaborate with rather than to attack the unjust colonial government due not to their lack of social consciousness, but due to the fact that they somehow felt that "now is not the time".[254] Chinese, in the past hundred years, witnessed the downfall of Qing dynasty, the exploitation of Western imperialism, the chaos of warlords, the invasion of the Japanese military, the civil war between communists and the Kuomintang, and the turmoil of Cultural Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of mainland Chinese fled to Hong Kong to escape from political

[252] Mainline churches included Catholic Church and Protestant churches - Anglican, Methodist, the Church of Christ in China, and so on.
[253] Carroll, J.M. 2005, p.191
[254] Tsang, S. (ed.) A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government & Politics (Hong Kong: HKUP, 1995), P.244

unrest and economic hardship. The colonial government was capable: it not only provided a harmonious and stable environment for business, but was also able to defend the territory from being influenced by political disorder in China. Against this background, if the people of Hong Kong chose to support the Catholic position on initiating dialogue with communists, this would "provide an opportunity for communist party infiltration, rock the present stable political situation and cause social unrest."[255] Perhaps, if China had not experienced the Cultural Revolution, the people of Hong Kong would have been more active in criticising the antagonistic position of Britain. Based on these reasons, the people of Hong Kong wisely choose to stay on the position of political neutrality/apolitical involvement which helped the colonial government modify its antagonistic policy towards communism and succeed in harmonizing the dynamics from different parties. The attitude of political neutrality among Hong Kong people also constrained Christian churches from taking a political side. This is another reason why the Catholic bishop did not insist on initiating dialogue with communists.

Cultural factors (Chinese traditional values and Hong Kong mentality) [256]

Apart from recognizing the unrest of China's political factor, the people of Hong Kong chose to stay away from politics and to collaborate with the colonial government due to the influence of the Chinese traditional values and the emergence of individualism. The Chinese traditional values founded mainly on the Confucian social order consists of the following elements. First, everyone had their own duty including how to play a proper role in the family and the society. Building up a good family was the foundation for building up a good nation, and the basic criterion of building up a good family was to

[255] Ibid., P.245
[256] The section of cultural factors is similar to the basic arguments of my M.phil. thesis, Kwok, pp80-89

cultivate oneself first. Confucianism highlighted individual morality and social responsibility. The collective interest, of social order and harmony with others took precedence over the individual interest.[257] Second, there was a hierarchical relationship between the rulers and laymen.[258] This meant that politics was only the duty of the rulers who were responsible for maintaining social order. Laymen were not supposed to intervene, but to obey and practice the laws imposed by the rulers. Any deviation from the ruler's order was discouraged and punished. As a result, both the civil and political rights of the ordinary citizen were not widely known in Chinese society. Such a political culture did not encourage resistance against rulers. Lin Yu-tang, a renowned Chinese scholar made these comments: "The Chinese people have put up with more tyranny, anarchy and misrule than any Western people ever put up with, and seem to have regarded them as part of the laws of nature."[259] To seek for harmony was another characteristic of the Chinese mentality. Political involvement was often engaged in sensitive topics. To stay away from politics could avoid conflicts and maintain a harmonious relationship with others. This ideology reinforced the culture of political apathy in the colony.

As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong was made up of immigrants who were almost entirely farmers, workers and merchants. The agrarian-landlord and gentry-scholar-official who upheld Confucian morality and virtues did not come to stay in Hong Kong.[260] Without the Confucian elite, Hong Kong was led by a group of people whose concerns were

[257] Munro, D. *Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values* (USA: UOM, 1985), P.332; Munro, D. *The Concept of Man in Early China* (Stanford: SUP; 1969), P.23
[258] Ibid.
[259] found in Miners, N.J. "Hong Kong: a case study in stability", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*13.1 (1975), P.32
[260] Lau, S.K. & Kuan, H.C. *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese*, (Hong Kong: CUP; 1995), P.34-35

wealth and survival rather than justice and moral excellence. This fostered a cultural climate in which "economic pursuits and the acquisition of wealth, whether for survival or status attainment, became the most valued goals of the population. Amorality, materialism, and pragmatic, pecuniary orientation eventually prevailed over Confucian ethics in the evolution of the Hong Kong culture."[261]

Since the number of refugees was huge after 1949, the colonial government was both unwilling and unable to take care the needs of the refugees. Apart from the limited charity from the churches, the refugees had to rely on the support of their families or kinsfolk. This contributed to or reinforced the apolitical, pragmatic, and familistic culture. Leung made this remark:

> The force of circumstances gradually rendered the family the centre of the individual's world that was to be enriched primarily through material gains. The significance of people and things in the larger society was to be evaluated in terms of their usefulness to the family, for the well-being of the family meant the well-being of the individual.[262]

In other words, the minimally integrated social-political system shaped the culture and the Chinese community resolved their problems mainly through individual efforts, family, and kin support. This instilled an attitude of indifference to the outside except when it impinged on the well-being of the family.[263]

[261] Leung, K.P. Op cit., P.51
[262] Leung, B.K.P. (ed.) *Social Issues in Hong Kong*, (Hong Kong: OUP, 1990), P.15
[263] Lau, S.K. *Utilitarianistic Familism: An Inquiry into the Basic of Political Stability in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1977), P. 319-20

The above discussion indicates that the traditional Chinese morality in Hong Kong, sacrificing one's interests for the common good of the community, has been overshadowed by a materialistic and individual ethos that places the self-interests of one's family above the collective interests of society.[264] This family ideology had been declining in Hong Kong since the 1970s, because the government began to enlarge its role in providing social welfare services.

As the city of Hong Kong was made up of immigrants with a refugee or sojourner mentality, the people did not have a strong commitment to the development of the city. Moreover, they were excluded from the policy-making system. They had a strong feeling of powerlessness with regard to government affairs. In addition, the Chinese tradition meant that subjects were not supposed to intervene in the rulers' policies. Therefore, the people of Hong Kong were not concerned with whether they had the right to express their views in political issues. Rather, they were concerned with whether the society provided sufficient opportunities for them to pursue economic and social advancement. Research findings in 1985 show that 63.9 percent of Hong Kong people do not have a norm in which they strictly follow. Rather they would modify their moral principles if adherence to them would bring adverse consequences.[265] Also, the findings indicate that the majority of Hong Kong people share the view: "The rights possessed by a person in society are not in-born. It is because of his good performance that society gives him the rights as rewards."[266] This belief leads most Hong Kong people to choose the answer that "they would not hesitate to deny the rights to those

[264] Leung, K.P. Op cit.,P.52
[265] Ibid., P.49-50
[266] Ibid. ,P.51

who pose a menace to social order."[267] This implies that a performance upholding the social order is regarded as good, while threatening the social order is bad. In other words, "an important ingredient of Hong Kong people's morality is situated in their predilection for order and stability."[268]

The above findings seem to suggest that the people of Hong Kong are concerned about their collective interests, particularly, social order. However, as Benjamin Leung argues, if one examined what 'social order' meant to the people of Hong Kong, one would have a different understanding. He says, "Order is the basis of Hong Kong's prosperity and is treasured primarily for its role in facilitating the individual pursuit of wealth."[269] In other words, the people of Hong Kong upholding social order have nothing to do with moral judgment. Rather, it is just a utilitarian reason. Thomas Wong shares this view and makes the comment: "For the Hong Kong people…as long as there is room for their individual selfish decisions and efforts to bear fruit, then things are fine… (About) the moral implications…the Hong Kong people hardly care".[270]

Thomas Wong's comment on the ethos might not be the whole picture of Hong Kong people, but it reflects that the ethos of Hong Kong people is not built on a moral foundation. The Hong Kong ethos is rather utilitarian and amoral. The term 'amorality' does not necessarily mean that the people of Hong Kong are lacking moral reserves, but

[267] Ibid.
[268] Leung, K.P. Op cit., P.54
[269] Ibid.
[270] Wong, W.P. & Liu, T.L. "Morality, Class and the Hong Kong Way of Life", *Occasional Paper* (Hong Kong: HKAPS, 1993), P.21-22

it implies that the people have "intermittent and capricious engagement in moral considerations."[271]

The amoral and utilitarian Hong Kong ethos combines with a persistent sense of political powerlessness. The people of Hong Kong tend to see politics just as an instrument to help them realise their personal material interests. Their participation in politics is selective, concentrating on those issues which primarily relate to their immediate and individual interests. They do not see that political participation is the duty and the right of being a citizen. They are reluctant to commit themselves to any long-term struggle for political change so as to build a better and more just society. The instrumental and pragmatic concern for self-interest explains why the majority of Hong Kong people consider social stability and prosperity more important than political reform.[272]

Redefine church's vision and coloniser's policy in Hong Kong

The discussion on Hong Kong culture indicates that Christian churches lacking of a prophetic role should not be reduced to only one factor of financial dependency. In facing the particular context of Hong Kong, the Church found it difficult to take a radical approach to confront the colonial unjust rule, because the people of Hong Kong would not support any radical action to destabilise the stability of the territory and the colonial protection from communist infiltration. In other words, the prophetic voice of

[271] Ibid., P.25-26
[272] Lau et al.(ed.) *"Political attitude" Indicators of Social Development: Hong Kong 1988*, (Hong Kong: HKIAPS 1991)

Christian churches was trapped by the unrest of China's politics and the mentality of Hong Kong people.

In brief, mainline churches before 1980s were focused on the ministry to individuals or to society in moments of crisis. With regard to political and social issues, they usually remained silent and took a non-confrontational approach to the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese governments. Fundamentally, they gave support to the existing structure in society and paid little attention to socio-political dimensions. This was not their indifference to politics, but the churches' prolonged encounter with the people of Hong Kong influenced their choice of pastoral approach.

Likewise, through the prolonged encounter with the collaborative culture of Hong Kong Chinese, the colonial government gradually gave up its 'antagonistic policy' between the British colonial government and the Chinese communist authority, and its 'segregated policy' between the coloniser and the colonised. Instead, it redefined its policy as 'rule of law' and 'counsel direct but light colonial governance.'[273] This meant that the colonial bureaucracy was in charge of directly administering the territory, but undertook non-intervention in society and the economy. In order to stabilize and maintain its political rule, the British government gave little opportunity for the people of Hong Kong to take part in political activity and organisation. Only the established and emergent Chinese elite could be co-opted into the colonial regime as its complementary but subsidiary components.

[273] Ibid., P.4

According to British constitutional law, Hong Kong was a 'Crown Colony', which was ruled by a governor, who was required by the Letters Patent to consult the Executive council and Legislative council. Before 1985, both councils were composed of 'official' and 'unofficial' members. Neither of these bodies had any elective element nor was there universal suffrage. All the unofficial members were appointed by the governor. They were chosen mainly from professionals, the rich, and businessmen. This system made it difficult for the appointed members to pose an effective opposition to the government. The co-optation was basically of an individual rather than a party. To a certain extent, the appointed individuals might reflect the views or interests of the social sectors to which they belonged. However, it was the individuals who were recognised and rewarded by the colonial government. This system did not serve to equip party leaders and strengthen its relations with the masses. Rather, it was aimed at activating intense individual competition among the Chinese elite for colonial favours, individualizing the Chinese elite, and detaching them politically from the masses. Lacking support from any party or group, the appointed elite would find it difficult to oppose the united front of the officials representing the government. Even though they could join together to counter with the government, there were no constituents to provide them with a basis of support. Thus, Leung comments that,

> At the highest level of policy-making, the government as represented by its bureaucrats seemed to have the lion's share of political power. The co-option of members of the public into the two councils appeared to be essentially an attempt at democratic window-dressing.[274]

[274] Leung, Op. cit., P.16

The notion of a bureaucratic polity indicates that the colonial Government did not wish to see political interference from Chinese society. The majority of Hong Kong people were excluded from policy-making. They had a strong feeling of powerlessness with regard to the government. In order to stabilize its regime, the British used the Chinese elite as collaborators to control the masses and applied coercion to suppress anti-colonial activities. The co-optation of the Chinese elite in the government system was not intended to equip strong indigenous leaders to rule Hong Kong in the future. Rather, it had a negative impact on the rise of local leaders in Hong Kong. The British "encouraged individualistic competition among the Chinese elite for political patronage from the government and to establish a channel of political mobility for the Chinese elite which would foster their detachment from the masses".[275] Also, the colonial policy denied the right of people to take part in policy-making and intended to reinforce an apolitical culture and individualism. The people of Hong Kong including the government officials under the colonial system did not have the opportunity to develop their political skills and the temperament to mobilize the masses for social change. This created a difficult situation for the people of Hong Kong to rule the territory in 1997, because they were lacking indigenous leaders, lacking the civic responsibility, and lacking experience to deal with social change.

The analysis of the colonial policy indicates that throughout the colonial rule and until the 1970s, the Chinese and the British communities maintained only limited contacts. The British community was mainly responsible for the development of government. The majority of the local Chinese were excluded from the participation in policy-making, but they accepted this political reality and fully supported the colonial policy,

[275] Lau, S.K. Op cit., P.7

because their purpose in coming to Hong Kong was to make a living and to escape from persecution under communism. Since the Chinese community did not pose any threat to the government, the British community felt more relaxed in undertaking a policy of non-intervention in the Chinese community and in establishing a system in which people could enjoy a decent level of political freedom and of human rights protection. The two different communities co-existed peacefully.

Conclusion

Hong Kong missionary churches, through their continuous efforts to provide a good education for a new generation, had produced many Chinese elites serving the colonial government, the Chinese government and all over world. The special role of the Hong Kong elite helped them distinguish themselves as a special class of Chinese different from their counterparts on the mainland. However, their distinctiveness was not necessary to create a barrier blocking the people of Hong Kong to have a good relationship with its motherland. Rather, their multi-layered identities allowed them to shift their roles to serve the welfare of Chinese, to civilise China, and to speed up national reform. With regard to the coloniser, the hybrid or multi-layered identities of Hong Kong elites challenged the homogenous narrative of the colonised. The colonised were not an object shaped by the coloniser. Rather, they were subjects who consciously handled the different dynamics, skilfully used the hybrid space or crack to resist colonial domination, and wisely shifted their roles to meet their different purposes. The approach of collaboration produced an effect of ‘similar but different’ to destabilise the absolute authority of the colonial government and to emerge a new space for

negotiation – allowing the coloniser and the colonised to redefine their identities and their roles.

This chapter has demonstrated that to resist domination or colonisation is not necessary for theological narrative to be binaristic and resistance to be antagonistic. Hong Kong churches adopting the mode of collaboration as resistance that is anti-colonialist (Britain) and anti-communist (mainland China) has made significant contributions to the successfully story of Hong Kong and to the modernisation of mainland China. Moreover, the collaborative experience of Hong Kong churches will contribute to the development of the theological liberation movement (Taiwan and Korea in the next chapter) by adding to it an alternative mode of resistance – a kind of resistance which is not the narrative of binary opposition. This has constructed a basis for our further exploration on cultural reconciliation.

CHAPTER SIX
BINARY OPPOSITION IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF RESISTANCES: THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH OF TAIWAN & KOREA IN RECONCILIATION OR REUNIFICATION

6.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, we discussed how most Hong Kong mainline churches chose hybridity as a mode of collaboration to resist imperialism and British colonial rule in order to transform the city and develop both a modern China as well as a prosperous Hong Kong. The approach of collaboration and the multi-layered identity of Hong Kong people destabilise not only the binary opposition between the coloniser and the colonised, but also the stereotype between Hong Kong and mainland China. This allows a new space to emerge for exploring other modes of resistance (such as liberation, subversion, and transformation) between the two places. In order to avoid falling into the pitfalls of narrow cultural essentialism, this chapter will go beyond the particular contextual narrative of Hong Kong and move towards a wider cross-cultural setting to see how other churches are narrating themselves in the process of reunification. The main concern of this chapter is to find out how they struggle to understand the meaning of reconciliation in conflicted contexts and how they deal constructively/creatively with differences. Two cross-regional cases will be selected to illustrate this theme, namely, Taiwan and South Korea. Both Taiwan and South Korea have been exploring the possibility of unification or reconciliation. Apart from sharing the similar context of Asia with HKSAR, the two cases have been struggling with the long-divided systems – the deep structural and life-styled differences between communist and capitalist regimes. These are unlike the model of South Africa, where the oppressive regime has fallen and the churches have been taking a role to reconcile the oppressor and the oppressed. Also,

the core issue of the conflict in South Africa was apartheid, a racial rather than an ethnic discrimination. Taiwan and South Korea are unlike the model of India-Pakistan and Malaysia-Singapore, where both sides have had mutual consent to separate and allowed the Other to enter an inter-state system. Moreover, they are unlike the model of West and East Germany, where both sides have had a shared vision of reunification in which the East was willing to give up the ideology of socialism and to integrate with the democratic capitalism of the West.

Taiwan reflects a situation that the reunification is not in place but some churches, particularly, the Presbyterian church in Taiwan (PCT) – the biggest denomination in the island – have chosen the path of resistance against assimilation and utter opposition to the reunification, creating a deep division between the Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese, and escalating the possibility of military confrontation between Taipei and Beijing. South Korea reveals another situation that although there is a broad consensus among the people and among churches on the historical necessity of reunification, South Korean para-church organisations (Minjung movement and theology) in the earlier period held a belief that to defeat communism was the earthly task of the church mission in which God's justice, freedom and peace can be truly realised.[276] In this sense, reunification for South Korea churches had a radical character to defeat the Other (victory over communism) and to establish a democratic/capitalist country. In the 1980s, South Korea churches have gradually realised that resistance as the binary-opposition/subversion of communist North Korea might trigger nuclear confrontation which would bring disaster to both sides. They have begun to conceive the mode of

[276] Lee, J. M. *A Study of Anti-communism as a Church-State Security Ideology in the Protestant Church of Korea Unit 1979*.PhD Thesis, (Birmingham: Birmingham University, 2009), p.239

reconciliation as an alternative way of resistance against injustice/inequality, liberation from division/contested ideologies, and mutual transformation which is a pre-condition for building up a peaceful, united, and better country.

Putting the two different contexts together in comparison with HKSAR, our horizon will be widened and our imagination will be expanded. Three steps will be taken to identify the issues. Firstly, to examine the starting points that existed or still exist for reunification in China and Korea will help us find out the similarities and differences between the two countries. Secondly, we move on to the issue which is very significant in this thesis that is the role of the church or para-church organisations contributing to reunification or cultural reconciliation. Finally, in light of the above consideration, the churches in HKSAR might gain insights or guidance from these two models to move forward to the action of cultural reconciliation with mainland China.

6.2 The similar starting points – bi-polar global order suppresses decolonisation

6.2.1 US' neo-colonialism – the innate superiority of Western culture

Both the division of South-North Korea and Taiwan-mainland China were partly a consequence of that binary opposition between the two world powers, the US and the USSR, which came to the fore soon after the end of the Second World War. With the removal of Japanese colonial rule after 1945, both Taiwan and Korea were assumed to have entered a postcolonial era – political independence or decolonisation. However, the people of Korea and Taiwan were excluded from the liberation process. Korea was forcefully divided into two at the 38th parallel; the South was ruled by the US under the

name of 'trusteeship' while the North was controlled by the USSR.[277] Taiwan was undertaken with military occupation by the Kuomintang (KMT) government – also called the Nationalist government represented by the Republic of China (ROC) – as a trustee on behalf of the US-led Allied powers to accept the Japanese surrender of the island.[278] As the Japanese colonisers had left, the politically superior US and its allies proceeded to behave like the former coloniser in transforming the postcolonial South Korea and Taiwan into an opportunity for internal colonisation. Likewise, the Soviets used a similar method to handle North Korea and mainland China. In other words, the liberation of South Korea and Taiwan was the beginning of the US' neo-colonisation – a new form of hegemony which was not so much given by direct political and cultural domination, but by diplomatic and cultural influence.

To handle the Other (communism), the US and its Euro-centric allies adopted the Western modernism of exclusion and discrimination fused by binary opposition – liberal capitalism is good, economically advanced, and free while communism is evil, economically backward, and autocratic. The binary narrative, built on two centres and constrained by the language of centrism (enemy versus us), was intentionally and unintentionally imposed on their neo-colonies. Together with the internal political contradictions stemming from the past, the Euro-centric ideology of "Enemy versus Us" intensified the antagonism between the two pairs of rivals, eventually, leading to open military confrontation, economic competition, and cultural conflicts. It appeared that the only way to achieve reunification was through military force. The hostility of the

[277]Habermas J. *National Unification and Popular Sovereignty*, p.4
[278]Huang, P.H. *From Galilee to Taiwan: Towards a Theology of Chhut-thau-thi* (Manila: ATESEA, 2005), p. 22

Other, influenced by the bi-polar Cold War order and collaborated by military regimes, made the peaceful reunification and reconciliation more difficult.

6.2.2 Fighting for identity legitimacy and using military force for reunification

In 1949, the (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek was defeated by the Chinese communist party (CCP) and fled to Taiwan. On the first of October 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was formally established. This implied that China was officially divided into two regimes, the PRC and the ROC. The division occurred when the Soviet-American rivalry generated a cold war, a global bi-polar confrontation, between the communist and liberal capitalist camps. With the fear of communist expansion and the threats to American security, the US chose to recognise the ROC in Taiwan as the sovereign authority of China rather than the communist PRC in the mainland. Defeated by the CCP, the KMT's government shared the American, anti-communist attitude and was incorporated into the US policy against communist China. With the full support from the US, the ROC in Taiwan succeeded in gaining a seat in the UN in the period of Korean wars. As the sole legitimate government of China, Chiang Kai-shek always claimed that he had the right to recover mainland China by counter-attacking and destroying the Chinese communist military forces, using Taiwan as a base of subversion.[279] On the other hand, the PRC in the mainland shared the ideology with communist countries and established the Sino-Soviet alliance to resist the US' hegemony. The hostility between mainland China and Taiwan were escalating in the context of the Cold War. In the Zedong Mao's era, the emphasis of the PRC was on liberating Taiwan by whatever methods, the basic concept to liberation meant using

[279]Chung, C.P. *Democratisation in South Korea and Taiwan: the effect of social division on inter-Korea and Cross-Strait Relations* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p. 24

armed force[280] – the People's Liberation Army often bombed Taiwan's offshore islands, Dachens, Quemoy and Matsu in that period.[281] At the beginning of the KMT's conflict with the CCP, the US decided not to become involved in the Chinese civil war, because of the threat to the US security coming from the Soviets rather than the Chinese.[282] However, once the PRC made an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1950 and took part in the Korean War, the American President Harry S. Truman immediately changed the position of non-intervention and sent the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to protect the KMT from being attacked by the communist PRC.[283]

Korea was forcefully annexed and autocratically ruled by Japan since 1910. After the end of the Second World War, Koreans, on the side of victors, assumed that freedom and independence were fully at hand. However, the liberation of Korea was the beginning of division – the US and the USSR divided the country into two at the 38th parallel. Without Korean participation in the process of decision-making, the Republic of Korea in the South (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North were proclaimed by the two Blocs within a month of each other in 1948.[284] Both regimes claimed to be the legitimate government of the country and both pledged that they would eventually reunify Korea under their leadership.[285] Similar to the case of Taiwan, South Korea, supported by the US, got the recognition from the UN as the

[280]Zhang, Q Interpreting China's new Taiwan Policy, Column: Global Survey, 15 Jan, 2009
[281]Miao, I. W., p.234
[282]"A Report to the President by the National Security Council: The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia", NSC No. 48 published on 30 December 1949, in Stephen P. Gibertand William M.
[283]Copper, J.F. *China Diplomacy: the Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p.2
[284]Habermas J. *National Unification and Popular Sovereignty*, p.4
[285]Heo UK & Horowitz, S.A. (ed.) *Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003). P.68

sole legitimate government of the Korea peninsula on 12th December, 1949.[286] Thus, Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea, claimed that North Korea was an illegal entity occupying half of the territory and the ROK had the right to use force to recover it in order to free the people from repression.[287] Did the North Korean regime claim to be the only lawful national government on the peninsula? The DPRK's approach towards unification was to overthrow the rule of the ROK by force.[288] As the two regimes took the line of reunification through military force to recover the whole peninsula, this attitude culminated in the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

6.2.3 Economic competition and cultural conflict

The bi-polar confrontation between the Soviet and the US was not confined only to the global level of military rivalry or national security, but also extended to the regional level of economic and cultural concerns. In order to form a security shield against the spread of the Soviet-led communist empire, the US pursued a course of supporting allies around the world by providing them with financial aid, associated with a plan to allocate aid for military and economic purposes.[289] South Korea and Taiwan benefited from the American aid both in promoting their economic developments and in advancing their military equipments.[290] Strategically, the US considered itself as the centre, placing Taiwan, Korea, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries within the anti-communist network. This led to the trade boom of East Asia, because the US

[286]Ibid., p. 92
[287]Heo UK & Horowitz, S.A.(ed.), p. 92
[288]Kim, H.J *The Unification Policy of South and North Korea*, (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1977), p. 77
[289]Miao, I. W. "A Social Constructivist approach to the "Sovereignty" of the Republic of China on Taiwan", PhD Thesis., (Birmingham: Birmingham University, 2004), p.199
[290]Packenham, R. A. *Liberal American and the Third World*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.54

served as the centre of an East Asian regionalization linked with an international trading system regulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Domestic Institutional Norms (DINs) and Global Institutional Norms (GINs). All these kinds of regionalization rooted in trade and the alliance based on anti-communism gradually formulated a particular norm for the region. For instance, those countries which would like to enjoy the tariff-free international system had to meet the conditions prescribed by the three institutions. This allowed the US to create an external trade-friendly environment and world-wide market for those countries or her alliances which shared with her liberal values and capitalism-based economic ideology. At the same time, the US can exclude those countries which did not share the norms of capitalism and even gave sanction to her imagined enemies – the communist countries. More importantly, the motive of the American East Asian policy of prosperity was to demonstrate the superiority of capitalism over communism and demonize the backward, Soviet-led, communist economic reforms. Thus, the US was able to use the international trade institutions to spread its liberal values at the global level and to impose its anti-communist policy at the domestic realm.

6.2.4 The US' support for autocratic rule

Surprisingly, the US made every effort to spread its liberal value to the world, but did not impose its ideology of democracy on the KMT government in Taiwan and the ROK government in the South Korea. There are three main factors leading to the US' belief that authoritarian government was the most effective way to achieve America's liberal aim of the free operation of international capital flow and to prevent communist

dissentients from taking power.[291] Culturally, Taiwan and Korea had long been influenced by the doctrine of Confucianism – all power comes from above and resides in a supreme authority. This belief justified the asymmetric power relation between the ruler and the ruled. The KMT and the ROK governments were supposed to have the supreme authority and power. Moreover, the Confucian principles of loyalty, the "Five Cardinal Relationship" were taught and practiced in daily life.[292] Owing to the power relation-perceived cultural value of obedience, the centralization of power in the KMT/ROK government enabled it to exercise traditional authoritarianism to prevent dissentients from taking power.[293] Economically, Taiwan and South Korea were facing economic hardship after the Second World War and the civil war. The satisfaction of physical needs/security was considered as the basic human right. To resolve the economic problem preceded the implementation of democracy. It was believed that the effective way in handling the economic difficulties was to have a centralized or authoritarian state to mobilize the whole society to tackle the problem. In this sense, "the authority of authoritarian states which had originally been legitimized by tradition was further legitimized by economic performance."[294] Historically, Taiwan had long been colonised by different foreign powers and was habituated to authoritarianism. Although the duration of Japanese occupation in Korea was much shorter in comparison with Taiwan, the colonisation period was still over thirty-five years. A radical change to the establishment of democracy might destabilise the stability of the new government. Particularly, the Soviet and mainland China formed an alliance and triggered the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, as well as the communist encroachment into South

[291]Miao, I. W., pp.213-214
[292]De Bary, W. T. & Tu, w. (eds.) *Confucianism and Human Rights*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp.85-7
[293]Pye, L.w. *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1985), pp.183-4
[294]Miao, I. W., p214

Vietnam. This indicated the aggressiveness of the communist forces. In order to respect the local culture, to give priority to the rapid economic growth, and to avoid taking the risk of destabilizing the KMT and ROK powers to suppress communists, the US legitimized the autocratic rule of the two governments.

6.2.5 The autocratic regimes adopted the US' bi-polar Cold War policy - demonised communists as external enemy and suppressed internal decolonisation for the sake of self-security as well as rapid economic growth

Both the KMT and the ROC military regimes ruled over their domains with two ideologies, anti-communism and economic growth, which are used to defend their autocratic rule and prevent their people from active involvement in internal decolonisation such as democratisation, self-determination, and independent movement.

After the Second World War and the civil war, Taiwan was facing economic hardship. For the KMT government, the satisfaction of physical needs/security was considered as the basic human right. To resolve the economic problem preceded the implementation of democracy. It was believed that the effective way in handling the economic difficulties was to have a centralized or authoritarian state to mobilize the whole society to tackle the problem. A radical change to the establishment of democracy might destabilise the stability and the authority of the new government to speed up economic growth. In order to strengthen its autocratic rule, the KMT government in Taiwan promoted the essence of Dr. Sun's theory (national father of the ROC) of national reconstruction that the rulers, based on the Chinese tradition, must possess the supreme

authority over their subjects.[295] This theory justified the KMT to centralize its power in terms of military, politics, and economics. The people of Taiwan were completely excluded from policy-making, for example, the enactment of the Temporary Provisions and the Decrees of Emergency legitimized the KMT as the only party controlling the central government.[296] With the US' endorsement, the KMT legitimized its dictatorship to eliminate any forces disloyal to its rule – any anti-KMT activity could be lawfully suppressed in the name of communist rebellion.[297] Against this context, the autocratic KMT government suppressed the process of decolonisation – people's aspiration for self-determination and democracy.

Apart from controlling tightly the majority of islanders under military law,[298] the KMT adopted a binary opposition approach (enemy versus us) to handle the relationship between the two communities (the people of mainland China and the people of Taiwan) and between the two regimes (the KMT and the CCP). The KMT government attempted to demonize the Chinese communist party policy by extensively reporting the evil campaigns in mainland China – first with the Anti-Rightist Campaign, later with the Great Leap Forward, then with the Cultural Revolution – which resulted in the deaths of at least 23 million people, many from starvation. As the CCP brought turmoil to the mainland Chinese, the KMT considered the Beijing authorities not only evil, but also the enemy. Chiang insisted that "the loyal and traitorous cannot coexist" (*Hanzei bu Liangli*)[299] – negotiations on any subject with the communist "rebels" were strictly

[295]Pye, L.w.., pp.183-4
[296]Rigger, Shelley, *Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy*, pp.70-1
[297]Miao, I. W., p.226
[298]The Website for Taiwan's history, present, and future, www.taiwandc.org/history.htm
[299]Goldstein, S.M. "Terms of Engagement – Taiwan's mainland policy," in *Engagement China – The Management of the Emergent China*, Johnston, A I & Ross, R.S. (eds.), (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.58

prohibited.[300] Its official foreign defence policy was to recover mainland China by military forces.[301] China was, thus, divided into two sovereignties by an unfinished civil war and a contested identity between the CCP and the KMT. Although the KMT controlled only one province in China, it continued to claim for its sole legitimate Chinese government based on the logic of a single country divided by a yet-to-be-ended civil war. In the lifetime of Chiang Kai-shek, he condemned the two-China policy[302], ruled out the option of Taiwan's independence, and implemented the "three nos" policy toward the mainland - "no contact, no compromise, and no negotiations".[303] To sum up, the KMT military regime, dominated by the US' Cold War policy, ruled over Taiwan with the binary opposition ideology of anti-communism. This dominant narrative served as a means of suppressing internal decolonising movements such as fighting for freedom of speech, democratisation and self-determination. Also, its 'enemy versus us' narrative to the PRC in mainland China invoked a common resentment towards the Beijing authorities. This made the people of Taiwan find it difficult to identify with the mainland Chinese and created a barrier for cultural reconciliation in the process of reunification.

Similar to Taiwan, the Rhee Syng-Man regime in South Korea considered his rule as the only legitimate government in the whole peninsula and rejected any negotiation

[300]Chung, *Democratisation in South Korea and Taiwan: the effect of social division on inter-Korea and Cross-Strait Relations*, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2002), p.21

[301]Chung, C.P., p. 24

[302]Chiang condemned the two-China policy in reviewing the world situation on 8 February, 1955 by saying "we have also heard about the ridiculous view of 'two Chinas'. This is simply absurd. I would like to ask those people holding such views whether, if unhappily, Soviet Russia should invade their countries, and install Quisling regimes on their soil, they would still be prepared to swallow the reality of having their countries cut into halves." China News Service, "President Chiang Reviews World Situation, 8 February, 1955.

[303]Cheung, T.C. et al., *Inherited Rivalry: Conflict Across the Taiwan Strait*, (Boulder : Lynn Reinner, 1995), p.236

with the North. The ways to handle the illegal occupation by the DPRK (puppet regime) was to liberate the Northern part either through military force or through free general elections under the supervision of the UN. Owing to the economic widespread poverty and government corruption, the Rhee regime was overthrown by Major General Park Chung-hee. Park's ruling system aimed at a reinforcement of the material basis of anti-communism, national security, and economic growth. He succeeded in making the rapid economic growth in the 1960s based on an export-oriented industrial strategy and normalization of diplomatic relationships with Japan to attract investment. However, he ignored the South Korean animosity toward Japanese brutal colonial rule and 'low wage and low grain price' policy which created a vicious circle of poverty.[304] The workers and farmers were still suffering from the poverty which raised many social protests in the late 60s and the early 70s.

Park attempted to use the narrative of the rapid economic growth to reverse the reality that their poverty resulted not from an incorrect economic policy but from their own laziness or misfortune. In facing democratic and Minjung movements against his ideology, he stiffened South Korea's anti-communist stance under the banner of unification through military force and national security through suppressing internal decolonising movements. This included new labour laws to control the labour movement, and Presidential Emergency Decrees to oppress the democratisation movement. All dissenting voices were labelled as pro-North communists which must be severely condemned. Under Park's autocratic ruling system, "the Executive, the

[304] Lee H.K. *Korean Economy: Perspective for the Twenty-first Century*, (NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), p.19

Parliamentary, and the Courts were merely decorative apparatuses to disguise the concentration of power in Park's hand."[305]

6.3 The different starting points– identification of the core issue

The global bipolar order and the internal dictatorial rule were the result of the power-in-relationship (enemy versus us and fear of other) in which the existing power distorted and alienated its relationship and its community in South Korea and Taiwan – political oppression, economic exploitation, religious condemnation/discrimination, and cultural marginalisation. The global order/culture controlled by the US and other superpowers created a lot of homogenizations and led many Third World countries to lose their own identity. Since there is no longer any "local" that is uninfluenced by powerful external forces, the local cannot be defined simply in territorial terms. In order to resist assimilation and hegemony, local theologians and churches are required to struggle to maintain or search for their own identity. Critical consciousness and contextual awareness became an entry point to identify the core issues and to reconfigure a vital relationship of theology in resistance against the global and the local oppressive cultures.

6.3.1 Korean issue

In postcolonial theory, oppressive culture cannot be simply understood in terms of ideas and objects, but sites of contest in relations. As the notion of power is often embedded in the concept of culture, cultural struggling amid the asymmetry of power is to be

[305]CISJD (ed.) *Democratization Movement and the Christian Church in Korea during the 1970s*. (Seoul: CISJD, 1985), p 24.

constructed rather than discovered. The core issue of South Korea is a power-in-relationship that Minjung[306] were in conflict with the inseparable cultural/political oppressive system of the global empire in which both external superpowers and internal military authorities bore allegiance. This power system created a distorted identity, the divided country, the iron rule of military regime, and sinful structure which obstructed the country's decolonisation and the Minjung's self-determination/actualisation. All these caused the Han of the Minjung, which is the particular mode of the Korean deep suffering experience of the oppression – a complex, dynamic feeling (such as resentment and helplessness, anger and lamentation) which cannot be neatly analyzed or dichotomized. Rather, it is multi-layered or multi-dimensional.[307] Han consoles and guides the Minjung in their quest for national identity through resistance as a mode of transformation and liberation from the oppression of the present situation.[308] For Minjung theology, salvation means creating a Hanless society where "an egalitarian society is freed from patriarchy and hierarchy, a self-determining country beyond foreign intervention, a reunified country beyond the division, and a democratic society beyond northern totalitarianism and southern authoritarianism."[309]Thus, the Minjung will be the subjects of their own history or the protagonists of their own destiny.

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[306] "Minjung is a Korean word for the people, the politically oppressed, economically exploited, culturally marginalised, the poor and powerless. It was born in the struggle of the Korean minjung for basic human rights and democratisation and against the oppressive process of economic development and militarisation" quoted from Suh, D.K.S. "Minjung Theology" in Fabella, V. & Sugirtharajah, R.S. *Dictionary of Third World Theologies*, (New York: Orbis, 2000) p. 143

[307] Sung A. Park gave a clear explanation.of multi-dimensions of Han. "At its personal conscious level, Han takes the form of anger, helplessness, deep mourning, and resentment. At its personal unconscious level, Han is buried in deep anguish and bitterness. At its collective conscious level, Han is demonstrated through collective wrath, rage, street demonstrations, and rebellion. At its collective unconscious level, Han is submerged in the deep silence of racial lamentation. Social injustice, political oppression, economic exploitation and foreign invasions produce collective Han. Han is transmittable. When the Minjung experience suffering over many generations, they develop unconscious collective Han and transmit it to their posterity." Park, Sung A., "Minjung and Process Hermeneutics," *Process Studies* 17.2 (Summer 1988): P.125

[308]Bretzke, J. "Cracking the Code: Minjung Theology as an Expression of the Holy Spirit in Korea." *Pacifica* (10, October 1997): pp. 319-330

[309]Park, A. S. "Minjung and Process Hermeneutics" P.125

In dealing with the divided country, both Koreas have had a broad consensus among the people on the historical necessity of reunification. Even those in power, who have had a vested interest in the existing division systems, would not take a negative stance in public against the issue of reunification. Instead, the successive regimes on both sides have proclaimed "repeatedly their unchanging and sincere commitment to the great cause of national unification."[310] There are several reasons leading to the aspiration of the Minjung for reunification.

Historically, Korea has long been a unified country and the high degree of national/cultural identity/speaking the same language since the Shilla dynasty in the late seventh century. Sixty years of division was still a short time in comparison with the long history of unification. Moreover, Koreans, as a whole, experienced the suffering of external suppression/invasion. Japan annexed Korea in 1910 and ruled the colony until 1945 with an iron fist. After the end of the Second World War, Koreans, on the side of victors, assumed that freedom and independence were fully at hand. However, the liberation of Korea was the beginning of division – the UN controlled by the US and the USRR divided the country into two at the 38th parallel without Korean consensus.

Geographically, North and South Korea are closely attached and divided only at the 38th parallel. Without any geographic protection or distance, the security of both sides

[310]CCA & ICNDK (ed.) *Reunification: Peace & Justice in Korea – Christian Response in the 1980s*, (Hong Kong: Christian Conference of Asia 1988), p.1

becomes weak. For the fear of being attacked, the Korean peninsula is one of most heavily armed areas in the world. The development of nuclear weapons has increased the anxious feeling of nuclear genocide in the peninsula.[311] The militarization of both sides is a direct result of division.

Politically, the division allowed both sides to justify their autocratic rule. The assumption was that a centralized or authoritarian state easily mobilized the whole society to tackle their problems, to pursue modernisation, and to strengthen the stability of the government against the invasion of other. However, the autocratic rule had a tendency to divide 'Ours versus Yours' by essentialising and totalising the Other. This allowed each government to abuse its authority to suppress heterogeneous voices and to deny human rights/democratic activists in the name of communist or capitalist.

In brief, Koreans on both sides have a strong aspiration for reunification, national identity, economic justice, and physical security. However, the existing division system is incompatible with Minjung's expectation. The core issue of South Korea is the people in the midst of national community's suffering (the pain of Han) in search for their identity of subjectivity against all forms of oppression. The South Korean church locates this in the situation and has been actively involved in the reunification movement.

[311]Ibid., p.2

6.3.2 Taiwan issue

Unlike Korea, Taiwan did not have a broad consensus among the people on the historical necessity of unification. Although the KMT had a strong sense of recovering mainland China to achieve a reunification, the majority of Taiwanese did not share the KMT's sense of national identification. Instead, there is a contested identity, Chinese/mainlander versus Taiwanese/islander, which destabilises the 'One China policy'.

The contested identity in Taiwan did not come from a vacuum, but emerged from a history of power-in-relationship. Unlike Korea, Taiwan had long been colonised by different foreign powers since the 17th century, namely, the Netherlands, Spain, Manchuria, and Japan. The division system between Taiwan and mainland China had been established over several hundred years. Unlike Korea, Taiwan is not geographically attached to mainland China. Rather, it is an island located 220 km off the southern coast of mainland China. Unlike Korea, the majority of Taiwanese do not speak the same language with Chinese. The original population of Taiwan was formed by people of Malay-Polynesian descent, who were the ancestors of the present-day aborigine groups[312], joined later by Hakka-speaking Chinese settlers from southern Kwantung Province and speaking Hoklo (Minnan) from southern Fukien (Fujian) Province across the strait. Today the population of Taiwan is over twenty millions – the Hoklo-speaking is about seventy percent of the population while Hakka settlers are around twelve to fifteen percent of the populace.[313] Although Hoklo and Hakka have traditionally maintained different identities, the suppression of the foreign/outsider

[312]Lin, C.L, p.2

[313]Cohen, M.J. & Tang, E. *Let Taiwan be Taiwan: Documents on the International Status of Taiwan*, (USA: Centre for Taiwan International Relations, 1990), p.11

powers prompted them to put aside their differences and unite together as Taiwanese.[314] Thus, native Taiwanese should not be confused with the aborigines, who are only about one to two percent of the people. Many of them intermarried with the Chinese, living mostly in the mountains and the narrow plains along the eastern coast.[315] In fact, "the great majority of the so-called Taiwanese are Chinese and not racially different from the mainlanders."[316]

Before 1945, the Taiwanese resistance to the Chinese identity was not strong. Contrarily, when the KMT representing the ROC government accepted the Japanese surrender of Taiwan after the Second World War and undertook the military occupation of the island as a trustee on behalf of the Allied powers,[317] the Taiwanese welcomed the KMT government as ruler and as a Chinese family of brothers, partly because they shared an ethnic affinity with mainlanders, and partly because they assumed that their "Chinese brotherhoods" would treat them like family members – at least better than the Japanese. However, the KMT military and civilian forces treated the Taiwanese as inferior and demonstrated essential skepticism about their colonial past of cooperation with Japanese. Apart from taking resources from Taiwan to supporting the civil war in mainland China, the KMT government's corruption and domination led to an island uprising in the February 28th Incident of 1947 against the tyrannical rule of the KMT (the mainlander-run authorities). Eventually, tens of thousands of Taiwanese were

[314]Lin, C.L. *The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan and the Advocacy of Local Autonomy*, p.2
[315]Tyson, J. "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement: A Commentary," *Asian Affairs* 14.3 (Fall 1987): p.2
[316] Tyson, J., p.2
[317]Huang, P.H. *From Galilee to Taiwan: Towards a Theology of Chhut-thau-thi*. (Manila: ATESEA, 2005), p. 22

killed. The brutal suppression of the 228 Incident deepened the gap/hatred between mainland Chinese and local Taiwanese.

After the end of the civil war, the Chinese mainlanders who came over with the KMT were only a minority of Taiwan's population (about 15 percent), but they followed the strategy of the past colonisers in using ethnicity to distinguish between rulers (mainlanders) and subjects (native Taiwanese). In order to justify the exclusion of Taiwanese from the government, Taipei implemented the KMT hegemony over political and cultural affairs by treating Taiwanese culture as uncivilised, backward, and inferior. Politically, the KMT legitimized its dictatorship to eliminate any forces disloyal to its rule – any anti-KMT activity could be lawfully suppressed in the name of communist rebellion.[318]

Apart from controlling tightly the majority of native Taiwanese under the military law,[319] the KMT government introduced a monolingual policy, Mandarin (mainlander's language) as the national language, which implied three distinct concepts. Firstly, it highlighted Greater China's centre rather than Taiwanese local centre. The KMT government believed that mainland Chinese ancestors had arrived in Taiwan centuries before 1945 and the rulers from the mainland were more authentically Chinese than the islanders who were Chinese only in ethnic term. Secondly, it referred to the possibility of the recovering mainland China or re-establishment of a single Chinese state.[320]

[318]Miao, I. W., p.226
[319]The Website for Taiwan's history, present, and future, www.taiwandc.org/history.htm
[320]Wei, J M, *Language Choice and Identity politics in Taiwan*, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), p.107

Thirdly, it symbolised the coloniser‘s domination and cultural superiority. The heavy-handed monolingual policy extensively restricted the use of indigenous or Taiwanese language (*taiyu*) – even the Bible printed in the local language was confiscated. The KMT language policy generated distrust in the mainlanders in Taiwan, and a division arose among the Taiwanese. The KMT’s autocratic rule created not only a contested identity between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, but also a divided Christian community in search for their identification and identity.

Following the communist Revolution in China, various Protestant denominations fled to Taiwan with the defeated KMT government, such as Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, and Assemblies of God. Based on their negative experiences of the communist Revolution in mainland China (prosecutions and restrictions), they were working closely with the KMT government to serve newly-arrived mainlanders, Mandarin-speaking refugees, by providing education, social welfare and medical care. For them, mainland China was their country and Taiwan was only a Chinese Province. In this sense, the object of identification should be mainland China and Chinese culture rather than Taiwan and Taiwanese culture. Thus, Taiwanese context was considered as a transitional base for theological reflection or for deepening dialogue with Chinese culture, particularly, classical/Confucian ideology. Most of them kept distance in politics, ethnic conflicts or remained silent in the face of the KMT’s authoritarian government. Their silence can be interpreted as a support of the status quo and the existing power system which was to exploit and oppress the people of Taiwan.[321]

[321]Huang, Bohe. *A Theology of Self-determination: Responding to the Hope for "Chhut Thau Thi " of the*

The ‘mainlander’ Christian attitudes towards the KMT’s authority and their identification with mainland China created a huge gap with the Presbyterian church in Taiwan (PCT), which is the biggest Protestant Church in the island (1% of Taiwan’s people are Presbyterians, 1.5 % Roman Catholics, and 1.5% belong to other Christian denominations)[322] and has long been identified with Taiwanese suffering in search for their own subjectivity. There is a historical reason leading to the distinctiveness of the PCT. In the middle of 19th Century, Great Britain extended its power to China[323] and the British Presbyterian mission came to Taiwan settling in Tainan in the southwestern part of the island while the Presbyterian Church from Canada arrived a decade later establishing a new mission station in Danshui in the northwestern corner of Taipei. Both of them were working along the similar lines and gave pastoral priority to the Taiwanese and the Plains aborigines. Apart from providing education and medical services, they promoted the use of the Taiwanese language and introduced them to a Romanized Taiwanese alphabet, because the local Taiwanese did not have an established written language for the local vernacular and used to learn to read/write in Chinese characters.[324] Lin points out that Taiwanese language is considered as “an identity issue that exists in the interface between the PCT and human rights in Taiwan: the PCT’s legitimacy of Taiwanese as a language has become closely related to the PCT’s concern for Taiwan independence, self-determination, and the human rights of

People in Taiwan. (Tainan, Taiwan: Chhut Thau Thi Theological Study Centre, 1996), p. 25

[322] Huang, P. H., p.106

[323] Britain forced the Chinese (Qing) government to sign several unequal treaties, particularly, the treaty of Beijing in 1860 which made Taiwan into treaty ports, opening for western merchants and missionaries.

[324] In order to help the local Taiwanese to understand the word of God easier, Rev. William Barclay published the Taiwan Church News in 1885, and worked alongside with other missionaries to produce Bibles as well as hymnals in their native language. At the same year, the PCT established a theological seminary to train Taiwanese clergy and began to publish a weekly newspaper in Romanized Taiwanese.

the Taiwanese people."[325] In 1887, the Qing troops were defeated by Japan in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and ceded Taiwan to Japan in perpetuity. Japan valued the Presbyterian contribution to Taiwan through medical service and their Romanization of the spoken Taiwanese dialect in the field of education. In order to avoid causing problems by allowing too many denominations to serve Taiwan, Japan forced all other denominational missionaries to leave the island. The Presbyterians became the only Protestant denomination in the island for over sixty years and were allowed to establish churches in every part of Taiwan. Since most of foreign missionaries were ordered to leave Taiwan, this created space for local people to exercise rights, responsibilities, and leadership. All these contributed to the PCT to growth independent of missionary society, to develop indigenous Churches, and to foster the local identity of the Taiwanese. As the biggest Protestant denomination, the PCT has had the coordinating internal structures and broad-based international support to resist the KMT's oppression.

Politically, the Taiwan issue is whether Taiwan should be reunified with mainland China as a part of the Chinese nation or separated as its own independent nation. Fundamentally, the Taiwan problem is an issue of identity. These two statements are not contradictory, because politics and identity are mutually related – using different names or identities may invoke identification with different histories and cultures that the people of Taiwan legitimately label themselves as, with relation to the island.

In brief, the people of Taiwan have experienced numerous foreign invasions, the KMT's ethnic discrimination, the US's neo-colonisation, and Beijing's international

[325]Lin, Ibid., p.5

diplomatic isolation in which the Taiwanese identity and self-determination have been denied. In addition to the long divided system and the demonisation of communist rule in the mainland, the majority of Taiwanese find it difficult to identify with mainland Chinese identity or to have a strong aspiration for reunification. The core issue of Taiwan is a contested and controversial choice of identity. Local theologians use the above experiences to do a theological inquiry into the questions of a homeland for Taiwan where the people love the country, and the question of a new identity of subjectivity – the right of self-determination for their own future without outside intervention (independence or reunification).

6.4 The Church's role in the decolonisation process

The last section indicated that reunification involved justice, history, culture, ethnic, and global order/external forces. The postcolonial stage not only signified the structural end of colonialism, but also required the transformation of its legitimizing narratives as well as the reconfiguration of power-in-relationship.

6.4.1 Christian churches providing an evaluation of a narrative situation and a new understanding of its own context

The end of Japanese colonial rule in 1945 did not mean that the real postcolonial period began in Korean and Taiwanese societies. Instead, the influence of the US/Western ideology and the domination of the military regimes limited the liberating space of the two societies to the edge of both colonial and postcolonial borderlands. Against this context, churches and native theologians began to reconfigure the power in relationship with the Western domination, the autocratic military rule, and the communist threat. For

1them, Japan was the object of nationalism as political colonialism while the US/West was that of nationalism as cultural neo-colonialism. More importantly, they recognised that their existing problem did not simply come from external (Western/Euro-centric) ideological domination, but also from internal collaborators who unconsciously engaged in imitating/internalizing the Western culture and in formulating their subjective consciousnesses through the narrative of civilisation, rapid economic growth, modernity and the security of the country. Consciously, some internal collaborators worked with foreign powers to advance their own interests and to seize power (the existing military government and the elite) to suppress the majority of their own people. The recognition of the global oppressive relationship with local collaboration drove the native theologians and churches to explore the mode of resistance against the neo-colonial narrative – Western culture/ideology and even Western Christianity. Thus, the idea of resistance provided a primary framework for churches to do contextual theology and develop the critical project of postcolonialism.

In facing the external and internal oppressive reality, local theologians and churches in Taiwan and South Korea began their theological reflections exclusively from their own contexts which later became the main controlling criteria for narrative theologies. The term "contextualization" was first introduced to the theological world by Shoki Coe (in Mandarin Chang-hui Huang), who was head of Theological Education Fund of the WWC[326] and who was a leading figure in the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan to struggle for Taiwanese identity. For Coe, doing contextual theology does not ignore traditional culture (indigenization), but goes beyond it in a dynamic way, taking into account the struggle for human injustice, which characterizes the historical moment of the nations

[326]Sugirtharajah, R.S. *Dictionary of Third World Theologies*, p.58

in the Third World. More importantly, doing local theology must be careful to distinguish between authentic and false forms of contextualization: the later "yield to uncritical accommodation, a form of culture faith" and the former is always "prophetic, arising always out of a genuine encounter between God's word and his world" – it aims at changing the situation through the commitment to a given historical moment.[327] In this sense, contextualization is a theology of change which takes their particular context and struggles for human injustice seriously. A paradigm shift can be seen in Coe's contextualization – a shift from static to dynamic, from an abstract theory to a strategic change, from past-oriented (indigenization highlights the harmonization of Gospel with the tradition culture) to present/future-oriented (existing socio-political situation), and even a shift of site from the local to the Third World circle, particularly, in Asia.

6.4.2 Christian churches as a reflective agent contributing to the challenge of the First World/coloniser hegemonic narrative

Owing to the adaptations of Marxist thought[328], the Third World narrative has the tendency of imagining dichotomy between the First World and the Third World, between the oppressor/coloniser and the oppressed/colonised. This binary-oppositional rhetoric becomes the identity of the Third World. Taiwan and South Korea shared the burning issue of Third World. Politically, the countries were divided and the autocratic military rule was supported by the First World great powers. Economically, the Third Worlds were made dependent on foreign debt, because they were continuously controlled by the First World and the local elites/military governments who

[327]Coe, S. *Ministry in Context: The Third Mandate Programme of the TEF*, (London: TEF, 1972), pp.20-21

[328]Marxism has a tendency toward a position of polarisation which often creates opposition and prevents reconciliation from both sides. For example, Marxism not only identified the bipolar position between the oppressed/the proletariat and capitalist oppressors/the bourgeois, but also encouraged the former to rise up to overthrow the later.

collaborated with the international economic-political system. Thus, the economic growth did not benefit the masses, but only served in repaying debts to foreign capitalist countries or a minority of the rich/the powerful who controlled most of the national wealth. The gap between the rich and the poor remained wide. Culturally, the Third World was considered underdeveloped, uncivilised, and backward. Against this injustice, the Third World theologians explicitly identified with the oppressed (for example Taiwanese and Minjung), publicly reclaimed themselves as the historical subjects, and consciously interrogated the hegemony of the West.

Third World theologies become a theology of resistance against all forms of oppression imposed by the First World. The antagonism is clearly inscribed in the Third World narrative. Both South Korean and Taiwanese theologies belong to the contextual model and share a similar background to that of the Third World, which causes their cultural dependence. However, each of them has its own emphases on striving for cultural liberation. Unlike Latin American liberation theology, Taiwanese and South Korean theologians do not limit their cultural analyses to dimensions of the socio-economic structure. Rather, as we shall see, they attempt to affirm the whole of their culture and history as the context in which theologians must make cultural analyses and build their theology. This is due to the fact that when South Korean and Taiwanese theologians first, in the midst of the struggle for human rights and democracy, came into contact with people from the lower classes, they discovered their alienation from the people and their inability even to understand the language of those people. Thus, they tried to discover the language of the common people by listening to popular cultural expression in stories, poems, songs and dances. All these are the ways for the people to express themselves, but

they are other forms of language than that of Western philosophical and theological narratives. Popular cultural expression was found to be a great help for understanding the feelings of the peoples. Thus, they began to trace 'common people' history or 'social biography' not only through written records, but also through popular cultural expression in stories, poems, songs, and dances.[329] This does not mean that this culture refers to a general concept of culture, but relates to the specific culture of the Taiwanese or Minjung, created out of their life of misery and oppression.

6.4.3 The reflective agent redeeming the narrative of their own culture

Apart from listening to popular cultural expression, they attempted to revive their primitive religious practices and traditional values in reaction to colonialism and the Western Mission Movement. Unlike Latin America, the church in Taiwan and South Korea is not a central institution in most of the country and does not interact closely with all sectors of society. Instead, when Christianity was introduced to Korea or Taiwan, Buddhist and Confucian influences were dominant in all levels of their society and in every aspect of life. Both Korea and Taiwan are multi-religious societies, including Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, Christianity, and, in Korea, Shamanism. The two societies are characterized by their inclusive and syncretic nature. However, the missionaries took an exclusive approach in introducing Christianity to Asia. They claimed the superiority of Christianity over all others, rejected dealing with the question of the dialogue with other religions, and showed disrespect to these other religions. Seeing the West as the hegemony has led to a further resistance against the missiologically-oriented theologies. Taiwan and South Korea are located in Asia, where

[329].Kane, M. "Minjung Theology," *Theology* (September,1987) P.351

its theology is more concerned about inculturation, particularly, the positive valorization of its multifaceted religiosity and local resources.[330]

In order to reject "Christ-against-religions", Minjung theologians attempted to detheologise the traditional Christian understanding by redefining what is transcendental in the primitive religious practices of Shamanism, Buddhism, and folk culture.[331] Minjung theology is an attempt to revive their primitive religious practices and traditional values in reaction to the wholesale disruption of non-Western cultures by Western colonial expansion. The emphasis of this revival of its culture is on the affirmation of one's own identity, rooted in a past heritage but refined to suit a new context. For Frantz Fanon, the rediscovery of pre-colonial national culture is the colonial-resistance of the narrative, because the colonised are in danger of losing their own identity.[332]

Choan-Seng Song, the second Chinese principal of Tainan Theological College and Seminary (1965), picked up Shoki Coe's "contextualization of theology" and continued the task to struggle for liberation from the unjust circumstances in order to gain a new identity for the people of Taiwan (Asia). He criticized the Western foreign missionaries for equating the Gospel with Western culture. The unevangelised were considered uncivilised. This identified the Gospel to the Western ideology which belittled Asian

[330]Pieris, A. "Towards An Asian theology of Liberation: Some Religio-Cultural Guidelines," in *Asia's Struggle for Full Humanity*, Virginia Fabella (ed.) (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1980), p.75

[331] "This wisdom of the Minjung has traditionally expressed in traditional religions such as Shamanism and Buddhism and through vehicles such as folk tales .., art-forms such as the masked dance…, songs and folk opera…, and farmers' traditional music –all of which often carried a biting social satire on the upper class." Bretzke, J. T. "Cracking the Code: Minjung Theology as an Expression of the Holy Spirit" *Pacifica* 10 (October, 1997) p. 325

[332]Fanon, F. *The Wretched of The Earth*, (Constance Farrington, NY: Grove.P. 1963) pp.169-170

culture or other religions. As the matter of fact, God is universal and should not be bound by any culture. However, the Western foreign missionaries imprisoned God in a White God and deprived God of his freedom.[333] In order to release God from captivity, Song reinterpreted the traditional local folk tales and the modern local living stories with his "third eye," a term derived from Japanese Buddhism, which is an eye seeing Christ with one's cultural experience.[334] Song juxtaposes Taiwanese/Asian stories with biblical stories and interprets the living stories in correspondence with Christian biblical message. This methodology he calls "contextualization of theology" which means "transposing" the biblical faith directly into one particular context – like St Paul had transposed that faith from Palestine to the Greco-Roman World and eventually to Europe and the West.[335] The term "transposition" is used to characterize the task of the "contextualization of theology". In order to transpose the biblical faith directly from Palestine (not from the West) into Taiwan, theologians have to look at the local culture with their "third eye". This transposition makes the Christian theology become flesh in the reality of Taiwan. In other words, the PCT can offer the Christian resources to a society that is to decode the narrative lie of the Western foreign missionaries and the KMT government – the belittling of Taiwanese culture and denial of the right of self-determination. To redeem the narrative or to restore the truth is to "deepen our theological imagination and strengthen the power of our theological imaging"[336] – human rights were gifts bestowed by God. The valorisation of non-Christian religions and resources springing from the anti-Western-missionary movement can not only be read as a strategy to draw a we-they demarcation line, but also can be considered a binary oppositional type.

[333]Song, C.S. *Christian Mission in Reconstruction – An Asian Attempt*. (Mardras: CLS,.1975) p.23
[334]Song, C.S. *Third-Eye theology: theology in formation in Asian Settings*, (New York: Orbis Books, 1979), pp.10-11
[335]Song, C.S. *The Compassionate God*, (New York: Orbis Books, 1982), p.7
[336]Song, C.S. *Theology from the womb of Asia*, (New York: Orbis Books, 1986), p.16

In brief, the power-in-relation with the Western cultural domination is a dialectical process, in which both the oppressor and the oppressed engaged in negotiation so as to find out their own identity. The two theological communities, South Korea and Taiwan, adopted the binary-opposition as a mode of resistance against Western oppression.

6.5 The Church's role in reunification/reconciliation

The hybrid nature of Christianity causes internal pluralism and allows different modes to emerge in response to reunification/reconciliation

The relationship between Christianity and reunification is hybrid and ambivalent because churches can be a contributing factor in both division/conflict and reunification/reconciliation. On the one hand, churches offer a perspective, a system of meaning/value, through which people have a critical understanding of their own situation and have a view of their own experiences in relation to another. This produces a particular moral view that establishes the concept of the outsider or the Other in relation to us – an "us versus them" attitude as with good and bad, saints and heretics. On the other hand, Christian tradition has a sacred duty to seek for peacemaking and reconciling the conflict situation – "the willingness to live with, explore and honour difference".[337] The dualistic nature of Christianity causes internal pluralism and allows different models to emerge in response to reunification/reconciliation in different contexts and times. Each model has its own moral narrative, which serves not to describe the socio-political reality, but to form a community which, by virtue of its particular convictions, shapes a moral context out of which moral action will come out.

[337]Kim, C.H et al., G, *Peace and Reconciliation: In search of Shared Identity*, (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p.1

Each church has framed and pursued their self-defined ends, each in their own way and often in opposition to others. They are unconsciously promoting an end which would arouse conflicts.

6.5.1 Subversion as a mode of resistance

Subversion of the externally communist rule – the South Korean church at the time of military regime.

After painfully experiencing the invasion of northern communists in the Korea War and witnessing the political persecution of their northern Christian brothers in the course of a socialist revolution, South Korean churches recognise communism from its theoretical form into a practical one. Anti-communism among Christian circles was developed from a theoretical ideology into a matter of church-state security and liberation[338]. Apart from supporting the ROK regime in opposing communism, many South Korean churches and theologians in the earlier period held a belief that to defeat communism was the earthly task of the church mission in which God's justice, freedom and peace can truly be realised.[339] The affiliated churches of the Presbyterian Church of Korea (PCK) across the country held services, on June 25th 1971, to promote the idea that only the Gospel could liberate the northern people who were groaning under the dictatorship.[340] For Professor Hyeon-seol Hong, the mission for the North was an ideological struggle between communism and Christianity[341] – to put it simply, democracy is based on freedom, communism on autocracy. In confrontation with

[338] Cho, Eunsik believes "that negotiation for reunification with the North was dangerous and would lead to communization... Consequently, the Korean churches' reunification movement followed a unification theory of the eradication of communism." Quoted from Cho's PhD thesis, *Dimensions of Christian Mission Toward Reunification of Korea*. Ohio: United Theological Seminary, 1998, p66

[339] Mun, I. H. "The Reunification between the North and the South," P.55

[340] Lee.J.M., p.247

[341] Ibid., p.248

communism, the approach of the mission was to plant the spirit of freedom in the North through the spread of the Christian faith and to seek international support putting pressure on the northern regime to allow its people to have the freedom of religion. The logical link between evangelisation and liberation in the northern mission stemmed from the Christian value of freedom, as identified with democracy in its spiritual nature. For churches in the South, reconciliation/reunification required resistance against totalitarianism. Otherwise, national reunification without having justice and freedom will be meaningless.[342] Also, nation-wide elections for unification would be impossible to hold if the North was included, since the North was a despotic society that repressed freedom. Churches believed that it was unrealistic to ask for peace talks with communists, who adopted violent revolution as their fundamental principle. To an extreme, Dr. Frederick Nolde Otto, Director of the CCIA-WCC, held a view that reconciliation with the communists was nonsense, that communism was simply an ideology, but Satan would bring ruin upon human beings.[343] In this sense, the northern mission, holding an aggressive character, had an intention to defeat the communist regime and establish a democratic government.[344]

In brief, the northern mission was a Christian way to liberate the people from the dismantlement of the northern communist system and to reintegrate peacefully the two Koreas without using military means, based on spreading the gospel of freedom and the spirit of democracy. Although South Korean churches learned from the Korea War that neither side could achieve unification by military force and highlighted the non-military hopes of defeating the communist regime, the method they adopted was fundamentally

[342] Ibid., p.249
[343] Ibid., p.143
[344] Ibid., p.250

radical and aggressive in eliminating the Other – the only difference between the military and the Christian approaches was on the degree/way of using force. They treated the Other as the 'enemy versus us' and ruled out the possibility of collaboration with the Other to transform the injustice and to seek for reconciliation. The hostile attitude towards communism and the northern regime was consistently sustained at least up to 1979.

Subversion of the internally Military regime

Since the ROK regime was under the threat of communism in terms of ideology and military, the military regime adopted the policies of rapid economic development and anti-communism to justify its policies to subdue the process of decolonisation – the suppression of human rights and democratic development. At the very beginning, South Korea Christians did not take a binary-oppositional approach to resist the military rule. Instead, some proposed an alternative vision of transformation against the autocratic regime and the communist threat. They refuted the accusation of pro-communism by urging that the improvement of dehumanizing conditions and of democratic process were the best policy to resist the ideological threat of communism and to defend the military invasion from the North. In other words, Christian participation in the democratic movement would help in strengthening the self-security of the state. However, some churches, which valued more highly the security of the state than the democratic struggle, responded differently to the democratic movement and worried that social divisions would weaken the safety and security of the state. Thus, they exhorted their church members to oppose taking part in the movement. On the whole, South Korean Christians who participated in the democratic movements belonged to the

minority. Most Christians in South Korea were silent in relation to these situations and, instead, participated in the Church Growth Movement in the early post-war period.

During the Park regime (1962-1977), South Korea rapidly developed into an industrial country with the help of the US. As discussed earlier, the economic growth did not benefit the masses, but produced a high level of external debt and widespread poverty. The country continued to be dominated and exploited by the imperialist countries and local elites who collaborated with the international economic-political system. All these generated a strong aspiration for a democratic government.

In order to justify the autocratic rule, the Park authorities took a binary oppositional approach to suppress the alternative voice based on the discursive framework of self-security, anti-communism, and rapid economic growth. The military government introduced a new type of ruling system known as bureaucratic authoritarianism,[345] which included new labour laws to control the labour movement and "Presidential Emergency Decrees" to oppress the democratisation movement. "Under this system, the Executive, the Parliamentary, and the Courts were merely decorative apparatuses to disguise the concentration of power in Park's hand."[346] In response to the oppression, the National Democratic Youth and Student Federation (NDYSF) asserted in the "Minjung, Minjok (people), Minju (Democracy) Declaration" attempted to overthrow the military regime, abolish anti-labour movements and to establish an independent

[345] Han, S.J. "Political Economic Characteristic of Yushin System", in *Re-Understanding of Liberation after its 40 years II*, p.164
[346] CISJD, op cit., p.24

economic system.[347] In facing resistance, the military regime further suppressed the dissentient actions and declared Emergency Decree 4, which prohibited any association with the NDYSF movement, and Decree 9, which permitted no freedom of expression, assembly, association or demonstration in relation to the Constitution. Students' circles and students' societies were disbanded and police were legitimated to station themselves on university campuses. At that time, theological ideas such as liberation theology, political theology, and *missio Dei* influenced the South Korean church and its theologians. The new tide of world churches, such as the Second Vatican Council and WCC's conference on Church and Society in 1966, also had a great impact on them. The self-immolation of Chun Tae-il, a clothing worker, in the centre of Seoul in 1970 was the starting point of the democratisation movement in 1970s. It galvanized the student movement, so that politics-oriented student movement changed. The movement added historical consciousness of subjectivity of the Minjung to the ideas of democracy and nationalism in the 60s. The students recognised in the Minjung as the subject of the development of history, and defined their movement as an intellectual movement.[348] At this time, several Christian action groups were brought about: the Urban Industrial Mission and the Urban Poor Mission, the Korean Christian Professor Association, the Korea Student Christian Federation, and the Ecumenical Youth Council. The Korean Christian Professor Association was founded in 1966 and the Dismissed Professor Association was founded in 1978.[349] The members of these groups supported the Christian movement in this period by reinforcing it theologically, which gradually became Minjung theology.

[347] Kim H. G. "Characteristics and Prospect of Reproduction Structure of Capitalism in Korea" in *Change of Korean Society*, p.208
[348] Lee Hae-Chan, "Democratization Movement of Intellectuals and Students in the 70s"
[349] CISJD The Democratization Movement in the Seventies and Christianity, p.66-67

In facing antagonistic suppression, churches were trapped in the discursive framework of Park's autocratic regime and found it difficult to pursue the mutual transformation of the oppressor and the oppressed. It appeared that resistance could only be conceptualized as a form of saying 'no' or a mode of subversion to overcome the oppressor/the military rule. Against the socio-political reality, Minjung theology was firmly rooted in their own context and growing out of the struggle of Christians who embraced their own history as well as the universal message of the Bible. In other words, Minjung theology was a people's theology and "a development of the political hermeneutics of the Gospel in terms of the Korean reality."[350] Minjung theologians began to re-read the Bible with the Minjung, the mass of people, who were in the communist sense of the proletariat – politically oppressed, economically exploited, culturally marginalized, and religiously condemned. Thus, Minjung theologians approached the Bible not for the 'Word of God' or 'the kerygma', but the 'Jesus-event' and the 'Minjung-history'. They believed that the kerygma, which was formulated after the event of Jesus, was intended by the early church to unify the message of the New Testament. Since the early church focused on the providence of God as seen in the Jesus-event in an abstract or idealistic sense, the historical reality of the Jesus-event (the crucifixion, the resurrection, and Jesus' mission to sinners) was distorted or disregarded in the shape of the kerygma, due to such factors as the community leaders' political interest, the Roman Empire's colonial policy, and the Christian community's dialectical efforts to preserve its activity. For Minjung theology, the Jesus-event was holistic, dynamic, and changing while the kerygma was ideological, static and unchanging.[351] Minjung theology was characterized as 'the theology of event,' which set itself a task of finding the God who was acting in the historical events and of interpreting as well as

[350]Minjung Theology, p.17

[351]Yung, Y.L, (ed.) *An Emerging Theology in World Perspective Commentary on Korean Minjung Theology* (Mystic, Connecticut: Twenty-Third Publications, 1988) P.11

witnessing them. Won Don Kang believes that, "The God who is found in this aspect is one raising the events and, at the same time, one being perceived through the events".[352] Based on this understanding, Minjung theologians saw the Exodus in the first place as an historical event. It was an event in the history of the people of Israel who were treated inhumanly as slaves. They rebelled against the oppressive ruling system of Egypt and eventually escaped by making the Exodus. Minjung theologians considered the Exodus not only as a model for God's liberation, but also as an act of insurrection which supported a resistance of subversion and confirmed their radical commitments for liberation. In the case of the Exodus, Moses was described by Minjung theologians as a heroic leader, whose revolution was a success.[353] This was legitimate to view the Exodus as the prototype for present-day subversion and oppositional activity. The interpretation of the Exodus event as binary opposition resistance was clearly presented. The new way of reading the Bible allowed Christians to discover how these biblical paradigms of divine historical events can be realised in the history of the Minjung.

The rediscovery of the Minjung in the Bible led the mass not only to the realization that it is the Minjung who are the perceiving subjects of real historical experience, but also to the understanding that the Minjung are the subjects in the making history. As the Minjung is the subjects of the national suffering and historical event, their perception of history provided insights and vision for the transformation of unjust society into democratic and more peaceful community. In brief, the early Minjung theology committed not only to the new understanding of the context and the text, but also to radically reform the socio-political unjust situation – basically it is a socio-political

[352]Kang, Won-don (1992) *Theology of Materia*l (Seoul: Hanul, 1992) P.13
[353] Myong, K. C. "Theological Development in Korea", *International Review of Mission* (Vol. LXXIV 293, January 1985) P.159

subversive, rather than transformative practice. Minjung theology provided theological arguments to support and legitimize the Minjung narrative on a radical reform and a more just society. The binary opposition model of Minjung theology was socio-politically conditioned. Its radical approach to social changes arose within specific contexts where the South Korean people experienced destitution, including Park's autocratic/oppressive rule, the heavy international debt, and the huge gap between the rich and the poor. Also, the subversive approach was viable due to the relatively high percentage of South Koreans who practiced Christianity (approximately one-thirds of the Korean population claimed to be practicing Christians). Also, the church provided a unique haven for anti-authoritarian dissent to grow and evolve because governmental agencies, particularly the Korean Christian Professor Association, were reluctant to use military force against the church.[354]

In this section, the discussion on Minjung theological narratives cannot be directly linked to the Minjung Church or represent South Korea churches in general. The number of Minjung Churches increased to as many as 114 in the early of 1990s, but remained a minor denomination in South Korea.[355] Minjung theological narratives has its significance in the contextual reflection of transforming oppressive structures. Particularly, the narratives made Korean Christian churches realise the significance of Church's identity and its role in transformative practice – social movement in related to 'faith and faith's practice. After 1995, the number of Minjung Churches has been decreasing[356] and its methodology of binary opposition has been found inadequate in

[354]Cumings, B. *Korea's Place in the Sun: a Modern History*. (New York: Norton, 2005), p.376
[355]Chang, S. J. *Minjung Theology: Postcolonial Critique*. (Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2002), p.17
[356] In 1994, the number of Minjung Church decreased to 99 and continued to decrease gradually, found in

response to the changing context which seeks for reunification/reconciliation with North Korea. The critique of Minjung theology will be discussed fully in the later section.

6.5.2 Transformative as a mode of resistance - Churches in Taiwan

Although the KMT had a strong sense of liberating mainland China from the communist rule, the majority of Taiwanese did not share the KMT's sense of national identification or reunification. Churches in Taiwan took different attitudes toward the KMT's policy of the liberation of mainland China. Those churches that fled to Taiwan with the KMT government (such as, Roman Catholic, Southern Baptist, Episcopalian, Lutheran, Methodist, and Assemblies of God) would have a strong mainland Chinese identification and an aspiration for reunification. Particularly, the Roman Catholic view of mainland China as the object of identification and those churches that had the negative experience of the communist Revolution (prosecutions and restrictions) would have a preference of the KMT to liberating the mainland Chinese from the communist rule.

Particularly, when US president Richard Nixon announced his state visit to the PRC, in December 1971, this implied that the US would recognise the status of PRC as an official representative of China and would end its diplomatic/military relationship with Taiwan. In other words, Taipei would most likely be excluded from the UN. Nixon's state visit to China aroused the public anxiety that the Taiwan regime was doomed to be

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Chang, S. J., p.17

de-legitimization and fall into international isolation. If no countries recognise Taiwan, the island would be another Hong Kong.[357] International isolation and internal domination/oppression (such as, 228 incident and martial law) awakened the Presbyterian church leaders' concerns about the suffering of the Taiwanese and drew their attention to the crisis of national identity. The PCT issued immediately a public statement on "Our National fate" claiming for self-determination – "the future of Taiwan should be decided neither by the KMT authority nor communist China, nor by any superpower. Rather, it should be decided by all the inhabitants of Taiwan."[358]

After issuing the public statement, the KMT government became more suspicious of the PCT's intention and kept close surveillance of the church. In order to further suppress the development of the PCT, the KMT's officials not only confiscated Romanized Atayal Bibles and Romanized Taiwanese Bibles, but also banned the printing of all Romanized texts in January 1975. The restriction on the use of Romanized Bibles meant to deny the freedom of the PCT's members to worship in their own language. In response to the KMT's violation of Taiwanese religious freedom, the PCT issued its second statement, "Our Appeal," protesting the seizure of the Taiwanese Bible by the KMT government, demanding the implementation of religious freedom, concerning Taiwan isolation, asking for the mutual trust between the state and the church, and preserving human rights.[359]

[357]Nicholas D, "Kristof, Taiwan, Winning New Friends, Hopes for Another One in Clinton," in *New York Times*, 18 Janunary, 1993, www.nytimes.com

[358]The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, Public Statement on Our National Fate, Public Statement, 29 December 1971. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19711229.html

[359]The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, Our Appeal – concerning the Bible, the Church, and the Nation, Public Statement, 18 November 1975. http://www.taiwandocuments.org/pct03.htm

In 1977, US' normalization relation with Beijing increased the chance of the PRC military reunification with Taiwan.[360] The PCT issued the third public statement on the "Human Rights Declaration" fighting for Taiwan's independence and the freedom of the people of Taiwan.[361] For the PCT, "human rights and a homeland are gifts bestowed by God."[362] The people of Taiwan should be entitled to independence and should have the right/freedom to decide the fate of their own future. However, the KMT considered this declaration a violation of national policy (one China policy) and accused the PCT of conspiring with Taiwan independent terrorists to overthrow the KMT government. Rev. C.M.Kao, the General Secretary of the General Assembly of the PCT, denied this accusation and clarified that the purpose of the declaration was religious rather than political. The PCT as the largest native Taiwanese institution was morally obligated to speak on behalf of its members to express their belief that human rights and a homeland were gifts bestowed by God – the island's 17 million residents should determine the future of Taiwan. Thus, the people of Taiwan could live in a "new and independent country," where justice prevails, where special privileges do not exist, where the sovereign government is not a regional government of communist China.[363]

The KMT government did not find Kao's clarification satisfactory and took severe measures to suppress the PCT activities: 1) using propaganda and authorities (such as, military, officers, and instructors) to deter or discourage people to join the Presbyterian church;[364] 2) managing to get several of KMT's Presbyterian members elected as elders

[360]Lin, C.L. p.72
[361]The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, A Declaration on Human Rights, Public Statement, 16 August 1977. http://english.pct.org.tw/Article/enArticle_public_19770816.html
[362]Ibid
[363]*Taiwan Communiqué* No.32 (10 December 1987) p.7
[364]Cohen, *Taiwan at the Crossroads*, p.195

in local churches that split up the unity of the PCT; and 3) spreading the rumors that the PCT was a breeding ground for "independence terrorists" and had a link with the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) which was attempting to overthrow the government through violent means.[365] Although Kao attempted to clarify that the PCT respected the KMT government and was concerned mainly with the self-determination of the people in Taiwan[366], all the major newspapers in Taiwan reported that the three statements issued by the PCT represented "the views of only a minority of church officials", and accused Kao of "using the PCT to promote his own political ideas"[367]. Apart from the media's criticism, the PCT pastors Rev. Chen C.C. and Rev. Wu C.Y. also spoke out against Kao's ideas and foment divisions within the PCT.

In December 1979, a large human rights rally took place in the port of Kaohsiung and was organized by independence advocates connected with the magazine *Formosa,* which had links with the TIM. Eventually, the rally broke out into violence and several PCT's leaders were arrested. Kao explained his action simply as "a politics of love" inspired by the power of Christian compassion, not "the politics of violence" motivated by the fear and suspicion inherent in the tyranny of power. His position "politics of love" reaffirmed that the PCT's support of Taiwan independence was out of its concern for the welfare of the Taiwanese rather than for overthrowing the KMT government.[368]

[365]Lin, C.L. p.75
[366]Song, C.S. *Testimonies of Faith: Letters and Poems from Prison in Taiwan* (Geneva: Studies from the world Alliance of Reformed Churches, 1984) pp23-24
[367]Lin, C.L. p. 76
[368]Lin, C.L. p.83

The series of counter-oppressive events made it clear that the PCT and Taiwan's theologians, from the very beginning, did not take as subversive mode as a resistance against the threat of the autocratic rule of the communists and the KMT. Instead, they posited as an alternative way of conceiving resistance: transformation. They fought for transforming the oppressive structure in which the people of Taiwan were excluded from the decision-making of their own future and the culture of Taiwanese were distorted/ discriminated. They were in search of a replacement rather than a condition of subversion which forecloses the possibility of structural change. One example of this, known as Homeland Theology, will provide a clear picture of this mode 'transformation' as a resistance against oppression.

Cian-chi Wang was the professor at Tainan Theological College and Seminary beginning in the earlier 1970s and has been actively engaged in constructing the Homeland Theology. This theology was mainly developed by the people of Taiwan who loved this island and came to build a new home of peace, justice, and freedom, no matter whether they came by chance or by birth, or whether they are aborigines, Chinese, or another ethnic group.[369] As all islanders are commissioned to be God's steward to rule over the land,[370] Taiwanese are expected to be the subject rather than object of the land, the history, and the culture. However, the reality of Taiwan shows that the historical events are selected by ruling class – the rulers on both sides of the Taiwan Strait one-sidedly claimed that "Taiwan is part of China and her future should be decided by the Chinese alone."[371] People, as the

[369] There are four main themes in homeland theology, namely, people, land, power, and God. They emphasized the primacy of people over the land where people are called to rule, till, build and invent. For them, a people without land are just like a bird without a nest while a land without people is like a desert. More importantly, a people without self-determination are like a prostitute. Wang Hsien Chih, p.188

[370] Ibid.

[371] Wang H.C, "Some Perspective on Homeland Theology in the Taiwanese Context," in *Frontiers in Asian Christian Theology: Emerging Trends*, (New York: Orbis Books, 1994), p. 187

subjects of history, often disappear from so called "history" and their experience is subjected to the interpretation of the ruling class as well[372] – the ruling authorities both in Beijing and Taipei dominated the narrative that the only future for Taiwan is "reunification", and any other opinion was treated as heresy. Eighteen million people in Taiwan are supposed to have a God-ordained right to determine their own future, but their voices are suppressed and their rights are denied. Against this particular context, Homeland theologians take a radical break in epistemology that makes a commitment in the first act of theology and engage in critical reflection on the praxis of the reality.[373] Since the God of the Bible is very much concerned with the oppressed and is always listening to their cries, any theology that is insensitive to the cry of the oppressed is a deaf theology and would be insufficient to reveal God's love to them.[374] In other words, the 'first act', for Homeland theology, is the praxis of the faithful community acting in obedience to the gospel. This act is not the application of the gospel but the process of action and reflection of a believing community engaged in liberation activities. Clearly, Homeland Theology is "a theopraxis rather than a theologos."[375]

The death of Kai-shek Chiang in 1975 signified the downfall of military rule. His son, Ching-kuo Chiang, became the second President of Taiwan and introduced a political reform to enhance the development of democracy so as to win the support of international democratic communities. However, his reform was incomplete and

[372]Huang, Po-ho, *A Theology of self-determination*, p. 3

[373] In other words, the experience of oppression and of struggle for self-determination always come before any academic discipline. This means that reflections on the Bible can only be considered as secondary resources for those who are engaged in contemporary liberation, because scripture is inevitably conditioned by its social, political, and cultural context.

[374]Ferm,D.W. *Third World Liberation Theology: An Introduction Survey* (New York: Orbis Books,1988)P. 23

[375]Wang Hsien Chih, p.195

continued to treat all people of Taiwan as Chinese – Taiwanese identity remained delegitimized.

Teng-hui Lee, Ching-kuo Chiang's successor, further developed Taiwan's democracy, lifting martial law and legalizing political parties in 1988. His reform indicated that the transformation of a society was not necessarily to subvert the KMT/coloniser and to replace it with the Taiwanese/the colonised. Lee was a member of the PCT and was the first Taiwan-born president. He attempted to convert the KMT party-state into an indigenous Taiwan regime. On the one hand, he used the appeal of democratic reforms, such as direct presidential elections and the nationalization of the military to form a strategic alliance with the political opposition and civil society, and divide the KMT conservative forces.[376] On the other hand, Lee promoted the "Taiwanization" of the party by recruiting and legalizing more grass-root political parties, Christian-based civic groups, and native politicians into the state hierarchy. Examples of this last point include the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has been the biggest opposition grouping against the KMT and in favour of Taiwan independence, Presbyterian Christians that demanded for self-determination, and local enterprises that were dominated by Taiwanese.[377] Lee's policy legitimized the quest for identity and self-determination. Although he did not deny Taiwan as a part of China, he adopted a more "Taiwan first" stance when pursuing domestic interests and foreign policy, and became less interested in engaging issues pertaining to political unification with the PRC.[378]

[376]Chung, p.8
[377]Ibid., p.9
[378]Ibid., p.9

Lee is a national hero to many Taiwanese not only because he terminated the KMT authoritarian rule (which was hated by many local Taiwanese for being an outsider regime as much as for being oppressive) and made the dream of democracy/direct election for presidency come true, but he also succeeded in resisting the Beijing authorities' bullying, particularly the threat of missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait prior to the first Taiwanese presidential election of March 1996.[379] Advocating an independent Taiwan in the formal sense might lead to Beijing's military confrontation, but opinion polls on the island indicated that less than 10% of Taiwan people were in favour of integrating with the PRC or accepting its "one country, two systems" policy. Lee's promotion of Taiwan indigenous regime did not have any intention to accentuate the difference between Chinese and Taiwanese. Rather, he recognised the hybrid identity of the islanders and attempted to reunite the divided Taiwan. For him, Taiwanese are the people who settled and identified with the island.

6.6 A critique of binary opposition

6.6.1 Churches in Taiwan– transformative mode trapped in binary oppositional and homogenous narrative

The Presbyterian church in Taiwan claimed their pastoral approach as transformative rather than subversive against the KMT government. The military autocratic rule and the severe suppression to the PCT triggered more church members to participate individually and collectively in counter-oppressive movements. These were fundamentally antagonistic both in ideology and in practice – the binary opposition between the ruler and the subject, the oppressor and the oppressed, and the Chinese and the Taiwanese remained unchanged. In order to prevent further victimization by the

[379]Ibid., p.29

KMT, the PCT decided to seek support from other local political parties. Locally, the church changed its policy to publicly support Tangwei and independent movements which demanded for lifting martial law, a full democracy, and a presidential election. Globally, the church reapplied for membership in the WCC (1980) so as to gain international Christian support, to promote ecumenical theological thought, and to get recognition for the people of Taiwan.[380] Seeking support from other political parties and global Christian organisations gained momentum to oppose/resist against the autocratic rule of the KMT.

The binary opposition of Taiwan theology and the PCT's counter-oppressive movement has received a lot of positive responses from President Lee and Chen shui-bian (the leader of DPC elected as President of Taiwan for two terms)[381] because the theology is not just a theory, but also a theological narrative entangled with the praxis-oriented, change-oriented and dynamic social movement. They succeeded in reversing the role of Taiwanese as the subject of history and culture and in reconciling Christianity with the local culture and their traditional religions to develop an ecumenical movement in search for liberation – the liberation of churches from the ecclesiastical, cultural and theological colonialism of the West or Asian. This is intended to manifest a truly Taiwanese Christianity within the movement of the oppressed for the self-determination about their future – reunification and separation. Their praxis of fighting self-determination and democracy has won support from local communities, foreign

[380]Lin, C.L. p. 86

[381] Shui-bian Chen, ran his presidential campaign by designating himself as the 'son of Taiwan.' He asked voters to choose their identity by saying, "If you are Taiwanese vote for me, if you are Chinese vote for them." His election implied that the increase in local identity would fuel Taiwan's sentiment for independence and create a big barrier for reunification with Taiwan. In 2005, Beijing passed an "anti-secession in law" that formally authorized the use of military force if Taiwan declared itself independent.

democratic countries and global human rights organisations. However, their methodology attempts to make a radical break from the traditional methods, in order to resist the imperialism of binary opposition, hegemony, universalism and totalism. Its radical approach is unconsciously reusing the method of Marx which has a tendency toward a position of polarisation which often creates resistance and prevents reasoned narrative from both sides on controversial issues. For example, there is a clear attempt at placing Taiwanese as the centre while Chinese or other ethnic minority as the margin/periphery. The centre-margin binarism re-emerges in their theologies. Its aims at fighting against oppression can self-contradictorily become oppressive through an act of constructing a fixed and monolithic identity. They demonize and stereotype the Beijing authorities as evil, autocratic, and uncivilised. They urge to cut off the relationship from mainland China as liberation. In this sense, if the church or the Other refuses to take sides in fighting for separation, it will be accused of having an 'unholy alliance with' the authorities (the oppressor) to keep control over the oppressed. Such an approach has limited the choice to handle the differences between Beijing and Taipei.

Taiwan's election politics also exposed many weaknesses and limitations. According to many NGO activists, they voice frustration in Taiwan's electoral politics, which has been influenced by two major identity groups, rooted politically in the KMT and DPP. Because of the historic burden that both parties carry from the past, the people in Taiwan are deeply divided. This division is not only rooted in party politics, but its influence also affects families and schools as well as Taiwan's churches. I was told by a church pastor that the elder members of his congregation, who were related with the KMT in the past, felt very upset and angry when they learned that the younger

generation of the church had joined the 2-28 Protect Taiwan activities. In fact, the two generations have never been able to talk to each other rationally about their vision for Taiwan's future because of their different political stances and their different identity groups.

Disillusioned by both the green (DPP) and blue camps (KMT), some NGOs, including labour and women's groups, teachers' groups, a handicapped Union promoting the welfare and the education of the elderly, jointly formed a coalition called the Purple Movement in order to seek healing and reconciliation for the people of Taiwan. The first and second-term president elections to choose Yin-jeou Ma, the KMT's leader, is a good example that indicates that the people of Taiwan prefer to maintain the status quo rather than to choose either reunification or independence. In the process of running the President election, Ma pledged to end the binary opposition of cross-straits relations, and to strive for economic reconciliation with mainland China. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Ma believed that to engage in dialogue and to achieve economic reconciliation will help create "the feeling of a peaceful environment" and end the impasses of cross-straits relations.[382] In his inauguration speech in November 2008, he promised that he would not pursue reunification with, independence from, or war against China. A month later, Chinese president Jintao Hu offered six proposals to promote the peaceful development of cross-straits relations at a ceremony commemorating the 30th anniversary of the country's message to Compatriots in Taiwan, held in Beijing on 31 December, 2008. Hu's offering symbolised a significant policy adjustment toward Taiwan. Hu's point was to acknowledge the long division

[382] *New York Times*, 19 June, 2008 "I think if we could continue the current talks with them to achieve economic normalization, I am sure the feeling of a peaceful environment will continue to grow, this is exactly what we have in mind."

between the two places, and to respect the evolution of the political system (that is, democratic mechanisms) as well as the distinctive cultural identity. Rather than emphasizing unification of Taiwan with the mainland, Hu's speech was to engage interaction – establishing a framework for the peaceful development of cross-straits relations. Hu's policy highlighted the increasing economic interdependence and the promoting of the welfare of the people on both sides of the strait. Also, he suggested that the two sides established contacts and exchange on military issues. Hu's offering was consistent with his speech on the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress that on the basis of the one China principle, let us "call for consultation between the two sides on formally ending hostility, reaching a peace agreement and conceiving a framework for the peaceful development of the cross-Straits relations."[383]

In brief, Beijing's policy toward Taiwan has seen several changes since 1949, from binary opposition moving towards a peaceful/flexible framework for reconciliation. The mindset of Hu for conflict management is more than buying time or appeasing Taiwan. Rather, he begins to acknowledge the diversities, to respect the differences, to engage in dialogue, and to allow the third space to emerge. In his recent speech, Hu extended an olive branch to the Democratic Progressive Party, saying the CCP would respond positively to the party if it were to abandon its pro-independence stance. In other words, the antagonistic identities between Taiwanese and Chinese are socially constructed, neither fixed nor static. The differences or conflicts are open to be reconciled.

[383] Press release of *the Embassy of the People's Republic of China*(No.11/ 2008, Dec 31, 2008) http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t530286.htm

6.6.2 South Korea – binary opposition hindering the reunification and sealing the multiple voices

Political perspective

As discussed above, churches and theologians played a significant role in the liberation movement in South Korea – overthrowing the military regime, building up the political democracy, fighting for a nationally independent political and economic system, excluding foreign interference, and realising socio-economic justice. The task of national reunification was also a major concern of the movement – "Genuine democracy and economic justice cannot be achieved without overcoming the present division and ideological confrontation. And the reverse is also true: Without domestic democratisation and economic justice, it is impossible to achieve genuine unification."[384] The attempt of "unification through military" in the Korean War of 1950 and the binary oppositional approach (subversion model) for the elimination of the Other (regime) ended up with the result that neither side could achieve their goals – neither "victor" nor "loser". Likewise, the non-military northern mission to dismantle the communist system based on the spreading the gospel of freedom/democracy has also proved unsuccessful. The threat of military confrontation/nuclear genocide remains in the Korean peninsula. For South Korean churches, the North-South conflict was assuming such a threatening dimension that the peace and the reunification/reconciliation became the most urgent priority.

After the middle of the 1980s, the world was undergoing a rapid change – the collapse of the bipolar global order, the dominance of neoliberal capitalism (socialism was no

[384] CCA & ICNDK (ed.) *Reunification: Peace & Justice in Korea – Christian Response* in the 1980s, 1988, p.10

longer an economic alternative), and the emergence of democratic governments in the Third World countries. Even the People's Republic of China adopted an open door policy and developed economic reforms that were capitalistic/market-oriented after Xiao-pang Deng seized power in mainland. Deng and his successors adjusted Mao's hard-line policy toward Taiwan, from a binary opposition towards a peaceful/flexible framework for reconciliation. As the bi-polar Cold War context was rapidly changing in the late 1980s, North Korea became less important to its main patrons, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Moscow and Beijing began to normalize their relationships with South Korea and encouraged Kim Il Sung to undertake some economic reforms. Increasingly, the North was feeling more isolated and became less aggressive toward the South. The changing context has further challenged the insufficiency of binary opposition and has required the churches to explore other alternatives to respond to their particular situation.

In 1985, the governments of the North and the South and the churches began to talk about peaceful reunification. The initiative came from the 'Council of Korean and German Churches' in 1981.[385] The churches in the South formed the 'Committee for the Preparation of the Problems of the South and North Churches in Korea'. The committee aimed at engaging "the dialogue between the South and the North towards reunification …to prepare with one body of Christ."[386] Numerous meetings were called and Pyongyang visits were invited – first and second meetings organized by the WCC

[385] Kim, I. S. "Towards Peace and Reconciliation between South and North Korean Churches: Contextual Analysis of the Two Churches", Kim, S.C.H.et al (ed.) *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity*, (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008), p.138

[386] The Christian Sinmoon (The Christian Times), 4 April 1985, found in Kim, I. S. "Towards Peace and Reconciliation between South and North Korean Churches: Contextual Analysis of the Two Churches", Kim, S.C.H.et al (ed.) *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity*, p.138

was held in Glion, Switzerland in 1986 and 1988 and representatives of USA, an officer of the WCC, and many Christians had been in Pyongyang. The meetings and visitations were focused on making "reconciliation and love as the peaceful military and work together with prayer in Christ."[387]

Likewise, the southern government began to promote a northern policy and made a progress of having the joint entry into the United Nations.[388] Apart from domestic discussions about the reunification policy, the southern government even provided a clause concerning peaceful reunification in the Constitution.[389] In 1997, Kim Dae Jung was elected as the new president in the South and was determined to improve relations with the North. Kim Dae Jung proposed a "Sunshine Policy" to break the deadlock in North-South relations. In June 2000, Kim Dae Jung received a positive response from Kim Jong Il and made a historic visit to the North. After the June 2000 summit in Pyongyang, the two leaders concluded on an agreement. They would join hands to resolve the issue of national unification independently, facilitate mutual visits between relatives and families separated by the division of the two Koreas, repatriate political prisoners, pursue a balanced development of their national economies, and held to many other agreements.[390]

[387] T*he Bokeum Sinmoon* (The Gospel News Paper), 30 November 1988, Ibid.
[388] In the past, the Northern Regime did not recognise the existence of the Southern government and opposed two Koreas as well as refused the separated entry into the UN. Found in Cho, E. "Dimensions of Christian Mission Toward Reunification of Korea," 1988, p. 52
[389] The Constitution of Republic of Korea, Article 66, Clause 3. http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ks00000_.html
[390] *New York Time*s, June 15, 2000, p.A.10

The June 2000 Summit Agreement gave a promising prospect of reunification to the people of Korea in both sides. However, this optimism soon faded, because the September 11 terrorist attack made the new US president, George W. Bush feel skeptical about Kim Jong Il and the North Korean regime – armed with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, whiles starving its citizens. In the same category of Iran and Iraq, North Korea was condemned as an 'axis of evil'[391] and economic sanctions would be continuously applied. In return, North Korea threatened to restart its nuclear programme and the tension between the two Koreas has returned.

Bush's condemnation of the North Korean regime as an 'axis of evil' was to inflame conflict rather than promote peace. His condemnation was rooted in the notion of 'international police action', which was developed to justify the US intervention into the War.[392] Bush's assumption was that the justice and the ultimate truth are on his side. He forgot that the divided Koreas and the communist regime were the result of the bi-polar order created by the USA and the USSR. Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, pointed out that Bush has "single-handedly destroyed" the initial relationship she had established with North Korea during the Clinton age.[393] Bush's condemnation had caused North Korea to think that Bush was declaring a war against them.[394] It was believed that Kim Jong II was not crazy, but was more paranoid about what is going on around him. North Korea's recent missile launch heightened world tensions, particularly between North and South Korea. Missile launch can be seen as a

[391] Keum, J. "Korean War: The origin of the Axis of Evil in the Korean Peninsula", Kim, S.C.H.et al (ed.) *Peace and Reconciliation*, p.109
[392] Ibid., p.128
[393] "Interview with Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State," ABC, 1 February, 2002.
[394] Keum, J. p.109

kind of defending response to Bush - Kim Jong II had the ability to protect his regime and to bring mass destruction to his enemy.

Theological perspective

Minjung theology in South Korea shares similarities with Homeland theology in Taiwan, successfully bringing the marginal/peripheral or oppressed/silent voices into their histories or into their centres. However, this theology was seriously criticized by Jong-Sik, Chang in his PhD thesis "Minjung Theology: Postcolonial Critique" for driving the multiple identities within the Minjung into 'homogeneous and collective identity' as the grand narratives, based on essentialism and binary opposition. He believed the multiple voices and the hybridised identity have been ignored. Chang uses two ideologies (macro and micro sealed system) and two modes (arborescent and rhizome) to critique the narrative framework of binary opposition within Minjung Theology.

For Chang, the macro sealed system focuses on defining the Minjung as a homogeneous group based on "the external grand narratives such as nationalism, national culture, decolonisation movement or class struggle and the like."[395] The grand narratives were justified by the construction of an anti-Western theology and the resistance of the dominant power (in particular to the military regime). The collective identity and the grand narratives have played a significant role as a macro sealed system through which the multiple voices of the Minjung are controlled. This system has not only ignored the

[395] Chang, S.J. *Minjung Theology: Postcolonial Critiqu*e p.260

solidarity among the Minjung based on the various voices of suffering, but also have sealed the Other voices of oppression, such as Asian labourers in Korea, Chinese Sojourners, and women.[396] The macro sealed system promotes their fixed/collective identities based on essentialism and binary form losing the sight of the hybrid identity within Minjung.[397]

Micro sealed system, another way of disrupting the multiple voices, highlights a 'suppressive system or discourse' as a means for seeing "the Minjung as a representative Minjung" without considering multiple voices of the Minjung.[398] For Chang, the homogeneous identity of Minjung is constructed based on "patriarchal systems, the class centred Minjung discourse, or the labour centred Minjung Movement." [399] The consolidation of the hierarchal system could easily create internalized colonialism within ourselves, for example, the suffering of the female within the male-centred Minjung.[400] The micro-sealed systems reminds us to be aware of the multi-layered oppression within Minjung such as gender, sex, race, age.

Apart from the macro and micro sealed systems internally suppressing the multiple voices and hindering the hybrid identity of the Minjung, Chang points out that the marginal group unconsciously adopts the oppressor's methodology of arborescent (tree) model – 'a hierarchal opposition' through which the division of inclusion/exclusion,

[396] Ibid, p.262.
[397] Ibid.
[398] Ibid, p.263
[399] Ibid.
[400] Ibid., p264

good/evil, centre/periphery and "the like are justified and result in discrimination."[401] For example, the narrative of Minjung salvation is on condemning the ruling class who commit the structural sin of discrimination/dehumanization. Due to their failure to repent, the Minjung fight against the oppression of the ruling in order to lead them to repent. The Minjung become the subject of salvation while the ruling class are the object of salvation. The demonising and essentialising of the ruling class ignores the sinfulness of the Minjung which are the "subject of salvation and at the same time the object of salvation which should receive God's grace."[402] The adoption of arborescent model not only strengthens the antagonistic identity between the ruling and the ruled classes, but also reproduces 'a collective and homogeneous voice' suppressing the multiple voices and multi-layered identity.

Chang suggests reconstructing the narrative framework of the Minjung based on the rhizome model (root) of multiplicity and plurality. This model does not "aim at a certain centre, but intersects in heterogeneous and different relations."[403] This model attempts to move away from the political tensions/differences between the dominant group and the Minjung, and move towards a politics of differences and hybridity – exposing 'the various and hidden voices within the Minjung'.[404] More importantly, this model does not deny the existence of the contested identities between the dominant class and the Minjung, but highlights the unfixed identity and the constantly changeable narrative.

[401] Ibid., 267
[402] Ibid.,268
[403] Ibid.,269
[404] Ibid.,270

The two ideologies (macro and micro sealed systems) and the two models (arborescent and rhizome) reveal the diverse forms of resistance against domination. The methodology of binary opposition producing the grand narrative and collective identity finds it inadequate to embrace various voices and to reconcile the antagonistic views within a hybridised and multi-layered society. Chang believes that to identify Minjung theology as the Third Space hybridity will become more possible and feasible to embrace diversity and plurality. Third Space hybridity is a site where resistance and subordination occur simultaneously in the interactive process. As the hybridised site does not have a primordial or fixed identity, the interaction process (translation, transformation, and reconciliation) allows a new identity to emerge. The mode of Third Space hybridity will be discussed fully in the next chapter.

6.7 Insights from the comparison

The above comparison between Minjung Theology in South Korea and Homeland theology in Taiwan reveals that the mode of binary opposition has made a significant contribution to resist an authoritarian government. The two theologies arose from Christian churches which responded to the social reality. Basically, they are contextual theologies emerging from similar situations of military dictatorship, anti-communism, and exported-oriented industrialisation. The theological narrative came into being through solidarity with the oppressed in the struggle for democratisation and human rights. Theologians attempted to link the traditional narrative of the oppressed with the biblical traditional narrative of liberation – Jesus Christ identified with the people and reverted the objects of the oppressed to be the subjects of history (self-determination).

The concrete realities of South Korea and Taiwan were similar, but not the same. Particularly, the two theologies have their own emphasises in search for reunification. Minjung theology developed from the painful experience of being invaded by the northern communists during the Korean War. South Korean Christians maintained a strong anti-communist position, keeping them from a biblical narrative of reconciliation. In resisting communism, the approach of the mission shifted to have a goal of planting the spirit of freedom in the North through the spread of the democratisation and seeking international support, putting pressure on the northern regime to allow its people to have the freedom of religion. For churches in the South, reunification required democracy and resistance against totalitarianism. Otherwise, national reunification without having justice and freedom would be meaningless. Based on this context, Minjung theologians find their biblical support in the Exodus-event and Jesus-event, which can be seen as the prototype for present-day subversion and oppositional activity – a mode of "binary opposition as subversion".

Originally, Homeland theology did not emerge from the CPC's persecution. Rather, it emerged from the KMT's ethnic discrimination. The mode of theology that was taken focused on binary opposition which resists against discrimination. Unlike Minjung theology, the goal of Homeland theology did not have an attempt to subvert the existing military regime (the KMT government). Instead, Homeland theologians asked for the mutual trust between the state and the church, and preserving human rights. Its mode was called "resistance as transformation". Unlike the people of South Korea, the Taiwanese do not have the strong desire for reunification. The emphasis of Homeland

theology is not focused on destabilising the rule of communist Beijing through the democratic movement, but on struggling for Taiwan's independence – a theology of self-determination.

The comparison identifies the relationship between Christian theology and reunification as hybrid or ambivalent, because theology can be used to support both division/conflict and reunification/reconciliation. In the Christian tradition, the church has played a significant role of reconciling conflicts in a divided situation. However, the Minjung and Presbyterian Churches have actualised their faith in an opposite way. In South Korea, Christian churches against communism inflamed the conflict rather than promoted reconciliation. Likewise, the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan absolutised the particular (Taiwanese) identity, telling the islanders where they belonged and where they were to draw national and ethnic boundaries. On this basis, Taiwanese identity can be seen as a variant between Us/inclusive and Them/exclusive. The distinct boundary is present between the Chinese/outsider and the Taiwanese/insider. In other words, Christianity can nurture the national identity and cause division in the people of the island towards reunification.

The discussion on Minjung and Homeland theological narratives cannot be directly linked to the represent South Korea or Taiwan churches in general. Although Minjung theological narratives have their significance in subverting the military regime and transforming oppressive structures, Minjung churches remain a minor denomination. However, there were many conservative churches and para-church organisations taking the same approach of binary opposition against the communist North. For example,

KNCC made the "Declaration of the Churches of Korea on National Reunification and Peace" in 1988. In order to create a reconciling environment, the Declaration called for the evacuation of the US troops and for the reduction of armaments under the premise of a guarantee of peace.[405] In response, eighteen conservative religious bodies and organisations rejected the Declaration. They found it impossible to accept that communism and Christianity can coexist. Moreover, one hundred twenty-six representatives of the seventy-two religious bodies and organisations formed the Common Measure Committee of Pan Denominations and Lay Groups to discuss the Reunification Declaration of KNCC and critique the Declaration. They would ultimately choose peace rather than reunification. In order to maintain peace in Korea, the stations of US troops is important and the existing division is inevitable.[406]

Although the KNCC's Declaration in 1988 could not be seen as a formally recognised representative of the Korean church, it reflects the idea that not all Korean churches held a binary opposition against the communist North. The Declaration did give a challenge to many conservative churches. Many of them began to participate in the reunification movement and formed North-South Sharing Movement for peace and Reunification in 1993. Roman Catholic churches in Korea, which used to be passive in the reunification movement, became more active in participating with the Christian Conference for the Peaceful Reunification of North Korea.[407] The reunification movement played a role of envisioning reconciliation and unity. It promoted brotherhood and developed dialogue with North Korean Christians. This could improve

[405] Cho, E. *Dimensions of Christian Mission toward Reunification of Korea*. Ohio: United Theological Seminary, 1998. p. 84
[406] Ibid., p.85
[407] Ibid., p.97

the mutual understanding and blur the identity between enemy and cooperative partner. Reconciliation is a long process and requires continuous prayers.[408]

Likewise, Christian churches and para-church organisations in Taiwan do not all share the binary approach of Homeland theology. As mentioned earlier, the Purple Movement can be seen an alternative voice crying out against the antagonistic narratives between the KMT and DPP, and between the Chinese and Taiwanese. Although the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan constitutes only 1% of the total population, their influence and presence in suffering are very significant in motivating/empowering the islanders to resist any forms of oppression and struggle for self-determination – Taiwan's independence. The core reasons for the contributions are that the PTC offers a perspective, a system of meaning/value, through which people have a critical understanding of their own situation and have a particular narrative on their own experiences in relation to the Other. Also, the PTC possesses a particular view to motivate believers to take part in the movement and to serve as social agents to enhance civic leadership, addressing the issues as well as developing a strategy for independence.

The dualistic nature of Christian churches caused internally pluralism and allowed different models to emerge in responding to reunification/reconciliation in a particular context and time. Each model has its moral narrative, which serves not to describe the socio-political reality, but to form a community which, by virtue of its particular convictions, shapes a moral context out of which moral actions can come out. In other words, churches can be seen as moral communities for socio-political action because

[408] Ibid., 376

they have served as educators and institution builders, building up the oppressed and the poor as the power of resistance for the sake of justice.

In brief, the above comparison between Taiwan and South Korea reveals the insufficiency of binary opposition – essentialising and demonising the Other, producing a grand narrative and a collective identity, sealing the multiple voices and ignoring the hybrid identity. However, this chapter has no intention to downplay the importance of the methodology of binary opposition. Rather, I have recovered the diverse forms of binary opposition in contributing to the resistance of domination, the liberation of the oppressed, and the transformation of society. One of the objectives in this chapter has been to acknowledge the diversity/hybridity in the contemporary world, and to recognise the insufficiency of binary opposition. This acknowledgment and recognition paves the way for engaging in dialogue with different modes of pastoral care and for creating a Third Space for reconciliation.

CHAPTER SEVEN
THIRD SPACE HYBRIDIZED CHURCH AND RECONCILIATION

7.1 Introduction

In the chapters of Part II, we discover that there are different forms of resistance against domination and exploitation, such as collaboration and binary opposition (in the forms of liberation, subversion, and transformation). Particularly, the mode of binary opposition has made significant contributions to the transformation of the sinful structure, the subversion of the autocratic domination, and the liberation of the oppressed from the coloniser/the oppressor. However, this mode unconsciously reuses the methodology of Euro-centric modernism (such as, meta-narratives, totalising, demonising, and essentialising) to produce other forms of oppressing the multi-layered/hybrid identity and sealing multiple voices. In this sense, this mode fails to provide a framework for understanding the hybridizing trend of this age and for transforming the antagonistic narratives/cultures to achieve a cultural reconciliation. The mode of collaboration in British colonial rule played an important role in transforming the fishing port of Hong Kong into an international and prosperous city. However, the mode of collaboration finds it inadequate to deal with the changing contexts of postcolonial Hong Kong, such as the fear of the new master (that is, Beijing's autocratic rule and recolonisation) and the defence of the local identity (fighting for full democracy).

Having critiqued the insufficiency of the two modes of collaboration and binary opposition in responding to the changing context of Hong Kong's reintegration with

mainland China, this chapter will move towards a resolution of the two questions posed at the introduction of this thesis: how would it be possible to maintain Hong Kong's identity with binding the values of capitalism/democracy whilst reconciling with the one-party domination in communist mainland China? In light of the impact of the pluralistic and fragmented world, is the mode of hybridity the best approach for the Christian churches of HKSAR to resist against China's recolonisation under the policy of "one country, two systems" and to build cultural reconciliation with Beijing? In answering these questions, this chapter will draw together the insights of the three cases studying (that is, South Korea, Taiwan, and colonial Hong Kong) and will test the theoretical findings of hybridity with reflection on actual church praxis in the context of HKSAR.

Before proceeding to the next section, I have to return to our main conceptual framework and highlight several main themes of hybridity, which will be the focus of our discussion in this chapter. Firstly, it is a contextual reflection which is a resistance against the Euro-centric modernism (represented by universal truth, meta-narrative, unity, and certainty) eroding the distinctiveness of the identity of the Other. Secondly, it is an inclusive (holding together rather than excluding) and interdisciplinary methodology which aim at engaging the dialogue with the competitive and even antagonistic perspectives and using imagination to create a third space to reconcile the conflicts. Thirdly, it is a transformative practice which is committed not just in seeing/understanding the issue in a different way, but also guiding the actions of the Christian churches toward social and individual transformation.

In order to have a coherence in the whole thesis, I will repeat the pastoral cycle, based on the discussion of the methodological considerations in chapter one, to structure this final chapter. The first section is a contextual reconsideration based on the new insights drawn from the previous chapters, revisiting the changing context of the postcolonial Hong Kong so as to understand the present action of the dominant narrative framework and to identify the core issue for future action. The second stage is to initiate a dialogue between the text of Christian tradition and the context of the HKSAR, so as to purify and clarify the insights for the reconstruction of the narrative action. The final stage is to generate alternatives, and to choose among the partial solutions. Transformative practice, in this chapter, means a pastoral action or pragmatic response to the contextual core issue of an antagonistic identity which hinders reconciliation due to narrative framework of essentializating and demonising the Other. To deconstruct this framework is to recognise the shared/hybrid identity that creates a contact point – the oppressive and transforming nature within ourselves. Transformative practice expects not just to deconstruct the narratives of binary opposition, but to produce an alternative narrative and framework that focuses on relation, communication, diversity and responsibility.

7.2 Contextual reflection – identifying the narrative framework of antagonistic identity

Reunification with its motherland is no longer a debated issue for the people of Hong Kong, because the territory is now *de jure* and *de facto* (politically and legally) a part of China. Unlike Taiwan and South Korea, HKSAR does not have any recurring state of military tension with its motherland, because the Chinese People's Liberation Army has already been stationed in the territory since 1st July, 1997. Unlike the two Koreas, the divided economic policies is no longer the main issue because China has adopted an

open door policy and free market economics since 1978 which has transformed its economic systems in line with the globally capitalist development and which has raised its people's living standard more closely to the West. Apart from narrowing the economic gap between HKSAR and mainland China, economic reform has made China more open to the outside world and its people are more accessible to the global information as well as more face-to-face encounter with one another. In comparison with the Korean peninsular and the Taiwan cross-strait relations, the tension between HKSAR and mainland China is more relaxed in terms of military security, economic competition, and face-to-face encounters.

Nevertheless, the cultural or in-depth reconciliation with mainland China remains an unresolved issue of Hong Kong's reunification with its motherland. A recent Hong Kong University survey indicates that the people of the HKSAR still identify themselves more strongly as Hong Kongers rather than as Chinese citizens after 15 years of political reunification and increasingly economic integration.[409] In the recent Policy Address, Chun-ying Leung, the new Chief Executive, stated that he plans to introduce Moral and National Education as a compulsory subject in the primary and secondary school curriculum. This announcement has sparked protests among Hong Kong people, who claim it amounts to "brainwashing" children with pro-mainland propaganda – more than 90,000 people took to the streets on Sunday, 29 July, 2012.[410]

[409] Hong Kong University's survey on Hong Kong People's ethnic identity, Press Released on 28 December, 2011. The survey indicates that the percentage of those identifying themselves as "Chinese citizens" has dropped to a new low since 2000, now at 17%. Figures also show that in terms of absolute rating, people's identification with "Hong Kong citizens" has reached a ten-year high, while that of "Chinese citizens" has dropped to a 12-year low. This is contrary to China's economic development in recent years, so it must be due to factors beyond economic development. Combining all measurements, Hong Kong people feel strongest as 'Hong Kong citizens', then followed by a number of cultural identities. The feeling of being 'citizens of the PRC' is the weakest among all identities tested.

[410] *CNN*, 30 July, 2012.

These two examples reflect that the local continues to struggle to maintain its own identity and to resist the PRC's domination. The fortified boundary between communism and capitalism is often demarcated by highlighting the difference between us and them – a distinction that is considered clearly self-evident. Such identity marking blocks the cultural reconciliation between Hong Kong and mainland China.

The previous chapter makes it clear that the issue of antagonistic identity constructs is the first place of hindering reunification and reconciliation. Once the antagonistic enemy identities have been constructed, both sides have a legitimate reason (fear/suspicion of the Other) to imbue with militarism for state security. The significance of identity constructs extends well beyond the four rivalry governments (South–North Korea and Taiwan–mainland China), which became intertwined with Cold War global bipolar conflicts. Although the global order of the Cold War has gradually moved away since the 1980s, the fear and the negative image of communism remains essentially static in the contemporary world. This indicates that identity constructs are not only reflections of political situations, but also of cultural values (such as, Euro-centric modernism and liberal capitalism), which serve to sustain and reproduce an environment of hostility and distrust between two systems. The reconciliation becomes almost exclusive, due to an antagonistic enemy assumption that both sides have continuously essentialised and demonised the Other as dangerous and threatening. I will illustrate how the identity constructs recur in the patterns of distrust and continues to shape the current confrontation between HKSAR and mainland China in different levels.

7.2.1 Global context – Cold War mentality remains

The polar global order of the Cold War appears to come to the end in the early 1990s, but the contested identities between autocratic communism and democratic capitalism have not been washed away and the Cold War mentality of binary opposition continues to demonize the threatening other. The US, the great, leading Western power, continues to consider North Korea as 'an axis of evil' and China as 'a threat of the Western structure or the security of the region'. This will eschew the current global acute confrontation, such as the nuclear crisis in Korean peninsula and China Sea disputes. In one instance, the US deploys more troops in Asia, announces military alliances with Asian-Pacific countries (e.g., Japan, India, and Australia), and operates a week-long joint military exercise in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. Many analysts see the maneuvers as efforts by a democratic coalition to "contain" rising communist Chinese power.[411] In another instance, the US has also made a firm position to support the democratic Philippines on the dispute with mainland China over ownership of the Scarborough Reef, by holding talks over possible access to military bases and operating joint naval drills close to the much-coveted South China Sea.[412]

The above two instances point out that although the Cold War may not be back, the fear and distrust of communist China remains. Such an antagonistic identity marking between autocratic communism and democratic capitalism has been constructed by essentialists who hold the view of identity as fixed and trans-historical, little room leaving for the Other as fluid and contingent. For the essentialists, peace and reconciliation can only emerge when China fully opens up and whole-heartedly

[411] *BBC News*, "New Strategic Partnership' against China", 3 September 2007
[412] *The China Post*, 29th June, 2011; US military plan against China outlined in think-tank report, 14 August, 2012

embraces the values and virtues of democracy and market economics. Ming Xia gives an explanation to this point.

> Ideological and cultural factors make China a threat. For neo-conservatives in the Bush Administration, the mere factor that China still sticks to communism makes view it adversely. Samuel Huntington has added a cultural factor: in the clash of civilisations, the "unholy alliance between Islamic and Confucian civilisations" is the most fundamental threat to the West…[413]

Based on this consideration, the US-China bilateral relationship remains in the situation of conflict, competition, and confrontation ... Ming believes that the harmonious relationship between China and the US can emerge only if China removes "the thorn of communist ideology and authoritarianism."[414]

No matter how willing China is willing to adjust its ideology to the international community, particularly, in the field of economic cooperation and global peace, the US' and the essentialists' inability to see China as anything but a threatening new power deepens the antagonistic identities or confrontational attitudes among the international community. This seriously hinders both an adequate understanding and potential resolution to the confrontation. The precondition of reconciliation can occur only if the threatening Other has been removed. In this sense, reconciliation is conceived as an 'end-product' of struggle. There is no language of moral ambiguities – never bad in the good or good in the bad. All these limit reconciliation in the mode of binary opposition ignoring the diversity within resistance.

[413] Ming Xia '"China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?' *The New York Times* March 24, 2006.
[414] Ibid.

7.2.2 Local context – continuously internalize Cold War mentality

Hong Kong has been a British colony for over 150 years and has been strongly influenced by British Western ideology – Euro-centric modernism (binary opposition) and Cold War mentality (bi-polar order). In addition to the economic backwardness before 1997 and the negative memories of communism oppressing human rights (such as, Cultural Revolution – an unparalleled disaster to its people and the crackdown at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 – the brutal way of suppression to the different voices), the people of Hong Kong both consciously and unconsciously internalized the British ideology into the local identity – democratic capitalism is good, civilised, and modern while autocratic communism is evil, uncivilised, and backward. The general climate of distrusting the communist Other has embedded in the local culture and the antagonistic identity constructs that continue to drive interaction between the people of Hong Kong and the mainland Chinese authority. For the fear of the communist historical wrongdoings coming to Hong Kong, the people of the territory develop its security ideology which highlights the value of freedom and democracy as the identity of Hong Kong in discriminating between autocratic communism and democratic capitalism. For the fear of Hong Kong becoming as a subversive base destabilizing the communist rule, the mainland Chinese authorities intervene or dominate the pace as well as the form of democratic development.

Hong Kong Christian churches as social agents have no choice but being trapped in the political/cultural mind-sets that have been created in British colonial times. The antagonistic identity constructs between communism and capitalism destabilised not only the unity of the HKSAR politics as well as the Christian churches, but also

persistently recurred to the old patterns of conflict and distrust. For mainline churches which openly support the Chinese authority or remain silent in controversial issues have often been labelled as 'royalists' in favour of Beijing's domination or intervention into Hong Kong's socio-political development. The 'royalists' have been accused of undermining the purpose of "one country, two systems" – rule of law, freedom of speech, and the high degree of Hong Kong's autonomy. Likewise, those churches that have collaborated with either local or national governments have been viewed as having an "unholy alliance" with evil (see Introduction).

The residue of Cold War mentality and the British legacy of Euro-centric modernism make the people of Hong Kong internalize the fear of communism as a threat of local autonomy which shape the current confrontation between local HKSAR and national mainland China. The linkages between the antagonistic identities and the recurring patterns of conflicts help us to understand how threat and distrust moved from the global to the local. More importantly, the changing of sovereignty does not reduce the tension of contested identities, because the narrative framework of antagonistic identity and binary opposition has been deeply embedded in both local and global culture.

7.3 Deconstruct the narrative framework of antagonistic identity in socio-political context

The antagonistic identity construct provides not only a framework for us to interpret, but also the subject for the reconciliation to resist. Antagonistic identity, built on the narrative framework of essentialising the Other, will be lacking points of contact or reconciliation. The first step of deconstructing this narrative framework is to recognise

a hybrid or a shared identity. As we discussed in previous chapters, modern nations are basically cultural hybrids[415] – it would be highly unlikely to find a nation which is composed of only one people, one culture, or one ethnicity. The context of HKSAR provides evidence to support this belief that nations are fundamentally cultural hybrids. China is not a state of having an ethnically homogeneous population and its national identity is fundamentally constructed by many different ethnicities. The given national culture has been interpreted and practiced differently by diverse provinces or ethnic groups, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. HKSAR and mainland China have been politically separated for over 150 years and have developed their own cultures of Chinese identities as well as their own route towards modernisation. It would be wrong to see the reunification as the mixing of two distinct or separate traditions/cultures, because neither mainland China nor HKSAR is bounded and homogenous. mainland China, under the rule of PRC for over 60 years, has developed a hybrid identity of communism. This mixed with a capitalist economic ideology while Hong Kong under the British rule for over 150 years, the people of Hong Kong has developed multi-layered identities (ethnic Chinese with British liberal capitalist ideology and Hong Kong collaborative/pragmatic mentality) which can shift identification as they determined it to be situationally appropriate and which can draw on multiplying (global, national, and local) resources. Clearly, the reunification based on the formula of "one country, two systems" possesses the characters of Third Space hybridization – socio-culturally mixing the already hybrid parties (HKSAR and mainland China) together and creatively producing a third space ("one country, two systems") to accommodate the differences.

[415] Hall, S. (ed.) *Modernity and Its future* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992) p.297

The above discussion indicates that shared identity is not naturally occurring phenomena but contingent historical-cultural formation. It is a form of imaginative identification with the symbols and narrative of the nation-state. Nation is more than political or territorial formations. Rather, it is continually reproduced through discursive action related to the thick memories of shared ethnicity as well as traditions, and thin memories of a set of ideals as well as an ideology[416]. Returning to the context of HKSAR, the people of the territory do not have any problem of identifying themselves as ethnic Chinese and as descendants of Yellow Emperor with a five-thousand-year history (thick memory). Although many Hong Kongese have a difficulty in acknowledging its continuity with the past sixty-year negative memories of the communist rule (violation of human dignity and freedom), the thin memory has developed a lot of ideological similarities – the practice of capitalist economic systems and the vision of respecting two systems within one country. Recognizing our hybrid and shared identity, we can work together and constitute a new discursive framework to deconstruct the antagonistic identity and to reconcile our differences.

The second step is to deconstruct the narrative framework of demonising the Other. Such a narrative implies that the Other is evil without humanity and enemy threatening my security. The only way to deal with evil/enemy is to eliminate rather than to reconcile with them. Little space is open for reconciliation. If we look at the Chinese

[416] Schreiter defines the meaning of thin and thick memories. The latter is related to "a long history of historical relationships that are acknowledged and appropriated by the citizens of s state." The former is linked with citizens' feelings which are free to "disavow any responsibility for a state that existed prior to the assumption of this ideology." Take Germany as an example, both the East and the West had the Nazi past. West Germany acknowledged its continuity and admitted the historical wrongdoings (issuing public apology and paying compensation to the victims – nearly USD 90 billion in restitution to Jewish and other survivors of the Nazi regime) – an example of thick memory. East Germany considered "its embrace of Marxist Communism as a clear break (even liberation) from the past" and declined to take up any responsibility for the Nazi misdeeds – an example of thin memory. Schreiter, R. "Establishing a shared Identity: The role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrative", p.11

political leaders, they are not demons. Instead, they are just ordinary people – many of them are victims in the Cultural Revolution. For example, Deng Xiao Ping, the designer of 'one country two systems', was persecuted twice during the Cultural Revolution. He was imprisoned while his eldest son was tortured and jumped out the window of a four-story building in 1968, becoming a paraplegic.[417] They transformed their experience of suffering into the practice of reforming economic systems and improving the relationship with the international community. Good or bad are ambiguous – there is a possibility of bad in the good and good in the bad. In facing an unjust structure, if I were the Chinese leaders, I would need a lot of courage or even risk my life to resist the system that provided me with such a substantial privilege. They legitimize the existing system of abuse based on the narrative framework of stability, prosperity, and unity – the fear of instability and subversion. Another problem of demonisation is to put the blame on the Other, failing to recognise the 'oppressor' within them – Euro-centric imperialism and American hegemony. The antagonistic identity cannot be deconstructed without an acknowledgment of our shared identity – both oppressor and transformer within us.

7.4 Deconstruct the narrative framework of antagonistic identity in a religious context

The practice of essentialising and demonising the Other are also embedded in the Hong Kong Christian narrative framework. Kwok Nai-wang is considered a representative of a locally dominant view on condemning the mainline churches of losing their prophetic role. He believes that the close relationship with the government and the heavy involvement in social services have made the Christian churches become very much

[417] *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deng_Xiaoping, 31 May, 2013

part of the establishment. In order to maintain the status quo, the Christian churches are unwilling to take a confrontational approach against the authorities. The prophetic role of the Christian churches is no longer to be seen. Thus, the Christian churches should stay away from the government and should not get involved in their plans for Hong Kong, because the involvement would constrain the prophetic role of the Christian churches. He goes further to encourage the mainline churches to confront the rich and the powerful. Kwok's negative labelling of the mainline Churches has its ground on liberation theology – identify with the marginalized and resist against the oppressive structure. The condemnation applies to those churches which are apolitical, because their silence implies the support of the status quo and the loss of the prophetic voice. His views are supported not only by local theologians, but also by foreign academics in local research. Deborah Ann Brown and Stephen Carl Pavy are good examples to illustrate this point. Both of them are from the United States and are doing PhD research in Hong Kong's reintegration with mainland China. They seem to adopt a Euro-centric modernistic binary opposition to tackle the issue of Hong Kong and the stereotype of the autocratic China which would not allow the people of the territory have the right of self-determination. They view Hong Kong Chinese from the false cultural assumption of the Western World, facilitating the cultural misrepresentation of the "the Orient" in general.

For Brown, most of the Chinese surrender to the arrangements imposed by Beijing because the Chinese have a submissive character with authority and bitter fate,[418] including mainline Chinese leaders, who are timid about openly condemning both

[418] Browns, D. A. "The Role of Religion in Promoting Democracy in the People's Republic of China and Hong Kong," in Leung, B. (ed.) *Church & State Relations in 21 Century Asia* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996) p.111

national and local unjust policies. This explains why the established churches in Hong Kong do not have a history of political activism. Her generalization does not do justice to the Chinese character. As we discussed in Chapter Four, Christian churches in Hong Kong consciously chose to collaborate with rather than to attack the unjust colonial government due not to their lack of social consciousness, but due to the fact that they somehow felt that "now is not the time".[419] Chinese, in the past hundred years, witnessed the downfall of Qing dynasty, the exploitation of Western imperialism, the chaos of warlords, the invasion of Japanese military, the civil war between the communists and the Kuomintang, and the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution. Hundreds of thousands of mainland Chinese fled to Hong Kong to escape from political unrest and economic hardship. The colonial government was capable: it not only provided a harmonious and stable environment for business, but was also able to defend the territory from being influenced by the political disorder in China. Against this background, the people of Hong Kong wisely choose to stay on the position of political neutrality/apolitical involvement which helps the colonial government modify its antagonistic policy towards communism and succeed in harmonizing the dynamics from different parties. The attitude of political neutrality among Hong Kong people also constrained Christian churches from taking political side.

For Brown, the only ways to deal with China's domination is either confrontation/resistance (distance from the authority) or submission (collaboration). In her research, she has neglected that hybridity and collaboration can be modes of resistance which has been discussed fully in Chapter Four. Brown selects the Hong

[419] Tsang, S. (ed.) *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Government & Politics*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995), P.244

Kong Anglican Church as her PhD research focus, due to the Christian churches epitomizing the adjustment of mainline Protestant leaders to the reintegration with mainland China. Peter K. K. Kwong, the former Bishop of the Anglican Diocese of Hong Kong and Macau in British colonial times, was appointed by Beijng as an adviser to the central government and as a member of both the Basic Law Drafting Committee and the Basic Law Consultative Committee. Based on the Orientalist generalization and the dualistic belief, Brown did not see Kwong's Beijing appointments as a role in advising or communicating with the central government and fighting for the freedom of religion inscribed in the Basic Law. Rather, she had a strong suspicion that Bishop Kwong was drafted to help ensure "the Chinese government's plan for a passive convergence of Hong Kong with China."[420] She also accused the Hong Kong Anglican hierarchy of being inward-looking and lacking an ethical vision (promoting and defending prodemocracy movement), because the Christian churches are submissive in character, heavily involved in government structure, and financially dependent on the local government.[421]

Brown's narrative on the Hong Kong Anglican Church is based on a typical binary opposition, ignoring the Anglican tradition/methodology of a 'Middle axiom'. Bishop Kwong held the view that the Christian churches are an inclusive community, which allows individual members to have different perspectives in response to the issue of 1997. He highlights William Temple's teaching, in his book *Christianity and Social Order* (1942), that Christian churches gives general Christian principles for guidance and allows individuals (either members or non-members) to relate those principles to

[420] Browns, D. A. p.118
[421] Ibid, pp 115-118

their own practical judgment in response to their particular socio-political concern. The strength of the 'middle axiom' approach is to bridge the gap between the fundamentals of the faith and the immediate situation, without being reductionism and taking a risk of dividing the Christian churches on political issues. Also, this approach can help the Christian churches to avoid either pietism, which is not concerned about society, or perfectionism, which can only deal in absolutes. Furthermore, this approach brings together Christians and non-Christians in facing a common challenge. The expertise of non-Christians can often be brought into the discussion out of which they arise.[422]

Pavy shares Brown's presuppositions in structuring his research and investigating the theological processes of Hong Kong Chinese Christians toward the reunification with mainland China. His research connects ideologies to material conditions. He criticizes mainline churches for neglecting the prophetic roles of the Christian churches and legitimizes the oppressive social order[423] due to the fear of losing their privileged position within society and the financial support from the government.[424] Then, he goes further to recover particular a small number of parachurch organisations to contest the dominant practice of Mainline churches as "unholy alliance".[425] They are Temple street and Shepherd Community Church Network (stand for local grassroots cell church network), Jubilee (Hei Fook) Grassroots Mission (helping the poor to go work among the poor), Mission to New Arrivals (immigrants from mainland China), Industrial Evangelical Fellowship (grassroots industrial workers), Hong Kong Christian Institute (fight for social justice in the community). For him, parachurch organisation can be

[422] Kwok, C.P., p.313
[423] Pavey, S. C. *Envisoning/Embodying Christianity in Hong Kong: Theologies of Power and Crisis*, PhD thesis, University of Kentucky, 2005, p.65
[424] Ibid., p84
[425] Ibid., p.147

seen as extensions of the Christian churches that remain structurally separate from any denomination or local church decision-making body. They focus on a particular area that the Christian churches are unable or unwillingly to do - active in social justice, advocacy, and development. The narrative of these organisations is on the side of the powerless and the marginalized to challenge "the structural relations of powers and its flows –material and ideology." [426]

Pavy's research repeats Brown's Eurocentric binary opposition to generalize images of Chinese and mainline churches and attempts to justify their hegemony/imperial ambition by demonising the Other of differences. This is what Said claims as "imperial satraps" which have internalized the romanticized other culture created by American Orientalists.[427]

The residue of Cold War mentality makes the people of Hong Kong to internalize the fear of communism as a threat of local autonomy while the Euro-centric modernism of binary opposition divides the inter-church and church-state relations. All these shape the current confrontation between local HKSAR and national mainland. The linkages between the antagonistic identities and the recurring patterns of conflicts help us to understand how threat and distrust moved from the global to the local. More importantly, the changing of sovereignty does not reduce the tension of contested identities. The national education is one example mentioned above and the Other example is that the Most Reverend Paul Kwong, the Archbishop and Primate of Hong

[426] Ibid.
[427] Said, E.W. *Orientalism* (London: the Penguin Group, 1978)

Kong Sheng Kung Hui (Anglican Church), has recently been appointed to be a member of 2013 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). His appointment is similar to the Emeritus Archbishop Peter Kwong appointed by Beijing as an advisor on government policy. This could be seen as an opportunity to communicate and interrogate with the Chinese authorities. Owing to the antagonistic identity between the autocratic Beijing government and the prophetic church, Christians both from internally Anglican Church and externally other denomination (not a great numbers) are resentful to Kwong's appointment and demanded his resignation. Their argument is not sitting in the seat of "Scoffers", the Chinese authority, who has the history of violation against human right, particularly, in suppressing religious freedom.[428]

Both Brown's and Pavy's criticism do not do the justice to the unique context of HKSAR and the diversity of mainline churches in response to the reunification. Apart from the above critique, this chapter attempts to deconstruct the Christian narrative framework of binary opposition by recovering the hybridised and multiple identities of mainline churches. After 1997, the close relationship or partnership with the government has undergone a significant change. The HKSAR government has produced several policies attempting to reduce the influence or significance of Christian churches in public sectors, such as encouraging more non-Christian organisations to provide education and social services, imposing taxation on churches' related commercial incomes, lowering the ranking of Anglican/Catholic bishop in the protocol list, and reducing the percentage of church representatives (from 100% to 60%) in the School Management Board. In response, diverse socio-political narratives have

[428]Open letter written by Hong Kong St. John's Cathedral member, found in WWW.Chang.org/petitions, 1 May, 2013

emerged among Christian churches towards the new relationship with the Hong Kong (local) and the central Chinese (national) governments. Their responses and narrative reflect their sense of identity and unique belief of their own faith.

Resistance as a mode of defending the local identity (participation and criticism)

Unlike the early stage of the Minjung movement, HKSAR, after 1997, does not have any Christian church which has taken the position of "subversion of communist rule as a mode of resistance". The mode of resistance, here, means to defend the local identity from the national domination rather than to equate liberation with the overcoming of the communist. After the reunification, the Catholic and Protestant churches and para-church organisations,[429] have moved away from the mode of collaboration (government supporter/contractor) toward a new hybrid form of church-state relations: attempting to strike the balance between a government contractor and a critical prophet, between participation and criticism, between political reality and religious ideal, and between the national and the local identities.

Regarding the national identity, both the Catholic and Protestant churches have affirmed the communist rule and expressed their national sentiment of being Chinese. For example, it was a heated debate on the issue whether the Christian churches should celebrate the National Day on 1st October. Lo Lung-Kwong, a Methodist priest, called

[429] "A para-church organisation is a Christian group that acts independently of an official church, but is linked to it through a shared mission and common beliefs. Para-church organisations are usually more flexible in their organisational structure than official church bodies. As independent groups, para-church organisation can usually respond to social issues more freely than official church bodies." Parac-church organisations in Hong Kong include The Catholic Church's Justice and Peace Commission, the Hong KongChristian Institute for the Protestant mainland churches, and the Society for Truth and Light for the Protestant evangelical churches. Chan, S. H. "Christian Social Narrative in Postcolonial Hong Kong." *Postcolonial Studies* 10.4 (2007), p.448

for National Day Celebration based on "expressing solidarity with the nation and celebrating China's history together with Chinese compatriots."[430] However, the proposed celebration was strongly opposed by seven Christian social groups[431] due to the implication of supporting the autocratic communist regime. Some of the Christian groups (e.g. Grassroots Christians) even suggested having a form of "mourning, lamentation and confession" as a way to celebrate the National Day.[432] In order to reduce the polarisation between the mainline churches and the Christian social groups, the Catholic and the Protestant church leaders attempted to develop a hybrid way of church-state relations, by renaming the National Day 'Celebration' as 'Service'. The proposed service meant to accept the political reality of the communist regime, but to highlight the diverse interpretations of the celebration among Christian circles.

Similarly, the Catholic and Protestant churches have chosen the hybrid way to handle the pace of democratic development. The policy of "one country, two systems" allows Hong Kong to develop the full democracy before 2047, but the pace moving toward universal suffrage of both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive is long and slow. Both Christians and politicians are discontented with the democratic progress. Their discontents did not stop Christian churches from sending representatives to take part in 'the small circle election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive'[433], because they recognise the political reality and attempt to strike a balance between participation and

[430] Leung, B & Chan S.H. *Changing Church and State relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003) p.126

[431] The seven Christian groups include: the HK Christian Institute, HK Student Christian Movement, Christians for HK Society, HK Christian Industrial Committee, Catholic Youth Council and the Justice and Peace Commission of the HK Catholic Diocese. Leung, B & Chan S.H. Changing Church and State relations in Hong Kong, 1950-2000, (Hong Kong: HKUP, 2003) p.194

[432] Leung, B & Chan S.H. *Changing Church and State relations*, p.129

[433] The existing electoral system set up for selecting the SAR Chief executive is confined to 800 select representatives from business, government, social and religious groups who have the sole voting right to choose the Hong Kong's leader.

criticism. This explains why the Catholic and Protestant churches, on the one hand, expressed their national sentiment and Chinese identity after 1997, but they, on the other hand, have become more outspoken both in socio-political and moral issues.[434] This point will be illustrated in the following issues.

Regarding the political concern, they seriously criticize the Central and HKSAR governments' failure of upholding the principle of high degree of autonomy. Three examples were put forward to support his argument. Firstly, Cardinal Joseph Ze-kium Zen and other Protestant church leaders made a Christian statement criticising the Fifth Report on Constitutional Development in 2005 for lacking a time-table or procedure towards the universal suffrage. Their comments were well-received by many Legislative Council members, who joined together to turn down the government report.[435] Secondly, the Final Court of Appeal in 1999 ruled that under the Basic Law mainland-born children of Hong Kong citizens had the right of abode in Hong Kong. But the Hong Kong government blocked the ruling by calling on the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) to re-interpret the Basic Law. In response, Cardinal Cheng-chung Wu, Bishop Kwong (Anglican church), the Ministerial Session of the Methodist Church, as well as the Concern Group for Social Affairs of the Theological and Ministerial Department of the Churches of Christ in China, publicly condemned the NPC's re-interpretation of the Basic Law which had undermined the Basic Law (mini-constitution)[436], damaged "the foundation of the autonomy of the SAR", and weakened "the confidence of the international community towards Hong

[434] Chan, S. H. "Christian Social Narrative in Postcolonial Hong Kong," p.451
[435] Justice and Peace Commission of Hong Kong Catholic Diocese, 'Christian Joint Statement on The Fifth Report of the Constitutional Development', 4th Nov. 2005 www.hkjp.org./Statement
[436] Chan, S. H. "Christian Social Narrative in Postcolonial Hong Kong," P.453

Kong."[437] Thirdly, the HKSAR government in 2002 began a consultation process on a new national security (legislative provisions) bill under Article 23 of the Basic Law. In response, the Social Concern Group of the Christian Churches of Christ in China, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and mainline Protestant para-church organisations publicly challenged the National Security Bill that would introduce mainland China's legal mechanisms in Hong Kong – threatening the protection of human rights and religious freedom. Apart from socio-political concern, the Catholic and Protestant churches as well as their para-churches are also active in joining ecumenical activities to improve morality in society, such as opposing the legalization of soccer gambling, launching a programme to care for the unemployed and a signature campaign in opposition to the proposed legislation on 'Anti-discrimination based on sexual orientation'.[438]

The Catholic and Protestant mainline churches' narratives on socio-political and moral issues reflect not only their religious belief, but also their hybrid identities – both members of a church and members of society, and both a prophet and a servant. As Christians, they have a prophetic duty to stand up for justice and defend human rights. The role of a prophet has different interpretations within Christian circles. For liberal church leaders, Nay-wang Kwok holds the view that Christian churches should comply with the principle of church-state separation which allows the Christian churches to independently monitor and freely criticize the government. For Catholic and Protestant churches, the Christian churches-state relations have been trapped by the colonial past of being the government's 'education and social welfare contractors,' in which the

[437] *Cardinal Wu's Pastoral Letter* 'God is love' in 1999, visitation of Our Lady, 31May, 1999. www. Catholic. Org.HK;
[438] Chan, S. H. "Christian Social Narrative in Postcolonial Hong Kong." pp.453-455

complete church-state separation appears unrealistic. Thus, they tend to believe that being a critical participator or a hybrid Christian identity (prophet and servant) is possible.[439] Being a servant, they will continue the colonial legacy of collaborating with the government in serving the public in the fields of education and social service, but being a prophet, they will remain critical to defend Christian values and to safeguard the local traditions of plurality, liberty, as well as justice. It seems that this hybrid role allows the Christian churches to transcend the two political poles of pro-China and anti-China and to maintain their independent position.

The current hybrid role taken by the Catholic and Protestant mainline churches has its limitations both in theory and in practice. Owing to their heavy involvement in government contract-out services, the Christian church leaders and the heads of government-aided organisations find it difficult to speak out freely or loudly. Even they have been outspoken to criticize the poor governance of the HKSAR and to condemn the Chinese government's interference of HKSAR internal affairs, disregarding the potential that their social narrative might damage the harmonious relationship with the local and national governments. However, the public has the impression that the rapid changing attitude toward church-state relations after 1997 is due to their vested interests being reduced. Likewise, the Catholic and Protestant mainline churches, upholding the principle of "one country, two systems," can be seen as a kind of secured consciousness (the fear and suspicion of the communist other) – to defend China's intervention in local autonomy and to protect Hong Kong's religious freedom. In this sense, to defend the principle of "one country, two systems" is no longer an attitude toward a promotion

[439] The Methodist Church, Hong Kong, *Pastoral Lette*r in 1997, WWW.Methodist.org.hk; The Catholic Diocese of Hong Kong, 'March into the Bright Decade', pastoral exhortation, vgoffice.catholic.org.hk

of in-depth reintegration, an embrace of democratic spirit, or a celebration of differences, but is downgraded to the political means of toleration – a safety net of defending the local differences.

Collaboration and reconciliation as a mode of resistance

In the British colonial period, most of the Protestant evangelical churches had a preference to stay away from politics and to focus on evangelisation. After 1997, the evangelical churches have become more active in building up close church-state relations – boosting collaboration, communication, and reconciliation. For evangelical Protestants, Chan indicates that they see their identities as believers as more important than their identity as citizens.[440] Thus, they consider the involvement in the social narrative as a means to achieve their goals of conversion. Although they have criticized the Hong Kong government on some public issues, such as opposing the introduction of soccer gambling and the legislation on anti-discrimination based on sexual orientation, they largely remained silent on socio-political issues because their concern has been to strengthen the good relationships with both local and national authorities. Two examples are put forward to illustrate their identity.

After 1997, Hong Kong faced an economic downturn, political disputes, and social discontent. Most of the Protestant evangelical and charismatic churches did not take a critical approach to government policy. Instead, they publicly called for communicating with the government. This calling has fundamentally changed their traditionally political approach from staying away from politics and concentrating on individualistic

[440] Chan, S. H. "Christian Social Narrative in Postcolonial Hong Kong." pp.455-463

faith, to a collective political concern. In May 2004, fifteen evangelical church leaders drafted a mission statement entitled 'Reconciliation and Reconstruction: The Mission of Christian churches in Hong Kong', expressing their views on society and the role of the Christian churches after 1977. The mission statement was signed by 178 evangelical Protestants and was published in *Ming Pao* on 12 July 2004. The statement identifies the chaotic situation of Hong Kong as the result of political problems, economic downturn, and the effect of global disconnection. It then went to list four objectives or responsibilities for Protestants:[441]

> 1. help Hong Kong people search for spirituality; tolerate, respect, and care for others. 2. mobilize Christians to fulfill their civic responsibilities; uphold the rule of law and human rights, share the burden of others and build a caring and righteous civil society. 3.seek to resolve cultural conflict and build cultural reconciliation between Beijing and Hong Kong. 4. shoulder the responsibility of equipping future generations with leadership skills and cultural values.

The mission statement provides insight into how evangelical Protestants viewed the situation in postcolonial Hong Kong and their role in society. Chan criticizes the statement and mission for oversimplifying Hong Kong's socio-political context and ignoring the poor governance of the local authority as a major factor leading to social discontent. Chan goes further to challenge the descriptive slogan of cultural reconciliation in which no explanation was given and no practical solution was offered in the real situation of conflicted values. The statement appears to urge "Protestant communities to support the government, to accept the discrepancies between Beijing

[441] *Ming Pao* on 12 July 2004

and Hong Kong, and to display a kind of cooperative attitude rather than one of critical civic responsibility."[442] It only provides a partial and limited step towards reconciliation.

Chan's critique of the evangelical narrative reveals that the call for cultural reconciliation is only a slogan/lip-service, lacking a practical theology to resolve the conflicted situation. In the conclusion of Chan's article, he points out that there are only two main Christian social narratives existing in Hong Kong in the past fitteen years after reunification, namely 'the protest model' and 'pragmatic model'. The former model is to play the role of 'prophet' to resist/challenge an undemocratic authoritarian regime while the latter is to remain silent in order to preserve their organisational interests.[443] His conclusion is also oversimplifying the hybrid identity of Christian churches. The socio-political narratives of mainline churches and evangelical Protestants have clearly reflected their intention and implementation to move away from the mode of binary opposition and move forward to the possibility of hybrid identity and the thinking of the Third Space.

7.5 In search of a counter-narrative against antagonism within the Christian tradition of reconciliation rooted in shared identity/vision, humanity, mutuality, and hybridity

To discern the mode of hybridity appropriation depends not just on socio-politically finding out the core issues that emerged from the particular situation of Hong Kong, but also on an interpretation of a fitting response to the context guided by an interpretation of values/norms developed from the long history of Christian scripture

[442] Chan, S.H. "Christian Social Narrative in postcolonial Hong Kong," p.458
[443] Ibid., p.464

and tradition. To evaluate human action cannot ignore the dimension of God's action in history and creation. In response to the insufficiency of a binary opposition approach and an antagonistic identity, Hong Kong theologians have developed an alternative approach to do reconciliation with mainland China, such as collaboration and participation and criticism. In this section, this chapter attempts to look for a counter-narrative against antagonism within the Christian tradition based on two local theologians, Archie Lee and Arnold Yeung. Both of them are in search for the dialogue between the local context and Christian reconciling tradition.

7.5.1 Archie Lee : building up a shared vision (Cross-textual interpretation)[444]

Archie Lee, a Hong Kong Old Testament scholar and retired professor from the department of theology at Chinese University of Hong Kong, proposes a cross-textual biblical interpretation to do theological reflection without falling into two extremes of either narrowing the scope of inquiry to immediate/concrete situations or concentrating too much on the scriptural and philosophical complexities of pastoral concerns. Unlike traditional biblical scholars who read the bible based on historical-critical exegesis, Lee constructs a new framework for biblical interpretation building on the context of postcolonial Hong Kong. This allows "a reading between the East and West, between the dominant interpretation and scholarship of the formerly colonial and Western cultures and the newly arising consciousness of emerging postcolonial identities in the histories and cultures of Asia."[445] To begin with, Lee locates the biblical interpretation

[444] In this section, the summary on Lee's Cross-textual interpretation is similar to my Mphil. Thesis. Kwok, pp293-303

[445] Lee, A.C.C. "Returning to China: Biblical Interpretation in Postcolonial Hong Kong," *Biblical Interpretation* 7.2 (1999), p 156

between the formerly colonial cultures of Britain and the emerging postcolonial identities of being Hong Kong Chinese.

For Lee, the postcolonial context of the Hong Kong is rather unique. The people of Hong Kong do not share most of Asian or Latin American characteristics of having a "hostile anti-colonial attitude that subversively promotes a distancing from the legacy of the coloniser." [446] Rather, we share the view that "postcolonialism does not necessarily oppose and radically reject a former colonial legacy", because "there are certain formal aspects of colonial culture and western democratic ideas which will contribute to the formation of the new social order."[447] The situation of Hong Kong reveals the term 'postcolonial' itself which is a complex one, because postcolonial narrative is often complicated by the different forms and histories of colonialism, accompanied by different processes of decolonisation. Therefore, one should go beyond a simple dualistic construction of coloniser and colonised, self and other, past and future, British and Chinese. The confrontational approach should not be assumed as the only way of perceiving postcolonialism, because people's colonised experiences have never been monolithic. Thus, terms such as 'binary opposite' or 'separateness and difference' should not be seen as the dominating elements of postcolonial narrative.

The present experience and dilemma[448] of those of us in Hong Kong help us to understand that 'binary opposition' or 'polarisation' should not be the dominating

[446] Lee, A., P.165
[447] Ibid.
[448] Lee points out that "being a minority in a vast and powerful China, the people of Hong Kong find it not an easy task to locate themselves and foster their own cultural identity." Instead, they have to posit

elements of postcolonial narrative. Instead, the postcolonial identity should be constituted through the process of negotiation and resistance. Lee has made this insight his own and proposes reading the book of Isaiah with the changes of Hong Kong as a 'social text' through a cross-textual hermeneutical process. Lee believes that "when two texts are brought together and read cross-textually, the horizon provided by one text will enlighten the Other and a fusion will be achieved for the enrichment of the reader's understanding."[449]

Most of Hong Kong people perceive the postcolonial context with a positive sense of social integration and transformation. Such a context for postcolonial Hong Kong is radically different from many parts of the world. For example, liberation theologians interpret the Exodus experience with the emphasis on a confrontational approach and a political revolution, which are different to our experience of God. We see the Exodus story as only one of the Bible stories. There are other biblical stories which will make a good sense to the experience and status of Hong Kong. The biblical text of the returned exiles in the early restoration is a good example which shares the similar context with Hong Kong: there is tension between groups as a community seeks to reassess and re-establish its postcolonial identity in changed circumstances. The dynamics of internal conflicts and the experiences of a post-exilic community rebuilding the city based on negotiation and collaboration provide insights for our interpretation of the text. In the same way, the hybridity of postcolonial Hong Kong context can also illuminate the text of the returned exiles.

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themselves in history and culture in order to "negotiate for a dynamic hybrid identity"Ibid, p159

[449] Ibid, P161

The struggle for return

Archie Lee is fully aware of the continuity and discontinuity of the culture and the structures in the two societies, the Jewish exilic community and the Chinese community in Hong Kong. To begin with, he uses the letter of Jeremiah to the exiles in 597 BCE (Jer 29:4-7) to illustrate this point.[450] Lee points out that both the Jewish community in Babylon and the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong were exiled from their homeland either by force or by choice but they settled down quite well in alien lands under foreign rule. Both of them held a positive attitude towards the foreign rules and worked hard to make settle their lives in an alien land. However, one of the major differences between them is that the Chinese community in Hong Kong did not have "a sense of being punished by the divine as a collective whole, nor did they have any idea of being sent by the divine to a foreign city on purpose."[451]

Another similarity between the Jewish exilic community and the Chinese refugees in the Hong Kong was that both of them were separated from their motherland and had their own development for more than fifty years. This created "a great gulf between the two places in terms of political ideologies, standard of living, lifestyles, and basic social and human perceptions."[452] The return to their motherland became a new and risky venture for the two communities. It was not in doubt that their struggle to return was full of fear, anxiety, and uncertainty.

[450] Lee, A. "Exile and Return in Perspective of 1997" in *Reading from this Place*. Vol.2, Social Location and *Biblical Interpretation in Global Perspective*, (ed.) Segovia,F & Tolbert, M (Fortress Press,1995) pp. 97-108
[451] Ibid.
[452] Ibid., P.100

Unlike the Jews, the people of Hong Kong did not have a feeling that the return to their homeland was Yahweh's favor and Yahweh's promise for a peaceful, prosperous, and hopeful future. However, both the Jewish and Hong Kong communities lacked an enthusiastic response to the reintegration with their motherland, even though the return was considered by the Jewish exilic community as a sign of hope and of God's grace. It was even worse that Hong Kong was not physically returned to its motherland, but metaphorically returning to the mainland Chinese sovereignty. Thus, the people of Hong Kong's return to China did not involve taking a journey back to its motherland, as the exilic community in Babylon did. This meant that the people of Hong Kong were not given the choice to return to China or to remain in the British rule. If anyone did not want to be reintegrated with China, the only alternative for them was to embark on a second exile to foreign countries.

The conflicts between the returned and the left behind communities

Both the Jewish exilic community and the Chinese community in Hong Kong were deeply concerned about the integration with their motherlands and hoped for their peaceful co-existence. However, the socio-political reality told us that the hope did not easily come by. The returning exilic Jewish community encountered a situation of conflicts, quarrels, and disputes. Their hopes "for new song (Isa. 42:10), new thing (Isa.48: 20-21) and new exodus (Isa. 48:20-21) turned out to be a nightmare in Trito-Isaiah."[453]

[453] Lee, A. "Returning to China", p.163

It seemed that the social conflict was inevitable when two communities rejoined after having been separated for over seventy years. They had already developed their own lines and own cultural settings. Also, the two groups represented different interests and orientations. For example, the returnees from Babylon and the remainders in Palestine were "both claiming to be the genuine heirs of the old Israel destroyed in the massive disasters of sixth century".[454] This created a situation in which the communities were split and were bombarded every day by conflicting interpretations of the political events in relation to the power struggle between the returnees and the remainders.

It was not in doubt that conflicts between opposing factions and rival groups did exist in the post-exilic community. However, scholars have not come to a consensus in determining the identities of the different factions and the nature of the divisions.[455] Lee believes that it would be too simple to create "a sharp dichotomy between the oppressed, powerless visionaries and the priestly, powerful oppressors of hierocratics."[456] Any sufficient analysis would not overlook the dynamics between the returned minority and the left behind majority. The former presented a challenge to the existing order and the status quo defended by those who reminded in Palestine. The latter considered the

[454] Blenkinsopp, J. 'The "Servants of the Lord" in Third Isaiah: Profile of a Pietistic Group in Persian Epoch', in Robert P. Gordon (ed.) *The Place is Too Small For Us: The Israelite Prophets in Recent Scholarship* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), P. 394

[455] Morton Smith and Bernard Land Lee believed that the division of the postexilic community could be traced back to the pre-exilic "Yahweh alone movement" and the syncretists left behind in the land. Archie Lee argued that although "the majority of the people were left behind in the land and syncretistic religion was practiced, as Ezekiel's vision of the ruined temple testified (Ezk 8: 1-18), no conclusive evidence can be proven to substantiate that the division of the exilic people and the community left behind in Palestine community is to be drawn along the lines of "Yahweh alone" and "sycretist". Lee, A. "Hope and Its Interpretation in the Returning Community of Isaiah 55-56", p.5. Paul Hanson used the "contextual-typological approach" to trace the origin of the conflict between rival groups. He held the view that there existed two rival parties in the postexilic community. One was hierocratic group, which was related to the control of the official cult and the temple. The Other was the visionaries, which was associated with the disenfranchised levites that, in rejecting the position of the status quo, were excluded from taking part in the temple services at Zion. Hanson, P. *Isaiah 40-66* (Louisville: John Knox Press,1995).

[456].Lee, A. Op cit., P.5

returned community as a threat to their social stability. One reason is that the returnees sought for the re-distribution of power and the wider participation in the social structure. The Other is that they sought for "legitimization and affirmation of their exilic experience of being exposed to foreign influence and plurality of culture."[457] In addition to the cultural, political, and religious differences between the two communities after a long period of separate development, the first period of the return appeared to be marked by a rather ineffective attempt at restoration, frustrated by the lack of co-operation and the divided community.[458] For example, when the returnees began rebuilding their projects, some of the local leaders accused them of plotting to overthrow the rule of the Persians (Ne. 6:6-7). In a similar situation, Hong Kong has been faced with inner-community conflicts. As discussed before, Hong Kong was split in the transitional period. The split was between the democrats and the pro-Chinese community.[459] Lacking the mutual trust and cooperation between the two groups, the democratic reform in the transitional period was met with strong oppositions from the Chinese authorities and the pro-Chinese community. The confrontation over the democratic reform hit the confidence of Hong Kong people and delayed in building up a better society.

Resolutions: building up a shared vision and an open inclusive community

The inner community conflicts in the post-exilic period raised a question on God's promise of peace and the high hope of salvation. The hope of the returned community

[457].Lee, A. "Hope and Its Interpretation in the Returning Community of Isaiah 55-56", p.11
[458].Ackrord, P.R. *Exile and Restoration* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,1968), p.144
[459] The former advocated for a rapidly democratic reform and took a confrontation approach to China. The latter called for a gradual development of democracy and for the full cooperation with the Central authorities. In that period, Hong Kong was bombarded by different views and interpretation of the political events relating to the reintegration of China. For those who supported the rapid reform for democracy were accused of using Hong Kong as a subversion base to overthrow China or the conspiracy of Western countries which initiated a new Cold War against China.

turned into frustration and disappointment. In order to reduce the dissonance, prophets attempted to re-interprete the hope. The new age as it was understood by Haggai, Zachariah, and Isaiah could only be brought by the divine presence and blessings.[460] The divine presence was linked to the Temple because that was the place in which God chose to dwell in the midst of his people and to reveal his blessing. This implied that the rebuilding of the Temple was directly related to the people's condition. This was what the prophets explained in the delayed realization of God's blessing with the community's failure in rebuilding the Temple.[461]

The reconstruction of the Jerusalem Temple and the rebuilding of the city were considered essential steps in ensuring the fulfilment of God's promise for a better future. The re-interpretation of hope provided the vision (that is, the rebuilding of Jerusalem) for the two communities. In order to secure the fulfilment of God and to remove obstacles for the reconstruction, the leaders of two communities called for peaceful co-existence, the rule of law, and co-operation. The texts in Trito-Isaiah indicated an open liberal position to include foreigners among the people of God. Regardless, eunuchs and aliens were allowed to worship with his people (Isa.56:1-8). Also, they were permitted to be involved in rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem (Isa.60.10) and to bring their sacrifice to the Lord on the throne (Isa. 60-61). Even more, they were accepted to serve in the shrine (Isa. 65-66). The inclusion of foreigners in the cultic community was an

[460] Ackrord, P.R. *Exile and Restoration*, p.144

[461] Isaiah explained the delayed realization of salvation with the failure in the community's cultic and dietary offenses as well as their immoral behaviour (Isa. 56-59; 65). In other words, the promise of salvation would certainly arrive only if the community behaved properly, keeping Sabbath and justice (Isa. 56:1-2). This indicated that "keeping justice and maintaining righteousness are not the means for salvation, but appropriate preparation." Lee, A. "Hope and Its interpretation in the Returning Community of Isaiah 55-56", p.7

attempt to foster an open and inclusive community which could embrace plurality and promote cooperation.

The inclusion of foreigners among the Israelite people seemed to be contradictory to the position of Ezra and Nehemiah, which excluded foreigners from participation in the rebuilding of Jerusalem (Ezra 4:2-5; Neh. 3-4) and which condemned foreign marriage. Daniel Smith-Christopher believes that the options of exclusion and inclusion of foreigners among the Israelites co-existed in the post-exiled period[462]. He holds the view that "the only basis for Ezra's objection is that those he called [foreigners] were simply Jews who were not in exile."[463] He further posed the possibility that the Ezra documents "are dealing with the rise of denomination, sects within the life of the community who are vying for the title of true Jews."[464] On the whole, Archie Lee concluded that the main concern of the Ezra texts was to reveal the Jewish community in search of their postexilic identity. The profound consciousness of "us" and "them" highlighted by the Ezra passages led to "sharp enforcement and rigid maintenance of boundaries of separation through dissolution of mixed marriages."[465]

Including foreigners among Israelites in the post-exilic period was to advocate a more enlightened way of dealing with enemies and conflicts. First of all, the texts that called for the exclusion of enemies were not allowed to overshadow the Hebrew vision of

[462] Smith-Christopher, D. "Between Ezra and Isaiah: Exclusion, Transformation, and Inclusion of the [foreigner] in Post-exilic Biblical Theology" in Brett, M. G. (ed.), *Biblical Interpretation Series*, Vol.19 (New York: TSAP, 1997) P.140
[463] Ibid., P.126
[464] Smith-Chritopher, D. "Marriage to a Stranger in Ezra 9-10" in Tamara C. Eskenazi and Kent H. Richards (eds,) *Second Temple Studies 2: Temple and Community in the Persian Period* (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994) PP. 266-85
[465] Lee, p.170

peaceful co-existence and inclusion engendered by Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jonah, Ruth and Esther. Secondly, even though Nehemiah and Ezra upheld the rigid maintenance of boundaries of separation from foreign elements, they had no intention of destroying enemies or taking a bloody revenge. Rather, they pursued a lawful solution.

Summary

Several implications can be learned from the conflicts and resolutions that existed between the returned and the left behind communities in the post-exilic period. Firstly, the people of Hong Kong should be prepared for a long period of adjustment because the territory separated from the motherland for over one and a half centuries. Each has developed separately. Conflicts seem to be inevitable and are likely to continue until the two people become totally integrated. Secondly, there were different opinions with regard to the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the inclusion of foreigners within the post-exilic community. The two main options of inclusion and exclusion clearly co-existed. It is not necessary to argue that the Bible must speak with one united theological voice. Rather, different voices provide alternative ways of dealing with diversity or conflict. Thus, the view of exclusion should not be allowed to overshadow the Hebrew visions of peaceful co-existence and the possibility of including foreigners among the people of God. Trito-Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jonah, Ruth and Esther uphold an inclusive view of the community that can embrace plurality and facilitate the integrity of humanity. This is definitely part of a postcolonial vision that could sustain the community of Hong Kong.[466] Also, Nehemiah and Ezra, upholding an exclusive view, refuse to compromise with their enemies and tenaciously pursue a lawful resolution of conflicts. Their respect

[466] Ibid, 173

for the rule of law should be a guiding principle for the people of Hong Kong in dealing with diversity.

Thirdly, the reconstruction of the Jerusalem Temple and the open inclusive community is the shared vision of the post-exilic Israelites, which is an essential element to unify the divided/conflicted community together and to work together to build up a better city. In facing the antagonistic relationship between the local and the national, the people of Hong Kong need to rediscover our shared vision and to reconcile the conflicts. The successful implementation of 'One Country Two Systems' can be seen as a postcolonial vision which is shared both by the people of Hong Kong and by the mainland Chinese authority. The shared vision has the two-fold hope for 'stability and prosperity' and 'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong.' This vision is clearly stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and represents the hope of Hong Kong people to live as autonomous subjects rather than as objects or the Other of colonialism.[467] A high degree of local autonomy is expected to be integrated in Hong Kong's hybrid identity and to have a wider participation in the power structure of the SAR. Democraticization is a performing practice to realise this vision which can embrace diversity and plurality.

Finally, the struggle of the post-exilic community tells us that human works are not the means of salvation, but only a preparation for God's intervention. An appeal to divine action is the most powerful and effective way of transforming the world. This implies that the hope of the community is in upholding the power of the Word of God. The life of reliance on and commitment to God that characterized the leaders of the returnees,

[467] Ibid.

challenges the Christian churches in Hong Kong to appeal to God's intervention as we face conflicts.[468] Lee draws our attention to pluralistic views and multiple identities existing in post-exilic and post-colonial communities. To seek for reconciliation needs a vision for respecting/holding the diversity together and working together to build up a better society as a sign of God's presence and values.

7.5.2 Arnold Yeung – building up a shared identity

There are two main themes from Yeung's book of reconciliation, which are important to this thesis, but have not been discussed in the last section. Firstly, Yeung argues that reconciliation must go beyond ideological differences between Christianity and communism, because the restoration of right relations with God and with one's fellow human is a top priority in the Christian faith. Secondly, reconciliation is more than human work. It is God who initiates and fulfils reconciliation.

a) Go beyond ideological differences– recognizing a shared identity of human sinfulness

The concept of hybridity is discontent with binary opposition and cultural essentialism. It highlights differences by allowing for the co-existence of distinctive identities or narratives, and by allowing the contested identities to engage in negotiation with the differences – not to negate the Other or deny the difference, rather to make space for a new/hybridised identity to emerge. Such an inclusively defined vision of identity appears more promising to engage in this pluralistically contemporary world and to

[468].Louie, W. "Conflicts and Resolutions between the Leaders of the Returnees and the Leaders of Judah in the Persian Period," *CGST Journal* No.23, (1997): P.100

redraw the antagonistic demarcation of self and other. The hybridity bears a lot of similarities with Christian reconciliation. The first area of overlap between hybridity and Christian reconciliation is the mutuality of relationship, bringing the alienated Other together rather than exclude/negate them. Reconciliation is a sacred priority of the Christian tradition. Its origin is rooted in Christian Scriptures. Although the term reconciliation is not commonly used in the Bible (and the term is not used in the Hebrew Scriptures at all), the concepts of restoration, propitiation, and atonement are closely related.[469]

For Yeung, the origin of splitting human community does not come from ideological differences, but from human indwelling in sin which separate us from God and our fellow human. It is more than a matter of God being hostile to sin and refusing to bless our sinful life. It is just that sin creates an antagonistic environment that His righteousness and blessing are concealed from our life and the evil of sin expanding to our life – violently offending and totally depraving the right of the Other, ultimately rebelling against God and bringing divine judgment (e.g. Cain and Abel).[470] Cain represents a human viewpoint of culture that is the sinfulness of human arrogance putting oneself in antagonism to God. "Suppressing the truth in unrighteousness" (Romans 1:18) is exactly what the human condition is, in that it rejects what God has revealed and structures reality according to one's own desire.

[469] Yeung A, p.98
[470] Ibid, p.102

For Yeung, the sin of arrogance/self-centredness manifests in human history and produces a culture that is antagonistic to God and hostile to the human Other. Looking at the New Testament, Pauline writings can be seen as a main resource in the Scripture for the idea of reconciliation. Particularly, Paul's narrative on God's reconciling Jew and Gentile is highly relevant to the situation of Hong Kong and related to Yeung's concept of human sin. The arrogant Jews considered themselves as God's chosen people who enjoyed the privileges of God's promised covenant and were proud of their own righteousness/superiority among gentiles. They chose to draw boundaries that secured their culture and identities. They placed the gentiles beyond their boundaries (us versus them) and excluded the gentiles from the commonwealth of and interaction with Israel. The Jewish attitudes and actions towards the gentiles was taking the mode of binary opposition to deal with the Other: 1) demonize the Other and treat them as dangerous/unclean; 2) fear the Other by viewing the mixing with them as damaging to their holiness – either separate or eliminate them; 3) colonize the Other by treating them as inferior and worthy of discrimination; and 4) homogenize the Other and seeing all of them as non-individuals with no differences.[471]

The Jews try to construct a narrative that sustains their privileged identity and attempts to exclude the gentile from God's community. This narrative does not reflect the truth but a lie. The narrative of the lie (the demonising and condemning of the Other) gradually forms antagonistic identities between the two communities. Once the antagonistic identity was formed, reconciliation would become difficult. In reconciling the contested identity, Yeung rediscovers Paul's methodology of redeeming narrative to

[471] Some ideas are taken from Schreiter, R. *Reconciliation: Mission & Ministry in a Changing Social Order* (Maryknoll, NY:Orbis,1996) p52-53

restore truth based on the Ephesians 2:11-22 – blurring their identity boundaries and recognizing the shared/true identity. Both have a shared identity of sinners and aliens to God. Both are "Gentiles by birth and called 'uncircumcised' by those who call themselves 'the circumcision' …were separate from Christ, excluded from citizenship in Israel and foreigners to the covenants of the promise, without hope and without God in the world" (Ephesians 2:11-13, NIV). Without God's grace and Jesus' blood, both the Jews and the Gentiles will face God's wrath and punishment – "But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far away have been brought near through the blood of Christ. For he himself is our peace, who has made the two one and has destroyed the barrier, the dividing wall of hostility" (Ephesians 2:14-15, NIV). The cross and the blood of Christ bring the two alienated groups into one body. This signifies that both of them "share a common space within a common boundary. Thus, the alienation has passed away."[472]

Deconstructing the Jew's narrative of lies about the gentile and restoring the narrative of truth to the shared identity of human sinful nature are the ways to reconcile the two aliened groups (the Jews and the Gentiles) to God in one body through the death of Christ. The passage from Ephesians indicates that reconciliation goes beyond just holding two aliened groups together (simple co-existence). Instead, the antagonistic communities have to move away from the old ideology/identity and to move towards embracing the alienated Other as well as creating "one new man out of two" (a new identity of humanity) in Christ.[473] Yeung did not specify what the new humanity or the

[472] Ibid., p55

[473] "by abolishing in his flesh the law with its commandments and regulations. His purpose was to create in himself one new man out of the two, thus making peace, and in this one body to reconcile both of them to God through the cross, by which he put to death their hostility" (Ephesians 2:15-16, *NIV*).

new identity is in the local context of Hong Kong. Perhaps, he leaves it open to the imagination of readers, but he opens up a theme for us to explore in the area of Christian ethics.

Yeung's argument helps us realise that the source of forming an antagonistic identity does not come from the ideological difference between autocratic communism and democratic capitalism, but from the arrogance of human sinful nature putting oneself in self-righteousness (our culture is good and civilised) and the Other in wickedness (their culture is bad and evil). The narrative of generalizing and demonising the Other is the main barrier obstructing the local and the national community from joining together. For Yeung, both the ruler (the Chinese authority) and the ruled (the people of Hong Kong) have a shared/sinful identity and a potential to become demon-suppressing or depriving the right of the Other. As we discussed before, the humanistic rhetoric of the colonial or imperial projects revealed the hypocrisy of the Western ideals. The universal human rights were largely confined to the White, the powerful, the rich, and the masculine. Even the liberation theologians claims to identify with the marginalized, but they unconsciously reuses the Euro-centric method (binary opposition) of totalising their values or ideology to suppress the voices of diversity/hybridity. Also, the binary opposition approach in liberation theology falls into oversimplication of moral dualism by the principles of equality and loyalty towards the particular groups are absolutised in an unbalanced way. Recognizing our shared identity of arrogance and bias helps change our understanding of the take-it-for-granted narrative and opens up new possibilities for the reinterpretation of our context. These new possibilities are fundamental for the new relations.

b) Go beyond human work – recover the shared identity of the image of God (new humanity)

Recognizing human sinfulness can easily fall into the anxiety of human inability in managing the process of reconciliation. Yeung shares this feeling and strongly believes that reconciliation is not human work, but initiated by God and done by the death of Jesus Christ.[474] He quotes the following two texts from Romans and 2 Corinthians to support their belief.

> For if, while we were God's enemies, we were reconciled to him through the death of his Son, how much more, having been reconciled, shall we be saved through his life! Not only is this so, but we also boast in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have now received reconciliation. (Romans 5:10-11); All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ and gave us the ministry of reconciliation: [19] that God was reconciling the world to himself in Christ, not counting people's sins against them. And he has committed to us the message of reconciliation. (2 Cor.: 18-19)

The belief of human sinful nature and inability in managing reconciling process has long been recognised in the Western church, particularly after Augustine of Hippo, a Doctor of the Christian church.[475] He points out the fallen nature of this Earthly city, where humanity lusts for domination as well as power.[476] Conflicts are not often overcome through consensus and true justice cannot be fully realised in this temporary and sinful world. In his book "The City of God", Augustine indicates that the hybrid

[474] Yeung, A. p117
[475] *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, St. Augustine of Hippo, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02084a.htm
[476] Augustine believes that the *libido dominandi* is at the very heart of the city of this world, "a city which aims at domination, which holds nations in enslavement, but is itself dominated by that very lust of domination." St. Augustine, *Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans* (hereafter City of God), preface, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1972). Found in Kristen Deede Johnson, *Political Theory, and Pluralism: Beyond Tolerance and Difference*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p.142

identities of Christian churches are facing the dilemma of being citizens of the fallen nature of the Earthly city and of the perfect nature of the Heavenly city. The former is shaped by the love of self, even to the contempt of God, while the latter is shaped by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The two cities created by two kinds of love have developed two different effects. The love of self produces the desire for pride and power to dominate the Other for its own sakes. This will hold the Earthly city in enslavement.[477] The love of God creates humanity leading to dependence on God and the Others. Christians are on a pilgrimage to the Heavenly city and share God's love of emphasizing justice over power and humility over pride. For Augustine, power can be abused when it is being used for the end of self-interest rather than for the greater good of justice.[478] In other words, the primary concern of being a citizen of the Heavenly city is to prioritise justice over power.

Christians are on the pilgrimage to the Heavenly city, but remain part of the Earthly city. Thus, Christians have to acknowledge the limitations of this 'human city', where the true justice, peace, and order cannot be fully realised – power can often be placed over justice. Augustine recognises the hybrid identity of Christian churches and the complexity of the Earthly city. He indicates that justice is not the only substance to take priority over and transform the common understanding of power. He uses the event of Jesus' interacting with the adulterous woman to illustrate that truth, love, and justice belong together and are embodied together in Jesus' pastoral ministry to transform the corrupted power. In that event, Jesus spoke the truth that all humans are sinful – he won recognition; his gentleness and love did not offend his enemies – he won the praise.

[477] City of God I, preface
[478] City of God I, preface – power of humility

"[H]is enemies, then were tormented by spite and hatred because of these two, his truth and his gentleness, and they put a stumbling-block in the path of the third, his justice."[479] Augustine recognises reconciliation having an eschatological character which designates, in its fullness, a perfectly redeemed creation, a vision only wholly fulfilled when the Heavenly city comes. In this present human city, Christian churches have to accept the inability of humans to transform the corrupted power and reconcile the sinful world.

Although reconciliation goes beyond human capacity to initiate and achieve, the Bible never denies the role of humans in the process. Robert Schreiter indicates that humans can "discover it already active in God through Christ."[480] God takes the lead in overcoming the enmity by identifying Himself with the victims and gives courage/strength to the victims to challenge the oppressor. Romans 5:8-9 make this point clear: "But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us. Since we have now been justified by his blood, how much more shall we be saved from God's wrath through him!" Our sin makes God angry. In this sense, the offer of reconciliation is given to us due to God's mercy and his deep feeling of enmity up to the point of wrath. Schreiter's concept of humans discovering God's mercy and wrath to our sins reverses the traditional understanding of reconciliation – the oppressor should repent and seek forgiveness. For him, reconciliation is the Other way around. "We discover and experience God's forgiveness of our trespasses, and this prompts us to repentance. In the reconciliation process, then,

[479] "Commentary on the gospel of John,33" 419/421, in *Augustine: Political Writing*, p. 103 in Reading from Johnson, Kristen Deede. *Theology, Political Theory, and Pluralism: Beyond Tolerance and Difference*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2007, 164

[480] I am indebted to Robert Screiter's book on reconciliation, especially, his Pauline writings' review, *Reconciliation: Mission & Ministry in a Changing Social Order* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1996) p.43

because the victim has been brought by God's reconciling grace to forgive the tormentor, the tormentor is prompted to repent of evildoing and to engage in rebuilding his or her own humanity."[481] Schreiter goes further to indicates that the proper subject of reconciliation is the victim who is the one who needs to initiate the process. The object of reconciliation is not the evil practice, but the humanity of the practice's oppressor. The victim rediscovers one's own humanity and accepts in faith God's offer of humanity.[482] This is the victim to offer humanity to the oppressor in God's grace. For Schreiter, to punish the oppressor's wrongdoing does not often happen and does not guarantee repentance. The new narrative that overcomes the narrative of the lie (justifying the oppressor's wrong-doing) is participating in the passion (an act of deep solidarity with suffering humanity), death (wrath/resistant against injustice), and resurrection of Jesus Christ (the hope of reconciling the world in Christ).[483] Schreiter's concept of reconciliation is more a spirituality rather than a strategy.

Both Augustine and Schreiter highlight the sinful nature of human beings and their inability to reconcile this world. They overlook the Other side of human character which is created in the image of God (the existence and the role of original righteousness).[484] From this perspective, humans also have the potential to exercise a conscience, the ability to understand, discern, and implement moral values such as freedom, equality and love. The concept of God's image in humans provides a less pessimistic view about human ability to pursue the common good for the Other and the

[481] Ibid, p. 45
[482] For Schreiter, humanity refers to human dignity - a sense of safety and self-hood. In other words, people have the right to construct their own narratives of self-identity in a secured/safe space. Ibid., pp33-35
[483] Ibid., pp60-61
[484] Baker, R.C. *The Hybrid Church in the City: Third Space Thinking* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007) p.92

community at large. This is a recognition of the fundamental and inalienable human dignity of every person on the basis of being created in the image of God.

If we believe that humans have a hybridised character which has the potential to do good and to do evil, our shared identity is no longer antagonistic but interdependent. We work together to maximize our humanity (God's image of righteousness) and minimize our arrogance (human sinfulness of self-righteousness). The object of evil is not in persons (the mainland Chinese authority or those who are supporting the status quo), but in the narrative framework which construct the evil structure or the vicious circle. As mentioned above, the mainland Chinese authority is not totally evil and many of them had been victims of the Cultural Revolution. They recognise the two systems between Hong Kong and mainland. The policy of 'one country two systems' is creation of the Third Space hybridity to resolve the differences. Both the local and the national have the shared vision to make it succeed – the conflict is only on the narrative of the way, pace, and time. Antagonistic narrative is not the way to resolve our conflict.

7.5.3 The limitations of Lee's and Yeung's arguments

Both Lee and Yeung attempt to locate the Hong Kong context in the dialogue within the Christian tradition of reconciliation. Lee's biblical interpretation appears more adequate to put the local context and the Hebrew's text into dialogue and to construct a counter-narrative of shared vision (building up the Temple or the better society) against the antagonistic practice between the returned and the motherland communities. Perhaps, the focus of his article is on the shared vision. Several issues related to reconciliation

have not been discussed adequately and even mentioned entirely, such as the power relations, the ethics of difference, and the role of the human in reconciliation. Yeung's book provides a more comprehensive discussion on reconciliation, particular on building up a shared identity. However, he does not relate the biblical findings to the particular situation of Hong Kong.

Both of them did not adequately discuss the transforming practice which not only produces a gap between theory and practice, but also remains staying at the intermediate stage of the pastoral circle (dialogue between context and text). The final stage is needed to provide a guiding action which includes decision-making and an expectation of delivering a desirable outcome of transforming the situation of Hong Kong. The action to choosing a right model or mode in response to the need of the local requires a process of theological reflection based on attending to the Christian churches' dialogue with different sources of information. Christian ethics are the basic criteria of making right decisions and judgments. However, both Lee and Yeung[485] did not further explore how to make a decision in choosing different modes and how to handle the different views of Christian ethics. In the next section, I will focus on putting the above findings into decision and practice – moving toward a Third Space hybridised church.

[485] Yeung did mention in his book that to pursue the right relation with God and fellow Other requires moral justice – without justice, there is no reconciliation. For him, the conflicts between the church and the state are often unavoidable due to the contested values. The Christian church is a worshipping and everlasting community, neither giving up its faith/belief in order to survive in particular political ideology nor reducing the gospel/salvation to particular a political movement. Yeung, P.85

7.6 Transformative Practice – Moving Toward a Third Space Hybridised Church based on the theology of reconciliation

As discussed in the Chapter of Methodology consideration, transformative practice in practical theology is the final stage of drawing the insights from the interaction among information (Christian tradition and scripture; contemporary experience and culture) to develop principles to guide Christian practice in response to the challenges of the concrete situation. In other words, transformative practice is not an abstract series of philosophical propositions, but a performative discipline where the faithful-community (Christian churches) collectively and publicly actualise Christian visions and values in the particular situation. This involves the ability to generate alternatives, to choose among the partial solutions, and to develop an appropriate strategy.

Looking at the particular situation of HKSAR, we can realise that there are different ways of interpreting reconciliation. For the Chinese authority, reconciliation means to reunify Hong Kong under the policy of "one country, two systems", allowing two distinct (even antagonistic) systems or cultures to peacefully co-exist. This is a political reconciliation, managing in the macro level of society and dealing with issues of re-establishing order and governance and justice.[486] Although the political level of reconciliation has already emerged, the twin forces of cultural narratives (the assimilative drive toward integration and the competitive drive of the diverse) on identity remain unresolved. As a result, the antagonistic identity has gradually been constructed, destroying the authenticity of unity with diversity and the democratic way of negotiating differences. The antagonistic identity not only escalates the tension

[486] Clegg, C. "Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in North Ireland" in Kim, Sebastian C. H., Pauline Kollontai, and Greg Hoyland. *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.

between the local and the national relationship, but also tears the society apart. For the purposes of this thesis, the reconciliation will be focusing on societal and cultural reconciliation. Societal reconciliation is about "managing the group to group level of society. It focuses on people, in their corporate aspect, learning to share … a contested space and is more concerned with relationship than with justice per se."[487] The purpose of societal reconciliation is to re-establish the disconnected or restore the broken relationships between groups to groups. Culture is a way of life of Hong Kong people --- the behaviours, beliefs, values, and symbols that they accept, generally without critically thinking about them, and that are passed along by narration and imitation from one generation to the next.[488] Culture and identity are closely related. A community forms an identity based on integrating their life experiences/culture into an internalised, evolving story of the Self and the Other, which provides the community with a sense of unity and belonging. The distorted narrative of the Self (superiority and narrowed self-identity) and the negative narrative of the Other (inferiority and the threatening Other) would create a dominant cultural narrative of prejudice, suspicion, and fear of the Other. No space will be created for receiving the Other and no readjustment will be achieved in light of the differences of the Other. Cultural reconciliation is to reconstruct the narrative of the shared/hybrid identity (dilute the two distinct identities) and allow a Third Space to emerge to reconcile the twin forces of cultural narratives.

7.6.1 Reconstructing church narrative framework

Having identified the relationship between hybridity and reconciliation, the research move to explore the guiding principles for us to actualise God's vision in our concrete

[487] Ibid., p.83
[488] *Culture Definition* http://www.tamu.edu/faculty/choudhury/culture.html, 9 Sept.2013

situation. The transforming practice in choosing the mode of hybridity as a vehicle to reconcile the antagonistic identities should be built on two guiding principles developed from the triune God's embodiment of reconciliation in the world and the speculation about the future of China's attitude towards HKSAR based on the analysis of the particular situation.

Based on the vision and mission of the Triune God

God the Father had a vision of reconciling to "himself all things whether on earth or in heaven" (Col. 1:20) and sent his Son of Jesus Christ to incarnate the vision into the world by breaking the Self in order to make space for receiving the Other (the sinner) into divine communion. His Son sent his disciples (the Church) to continue this mission in cooperation with the Holy Spirit. Christian churches as a faith-community are called to participate in God's vision and mission building up a reconciled community in a divided society in the following way: 1) re-visioning the church's mission be the witness/sign to God's bringing to being a reconciled human community across all that divide us; 2) breaking the Self (like Jesus' sacrifice) to make space for receiving the Other into the divine community and to readjust our identity in light of the difference of the Other; 3) creating a multi-voiced community in the operation of the Holy Spirit; 4) reconciliation is a process in which has its origin, continuing, and fulfilment in the life of the triune God. Human beings have the part of discovering the vision and the responsibility to continue the mission in a process of non-final reconciliation. In the

transition to the final reconciliation, Christian churches have to be focused more on restoring broken relationships rather than justice per se. To restore justice could not ignore a transitional process, demanding to strike the balance between peace and justice. It is often that transitional justice processes require negotiations among contested parties. The prerequisite of these negotiations demands a consensus that is satisfactory enough for all parties concerned, in such a way that they are willing to work together to break the vicious cycle of injustice or mutual enmity. Recognising the hybrid situation in seeking reconciliation (having already begun, but not yet completed), Christian churches have to be patient in handling the transitional injustice, and to be positive in envisioning a shared future of building up a reconciled community in the divided context. Basically, reconciliation is more concerned about the future.

Based on a reasonably optimistic scenario

Based on the socio-political analysis in the previous Chapters, the writer argues that China is not an unchanged object (try not to essentialise the Other) and has become more capitalistically-oriented, diluting the features of the communist dictatorship and bluring the distinct identities between the communist China and the capitalist HKSAR. In order to be involve in the global market, China is so willing to compromise its socio-economic structure to fit in the transnational governing structure of global capitalism. The compromise might undermine the autonomy and weaken China's domination within the mainland and HKSAR. China's openness and readjustment to the international governing structure would help ensure actualisation of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law guarantee that Hong Kong can maintain its capitalist systems and develop a democratic government within fifty years. More importantly,

the original plan or policy of "one country, two systems" was designed as a vehicle for the reunification with Taiwan. As Taiwan has already developed a democratic government, the writer finds it hard to believe that China would violate the Hong Kong Basic Law that "guarantees democracy"[489] and give Taiwan further excuse for rejecting the policy of "one country, two systems" as a means of reunification. In fact, the central government has not only publicly declared its support for HKSAR to develop a democratic system[490], but it has also allowed HKSAR to put the democratic system into practice in accordance with the basic law.[491] Based on the above analysis, both the Chinese authority and the people of HSAR have a shared vision to make the policy of "one country, two systems" succeed, building up a system of democratic capitalism within the territory of China. Trusting the sincere promise of the central government in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law, the writer develops a reasonably optimistic scenario to reconstruct the narrative of reconciliation, an indispensable partner (the central government and the people of Hong Kong) to build up a democratic HKSAR. Blurring the identities of the oppressor (the Chinese authority) and the oppressed (the people of Hong Kong) can avoid demonizing the Other and help make space for receiving the Other into the Self as a partner making contribution to the process of nation-reunification.

[489] According to the Basic Law (Article 45), taking forward the HKSAR's constitutional development towards the ultimate aim of attaining universal suffrage is the most important constitutional responsibility for the Chief Executive. *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administration Religion and of the People's Republic of China*, p.15

[490] Wu Bangguo, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, delivers a speech during the seminar marking the 10th anniversary of implementing the Basic Law in Beijing June 6, 2007, Zhu Zhe "HK Basic Law 'guarantees democracy'" *China Daily*, 9 February, 2014

[491] Since the reunification, the HKSAR has made gradual progress in democracy - the number of members in the Election Committee, which elects the chief executive, has grown from 400 to 800; and they are from different social strata and sectors. In the Legislative Council, the number of directly elected seats has also increased from one-third in the first term to half in the third term. Zhu Zhe "HK Basic Law 'guarantees democracy'" *China Daily*, 9 February, 2014

Re-vision of the church's mission – developing a vision of reconciled community

In facing the antagonistic division, Hong Kong Christian churches are losing their role model and lacking a vision to contribute to the perpetuated suspicion and fear of the threatening Other (the Chinese authority and mainlander) in a process of reintegration with its motherland. Although Christian churches have its tradition and responsibility to be a minister of reconciliation, we cannot automatically assume that it has a mediating role between the central government and the people of Hong Kong due to the fact that Christian churches are also a contributing factor to the division. As discussed in the above, Christian churches are a microcosm of society, where the lines dividing society run right through the centre of the Christian churches. The contested views on church-state relations deeply destabilises the unity of the Christian churches and hinders Hong Kong Christian churches from working together to transform the antagonistic culture. Also, Hong Kong mainline churches have a tradition of collaboration with the British colonial government in serving the need of the masses. This is so different from liberation churches (e.g. South Korean Minjung, Taiwan Presbyterian, Latin American, South African, and Philippine Churches) which have already earned their rights to exercise a ministry of reconciliation, because they stood by the people against the coloniser or military regime throughout the struggle and now can be agents of reconciliation. Although the collaborative mode did make a significant contribution to the successful story of colonial Hong Kong (refer to Chapter Four), the binary oppositional ideology of the Eurocentric modernism and the Cold War has been deeply embedded in the narrative framework of Hong Kong culture – the label of "unholy alliance" with the coloniser cannot be easily taken away from the internal and external narrative on mainline churches. My first concern of Christian performative practice is not to transform the structures of society into a better correspondence to the Kingdom

of God. Rather, it is to reform the cultural values/vision of the Christian churches which conforms to Christ's coming Kingdom. Some theologians believe that "the kingdom of God must first be actualised within the Christian churches before it can have a significant impact in the world."[492] The disunity of Hong Kong Christian churches has lost its identity as the "forerunner of society" (a sign of reconciliation), but reduced its role to "a mirror of society" (a reflection of the divisive society). This implies that the Christian churches not only fail to put the Christian ideal of reconciliation into a transforming practice, but they also feed social division and injustice.

Reconciliation and unity is a gift of grace and a mandate of God. It is a grace that God himself initiates and fulfils the process of reconciliation with us through Christ. It is a mandate that believers are invited to accept/celebrate this grace, and are called to put it into practice to become reconciled with one another. To embody the grace and the mandate does not mean that Christian churches have to strive for unity in sameness or unity in uniformity. Rather, they have to reconstruct their vision and structure, in the identity of Third Space hybridity, through which a unity in diversity, mutuality, and communion is recognised. This requires a cultural shift from thinking of "them and us" to "us and us." It is a blessing that the Hong Kong Christian Council (HKCC) has already committed to embodying God's vision to reconcile the divisions among Christian denominations and constructing a hybrid character in order to connect/reconnect different Christian groups.

[492] Ng, K.W. *From Christ to Social Practice* (Hong Kong: Alliance Bible Seminary, 1996) P.175

Being a sign or role model of reconciled community in the society

HKCC was founded in 1954 as an ecumenical body of churches (including mainline churches and evangelical churches), para-church organisations, and Christian institutions. It has a vision aimed at reconciling various denominations both on local and global levels by overcoming historical divisions and embracing doctrinal/liturgical differences. In practice, HKCC does provide a hybridised space for different denominations or para-church organisations/institutions to receive the differences of the Other, to negotiate the differences, and to work together to resist injustice as well as to bring reconciliation to the broken society. Within HKCC's structure, there is the Church Unity and Relations Committee, which fosters a spirit of unity among churches in Hong Kong and promoting mutual harmony with other faiths.[493] Apart from responding to the "Week of prayer for Christian Unity" promoted by the WCC, HKCC have regular activities in HKSAR such as, "the Joint Ecumenical Communion Service, Unity Gatherings, Joint Statement (issued by this Committee and the Hong Kong Catholic Diocesan Ecumenical Commission), Unity Sunday (to promote the exchange of pulpits) etc."[494]

The Joint Ecumenical Communion Service can be considered "a visible sign of church unity in Hong Kong ... promoting the spirit and work of the ecumenical movement."[495] It deserves further exploration because it can be seen as a ritual and a vehicle for

[493] Church Unity and Relations : the Church Unity and Relations Committee http://www.hkcc.org.hk/acms/content.asp?site=hkcc&op=showbycode&code=Ministries-Unity, 5 Nov.2012

[494] The Movement of Church Unity.

[495] *Mission of The Hong Kong Christian Council*, http://www.hkcc.org.hk/acms/Default.asp, 1December, 2013

actualising the ethics of hybridity (inclusive, dignity, and holy) and for reconstructing the narrative of the Other as brotherhood rather than threatening the Other.

A communal meal is created by God, who is the one triune God - Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are different, but one. The truth is that communion is not done by human work but is given by the Father through His Son's incarnation, death on the cross and the resurrection.[496] For those who are baptised in the name of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are invited to take part in the communion. Participation in the communion symbolises, confirms, and celebrates the Christian's unification with the triune God. In breaking the bread during the Holy Communion, the celebrant would say "we break this bread to share in the body of Christ" while the people reply "Though we are many, we are one body, because we all share in one bread."[497] The quotation highlights that God reconciles humankind - in vertical dimension (God and human) and horizontal dimension (human and their fellows).

Communion is our faith rested on the gifts (grace) of God for the people of God. Even though small children cannot express their faith, they are welcome to join the Holy communion. Faith is not a condition, but a fruit of God's redemption. In this regard, good works are not the basis for inclusion, but inclusion has its fruit of good works. Those who are exposed to the unconditional love, inclusion, and acceptance, they would not remain unchanged, but would be transformed so that "they can increasingly

[496] Avis, P. *Reshaping Ecumenical Theology: The Church Made Whol*e (London: T & T Clark International, 2010) p.151
[497] Hong Kong Sheng Kung Hui, *The Holy Eucharist: Rite Two* (Hong Kong: Wen Lin Publisher Limited, 2000) p.22

conform to Jesus Christ."[498] Unconditional love and acceptance do mean that God's grace is free. Communion also proclaims our union with the historical Jesus, participating in His incarnation, death, resurrection, and ascension into heaven. We are incorporated into his communion involving obligations – "to strive to enter into communion with one's fellow Christians, to continue in communion with them, and if necessary, to fight to maintain communion."[499] Every effort has to be made to maintain communion and make it as visible as possible.

The joint ecumenical communion service has significance for our narrative about Christian identity. It affirms the hybrid identity of Christian churches. We are one body, but have a diversity of members. The unity in diversity has significant features: the differences of tradition, ideology, and practice are not only tolerated, but also appreciated. The hybridised identity paves the way "for Christian denominations to live in a unity and catholicity that comes to expression in ecumenicity through particularity."[500] This helps maximise one's own identity of a particularly denomination (I am more than Anglican, Presbyterian, or Methodist) and minimise the divisiveness of denominationalism. Communion helps us live with paradoxality. Although we are sinners, we do not deserve to be incorporated in God's covenant. However, communion and reconciliation are initiated and completed by the triune God. This is the fruit of God's redemption and the gift of God's grace. Whenever we receive His grace, we become the justified ones. Although receiving God's grace does not require our good

498 Koopman, N. "Faith & Hybridity in Contemporary South Africa," http://www.soliustitiae.co.za/insights/2012/02/15/faith-and-hybridity-in-contemporary-south-africa/ 15 Feb., 2012

499 Avis, P. *Reshaping Ecumenical Theology: The Church Made Whole* (London: T & T Clark International, 2010) pp.152-153

500 Koopman, N. "Faith & Hybridity in Contemporary South Africa."

works, interacting with God's unconditional love and acceptance would increase our obligations to change to conform to the historical Jesus' practice. These paradoxes are not real contradiction, but permeate in the theology of communion and human existence.

The embodiment of unity with diversity within the mechanism of Christian churches can be seen as a role model for the divided society, giving them the confidence that Christian churches have the ability to handle differences and negotiate plurality. Also, it helps to rediscover Christian brotherhood identity among members of different Christian communities, which no longer consider each other as enemies or competitors but as brothers and sisters in Christ in the journey towards full communion. This can provide a safe space for the various denominations, holding different approaches to resist Beijing's assimilation (collaboration, binary opposition, or reconciliation), to express their views freely without being negatively labelled (e.g. "unholy alliance"). Recognising/respecting the differences does not mean indifferent to the Other. Engaging in dialogue presupposes denominations having a clear understanding of their own identity and prospective. Thus, they can enter into a meaningful dialogue and be enriched from each other. Safe space provided by Christian churches means here that each one or group feels respected and heard. Their unique contributions can be recognized and be used to build up a reconciled community in HKSAR. This is similar to the post-exilic Jewish community working together to build up the Jerusalem Temple (an inclusive community) shining upon the nation.

Being an instrument for reconciling with other faiths

In God's plan, Christian churches are called not just to be a sign of visible unity of the church in one faith and one Eucharistic fellowship, but also to be an instrument for the unity of humankind, breaking down barriers between people. To build up a reconciled community in HKSAR relies not just on a minority of Christians (around 10 percent of total HKSAR population)[501], but on the Church with greater openness to other faiths (the population of other religions are up to forty percent, including 1.5 million Buddhists and 1 million Taoists).[502] Moltmann favors the ecumenical movement within churches and the development of "relationships with partners in history who are not the church and will never become the church."[503] He claims that "the true church is one and indivisible."[504] The unity of the church is not only for the sake of its inner wholeness, but also a testimony of peace to the world. Moreover, he believes that "the friendship of Christ should be inclusive enough to lead the church to adopt a solidarity with people different from itself."[505] Moltmann does not ignore the conflicts and differences among denominations. Instead, he takes them seriously and adopts a conciliatory approach that is to seek for dialogue and co-operation.[506] Moltmann's call for an inclusive community does not mean that the church should give up its integrity. Rather, the church should have a genuine desire to search for the true church and develop a creative way to deal with conflicts.

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[501] Census and Statistic Department, HKSAR. Hong Kong population, 7,187,500 http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20.jsp 15 Nov.,2013
[502] Religion in Hong Kong (2010) http://pediaview.com/openpedia/Religion_in_Hong_Kong15 Nov.2013
[503] Moltmann, J. *The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit*, P.134
[504] Ibid., P.12
[505] Ng, K. W. *From Christ to Social Practice*, P.179
[506] Moltmann, J. *The Church in the Power of the Holy Spirit*, P.14

HKCC recognises the importance of reconciling with other faiths and has developed a ministry to other religions - joining together with the Hong Kong Buddhist Association, the Diocese of Hong Kong Catholic Church, the Confucian Academy, the Chinese Muslim Cultural & Fraternal Association and the Hong Kong Taoist Association to form the "Colloquium of Six Religious Leaders" (the Six Religions) in 1978. The religious leaders have regular activities, "such as: two meetings held during the year; celebration of the Chinese New Year and delivering the New Year's message to the public; sponsoring inter-faith dialogue and visitation to other sectors. Also, there is response to social issues when necessary." [507]

Reconciling the various denominations and promoting inter-faith cooperation has contributed to both unity and division. Many fundamentalist and evangelical churches have considered "ecumenism as a negative term, equivalent to syncretism, doctrinal relativism and indifferentism."[508] Some of them have a reservation to accept Roman Catholicism as an ecumenical member and working alongside with other religions. Many evangelical churches find that HKCC's narrative on socio-political stand is too binary (refer to p.225) and could not reflect their narrative of "collaboration and reconciliation." This is the reason why fifteen evangelical leaders, in 2014, presented their mission statement "Reconciliation and Reconstruction" in secular newspapers rather than in HKCC's newsletter (refer to p.227). In the HKSAR, there is another Christian ecumenical institution called the Hong Kong Chinese Christian Churches Union (HKCCCU). Its memberships are exclusively for Protestant churches, excluding

[507] HKCC: *Relationship with other Religions*
http://www.hkcc.org.hk/acms/content.asp?site=hkcc&op=showbycode&code=Ministries-Unity
[508] Kasper, Walter, **"**The ecumenical movement in the 21st century" in *World Council of Churches* http://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-commissions/joint-working-group-between-the-roman-catholic-church-and-the-wcc/the-ecumenical-movement-in-the-21st-century. 18 Nov.,2013

Catholic churches and para-church organisations. Its vision is focussed on evangelism and inter-denominational cooperation on social, medical, and education services.[509] In comparison with HKCC, HKCCCU have more than ten denominations joining its membership, such as Baptists, Pentecostals, Evangelical Free Church of China, Chinese and Missionary Alliance, Hong Kong Ling Liang Church, and etc.[510] This reflects that moving towards a Third Space hybridised church needs to be careful to the ambivalent relationship between ecumenism and reconciliation - unity and division.

Ecumenical dialogue/cooperation not only gains knowledge of the different Other, but also form bonds of inter-denominational and interreligious solidarity against the hijacking of religion to legitimate the meta-narrative of a particular belief or truth. The history of the ecumenical movement shows the misuse of religion, particularly, Christianity, as an instrument to expand imperialism and to justify colonialism – "a providence of God to take the good news to the so-called heathen world."[511] The crusades and colonisation expanded Christianity by means of violence and military might. In colonial period, the understanding of mission was of mass evangelisation - engaging in denominational expansion rather than God's mission. Success in mission has been measured by the number of conversions and churches planted. The interpretation of mission is exclusive. They have never acknowledged God's revelation in other religions (claiming Christianity to hold the absolute Truth) and have demonised other religious expressions of resistance to the absolute power of their God and the supremacy of their belief.

[509] The front page of the Hong Kong Chinese Christian Churches Union http://www.hkcccu.org.hk/about1.htm, 1 December, 2013
[510] The Hong Kong Chinese Christian Churches Union, *Membership list* (Hong Kong: HKCCCU, 2014).
[511] Longchar, A. Wati, "The Ecumenical Movement in Asia:A Theological Reflection" *CTC Bulletin*, Vol. xxii No.3 December 2006, p.49

In facing the abuse of using religion to legitimise imperialism and to demonise other religions as well as other cultures, the ecumenical movement in Asia calls for a new paradigm of Ecumenism, reverting the imperial theology (Christian values supporting the ruler and oppressor) to servanthood liberation praxis (empowering the ruled and the oppressed) - turning Jesus from the King to suffering servant, from the ruler to the ruled, from the oppressor to the oppressed. The narrative framework of the ecumenical movement in Asia was built on binary opposition, reverting the oppressed object to the subject resisting against the empire for the liberation of the oppressed.[512] This is inadequate to promote reconciliation. The writer proposes to call for a new paradigm of ecumenism of de-centring of Selves.

The major obstacles for a healthy way of dealing with the religious difference is the pervasive habit of thought shaped by the Enlightenment and modernism – the human self of a particular group (Western culture) "the Self is autonomous, self-contained, integral , self sufficient, often monologically defined."[513] Within Christian theology, the triune God was conceived as a relational Other (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit within Himself). Jesus Christ incarnated and broke himself in order to receive the Other into his divine communion (the triune Self). When the Holy Spirit came upon the disciples in the story of Pentecost, they were dispersed and their collective existence was de-

[512] Ibid.p.53
[513] For example, Aristotle's understanding of individuals as independent, unchanging, and enduring subjects, found in Duraisingh, p.191

centred. The Holy Spirit was "set against the disciples' earlier question of the kingdom of Israel will be restored and their identity would be affirmed."[514]

Self-centre or self-sufficiency is characterised by a search for a single meta-narrative. Inter-faith dialogue and cooperation prerequisite for nurturing a sense of their selves as an act of God's grace and a gift of the Other. We embrace and celebrate the Other as the one who contributes to their becoming. This is the societal way of reconciliation, connecting with other groups that one comes to be and has fuller life. My Self is connective.[515]

In a dialogical context across difference, the temptation is to search for quick agreement and superficial consensus. This is so easy to fall into the desire for one system and one truth, suppressing human diversity and differences. Such an inter-faith border crossing is costly and risky, because we would be facing resistance and binary opposition. Border crossing calls us into a liminal space, encountering challenges, ambiguity, uncertainty, diversity and paradoxity. This is reconciling pathway leading to a vision of life in its fullness and into all truth.

Truth is shared not in propositional narratives, but a variety of stories in the life of the Holy Spirit. The will to listen to the Other's stories could create a space for multi-voiced community. Cultural narrative is story-based and can be seen as a transformative

514 Duraisingh , p.190
515 Ibid.,193

practice of empowerment and community building. Carol Gilligan's ground-breaking text on moral development of women, points out the power of narrative/story-telling as follows:

> Indeed, when I understand truth as story, I am more likely to be open to other people's truth stories. As I listen to other stories, I am invited to move out the subjectivity of my own story into another realm of thinking and acting. The same is true for others when I tell my story…Indeed it is only when we refuse to listen to another story that our own story becomes ideological that is closed system, incapable of hearing the truth. [516]

Inter-faith dialogue helps us to be aware of the tension with what the Other has affirmed as God being present in and at work in people of other faith. We have to appreciate the tension and to not attempt to resolve it easily. Inter-faith dialogue contain a character of hybridity which can be seen as an instrument to reconnect different groups, to build up mutual understanding as well as trust, and to make it possible to share in service to the community. The ultimate aim of a hybridized church is to establish the kingdom of God on earth and to reconcile human kinds. To embody this vision has to be materialized through the cooperation between Christians and non-Christians in the promotion of social peace.

7.6.2 Reframe the narrative of the historical past

The Hong Kong Christian Council as an ecumenical agent could use our Christian reconciling vision and Holy Communion (unity in diversity) symbol as a collective behaviour which relates and incorporates various denominations and interfaith

[516] Cone, J. *God of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975) p.103

organisations into the larger group and expresses a shared identity. Durkheim, the classical sociologist, presents that religion provides a society with a basis of moral cohesion, because religion can give people a sense of higher purpose to their existence when they are in crisis.[517] Religion could even contribute to a substantial social change, subverting or transforming military regimes, as discussed in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan. Also, religion can serve as a mediator between the contested groups with the aim of creating mutual respect, by providing a new narrative framework of meaning and for action. When the narrative framework of reconciliation is presented as the vision of God, it will give a directive for the believers to live with. If the religious narrative framework is closed, it will affect the believers' response to potential and actual conflicts.[518] For this reason, HKCC could use its existing platform to reconnect all religious leaders, theologians, and parachurch organisations to express our reconciling vision. In fact, the Six Religious leaders did have a joint Lunar New Year Message, appealing to the people of Hong Kong to fully exercise one's own religious beliefs, by putting aside political ideologies and other differences for the sake of peace and helping to build a reconciling society.[519]

The lunar New Year Message did express the will to building up a reconciling society, but the content did not mention any specific direction or action. The research holds the view that the construction of antagonistic identity between the local and the national is

[517] Durkheim, E. *Elementary Forms of Religions Life* (New York,1965) p.22

[518] Kollontai, P. "Religion as a Tool for Waging Peace: Theoretical Perspective in the Context of Bosnia-Herzegovina" in Kim, S. C. H., ed. *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2008.,p65

[519] The six leaders from Hong Kong Christian Council, Hong Kong Confucian Academy, The Chinese Muslims Cultural & Fraternal Association, Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, The Hong Kong Taoist Association, and The Hong Kong Buddhist Association. Found in Hong Kong Joint Secretariat for Colloquium of Religious Leaders. http://www.crs.cuhk.edu.hk/csrlhk/files/D021.pdf on 9 November,2013

mainly due to the fear and suspicion of the Chinese authorities, built on the negative memories of communist autocratic rule in the past. Many modern theologians and scholars (such as Robert Scheiter and Roland Bleiker) believe that history or national memory is one essential variable that can be used either as a negative tool for transfixing antagonistic identities or as a positive means for finding an alternative present or future – to shape the process of reconciliation from enmity to amity. The passage of time adds an additional burden to the process of reconciliation, because Hong Kong has been separated from its motherland over 150 years, much longer than Korea and Taiwan (both around 60 years), and in particular, the local born Hong Kongese or the younger generation have received education outside China. History can be a shadow that the fear of the Other might repeat history. Negative memory is an essential element hindering the divided groups to build a shared identity or to seek reconciliation. There are several negative memories of China's repressions which continue to dominate politics and to reproduce the image of threatening others in Hong Kong, such as the Cultural Revolution (unparalleled disaster to its people), the crackdown at Tiananmen Square on June 4 (the brutal way of suppression to different voices), and the continual situation of abusing civil rights (violation of human dignity or freedom). The fear of repeating historical tragedies develops Hong Kong's security ideology which highlights the value of freedom and democracy as the identity of Hong Kong in discriminating between the autocratic communism and democratic capitalism.

In comparison with South Korea and Taiwan, the antagonistic identity constructed in Hong Kong is far less hostile, because the territory has not experienced any fighting against each other. In the contrary, Korea experienced a three-year civil war which

devastated the peninsula while the PRC bombarded Taiwan during the military rule of Kai-shek Chiang. The memory of these events continues to shape virtually all aspects of politics on Taiwan and South Korea. Nevertheless, the less hostile attitude remains a stumbling block in building up a trustful relationship between Hong Kong and mainland China, and in moving towards shared identities. To restore the capacity to trust requires a secured and communicating space where the two parties are able to link their narratives to one another[520] and be able to reconcile in truth without forgetting the past as well as eliding over injustice.

Ecumenical joint project on compilation of national education textbooks

The writer proposed the setting up of an ecumenical joint project to compile national education textbooks in search of the possibility of historical reconciliation. In 2012, the HKSAR government's plan to adopt national education into the school curriculum sparked protests (including hunger strike) among residents, who were suspicious and fearful of "brainwashing" young minds with pro-mainland propaganda[521] and distorting historical facts (e.g. Cultural Revolution and June 4th Crackdown). For pro-Beijing left-wings, anti-national education campaign was interpreted as "an attack on the central government, on mainland China as a whole, and the HKSAR." [522] For the protestors, the campaign started simply to safeguard HKSAR's freedom of thought and to urge for the fulfilment of the "no patriotic education in Hong Kong" promise. The breach of this

[520] Schreiter, R. *Shared Identity*, p7
[521] Lai, A. " National Education Raise Furor in Hong Kong" *CNN* 30 July,2012 *http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/30/world/asia/hong-kong-national-education-controversy/index.html* 20 September,2013
[522] Editorial, "National Education should be Withdrawn" *Ming Pao*, 6 September,2012

promise was represented as a vicious conspiracy.[523] In facing the strong resistance, HKSAR Chief Executive made a big concession not to implement an originally planned 2015 deadline to introduce mandatory national education in schools. For the Chief Executive, the amendment of this policy means that "we are giving the authority to the schools. The schools are given the authority to decide when and how they would like to introduce the moral and national education"[524].

Reasons for the joint project

As schools are given the authority to develop their own national education curriculum or textbooks, Hong Kong Christian churches, which run nearly sixty percent of schools in the territory, can provide a huge network to connect with different backgrounds of students. If Christian churches and other religious organisations could join together to launch an ecumenical project on compiling national education textbooks, this implies that different denominations or faiths would be able to start a dialogue on the controversial historical issues and the future democratic development. Bringing all of them together and exchanging narratives on historical past could be enhanced to form cultural exchanges in the true sense of the reality, via efforts to form a narrative framework that embraces culture and history rather than antagonistic emotions.

Truth findings - a process of debates at symposiums

[523] Ibid.
[524] "HK Backs Down on National Education" *South China Morning Post*. 2 March,2014 http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1032346/hk-backs-down-national-education, 20january,2014

To find out the historical facts requires four dimensions of the truth finding, namely objective, personal, dialogical, and restorative.[525] What do the four dimensions of the truth means to the context of Hong Kong? The Cultural Revolution is the objective truth that halted most economic activities and education. The Red Guards destroyed countless historical reserves, valuable artifacts, and sites of interest. Crimes against the government were brutally and publically punished. It clearly appears that the Cultural Revolution is considered by most people inside and outside of China, including the Beijing authorities, as "an unmitigated disaster and as an event to be avoided in the future".[526] However, the objective truth is not always to be found or accepted by both sides. In the case of June 4th Incident, there is a big difference in the estimation of deaths and casualties issued by journalists and the Chinese government. The interpretation of the incident has also been deeply divided – a patriotic democratic movement versus bourgeois liberalism/the true nature of the turmoil. The crackdown on June 4th is not only a controversial issue, but also a taboo subject. The incident of June 4th (the oppressed of human/civic rights) becomes the core of confrontation and has added a heavy weight of the past on the present. This explains why the implementation of national education in school textbooks becomes so controversial – both the local and the national hold different narratives on human rights. If the national education avoids discussing the taboo subject of June 4th, it will have a tendency of suppressing different voices and allow the oppressor to escape from taking up the responsibility and learning from the historical past of abusing human rights.

[525] Gruchy, J. De, *Reconciliation: Restoring Justice* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Books, 2002), p.155
[526] "Cultural Revolution", found in *Biology Daily.Com* 2005. Legal Info.

History might not fully reflect historical facts, because it involves selection, construction, and narratives.[527] In the case of June 4th, there are a lot of Chinese witnesses and Chinese surviving victims that give testimony to the killings of Tiananmen. The case looks different from the mainland Chinese authorities, who deny the killings and often downplay them. Undoubted evidence is acknowledged from one side, but denied from the Other. The interpretation syntheses are completely in contrast to each other. For Hong Kong and the Western community, the brutal crackdown to the students is a serious crime while for the mainland Chinese authorities it has not happened or was a rather mild case. The impact for present and future times is imagined differently. For the local, the mainland Chinese authority has to apologise officially, compensate the surviving victims and allow students to return to mainland China. However, for the national, the incident of June 4th is an event of turmoil which destabilises the stability and prosperity of China's development – recovery of the social order was needed.

As historical truth is often dialogical and justice is relational, they have to be worked out carefully and have to take in other factors into consideration about justice, such as of stability, peace and reconciliation. Christian churches as the biggest education sponsoring body can be used as a secured space or hybrid space to accommodate the different narratives of the truth of the historical event in the larger web of truth. For example, Christian churches could hold a series of debates at symposiums, bringing

[527] "History is not a – proportionally accurate, though reduced in size – model of the past, but a narrative about events and changes in the past, which explain differences and development unto today and remain relevant for patterns of orientation in the present. These narratives have a character of "synthesis and generalization," and "interpretation". Bodo Von Borries "Historical Education for historical reconciliation" *International Forum on Historical Reconciliation in East Asia*, p.139

different religious leaders, theologians, and political parties into dialogue. As a matter of fact, Christian churches have already had all the social connections.

For religious leaders, the linkage between church leaders and political leaders already existed. Bishop Joseph Zen can be seen as a "moral leader in campaign for universal suffrage." He called on the public to "fight against proposed national security legislation." Although he was criticised as "a draconian cub on civil liberties," he has earned high respect in pan-democratic circle.[528] Paul Kwong, the Archbishop and Primate of Hong Kong Anglican Church, has been appointed member of the 2013 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference which provides an opportunity for religious leaders to communicate with the Chinese authorities. For lay leaders, Martin Lee, a Catholic, is one of the founding members of Hong Kong's democratic movement while Donald Tsang, the former HKSAR Chief Executive, is a Chinese loyalist. Apart from personal connections, many parachurch organisations have already developed a linked with other political sectors, these include the Social Concern Group of the Christian Churches of Christ in China, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, and mainline Protestant parachurch organisations, Industrial Evangelical Fellowship (grassroots industrial workers) and Hong Kong Christian Institute (fight for social justice in the community).

Bringing all of them together would help us move toward the dialogical truth, which allows the divided parties to listen to other narratives, to probe the story together, and to

[528] Leung, A. "Bishop Joseph Zen Zen-Kiun" *South China Moring Post*, 24 February, 2014

explore the ultimate truth as well as the meaning of their respective narratives.[529] The dialogical truth allows each party to narrate their own version of the story without fear of confronting the different versions that others may propose. This helps overcome "Enemy Images" which tend to generalize/stereotype the Other and impose enemy images on the other. The truth finding process at symposiums will be the preparation for the joint compilation of the materials, because all the exchanging arguments, supporting materials or findings will be incorporated into compiling textbook materials. The compiling process often leads to confrontations among the members due to the basic differences in their views. This creates a model for the younger generation learning how to know about others and how to acquire relativistic views.

National education is future-orientated overcoming the negative memory of the past

HKSAR's national education textbooks have now been changed from government-compiled/ government-approved to school-based ones. Surely, a variety of versions or historical materials in national education would emerge and would be provided for comparison. Our ecumenical/jointly compiled historical materials are also expected to perform such a function. In comparison with different narratives, students would be able to look at the historical incident from a wider perspective. Learning historical past goes beyond knowing/understanding the facts about events; it helps learners to move forward, to internalising them into their mind and to develop joint perceptions – acknowledging/recognising the differences, respecting the difference and engaging the

[529] Schreiter, R. "Establishing a shared Identity: The role of the Healing of Memories and of Narrative", Kim, S.C.H.et el (ed.) *Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008) p.16

difference into dialogue, creating a new space for their imagination to resolve the differences. This is the concept of hybridity.

Primary and secondary school students are at the age of life when their self-identities are being formed. The national and historical views that are established in their mind remain there for the rest of their lives.[530] Proper national education and educational materials can help students build their future on the basis of national and historical views. Basically, national and historical education goes beyond focusing/viewing the past wrongdoing, it provides students with an opportunity for indirect experience, which helps them form their own historical views and build their own future based on it. In other words, our joint compilation of textbook project can be future-oriented, changing from the sharing of historical views to looking for opportunities for reconciliation over the negative memories of the past.

7.6.3 Reframing narrative on Christian Ethics (the ethics of differences)

Reconciliation has a character of hybridity, between grace (love) and discipline (justice), between heavenly (eschatological) and earthly (immanent) cities, and between good and evil. The concept of hybridity has often been accused of diluting the purity of the Christian tradition and losing its distinctive identity. This is the fear of contamination of one's own culture. Also, hybridity has often been misinterpreted as a perspective of cultural relativism that each culture has a self-contained system trait which is different

[530] Park,J.H. "In Search of the Possibility of Historical Reconciliation Through the Joint Compiled History Textbooks" in International Forum on Historical Reconciliation in East Asia. *Opening Historical Reconciliation in East Asia Through the Historical Dialogue*. (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009), p. 257

from one community to another[531] – culture is homogenous and bounded. Essentialising the cultural differences not only has an effect of strengthening the boundaries between capitalist and communist culture, but also has a negative understanding of cultural encounter that would lead to an undesirable consequence (destabilizing the communist rule and undermining the Hong Kong liberal capitalist culture). Under the cloak of this cultural relativism, both sides are required to respect the uniqueness of the Other culture. Any attempt to make peaceful evolution to the Other culture must be suppressed.[532] Such a kind of cultural relativism downgrades the notion of hybridity to a political way of tolerating the differences – simply bringing two distinct systems (capitalism and communism) together and yet the people are isolated from each other by a hidden wall of culture. In addition to the fear of Third Space hyrbidity which might produce undesirable consequences, both the Chinese authority and the people of Hong Kong limit the choices of tying down two systems together. As a result, little has been done to break down barriers between differences and to destabilise the antagonistic identities.

More importantly, unconditional acceptance of all cultural values would only strengthen the unjust structure and lead to further oppression to the marginalized. As a result, one can no longer be able to defend some core values, such as human rights and democracy. The main activity of Third Space hybridity is to resist domination/hegemony or to challenge the conceptually homogenized understanding of culture in the West. As we discussed in the previous chapters, there are different modes of resistance against domination, such as the mode of hybridity, collaboration, and subversion. Third Space hybridity has no intention to avoid conflicts while it locates

[531] Bauman, Z. *Culture as Praxis* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p.35

[532] Deng Xiaoping gave a warning to Hong Kong people that any attempts to make peaceful evolution to communist culture will bring disaster to the territory.

itself within conflicts by allowing different perspectives or parties to engage in an interrogative dialogue. This is a process of holding dynamics and listening to different challenges. Thus, there are no reasons why an appreciation of difference would prevent us from defending our moral judgment or choosing political action.[533]

Similarly, Christian reconciliation always holds the two modes of God's mercy/forgiveness and justice/discipline together. This implies that reconciliation is neither a tension-free coexistence with the oppressor nor only a post-conflict phase of forgiveness – "let bygones be bygone". Rather, reconciliation is a disciplined process that includes the element of uncovering the truth, resisting injustice, and transforming the sinful reality. In other words, the goal of this process is a state of reconciliation which will be reached when justice or other requirements have been accomplished.

Holding the two conflicted modes (grace and justice) together is inevitable to create a paradoxical or hybridised understanding of the Christian God that matches the Christian tradition. The early church was suppressed under the colonial rule of the Roman Empire, where Christianity was in the situations of cultures-in-contact with Palestine society, Hellenistic Jewish Diaspora, and the Hellenistic World. George Soares Prabhu, an Indian biblical scholar, fully supports the view that the New Testament Christology is "inclusive and pluriform".[534] Different Christian communities developed their own narratives of Jesus in response to their cries of life. The New Testament preserves the diverse narratives, without suppressing any one among them, in order to indicate a

[533] Bleiker, R. *Divided Korea: Toward a culture of Reconciliation* (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press, 2005)
[534] Prabhu, G S. "The Jesus of Faith: A Christological Contribution to an Ecumenical Third World Spirituality," in *Spirituality of the Third World*, (eds.) K.C. Abraham and Bernadette Muby-Beya (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1994), p.146

Christological open-endedness, inviting us to discover our own particular Christology. Such open-ended and fluid understanding of Christology changed due to the fact that Christianity, in the 4th century AD, shifted from a colonised position toward one of political and cultural hegemony, a totalising or imperializing narrative. For imperial unity, diverse narrative became a threat to the expanding Roman Empire. Nevertheless, political domination did not succeed in silencing the debate or suppressing the voices of difference – the Christological formulas constructed in Nicaea, Ephesus, or Chalcedon were never accepted as normative by all Christians.[535] In the 19th century, Europeans felt the superiority of their own culture and attempted to justify their cultural supremacy by downplaying the image of a Jewish Jesus and depicting him as a rebel against Judaism – calling himself the Son of Man to avoid being associated with his Jewish identity.[536] Such a kind of cultural supremacy and unique understanding of Christology faced a serious criticism in the context of the encounter with other cultures. Kwok offered five images of Jesus Christ[537] to further illustrate how "life (cultural) changes, Christologies changes too": 1. the Black Christ emerged in the black movement against the oppression of the white culture; 2. the Corn Mother arose from the struggle for sovereignty on the part of Native American peoples; 3. the feminine Shakti stemmed from cultural discrimination of Indian women; 4. the Transvestite came from the resistance of gender essentialism; and 5. the Bi/Christ goes beyond people's sexual identity – the binary opposition between heterosexuality and homosexuality.

[535] Kwok Pui-lan used to be Hong Konga Hong Kong theologian and is currently working for Episcopal Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. She points out that the most hybridised concept in the Christian tradition is that of Jesus Christ. Kwok, P.L, *Postcolonial Imagination & Feminist Theology*, (London: SCM Press, 2005) p.172

[536] Ibid, p.173

[537] Ibid, pp174-184

The Christian tradition of hybrid Christ deconstructs the imperial and the Western claims to a cultural supremacy based on unity, purity, originality, and universality. This allows marginalized groups to discover their own particular Christology, and the diverse understanding of Christ to construct the truth based on counter-knowledge "within the terms of a negotiation (rather than a negation) of oppositional and antagonistic elements."[538] This is what Bhabha calls a Third Space of translation and negotiation – "we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the Others of ourselves."[539] Also, the hybrid Christ helps us to understand that a genuine intercultural dialogue emerges from the recognition of diversity and the respect of the Otherness. Mutual respect does not mean to fall into cultural relativism or to give up defending justice. Rather, to embrace the antagonistic elements in cultures is important to reconcile the differences and to develop a new shared identity.

7.7 Summary

The ecumenical joint project on the compilation of national education textbooks can play a vital role in reconciliation in multiple ways. Firstly, this ecumenical joint project can be seen as a transformative practice (embodying God's reconciling vision in the concrete situation of HKSAR) by Christian churches to bring various denominational and interfaith organisations to work together to deal with the conflicting views on the negative memories of the communist rule. Secondly, history can be used positively as a tool for the church to engage Christian/non-Christians individually and organisations collectively in search for the possibility of reconciliation. Thirdly, the joint project provides a hybrid space, a permanent movement, for various parties to negotiate their

[538] Bhabha, H. 1994, p22
[539] Ibid, pp 38-39

differences in educating our new generation. Finally, this ecumenical joint project is only one of many ways to actualise the concept of hybridity into the transforming practice in reconciling the antagonistic identity between the people of HKSAR and mainland China.

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION

At the beginning of this thesis, the writer identified that the tension (hindering reconciliation) between the local HKSAR and the national mainland China did not come simply from ideological differences, but from the dominant narrative of binary opposition and antagonistic identity constructs. The mode of binary opposition had long been used for contextual analysis and socio-political transformation by liberation theology, Minjung theology, and Homeland theology. However, in facing an unprecedented way of decolonisation, Hong Kong did not gain territorial independence, but returned to a communist motherland which was so different from British colonial rule that was based on capitalism and the rule of law. The policy of "one country, two systems" created a hybrid context which challenged the contextual analysis, based on the mode of binary opposition, for failing to see multiple responses to the reunification: 1) the rising emigration was simply due to the fear of reversing to China, ignoring many other factors such as early childhood values and circumstances, a history of family migration and location of kin abroad; 2) Hong Kong Christians were not simply divided into two main camps – confrontation and collaboration. There was another group of theologians (such as Archie Lee, Wa-ching Wong, Shui-man Kwan and Paul Kwong) who were proposing hybridity as a mode of dealing with reunification; 3) the single identification with "Hong Kongese" was on the decline, but the dual identification "Hong Kong Chinese" was on the rise, reflecting a complex sense of belonging and the mixed feeling about reunification. All in all, the first Chapter did point out the significance of the experience of HKSAR as a context which is less characterised by simple dichotomy, binary opposition, and antagonism. The mode of binary opposition

overlooked the hybrid space between the oppressor and the oppressed. The mode of hybridity was introduced to fill this gap.

Hybridity as a mode of handling reunification was not new to Hong Kong academic circle. Archie Lee, Wa-ching Wong, Shui-man Kwan and Paul Kwong have already done a lot of research in this area. However, their attentions were given only to one out of the three sociological forces (postmodernism, postcolonialism, and globalisation). For example, the three local theologians (Lee, Wong and Kwan) were focused on postcolonial criticism while Kwong was focused on practical theology without considering the operation of the three forces. In this thesis, the writer has taken the three existing forces together and put them in dialogue with the context of HKSAR. This has given us a greater sensitivity toward the internal and external conditions. As a result, the research found that the notion of hybridity was already located in the centre of the existing sociological forces and had been operating in the life of the local and the global community. This provided a wider framework for us to do theological reflection and complement previous research.

Having located hybridity in the centre of the three sociological forces, the writer went further to indicate that hybridity had been used more positively as a counter-trend against the grand narrative of binary opposition created by modernism, colonialism and imperialism. Hybridity, on the one hand, challenged certainties and essentialisms, and on the other hand, acknowledged complexity and ambiguity. Its characters appeared more adequate to respond to the cultural shifts and diversity created by the three existing forces. More importantly, its notion of liminality, a permanent moving space,

destabilised the defined identities and provided a practical possibility for us to re-negotiate the existing antagonistic identities (the local of HKSAR and the national of mainland China) and to re-open the closed door for imagining a new shared identity.

Integrating the concept of hybridity into practical theology, the writer deconstructed the take-it-for-granted narrative that the contested identities between HKSAR and mainland China were fixed/static based on facts or truths. Using the event of handover as an example, the writer demonstrated that human narratives were not an objective reflection of historical facts, but were filtered through the activation of schematic knowledge shared among their home community based on assumption, supposition, and interpretation. The narrative of binary opposition did expose the partiality of HKSAR's reality, but the other voices had been sealed. The mode of hybridity helped us to rediscover that HKSAR was a site of contestation among various narrative communities for dominance over meaning and integration. This allowed the suppressed voices of ambiguous feelings be heard and the neglected hybrid identity (Hong Kong Chinese) to be re-valorised.

No theological research in Hong Kong has used the concept of hybridity to link up the three sociological forces and to develop them as an analytical tool to rediscover the neglected hybrid identity of Hong Kong people in colonial time. Based on the features of hybridity and the three sociological forces, the research revisited the colonial past and found that the contested site of the territory (the origin of hybrid identity) were not contingent features just before handover, but the formation of these features had been going on for much longer. Holding a hybrid identity was the approach of survival of the

Hong Kong people torn in between the two great powers (China and Britain), the two national parties (KMT and PRC), and the two political parties (pro-Beijing loyalists and pro-democratic activists). In addition to survival, the historical review indicated that hybrid identity had a function to preserve a cultural link with communist China and capitalist Britain, without being forced upon the people of Hong Kong to choose either Britain or China. This maximised the benefits from both sides and minimised the historical tension between the local and national. Another possible contribution of this thesis was to recover the memories of their successful experiences. This would give the people of Hong Kong a positive feeling of possessing a hybrid identity and a confidence to use the hybrid roles wisely to handle the cultural reconciliation with mainland China.

Christian churches collaborating with colonisers have long been condemned as an "unholy alliance with the power" by democratic activists and progressive Christians. Up to present, there have not been any local theologians or church leaders in the HKSAR who have publicly defended their collaborative position. This research has given several reasons to justify the choice of collaboration as a resistance against colonial domination. In British colonial rule, Hong Kong Christian churches went through a colonial process of identification and mimicry, creating a hybrid identity. Viewing the political unrest and economic hardship in China, Hong Kong Christian churches wanted the Chinese authorities to be mimetic of the Western world. Both Hong Kong Christians and citizens did not show a sentiment of anti-colonial rule and Western civilisation. Rather, they collaborated closely with the missionary enterprise and the colonial government to make contributions to the development of Hong Kong as well as modern China, in terms of finance, education, and Western values. The practical theology of Hong Kong

churches was highly mimetic of that of Western missionary mentality. They were collaborative with the imperialistic and colonial forces. However, the colonial domination and missionary ideology did not eliminate the Chinese identity in the heart of the Hong Kong people, but created a group of middlemen (mimic) and a hybrid identity of citizens in the territory. This was a kind of resistance from the within of the colonised, struggling for the co-existence of two opposite instincts (the coloniser and the colonised). They had a difference that was almost the same. The resistance did not come from any oppositional act, but from the very act of collaboration. All ideology or culture brought to the colonised would be translated, transformed, and distorted inline with the colonised culture. The research demonstrated that the hybrid role of Hong Kong people made contributions not only to Hong Kong prosperity, but also to the modernisation of mainland China. In other words, the success of Hong Kong was not simply the product of colonialism. Rather, it was the people of Hong Kong, a social agent, who had the ability to resist and the wisdom to choose the mode of collaboration working alongside with the British government to handle different dynamics.

Much research has been done in the area of Minjung theology/Minjung churches in South Korea and Homeland theology/Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, particularly, related to the resistance against military regimes. Little research has been done on comparing the two theologies and two churches in response to unification with the communist Other. No research has been done to engage dialogue with the three contexts in search for reunification. The comparison made it clear that the mode of binary opposition has made significant contributions to resisting the oppression of the military regime but little to the process of reunification. The research on the cases of South

Korea and Taiwan has alerted the people of Hong Kong to the importance of going beyond the binary opposition in search for cultural reconciliation with communist China.

The critique of existing theological research on Hong Kong's reintegration with China in the last Chapter revealed that many theologians (like Nay-Wang Kwok, Deborah Brown, and Stephen Pavey) saw reconciliation almost exclusively in Chinese authority terms. They assumed that reconciliation could only emerge when the communist China opened up and embraces the values and virtues of democracy. If not, Christian churches had no other choice but took a binary oppositional approach resisting against Beijing domination and assimilation. They laid all responsibilities to the Other, ignoring the possibility of breaking the Self to make space for receiving the Other in order to make readjustments in light of the Other's alterity. Based on the Christian concept of hybridity, this thesis appealed to reversing the responsibility to breaking our selves – a willingness to accept that a division of more than one and a half-centuries have created differences that could be simply forced into one ideology. Reconciliation is not to erase difference but to make it part of a new, "more pluralistically defined vision of identity and unity that may one day replace the present."[540] This may sound utopian, but it provided a hope and direction for Christian churches to move on.

Other Hong Kong theologians (like Archie Lee and Arnold Yeung) were more concerned about changing attitudes and deepening our theological understandings on

[540] Bleiker, R. *Divided Korea: Toward a Culture of Reconciliation*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005) p.100

the issue of reconciliation. Few of them drew attention to the action of transforming antagonistic situation. This thesis did not ignore the importance of transforming practice, focusing on deconstructing our (daily) antagonistic narrative against the communist Other, and reconstructing an inclusive narrative to embrace the threatening Other. The writer proposed to embody God's reconciling vision in the divided church and society at large, to break ourselves in order to make space to receive other denominations as well as other faiths, to work together in an ecumenical project of compiling national education in order to reframe the narrative of the historical past. Although the transforming practice in this thesis has not yet developed a detailed strategy to reconcile the conflicts between the local Hong Kong and the national mainland, the attempt of this research narrowed the gap between theory and practice, between vision and reality, and between the Earthly city (reconciliation has already begun, but not yet completed) and the Heavenly city (the hope of final reconciliation).

The mode of hybridity, as a kind of contextual theology, can function more adequately within a particular time and space. We have seen how the mode of collaboration made a significant contribution to the prosperity and harmony of Hong Kong in the colonial period, while the mode of binary opposition brought liberation to the people of Taiwan and South Korea under military regimes. The evidence appeared to show that the mode of the former might be better employed to maintain the status quo, while the latter might serve better in an insufferable or revolutionary situation. The colonial Hong Kong (which has enjoyed prosperity, stability, and liberty) was so different from the other Asian colonies in which most people lived in poverty, inequality, instability, and tyranny. The mode of binary opposition as resistance was more appropriate in such an

intolerable situation (like the military regimes in South Korea and Taiwan), but might not be in Hong Kong. After the reunification with the communist China, the capitalist system and the culture of HKSAR have been protected by the policy of "one country, two systems", which allows "Hong Kongese to govern Hong Kong" and to develop a full-democracy in the territory. In the past fifteen years of reintegration, the Beijing authority has not violated its promises, but has made every effort to maintain the prosperity of HKSAR by granting a lot of economic privileges in mainland China. HKSAR has developed a multi-layered and hybridised/pluralistic society. More than one mode of response to the unique context is needed. To hold the tensions between different perspectives is better than to get into a dispute about which mode is the most genuine or authentic liberation praxis.

This thesis is focussed on searching a counter-narrative against binary opposition and antagonism within the Christian tradition of reconciliation rooted in shared identity and hybridity. The contributions are limited to the transformative practice of reconstructing a narrative framework of hybridity, so as to reconcile the cultural differences between the local and the national. The ecumenical joint project on compilation of national education textbooks is only a small step moving forward to destabilising the antagonistic identity and to reconciling the historical past. Further research is needed to explore the problem of how to concretely integrating with communist one-party dominance without losing HKSAR's democratic capitalist identity.

In brief, the mode of hybridity aims at bringing together Christians and non-Christians in facing a common challenge. Basically, this approach is "opened-ended, ready to

secure compromises which seek for the best solutions at the time to complex problems." Of course, this approach involves "ongoing reflection, re-evaluation and self-critique."[541] I am convinced that the mode of hybridity is the best strategy for the Christian churches of HKSAR to resist against China's colonial assimilation and to build cultural reconciliation with Beijing.

[541] Villa-Vicencio, Charles. *A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation-building and Human Rights*. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992), P.278

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