ENACTION THEORY AND PENTECOSTAL LITURGY: ADVANCING JAMES K.A. SMITH'S EMBODIED EPISTEMOLOGY FOR PENTECOSTAL SCHOLARSHIP

by

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Abstract

In recent times, Pentecostal theologians have recognized the tendency of Pentecostals to highlight both theoretical and affective dimensions of human nature. Central to Pentecostals' theological framework is the belief that a personal encounter with God serves as an indispensable foundation of knowledge. Thus, there is a need for Pentecostals to develop a theoretical rationale that elucidates the meaning of experience with the Spirit and its impact on their lives. This thesis addresses this need by furthering dialogue concerning human experience within Pentecostal spirituality. Nevertheless, to be able to talk authoritatively about the Pentecostal experience, it is essential to ascertain the various degrees of meaning and conceptualization attributed to the term "experience" within the Pentecostal context. This thesis primarily engages the work of James K.A. Smith to develop a robust understanding of Pentecostal experience. While Smith has made significant theoretical contributions to the embodiment of Pentecostal experience and Christian spiritual formation, his work is primarily directed towards a broader Christian audience. Smith's interdisciplinary engagement with theology, philosophy, phenomenology, and cognitive science establishes valuable theoretical foundations that underscore the irreducible embodied nature of our being-in-the-world and the narrative structure of the mind. Smith proposes liturgy as a tool for "re-storying" Christian imagination by rehabilitating embodied perceptions of the world. Considering that Smith has not directed his scholarship to Pentecostal audiences alone, recent Pentecostal scholars Yoon Shin and Simo Frestadius have scrutinised whether Smith's work can be considered authentically Pentecostal. In this thesis, Smith's work is reimagined for Pentecostal scholarship in light of Shin and Frestadius's critiques. Furthermore, Smith's theoretical foundation is expanded and revised by incorporating recent scholarship from Shaun Gallagher and Robyn Fivush on embodiment, enaction, social interaction, and narrative identity. The result

is a more robust theoretical foundation that is directly applicable to Pentecostal concerns. The usefulness of this revised approach is demonstrated in two primary ways. First, areas within Smith's scholarship are reimagined to reveal how it could benefit from this thesis's revised approach. Second, this thesis applies its approach to the Pentecostal concept of testimony. It is argued that the Pentecostal concept of testimony is an autobiographical concept that correlates to what social psychologists refer to as the autobiographical self. Analysis is provided to illustrate how the Pentecostal community cultivates this religious autobiographical sense of self through various identity-forming narratives and liturgical practices.

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Finally, a few comments should be said about my background and motivation for this thesis. One of the main points of this research is to highlight the ways that narratives influence identity formation. Therefore, I believe it is important to recognize some of the narratives that have

influenced my own identity. First, though I take a neutral methodological approach in this thesis, it should be recognized that I am a practising Pentecostal. Undoubtedly, my experience within various multi-cultural and multi-lingual Pentecostal environments has provided me with life-changing experiences that indelibly influence my research interest. In this thesis, I argue that Pentecostal religious practice holds powerful narratives that reinforce narrative identity transformation because that is what has happened to me. The Pentecostal experience found me in a very pivotal time of my life. At 17 years old, I became very passionate about the Pentecostal experience and the power of biblical narrative and instruction to change and transform an individual. Before that experience, I had been greatly influenced by destructive and self-deprecating personal narratives. I was a failing Mexican-American high school student with no hope of graduating. I had accepted the fate that my future would be relegated to a lifetime of entry-level jobs in warehouses and restaurants. The narrative assumption that I did not have the intelligence and discipline to do anything else haunted my soul daily. I self-identified as more than just not having enough intelligence. I believed I was non-intelligent. I believed I was too dumb to pursue anything substantial in life. Much more could be said about this aspect of my background. In short, my religious experience with Pentecostalism and the resulting passion for the Bible saved my mind from these detrimental personal conclusions. I have been set free to believe what once was assumed to be out of reach.

Another important element of my background is my Mexican American heritage. My father and many of my aunts and uncles immigrated from Mexico. Thus, I was raised for most of my formative teenage years in a home shared by many aunts, uncles, and their families. At one point, we were a family of 18 living in a single home. Considering that we lived in the high-cost-of-living area of Watsonville, California, it was what our family did to survive. By “our family”, I

do not mean what is often seen as the immediate family of parents and children. Like many other homes of Mexican heritage, aunts and uncles are seen as secondary parents, cousins are secondary siblings, and my grandmother, Mama Maria, was our matriarch. Mama Maria integrated a strong Pentecostal faith to us all. I remember many mornings hearing her pray in Spanish for our family, name by name, between tears and Pentecostal tongues. My family was a religious family. The pastor was my uncle. The church was located in a neighbourhood called Pajaro, at the city's edge, hugging endless rows of strawberry and blackberry fields. I remember the church was filled with families that worked in those fields. Their fingertips were often stained with the colours of the berries they would pick, and their legs and backs were sore from hours of labour under a hot sun. Yet, within this Mexican-American church, families would come to worship. God had given them a profound reason to live. God gave them hope for their children in a city that was plagued by gang affiliations. I have countless memories of singing Spanish songs together in church, over firesides and in homes. We shared times of prayer and singing followed by communal fellowship with *pan dulce* (sweet bread) and Abuelita or Ibarra hot chocolate, which is beloved by many Hispanic communities in America. The songs, the preaching, and the community provided many families with important narratives to make meaning of their lives and overcome the various obstacles of living in an economically challenging region.

The background described above is merely a flash of the deep heritage that impacted the motivation for this thesis. I never did graduate high school. I woke up from the destructive narratives a little too late to reverse the damage that had been done to my educational journey. I earned the infamous GED (General Education Diploma), a detail that gives me much honour to share. I see it as a powerful testimony of the impact that the Pentecostal experience and the Bible

have had on my life. Now, I am here, performing doctoral research. The journey has been long and hard. Nevertheless, that I have come this far is a testimony of the ability that narrative and religious experience have to transform a life. In many ways, this thesis is a tribute to any individual who seeks to understand and maximize the power of narrative to form a new and more fruitful future.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SOURCES

1.1 Introduction

Recently, Pentecostal theologians have highlighted how Pentecostal sensibilities typically lead Pentecostals to consider both theoretical and affective aspects of humanity's nature. Daniel Castelo states that for Pentecostals, encountering God "serves as the epistemological grounding for Pentecostal theological methodology."[1] Theological assumptions for Pentecostals are often based on the idea that a personal encounter with God provides an indispensable foundation of knowledge. Castelo sees engagement with the subject of embodiment as necessary if Pentecostals assume that Spirit-baptism is an elemental characteristic of the Pentecostal ethos. Thus, Castelo states, "Pentecostals need a working sense of what a Spirit-baptized life looks like and what difference this kind of life makes in the world today."[2] In other words, Pentecostals need to develop a theoretical rationale for what experience with the Spirit means and how that experience influences their lives. While Castelo seeks to address this need by initiating further conversation in Pentecostalism as a mystical tradition, the work presented within this thesis seeks to address the need by furthering dialogue concerning human experience within Pentecostal spirituality.

However, before defining Pentecostal experience and spirituality, there are some theoretical obstacles to overcome. Peter Althouse states, for example, that "experience has varying degrees of meaning and conceptualization that need to be identified before one can speak

[1] Daniel Castelo, *Pentecostalism as a Christian Mystical Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2017), 81.

[2] Castelo, *Pentecostalism*, 160.

accurately of Pentecostal experience."[3] Before one can talk authoritatively about the Pentecostal experience, what must be determined are the many degrees of meaning and conceptualization that may be ascribed to the term "experience" for Pentecostals. While Althouse does not resolve the need to identify the various ways of understanding experience[4], Pentecostal theology has steadily moved forward in theoretically constructing the nature of experience and the uniqueness of Pentecostal experience.

In a recent article reviewing Pentecostal scholarship on experience, Truls Åkerlund and John Daniel Andersen argue that phenomenology is well-suited to the study of Pentecostalism.[5] Phenomenology allows for a focused investigation of the subjective and experiential aspects of Pentecostal spirituality.[6] They argue for four interconnected reasons why Phenomenology is useful for Pentecostal studies and theology, including an emphasis on embodiment, the importance of experiences, the assumption of consistency of appearances, and assumed realism.[7] Despite this methodological fit, Åkerlund and Andersen's review of the literature on Pentecostal studies reveals a lack of Phenomenological research "probing the meaning and essence of pentecostal phenomena".[8] A more intentional incorporation of phenomenological methods into

[3] Peter Althouse, "Toward a Theological Understanding go the Pentecostal Appeal to Experience," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies,* 38:4 (Fall 2001) 400.

[4] See: Althouse, "Toward a Theological Understanding," 403-411. Althouse focuses primarily, not on defining experience, but on explaining the nature of Pentecostal's *appeal to experience*. He ultimately characterizes Pentecostal's appeal to experience through George P. Schner's typology as an *appeal confessional*, see: George P. Schner, "The Appeal to Experience," *Theological Studies* 53, no.1 (1992): 40-59, DOI: 10.1177/004056399205300103.

[5] Truls Åkerlund and John Daniel Andersen, "Exploring Experience: A Case for Phenomenology in Pentecostal Studies," *Pneuma* 45, no. 1 (2023): 55-77, DOI: 10.1163/15700747-bja10082.

[6] Åkerlund and Andersen, "Exploring Experience," 56.

[7] Åkerlund and Andersen, "Exploring Experience," 66-72.

[8] Åkerlund and Andersen, "Exploring Experience," 60. See Åkerlund and Andersen, "Exploring Experience," 61-65 for an analysis of the following sources directly or indirectly examining Pentecostal experience: Anne Austad, Marianne Rodriguea Nygaard, and Tormod Kleiven,"Reinscribing the Lived the Body: A Qualitative Study of Extraordinary Religious Healing Experiences in Norwegian Contexts," *Religions* 11, no. 11 (2020):1-21, DOI: 10.3390/rel11110563; Dominiek D. Coates, "Post-Involvement Difficulties Experienced by Former Members of Charismatic Groups," *Journal of Religion and Health* 49, no. 3 (2010): 296–310. DOI:

Pentecostal studies is proposed to enrich theological and academic understanding of the movement.[9]

Frederick Ware is an excellent example of the direction that may benefit theoretical construction within Pentecostal scholarship. In a project exploring possible engagement between Pentecostal scholars and the sciences[10], Ware explores using phenomenology to analyze Pentecostals' self-transcendence in relation to biblical narratives that are central to Pentecostal spirituality.[11] While Ware recognizes that cognitive neuroscience may aid individuals in understanding what occurs in Pentecostal experience, he also challenges the notion that studying the brain is capable of providing comprehensive or even adequate explanations.[12] Ware utilizes phenomenological insights, given phenomenology's more holistic analysis of the lived-body.[13] In

10.1007/s10943-009-9251-0.; Shannon K. Johnson and Marilyn P. Armour, "A Hermeneutic Phenomenological Study of the Lived Experience of Spiritual Conversion in a Neo-Charismatic Evangelical Context," *Journal of Religion and Health* 57, no. 5 (2018): 2013–2032. DOI: 10.1007/s10943-018-0672-5.; John Ringson and Admire Chereni, "Ritual, Myth and Transnational Giving within the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa in Johannesburg, South Africa," *Hervormde Teologiese Studies* 76, no. 3 (2020), https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/5860/14941.; Kirsty Rowan and Karen Dwyer, "Demonic Possession and Deliverance in the Diaspora: Phenomenological Descriptions from Pentecostal Deliverees," *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 18, no. 6 (2015): 440-455, DOI: 10.1080/13674676.2015.1077211.; Nomatter Sande and John Ringson, "Do Persons with Disability Need Healing?: An African Pentecostal Perspective within the Selected African Pentecostal Churches in Zimbabwe," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 30, no. 1 (2021): 162–180, DOI: 10.1163/17455251-bja10016.; W. Paul Williamson and Howard R. Pollio, "The Phenomenology of Religious Serpent Handling: A Rationale and Thematic Study of Extemporaneous Sermons," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 38, no. 2 (1999): 203-218, DOI: 10.2307/1387790.; W. Paul Williamson and Ralph W. Hood, "Spirit Baptism: A Phenomenological Study of Religious Experience," *Mental Health, Religion & Culture* 14, no. 6 (2011): 543-559, DOI: 10.1080/13674676.2010.493860; W. Paul Williamson and Ralph W. Hood, "Spiritual Transformation: A Phenomenological Study among Recovering Substance Abusers," *Pastoral Psychology* 62, no. 6 (2013): 889–906, DOI: 10.1007/s11089-012-0502-8.

[9] Åkerlund and Andersen, "Exploring Experience," 6-7.

[10] James K.A. Smith and Amos Yong, eds., *Science and the Spirit: A Pentecostal Engagement with the Sciences* (Indiana University Press, 2010).

[11] Fredrick L. Ware, "Can Religious Experience Be Reduced to Brain Activity? The Place and Significance of Pentecostal Narrative," in *Science and the Spirit: Pentecostal Engagement with the Sciences*, eds. James K.A. Smith and Amos Yong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

[12] Ware, "Pentecostal Narrative," 199-122.

[13] Ware, "Pentecostal Narrative," 122-125.

exploring the Spirit baptism of Charles H. Mason[14], Ware proposes that the baptism of the Holy Spirit is a "symbol of self-transcendence".[15] In other words, it is a change where "the self" transitions to a new identity based on the Pentecostal experience. This self-transcendence overcomes prior autobiographical notions of self to take upon a new identity. For Pentecostals, this is deeply rooted in identification with the narrative of the baptism of the Spirit relayed in Acts 2. Ware's interdisciplinary approach demonstrates Pentecostal proclivity for integrating holistic embodied forms of understanding Pentecostal spirituality. However, it stops short of the kind of rigorous explanation that is developed in this thesis. To Ware's credit, that observation is certainly not to disparage the work that was done. Ware convincingly argues for the need to integrate rigorous studies in narrative analysis and phenomenology. Ware does not attempt to fill a need. He argues that there *is* a need.[16] At this juncture, the work of James K.A. Smith can be exceptionally useful as a platform to launch more rigorous studies on phenomenological aspects of Pentecostal experience. This thesis argues that the Pentecostal concept of testimony is an autobiographical concept akin to what social psychologists refer to as the autobiographical self. Furthermore, additional analysis is provided to show how the community cultivates this religious autobiographical sense of self.

A clear example of an embodied approach within Pentecostal theology can be found in James K.A. Smith's work. Smith's work has been recognized as "the most philosophically sophisticated argument for the role of experience in Pentecostal theological reflection.[17]

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[14] Charles H. Mason was a highly influential figure in the beginning of the Pentecostal movement within the United States; see: Raynard D. Smith, ed., *With Signs Following: The Life and Ministry of Charles Harrison Mason* (Danvers: Christian Board of Publication, 2015).

[15] Ware, "Pentecostal Narrative," 125.

[16] Ware, "Pentecostal Narrative," 128.

[17] Steven E. Parker, *Led by The Spirit: Toward a Practical Theology of Pentecostal Discernment and Decision Making*, Expanded Edition (Cleveland: CPT Press, 2015), 36.

Additionally, his work in *Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy* is recognized as a ground-breaking work that requires engagement from anyone attempting to do Pentecostal philosophy.[18] Smith provides exceptional work in Christian theology that has furthered the discussion on Pentecostal experience. His interdisciplinary engagement with theology, philosophy, phenomenology, and cognitive science provides valuable theoretical foundations. However, though Smith has identified as a Pentecostal and contributed to Pentecostal scholarship, much of his work is not explicitly directed toward Pentecostal theology. This has resulted in scrutiny regarding whether his approach can be considered authentically Pentecostal. Some recent examples include Pentecostal Scholars Yoon Shin and Simo Frestadius.

The concerns brought to light by Shin and Frestadius are particularly helpful in identifying key elements that require adjustment and clarification in Smith's work. The aspects of Shin and Frestadius's work that this thesis focuses on are their reception of Smith's epistemology and where Smith's theology stands as a Pentecostal enterprise. Though this thesis recognizes some important contributions in Shin and Frestadius's analysis of Smith, there are key areas where this thesis dissents from their critiques. In short, Shin and Frestadius both argue that Smith's focus on the primal aspects of pre-theoretical thought is misguided and consequently leads to an approach that overlooks the role of Pentecostal theology in influencing practice. While it is possible to concede that Smith's approach does not do enough to address the relationship between theoretical and pre-theoretical domains (e.g., Pentecostal theology and practice), Shin and Frestadius do not convincingly defend the notion that Smith's theory is

[18] J. Aaron Simmons, "Prospects for Pentecostal Philosophy," *Pneuma* 42 (2020): 176. DOI: 10.1163/15700747-bja10019.

entirely one-sided in his focus on the pre-theoretical cognitive domain. On the contrary, this thesis defends Smith by arguing that his theory assumes that pre-theoretical and theoretical domains—and consequently theology and practice—are fundamentally united in ways that cannot be bifurcated.

This thesis is an interdisciplinary project. Wide overarching pictures of each discipline are made, along with more direct and pinpointed pictures of how the particular discipline relates to a specific subject. In addition to the primary works serving as the foundation, supplemental analysis is included to reinforce forms of enactive social interaction that give insight into the complexities of the theory. These forms are concrete examples that fall under the umbrella of enaction yet demonstrate some specific characteristics that help contextualize general theory to the Pentecostal movement. Some of those unique examples include testimony, preaching, call-and-response liturgical dynamics, and congregational singing.

The three general academic areas that are engaged in this thesis include enactive conceptions of embodied cognition, social cognition, narrative identity, and Pentecostal theology and philosophy. Provided the array of academic cross-sections, it may be helpful to clarify what this thesis is versus what it is not. First, this thesis is a descriptive project addressing human behaviour in general and Pentecostal behaviour in particular. It does intend to prescribe the kind of behaviour humans or Pentecostals should demonstrate. Second, it utilizes philosophy and cognitive studies to establish the nature of narrative identity. It does not seek to pose as a cognitive science or philosophy research project. In short, this thesis is an interdisciplinary project that defends and highlights critical areas of Smith's work that are valuable for Pentecostal scholarship, advances his theoretical foundation with contemporary phenomenology and cognitive studies, and applies the result to analyse the concept and practice of testimony in

Pentecostalism. Given the various academic disciplines that are brought into dialogue, the following section discusses the primary sources that are used along with justification for why certain scholars notable within those disciplines are not fully engaged.

1.2 Sources

1.2.1 Embodiment and Enaction

Perhaps the one of the most critical aspects of this thesis involves theories of embodiment. The kind of embodiment referred to here is intended for theories associated with what has been referred to as 4E cognition. 4E cognition is a term that was coined to discuss the turn of cognitive science and phenomenology towards embodiment in light of emerging discoveries that stipulated that cognitive processes are not merely a product of the brain but are embodied, embedded, extended, and enactive. Although the different approaches are united under the same heading, they are predominantly united in opposition to the internalist, brain-centred views of cognitivism. Mark Rowlands describes each element of 4E cognition as the following:

1) Embodied: the idea that mental processes are partly constituted by, partly made up of, wider (i.e., extraneural) bodily structures and processes.
2) Embedded: the idea that mental processes are designed to function in tandem with an environment outside of the brain.
3) Enacted: the idea that mental processes are constituted in part by the ways in which an organism acts on the world.
4) Extended: the idea that mental processes are not located exclusively inside an organism's head but extended out into the organism's environment.[19]

Despite some uniting tenets, embodied approaches to cognition are far from sharing everything in common. There is wide-ranging disagreement within each approach and how they relate to each other, especially regarding the precise way the brain, body, and environment

[19] Mark Rowland, *The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), 3.

interact to form cognition.[20] Scholarship on enaction is vital for this thesis because it demonstrates how our understanding of the world is not merely a matter of linear objective observation. Cognition includes active participation on our part to form a dynamic ecological meaning-making. The primary interlocutor in this thesis within enaction theory that is engaged is Shaun Gallagher. Gallagher is a philosophy professor proficiently engaged in interdisciplinary 4E approaches to cognition. His scholarly publications are extensive. It is impractical to address them all and yet remain focused on the subject of this thesis. Nevertheless, much of Gallagher's work addressing phenomenology, embodiment, cognitive science, and social cognition is included in this study.[21] Gallagher signifies an exceptionally unifying scholarly figure in this project as his work provides cohesive theoretical frameworks for binding philosophical, scientific, sociological, and theological domains together.

As I show further below, much of the concept of testimony and practice of testimonials is linguistically and theologically charged. Unfortunately, Gallagher's scholarship lacks a method to analyse language and expression. This limits the use of Gallagher's enaction theory to primarily ontological domains. A theoretical bridge is necessary to connect our embodiment of the world to how we express ourselves. For Pentecostals, that means there should be a method in this thesis to connect the ontological aspects of an individual's humanity to how and why they express themselves within Pentecostal narrative frames. Embodied forms of cognitive linguistics

[20] Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher, "4E Cognition: Historical Roots, Key Concepts, and Central Issues," in *The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition*, eds. Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin, and Shaun Gallagher (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 4. Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher state for example that, "embodied approaches range from the computation/representation friendly," to others that are "explicitly anti-computational and/or anti-representational,": Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher, "4E Cognition," 8.

[21] The following is a representative list of Gallagher's t recent publications in these subjects: Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind*, Third Edition (New York: Routledge, 2021); Shaun Gallagher, *Action and Interaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); Shaun Gallagher, and Deborah Tollefsen, "Advancing the '*We*' Through Narrative," *Topoi* 38 (2017): 211-219. DOI 10.1007/s11245-017-9452-1; Shaun Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

provide a theoretical bridge. The work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson is used to establish how language and cognition are linked to our embodiment of the world. Lakoff and Johnson are used because they are seminal figures in establishing the embodied approach to cognitive linguistics and the embodied mind. Furthermore, their work is extensively engaged by scholars in the realm of theology, biblical studies, and Pentecostal scholarship.[22] The inclusion of Lakoff and Johnson's scholarship within this thesis provides for a contribution to future engagement between theology, philosophy, and scholarship in 4E cognition.

It is a significant aspect of this thesis to demonstrate that the scholarship that is developed in this thesis finds compatible elements in Smith's work. Smith has proficiently developed an embodied epistemology and utilizes scholars that reside within embodied, enactive, and cognitive linguistic academic fields. Smith is not alone in this endeavour. There has been a demonstratable interest in exploring the cross-sections between theology, spirituality, and the fast-developing field of cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, and narrative studies.[23] The research within this project advances scholarship in ways that have already captivated interdisciplinary yet creative directions.

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[22] Some great examples of this include: Bonnie Howe, *Because You Bear This Name: Conceptual Metaphor and the Moral Meaning of 1 Peter* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); William E.W. Robinson, *Metaphor, Morality, and the Spirit in Romans 8:1-17* (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016); Brian P Gault, *Body as Landscape, Love as Intoxication: Conceptual Metaphors in the Song of Songs (*Atlanta: SBL Press, 2019); along with a collection of essays from the Cognitive Linguistics in Biblical Interpretation section of the Society of Biblical Literature: Bonnie Howe and Joel B. Green, eds., *Cognitive Linguistic Explorations in Biblical Studies* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014).

[23] The following are some great examples of what is being done in this field: Joel B. Green, *Conversion in Luke-Acts: Divine Action, Human Cognition, and the People of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015); John Sanders, *Theology in the Flesh: How Embodiment and Culture Shape the Way We Think about Truth, Morality, and God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016); particularly the topical issue within the academic journal, *Open Theology*, on cognitive linguistics edited by John Sanders, see: John Sanders, "Introduction to the Topical Issue 'Cognitive Linguistics and Theology'," *Open Theology* 4, no. 1 (January 2018): 541-44, DOI: 10.1515/opth-2018-0042.

1.2.2 Testimony

One of the central theoretical advances within this thesis is a revision and expansion of Smith's work and an application to a specific event in which a congregation sings a hymn together. The area of testimony within Pentecostal religious practice presents a worthy opportunity for this. Within one of Smith's extensive contributions to Pentecostal philosophy, Smith suggests that Pentecostal testimony demonstrates evidence of "narrative knowledge". [24] This thesis details below that Smith views narrative knowledge as a kind of knowing that is beyond propositional statements. It is knowledge that connects story with affect and emotion. Narrative knowledge refers to how people make meaning of their lives.[25] For Smith, the concept of testimony and its use in religious practices includes this kind of narrative knowledge.

The study of testimony is important to Pentecostal theology because scholars have recognized that Pentecostal theology has occurred and been developed through spiritual practices that carry theological meaning, including story and testimony.[26] There certainly has already been introductory engagement on the concept of testimony as narrative identity and autobiographical in character. Nevertheless, it has not been engaged to the extent that is done within this thesis. That it has been addressed seems to signify that Pentecostal scholarship is taking serious steps in that direction. For example, Tony Richie has highlighted high autobiographical content within Pentecostal testimony and recognizes an interest in the concept that "personal identity for humans is essentially internalized in story" and that "to some extent testimony may be intrinsic

[24] James K.A. Smith, *Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy* (Grand Rapids: Wm. Eerdmans, 2010), 64.

[25] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 65-66.

[26] L. William Jr. Oliverio, "Theological Hermeneutics: Understanding the world in the encounter with God," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, ed. Wolfgang Vondey (London: Routledge, 2020), 142.

to human identity".[27] Consequently, he states, "some connection between one's story/testimony and one's self-identity/understanding seems clear enough".[28] While Richie's intuitions regarding narrative identity provided some informed precursory engagement, the engagement within this thesis provides a more extensive treatment of the subject that can authoritatively conclude Richie's speculation that, indeed, testimony is related to the kind of autobiographical identity that is intrinsic to human identity in general and Pentecostal specifically.

This thesis is not the first time disciplines within social science have been brought into conversation with the religious practice of testimony. Amanda Hontz Drury provides extensive engagement of this sort in her recent work, *Saying is Believing: The Necessity of Testimony in Adolescent Spiritual Development*.[29] Her book is the product of a doctoral dissertation that develops an *articulacy theory* of testimony that argues that engaging in the practice of testimony "develops and deepens" faith in adolescents.[30] In Chapter 6, it is argued that while there are aspects of her work that are useful for this thesis, there are also some conceptual differences. Drury sees testimony as a quasi-empirical report of an event that requires interpretation and articulation. Drury's view means that testimony is not an objective form of an event. It is the report of an event.[31] This concept is in part drawn from Paul Ricoeur on the hermeneutics of testimony.

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[27] Tony Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit: A Pentecostal Model for Interreligious Dialogue* (Lexington: Emeth Press, 2011), 138, footnote 113.

[28] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit,* 146, footnote 207.

[29] Amanda Drury, *Saying is Believing: The Necessity of Testimony in Adolescent Spiritual Development* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2015).

[30] Amanda Drury, "'I Have Seen and I Testify': An Articulacy Theory of Testimony in Adolescent Spiritual Development," (PhD diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 2012), 1. ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis Global.

[31] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 22.

For Ricoeur, testimony is a philosophical problem that should be critically analysed beyond the concept of testimony as an "account of a witness who reports what he has seen".[32] Testimony for Ricoeur is "not perception itself but the report that is, the story, the narration of the event".[33] The practice of testifying requires the initial perception of the attended event, an interpretation of the perception, a narrative communication of the attended event, and the person or group to whom the narrative is being communicated. The person or group then enactively perceives the story and embodies it through their own interpretive lens. Thus, Ricoeur states that testimony is in an intermediary position. It stands between the person who has communicated the narrative and those who interpret it.[34]

This study adds the element of embodied cognition to the study of testimony. The developments in embodied cognition are an area of scholarship that was not available to Paul Ricoeur. Consequently, it leaves some areas regarding testimony that are unexplored by Drury. Ricoeur makes statements that do not go far enough. He speaks continuously of testimony as something that is spoken and perceived in terms of sentences and statements. This thesis agrees with Smith in that narrative is much more than what is spoken. Narrative is not only spoken. It is also expressed in terms of things like body language, non-linguistic aural communication, and embodied conceptual metaphors. This is not to say that Ricoeur did not have a place for the body in his understanding of narrative and the self. Ricoeur describes testimony as having the quality of an action, work, and movement of a life "insofar as these things constitute by themselves the mark and the living proof of a man's conviction and devotion to a cause".[35] The quality of

[32] Paul Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Testimony," *Anglican Theological Review Evanston, III* 61, no. 4 (1979): 436.

[33] Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Testimony," 439.

[34] Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Testimony," 439.

[35] Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutics of Testimony," 444.

action, work, and movement certainly implies non-aural embodied expression. However, he does not include the prereflective element within his analyses of testimony. The embodied and enactive qualities of testimony are an essential topic for this thesis. It is argued within this thesis that the concept of testimony is not merely involved with propositional communication. Rather, testimony is directly linked to the concept of the autobiographical self. Since the autobiographical self requires a multiplicity of prereflective embodied elements, testimony itself also involves these embodied elements.

Setting the limitations of Ricoeur's work aside, his work reveals a few things that should be further unpacked if the practice of giving a testimony is to be more fully understood. It should include analyses on 1) the nature of human perception, 2) the nature of interpretation of perception, 3) the narratives in which perception and interpretation are embedded, 4) the ways this contributes to the narrative of the identity of the self, and 5) the effect that group discourse has on narrative and narrative identity. Additionally, since this project is specifically an analysis of the practice of testimony within the Pentecostal community, what is discovered within the nature of testimony, in general, is applied to the Pentecostal community in particular.

This thesis utilizes established cognitive theories on the ecological nature of perception to define the nature of human perception. That perception is described as ecological is essential because it describes the dynamic coupling between an individual, the environment in which the individual is embedded, and the process of making meaning of experience within that environment. The cognitive theory that is utilized to understand is that of enaction theory, predominantly as constructed by Shaun Gallagher. Enaction theory is generally understood to be under the umbrella of embodied theories of cognition. However, the focus of this thesis is an

analysis of community. A firm understanding of how individuals function is critical to an appropriate understanding of community.

Additionally, this thesis expounds on hermeneutical elements of making meaning of memories. An individual is not only situated within a particular environment but experience is always contextualized within an individual's mind within prior experiences. Past experience is the "environment" in which new experiences are contextualized. As such, the meaning of new experience is affected by past experience. Consequently, one of the most influential aspects of how individuals understand their past is in terms of narratives. Narratives help give meaning to past experience by stitching together past experience in coherent ways. To elucidate this aspect of the self, this project utilizes the ecological systems theory present in the work of Robyn Fivush and the enactive perspectives of Daniel Hutto on autobiographical identity. Fivush's work provides an excellent theoretical foundation for understanding the narrative nature of human cognition. Additionally, Daniel Hutto is a scholar who provides valuable work that bridges the academic domains of narrative identity studies and enaction theory.

Although Drury provides valuable analyses on the concept of testimony within its Christian use, there are some limitations on her project's use for the thesis presented here. Drury has constrained her project specifically to confessional Christian audiences. Drury states that "Articulating where we understand God to be present, along with how God interweaves his presence with our own spiritual narratives, affects and strengthens the knowledge we have, thereby aiding participation with the divine nature".[36] The assumption that God "interweaves his presence" that affects, strengthens and aids "participation with the divine nature" assumes God is practising agency and involvement with human affairs. Drury draws heavily from the social

[36] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 24.

sciences to inform her understanding of human identity formation and the social construction of reality. Thus, Drury argues that her approach goes deeper than the sociological and psychological standpoints she presents. Drury argues that psychological and sociological standpoints are merely used to support that testifying can serve as a way to construct our identity. Drury contends for a more normative role in the practice of testifying. Testifying is part of the church and is part of the Christian calling.[37]

An essential part of her project is a Christian approach to spiritual formation that takes into consideration the participation of the Holy Spirit.[38] Hence, Drury's project focuses on testimony's influence on Christian spiritual formation. The purpose of highlighting Drury's assumptions is not an attempt to support or vilify the claim. It is highlighted to point out that Drury's approach is significantly different from the approach of this thesis. This thesis does not make a claim about God's participation in human affairs. It is an analysis of Pentecostals' assumptions about God's participation in human affairs and how this perspective affects their sense of autobiographical identity. In contrast to Drury, it is not a study of spiritual formation. Rather, it is a study on the influence of testimony on Pentecostal narrative identity. The existence of God and whether or how God participates is not a topic of discussion. This work is written with a broader audience in mind than that of Drury's.

Another aspect of Drury's work testimony that is not in complete agreement with the theoretical foundation presented in this thesis is Drury's claim that testimony requires a personal narrative. However, this thesis argues that Drury's claim does not concord with recent scholarship on the prereflective narrative nature of the mind. Ironically, some of the scholars Drury utilizes argue for a view of narrative that could have offered a correction to Drury's work.

[37] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 102.
[38] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 25.

Drury makes some reference to Dan P. McAdams, who is an important scholar of social scientific approaches to narrative identity. McAdams and Robyn Fivush have worked together to define the concept of autobiographical memory, narrative identity, and the various ways it is formed. Drury's engagement in McAdams and Fivush's work is limited, having only referenced McAdams' *Stories We Live By*. McAdams and his interlocutors have contributed much to the subject. In short, Drury misses an opportunity to develop a more rigorous exposition of what testimony is within Christian religious practice. This subject requires more engagement than would be appropriate for this section. Nevertheless, it is more extensively addressed in Chapter 6.

Fortunately, it seems that Pentecostal scholarship has an excellent grasp of the concept of testimony. Although a comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis of the nature of testimony is not specifically offered in Pentecostal scholarship, it is clear that Pentecostal scholars are aware of the reflective and prereflective elements of testimony. In this regard, this thesis finds the work of Tony Richie, Mark Cartledge, and Stephen Parker very useful. Richie provides a richly comprehensive examination of what Pentecostal testimony is from a scholarly perspective. On the other hand, Cartledge provides what he describes as the *ordinary theology* of Pentecostals. Cartledge intends to provide a practical-theological account of Pentecostal identity. Parker's work in *Led by The Spirit*, provides an ethnographic study of a Pentecostal congregation that describes the kind of social interaction within church settings that leads to identity formation. Though Parker's work does not explicitly focus on the concept of the autobiographical self or testimony, it provides valuable examples of how testimonies are expressed.

1.2.3 Pentecostal Philosophy, Theology, and Embodiment

One of the most crucial aspects of Gallagher's work that is used in this work is phenomenology. It has already been mentioned that Fredrick L. Ware's work represents work within Pentecostal scholarship in the direction that this thesis is pursuing. At the same time, it is an academic domain that is distinct from the kind of phenomenology engaged by some notable Pentecostal scholars. J. Aaron Simmons is a Pentecostal philosopher who has suggested that Pentecostal theologians can effectively present who they are, who they have been, and want to be by engaging philosophy.[39] Simmons suggests that there is an opportunity for fruitful engagement with the phenomenological philosophy of contemporary French philosophers like Jean-Louis Chrétien and Jean-Luc Marion.[40] Such philosophers represent a turn in second-generation phenomenologists toward theology.[41] The phenomenologists suggested by Simmons represent scholarship that is rigorous and respected in its own right. However, they do not sufficiently address the objectives of this thesis in regard to 4E cognition. That is not to say that Simmons has not foreseen the kind of engagement that is offered here. Simmons has recognized that emerging work in affect theory, liturgy, and embodied cognition has an opportunity to facilitate stronger arguments for the importance of Pentecostal theology and philosophy.[42] Simmons states that "philosophy helps to make explicit the assumptions that often form the background conditions of theological work".[43] Indeed, that is exactly what is advanced in this thesis; however, in a way that has not been developed explicitly by Simmons.

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[39] J. Aaron Simmons, "Philosophy: Inspiration for Living Relationally and Thinking Rigorously," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, ed., Wolfgang Vondey (New York: Routledge, 2020), 399-409.

[40] Simmons, "Philosophy," 401-402.

[41] Bruce Ellis Benson, and Norman Wirzba, eds., *Words of Life: New Theological Turns in French Phenomenology* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).

[42] Simmons, "Philosophy," 399.

[43] Simmons, "Philosophy," 402.

As stated above, the primary interlocutor that is addressed in this thesis for Pentecostal philosophy and theology is James K.A. Smith. Smith has produced a wide array of scholarly projects. Consequently, not all of his scholarly works are pertinent to this thesis. Thus, the primary texts that are examined are Smith's *Thinking in Tongues*, and *Imagining the Kingdom* with reference to other works as necessary throughout. Furthermore, the majority of Smith's work is analysed in conjunction with other scholarship. *Thinking in Tongues* represents one of Smith's largest contributions to Pentecostal theology, while *Imagining the Kingdom* represents a critical development in Smith's work on embodied epistemology. Furthermore, what distinguishes Smith's work in *Desiring the Kingdom* from *Imagining the Kingdom*, is his engagement in *Imagining the Kingdom* with Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu. His work in *Imagining the Kingdom* contributes to what he sees as a needed "phenomenological analysis of religious practice". An important observation made in this thesis about Smith's work is that he addresses both the individual and the community. This is significant because it justifies this study's approach to addressing both individual and communal aspects of cognition and identity formation.

In Smith's work, a sustained philosophical engagement with human embodiment is not substantially engaged until his affective epistemology in *Thinking in Tongues*, and his embodied epistemology in *Imagining the Kingdom*. However, though substantive engagement is not present in his earlier work, the embodied epistemology developed later concords and seems to be an expansion of his earlier work. A significant time before *Thinking in Tongues* and *Imagining the Kingdom*, Smith is already concerned with the topic of experience within philosophy, the pretheoretical aspects of experience, and how to theoretically articulate the aspects of experience

that is pretheoretical.[44] Smith's earlier epistemological work includes a careful consideration between immanence, transcendence, and incommensurability. This aspect of Smith's epistemology does not directly address embodiment. Nevertheless, it is important to Smith's view of Christian realism and the knowability of God and others. In *Speech and Theology*, Smith argues that if a theoretical articulation of an object exists fundamentally outside of what language can describe, any attempt to present it within language will fall short of capturing the object itself. The object will not truly be presented in language because the conceptual articulation is not able fully encompass something that inherently surpasses understanding. Instead, the object will appear in a distorted form, conforming to the constraints of the theory and thereby experiencing the distortion of being conceptualized. Smith proposes a new approach to the meaning of a "concept" and provides a phenomenological approach that is able to refer to a topic while simultaneously respecting its alterity and incommensurability.[45] This approach is contrasted from the view that a "concept", including theories and descriptions, is inherently reductive and violent.[46] Smith describes his philosophy as an incarnational approach. Through an incarnational approach, Smith seeks to account for the appearance of an object while at the same time withholding complete disclosure.[47] It bears an analogy to the appearance of God within humanity in that God appears in human form without forfeiting His transcendence. The infinite is disclosed through the finite.[48] Smith's notion of incarnation is an intentional invocation of a

[44] James K.A. Smith, *Speech and Theology: Language and the Logic of Incarnation* (London: Routledge, 2002), 4.

[45] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 6.

[46] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 5-6. See also James K.A. Smith, *The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2012), 25.

[47] For a useful concise description of Smith's incarnational approach as a response to conceptual violence see William L. Oliverio Jr., *Theological Hermeneutics in the Classical Pentecostal Tradition: A Typological Account* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 215-218.

[48] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 10. See also, James K.A. Smith, "A Principle of Incarnation in Derrida's (*Theologische?) Jugendschriften*: Towards a Confessional Theology," *Modern Theology* 18, vol. 2 (April 2002).

Christological notion of "the appearance of God within humanity in the person of the God-man, Jesus of Nazareth". Importantly, Smith's intention is not to defend a Christological position, despite perhaps presupposing one.[49] Smith's work in *Speech and Theology* provides the foundation for a philosophical theology that takes into account formal indications and the incommensurable aspects of meaning, including God's transcendence. In another work Smith recognizes that though the incarnation demonstrates the iterability of God, it can also be distorted. Smith states, "Insofar as revelation is a communication to finite embodied beings, God's speaking must operate under the conditions of finite language". [50] There are limitations on what human language can directly communicate. Nevertheless, God utilizes human language to reveal himself to humanity. As a result of limitations of finite language, the Word is subject to interpretation and can be decontextualized or misunderstood. Pentecostal scholar William Oliverio recognizes that Smith's earlier more Pentecostal work argued that a recognition that human knowledge is always limited, partial, and mediated is more faithful to biblical narrative. This is not a result of the Fall. Rather, it describes how finite humans come to know.[51]

While *Speech and Theology* rigorously describes *that* an incarnational model represents a theory that is respectful of transcendence and immanence, it does not give an extensive theory on *how* immanence emerges and the relationship between immanence and transcendence. In contrast, this thesis argues throughout that our patterned self emerges from our embodied interaction with the world. Our patterned self can be understood as both prereflective and

[49] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 10.

[50] James K.A. Smith, "Limited Inc/arnation: Revisiting the Searle/Derrida Debate in Christian Context," in *Hermeneutics at the Crossroads*, eds. by Kevin J. Vanhoozer, James K.A. Smith, and Bruce Ellis Benson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 124.

[51] William L. Oliverio Jr., "The Nature of Theology and Pentecostal Hermeneutics: On the Relationship Among Scripture, Experience of the Spirit, and Life in Spirit-Filled Community," in *Pentecostal Theology and Ecumenical Theology: Interpretations and Intersections*, eds. Peter Hocken, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 167.

reflective durable dispositions that influence our navigation of our being-in-the-world. This is the location of any transcendent identity. It is the compendium of patterned and durable dispositions that when generally conceived together constitutes our sense of self. This thesis also gives an account for how these dispositions emerge from our perception and interaction with the world from the first moments of life. The foundational aspects of our patterned selves is addressed through Gallagher's enaction theory, whereas the narrative and social psychological aspects is addressed through Robyn Fivush. Thus, it extends Smith's argument of *that* into a more detailed articulation of *how* immanence and a transcendent self is possible. There is a critical aspect of Smith's philosophy that will not be fully addressed in this thesis. There is limited interaction with the implications of what enaction theory and Fivush's work on the autobiographical self might mean for Smith's theological assertions. The thesis focus primarily on the aspect of Smith's philosophy that addresses his view of embodied epistemology and affective orientation.

In his work in *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism,* Smith focuses on developing a Chistian view of story, community, and the lived story of Christian life. Smith uses insights from Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, and Michel Foucault's work to show how that postmodernism's focus on the communal aspects of life can correlate to the church's own practices of discipline, worship and community.[52] He suggests that engagement with Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault might help Christianity, "recapture some truths about the nature of the church that have been overshadowed by modernity and especially by Christian appropriations of modernism".[53] Smith offers an interdisciplinary approach with postmodern thought to recover aspects of Christian identity that has been damaged by modernist approaches. For Smith, the postmodern church

[52] James K.A. Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?: Taking Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault to Church* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 23-24.

[53] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?*, 23

understands that its primary role is to live the story for the world. The postmodern church not only narrates the story in Word, but also its what it does. Christians have a storied community that replays the narrative of Scripture in deed. Thus, Christians are called to faithfully enact God's love within the church as a community grounded in love and justice.[54] Smith states that "Our storytelling should be supported by our story living".[55] It can be observed that the concept of "story living" that Smith refers to in *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?* seems to emerge into the embodied narrative epistemology developed in his later works including *Desiring the Kingdom*, *Thinking in Tongues*, and *Imagining the Kingdom.*

In *Desiring the Kingdom*, Smith presents a philosophical anthropology that argues for our affective embodied creaturehood and that humans are by nature liturgical animals because we are desiring creatures. Smith argues that "we need a nonreductionistic understanding of human persons as embodied agents of desire or love." Smith asserts his model presented in *Desiring the Kingdom* "resists the rationalism and quasi-rationalism of the earlier models by shifting the center of gravity of human identity, as it were, down from the heady regions of mind closer to the central regions of our bodies, in particular, our kardia—our gut or heart".[56] We are shaped by what we love, and this love is directed, formed, and cultivated through liturgical practices. We are what Smith calls primarily "homo liturgicus," or liturgical, embodied, and practicing creatures.[57] Thus, Smith argues that our embodied liturgical practices influence our orientation to the world more than doctrinal theologizing. Before systematic theology was offered to the Christian community, they first participated in singing hymns and psalms, praying, and

[54] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?*, 76-79.
[55] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?*, 79.
[56] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 63.
[57] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 53.

"becoming a people marked by a desire for God's coming kingdom".[58] Undoubtedly, *Desiring the Kingdom* marks an important progression in Smith's thinking.[59] It seems to represent a convincing justification for the need of a more philosophically rigorous investigation into *how* human embodied epistemology comes about presented later in *Imagining the Kingdom.*

Another reason that compels this thesis to focus its engagement on Smith's work in *Thinking in Tongues* and *Imagining the Kingdom* is that the concept of embodiment is not as significantly present in much of Smith's works after *Imagining the Kingdom* as well. For example, in *Who's Afraid of Relativism?*, Smith uses theology to respond to the problem of incommensurability of language to disclose the nature of an object, there is a response given in this thesis through cognitive linguistics. In Chapter 3, it is argued that because our bodies are similar and situated and similar environments, it produces an intersubjective existence. When concepts are articulated, we reuse the experiences that are present in our patterned self to conceive the pretheoretical (prereflective) aspects of meaning. Though the approach of this thesis is different than Smith's, it remains in agreement with Smith's philosophical foundation. Smith's work in *Who's Afraid of Relativism?* explores the implications of creaturely contingency and dependence to bring nuance to his account of knowledge and truth. It engages in pragmatist philosophy "to provide an account of knowledge and truth that remembers and re-appreciates the implications of a biblical doctrine of creation".[60]

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[58] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 185.

[59] Oliverio recognizes similar themes between *Desiring the Kingdom* and *Thinking in Tongues* while recognizing *Thinking in Tongues* uniquely develops the concept of a Pentecostal "social imaginary", Pentecostal worldview, and affective epistemology. See: L. William Oliverio Jr., review of *Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy*, by James K.A. Smith, *Pneuma* 34 (2012), DOI: 10.1163/157007412X621905.

[60] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Relativism?*, 36.

Smith seeks to introduce philosophical precision to the concept of relativism. If something is relative, it means that its constitutions is dependent or contingent on something else.[61] Smith states that his view of relativism is "synonymous with the conditions of creaturehood".[62] Relativism, for Smith, is simply another way of understanding the dependent and contingent aspect of creaturehood. Only God is independent and absolute in himself. Since, for Smith, God is the only one who is Absolute and independent, it should be safe to say that God is the only truly transcendent being. He is consistent throughout time and space.[63] To rephrase this in terms more consistent with this thesis, only humanity produces a patterned self. However, that self is always being repatterned by environment, and is therefore contingent on the environment in which they are embedded. Nevertheless, for Smith, God does not change and remains consistent throughout time despite the ever-changing environment.

In addition to Smith, some are brought into dialogue to clarify Pentecostal theology and epistemology. Kenneth Archer has done excellent work on Pentecostal hermeneutics, while the work of Wolfgang Vondey provides insight regarding Pentecostals' approach to encounter with God. Though these are some of the primary Pentecostal figures within this work, this thesis takes advantage of the rich scholarship that Pentecostal scholars have developed to define who they are and the conditions that have formed and continue to form their identity.

1.3 Thesis Summary

A critical detail about the approach of this thesis is that though the author is a practising Pentecostal, it is not explicitly written for Pentecostals. One of the primary purposes of this thesis is to produce a work that fosters as much interdisciplinary engagement as possible. As

[61] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Relativism?*, 179.
[62] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Relativism?*, 180.
[63] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Relativism?*, 180.

such, the work here is presented with the assumption that the reader of this thesis may be an outsider to the Pentecostal movement. Therefore, terms and concepts that seem natural to Pentecostals or even Christians, more broadly, are further elucidated. While being a Pentecostal has contributed to my understanding of Pentecostalism, Pentecostals are methodologically analysed as an "other". It is the intent of this thesis to cultivate a space for religious and non-religious readers alike to come to a deeper understanding of Pentecostal theology and spirituality.

As for the progression of this project, this thesis 1) defines Smith's approach to cognition, narrative, theology and religious practice, 2) defends the usefulness of Smith's work for Pentecostal theology, 4) defines the interdisciplinary elements that can be used to revise and advance Smith's work, 5) contextualizes a revised Smithian approach within the concept of testimony in the Pentecostal movement, and 6) envisions the possible directions that the methodologies expressed here can contribute to fruitful engagement in other areas of study. Each chapter uniquely contributes to the goals stated above.

Importantly, Chapter 2 stands separate from the work in the rest of this thesis. Before progressing into theoretical construction, the use of Smith's work for Pentecostal theology requires some justification in light of recent critiques. First, Chapter 2 seeks to elucidate some defining characteristics of Smith's approach as it relates to the narrativity of the mind. After defining some foundational characteristics of Smith's approach, the contributions of Shin and Frestadius are explored to elucidate some key areas that need to be addressed for Pentecostals who should seek to use Smith's recent scholarship. In essence, Chapter 2 helps to make the direction for the rest of this thesis clear and concrete.

Once some critical clarification and justification are performed in Chapter 2, the central goals of this thesis are then pursued. Smith's theoretical arrangement in *Imagining the Kingdom*

is useful for organisation in this thesis. In *Imagining the Kingdom*, Smith devotes his first chapter, "Erotic Comprehension", to the embodied mind. His second chapter, "The Social Body", utilizes Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* to develop a robust account of how the environment shapes human practice. Thus, a cognitive individual is not formed alone. An individual is also shaped by relational interaction with others and the environment. In this way, human beings are fundamentally social creatures. Smith's third chapter develops the storied or narrative nature of the mind. Smith's understanding of the mind is constructed from a micro to a more macro level of human cognition. At the micro level, he explains the concept of primary metaphors and how they contribute to meaning-making of the world on a primal level. This kind of thinking primes and leads individuals to more complex narrative forms of meaning-making. Finally, Smith envisions the way that Christians can re-story their lives. Liturgical methods can be utilized to touch and transform the most fundamental aspects of being-in-the-world.

Likewise, this thesis follows a similar progression yet with some notable variations. In Chapter 3, following Smith, this thesis begins its theoretical foundation by addressing the embodied nature of cognition. However, this thesis combines Smith's work on conceptual metaphor theory with the embodied nature of cognition. Hence, concepts that are introduced later in Smith's book are integrated earlier within this thesis. This is because conceptual metaphor theory is used by Mark Johnson and George Lakoff as compelling evidence for embodied cognition. Conceptual metaphor theory seems better suited as support for what Smith describes as "erotic comprehension". In Chapter 4, this thesis introduces the concept of the narrativity of the mind as emerging from the earliest moments of an individual's interaction with the world. Only after establishing these primal ways of our being-in-the-world does this thesis proceed to expound on the social aspects of the narrative mind. The social aspect of the narrative mind is

expounded to demonstrate the significance of environment and social interaction to the cultivation of narrative identity. In Chapter 5, this thesis brings Smith's work into dialogue with embodied and social cognition to generate a critical and rigorous revision of Smith's work. Some of Smith's work is revisited to posit the kind of ways this revised insight enhances Smith's theological and philosophical reflection.

Once the task of revising Smith's work is accomplished, this thesis then turns to the Pentecostal movement. Chapter 6 lays the groundwork to understand the concept of testimony, the practice of testifying, and its significance to the cultivation of Pentecostal's narrative identity. Examples of testimony are traced from the early roots of the Pentecostal movement to more contemporary examples. The concept of autobiographical self and memory is an important aspect of this thesis, along with how narrative transcends from community to the individual. Thus, some central narratives that are embedded within the Pentecostal community are analysed along with crucial ways that Pentecostals utilize those narratives to make meaning of their lives.

This thesis primarily focuses on testimony and narrative from Pentecostal sources that are related to the Azusa Street Revival. However, despite the common implication, it is important to note that the Azusa Street Revival is not the only contributor to the birth of the Pentecostal movement. Early Pentecostal historians largely drew from the accounts of early writers and eyewitnesses, often incorporating their understanding of Pentecostal origins without concern for historical veracity. This led to the creation of historical narratives of the Pentecostal movement that were heavily influenced by the paradigm that the modern Pentecostal movement grew out of solely the Azusa Street Revival. These early narratives became the foundation for later

interpretations that perpetuated this inaccurate perspective.[64] While Azusa is a major contributor to the massive expansion of Pentecostalism, scholars have done considerable work to dispel the argument that the modern Pentecostal movement had a single origin.[65] In essence, the question of influence on Pentecostal expansion differs from that of origin and requires complex considerations that are beyond the scope of this thesis. While this thesis focuses on testimonies and narratives that emerged from the Azusa Street Revival, it is recognized that Pentecostalism as a global phenomenon is the product of a compendium of diverse national and ethnic origins that experienced what can be described as a Pentecostal experience.

In Chapter 7, this thesis finally applies the theoretical tools garnered within this thesis to demonstrate how the practice and concept of testimony within the Pentecostal community directly address what Smith describes as the re-storying of the mind. Various Pentecostal religious events are analysed to discuss how narratives are integrated into the narrative self through liturgical discursive dynamics. The act of testifying is analysed through multiple instances that show how Pentecostal narrative identity is cultivated. The first is a Pentecostal church service within an ethnographic study produced by Pentecostal scholar Stephen Parker. The ethnographic study is used to describe discursive liturgical activities involved with testifying and altar call of a church service. Additionally, an analysis of a congregational performance of a song is provided to highlight how singing together can be a powerful tool in identity formation

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[64] Adam Stewart, "A Canadian Azusa? The Implications of the Hebden Mission for Pentecostal Historiographical Mission for Pentecostal Historiography," in *Winds From the North: Canadian Contributions to the Pentecostal Movement*, eds., Michael Wilkinson and Peter Althouse (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 17-18.

[65] Allan H. Anderson, *An Introduction to Pentecostalism: Global Charismatic Christianity* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014), 36-38; Allan H. Anderson, *To the Ends of the Earth: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of World Christianity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 44-46; Allan H. Anderson, "Varieties, Taxonomies, and Definitions," in *Studying Global Pentecostalism: Theories and Methods*, eds., Allan Anderson, Michael Bergunder, André Droogers, and Cornelis van der Laan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 22-23; Wolfgang Vondey, *Pentecostalism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013), 11-12; Joe Creech, "Visions of Glory: The Place of the Azusa Street Revival in Pentecostal History," *Church History* 65, no. 3 (1996): 405-24, DOI: 10.2307/3169938.

within a church service. The Spanish hymnal, *Aleluya al Señor* (Hallelujah to the Lord), is examined along with an analysis of how Pentecostal narratives are integrated into multicultural settings. In conclusion, it is argued that the narrative nature of testimony predisposes Pentecostals to be changed on a fundamental, epistemological, and narrative level. Genuine behavioural change is produced because of a primal transformation of narrative identity.

CHAPTER 2: SMITH'S EMBODIED EPISTEMOLOGY: TOWARD INTEGRATION AND CONSTRUCTION

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to begin the task of establishing the usefulness of James K.A. Smith's work for enactive approaches to Pentecostal scholarship. This chapter begins with an overview of Smith's work that is critically pertinent to the purposes of this thesis. Subsequently, the work of Frestadius and Shin is addressed. Their work raises some concerns about Smith's theoretical foundation and its usefulness for Pentecostal theology and philosophy. Finally, this chapter proposes a way forward if Pentecostals are going to use Smith to continue analyzing the theology and religious practice in Pentecostalism. This chapter sets the stage for the theoretical development and application of Chapters 3 and 4. What is envisioned is clear ways that Smith's embodied epistemology can be updated, revised, and utilized for Pentecostal scholarship.

2.2 Smith on Pentecostal Epistemology and Embodied Epistemology

Smith has made some significant contributions to Pentecostal theology. His book *Thinking in Tongues* stands as an attempt to articulate elements of a distinctly Pentecostal philosophy and explore what that philosophy may offer in conversations that proceed into broader, more universal Christian domains. For Smith, Pentecostalism is best understood as a "spirituality" rather than a movement with a set of doctrines.

To pinpoint what Smith refers to as "fundamental *pentecostal* commitments", Smith articulates what he sees as a general overarching Pentecostal worldview. While these five elements of a Pentecostal worldview are described here, they are analyzed with more extensive examples throughout this thesis. The five fundamental Pentecostal commitments include:

1. A position of *radical openness to God*, and in particular, God doing something *differently* or *new*.
2. An "*enchanted*" *theology of creation and culture*.
3. A *nondualistic affirmation of embodiment and materiality*.
4. An *affective, narrative epistemology*.
5. An *eschatological orientation to mission and justice.* [66]

Pentecostals' radical openness to God refers to Pentecostals' willingness to participate in the spontaneous experience and expressions as a result of an encounter with God. Smith contends that this largely extends from the biblical Pentecostal narrative. The spontaneous and unorthodox experience and expression found in Acts are available and expected within the present-day Church. [67] Pentecostals' enchanted theology refers to a cosmological view of creation that includes the participation of the Holy Spirit and other supernatural forces.[68] It is suggested by Smith elsewhere that that the best way of viewing the Pentecostal perspective of the world is that it is an "enchanted naturalism" or "en-Spirited naturalism".[69] Smith describes their nondualistic affirmation of embodied life as the commitment to see spiritual life as directly and indivisibly affecting and affected by that which is commonly understood as the material world. The "embodied life" referenced here is nuanced from Smith's embodied epistemology. The nondualistic embodied life refers to the belief that the world the Pentecostals inhabit can and, at times, should be changed and reformed by the Spirit of God. For example, Pentecostals believe that the Holy Spirit *can* bring physical healing to an individual. On the other hand, it *should* affect our decision making processes.[70] Smith's embodied epistemology refers to the primacy of prereflective thinking on reflective and propositional thinking. However,

[66] See: Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 11-12, and 32-42.
[67] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 33-34.
[68] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 39-41.
[69] James K.A. Smith, "Is the Universe Open for Surprise? Pentecostal Ontology and the Spirit of Naturalism," *Zygon* 43, 4 (2008), 887. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2008.00966.x.
[70] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 41-43.

Pentecostals' affirmation of the nondualistic embodied life certainly leads to a predisposition to an affective, narrative epistemology. Hence, Pentecostals' view of coming to right belief includes an affective transformation that impacts even the most basic aspects of their embodied narrative epistemology.[71] Finally, Pentecostal's assumption that the kingdom of God is yet to be fully inaugurated motivates a sense of urgency to participate in God's plan for the present time.[72] It is clear that Smith's list of fundamental Pentecostal worldview commitments is full of information that needs to be further unpacked. The nondualistic embodied commitments and affective narrative epistemology are further analysed in this chapter and Chapters 3 and 4. The other three elements are further analysed in Chapter 6 as they require more theological engagement from other Pentecostal interlocutors.

Smith expounds on how Pentecostal epistemology stands as a kind of postmodern critique of rationalism, which he sees as a "reductionistic model of reason and rationality."[73] He provides commentary on the problems of a Cartesian view of the mind and body. For Smith, Cartesian rationalism mistakenly values *thinking* as the core of human identity and devalues and even denigrates the role of the body (embodiment). That is a problem because it leads to an "attended cultural privileging of what is *cognitive*".[74] By the word "cognitive" in *Thinking in Tongues,* Smith refers to the reflective and propositional aspects of thinking. The assumption that the cognitive domain refers to propositional thought presents some theoretical conflicts that are later addressed in this chapter.

Smith argues for the irreducibility and primacy of a kind of narrative knowledge. He distinguishes narrative knowledge from the kind of knowledge referred to by some philosophers

[71] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 43-44.
[72] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 44-46.
[73] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 53.
[74] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 54.

as justified true belief.[75] Narrative knowledge encompasses affective prereflective domains. It is an affective and embodied orientation that helps us make meaningful sense of the world.[76] Smith contends that Pentecostal testimony includes transformation in this primal domain through the working of the Spirit. It is more than a change of mind or belief. It is a narrative transformation that changes affective orientation.[77] Smith's understanding of Pentecostal testimony reveals two things that are important for the topic of this thesis: 1) Smith's concept of Pentecostal testimony relates clearly to what this thesis argues is an enactive view of testimony, and 2) Smith's concept of narrative knowledge is a precursor to what is more fully developed in his work in *Imagining the Kingdom*.

In *Imagining the Kingdom*, Smith provides a more sustained conversation regarding his understanding of embodied epistemology than that which was present in *Thinking in Tongues*. The result is an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and liturgy. Smith conceptualizes liturgy as "those rituals that are loaded with a Story about who and whose we are" and "those social practices that capture our imaginations by becoming the stories we tell ourselves in order to live".[78] He sees liturgical anthropology as having "implications for the social sciences, particularly social-scientific accounts of religion and religious phenomena."[79] This definition of liturgy expands beyond religious contexts. It includes all kinds of practices and rituals that influence identity formation. The focus of Smith's work in *Imagining the Kingdom* is to communicate a:

> Christian philosophy of action that (1) recognizes the nonconscious, pretheoretical 'drivers' of our action and behavior, centered in what I'll call the imagination; (2) accounts for the bodily formation of our

[75] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 64.
[76] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 65-66.
[77] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 67-68.
[78] James K.A. Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 139.
[79] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, xix.

> habituated orientation to the world; and thus (3) appreciates the centrality of story as rooted in this 'bodily basis of meaning' and as a kind of pretheoretical compass that guides and generates human action.[80]

Smith argues throughout his work in *Imagining the Kingdom* that Christian philosophy should include an essential role of the "nonconscious" pre-theoretical influences on the mind. The pre-theoretical mental foundation incorporates embodiment of the world from some of the earliest stages of life. The pre-theoretical embodiment of the world creates a habituated orientation towards making meaning of the world that determines the way the world is perceived. By orientation, Smith refers to a concept of habitual orientation grounded in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. The philosophy of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu is employed to demonstrate how our perception and meaning-making of the world are part of a pre-theoretical, embodied situatedness in the world. Smith's use of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu creates promising compatibility with what is proposed in this thesis. That compatibility is further examined in Chapter 5, where Smith's theoretical foundation is compared and augmented by additional contemporary scholarship on embodied cognition. For Smith, the narrative nature of the mind should be taken into consideration as an essential aspect of our being-in-the-world as well. In short, what is constructed is an embodied account of human epistemology.

After developing his philosophical foundation, Smith continues to incorporate some additional contemporary sources on *meaning-making*. Mark Johnson's theoretical framework is primarily used. Johnson sees the mind as something that emerges from an organism's enacted sensorimotor interaction with the world. The emerging schemas of meaning-making within an organism's mind orient the brain on a neural level. Smith highlights that neurons will "fire

[80] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 13-14.

together and wire together",[81] forming a dominant neural map, "and hence the primary repertoire by which we constitute and interact with our environment."[82] Hence, Smith concludes that rhythm and routine "shape my habitual orientation toward and perception of the world in no small part because they form the neural maps that govern that perception of the world."[83] By integrating Johnson, Smith provides evidence for the role of the body in our meaning-making of the world. It is theoretical development that goes beyond what was stated in *Thinking in Tongues*, where he postulates that "there may be a *primacy* of narrative understanding" that emerges from our embodiment of the world.[84] Smith's statement indicates that the "storiedness of our identity" is the product of more than the cultural constructs we are embedded in. It comes from our bodily interaction with the world as well.[85] In short, specific speculatory statements made within *Thinking in Tongues* are made more concrete within *Imagining the Kingdom*.

A notable difference between Mark Johnson and Smith is that Johnson is devoted to a physicalist perspective of reality. As a physicalist, Johnson believes there is a material basis for what he understands as being real. While he rejects a paradigm of the mind that categorically bifurcates the brain from the body, he ultimately sees the mind as having a physical materialist basis.[86] On the other hand, Smith recognizes an essential role that the Holy Spirit plays in empowering believers to participate in the story of God. Central to Smith's conviction is that

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[81] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom,* 115; quoting Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 151. Interestingly, Frederick Ware utilizes some of the work of Mark Johnson as well in his analysis of the narrative of Charles Mason's Spirit baptism. Though Ware's use of Johnson differs from Smith in that he uses Johnson and George Lakoff's joint work on cognitive linguistics, see: Ware, "Pentecostal Narrative," 127; see also: George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

[82] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 115.

[83] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 115.

[84] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 66.

[85] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 66.

[86] See: George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 109-110.

"Just as God's revelation accommodates itself to the hermeneutical conditions of our finitude, so the transforming Spirit of God meets us as the finite creatures of habit we are. The sanctifying Spirit condescends to meet us as narrative, imaginative, ritual animals, giving us practices and liturgies for our sanctification."[87] Thus, liturgy is seen not only as a Christian encounter with the story that is told but also as a meeting place for a spiritual encounter with God.[88]

Smith ultimately envisions liturgy as a tool for the transformation of the imagination. Smith creatively formats the word "re-storying" as "restor(y)ing" in a play on the assumption that the Spirit of God and liturgical practice has the power to *restore* and *re-story* (i.e., change the narrative that influences *habitus*) our lives. To present a consistent form of communication, I format the term as "re-storying" rather than Smith's creative format. The "re-storying" of a Christian's life involves rehabilitating embodied perceptions of the world, even to the point of reconfiguring established neural maps. Smith's theoretical work in *Imagining the Kingdom* seeks to establish how worship shapes and has the potential to shape a Christian's orientation to the world. The reshaping occurs in a way that enables a Christian to participate in the story of God in Christ, reconciling the world to himself.[89] This orientation is influenced by incorporating our subjective body into a "social body" that incorporates elements from our particular communities of lived practices. Thus, it is recognized that there are communal effects on any given individual's embodied epistemology. [90] The result is a liturgical individual who has a habitual

[87] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 33.

[88] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 150.

[89] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 150.

[90] Smith is not alone in recognizing the role of the body, experience, and environment in forming our foundational meaning-making mental processes. Pentecostals apart from Smith, Shin, and Frestadius have recognized this embodied dynamic as well, though not as explicitly developed as what is done in *Imagining the Kingdom*. For some notable examples see: Oliverio, "Nature of Theology and Pentecostal Hermeneutics," 159-160; Peter Althouse, "Inner Healing, Embodied Emotions, and the Therapeutic Culture of Christian Healing," *Pneuma* 45, no. 2 (2023): 188-190, DOI:10.1163/15700747-bja10096; Wilkinson, Michael, and Peter Althouse, "Social Theory, Religion, and the Body." In *Annual Review of Sociology of Religion*: *Pentecostals and the Body*, Michael Wilkinson and Peter Althouse (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 1-14.; Wolfgang Vondey, "Embodied Gospel: The Materiality

way of processing and making meaning of the world.[91] Smith advocates for the sanctification of perception, which he states requires "re-storying the imagination". Thus, narrative and the way narrative is embodied is a hallmark of Smith's approach, as he sees human beings as inherently narrative animals.[92] As such, Smith recognizes self-narrative's central role in human action. In this, he joins Alasdair MacIntyre in saying that "I can't answer the question, 'What ought I to do'? unless I have already answered a *prior* question, 'Of what story I am a part?'"[93] In other words, Smith proposes that an individual can intentionally utilize liturgical religious practice to self-identify with a revised self-narrative. Because humankind utilizes narrative to make sense of the world, the new self-narrative that an individual identifies with can become a re-habituating influence.

2.3 Recent Pentecostal Reception of Smithian Pentecostal Epistemology and Theology

In his recent book, Yoon Shin sets out to establish what he argues is a plausible postmodern Christian epistemology. In this effort, Shin provides an analysis of Smith along with what Shin argues is a repair to Smith's epistemology. Thus, Shin constructs a postmodern Christian epistemology through a conversation between Smith and the Reformed epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. Shin concedes that Smith's distinction between prereflective doxological confessions and second-order theoretical knowledge is helpful. Nevertheless, Shin states that this

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of Pentecostal Theology," in *Annual Review of Sociology of Religion*: *Pentecostals and the Body*, eds., Michael Wilkinson and Peter Althouse (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 102-119; Devaka Premawardhana, "Before Habitus: Embodied Indeterminacy in Black Atlantic Pentecostalism," in *Annual Review of Sociology of Religion*: *Pentecostals and the Body*, Michael Wilkinson and Peter Althouse (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 149-150; Rafael Cazarin, "Emotions and Spiritual Knowledge: Navigating (In)Stabilities in Migrant Initiated Churches," in *Annual Review of Sociology of Religion*: *Pentecostals and the Body*, eds., Michael Wilkinson and Peter Althouse (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 159-176. Michael Wilkinson, "Worship: Embodying the Encounter with God," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, ed., Wolfgang Vondey (London: Routledge, 2020), 117-126.

[91] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 92-95.

[92] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 108.

[93] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 108 (emphasis original); quoting Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*. Second Edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007, first published 1984), 216.

foundationalist relationship between pretheory and theory contradicts Steven Land's definition of Pentecostal spirituality. According to Shin, Land integrates orthopraxis and orthodoxy in orthopathos. In other words, right praxis and right thinking produce right affect. By neglecting Pentecostal concepts of orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathos, Smith's epistemology falls short of being truly Pentecostal.[94]

Shin supplies a theoretical foundation to epistemology that is unique to Smith's through the scholarship of Jonathan Haidt.[95] Shin draws on insights from moral psychology and the philosophy of emotion to support the reciprocal relationship between pretheory and theory. He challenges the notion that affect and cognition can be divided by framing affect as a form of cognition itself. Shin addresses what he perceives as problematic similarities between Smith's approach and Haidt's assumptions about the relationship between affect and cognition, offering corrections to these points.

According to Shin, Haidt's social intuitionist model suggests that most moral judgments are intuitive rather than reflective while still acknowledging the significant role that reason can play in moral judgment. It is described as the sudden emergence of a moral judgment in consciousness, accompanied by an affective sense of good or bad, like or dislike, without conscious awareness of having engaged in propositional reasoning. Shin highlights that, like Smith, Haidt's model challenges the rationalist perspective, which posits that moral judgments follow a linear progression from an eliciting situation, followed by propositional reasoning that directs moral judgments thereafter. Instead, Haidt proposes a complex interplay between intuition, judgment, and reason.[96]

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[94] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 49.
[95] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 63-65.
[96] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 60.

For Shin, Haidt's social intuitional model can only be utilized to repair Smith's affective foundationalism in part. Shin states, "But just as Smith overemphasized affect to the detriment of reason, Haidt overemphasizes the claim that private reason does not have greater causal role on intuitions and judgments," and further claims that "reason can have greater qualitative primacy on the direction of intuitions and judgements".[97] Shin seeks to correct this overemphasis by integrating the work of Cordelia Fine, who cites a study using fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) to study brain activity in individuals who were given easy or difficult moral dilemmas.[98] Fine states that significant activity was found in the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is a region of the brain associated with abstract reasoning processes which Fine concedes may indicate *post hoc* justification but is more plausibly a demonstration of moral reason in search of moral judgment. If correct, this shows that moral judgments can be determined by moral reasoning, not solely intuition.[99]

Shin further substantiates his argument by engaging with Robert Solomon's cognitive theory of emotions. Solomon's perspective aligns with Smith in that he conceptualizes emotion as intelligent, rational, and within the complete framework of cognitive processes. However, according to Shin, Solomon diverges from Smith in his correlation between emotion and cognition, treating them as deeply intertwined. For Solomon, emotions function as fundamental judgments about our identity and place within the world. Through emotions, we project our

[97] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 63.

[98] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 63; see also: Cordelia Fine, "Is the Emotional Dog Wagging Its Rational Tail, or Chasing It?: Reason in Moral Judgment," *Philosophical Explorations* 9, no. 1 (2006): 83-98. DOI: 10.1080/13869790500492680; Joshua D. Greene, et al., "The Neural Basis of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment," *Neuron* 44, no. 2 (2004): 389-400. DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027.

[99] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 64. Fine, "Is the Emotional Dog Wagging Its Rational Tail or Chasing it?," 89.

values, ideals, structures, and mythologies that guide our lives and shape our experiences.[100] After establishing the connection between affect and reason, Shin critiques Smith's sub-cognitivism, using Pentecostalism as a corrective lens, while acknowledging Smith's nuanced understanding of the reciprocity between pretheory and theory in his broader work within *Imagining the Kingdom*.[101]

Shin contends that Smith's Pentecostal epistemology exemplifies his broader postmodern epistemological framework. According to Shin, Smith's *Thinking in Tongues* represents a fully developed embodied epistemology, a perspective that is consistently reflected in Smith's subsequent works on anthropology, hermeneutics, and epistemology.[102] This thesis recognizes Shin's point in general yet offers a more nuanced view of the perspective that Smith had fully established his embodied epistemology by the time he wrote *Thinking in Tongues*. While it is clear that Smith's later work remains predominantly consistent with his Pentecostal epistemology, he makes some terminological shifts in *Imagining the Kingdom* that refine his approach. For example, this point is further elucidated below regarding Smith's use of the term "precognitive" to describe prereflective or preprepositional thinking. Smith's terminological adjustments add precision to his epistemology and bring it closer to the embodied perspective developed in this thesis.

Ultimately, Shin seeks to critique and repair Smith's interpretations in areas that he believes pose a risk to his own perspective on epistemology.[103] Shin argues that Smith's realist position lacks a method of adjudicating between various cultural-linguistic traditions and

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[100] Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: Emotions and the Meaning of Life* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 126; Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 65-66.

[101] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 74.

[102] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 87.

[103] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 88-97; see also, Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology", 138-205.

narrative, affective knowledge. Shin offers a possible solution to incommensurable language games through his understanding of George A. Lindbeck's integration of the concept of *phronesis* and his postliberal approach to religious doctrine.[104]

Norms within religious *phronesis* function like the deep grammar, which works as a kind of reasonableness or skill in religion and theology that cannot be formalized. Confirmation or disconfirmation within Lindbeck's understanding of religious *phronesis* happens through the gradual accumulation of successes or failures in achieving practical and cognitive coherence with relevant data. This process remains ongoing in the context of religions until the end of history. This approach does not allow individuals to choose between major alternatives based solely on reason. At the same time, it offers strong ground for considering the reasonableness of religious belief. It sheds light on why the theoretical intellectual efforts of theologians can still have a role in the health of religious traditions.[105]

For Shin, Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model accounts for the different ways that various cultures make unique meaning of the same religion. For Christians, some cultural-linguistic frameworks proceed unevenly toward achieving coherent correspondence with reality. Shin argues, "Claims that correspond to reality are those that seem to explain the world adequately, that correspond with the reality of lived experience".[106] While adding what Shin sees as correctives to Smith, Shin also defends Smith's affective and narrative epistemology from critiques that see narrative affective knowledge as relativistic. Thus, an epistemology founded on

[104] George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1984).

[105] Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 130-131; see also Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 133.

[106] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology", 181-182.

the concept of narrative, affective knowledge does not have the capability of differentiating various truth claims.[107]

Shin analyzes Smith's ontological and epistemological realism and provides possible modes of justification for truth. He then argues that both Smith's logic of incarnation and logic of creation demonstrate the importance of correspondence of right knowledge. For Shin, Smith's logic of creation reimagines the healthy relationship between pretheory and theory as a creational possibility. While epistemological warrant and truth justification are undoubtedly important subjects in Christian and Pentecostal philosophy and theology, this thesis is careful not to venture into how claims about Pentecostal narrative can be verified as true. This focus also applies to setting aside the more theological and religious claims that Smith proposes related to the logic of creation and incarnation. For this reason, this thesis maintains focus on Shin's understanding of Smith's embodied epistemology.

Furthermore, as stated above regarding the progression of Smith's thought on epistemology, there are major limitations on the ways that this thesis can utilize Smith's earlier work due to an underdeveloped theory of how the body is fundamentally involved in meaning-making cognitive processes. That Smith has a view of the role of embodiment seems to merely be minimally evident and implicit. For example, while the concept of incarnation implies the notion of embodiment, Smith's analogical use of the concept of incarnation in *Speech and Theology* is primarily used for explaining theological implications as opposed to the philosophical notion of embodiment found in the work of Merleau-Ponty.[108] Smith concedes, "A participatory ontology that confirms materiality and embodiment is the ground for a doxological

[107] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 127-129.
[108] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 10.

and sacramental philosophy of language".[109] Though Smith's sacramental account of language is developed in his incarnational account,[110] a clear explanation of how embodiment grounds his sacramental philosophy of language and epistemology is missing. In contrast, Smith presents a more rigorous embodied rendition of epistemology within *Imagining the Kingdom* and correlates it with his earlier theological incarnational accounts.[111] He states that if Merleau-Ponty's account of our embodiment and conditions of experience are accurate, "then these would also be the conditions under which God's revelation would have to be manifest," which conceptually includes the incarnational dynamic presented by Smith in *Speech and Theology*.[112] For this same reason, though Shin provides some helpful analysis of Smith's understanding of hermeneutics, this thesis focuses on the nature of cognition and how it emerges. Shin's work on Smith's hermeneutics prior to Smith's more embodied account of epistemology requires an engagement that will not directly contribute to the goals of this thesis. This thesis focuses on embodiment to further develop an understanding of the "ground" upon which Smith's sacramental account of language and hermeneutics is founded. Considering this, this thesis reserves the focus of its analysis in this chapter on Shin's treatment of Smith that is relevant to embodied cognition. This methodological constraint is necessary, as the various disciplines and subjects integrated throughout Smith's work are too extensive to deal with appropriately within this thesis.

Shin acknowledges the essential task of recognizing the relationship between Smith's work and Pentecostal theology. As stated in the introduction of this thesis, this acknowledgement is important because one of Smith's influential and extensively comprehensive works on

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[109] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 175.

[110] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 176. See also, James K.A. Smith "Staging the Incarnation: Revisioning Augustine's Critique of Theatre," *Literature & Theology* 15, no. 2 (June 2001), 130-132.

[111] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 41.

[112] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 111, no. 16; see also ibid., no. 17.

epistemology is in relation to Pentecostal philosophy. Hence, within the broad scope of Shin's interdisciplinary project, Shin addresses Smith's epistemology and analyzes the scope of its Pentecostal nature. In other places, Shin also utilizes Smith to construct an epistemology and ontology that revalues the body as a part of a "wider mode of knowledge that includes, but also goes beyond, theoretical conceptualization and an openness to the work of the Spirit through bodily means in affective, narrative ways."[113] In other words, Shin utilizes Smith to elucidate how Pentecostals envision how the Spirit is embodied and influences our being-in-the-world. However, though Shin recognizes Smith's valuable contribution to Pentecostal theology, he argues that Smith's Pentecostal epistemology does not appropriately address the relationship between pre-theoretical understanding and theoretical knowledge.[114] As a byproduct, neither does Smith address the theoretical beliefs of Pentecostalism. Shin concludes that while Smith's epistemology is postmodern, it is also not uniquely Pentecostal.[115]

Frestadius's work focuses on recent theoretical constructions addressing Pentecostal rationality and epistemology. His book, *Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition*, is the product of his doctoral thesis.[116] He engages three primary interlocutors: Amos Yong, James K.A. Smith, and L. William Oliverio Jr. Frestadius's assessment of these three perspectives argues that Yong's rationality warrants further investigation to determine how well it aligns with any specific Pentecostal tradition[117]

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[113] Yoon Shin, "Radical Orthodoxy, Pentecostalism, and Embodiment in Exodus 20: Re-envisioning a Pentecostal Hermeneutic for a Formative Liturgy," in *Constructive Pneumatological Hermeneutics in Pentecostal Christianity*, eds. Kenneth Archer, and L. William Oliverio, Jr. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 125.

[114] Yoon Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism, and Reformed Epistemology: James K.A. Smith and the Contours of a Postmodern Christian Epistemology* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), 55.

[115] Yoon Shin, "James K.A. Smith and the Possibility of a Postmodern Christian Epistemology: A Constructive Proposal," (PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2019), 137; see also, Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 97.

[116] Simo Frestadius, "Whose Pentecostalism? Which Rationality? The Foursquare Gospel and Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism of the Elim Tradition," (PhD Thesis., University of Birmingham, 2018).

[117] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 18-19.

and that his lack of theoretical development on a methodological justification of knowledge leaves his epistemology ambiguous and unable to comprehensively account for the human complexities involved in the justification of knowledge.[118]

According to Frestadius, Smith's epistemology appears to have four key weaknesses. These weaknesses include Smith's "one-sided view" on the relationship between practices/faith and beliefs/theology[119]; an emphasis on present practices that overlooks the historical, theological, and communal narratives that develop these practices[120]; a potential problem in his theory of justification concerning beliefs/narratives[121]; and his notion of '"realism" without correspondence.[122] For Frestadius, Smith's approach does not fully engage with Pentecostal theology and history. This neglect seems to weaken the distinctly 'Pentecostal' elements of his epistemology.

Frestadius considers Oliverio's approach the most promising in developing a tradition-specific and historically informed Pentecostal rationality. However, he argues that Oliverio's Pentecostal theological hermeneutics is not entirely developed according to the methodology he proposes. For Frestadius, Oliverio's hermeneutical realism suggests that all hermeneutical activity occurs within an existing paradigm. However, Oliverio does not clearly define what comprises the Pentecostal paradigm. Due to this lack of clarity, it is difficult to assess whether Oliverio's Pentecostal hermeneutical realism is suitable for constructing an authentic historical and tradition-specific Pentecostal philosophical hermeneutic.[123]

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[118] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 19-20
[119] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 27-29.
[120] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 29-30.
[121] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 30-31.
[122] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 31-32
[123] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 42-44.

Ultimately, Frestadius sees various elements in Yong, Smith, and Oliverio that require additional theoretical development. As a corrective, Frestadius offers Alasdair MacIntyre's work on practices, tradition, and rationality as a resource to construct *narrative Pentecostal rationality*. Thus, Frestadius constructs what he calls a MacIntyrian tradition-specific Pentecostal rationality. Frestadius suggests that MacIntyre views traditions as "arguments extended through time," that are teleologically guided, socially embodied, and contextual, with a unique form of rationality specific to each tradition.[124] While MacIntyre's work recognizes the historical and social contingency of tradition-dependent rationality of a point of view, Frestadius argues that he escapes relativism by developing a critical realism that postulates that traditions are "truthful to the extent to which they reflect the reality of the world and the objects of enquiry".[125] For Frestadius, MacIntyre can further provide a method for justification for belief through its dialectical process of evoking as many questions and objections of the greatest strength possible to test the resilience of a claim to truth.[126] Frestadius acknowledges that MacIntyre's approach shares similarities with the historical methodologies used by Pentecostal scholars like Oliverio and Kenneth J. Archer. However, he believes MacIntyre's approach offers additional tools for a more precise understanding of the nature of a Pentecostal tradition.[127]

Frestadius subsequently analyzes the Elim movement within the Pentecostal tradition based in the United Kingdom to create a prototypical application of his narrative Pentecostal rationality. Although Frestadius's thesis addresses subjects that go well beyond Smith's work, it

[124] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 45-47.
[125] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 53.
[126] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 54-56.
[127] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 59.

is worth addressing as it stands as a recent critique of Smith's epistemology and where it stands as a Pentecostal work.

Frestadius addresses Smith's theological epistemology in general and evaluative observations on where Smith's theoretical foundation stands as a distinctly Pentecostal epistemology. While Frestadius recognizes that Smith effectively identifies important aspects relating to Pentecostal epistemology (i.e., knowing is affective, embodied, and narrative), he also identifies what he sees as weaknesses in Smith's theory as it relates to Pentecostal identity. While Frestadius recognizes that Smith has substantially contributed to the Pentecostal scholarly community, he also observes that Smith's "*narrative postliberal* approach is in danger of being *liberal* (read: 'experiential-expressivist') by not paying sufficient attention to the Pentecostal community's theology, and *non-narrative* by effectively being ahistorical."[128] I address this critique more specifically later when evaluating Shin and Frestadius on Smith's Pentecostal theology. Generally, Frestadius critiques Smith's work along the same lines as Shin by recognizing Smith's theoretical achievements in epistemology while identifying Smith's theory as overly focusing on pre-theory and lacking Pentecostal ethos.

For Frestadius, Smith's insistence that our individual realisms are contingent on communities of practice and relative to the environment indicates a kind of anti-realism that does not accord well with Pentecostal epistemology. Smith's work in *Who's Afraid of Relativism* is valuable because it can be helpful in addressing Frestadius's concerns that Smith is in danger of presenting a kind of anti-realism. Frestadius's critique seems to overemphasize the relativity highlighted by Smith's nuanced point that creaturely knowledge is always contingent because it is shaped by context. As stated in the overview of Smith's work above, Smith's realism

[128] Simo Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality: Epistemology and Theological Hermeneutics in the Foursquare Tradition* (London: T&T Clark, 2018), 31. Emphasis original.

maintains that God, as the only independent and absolute being, provides the grounding for truth. Smith presents a kind of Christian realism, where aspects of human understanding are contingent but still capable of accessing truth through its connection to the unchanging nature of God and the reality that He has created. Thus, Smith's brand of realism still allows for shared, meaningful engagement with the world and others.

Regarding Frestadius's concerns with justification of knowledge and epistemological warrant, this thesis stands in tandem with its position on Shin. While Frestadius's integration of MacIntyre's work on tradition-specific epistemology and the dialectical process of developing truth seems useful for Pentecostal reflection, this thesis is focused on Frestadius's view of Smith. MacIntyre's work provides valuable conceptions of tradition and practice. However, this thesis seeks to establish a robust embodied epistemology that builds off of Smith's work.

In the following section, this chapter addresses some specific critiques that Yoon Shin and Simo Frestadius make of Smith's work. Though Shin and Frestadius address different issues in their research respectively, the primary focus will be the content that pertains to Smith's epistemology and Pentecostal theology, especially to the content that is developed in Smith's work that focuses more specifically on the body (i.e., *Imagining the Kingdom*).

2.3.1 Evaluation of Shin and Frestadius on Smith's Epistemology

Shin and Frestadius's conclusions about Smith's focus on the pre-theoretical are worth considering.

However, there are some key areas where their conclusions may be overreaching. Their critique is primarily based on a method that Smith has explicitly stated as his intended approach. . For instance, Smith states in *Imagining the Kingdom*, "The core of my argument has been to

emphasize all of the nonconscious ways that we intend our world."[129] Furthermore, his emphasis on what he refers to as the "nonconscious" modes of meaning is motivated by what he sees is an underemphasized subject in discussions regarding Christian formation and Christian higher education.[130] Ultimately, Smith's focus on the pre-theoretical elements of our being-in-the-world is not the product of a theory that neglects the role of theoretical reflection and intellectual analysis in Christian formation.[131]

As an example of how Smith envisions pre-theoretical and theoretical elements that can work in tandem, he discusses how worship leaders can influence a more intentional and "habit-forming" worship experience in a congregation. Smith suggests that intentionality is important on at least two levels. First, Smith suggests that "those who are responsible for the shape and form of Christian worship understand the 'logic' of the practice in order to know what counts as wisdom *within* the practice" and that "Christian worship planners need to be reflective in order to articulate and analyze the logic of practice so that they can then discern those forms of worship that are consistent with the Story that worship is supposed to invite us into."[132] In other words, Christian worship planners should be careful to analyze how worship is practised to either affirm the logic of liturgy or reform the liturgical practice to facilitate an authentic "story" transforming experience.

Second, Smith envisions intentional worship as a full, active, and conscious participation to enable an adequate incorporation of worship into the body. As an example, Smith cites the "mystagogical preaching" employed by the fourth-century bishops Ambrose of Milan and Cyril

[129] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 186.
[130] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 186.
[131] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 186.
[132] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 187.

of Jerusalem.[133] According to Craig Satterlee, Mystagogy is "sustained reflection on the Church's rites of initiation, preaching on the 'mysteries' of the Christian faith."[134] Their pedagogy was mystagogical because it was designed to lead the newly baptized into reflection upon the ways various ceremonies connect them to the biblical story and thus the "mysteries" of baptism and Communion.[135] According to Smith, the intellectual understanding produced by a more conscious and intentional awareness of worship will solidify conviction that "then moves us to be committed to immersion in the practices."[136] This more conscious approach to worship constitutes an "angle of entry" that seems to be "a determining factor in the formative power of worship."[137]

Admittedly, it is possible to grant Shin and Frestadius merit for holding the opinion that Smith's approach has not done enough to address the relationship between theoretical and pre-theoretical. However, the characterization Smith's theory as entirely "one-sided" seems to be overstated considering his intentional emphasis on the pre-theoretical aspects of our being-in-the-world. It is clear from the examples stated that Smith has a defined understanding of the way that theoretical reflection can and should influence pre-theory, contrary to what Shin seems to imply Smith denies.

Additionally, some of the critiques of Smith's work seem to be the product of misunderstanding what Smith is attempting to state. For example, Frestadius states, "Smith's insistence that it is practice that informs theology and not theology that informs practice seems to

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[133] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 187.

[134] Craig A. Satterlee, *Ambrose of Milan's Method of Mystagogical Preaching* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002), xxiii.

[135] Lester Ruth, Carrie Steenwyk, and John D. Witvliet, *Walking Where Jesus Walked: Worship in Fourth-Century Jerusalem* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 130.

[136] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 188.

[137] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 188.

be overly simplistic."[138] This statement is a response to Smith's resistance to Michael Wilkinson's idea that beliefs give rise to practices. Smith states, "While Wilkinson sees the beliefs 'giving rise to' practices. I'm suggesting that in some significant sense it is the practices that give rise to (articulated) beliefs."[139] It is unclear whether Smith suggests here that Wilkinson believes that beliefs *exclusively* give rise to practices. What is clear is that Smith asserts that practice has a significant influence over articulated beliefs. Furthermore, as stated before, it is clear that Smith sees a place for the influence of theory on pre-theoretical aspects of our being-in-the-world. Frestadius's statement seems to be overlooking this detail of Smith's work.

On the other hand, it seems that a plausible reason why Shin stands in contrast to Smith is that Shin believes that though knowledge is more often pre-theoretical than theoretical, it is not necessarily so. Shin goes on to say, "Pretheoretical knowledge is influenced by noetic and theoretical knowledge in various ways, such that pretheoretical knowledge does not necessarily have primacy all the time."[140] Shin also states that in some instances, "discursive reasoning has greater epistemological impact on knowledge" and that "pretheoretical knowledge does not have absolute primacy".[141] His argument seems to be founded on the notion that because theory can shape pre-theory, the concept of the primacy of pre-theory is not tenable.[142]

Thus, for Shin, Smith's theoretical description of the primacy of narrative and affective knowledge stands in an irony with Smith's point that the pre-theoretical is a primordial element of theory. Nevertheless, it seems Shin's reading of *irony* may be a mischaracterization of Smith's work. It demonstrates that Shin likely has not fully considered the implications of what

[138] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality*, 28.
[139] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 31 n35.
[140] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 99.
[141] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 53.
[142] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 275.

Smith has argued. Smith states, for example, that "the goal is not to denigrate the intellect, rather, it is to situate theoretical reflection within the wider purview of our fundamental pretheoretical orientation to the world."[143] For Smith, it is critical to have an appropriate understanding of cognition to hold to the irreducibility of our pre-theoretical domain in theoretical terms. This point does not mean that theoretical reflection does not affect the pre-theoretical. To say that cognition cannot be reduced to theoretical propositional statements is simply a recognition that there is more to our cognition that is ineffable than that which can be propositionally reflected upon.

Pre-theoretical orientation is a fundamental and inseparable element of humankind's situatedness in the world. Consequently, the prereflective, which for Smith includes the "pre-theoretical" domain, is a domain from which theoretical thought and communication emerge. It is a primal function that enables communication and formulation. In other words, conscious reflection cannot be separated from prereflective cognitive processes. While all reflection has a pre-theoretical grounding, not all prereflective cognition is theoretical and reflective.[144] For example, blinking is not something that is reflected upon constantly. It occurs throughout the day without the aid of propositional thought. However, if a particle becomes lodged in an individual's eye, then blinking is attempted strategically and self-reflectively to facilitate expelling the particle. However, one does not simply forfeit the use of the prereflective domain

[143] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 12; a notion that Smith credits to Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre's *Dependent, Rational Animals*, see: James K.A. Smith, "Worldview, Sphere Sovereignty, and Desiring the Kingdom: A Guide for (Perplexed) Reformed Folk," *Pro Rege* 39, no. 4 (June 2011): 23n12.

[144] Oliverio recognizes a similar dynamic stating, "Hermeneutics always involves embedded understanding formed by language, tradition, proclivities and habits that, while often taken for granted and left unreflected or minimally reflected upon, nevertheless provide the interpretive structures not only for second order conscious, reflective understanding but also first order intuitive experiences, including spiritual experiences, which embed much prior understanding into human experiences". See: Oliverio, "Nature of Theology and Pentecostal Hermeneutics," 159-160. Oliverio's use of Daniel Kahneman's psychological theory of system 1 (intuitive reasoning) and system 2 (conscious reasoning) thinking seems to coincide well with an enactive view of reflective and prereflective thinking.

in doing this. Prereflective elements are integrated by the body, including, for example, an involuntary release of tears. Smith's approach can be understood enactively when thinking theoretically. Prereflective cognitive activity is automatically embedded in reflective thinking. The primacy of prereflective cognitive processes is that conscious thinking cannot initiate prereflective thinking. Only prereflective thinking can bring about conscious reflection (e.g., what Smith and Shin refer to as theoretical thinking). The primal function of prereflective cognition and its enactive characteristic is dealt with more extensively in subsequent chapters in ways that further support Smith's thesis.

It seems Shin may have a level of awareness that the theoretical always has a pre-theoretical element. He states, "Knowledge may be predominantly pretheoretical, but theory often steers or corrects pretheoretical knowledge, even as it is shaped by pretheory."[145] This statement seems to indicate an intuition of the primal prereflective (i.e., pre-theoretical) role in theoretical reflection. However, that understanding is not consistently considered throughout Shin's work, especially considering the nature of his critique of Smith. Shin says, for example:

> Both pretheoretical and theoretical thought can have greater influence than the other at different times, all the while involving each other. Context will determine when one perspective is more prominent than the others. One is not essentially more primary than the other, but only in emphasis, even if pretheory is the default mode of being-in-the-world and thus quantitatively primary.[146]

The statement above seems to presuppose some inconsistent assertions regarding the relationship between pre-theoretical and theoretical thought. What makes Shin's point problematic is his use of the idea of "primary" influence. If we understand "primacy" in terms of what is most fundamental or what comes first in our cognitive makeup, prereflective cognition indeed has the primary role. It is the first mode of enacting in the world, providing the basic

[145] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 277.
[146] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 136.

structure upon which reflective thought builds. Prereflective cognition is always active; it is the ongoing, underlying way we unconsciously or consciously engage with the world. Reflective thought is most appropriately seen as derivative rather than primary. It emerges from prereflective domains but does not replace or override it. Reflective thought interprets and sometimes reorganizes prereflective domains, but not because reflection supersedes, precedes, or replaces prereflection at any point. The effectiveness of reflective thought in changing cognitive states is because it can tap into, through prereflective means, other prereflective processes.

The problem above is also present in Shin's use of Cordelia Fine's work, which analyses fMRI studies on moral judgement by Joshua D. Greene et al. Throughout their article, Greene et al., maintain a distinction between "emotion" or "affect" and "cognition,". Importantly, they acknowledge this distinction's usefulness while recognizing it is artificial. They note that "cognition" is often defined as "information processing" but point out that all the processes they examine—including those labelled as "emotional"—involve information processing, which challenges the adequacy of this definition of "cognition."[147] Alternatively, they suggest that the distinction between emotion and cognition might be better understood as a contrast between representations with direct motivational force and those without such force, which can still be linked to affective/emotional states that do carry motivational power. From this perspective, the emotion/cognition distinction is real but is more a matter of degree. Greene et al. operate within this framework, continuing to use the distinction between emotion and cognition while acknowledging its limitations and the fact that it is still not completely understood.[148] It seems clear that what Greene et al. recognized is the terminological inconsistencies within cognitive

[147] Green et al., "Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict", 397.
[148] Green et al., "Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict", 397-398.

studies regarding their understanding of cognition, perception, and information processing. This thesis argues that enaction theory provides a foundation that both agrees with Smith and clarifies in the following chapters how the concept of cognition can be better understood.

Consequently, it is necessary to point out that Shin's integration of Fine's work is problematic and seems to fall short of what Shin sees as a correction to Smith. In short, Fine proposes an interpretation of Greene et al.'s findings that include assumptions that do not correct Smith because they fundamentally diverge from an embodied epistemology. Fine's assumptions encounter what is described in the following chapter as *the starting problem*. In the starting problem, standard views of cognition do not clearly account for an individual's predisposed state that receives and makes meaning of information/stimulus. In reasoning and general meaning-making, there is a cognitive predisposition and habituation within the DLPFC that receives stimulus from the world to make meaning in what is popularly considered "reflective" thought. However, this label is imprecise. This thesis argues that the predisposed habituation present in the DLPFC is by nature a prereflective cognitive state that is utilized to both initiate and meaning-making and is dynamically integrated and sustained within reflective thinking thereafter. This point agrees with Smith's work within *Imagining the Kingdom,* where he integrates Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* and Merleau-Ponty's work on embodiment to establish his understanding of pretheoretical thinking.[149]

The reasons for this are developed further in Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis. While theoretical reflection gives access to effective intentional approaches to addressing the

[149] See, *The Fall of Interpretation*, 91-96, for a precursor of this view regarding Smith's understanding of the "always already" hermeneutic nature of human interpretation. For a concise description on how Smith's nuanced approach to interpretation from that of Heidegger, see: Oliverio, *Theological Hermeneutics,* 210-211

prereflective elements of our being-in-the-world, it is precisely because pre-theoretical elements are involved with theoretical reflection that our prereflective orientations can be affected.

On the other hand, this thesis stands in agreement with Shin on Smith's use of the term cognition. Smith has asserted pre-theoretical know-*how* as a precognitive function as opposed to cognitive "knowledge" of the world—a distinction Smith draws from Heidegger.[150] In various places of Smith's work, it is stated that elements of pre-theoretical "know-how" and affect were precognitive or noncognitive features distinct from perception proper and cognitive knowledge of the world. Within *Thinking in Tongues*, Smith utilizes what he perceives is Heidegger's bifurcation of *wissen* (knowledge) from *verstehen* (understanding) to explicate his understanding of a precognitive mode of thinking. According to Smith, for Heidegger, knowledge is seen as propositional content, while understanding, or *verstehen*, is seen as the primordial affective "attunement" to the world.[151] In contrast, for proponents of embodied cognition, this is an outdated perspective on cognition. Any bifurcation of pre-theoretical or theoretical aspects of the mind separate and distinct from cognition is not possible. The point here is not necessarily that there is no difference between pre-theoretical or pre-noetic elements of the mind and theoretical or propositional ones. In short, one cannot use the term cognitive to refer to one and not the other. According to Lakoff and Johnson, cognition includes, "All aspects of thought and language, conscious or unconscious."[152] Furthermore, any embodied approach to cognition must include a primordial role for the body for the construction and active utility of the mind. An example of this concept is the reason why an object can be referred to as having a *front* or a *face*.

[150] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 60.
[151] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 29.
[152] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 11.

Lakoff and Johnson explain this is because "We see from the front, normally move in the direction the front faces, and interact with objects and other people at our fronts." [153]

The subject of the body exposes aspects of Heidegger's work that do not find compatibility with embodied approaches to cognition. Heidegger's incompatibility is primarily because he does not critically engage the role of the body in our being-in-the-world. That point does not intend to give the assumption that Heidegger did not recognize the essential role of the body. However, lamentably, Heidegger did not satisfactorily elucidate how. Thus, Heidegger states in *Being and Time* that "Dasein's spatialization in its 'bodily nature' is likewise marked out in accordance with these directions. (This 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here.)"[154] That Heidegger did not critically engage the body's role in our meaning-making of the world is a point that is stressed by many.[155] Revealingly, Kevin Aho points out Heidegger's admission in 1972 that he was unable to respond to French criticism in *Being and Time* regarding the neglect of the body because "the bodily [*das Leibliche*] is the most difficult [problem to understand] and I was unable to say more at the time."[156] While it is crucial to be careful *not* to say that Heidegger *did not* see a role for the body, his admission demonstrates why one cannot substantially base an embodied approach to cognition on Heidegger. Alternatively, as Smith has done in *Imagining the Kingdom*, embodied approaches are predominantly based on Merleau-Ponty for his consideration of the body in perception.

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[153] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 34. See also, Johnson, *Embodied Mind*.

[154] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. Charles H. Seibert (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 108: 143.

[155] Kevin A. Aho, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body* (New York: SUNY Press, 2009), 4; quoting Heidegger's Heraclitus seminars of 1966-67, see Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus Seminar*, trans. Charles H. Seibert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 147.

[156] Aho, *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body*, 4; in quoting Heidegger, see: Martin Heidegger, *Zollikon Seminars*, trans. Franz Mayer and Richard Askey (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 231.

Despite the limits of Heidegger's work, he is recognized as one of many antecedents to embodied cognition theory. Heidegger's understanding of being-in-the-world is a precursor to the essential way we are situated in the world. Enactivist scholar Shaun Gallagher highlights that Heidegger's existential-phenomenological perspective recognizes that intentional relation with the world assumes an ontological connection with the world. Additionally, Gallagher recognizes similarities between Heidegger's and John Dewey's understanding of environment embeddedness.[157] Gallagher states that both Heidegger and Dewey recognize that "the organism does not simply find itself deeply situated in an environment as one possibility rather than another".[158] In other words, an organism does not exist separate from the world. Being part of the environment and in relationship with others is an essential part of human existence.

To Smith's credit, his understanding of cognition took a more critically embodied turn in *Imagining the Kingdom*. However, traces of a Heideggerian approach to "knowledge" and "understanding" seem to persist. For example, Smith states, "There is a kind of precognitive perception that is to be distinguished from perception proper," and that *perception proper* refers to the reflective action of, "being cognizant of and attentive to an 'object' in front of me."[159] In light of the way Smith has used the term *cognitive,* it would have provided greater theoretical consistency with his work in *Desiring the Kingdom*, and *Imagining the Kingdom*, to have omitted the use of the term *precognitive* in preference of the term "prepropositional" or even "prediscursive". A considerable detail on this is the fact that the term *noncognitive* is not used in

[157] Shaun Gallagher, "Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition," in *The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition*, eds. Philip Robbins and Murat Aydede (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 38-39. DOI:10.1017/CBO9780511816826.003.

[158] Shaun Gallagher, "Philosophical Antecedents of Situated Cognition," 39.

[159] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 18.

Imagining the Kingdom, and the concept of the *precognitive* domain seems to have only been used to describe pre-theoretical orientation once.[160]

While this thesis agrees with much of Shin's treatment of Smith's use of the concept of cognition, Shin's reaction requires some clarification. For example, Shin states that "Smith's dichotomization arises from his imprecise understanding of cognition and thought" in reaction to Smith's use of Heidegger to distinguish various forms of thought.[161] However, in Shin's consideration of Smith's more recent work in *Imagining the Kingdom*, Shin concedes that "A careful reading of Smith reveals no dichotomy between reason and affect".[162] These seem like contradictory statements in Shin's assessment of Smith. Nevertheless, as argued above, these two comments by Shin refer to two different instances of Smith's theoretical development. Shin's primary critique most appropriately applies to Smith's treatment of cognition in his Pentecostal epistemology, not his work thereafter. Shin rightly recognizes that though a dialectical and unified view of reason and affect is present in *Imagining the Kingdom*, this unity is "missing in his Pentecostal epistemology".[163] This point is worth recognizing. However, it is not always clear in Shin's work that his critique of Smith primarily refers to Smith's Pentecostal epistemology.

Smith's terminological shift is something that he seems to have attempted in *Imagining the Kingdom,* a task which he, to a great extent, was successful yet not completely consistent in accomplishing. Hence, it is crucial to an updated view of Smith to understand his references to precognitive and noncognitive being-in-the-world in terms of his view in *Imagining the Kingdom*. Considering the evolution of Smith's thought towards cognition and embodiment, if

[160] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 18.
[161] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 69.
[162] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 74.
[163] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 74.

the Pentecostal academy is to continue using Smith's earlier work on Pentecostal epistemology, it should be qualified by his recent work, considering that his recent work on cognition makes noteworthy changes to the theoretical foundation he initially set out in *Thinking in Tongues*; despite Shin's assertion that Smith has a "fully formed embodied epistemology" by the time Smith produces *Thinking in Tongues*.[164]

While Shin has shown considerable effort in demonstrating how affective perception is indivisible from the notion of cognition[165], it does not fully discredit the integrity of what is being communicated by Smith, considering that the term *cognitive* is used in different ways depending on certain philosophical traditions. Mark Johnson and George Lakoff state, "For philosophers in these traditions, *cognitive*, means *only* conceptual or propositional structure."[166] Though Smith more consistently uses the term *cognitive* to refer to both theoretical and pre-theoretical thought, there are moments of inconsistency that understandably leave Smith's work open for critique and correction.

Smith exhibits his awareness of Mark Johnson's work in *Imagining the Kingdom*, which is important for the way this thesis establishes concordance between Smith and enactivist scholarship. Nevertheless, if Smith is to continue to integrate Johnson's work, Smith's program would find more harmony if his notion of cognitive processes is consistently expanded to what Lakoff and Johnson describe as the "richest possible sense", which includes "any mental operations and structures that are involved in language, meaning, perception, conceptual systems, and reason."[167] Consequently, under this broader sense of cognitive processes, while

[164] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism,* 87; see also, Shin "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 138.

[165] See: Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 104-130; Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 65-72.

[166] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 12.

[167] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 12.

there is a recognition of pre-theoretical and unconscious elements to our being-in-the-world, a notion of *precognitive* processes does not exist. Instead, all the various and irreducibly complex ways we make meaning of the world are a primordial part of the cognitive process.

On a final note regarding Smith's epistemology, the concept of "pre-theoretical" and "pre-reflective" thinking seems to be used interchangeably within Smith, Shin, and Frestadius's work. This terminological issue stands in conflict with the methodological assumptions of this thesis. This thesis takes the stance of enaction theory when it comes to cognitive processes. Enaction theory assumes that the mind is more accurately understood as a cognitive embodied system in constant dynamic change. Enactivist scholars have gone to great lengths in distancing this view of cognition from standard theories of mind that see the mind as a closed internal system (See Chapter 3). As a result, enactivist scholars typically refer to the foundational pre-propositional, often described as nonconscious, cognitive processes as prereflective rather than pre-theoretical, and conscious thought as reflective rather than theoretical thinking. The following chapter further addresses the debate on standard theories vs enactive theory. Importantly, this qualifying point is not intended to argue that Smith is incorrect. On the contrary, I see no problem with Smith's use of the term if it is understood within the context of his work. The intention here is merely to highlight that this thesis prefers the term "prereflective" rather than "pre-theoretical" thought to speak in a way that is more consistent with scholars in enaction theory.

2.3.2 Evaluation of Shin and Frestadius on Smith's Pentecostal Theology

Regarding whether Smith's work stands as a categorically Pentecostal work, Shin concludes that since Smith does not address the theoretical beliefs of Pentecostalism, his Pentecostal epistemology does not stand as uniquely Pentecostal. Along these same lines,

Frestadius believes Smith's epistemology stands weak as a Pentecostal epistemology, primarily because he does not pay an appropriate amount of attention to the theology within the Pentecostal community[168], along with the historical narrative that gives meaning to Pentecostal theology and practice.[169] Considering this, both Shin and Frestadius critique Smith's "one-sided" relationship between beliefs and practice, claiming that Smith overlooks the "role theology plays in influencing religious practices."[170] While Shin states that Smith's epistemology does not stand as uniquely Pentecostal, Frestadius takes a more qualified stance in saying that Smith does not make full use of Pentecostal theology and, therefore, is "arguably not fully informed."[171]

Frestadius further expresses a pointed critique of Smith's neglect of the historical scenes within the Pentecostal tradition.[172] The historical scenes that Frestadius refers to are theological and historical narratives that have influenced Pentecostal hermeneutic. It seems the kind of narratives Frestadius refers to are theological narratives that emerge from Biblical accounts like Acts 2 and historical events like the Azusa Street Revival. However, Frestadius's critique of Smith would benefit from additional nuance to function consistently with the theoretical foundation of this thesis. Narrative studies, including the concept of narrative Smith addresses, are not exclusively historical. While the past and the way society understands the past (e.g., historical stories that are constructed based on people's understanding of past events) certainly influence how an individual makes meaning of the present, it does not encapsulate the totality of what narrative means for the mind. The narrativity of the mind is just as immensely influenced

[168] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality,* 31.

[169] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality,* 29.

[170] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 100, quoting from: Simo Frestadius, "In Search of a 'Pentecostal' Epistemology: Comparing the Contributions of Amos Yong and James K.A. Smith," *Pneuma* 38, no. 1 (2016): 111. DOI: 10.1163/15700747-03801006.

[171] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality,* 28.

[172] Frestadius, *Pentecostal Rationality,* 30.

by the embodiment of our environment as history and the past. This point relates to a similar idea made by Oliverio, who argues that a key characteristic of Pentecostal philosophical-theological hermeneutic is that Pentecostals interpret Scripture "with a dialectical relationship with a theological interpretation of life" that is "driven by the underlying habits and neurological patterning which guide human understanding and form the embodied gestalts of interpretation".[173] Oliverio's point implies that there are ways that our bodies influence how meaning is organized. This thesis demonstrates that not just Scripture but also Pentecostal understanding of history requires embodied understanding that is underpinned by mental narratives. These narratives do not require formal stories but are embedded in the way we understand the world. Frestadius may have overlooked an important aspect of narrativity by qualifying Smith's epistemology as non-narrative based solely on the notion that Smith does not sufficiently address the stories of the Pentecostal movement.Shin runs a similar risk as Frestadius when addressing Smith's speculation in *Thinking in Tongues* regarding the "storiedness" of our identity as primally influenced by our bodily interaction with the world. Shin compares what is being described by James K.A. Smith with what is being addressed by Christian Smith regarding the importance of narratives (communicative stories) and their role in helping individuals convey significance and meaning to events that occur in life.[174] However, while James K.A. Smith certainly does include an element of Christian Smith's communicative social stories, James K.A. Smith's work also includes much more primal elements of the "storiedness" of the mind. Thus, Smith states, "The storiedness of our identity, on this account, emerges not just as a cultural

[173] William L. Oliverio Jr., "Contours of a Constructive Pentecostal Philosophical-Theological Hermeneutic," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 29 (2020): 35–55. DOI:10.1163/17455251-02901003.45.

[174] Shin, "Postmodern Christian Epistemology," 90, in addressing Christian Smith's work: Christian Smith, *Moral, Believing Animals: Human Personhood and Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

construct but from our bodies".[175] While this thesis does not venture to say that Shin is incorrect when engaging these topics, it is vital to maintain a careful distinction between these topics, which certainly interact with one another in an individual's life yet are conceptually distinct in nature.

In Chapters 3 and 4, this thesis establishes that there are primal foundations to the narrativity of the mind involving fetal and infant cognitive development. Narrative meaning-making has its origins in even the earliest observations of human life. What is shown is that there are narrative constructions that precede the kind of historical and theological narrative that Shin and Frestadius refer to. When addressing the subject of the narrativity of the mind, it is useful to address it unique from literary definitions along with narratives addressing how social groups understand their past. A conflation of these three concepts in narrative studies risks forfeiting the opportunity to appropriately analyze the ways that literary and historical narratives influence individuals and social groups.

There is merit to the view that Shin and Frestadius have on where Smith's projects stand as Pentecostal if one is to consider Smith's work as a whole. Indeed, Smith's work does not stand as uniquely Pentecostal. In Smith's defence, it is also important to qualify critique on this matter by considering the particular methodology employed by Smith. Smith has not exclusively constructed his embodied epistemology and theology for a Pentecostal audience. Rather, his scholarship addresses Christian theology in general.[176] While Smith's project in *Thinking in*

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[175] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 66.

[176] For examples of the intended audience for Smith's work see: *Desiring the Kingdom*, 11; *Imagining the Kingdom*, xvii; *Who's Afraid of Relativism? Community, Contingency, and Creaturehood* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2014), 11. For this reason, Oliverio concludes that Smith's project does not sit neatly within what he has labeled a "contextual-Pentecostal hermeneutic", recognizing that his work "spills out into the project of the ecumenical-Pentecostal hermeneutic". See: Oliverio, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 224. Regarding what Oliverio means by an "ecumenical-Pentecostal hermeneutic" see: Oliverio, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 253-55; Oliverio, "Nature of Theology and Pentecostal Hermeneutics," 168-177.

Tongues, for example, is an intentional approach to construct a Pentecostal epistemology, few other of his monographs have specifically addressed topics that are of exclusive interest to Pentecostal theology. Importantly, even in Smith's work addressing Pentecostal theology, he states his intent to delineate the "understanding" (by this, I take Smith to mean worldview) implicit in Pentecostal spirituality in a form that is more universal or relatable to Christianity in a broader sense.[177] Smith's theoretical construction in *Imagining the Kingdom*, represents a further development in Smith's thought regarding his embodied epistemology. However, since his purpose for that work was not intended for a uniquely Pentecostal audience, Smith does not contextualize much of his work on narrative and pretheory within a Pentecostal theological framework. Smith's broad approach leaves his work open for more explicit application within the Pentecostal academy.[178] In simpler terms, if Pentecostals are going to utilize Smith, they will have to do it for themselves.

In comparing Shin and Frestadius's dialogue with Smith's work, it seems that Frestadius is more measured and hesitant than Shin in his critique of Smith. What is important to glean from both, however, is that they bring to surface elements in Smith's work that I agree require some mending if one is going to advance his theory into Pentecostal theology critically. This thesis proposes that fruitful engagement can be achieved first by revising and expanding Smith's anthropological and epistemological theoretical foundation and second by reimagining Smith's *Imagining the Kingdom* for Pentecostal purposes. Thus creating a Smithian Pentecostal embodied epistemology.

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[177] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 33.

[178] Oliverio seems to recognize this in stating within his review of Smith's *Thinking in Tongues* that Smith's work could have used particular application to answer the questions of whose "radical openness to God"? and which "enchanted theology"? See: Oliverio, review of *Thinking in Tongues*, 135.

2.4 Conclusion: Toward Integration

The reason why there is such communicability between Smith's embodied epistemology and Pentecostal theology is that Smith believes that elements of what he considers to be distinctively "pentecostal worldview" should be elements that are characteristic of Christianity as a whole.[179] For Smith:

> The key elements of pentecostal/charismatic spirituality represent the way to be authentically Christian. In other words, I think the birth of the body of Christ at Pentecost represents that the church is properly—and therefore should be—pentecostal… Authentic, radical, catholic Christianity is properly charismatic or pentecostal.[180]

Smith sees the experience of the Church at Pentecost as central and extending into Christian identity as an ecumenical whole. Therefore, while it is true that Smith's work is not categorically Pentecostal, it is also arguable that for one to fully understand Smith, one must also understand Pentecostal spirituality or at least Smith's understanding of it.

Despite whatever work was done within *Thinking in Tongues* on embodied epistemology, the embodied nature of our being-in-the-world was advanced more substantively in *Imagining the Kingdom*. As Pentecostals engage Smith's more explicit Pentecostal work, it would benefit the scholarly community to engage it in light of his work on embodiment in *Imagining the Kingdom*. Additionally, though Smith advanced the conversation between theology, liturgy, and phenomenology in *Imagining the Kingdom*, he admittedly had not vetted the project within the academic community.[181] That naturally left some theoretical sharpening to be done that could have been provided by the scholarly community. Shin and Frestadius did part of that work within the Pentecostal scholarly community. However, as demonstrated within the analysis of this chapter, there is more work to be done.

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[179] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 32.
[180] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 32.
[181] See: Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, xix-xx.

On a separate note, Shin recognizes a genuine cause for concern as it relates to how to verify whether the kind of formation suggested by Smith has warrant. Shin states, "If an unjustified narrative, affective claim passes off as a truth claim while insulated from rational evaluation, then breakdown of discourse might result".[182] Shin's claim is a credible ethical concern. In later chapters, a similar concern is recognized by Gallagher, who pinpoints the possibility of cognitive institutions (e.g., cultural, educational, legal cognitive forming entities) that produce narratives that limit autonomy.[183] However, the matter of epistemological warrant is an ethical matter. It does not negate the argument that prereflective orientation is the foundation of propositional thought. Smith's primary goal is to argue that habit and our prereflective nature should be understood and wielded intentionally to reorient oneself and cultivate rightly ordered desire. Smith clearly speaks of a notion of mis-formation of habits and the need to rectify them.[184] Naturally, this opens his work to critique regarding *how* one actually goes about assessing whether belief or affection is formed correctly and to what degree. Shin describes Smith's work as primarily descriptive and minimally prescriptive on the criterion for right affective knowledge. Shin appropriately recognizes the need for additional formulation on how to develop the "right" in affection and belief.[185] Nevertheless, despite the missing ethical element of warranted belief and affection, this thesis is focused on description rather than prescription. For this reason, Smith's work of *describing* the narrative foundation involved in cognition is of primary concern.

[182] Shin, *Pentecostalism, Postmodernism*, 50.
[183] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 223.
[184] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 88.
[185] Similarly, Oliverio suggests Charles Taylor's concept of "strong evaluations" could be an aid for Smith's claims to make valuations on what is true and good. See: Oliverio, *Theological Hermeneutics*, 223.

As stated above, Smith envisions a transformative role that intentional religious practice can play in transforming self-narratives and habituation. What is proposed in Smith's *Imagining the Kingdom* can benefit from critical engagement with phenomenology and cognitive science regarding the narrativity of the mind. Smith delivers some productive engagement in utilizing Mark Johnson. However, as with many subjects within academia, the well runs much deeper than what was offered in *Imagining the Kingdom*. For example, Smith provides a notable scholarly foundation on the "storiedness" of the mind. On the narrativity of the mind, he sees an opportunity for future engagement through Marco Caracciolo's work on how human embodiment of stories helps shape the values of those who engage with them. Smith's foresight on future engagement is what is developed within this thesis. Studies on the narrativity of the mind have resulted in additional advancements since Smith's engagement in the subject.[186] Scholarship in the area of autobiographical narrative, for example, have discovered the powerful influence an individual's understanding of their past has on their meaning-making of the present and future predictions. The narrative nature of the mind and the malleability of memory is further established in subsequent chapters to lead to a fuller understanding of the concept of testimony. Furthermore, in light of Shin and Frestadius's critique that Smith has not done enough to address the relationship between theoretical and pre-theoretical cognitive processes, this thesis seeks to apply embodied approaches to Pentecostal practice. It is crucial to make the connection between theoretical and pre-theoretical cognitive processes clearer than what Smith offers. In conjunction

[186] See: Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 133; citing Marco Caracciolo, "Narrative, Meaning, Interpretation: An Enactivist Approach," *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science* 11, (2012): 367-384, DOI: 10.1007/s11097-011-9216-0.; see also: Marco Caracciolo, *The Experientiality of Narrative: An Enactivist Approach* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014). For a study on the narrativity on the mind that considers intersubjective communal dynamics of stories, see Yanna B. Popova, *Stories, Meaning, and Experience: Narrativity and Enaction* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

with cognitive linguistics, the enactive approach to cognition provides rich engagement that can address Shin and Frestadius's concerns.

Smith intuitively states within *Imagining the Kingdom* that "I think would find constructive resources for advancing this project by staging further dialogue between theology, liturgics, and cognitive literary criticism" and that "understanding how story works would also give us insight into the conditions and dynamics of liturgical formation".[187] Indeed, constructing a way forward is precisely what Chapters 3, 4, and 5 propose. This thesis seeks to further Smith's approach by integrating some recent philosophical work on enactive approaches to the narrativity of the mind and autobiographical identity. Enactive theory is proposed as a theory that can help advance Smith's theoretical foundation on the embodied nature of meaning-making.

Pentecostal scholar William Oliverio provides four key characteristics of a Pentecostal philosophical hermeneutic that this thesis satisfies. Though this thesis does not describe its approach as a philosophical hermeneutic, the content of Oliverio's prerequisite list relates to the content of this thesis. First, a Pentecostal philosophical hermeneutic recognizes a participation in a living continuous story. The second is a recognition that Scriptural interpretation includes a dialectical interpretation of life that is motivated by foundational habits and neurological patterning "which guide human understanding and form the embodied gestalts of interpretation together in linguistic communities…". The third is that affections play a role in agency as feeling and action tended to be key characteristics for Pentecostals. Fourth, it recognizes a need for "broader theological narration that would provide a larger doctrinal-theological grid for Pentecostal hermeneutics".[188] The first is demonstrated in this thesis through the ecological

[187] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 133.

[188] L. William Oliverio, Jr. "Contours of a Constructive Pentecostal Philosophical-Theological Hermeneutic," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 29 (2020), 45. DOI: 10.1163/17455251-02901003.

systems model of the Pentecostal movement in Chapter 8. The second is demonstrated in Chapters 7 and 8, where Pentecostal narratives are analyzed, along with Pentecostal's use of the Bible and how narratives are integrated into the individual's narrative identity through ritual or liturgical practice. The third is addressed in the interaction with Smith's affective epistemology, drawing it into relationship with enactive theory and applying it to an analysis of testimony. The fourth is addressed in that this thesis provides methodological and philosophical tools for Pentecostals to expand its doctrinal-theological grid through phenomenology and conceptual metaphor theory throughout. A major difference between Oliverio's work and what is done in this thesis is that he offers confessional theological models to expand the doctrinal-theological grid as a possible approach.[189] In contrast, this thesis is does not assume a religious stance. This approach is intended to provide neutral ground for cultivating a foundational dialogue with enactive and embodied approaches to cognition.

This thesis makes use of both Smith and recent scholarship on autobiographical identity to provide some foundational analysis on the concept of testimony in the Pentecostal movement, along with narratives that help form Pentecostal narrative identity. The Pentecostal concept of testimony refers to the personal narratives that are embraced by individuals who make meaning of their religious experiences. Testimonies are often shared in church services or other religious gatherings and can take many forms, from personal stories to more formal sermons and speeches. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate some avenues that can produce meaningful theoretical development. However, the interdisciplinary nature of this proposition means that engagement is likely not for the light at heart. Given the rigorous scholarship within phenomenology, cognitive science, and Pentecostal theology, there is sifting to be done to achieve successful critical

[189] Oliverio presents his approach through the nexus of "Creation-Incarnation-Pentecost-Eschaton". See: Oliverio, "Contours," 47-50.

interdisciplinary dialogue. Smith has provided some beneficial engagement. Though it is undoubtedly not engagement that was unforeseen by those within the Pentecostal academy, there is much to be gained by utilizing Smith's work to further crystalize Pentecostal notions of experience.

CHAPTER 3: EMBODIMENT, ENACTION, AND COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter elucidates critical tenets of embodied cognition and enaction theory before moving on to how narrative influences individuals and group identity. This chapter also outlines some valuable tools for communicative analysis through cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics offers insight into the important aspect of our enaction in the world that relates to how language forms and is grounded in phenomenological experience. A methodological foundation is developed that I propose can help revise and expand Smith's work. Later in this thesis, cognitive linguistics is employed to extract and analyse how and why certain Pentecostal narratives influence Pentecostal identity. The concepts presented in this chapter are helpful to an analysis of the term *testimony* because *testimony* is considered in relation to its use within the Pentecostal community and academy. Since the term *testimony* is analyzed in this thesis within a specific social group, it is helpful to define the mental frames that the term *testimony* recalls and the concepts that drive the hermeneutical background of what Pentecostals consider a *testimony*. Due to the technical nature of enaction theory and cognitive linguistics, it is crucial to define the terms utilised before synthesizing the kind of update that is proposed here for Smith's work. More extensive engagement is offered in Chapter 5, where Smith's work is assessed. Nevertheless, this chapter's cursory engagement with Smith is present to foreshadow why this subject is valuable for Pentecostal theology in general and Smith in particular.

Johnson and George Lakoff were seminal figures that challenged the idea that thought and, consequentially, language were predominantly independent of the body. In his book, *Embodied Mind, Meaning, and Reason*, Johnson describes his journey away from theoretical

frameworks that downplayed the importance of the body on human cognition.[190] His journey led him to develop seminal works with Lakoff in cognitive linguistics and human cognition that were instrumental in spurring the ever-growing field of embodied cognition, which influenced the field of Cognitive Linguistics from its beginnings.[191] The work of Lakoff and Johnson has since been discovered and integrated within the field of theology, which has resulted in fruitful engagement. As stated in the introduction, some good examples include John Sander's book, *Theology in the Flesh*, and Joel B. Green's book, *Conversion in Luke-Acts*. While explicit examples exist in theological scholarship in general, some basic examples also exist in Pentecostal scholarship.[192]

In Smith's *Imagining the Kingdom*, Smith makes a few points leading up to the conclusion that religious practice can "re-story" the self. What is established first through the work of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu is that an individual's meaning-making processes and the construction of the self are embodied, interactive with the environment, habituated, and narrative. Smith utilizes the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty to address how cognition functions in individuals primarily. The philosophy of Bourdieu is utilized to primarily address how social aspects also constitute our being in the world. For successful integration within this thesis, contemporary scholarship that is compatible with Smith's methodology and addresses the individual and social aspects of human cognition is expounded.

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[190] Mark Johnson, *Embodied Mind, Meaning, and Reason: How Our Bodies Give Rise to Understanding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

[191] George Lakoff, "Explaining Embodied Cognition Results," *Topics in Cognitive Science* 4 (2012), 773, DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01222x.

[192] Ware, "Can Religious Experience Be Reduced to Brain Activity?" 127; Yong, *Cosmic Breath*, 93; E. Janet Warren, "'Spiritual Warfare': A Dead Metaphor?" *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 21 (2012): 278-297, DOI: 10.1163/17455251-02102007.

Within Smith's work, Smith describes the constitution of our being-in-the-world individually and socially. Contemporary theories on embodiment and enaction have progressed rapidly while still recognizing the valuable work of Merleau-Ponty as a precursor of what was to come. Furthermore, embodied and enactive approaches to cognition have led the way to robust theories on how our meaning-making processes are greatly influenced by environmental factors, which include both sensorimotor and social embodiment of the world. This chapter focuses on the individual's meaning-making processes. The next chapter focuses on the narrativity of the mind and situating the individual within social dynamics.

Any given academic theory is likely to have its proponents and opponents. The academic disciplines that are presented in this chapter are no exception. For example, one of the primary tenets of enaction and Johnson's embodied realism is that an individual is in ecological dynamic interaction with the environment. However, some influential theories of mind postulate that we do not truly interact with the world. What we interact with is information within our minds *about* the world. This is broadly understood as the representational approach to cognition. What is included in this conversation, then, is how individuals do not merely interact with internal representations of the outside world. Embodied cognition and enaction propose that an individual has genuine interaction with the environment and thus is fundamentally anti-representational.

Following Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, many proponents of 4E cognition (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) involve "an active engagement in and with an agent's environment".[193] As stated in the introduction, the particular approach of this thesis is to pursue an analysis of Pentecostal practice within the theoretical frame of enaction and embodiment. The theoretical frame in reference here does not include a systematic

[193] Newen, De Bruin, and Gallagher, "4E Cognition," 6.

methodological approach. Rather it is a specific set of ontological assumptions about the nature of cognition and social interaction. The overview of enaction and embodiment provided in this chapter is not an attempt at constructing a unified definition of enaction and embodied approaches to cognition. Such a venture would likely be impossible as there are an extensive amount of versions of enaction and embodied cognition. Embodied approaches to cognition should be understood less as a unified theory and more as a *research program*.[194] As a research program, scholarship in EC includes a wider variety of positions and methodologies than other disciplines like standard cognitive science. While EC overlaps with cognitive science, it has been recognized that the "longer and looser" ontological commitments and methodologies may go beyond what interests cognitive scientists.[195] For this reason, it is necessary for this project to introduce a more concrete methodology to enable analysis. While embodied cognition and enaction theory define and justify some overarching ontological commitments, cognitive linguistics offers methodological tools that EC does not provide. Cognitive linguistics is a movement that is rooted in dissatisfaction with formal approaches to language in the 1970s. It is not a specific theory as much as it is a movement that adopted common guiding principles and assumptions. According to Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, it is rooted in cognitive science—especially Eleanor Rosch and her associate's notion of cognitive categorization—and earlier traditions.[196] This can apply to Pentecostals because of the social situation of an individual interacting with a group of believers as it relates to Christian testimony. As believers share their stories of God's intervention in their lives, their understanding of that memory is ecologically

[194] Lawrence Shapiro, *Embodied Cognition*, Second Edition (London: Routledge, 2019), 2.

[195] Shapiro, *Embodied Cognition*, 3.

[196] Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, *Cognitive Linguistics: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 3.

affected by the reaction of the individuals hearing the testimony. This ecological effect is further explored with examples in Chapter 7.

If this study is to analyse the Pentecostal narrative that extends from the word *testimony*, it will be helpful to explain how language is grounded and emerges from the way we experience the world. Furthermore, because I will be analysing the Pentecostal community by way of a *word*, it is crucial to have an understanding of language as both a cognitive and social phenomenon. That means that language develops and is sustained by people's individual minds, and, as Ewa Dąbrowska describes it, "…a set of norms shared across a community of speakers, or utterances that conform to these norms."[197] Consequently, an appropriate analysis of the Pentecostal use of the word *testimony* should include an analysis of how the term is embodied in both individual and social domains. The interdisciplinary subject of cognitive linguistics and conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) is valuable for analyzing how testimony is embodied in an individual, especially as cognitive linguistics and CMT have increasingly been applied to theological reflection and biblical analysis in recent years. In relation to this thesis, it provides 1) a robust theoretical foundation for the phenomenological grounding of language and 2) a theoretical bridge to future engagement with the work of other theological and biblical scholars.

3.2 Enaction Theory

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch were the first to define enaction, taking as a notable inspiration the phenomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl (1913/1963), Martin Heidegger (1927/1962), and especially Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962).[198] Following their phenomenological philosophy, enactivist approaches were inspired and informed to rethink the

[197] Ewa Dąbrowska, "Language as a Phenomenon of the Third Kind," *Cognitive Linguistics* 31, no. 2 (2020), 213. DOI: 10.1515/cog-2019-0029.

[198] Francisco J. Varela, Even Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience*, Revised Edition (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2016, first published in 1991).

standard accounts of the mind.[199] Likewise, in the United States, there were clear philosophical precursors to embodied and enactive conceptions of being in pragmatic philosophers like Herbert Mead[200], Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey[201]. However, Varela, Thompson, and Rosch observe a critical gap between the work that is done today and their philosophical precursors:

> The challenge posed by cognitive science to the Continental discussions, then, is to link the study of human experience as culturally embodied with the study of human cognition in neuroscience, linguistics, and cognitive psychology. In contrast, the challenge posed to cognitive science is to question one of the more entrenched assumptions of our scientific heritage—that the world is independent of the knower.[202]

One of the primary differences between Continental philosophy and the more contemporary cognitive theories inspired by them is that Continental approaches have been constructed without significantly considering scientific research on cognition. Following Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, the philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists mentioned in this chapter like Gallagher, Johnson, and Lakoff represent the substantial task that contemporary scholars have undertaken to bridge the past to recent cognitive scholarship.

An enactive view of cognition generally holds to at least two general statements: " cognition is a kind of situated enactive, embodied activity" and that "enactive, embodied activity

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[199] Shaun Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 5.

[200] Ryan McVeigh, "The Body in Mind: Mead's Embodied Cognition," *Symbolic Interaction* 43, no. 3 (2020): 493-513. DOI: 10.1002/SYMB.476; Shaun Gallagher, "Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of Cognition," in *Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation*, ed. Roman Madzia and Mattias Jung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016); Roman Madzia, "Mind Symbol and Action-Prediction: George H. Mead and the Embodied Roots of Language," in *Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation*, ed. Roman Madzia and Mattias Jung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).

[201] Mark Johnson, "Pragmatism, Cognitive Science, and Embodied Mind," in *Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation*, eds. Roman Madzia and Mattias Jung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016); see also his work on John Dewey in: Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 37-56.

[202] Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, *Embodied Mind*, 150

does not always and everywhere involves thinking about the world in contentful ways."[203] In other words, cognition is not merely a matter of perceiving or receiving stimuli. Stimuli are embodied and given meaning in ways that ultimately change an individual's perception of stimuli. As Johnson suggests, the "meaning" given to stimuli includes "any experiences enacted or suggested by various affordances in our surroundings… That includes past experiences, present experiences, and projected future experiences perceived to be possibilities developing out of one's current situation."[204] This happens in a way that is not "contentful" in that propositional thought is not a prerequisite activity to cognition. Situated cognition encapsulates these elements of cognition under a single heading to conceptualize the way an organism is coupled with the environment.

Accordingly, contra to what Johnson describes as the MIND AS COMPUTATIONAL PROGRAM metaphor that captured the imagination of first-generation cognitive science, embodied cognition and, specifically enaction, challenged the computational and representational view of the mind.[205] The brain-centred view of cognition largely results from a dualist perspective between the brain and body. Alan Turing's work was an influential catalyst for the MIND AS A COMPUTER movement.[206] Additionally, Raymond Gibbs posits that the traditional view of the mind and body has caused limitations on the study of cognitive science.[207] Some important areas of study are overlooked by marginalizing the role of kinaesthetic action in

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[203] Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin, *Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), 9-10.

[204] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 19.

[205] Johnson, *Embodied Mind,* 16-17.

[206] Alan Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," *Mind* 59 (October 1950): 433-63, DOI: 10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433. See also for example, Howard Gardner, *The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1985); and Paul Churchland, "Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States," *The Journal of Philosophy* 82, no. 1 (January 1985): 8-28. DOI: 10.2307/2026509.

[207] See Raymond Gibbs, *Embodiment and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3-9, for an explanation on how the bifurcation between the body and mind has been part of the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece.

theoretical accounts of perception and mental life in general.[208] For Gibbs, cognition is "grounded in embodiment, especially in terms of the phenomenological experience of our bodies in action".[209] While the concept of embodied cognition does much to explain the importance of the body in cognition, enaction takes analysis a step further in describing *how* and *why* this occurs.

According to Gallagher, "Enactivist versions of EC emphasize the idea that perception is for *action*, and the action-orientation shapes most cognitive processes."[210] Enactivist versions of embodied cognition couples well with the theoretical groundwork for J.J. Gibson's ecological psychology, especially his notion of affordances. Gibson states that "affordances of the environment are what it *offers* the animal… It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment."[211] For enactive theory, this means that the cognitive dynamics of an agent, the brain, body, and affordances within an environment are coupled in an ecological process of meaning-making.

In his book, *Enactivist Interventions*, Gallagher posits some provoking questions, "Is cognition in *the head* or *in the world*, or in some mix of brainy and worldly processes?" He states that according to enactivist approaches to cognition, cognitive processes involve more than just the brain. Cognition involves bodily and environmental factors as well.[212] Standard opposition to enactive approaches has responded by suggesting that causal environmental stimuli say nothing about the constitution of mental states. In contrast, enactivists propose that what occurs as we live in the world is a diachronic constitution where causality and constitution are dynamically

[208] Gibbs, *Embodiment*, 2.
[209] Gibbs, *Embodiment*, 3.
[210] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 5.
[211] James J. Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), 127.
[212] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 1.

dependent. This dynamic dependence does not deny the possibility of interaction between constituent mental states. Enaction, however, takes into consideration how causal relations constantly intervene to produce an ever-changing constitution.[213] Thus, Gallagher states, "The nature of cognition depends on the instantiation of certain dynamical couplings such that a specific kind of cognition would not arise were it not for causal interactions that define the system."[214]

In other words, the constitution of our mental states requires phenomenological causal interaction that is provided by both our body and the environment. Furthermore, being that the constitution of our mental states is in constant interaction with our body and the world, the most appropriate way to conceptualize cognition is in terms of a dynamic diachronic constitution. An enactive view does not intend to minimize the importance of the brain. Rather, enaction theory properly contextualizes the brain within its broader cognitive context that includes organism and environment. The context of organism and environment is an essential concept for what later is established regarding social cognition and our interaction with social environments.

Importantly, Gallagher admits that theories of embodied approaches to cognition is not uniform. There are various theories of EC that range from weak to strong EC. While Gallagher's strong EC is incompatible with computational models of cognition, Gallagher posits that minimal, or, "weak EC" is compatible with the idea that embodiment can be equated to representation of the body in the brain.[215] It also describes bodily "anatomy and bodily movement as unimportant, trivial factors for cognition".[216] Bodily neural circuits (B-formats) are structured by bodily experience in the world. B-formatted representations are bodily

[213] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 9-10.
[214] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 10.
[215] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 28, and 44.
[216] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 38.

representations of one's own bodily states and activities.[217] Once these structures are created, they can then be redeployed or reused for other cognitive tasks different from their original function. Alvin Goldman and Frederique de Vignemont are examples of weak EC. Goldman and Vignemont believe that since "the brain is the seat of most, if not all, mental events", it trivializes the claim that the body is crucial to mental life.[218] Goldman equates his understanding of neural reuse to Michael Anderson's "Massive redeployment hypothesis".[219] However, it is demonstrated below that Goldman's utilization of Anderson's Massive redeployment hypothesis may be misplaced, as Anderson's recent work with Vicente Raja indicates an anti-computational approach to neural reuse.[220]

3.2.1 Enaction, Theory of Mind, and Standard Approaches to Social Cognition

Despite the solid theoretical construction that has resulted recently, embodied cognition and enaction are not without those who disagree. Some influential philosophical camps that stand in contrast to embodied notions of the mind are the representational approaches exemplified in *theory of mind* (ToM) and *simulation theory* (ST). Although it is not within the purview of this thesis to address the full extent of the ongoing representational versus non-representational debate, it is nevertheless a critical discussion. It warrants mention for the primary purpose of distinguishing embodied and enactive cognition from other approaches.

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[217] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 31.

[218] Alvin Goldman and Frederique de Vignemont, "Is Social Cognition Embodied?" *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 31, no. 3 (2009), 154. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.007

[219] Alvin Goldman, "A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognition Science," *Review of Philosophy and Psychology* 3 (2012), 75. DOI 10.1007/s13164-012-0089-0. See also: Michael Anderson, "Neural Reuse: A Fundamental Organizational Principle of the Brain," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 33 (2010): 246. DOI:10.1017/S0140525X10000853

[220] Vicente Raja and Michael L. Anderson, "Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience," *Ecological Psychology* 31, no. 3 (2019): 166-181. DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1615213.

In his book, *Action and Interaction*, Gallagher highlights how enaction stands in contrast to some standard approaches to theory of mind. The two main theories discussed are the *theory theory* (TT) and *simulation theory* (ST) of theory of mind.[221] Some important tenets of TT are based on classic experiments that demonstrate that children around the age of 4 develop an understanding of the minds of others. This is achieved by what is termed folk psychology or common-sense psychology.[222] The TT of theory of mind is a form of representationalism because it suggests that an individual does not have access to what another is actually thinking. Rather, an individual is irreconcilably distanced from another in that what they are really interacting with is a theory within their own brain. The interaction is merely an inference of what another is thinking and feeling. The ST theory of mind takes a different approach. Rather than saying it is a "theory" that is inferenced, it postulates that what is performed is a simulation of what another is thinking and feeling. As such, we create internal models of another's mental state. It is this internal model or simulation that is attributed to the other person. TT and ST are similar because they both propose an internal representation of the outside world. For example, Goldman states that observing others' mental states is converted into an inner representation of what we would experience or do in a comparable situation.[223] Therefore, we do not actually perceive others. What is perceived is an internal theory or simulation of others.[224]

Gallagher's approach argues that embodied practices inform an individual's understanding of another, not theoretical inference or internal simulation. Recognizing embodied practices does not deny that sometimes we understand others by enacting theoretical inferences

[221] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 69-97.

[222] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 69.

[223] Alvin Goldman, "Does one size fit all? Hurley on Shared Circuits," *Behavioral and Brian Sciences* 31, no. 1 (2008), 27. DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X07003184

[224] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 70-71.

and simulations. However, inferences and simulations are not the primary way of understanding others. TT and ST merely explain a small part of cognitive processes that are used to relate to others.[225] Though Gallagher takes great lengths in responding to TT and ST, I suggest two of his objections as exemplars that demonstrate the inability of representational approaches to explain the full range of cognitive activity. The first is what Gallagher describes as *the starting problem*.[226] For Gallagher, neither theory of TT or ST has a good explanation for how theoretical inference or simulation gets launched in the first place. To say that our understanding of others is dependent upon an internal representation of the other assumes that a similar state already exists within our minds. However, that assumption does not speak of the initial cognitive phenomenon in infancy but includes any other phenomenological experience. The question that is not sufficiently addressed is, what causes the representational process to begin in the first place? If someone is waving at you from the side of the road, how do you know whether they are saying hello or waving you down to pull over? The enactive context greatly influences our understanding of that social situation depending on whether the person waving at you is a police officer or your neighbour.[227] To recall a point made in the previous chapter, this is why Shin's integration of Fine's work is problematic and falls short of providing a meaningful correction to Smith. Fine's interpretation of Greene et al.'s findings diverges from an embodied epistemology and encounters what Gallagher would identify as the starting problem. Fine's view of cognition fails to account for an individual's predisposed state in meaning-making. The cognitive predisposition within the DLPFC, often mislabelled as "reflective" thought, is actually a prereflective embodied state that initiates and sustains meaning-making.

[225] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 98.
[226] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 76.
[227] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 77-78.

The second problem is what Gallagher describes as *the diversity problem*. The diversity problem further deals with the assumption that simulation depends on first-person experience as a basis for making meaning of another. The requisite of prior experience means that when simulation occurs, it is assumed that our personal experience is like another's. Therefore, when I project my own theory or simulation onto others, it does not genuinely understand another. It is merely understanding myself in that other's situation.[228] The lack of an "other" in a representational interaction is a problem that comes to light when studying subjects on social cognition. Theories of TT and ST have difficulty explaining the complexities in social cognition, especially when attempting to account for ideological constructs found in group identity, like cultural narratives, gender, race, and class relations in society.[229] For this reason, Ludger van Dijk and Erik Myin propose that human activity should be thought of as more than simply an internal neural process. They conclude that "the more we want to understand what happens inside the nervous system, the more we also need to scrutinize the socio-material environment in which we do so".[230] To more fully understand the way the nervous system works, the wider environment in which an individual is situated requires attention. The assumption that neuroscientific results do enough to understand individuals by merely studying the brain is faulty.[231] People are more than the neural mechanisms in the head. They are always a complex compilation of internal states in dynamic relation to external stimuli, which includes sensorimotor and social environments. Therefore, Gallagher states that "mechanisms of social cognition are constitutively dependent upon historical-cultural situatedness and group

[228] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 79.

[229] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 80.

[230] Ludger van Dijk and Erik Myin, "Ecological Neuroscience: From Reduction to Proliferation of Our Resources," *Ecological Psychology* 31, no. 3 (2019), 254. DOI: 10.1080/10407413.2019.1615221.

[231] van Dijk and Myin, "Ecological Neuroscience," 266.

membership".[232] What this means is that reflection on Pentecostal identity is more than merely a venture into what Pentecostals believe. Current religious practice and theological reflection certainly influence identity formation. However, religious practice and theological assumptions are situated within a historical process that has contributed to its nature. This can include things like intergenerational narratives and tradition. An example of this is the way that Pentecostals think about the biblical concept of "the altar". This is analysed further in Chapters 6 and 7. In short, the historical-cultural situatedness of an individual is in dynamic relationship with the historical-cultural situatedness of the Pentecostal community in the practice of testimony. This dynamic relationship produces a unique change in both individuals and the community as they participate in mutual interaction.

Gallagher is not alone in directly combating a wholesale acceptance of TT and ST's representational approach. Daniel Hutto and Myin explain that it cannot be assumed that "contentful states of mind are always in play whenever an agent stands in a cognitive relation to, has attitudes directed at, specific objects or states of affairs".[233] Enaction posits that cognition is more effectively understood in terms of interaction with the real world.[234] Hutto's notion of enaction posits that:

> Some cognitive attitudes are contentful in the restrictive sense of possessing correctness conditions… we sometimes think thoughts that refer to things beyond themselves—thoughts that can be true or false. Nevertheless, it denies that having thoughts with content—so understood—is fundamental to all cognition.[235]

Standard cognitive science is generally circumscribed to ontological commitments that cognition involves "algorithmic processes upon symbolic representations". [236] The problem with

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[232] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 80.

[233] Hutto and Myin, *Evolving Enactivism*, 11.

[234] Daniel Hutto, "Overly Enactive Imagination? Radically Re-Imagining Imagining," *The Journal of Philosophy* 53, Spindel Supplement (2015): 69. DOI: 10.1111/sjp.12122.

[235] Hutto and Myin, *Evolving Enactivism*, 12.

[236] Shapiro, *Embodied Cognition*, 2.

the brand of representationalism that views perception as completely representational and brain-bound is that individuals do not have authentic access to the world. Only neural representations of the world exist. Furthermore, epistemological disciplines built on representational presuppositions, at times, assume that though there may be a real world, due to the relatively subjective nature of each individual mind, we cannot gain access to anything we may call knowledge. Knowledge is irreconcilably subjective to each individual. Lakoff and Johnson do excellent work in demonstrating how human cognition is more than simply representational and computational processes. Rather, cognition involves dynamic coupling with the real world in what is described as *embodied realism*. Embodied realism is investigated more directly in the next section, covering the importance of embodied realism to cognitive linguistics and Conceptual Metaphor Theory.

How should cognitive science be reframed then, if not in a representational way? Psychologists like Vicente Raja and Michael Anderson are doing work in the field of ecological psychology that seems to be moving toward tenable terms. Raja and Anderson represent an approach to cognitive science that seems to be moving in a direction compatible with EC and enaction theory. Rather than a modular or computational view of the mind, Raja and Anderson have proposed a view of the mind that labels neural networks in the brain in terms of *neural reuse* rather than neural representation. Raja and Anderson's principle of neural reuse is anti-computational, which is important for alignment with the dynamic ecological perspective of cognition.[237] While representation and computation give notions of unchanging systems, what is proposed by Raja and Anderson is that neural reuse is "an organizational and developmental principle for the functional architecture of the brain".[238] The central nervous system uses and

[237] Raja and Anderson, "Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience," 171.
[238] Raja and Anderson, "Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience," 171.

reuses interactive neural structures with no clear boundaries and "actively soft-assemble in new or existing patterns of connectivity to accomplish different and/or new tasks".[239] Thus, neural reuse models are explicitly against modular accounts that are influenced by the idea that a brain is a group of distinct parts devoted to performing a specific function. This distinction is crucial because it distances Raja and Anderson's understanding of neural reuse from explicitly computational forms like Goldman's approach. For Raja and Anderson, acceptable neural reuse models are based on plastic and highly delocalized accounts of brain function.[240]

Another non-representational way forward can be found within the discipline of psychology. Raymond Gibbs proposes that metaphor should always be understood in terms of dynamical-ecological performance. As individuals are situated in various cultural and physical interactions, metaphor serves a critical role as an "augmented constraint" on human performance.[241] Metaphor helps in partial and probabilistic ways, considering the affordances of particular ecologies. According to Gibbs, "The dynamical-ecological perspective emphasizes how human thought and action continuously change over time with metaphor".[242] In the conversation thus far, there are roughly two elements to the subject of the nature of cognition: 1) the nature of the mind, whether it is representational or in constant dynamic flux, and 2) how the mind interacts ecologically with the world. Though the non-representational nature of the mind has been addressed, more is presented below about how the mind interacts with the world. The following introduces this concept through J.J. Gibson's notion of ecological engagement and

[239] Raja and Anderson, "Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience," 173.
[240] Raja and Anderson, "Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience," 173.
[241] Raymond Gibbs "Metaphor as Dynamical-Ecological Performance," *Metaphor and Symbol* 34, no. 1 (2019), 33. DOI: 10.1080/10926488.2019.1591713.
[242] Gibbs, "Metaphor", 33.

theory of affordances. However, much is reserved for Chapter 4, where Gallagher's interaction theory is brought into dialogue with the social aspects of the development of the self.

This section clarifies why this thesis prefers not to speak similarly to the way Smith and Shin understand "pre-theoretical" or "pre-theory". To say that cognitive processes can be pre-theoretical may mistakenly imply that once a cognitive process becomes reflective, it is theoretical in the representational sense. In light of Smith's work in *Imagining the Kingdom*, it can be recognized that Smith does not assume that pre-theoretical and theoretical thought is representational and thus closed off from the world. For this reason, this thesis steps away from the use of the term "pre-theoretical".

What is crucially important about this section is not necessarily the mechanics of how the brain works. Rather, it is that the notion of cognition includes a form of realism. Realism is essential because it accords with Pentecostal cosmological assumptions. As stated in Chapter 2, Smith holds assumptions that God, as an "other", participates in an essential role in empowering believers. God's participation with believers is an assumption that there is an outside force from individuals that influences the mental—and presumably the notion of the "spiritual"—state. In other words, a representational perspective on Pentecostal cosmology would assume that what believers interact with is not God at all. It is the individual's mind alone affecting itself. A representational view begs the question: Can it be argued that God even exists for an individual if genuine access to the outside world, including God as an "other," is not possible? More on the realist assumptions of Pentecostal cosmology is analysed in Chapter 6, as it is a common supposition of Pentecostal cosmological assumptions and encounter with God.

3.2.2 Ecological Engagement with the World

Concerning the world that we inhabit, J.J. Gibson's theory of affordances stands as a useful concept. Affordance is a term created by Gibson to metaphorically describe what the environment offers an organism. In any given environment, the environment offers a horizon of interaction to an organism that is relevant to the organism's capability to make meaning of it. Johnson provides a useful analogy of various kinds of caves. While some large caves afford space for hibernation to large animals, other caves afford small spaces that only smaller animals are capable of inhabiting.[243] The bodily makeup of an organism, along with its cognitive capabilities, can enable or constrain the organism's ability to interact with the affordances in an environment. Consequently, Johnson states, "The more complex the organism is, the more ways it has by which it can meaningfully interact with the energy structures that make up its environments."[244]

Environmental interaction is significant to an appropriate view of human cognition because an individual's mental constitution is greatly influenced negatively and positively by the environments that an individual has had the opportunity to interact with. This is because the way agents live in the world is not linear. It is circular and dynamic. A linear view of meaning-making generally would stipulate that 1) the senses receive stimuli, 2) the brain processes the stimuli through neuronal representations of the outside world, and 3) the result is a reaction to and effect upon the environment. A circular understanding of this process does not end at an agent's reaction to stimuli. It maintains that not only do agents receive and make sense of stimuli, but an agent is also actively involved in creating the world that it embodies. As an agent receives stimuli, it, in turn, makes meaning of the stimuli, which in turn changes the agent's

[243] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 19.
[244] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 19

perception of the object and, consequentially, the nature of its stimuli for the agent.[245] Thomas Fuchs offers a narrative example of this organism-environment dynamic:

> Let us take the example of an instrumental action such as writing a letter. In order to do so, I pick up a pen that was previously outside my perception, but had already been preconceived by my imagination. It is also suitably shaped for being held by my fingers and has an expected weight. In other words, my lived body already anticipated the pen through its habits and protentions.
> Now my hand moves the pen across the paper, but the locus of my sensation is in its tip: I feel it scraping on the paper, that is, the pen has become embodied and I perceive the paper's surface "through it." Paper, pen, hand, and my entire organism form a functional unit—so where are we to localize writing? In the pen? In my hand? In the brain? Or maybe in my consciousness, in which the written words are formed? But I am actually writing, and the words "flow into my fingers." My writing cannot be dualistically split into a mental and a bodily writing. *In a realized function, no distinction between inner and outer can be drawn*—just as it would be nonsensical to ask whether the air breathed still is part of the external world or already of the organism.[246]

Fuchs's narrative example demonstrates a full range of embodied cognition. In his example, the agent is embedded in an environment to write on paper. The agent is situated within that environment with the capability of knowing how to utilize a pencil and how to write words. The pencil and the paper contribute to the agent's intentions by affording necessary elements for the purpose of communication. Once the pencil is picked up and used for the intention of writing, the pencil becomes embodied by the agent through the agent's extended cognition of the object. The tip of the pencil becomes an extension of the agent's perception in that, for example, the surface of the paper is perceived through the tip of the pencil. Cognition is also extended through the pencil in that it becomes an extension of the agent's intention to communicate. Furthermore, what is also true is that the pencil and paper have now become more than mere instruments for communication. If, for example, the letter is written for a loved one, the letter can become an object endowed with sentimental value. Thus, the way an agent enacts writing the letter directly affects the meaning of the *paper with writing*.

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[245] For a sustained explanation of linear versus circular organism-environment relations see Thomas Fuchs, *Ecology of the Brain: The Phenomenology and Biology of the Embodied Mind* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 127-131.

[246] Fuchs, *Ecology of the Brain*, 128 (italics original).

However, what if the circumstances were different for the agent or the environment? What if, for instance, the agent did not know how to use a pencil or was too illiterate to write a letter? What if the pencil was broken or the paper was wet? What can be determined is that there is a dynamic coupling between organism and environment that takes place. Yet it is constrained by both the affordances of the environment and the organism's abilities. Johnson states that the more complex an organism is, the greater capability it has to meaningfully interact with the elements that make up the environment in which it is situated. For example, small caves do not afford access for animals that are too large. Thus, small caves do not have the same meaning for elephants as they can for smaller animals.[247]

In contextualizing the organism environment dynamic within more complex domains of human life, some powerful realizations can be deduced. Johnson states, "The connection between emotion and meaning is that emotions are our most elementary way of taking the measure of our current situation and responding to it".[248] That elementary way of making meaning is one of the reasons why Johnson describes adults as "big babies".[249] That is not to say that babies have all of an adult's mental capabilities. Johnson means that there are many ways in which an infant makes meaning of the world that continue to be an essential part of what it means to think as an adult.[250]

Another example of cognition that is carried into adulthood is the concept of primary intersubjectivity and secondary intersubjectivity.[251] Gallagher explains the concept of primary intersubjectivity, which describes the continual event in which an individual couples and interacts directly with another. Secondary intersubjectivity refers to an event where two or more

[247] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 19.
[248] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 32.
[249] Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 33.
[250] Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 33.
[251] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 100.

individuals share experiences. Both are involved in sharing experiences that are part of broader functions that form a shared identity between multiple individuals. The identity that is formed from this social interaction is further explored in Chapter 4, where the social aspects of the development of the narrative mind are addressed in depth.

The concrete examples above provide excellent anecdotal evidence to demonstrate how even small, seemingly insignificant details can affect an individual's perception and development. These simple anecdotes are representative of the more complex brain-body-environment interaction that occurs within the Pentecostal movement. In other words, because every social situation is unique, Pentecostal identity is formed by both similar and unique situations. For example, the Pentecostal narrative of Acts 2 is a central source of theological reflection that influences Pentecostal identity. However, so is the cultural context of individuals reflecting upon the Acts 2 Pentecostal narrative.

What is examined later is the influence of narrative on human cognition. Human capabilities in affordance theory go beyond sensorimotor skills or elemental kinds of primary and secondary intersubjectivity. Narrative mental states are hermeneutical elements that influence an individual's interaction with the world. They can both enable and constrain an individual from making fruitful meaning of the environment. Gallagher points out that affordances are not merely physical. They can be social as well. Social institutions like sports teams and cultural groups can develop or constrain their member's capabilities to engage affordances in social environments.[252]

Though a uniform consensus on how to speak of the ecological and dynamical nature of cognition is not available, there is undoubtedly a notable move away from traditional

[252] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 10.

computational and representational models of the mind. What is at stake within this conversation is how to speak of the mind more accurately. The academy is grappling with whether there is still value in the practical fiction found within terms that characterize the brain as static representations of the external world, even if that is not what happens. The MIND IS A COMPUTER metaphor has been used to elucidate mental activity. It is part of a group of powerful and pervasive metaphors that communicate formal function. For example, the MIND IS A COMPUTER conceptual metaphor can encourage the assumption that just as a computer recalls stored data and that data is stored and accessible precisely the way it was initially saved within the computer, the mind also stores data within the brain that can be accessed precisely the way it was "saved". However, the MIND IS A COMPUTER is a mistaken characterization of the mind. Another conceptual metaphor that is used to describe cognitive functions is that of a structure. Neural function is described as a "structure" that can recall the nature of a building. Since a building is systematic in its engineering with separate but complementing and unchanging components, these characterizations can be misattributed to the function of the central nervous system. Even the notion of function can recall the static, non-dynamic character of rudimentary mathematics. Computational, structural, and function metaphors help enable common conversation about the complex abstract nature of the mind despite it not being how the mind truly functions.

For this reason, Johnson and Lakoff attempt to avoid using the term representation because it recalls a model of the mind that disembodies internal processes and separates cognition from the world. However, the continual use of metaphors that recall a disembodied understanding of cognition shows that having a conversation without them is difficult. Gallagher states that what is being proposed in enactive theory is not new. It can be found in the cross-

disciplinary vocabularies of Gestalt psychology, ecological psychology, dynamical systems theory, intersubjective interaction, embodied and situated cognition, and anthropological discussions that emerge from studies in culture.[253] Gallagher provocatively posits that the question is "whether neuroscience can start to speak this different language and enter into the right kind of dialogue".[254] Though this thesis does not attempt to offer a conclusion on the matter, it does seek to engage the tenets of enaction and ecological dynamical models to advance what James K.A. Smith proposes. Smith's engagement with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy and Mark Johnson's work on cognition is only the beginning of what this thesis argues can be an extensive, fruitful theoretical construction of Pentecostal theology and practice. However, there is further theoretical construction that is necessary to be able to move "full steam" into advancing Smith's approach.

3.3 Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Cognitive Linguistics

According to Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green, conceptual metaphor theory was one of the earliest theoretical frameworks that provided an impetus for the cognitive approach.[255] Lakoff and Johnson transformed the subject of metaphor in their 1980 *Metaphors We Live By.* The work in *Metaphors We Live By*, resulted from Lakoff's discovery of "linguistic evidence showing that metaphor is pervasive in everyday language and thought—evidence that did not fit any contemporary Anglo-American theory of meaning within either linguistics or philosophy."[256] According to Lakoff and Johnson, "The essence of metaphor is *understanding and experiencing* one kind of thing in terms of another."[257] Additionally, in *Philosophy in the*

[253] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 162-163.
[254] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions*, 163.
[255] Evans and Green, *Cognitive Linguistics*, 286.
[256] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, ix.
[257] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphor*, 5 (emphasis mine).

Flesh, Lakoff and Johnson draw substantial insight from cognitive science to develop the idea of the "embodied mind." In their book, they take direct issue with the theory established by the Western philosophical tradition called faculty psychology. Faculty psychology theorizes that our ability to reason is independent of what is experienced in our bodies. They demonstrate that findings from cognitive science establish that bodily experience and perception are a fundamental part of the way we make logical sense of the world. In simple terms, thinking and experience are an inseparable part of understanding.[258]

Lakoff and Johnson propose, "If we are right in suggesting that our conceptual system is largely metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor".[259] Lakoff and Johnson were catalysts for the development of a view that language is essentially the product of lived experience in the body. The term they used within *Metaphors We Live By* to describe their theory is *experientialism*. However, it is described as *embodied realism* in their later work in *Philosophy in the Flesh*.[260] Thus, Johnson states:

> No traditional understanding of signs as having meaning only through some conceptual/propositional content grounded in reference to states of affairs in the world could even begin to capture the richness of body-based meaning that is experienced in all these varied forms of human meaning-making and communicative activity.[261]

For Johnson, language is founded on rich meaning that is based on experience. That experience is body-based and influences what may be considered literal language. Raymond Gibbs takes a bolder position to stipulate that there was no evidence for an ontological difference between literal and figurative language because literal language inherently depends on figurative language, which a traditional understanding of literal vs. figurative language attempts to

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[258] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 47.

[259] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 3.

[260] Mark Johnson, and George Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," *Cognitive Linguistics*, 13, vol. 3 (2002): 248. DOI: 10.1515/cogl.2002.016.

[261] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 20.

bifurcate.[262] In the process of metaphor analysis, this is described as an abstract idea (*target domain*), thought of in terms of a more concrete idea (*source domain*). In their seminal work, *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), Lakoff and Johnson elucidate the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR[263] as an example. The conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is demonstrated in everyday language through statements like, "Your *claims* are *indefensible*," "He *attacked every weak point* in my argument," and "His criticisms were *right on target*".[264] Lakoff and Johnson unravel the meaning of ARGUMENT IS WAR in describing that the conceptualization of arguments as a battle influences the shape arguments take and the way we communicate what is occurring in an argument.[265] As a result, our understanding of preparation for an argument takes a systematic and strategic shape. From the one conceptual metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR, one can continue to many more metaphorical ways to conceive the various elements of a contentious dialogue, including IDEAS ARE WEAPONS and further built upon the conceptual metaphor IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. IDEAS ARE WEAPONS can be seen in well-known statements like Edward Bulwer-Lytton's, in his play, *Richelieu; Or the Conspiracy*, "The pen is mightier than the sword," or in ancient examples like in the Proverbs of Ahiqar, "The word is mightier than the sword"[266], and the proverbs of the Egyptian king Merikare's father, "the tongue is a sword to [a man], and speech is more valorous than any fighting"[267]. This concept is also present in Hebrews

[262] Raymond Gibbs, *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative Thought, Language, and Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 75-6.

[263] Conceptual metaphors will be formatted in all caps as it is the standard format for stating conceptual metaphors.

[264] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 4.

[265] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors*, 7.

[266] Victor H. Matthews and Don C. Benjamin, *Old Testament Parallels: Laws and Stories from the Ancient Near East*, third edition (New York: Paulist Press, 2006), 304.

[267] James B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, third edition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1969), 415.

4:12, “For the word of God is living and active, sharper than any two-edged sword…” and Isaiah 49:2, “He made my mouth like a sharp sword…”.

Lakoff and Johnson do much to explain how metaphors develop from our embodiment of the world. They propose an integrated theory of primary metaphor to further explain more complex conceptual metaphors.[268] As Gibbs points out, one of the difficulties that CMT first encountered was that some metaphorical mappings included more complex concepts that did not make sense. [269] Primary metaphors are metaphors that have more direct correlations to sensorimotor experience, like INTAMACY IS CLOSENESS: “We have a close relationship”, or IMPORTANT IS BIG: “Tomorrow is a big day”.[270] Additionally, other primary metaphors are the result of how we embody emotions. Evidence has been demonstrated that there are some “culturally universal bodily sensations” associated with feelings like anger, fear, love, and depression.[271] They are the kind of intersubjective experiences that give way to primary metaphors like ANGER IS HOT.

Conceptual metaphors, on the other hand, like THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, do not explicitly map to embodied experience as there are aspects of a building that do not completely map to the domain of theories. Whereas primary metaphors have direct correlations to experience, complex metaphors are formed through a conceptual blend of various primary metaphors to form new conceptual metaphors. For example, IDEAS ARE OBJECTS has a more direct correlation with the experiential reaction that an individual can have to the words of

[268] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 46.

[269] Raymond Gibbs, *Metaphor Wars: Conceptual Metaphors in Human Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 28.

[270] Gibbs, *Metaphor Wars*, 29.

[271] Lauri Nummenmaa, Enrico Glerean, Riitta Hari, and Jari K. Hietanen, “Bodily Maps of Emotions,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 111, no. 2 (2014): 646-651, DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1321664111.

another. If person A throws a ball to another person B, the ball becomes an extension of person A's agency. The ball thrown by person A begins to affect person B as soon as person B perceives that person A has a possible intention to throw the ball. Therefore, The body is affected by the intention and action of person A. The cognitive orientation of person B is affected in a way that takes into consideration the whole of person A. This consideration can potentially include a question of why person A has thrown the ball. Is person A attempting to play or harm? Is it part of an attempt to create a positive social connection or a test of person B's capabilities? The purpose of relaying such questions is not to answer them but to highlight the effect that person A has on Person B in throwing an object such as a ball. Likewise, the more abstract concept of an idea can be communicated from person A to person B. As a ball is released, an idea is communicated to another. As a ball is thrown from person A to person B, the idea communicated from person A to person B affects the cognitive state of person B. Thus, ideas are metaphors for objects.

Consequently, more complex conceptual metaphors can be formed as an individual discovers that objects can be used to build. Objects can also be used to hurt or help another. Thus, conceptual metaphors like ARGUMENT IS WAR and THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS are developed. What can be seen here is an example of how linguistic capabilities emerge from and are constituted by embodied experience. Hence, Lakoff and Johnson conclude that conceptual metaphors are largely experientially grounded by our interaction with the environment. It is a system of categorizations and schemas that assist in making sense of the world that we experience.[272]

[272] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 47

3.3.1 Image Schemas

According to Gibbs, “Source domains in conceptual metaphors are primarily image-schematic because they emerge from recurring patterns of embodied experience.”[273] Furthermore, image schemas are dynamic yet consistent mental structures that are used to attribute meaning to experience. They are analogue conceptual patterns that emerge from experiences that are understood to have phenomenological similarities.[274] These conceptual patterns are abstract pre-conceptual structures that arise from our reoccurring phenomenological experiences.[275] Zoltán Kövecses describes these conceptual patterns as “skeletal preconceptual structures, " including CONTAINER, FORCE, and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL.[276] Expressions that follow the CONTAINER image schema include statements like “I am *in* love”, while expressions that follow the FORCE image schema include statements like “I was *overcome* with love”.[277] While being *in love* with another implies that love is a CONTAINER that one can be inside of, that one is *overcome* with love implies that love was a FORCE that provided a sense of loss of agency due to the influence of the experience of love.

The common concept of LIFE IS A JOURNEY is grounded on the image schema SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. The SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema has primal kinesthetic origins, including a *link* schema. According to Lakoff, links are first introduced to us in infancy with experiences like for example the umbilical cord. The basic logic follows, "If A is linking to B, then A is constrained

[273] Raymond Gibbs, “Embodiment,” in *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, ed. Barbara Dancygier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 452.

[274] Zoltán Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 53.

[275] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory*, 9.

[276] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory*, 9.

[277] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory*, 13.

by, and dependent upon, B" and visa-versa. [278] In the case of LIFE IS A JOURNEY, point A is the start and point B is the desired destination that is linked by events and decisions that occur to get an individual to point B. Hence, because LIFE is understood in terms of a JOURNEY, more complex constructions can occur, for example, when similar desires join two individuals involved in a romantic relationship. LOVE then can become the abstract target that is understood in terms of a JOURNEY. In the following diagram, I have demonstrated my adaptation of a metaphorical mapping that scholars typically use to demonstrate its function[279]:

Conceptual Metaphor: LOVE IS A JOURNEY

Source Domain: JOURNEY		*Target Domain: LOVE*
Travelers	→	lovers
Vehicle	→	lover's relationship
Journey: looking back	→	time/events that have already transpired
Journey: looking forward	→	time/events that are anticipated to transpire
Speed	→	rate in which anticipated time/events are transpiring
Obstacles and road conditions	→	difficulties and challenges experienced
Destination	→	shared goals for the relationship
Route choices	→	what decisions lead to relationship goals

Within this map are found various kinds of things that can be experienced within a relationship between lovers. The conceptual metaphor of LOVE IS A JOURNEY is what leads to statements like "It's been a long, bumpy road, but we come so far" or "I think it's time we part ways, we are going two different directions". The general schematic phenomenological experience of moving through time provides a reference to now as a point in time A and later as a point in time B. This intrinsic temporality involves corporeal experience recorded and dynamically organized in our body schema. In the acquisition of corporeal skills, for example, our sensory-motor experience does not forget an experience. It retains movement moment-to-

[278] George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), 274.

[279] For another example of this, see: Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 9.

moment. As time transpires, the past is used to influence present action and anticipates future action and consequences.[280] Likewise, moving from one place (A) to another intended place (B) provides a schematic experiential base similar to that of moving through time.[281] The metaphors involved here, as Lakoff describes, are:

> Understood in terms of destinations, and achieving a purpose is understood as passing along from a starting point to an endpoint. Thus, one may *go a long way toward* achieving one's purposes, or one may get *sidetracked*, or find something getting *in one's way*.[282]

Before moving forward, it is beneficial to clarify the use of some terms already stated. That is the term *image schemas* and *domains* in addition to the concept of *categories* and *frames*. According to Zoltán Kövecses, these basic elements characterize the cognitive conceptual system.[283] Image schemas are essential yet vague structures that are pre-propositional. Domains, on the other hand, are propositional conceptions constructed from image schematic structures. For example, the domain of a JOURNEY already presupposes various image-schematic experiences like starting from point A to another point B. It also likely presupposes various experiences that can occur along to way in moving from A to B. This may include things like turns and maneuvers required to reach the destination. Thus, a domain is a systematic assemblage of image-schematic experiences.[284], Though it would take more space to analyze all of the elements within the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, what can be observed is the embodied context from which it emerges. Theological scholarship has already begun to demonstrate how LIFE IS A JOURNEY provides part of the conceptual foundation of some theological concepts. For example, Joel B. Green has shown how conversion in the biblical Luke-Acts narrative is founded

[280] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 26-27.
[281] Gibbs, "Embodiment," 452.
[282] Lakoff, *Women Fire, and Dangerous*, 275.
[283] Zoltán Kövecses, *Where Metaphors Come From: Reconsidering Context in Metaphor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 35-37.
[284] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor*, 53.

includes a LIFE IS A JOURNEY concept where STATE ARE LOCATIONS and CHANGE IS MOTION.[285] Conversion is an event that changes an individual's state of being. Furthermore, converts' progressive changes as they follow Christ constitute forward motion in the journey of being disciples of Christ. Thus, Green states that "conversion signifies a continued journey in the right direction down a road under reconstruction".[286]

The notion of *categorization* is used in cognitive linguistics to describe the nature of human beings to organize mental information in terms of a prototype effect. It is highly influenced by Eleanor Rosch's experiments demonstrating that humans typically categorize objects by way of familial resemblance.[287] According to Rosch, two general principles characterize the formation of categories: 1) category systems are attempts to maximize information with the least cognitive effort, and 2) the world is perceived as structured information. Thus, "maximum information with least cognitive effort is achieved if categories map the perceived world structure as closely as possible".[288] In an effort to efficiently categorize information, humans categorize in terms of prototypes of a particular category. Evidence for prototypes was demonstrated through experiments that showed that people's reaction time is faster when responding to exemplars or prototypes of a category than when responding to nonrepresentative exemplars.[289]

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[285] Green, *Conversion in Luke-Acts*, 62-69.

[286] Green, *Conversion in Luke-Acts*, 68.

[287] Eleanor Rosch, "Natural Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 4, (1973): 328-350, DOI: 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90017-0.; Eleanor Rosch, "Cognitive Reference Points," *Cognitive Psychology* 7 (1973): 532-547, DOI: 10.1016/0010-0285(75)90021-3.; Eleanor Rosch and Carolyn Mervis, "Family Resemblances: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 7 (1975): 573-605, DOI: 10.1016/0010-0285(75)90024-9.; Eleanor Rosch, et al., "Basic Objects in Natural Categories," *Cognitive Psychology* 8 (1976): 382-439, DOI: 10.1016/0010-0285(76)90013-X.

[288] Eleanor Rosch, "Principles of Categorization," in *Foundations of Cognitive Psychology: Core Readings*, ed. Daniel J. Levitin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002, first published 1978), 252.

[289] Eleanor Rosch, Carol Simpson, and R. Scott Miller, "Structural Bases of Typicality Effects," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 2, no. 4 (1976), 491-502; Carolyn Mervis and

Rosch states that it is important to consider that "To speak of *a prototype* at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to are judgements of degree of prototypicality".[290] Cognitive prototypes are not concrete, nor are they universal. Prototypes are used to describe the elements of human cognitive categorization that are used as exemplars or cognitive reference points.[291] As Lakoff points out, robins and sparrows in the category *bird* are ranked high in prototypicality than owls and eagles, while ostriches and penguins rank among the lowest.[292]

The notion of *frames* is derived from Charles Fillmore's frame semantics.[293] By frames, Fillmore means "any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available".[294] Fillmore's analysis of the word bachelor is an excellent example of this concept.[295] The word *bachelor* is used to refer to an unmarried adult man. However, the category to which a *bachelor* applies does not include all married men. It is used to denote a specific kind of unmarried man in relation to a cultural expectation of marriage and marriageable conditions. For example, unmarried men that are with long-term committed romantic partners wouldn't typically be considered a *bachelor*. Furthermore, unmarried men like the pope (at the time of Fillmore's work: John Paul II) would not be considered a *bachelor*.[296] According to Fillmore's definition of

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Eleanor Rosch, "Categorization of Natural Objects," *Annual Review of Psychology* 32 (1981), 96, DOI: 10.1146/annurev.ps.32.020181.000513.

[290] Rosch, "Principles of Categorization," 263.

[291] Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 45.

[292] Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 44.

[293] Charles Fillmore, "Frame Semantics," in *Linguistics in the Morning Calm*, edited by The Linguistic Society of Korea (Seoul: Hanshin, 1982): 111-38.

[294] Fillmore, "Frame Semantics," 111.

[295] Charles Fillmore, "Towards a Descriptive Framework for Spatial Deixis," in *Speech, Place, and Action*, eds. R.J. Jarvella and Wolfgang Klein (London: John Wiley, 1982): 31-59.

[296] Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 70-71.

a *frame,* there is a cultural-linguistic context which forms a family of concepts that help define what is meant by a *bachelor*. If an individual who is outside of the social group that produces the word *bachelor* seeks to understand it, further investigation is required beyond the definition of "an unmarried man". The concept of the word *waiter* demonstrates the same dynamic. Various social elements are at play in the system of concepts behind the word *waiter* that potentially require much attention to disambiguate. However, it is beneficial to name a few. In a typical American context, *waiter* is a term that typically will recall the context of a restaurant. For a waiter, responsibilities may include taking customers' orders and facilitating the supply of the food order. Would it be fit to equate a waiter with a servant? Could an individual perhaps request a waiter to take a customer's laundry to the cleaners while customers eat? Those who are familiar with the cultural context of an American waiter know that this is not the case. Furthermore, there are cultural expectations of the customer in relation to a waiter. What is in mind here is the expectation of granting the waiter a tip, which is a certain amount of money granted directly to the waiter. The amount is typically relative to the amount paid for the meal and in proportion to a customer's satisfaction with a waiter's services. However, when considering the mental frame of a restaurant in global contexts, a tip is not always granted in every social context where there is a waiter.

3.3.2 Idealized Cognitive Models

The terms image schema, domains, categories/prototypes, and frames have all been used in cognitive linguistics in similar ways.[297] As a result, there is no conformity in the way that they are used in the academy.[298] Kövecses has proposed a solution that places them in a hierarchy of

[297] Fillmore for example states that what he means by frames is alternatively known as 'schema', 'script', or 'cognitive model'; see Fillmore, "Frame Semantics," 111.

[298] For a brief outline of the various ways these terms are used see: Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor*, 50-51.

schematicity. He suggests that *image schemas* are the most schematic concepts, followed by *domain*, *frame*, and *mental spaces*. Following Gilles Faucconier, Kövecses suggests that mental spaces as more conceptually rich than frames and can include a complex compendium of multiple frames.[299] Ultimately, while his proposal of a hierarchy of schematicity is an intriguing proposal, Kövecses recognizes that one could just as easily suggest that the terms are equivalent for practical purposes.[300] For this reason, this thesis utilizes what has been recognized as an arguably more inclusive theory: Lakoff's theory of idealized cognitive models (ICM).[301]

Jeannette Littlemore describes ICMs concisely as "a series of embodied, encyclopaedic, abstracts loosely connected and somewhat idiosyncratic knowledge networks that we have in our minds."[302] Lakoff's theory of ICM developed from sources on Fillmore's frame semantics, Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor and metonymy, Ronald Langacker's cognitive grammar, and Gills Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces. The concept of an ICM is guided by four kinds of structuring principles: 1) propositional structure from Fillmore's frames, 2) image-schematic structure from Langacker's cognitive grammar, 3) metaphoric mapping as described by Lakoff and Johnson, and 4) metonymic mappings as described by Lakoff and Johnson.[303] They encompass people's subjective views of concepts and events. Therefore, they include categories and frames that are both dynamic or more static in structure.[304] Given the various ways that cognitive linguistic terms have been used, ICM is a theoretical concept developed by Lakoff to generally refer to cognitive systems in our minds that are used as ideal situations.

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[299] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor*, 54.

[300] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor*, 50.

[301] Jeanette Littlemore, *Applying Cognitive Linguistics to Second Language Learning and Teaching* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 79.

[302] Jeannette Littlemore, *Metonymy: Hidden Shortcuts in Language, Thought and Communication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 12.

[303] Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 68.

[304] Littlemore, *Metonymy*, 10.

Though the theoretical foundations that gave birth to ICM theory were in the 1980s, it has been demonstrated to have continued relevance for the academy today. Jeanette Littlemore, for example, has used ICM theory to analyze the concept of *metonymy*[305] and, on another occasion, to analyze some barriers that occur in second language acquisition when learners have propositional ICMs different from the target language[306].

Idealized cognitive model theory connects well with what is developed later in this chapter regarding what Gallagher describes as the massive hermeneutical background (MHB). The concept of ICM is helpful in defining the hermeneutical tendency humans have in comparing phenomena in the world to what is considered ideal. Important to understand is that ICM refers to the subjective person, whereas a prototype or prototypicality refers to the object that a person is observing. The frame of a particular term is greatly influenced by what a social group has generally determined is the ICM. Therefore, if an effective understanding of a specific term is to be achieved, it is helpful to determine the general ICMs that help constitute the frames that serve as a hermeneutical background of the social group in which the frame resides. Within the Christian tradition, this correlates with the reception, revision, or rejection of individual or group expression. An example that is often used within Christian reflection is the concept of the Blood. It may seem strange to someone not accustomed to hearing religious talk about blood. However, for Christians, talk about blood seeks to apply to the present the way that blood is talked about in the Bible. The Bible and the community provide interactive guidance on how an individual should ideally talk about the blood. Blood is mentioned in reference to becoming

[305] Jeanette Littlemore, *Metonymy: Hidden Shortcuts in Language, Thought, and Communication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

[306] Jeanette Littlemore, *Applying Cognitive Linguistics to Second Language Learning and Teaching* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

ceremonially unclean[307], receiving protection[308], and the blood of Jesus that cleanses.[309] How, then, is an individual to know when and how to use talk of blood conceptually in life? How Christians actually use talk of blood is greatly influenced by the religious community in which an individual is embedded. For example, Stephen Shaver describes how in 1529, after a great debate between groups led by Martin Luther and Huldrych Zwingli, it was still not decided whether the bread and wine was a true presentation of the body and blood of Christ.[310] This indecisiveness is because while some groups speak of the bread and wine during the eucharist as "transubstantiation" (Roman Catholic), others speak of the bread and wine in terms of "change" (Eastern Orthodox) or "sacramental union" (Lutherans).[311] The theological conversation here is in reference to how to appropriately understand and speak of what happens to the bread and wine during the liturgical practice of the Eucharist. Various religious communities within this debate were negotiating the ideal nature of these religious concepts. Their indecision was spurred by ICMs that were not matching up. A vital point for this thesis is that religious communities are fundamentally involved in the process of developing an individual's understanding of theological concepts. Thus, a community's reaction will vary if an individual taking the eucharist inadvertently drops the bread or spills the wine. A community's reaction is influenced by how a specific religious tradition understands how the bread and wine correlate to the body and blood of Jesus Christ.

On a final note, regarding the nature of metaphor, it is important to recognize that cognitive metaphors, frames, and ICMs are not static representations. Gibbs provides some

[307] Leviticus 15:19.
[308] Exodus 12:13.
[309] Ephesians 1:7
[310] Stephen R. Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence: Language, Cognition, and the Body and Blood of Christ* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 1
[311] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharist Presence*, 1.

productive engagement on the ecological nature of cognitive metaphors. According to Gibbs, "Metaphor in human experience should always be understood as an action (i.e. something that people do) rather than as knowledge people possess or just a specific way of using language" and that "metaphorical performances are always part of dynamical, ecological cognition and must always be characterized as embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended".[312] This is because an ecological-dynamical perspective views human cognition as a "self-organizing dynamical system" involving the entire human system of an individual seeking to create "new task-satisfactory dynamical equilibria between the individual.. and the environment."[313] What metaphor helps do in the process of action in an individual's self-organizing system is that it provides a "projected constraint" based off of the embodied experiences involved with the metaphor. Gibbs uses an analogy of a music teacher instructing a violinist to play a musical phrase in a specific way. He gives the example of the teacher instructing the student to play the violin as if she were "throwing a ball into a basket".[314] In short, the metaphor provided of "throwing a ball into a basket" provides embodied constraints to the concept of playing a musical phrase, thus helping to enable the student to block undesired bodily actions and enable the student to engage in the desired motor function.[315] The effectiveness of the instructor's metaphor, however, is greatly influenced by the student's ability to throw a ball and the instructor's embodied action of throwing a ball while simultaneously communicating the phrase. As the student uses the conceptual metaphor to aid her actions, the very constitution of the metaphor is affected by her performance. A dynamical ecological perspective of metaphors recognizes the changing characteristics of a metaphor within an individual as the concept is

[312] Gibbs, "Metaphor as Dynamical-Ecological Performance," 33.
[313] Gibbs, "Metaphor," 34.
[314] Gibbs, "Metaphor," 34.
[315] Gibbs, "Metaphor," 35.

embodied throughout various situations in the lived world. It appropriately places the focus on metaphor studies on human-environment interactions rather than simply on how it is used to communicate a propositional statement.[316] Thus, "cognitive semantics", as Gallagher puts it, of image schemas and metaphors "gives us a way to conceptualize how embodied perception and action can scale up into the more sophisticated intellectual aspects of cognition".[317]

3.3.3 Gallagher's Enaction Theory, Lakoff, and Johnson: Establishing Compatibility

It is important to recognize that Gallagher has expressed some criticism of Johnson and Lakoff's position. Gallagher claims that Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory stands as an example of weak EC.[318] He claims that it is compatible with representationalism and champions an internalist view that is consistent with bodiless conceptions of cognition.[319] However, the disembodied claims of representationalism are something that Lakoff and Johnson have refuted continuously. Johnson and Lakoff have conceded that the only workable form of representation compatible with embodied cognition is a theory that views representation as a "flexible pattern of organism-environment interactions", not an internal static entity that is used as a reference to the outside world.[320] Johnson and Lakoff's statement does not necessarily allow for a form of representationalism. It is akin to what Gallagher seems to conclude in saying that if a minimal representation conforms to a dynamical view of representation, he doubts whether there is a purpose for using the concept of representation at all.[321]

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[316] Gibbs, "Metaphor," 43.

[317] Shaun Gallagher and Robb Lindgren, "Enactive Metaphors: Learning Through Full-Body Engagement," *Educational Psychology Review* 27 (2015), 391. DOI: 10.1007/s10648-015-9327-1.

[318] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions,* 33-36.

[319] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions,* 35.

[320] Johnson and Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," 249-250.

[321] Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions,* 104-105.

While Gallagher sees Johnson's theory as an example of weak EC, Johnson has stated that there is no need for a representational theory of mind that requires inner mental representations that "bridge the gap" between the mind and the world. Johnson states that his theory of embodied realism supposes that "there never was such a gap in the first place".[322] Bodily action and thinking are dynamically coupled with the world from the beginning. Cognition is more than a static inner representation. An authentic experience of the world is a primal aspect of cognition. In tandem with Gallagher, Johnson constructs his theory around the dynamic coupling between the brain, body, and environment. Furthermore, embodied cognition is often social and cooperative between multiple organisms.[323]

While Gallagher categorizes Lakoff and Johnson as being representational and compatible with the computational understanding of the mind, Lakoff and Johnson go to great lengths in refuting representational and computational conceptions of cognition. One of their primary goals is to demonstrate how the dominant first-generation paradigm was captured by the MIND AS A COMPUTATIONAL PROGRAM metaphor. This mistake led to dualistic views of mind and body in what Johnson calls the "body snatchers".[324] Likewise, Lakoff states that during the 1960s and 1970s, general semanticists like himself discovered "counterexamples" to the "idea that meaning could be seen as an internal representation of an external, mind-free reality".[325]

Lakoff and Johnson are committed to linking their theories to neural processes. For example, Johnson argues that as sentences are read and heard, sensory, motor, and affective areas of the brain are activated. He offers some theories that have garnered evidence toward this in

[322] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 67.
[323] Johnosn, *Embodied Mind*, 69.
[324] See Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 16-18.
[325] Lakoff, "Explaining Embodied Cognition Results," 774.

Lawrence Barsalou's theory of body-based perceptual symbols and Ben Bergen's "embodied simulation hypothesis". Johnson's use of Barsalou can be misleading to Johnson's enactive commitments. Barsalou makes great use of the representational paradigm. Johnson recognizes the apparent contradiction. However, he claims that "Barsalou's view could be made compatible with a nonrepresentational theory of mind".[326]

Despite Gallagher's criticism of Lakoff and Johnson, there is a clear resonance between them. The following chapter elucidates their resonance more clearly, especially as it relates to Lakoff and Johnson's embodied realism and how it produces shared meaning. For Johnson and Lakoff, embodied realism "is the view that the locus of experience, meaning, and thought is the ongoing series of embodied organism-environment interactions that constitute our understanding of the world".[327] As an ongoing process, mental processes cannot be conceived as anything akin to the classical view of representationalism. Furthermore, because an embodied experience of the environment, whether physical or social, is constantly changing, so is the constitution of the neural patterns that are being used to make meaning of the world. Their theory of embodied realism takes into consideration that cultural and social influences contribute extensively to variations in the way that meaning is extended and elaborated.[328] Recognizing the cultural and social influences on meaning-making is not a cause to adopt a form of radical subjectivity. Rather, given the intersubjective nature of human cognition, it is argued in the following chapter that humanity produces similar meaning to each other. Humanity has cognitive commonalities because cognition occurs in similar bodies within a similar reality. A crude way of referring to the space of common meaning is "objectivity".

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[326] Johnson, *Embodied Mind*, 24.
[327] Johnson and Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," 249.
[328] Johnson and Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," 251.

The conversation of objectivity and subjectivity is important to theology because what one assumes about epistemology can have a bearing on ethical responsibility to each other. Stephen Minister argues that since objectivity and subjectivity are irreducible to each other, it has implications for how ethics is thought about.[329] An individual's situatedness in unique material and social contexts should be considered when thinking about ethics. For this reason, Minister states, "Because our conscious subjectivity and our embodiment are inseparable, yet irreducible, ethical action toward others must take seriously both the subjectivity and the embodiment of others."[330] Likewise, since theology in religious settings is often ethical and prescriptive in nature, theology can more effectively form the community if it is communicated in such a way that it considers the unique backgrounds present within individuals in the community. John Sander's work in *Theology in the Flesh,* is an excellent scholarly example of what is proposed here. Sanders develops his theory on the embodied realism of Lakoff and Johnson and utilizes cognitive linguistics to examine how moral reasoning within American Christians includes both agreement and disagreement on ethical issues.[331]

Embodied realism is valuable for the study of cognitive linguistics and CMT because it is a foundational theory that addresses the cognitive constitution that emerges from ongoing organism-environment interactions.[332] For Johnson and Lakoff, it is more than a theory that is tacked on to their brand of CMT. It is "the best account of the grounding of meaning that makes sense of the broadest sense of converging empirical evidence".[333] It has been stated already how

[329] Stephen Minister, "To the People Themselves: The Value of Phenomenology for Global Ethics," in *Phenomenology for the Twenty-First Century*, eds. J. Aaron Simmons and J. Edward Hackett (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 14.

[330] Minister, "To the People Themselves," 14.

[331] Sanders, *Theology in the Flesh*, 139-171,

[332] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 90.

[333] Johnson and Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," 249.

embodied realism concords with Pentecostal cosmology. It also follows Smith's epistemology. Additionally, Stephen Shaver is a theologian that has shown how embodied realism is a position that rejects both naïve objectivist and radical subjectivist accounts of epistemology.[334] Shaver argues that the embodied realism espoused by Lakoff and Johnson has commonalities with what he calls a "critical realism" in theology.[335] The critical realism in reference here seeks to take into consideration both the creativity and uniqueness of the mind of individuals and the reality that the mind interacts with an objective world.[336] Shaver proposes a "sacramental-realist" epistemology that takes into consideration theological reflection and "grounds it in the flesh".[337] Shaver states, "Our deepest questions, fears, joys, and thanksgivings are experienced and expressed in bodily terms of image schemas and primary metaphors drawn from bodily human experience" and that it is precisely in this sense of our bodies that "God interacts with human beings".[338] Shaver provocatively states that conceptual language is essential in theology and that "The goal of theological language is not to be exhaustively, univocally true, but to disclose aspects of reality that can be understood only through figurative thought".[339] This is the reason why talk of "the blood" in Christian theological language is so powerful. Talk of "the blood" goes beyond the eucharist. In Chapter 6, "the blood" is analysed in relation to a Pentecostal testimony as being "under the blood". What is shown is that it is not that Pentecostals think they are literally "covered in the blood of Jesus". It is that the blood of Jesus is a conceptual expression signifying that an individual has access to the power of Jesus to, for example, cleanse

[334] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence*, 47.
[335] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence*, 49.
[336] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence*, 50.
[337] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence*, 51.
[338] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence*, 51.
[339] Shaver, *Metaphors of Eucharistic Presence*, 51.

one from sin or protect from the enemy. Thus, theological language aids in conceptualizing a Christian's belief that Jesus has the power to intervene in one's life.

3.4 Conclusion

One of the primary objectives of this chapter is to expound on concepts within embodied cognition and enaction theory to correlate them with Smith's embodied epistemology in later chapters. In addition to embodied and enactive ontological commitments, it is proposed within this chapter that cognitive linguistics provides additional useful methodological tools that concur with both Smith's embodied epistemology enaction theory. Various viewpoints on the nature of perception and the mind were analysed to argue for the primacy of the enactive view of cognition and its compatibility with Smith's theoretical foundation. Introductory remarks on why these topics are valuable for theology and Pentecostal identity were provided throughout to foreshadow their significance to the work presented later in this thesis. The work of Lakoff, Johnson, and Gallagher can reinforce each other's position in productive ways. Lakoff and Johnson's CMT can be used to elaborate further on Gallagher's position on the narrativity of the mind. In the following chapter, Gallagher's work on primary and secondary intersubjectivity is correlated with Lakoff and Johnson's understanding of how our shared embodiment of the world produces shared meaning. Gallagher's interaction theory also elaborates on the social influence on cognitive development. While much of the work of Lakoff and Johnson focuses on individual cognitive development, Gallagher's interaction theory addresses the more social ways in which cognition is developed. Both approaches, when combined with James K.A. Smith's work, provide robust explanatory theories on Pentecostal identity formation.

The theoretical foundation provided in this chapter is part of a more widely encompassing approach employed in this thesis to extract and analyse how and why certain

Pentecostal narratives influence Pentecostal identity. A missing element is a way to bring all of these interdisciplinary areas together. Whereas this chapter focuses primarily on how the individual mind makes meaning, the next chapter addresses the social aspects of how an individual makes meaning of the world. It includes a theory of interaction and narrative that can be efficiently correlated to both Smith's work and the subject of Pentecostal identity.

CHAPTER 4: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SELF AND THE NARRATIVE MIND

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is a continuation of the theoretical foundation presented in Chapter 4. The theoretical foundation is completed in preparation for application to Smith's work and the Pentecostal concept of testimony. While the prior chapter dealt with more individualistic cognitive concerns, this chapter examines the social influences on the narrativity of the mind. As a result, a more complete theory that takes into consideration both the individual and social aspects of meaning-making can be developed. The social aspects of meaning-making is important for the study of testimony because, in the approach of this thesis, testimony is both what an individual has and is co-constructed with the community in which an individual is embedded.

Gallagher's book, *Action and Interaction*, offers an extensive treatment of his understanding of human action, called Interaction Theory (IT). Interaction Theory is an interdisciplinary enactive account of human cognition that includes theoretical development on how humans make sense of the world on individual and social levels. It expounds on the nature of the mind and the various ways social and cultural practices shape it. In contrast to standard "theory of mind" and mind-reading approaches, Gallagher builds on embodied and enactive accounts of cognition to make a compelling case that from the moment of birth, we are brought into a world full of interactive relations. As such, our initial actions within the world form in reaction to the actions of others. Gallagher posits, "To work towards an understanding of how our encounters with others carry us into actions, and continue to shape our actions, and therefore our basic cognitive capacities, we need an account of social interaction."[340] Gallagher offers

[340] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 2.

Interaction Theory as a possible option to analyze and understand human action in a social world.

This chapter also explores the work of Robyn Fivush in light of her social interaction theory of autobiographical memory and identity. Fivush's work on the social aspects of cognition has contributed to the field of psychology by highlighting the importance of interpersonal and cultural factors in the development of cognitive processes. Her research focuses on the role of memory and storytelling in the development of the self and how our experiences and relationships with others shape our sense of identity. She has shown that our experiences and relationships with others play a vital role in moulding the ways we think, remember, and make sense of the world. This research has important implications for understanding the autobiographical self and how it is constructed and maintained over time. Fivush's work on the autobiographical self and the social aspects of cognition helps elucidate the complex nature of the self and provides valuable insights into how our experiences and relationships with others shape our cognitive processes and sense of identity. In later chapters, Fivush's work is integrated to argue that the concept of testimony is explicitly an autobiographical concept. It is constructed in ways similar to Fivush's concept of the autobiographical self.

Since this thesis includes an examination of the Pentecostal community as a group, this paper introduces the work of Gallagher and Deborah Tollefson on *group identity* and the *we-narratives* that support and construct group formation. The theoretical analysis offered in this chapter provides tools for critical analyses of some of the narratives and practices that characterize the Pentecostal community. Focus is placed on recent theoretical advances in enactive approaches to the narrativity of the mind and autobiographical memory. Enactive approaches to the narrativity of the mind propose that the mind is not just a collection of internal

mental states. It is constantly embodied and embedded in the ongoing process of living and interacting with the world. The formation of the narrative mind will be explored from birth to infancy as an individual interacts intersubjectively with others. The nature of memory is expounded, and how a compendium of dynamic memories and experiences called the Massive Hermeneutical Background contributes to the autobiographical self. In conclusion, this thesis makes use of what scholars have referred to as the pattern theory of self as a pluralistic term to encompass the various ways that various academic disciplines speak about what constitutes the self.

Broader social influences on the formation of the autobiographical self and narrative identity are explored beyond what is included in Fivush's work. First, Fivush's work on the ecological dynamics of family relationships is examined. However, additional insights on the nature of communal conversational discourse are considered to further investigate the concepts that Fivush proposes. Broader social structures are explored to demonstrate how the concepts provided by Fivush also apply to what Gallagher calls cognitive institutions and the patterned self.

4.2 An Infant in the World and Big Babies

Although Gallagher's program does not explicitly address the subject of this thesis, his theoretical work on the narrativity of the mind and social cognition is instrumental. Gallagher argues that "what we can learn from the interdisciplinary studies of intersubjectivity—including the significance of embodiment, interaction, and narrative—are important lessons for developing a critical understanding of the actual and potential effects of social relations and organizations".[341] An understanding of how embodied interaction functions will help identify the

[341] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 4.

interactional processes that lead to "normative and institutional arrangements" that birth and sustain practices that individuals may want to escape.[342] The kind of embodied practices that Gallagher gives insight into here are practices that innately inhibit human autonomy and where "less than good dependencies" and authoritative institutions are established.[343] For Gallagher, the study of intersubjectivity necessarily begins in stages at the beginning of life, including infancy and, in some ways, even in the womb.

The more primal subject of the narrativity of the mind addresses basic things like, for example, the way in which we act upon the world. Jerome Bruner calls this the "landscape of action".[344] The nature of an action includes initiation toward a purpose, along with possible corrective manoeuvres to reach or fulfil the purpose of the initiated action. The experience within any given action then becomes a unit of meaning that tests expectations. An enactive approach to this process means that a *unit* of memory is seen as being in constant dynamic flux as it is contextualized into new experiences. In other words, just as quickly as a memory is created, it is already changed. The ever-changing nature of memory is important for what is suggested later regarding autobiographical memory.

The origins of narrative meaning-making have been discovered even within the earliest observations of action by the human fetus. According to Jonathan Delafield-Butt and Colwyn Trevarthen, "These early intentional acts motivate an extension of the imaginative use of the body into the future, guided by prospective perceptual awareness which is beginning to inform a memory of consequences."[345] Intentional actions are assembled into more complex actions,

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[342] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 4.

[343] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 4.

[344] Jerome Bruner, *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). 14

[345] See: Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt and Colwyn Trevarthen, "The ontogenesis of narrative: from moving to meaning," *Frontiers in Psychology* 6, 1157 (2015), 3. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01157.

exemplified in actions where the fetus utilizes the legs to push against the uterine wall to cause it to turn over.[346] Gallagher also states that elementary hand-mouth coordination occurs before birth, which indicates a "motor-organizing process".[347] Additionally, according to ultrasound studies, fetal hand-face contact occurs from 10 to 12 weeks, and thumb sucking occurs from 15 weeks. These basic actions show that goal-oriented activity already occurs in the first trimester of gestation.[348]

The actions discovered in the fetus are examples of the kind of actions from which narratives emerge and are constructed. The narratives referred to here are constructed prior to the existence of propositional thinking. That is not to say that this embodied process does not cease to be an integral part of cognition throughout the span of life. Johnson provokingly states that as humans grow into adulthood, they merely become "big babies".[349] Johnson argues that the same processes that help construct the cognitive content of infants from birth are carried into adulthood. It is the very thing that underlies and makes possible what is commonly assumed to be more mature mental processes.[350] As an infant grows older, more complex narrative action develops as a person interacts with the world, creating a tapestry of interconnected cognitive domains. The result is an intricate hermeneutical background that serves to contextualize present experiences. As memory is contextualized within new memories, and as an individual is influenced by socio-cultural contexts that influence the meaning of past experience, an autobiographical narrative emerges within an individual. The primal role of elementary narrative schemas is compelling evidence for why narratives are so powerful. As Gallagher argues,

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[346] Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, "Ontogenesis of narrative," 3-4.

[347] Gallagher, *Action, and Interaction*, 25.

[348] Mijna Hadders-Algra, "Early Human Motor Development: From Variation to the Ability to Vary and Adapt," *Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews* 90 (2018), 418. DOI: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.05.009.

[349] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 15-51.

[350] Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 15.

narratives can greatly influence an individual because they can access the primal constitution of identity. Religious narratives and identity are not excluded from this concept.

Gallagher further analyses the process of experience and time by borrowing from Husserl's model of time-consciousness. The following is an adaption of Gallagher's diagram of Husserl's model[351]:




Figure 1. Husserl's Model of Time-consciousness.

This diagram is a representation of Husserl's model as it relates to the perception of a melody. The letters on the horizontal line ABCD signify a melody played throughout a moment in time. The vertical lines represent the various temporal phases involved with playing the notes ABCD. According to this diagram, there are at least three functions to each phase, including 1) a *primal impression* (I), 2) *retention* (R), and 3) *protention* (P). The primal impression is a term that signifies the aspect of an experience that is experienced in terms of *now*. As time progresses, there are aspects of the experience that are retained for the purpose of projecting expectations on

[351] Gallagher, *Action, and Interaction*, 28.

what is to come. This is protention. It is crucial to a proper understanding of this process to recognize this system within dynamic terms. In other words, for example, the retention indicated in the "now" phase (R3) should be understood in terms of a continuum between all phases prior R3 (R2[R1]).[352] However, not all of R1 is encapsulated into R2. Retention indicated in the second phase (R2) only signifies that key elements—yet presumably not all—of the first phase (R1) are referenced in the second phase and the second and first phases in the third. Thus, "Action and consciousness constitute meaning in the shadow of what has just been experienced, and in light of what they anticipate".[353] Furthermore, this process does not occur without further contextualization within all that cognitively comprises a person. Experiential phases are always concurrently integrated with other experiential events and across various cognitive domains.[354]

For example, if the example of a melody is integrated into the situation of a student learning to play the scale with an instrument for an upcoming performance, it presents a context that includes much more than simply hearing notes. Other cognitive domains concurrently integrate into the moment of practising the scale. The act of practising also potentially includes various ICMs about the student's future performance. There is an idealized performance that the student may be seeking to achieve relative to the frame of a beginning student performing in a concert. The student's practice session then may include things like satisfaction with the skills developed in practice or even frustration because it may not seem like the student is ready to perform. Consequently, the thought of not provoking an ideal reaction from the audience may elicit emotional discomfort in the student.

[352] Gallagher, *Action, and Interaction*, 28.
[353] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 36.
[354] Gallagher, *Action, and Interaction*, 30.

The process of primal impression, retention, and protention is an action that begins at the inception of our interactions with the world. The cognitive context that emerges from our actions in the world can be described as a compendium of cognitive domains. These cognitive domains, in turn, provide content for the narratives and frames that enactively both drive and constitute action. For Gallagher, most actions are prereflective and do not require reflective guidance or narratives. In this regard, he recognizes a general debate in narrative theory about whether action is intrinsically narrative.[355] Though working out a conclusion to the matter is beyond the scope of this current thesis, what can be said is that narrative is a fundamental component of the way we make meaning of and act upon the world. That it is challenging to distinguish narrative from the very nature of action speaks to the pervasiveness of narrativity within cognition.

In Gallagher's interpretation of Husserl's model of time-consciousness, the nature of *how* the past is understood introduces an additional element that colours the dynamic of primal impression, retention, and protention. If the content involved in retention is changed, then the subsequent primal impression will receive stimuli in a way that will differ from the experience of past primal impressions. It is an error to think that any two primal impressions could be identical. On the contrary, given the assumptions of enaction theory, for two primal impressions to be identical is impossible. What is being highlighted here is the unique thing that happens when the nature of retention is dramatically altered altogether.

The analysis above of the dynamics involved in time-consciousness is integral to understanding the influence of autobiographical memory on our present. It is an examination of a *unit of memory*. The next step is to explore further how a unit of memory is constructed within the context of the first social interactions. The construction of primal interactions then

[355] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 39, no. 11.

contributes to the more complex development of autobiographical memory and the autobiographical self. Autobiographical memory, and thus, testimony, represents a kind of retention that influences primal impressions and protention activity. Furthermore, that religious narratives have the power to transform the self is entirely understandable, considering that narratives deeply influence our understanding of past experiences.

4.2.1 Intersubjectivity and Cognition

Gallagher contends that when it comes to an individual's first actions in the world, they likely emerge from the very start in early interactions with others. The social interactions at the beginning of life are the context in which, even as infants, we learn to act and determine accepted social goals established through reference with others.[356] Gallagher's Interaction Theory (IT) is an approach to forming a foundational framework regarding interaction. The concept of social interaction for Gallagher can be defined as:

> A co-regulated coupling between at least two autonomous agents, where: (i) the co-regulation and coupling mutually affect each other, constituting an autonomous self-sustaining organization in the domain of relational dynamics and (ii) the autonomy of the agents involved is not destroyed (although its scope can be augmented or reduced).[357]

The kind of co-regulated coupling in reference here is the kind of mutual influence that occurs when walking a dog with a leash. When a person as an autonomous agent holds the leash, an active pull and tug often occurs with the dog which is a separate autonomous agent.[358] A dynamic interactive system is created that takes into account some of the intents of an individual walking the dog and the dog's intent to do things like explore the various environmental contexts involved in the walk. The scope of the autonomy of a human agent is constrained if, for example,

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[356] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 42.

[357] Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequil Di Paolo, and Shaun Gallagher, "Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?" *Trends in Cognitive Science* 14, no. 10 (2010), 442-443. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009.

[358] De Jaegher, Di Paolo, and Gallagher, "Can Social Interaction Constitute Social Cognition?" 441.

the human agent intends to exercise, seeing as the human agent is bound to the dog. Likewise, the dog's intent to explore is constrained by a leash that the human agent holds. Although the constraint of autonomy is presented here, an argument can also be made for how walking a dog mutually augments each agent's autonomy. However, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate the nature of interaction. This kind of interactive coupling does not begin later in life. It begins at birth. Gallagher builds IT upon three sets of processes: 1) primary intersubjectivity, 2) secondary intersubjectivity, and 3) communicative and narrative competencies.[359]

Primary intersubjectivity occurs as early sensory-motor capabilities give way to interaction with others. It occurs when an infant begins to perceive things like another's bodily postures and facial expressions. Studies have shown evidence of this dynamic in the ability of an infant to imitate facial expressions of another's tongue protrusion.[360] The academy has no consensus on how to interpret these perceived imitations. It is unclear whether these infant tongue protrusions can be considered cognitive coupling. Gallagher proposes, however, that regardless of how the data is interpreted, this kind of behaviour facilitates a context that can "directly lead to intersubjective interaction" as an infant's "arousal and response" affects the adult who "is encouraged to continue facial games" that allows for a "shared affective intentionality".[361] Likewise, as an infant grows, the world and the people that are embedded in it are not experienced passively. Rather, "we actively participate in the generation of the shared meaning we experience" as interaction with others produces pragmatic and conceptual

[359] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 100.

[360] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 101, citing as an example: Andrew M. Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore "Imitation, Memory and the Representation of Persons," *Infant Behavior and Development* 17 (1994): 83-99, DOI: 10.1016/0163-6383(94)90024-8.

[361] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 101-102.

conclusions about how the world works.[362] Other processes that include primary intersubjectivity include an infant's ability to be attuned to another's attention at two months and the ability of an infant to detect an emotional expression through visual and auditory information from another.[363]

Secondary intersubjectivity develops as infants begin to make meaning of events of shared attention and how others interact with things. Andrew N. Meltzoff, for example, discovered that this begins to occur in children as young as 18 months. In an experiment, Meltzoff observed that children of 18 months were able to perceive the intention of an adult who tried but failed to perform a targeted act. An analysis of the children's behaviour shows that they imitated the intended goal of the adult despite the adult's failure to complete the task.[364] Johnson describes the primary intersubjective facial coupling as mutual gaze.[365] In the experience of mutual gaze, an infant can progress to secondary intersubjectivity as it reacts to objects or events that go beyond itself and the other. As early as the end of the first year, a father can establish mutual gaze (primary intersubjectivity) and subsequently direct the infant's attention to a toy by slowly moving the gaze toward the toy. As the father and infant achieve joint attention to the toy, both can then experience the toy together.[366] This joint attention is the foundation that gives way to more complex forms of secondary intersubjectivity, especially as communicative competency affords new horizons of attention and embodied experience.

Competency in communication and narrative practices "enhance intersubjective interactions" and allows an individual more insight into others' motivation and reason.[367]

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[362] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 104.

[363] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 102-103.

[364] Andrew M. Meltzoff, "Understanding the Intentions of Others: Re-enactment of Intended Acts by 18-Month-Old Children," *Developmental Psychology* 31, no. 5 (1995): 838-850, DOI: 10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838.

[365] Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 37.

[366] Johnson, *Meaning of the Body*, 37.

[367] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 100.

Narrative and communicative competency develop as primary and secondary intersubjectivity is experienced in more sophisticated social settings.[368] Primary and secondary intersubjectivity is not "left behind" as language develops. Rather, language depends on these processes and carries them forward into every stage of life, utilizing them for more complex social contexts.[369] The complex social contexts are navigated by an education in narrative through interaction. As Gallagher states:

> An education in narratives of many sorts—even of the more general and less personal variety—provides knowledge of what actions are acceptable and in what circumstances, what sort of events are important and noteworthy, and what accounts count as reasoned accounts of action. Quite generally, stories—real or fictional—teach us what others can expect from us, but just as importantly, what we can expect from others in particular situations. This is not just coming to know what others ought to (and thus are likely to) do, but what they ought to (and thus are likely to) think and feel, as indexed to the sort of people they are and what social roles they play. Through narratives we learn the *norms* associated with what social roles that pervade our everyday environments—shops, restaurants, homes, theatres, etc.[370]

Narrative and communicative competency is aided by language and facilitates two or more individuals to gather an intersubjective understanding of experience. For example, in the case of a common descriptor like, "He was hot with anger". This statement is built upon the primary metaphor ANGER IS HEAT. Individuals can share a dialogue or come into joint attention because of the intersubjective experience of feeling the correlation between anger and the rise of body temperature. As language gives way to things like more primary and conceptual metaphors, more complex narrative practices are developed. Some can be shared with other communities, and some are unique narrative practices to a particular community. In a group where the expression of anger is used as a social cue that there has been a violation of a communal norm, the group interacts with each other to mediate correcting the norm in conjunction with the degree

[368] Gallagher and Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind*, 223.
[369] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 156.
[370] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 163.

to which anger is perceived.[371] Cultural groups often display different rules on emotional expression depending on cultural values, such as individualism and collectivism, or openness to change.[372] That group identity can be formed speaks of the primary and secondary intersubjective interaction that occurs along with group communicative narrative practices.

Likewise, Johnson and Lakoff argue that their shared embodiment, coupled with shared environments, leads to the development of shared meaning. Aspects of shared embodiment in combination with similar shared environments give rise to shared image schemas and conceptual metaphors.[373] This point should be qualified with the understanding that the shared meaning is a general constraint. There is significant cultural variation as meaning is extended and elaborated by social groups. Nevertheless, Johnson and Lakoff resist the notion of the relativist claim that there are no conceptual universals.[374] Their theory of embodied realism considers that there are both significant cross-cultural variations and conceptual universals in conceptual systems. Johnson clarifies this notion of universality by arguing that while body-based metaphors (e.g., UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, MORE IS UP) are likely to be metaphorical universals, they tend to be elaborated by various cultures in different ways.[375] The product is a unique language and conceptual understanding within various social groups. Nevertheless, metaphor theorists like Zoltán Kövecses have suggested that since conceptual metaphors have a basis in bodily experience, universal bodily experience results in what is likely a universal primary metaphor.[376]

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[371] Shlomo Hareli, Konstantinos Kafetsios, and Ursula Hess, "A Cross-Cultural Study on Emotion Expression and the Learning of Social Norms," *Frontiers in Psychology* 6 (October 2015), 2. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01501.

[372] Hareli, Kafetsios, and Hess, "Emotion Expression," 2.

[373] Johnson and Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," 251.

[374] Johnson and Lakoff, "Why Cognitive Linguistics Requires Embodied Realism," 251.

[375] Johnson, *Embodied Mind,* 15-16.

[376] Zoltán Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture: Universality and Variation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3.

That is not to say that universal bodily experiences automatically correlate with a metaphor.[377] Kövecses concedes that, at most, one can say that universal bodily experience can have a probability of leading to *potential* universal metaphors.[378] The problem with speaking of such metaphors in terms of *universality* is that it carries the notion of an absolute. For the sake of avoiding absolutisms that cannot be confirmed, it is beneficial to speak of these potentially universal metaphors in more qualified terms. For this reason, though there is certainly overlap between embodied realism and Gallagher's Interaction Theory, it is favourable to speak of the similitudes between two or more minds or peoples in terms of intersubjective meaning, not universality.

As children grow, they are already primed by primary and secondary intersubjectivity to understand language as having goals and intentions. Jerome Bruner recognizes this, stating that "Narrative structure is even inherent in the praxis of social interaction before it achieves linguistic expression".[379] As Gallagher puts it, with the help of the work of Bruner, Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, a child is primed with proto-narratives and proto-conversations that assist in integrating narrative into social interactions.[380] An example might be one that includes a mother who teaches her child to say "zoom" when playing with a car.

Despite the influential role of narrative and communication, more of our actions are not performed through conscious, reflective narrative guidance. The narrative meaning-making processes can occur both explicitly and implicitly. Implicit use of narrative means that while another's actions are perceived directly, meaning is added to the situation without realizing it.[381]

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[377] Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 4.

[378] Kövecses, *Metaphor in Culture*, 35.

[379] Jerome Bruner, *Acts of Meaning* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 77.

[380] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 160-162. See Bruner, *Acts of Meaning*; and Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, "ontogenesis of narrative," 1-16.

[381] Gallagher and Zahavi, *The Phenomenological Mind*, 224.

While narrative certainly influences primes and orients our situatedness in the world, action still occurs primarily prereflectively.[382] Narrative, communication, and theoretical reflection can directly affect prereflective embodied orientation precisely because it emerges from and is constituted by embodied prereflective content. This kind of narrative competency is shown in Chapter 7 to be embedded in the interactive event of infants performing synchronous musical acts with others. Studies indicate that prosocial behaviour can be cultivated through synchronous group action. Prosocial cultivation through synchronous group action has significance for Pentecostal religious practice because the act of singing together produces vibrant intersubjective interaction while reinforced with songs that have powerful theological narratives.

In continuing on the subject of the social aspects of the mind, there is more to be said about the social environments in which an individual is embedded. It is not enough to merely speak of the nature of an individual's mind. It is critical also to consider the contexts where our lives are situated. According to Gallagher, we are existentially and irreversibly tied to a set of circumstances in life that includes the nature of our orientation that has been shaped by our past and our own set of cultural narratives.

4.3 Autobiographical Memory and its Malleability

According to Daniel Hutto, though we have the ability to potentially narrate any event in life, only autobiographical remembering has a strong claim for being inherently narrative. According to Hutto, we "not only remember how but also who, what and where in purely enactive and embodied ways – insofar as they require nothing more than certain reinitiating a familiar pattern of prompted response."[383] The "reinitiating a familiar pattern" is not to be

[382] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 40.

[383] Daniel Hutto, "Memory and Narrativity," in *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory*, eds. Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian (New York: Routledge, 2017), 192.

understood as a static mental representation but a dynamic pattern that is influenced by things like circumstance and context. Hutto continues to elucidate the dynamic of narrativity and memory with the help of Felipe De Brigard's simulation theory. According to De Brigard, in an *attended event* (i.e., something that happens within a present time), mental recollection is an attempt to map a past event to a current situation. De Brigard points out that our memory often does not produce an accurate episodic memory of the cue at hand, so our memory employs a "probabilistic strategy". Given the strategies our memory system uses, autobiographic remembering is "self-centred mental simulations about possible events that we think may happen or may have happened to ourselves."[384] As such, "Acts of recall in which specific events or episodes are re-experienced… can be understood in terms of acts of re-enactment imagination that involve neural reuse and reactivations."[385] Gallagher's figure of Husserl's model of time-consciousness would be helpful to recall here. The action of re-enactment is not something that simply happens in the brain. It is re-experienced in the body as well. However, it is crucial to understand that re-enactment and re-experience is not objective identical experiences of something that occurred in the past. That assumption would be a reversion to the influential but inaccurate MIND IS A COMPUTER metaphor propagated by a representational theory of mind. Memory is not concrete data. We must be careful not to overly state memory as a kind of stable artefact of the past.

Additionally, Daniel Hutto has demonstrated that when thinking autobiographically, recalling truthful claims about our past is not as easy as many assume because our memories are

[384] Felipe De Brigard, "Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking," *Synthesis* 191, no. 2 (January 2014): 173, DOI 10.1007/s 11229-013-0247-7.

[385] Hutto, "Memory and Narrativity," 198.

powerfully susceptible to outside influences.[386] This susceptibility speaks to the malleable character of an individual's understanding of their self-narrative.[387] Nevertheless, susceptibility is not a reason to think pessimistically about our capability of faithfully remembering our past. These discoveries about memory should be a challenge to expand our understanding of what it means to recall a memory successfully. There are positive implications with the understanding that human beings have the potential to transform how the present is understood by redefining the way one understands past events.

According to Robyn Fivush and Jessica McDermott-Sales, "For an event that has already occurred, how it is remembered will not only reflect back upon prior coping and influence future coping with that specific stressful event but also provide a template for coping with similar stressful events in the future."[388] Fivush's research has shown that creating "coherent narratives" whose narratives include "causal explanatory language" such as *because*, *thus*, and *understand*, show lower anxiety and a higher sense of well-being. This higher sense of well-being is because: "The autobiographical self is intimately tied to our autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is the type of memory that most people mean when they say, "I remember".[389] Though there is a difference between the notion of an autobiographical self and autobiographical memory, they both interact with each other in a dynamically transformative way.

Fivush's view of memory is similar to that of Hutto's. She joins Hutto in recognizing that De Brigard's research convincingly shows that memories are not static but rather highly

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[386] See Daniel Hutto, "Memory and Narrativity," in *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

[387] Sue Campbell, "Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing Memory Value," *Philosophical Psychology* 19, no. 3 (2006), 361-380, DOI: 10.1080/09515080600690573.

[388] Robyn Fivush and Jessica McDermott Sales, "Coping, Attachment, and Mother-Child Narratives of Stressful Events," *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (January 2006), 126, DOI: 10.1353/mpq.2006.0003.

[389] Robyn Fivush, *Family Narratives and the Development of an Autobiographical Self: Social and Cultural Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory* (New York: Routledge, 2019), 1.

dynamic.[390] Fivush argues that memory should be seen as a process rather than a static entity. To recall memory is to recall highly dynamic patterns that activate as a response to some internal or external cue. The activation recalls previous patterns and simultaneously reconstitutes them based on present experience and reassessed assumptions of past experiences.[391] Fivush's view of memory concords with the enactive view of cognition as well, as enaction is committed to the idea that as soon as an individual receives information, it is continuously changed by the perceiver as it is contextualized and integrated within the MHB (Massive Hermeneutical Background).

According to Fivush, as experiences and memory are stitched together, an autobiographical self emerges. Fivush states, "The autobiographical self is that aspect of self defined by a temporally extended sense of one's own experiences as creating the person one is today and will become tomorrow".[392] Fivush's statement can be linked directly to Gallagher's table of time-consciousness. By "temporally extended", Fivush's statement matches with the parts of our past that are retained (i.e., retention) as having meaning for "the person one is today", or our present primal impressions, and "will become tomorrow", or our protention. It is critical to clarify that what has been described regarding the primal aspects of narrativity is not the same as what is being described regarding the autobiographical self. What is outlined by Gallagher is the narrative conceptual "building blocks", of what is stitched together later in childhood and adolescence. In the same way that moving from point A to point B provides an image-schematic structure for what later helps the conceptual construction of LIFE as a

[390] Robyn Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory and Narrative in Childhood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 9.

[391] Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory*, 9.

[392] Fivush, *Family Narratives*, 4.

JOURNEY, primal narrative experience is part of the tapestry of concepts that help constitute the narrative self.

The autobiographical self has also been described as *narrative identity* by Dan McAdams and Kate McLean. It is an "internalized and evolving life story" that reconstructs the past and constructs an imagined future to provide a degree of unity and purpose for life.[393] Narratives form a normative role in stitching together autobiographical memories in meaningful ways. They provide a conceptual tool to express who we are to others and ourselves and "simultaneously shape how we subsequently remember our past".[394] The reshaping of how we remember our past occurs because when experiences are shared with others, others' alternative interpretations and evaluations offer new ways of understanding the past.

McAdams' idea of narrative identity is not foreign to Pentecostal scholarship. Kenneth Archer has addressed the idea of Pentecostal narrative identity through Alasdair MacIntyre and McAdams. He proposes that since narrative identity is drawn from socio-cultural experiences, narrative identity is formed through experiencing what Kenneth Archer deems to be the *central narrative convictions* in the Pentecostal Christian community.[395] These central narrative convictions are established through "praying, preaching, teaching, testifying, singing, acts of mercy, evangelizing, sharing goods, tithing, and other community rituals".[396] The dynamics presented above are further expounded in Chapter 7, with additional methods further elaborated in this chapter.

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[393] Dan P. McAdams and Kate C. McLean, "Narrative Identity," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 22, no. 3 (2013): 233-238, DOI: 10.1177/0963721413475622.

[394] Robyn Fivush and Natalie Merrill, "An Ecological Systems Approach to Family Narratives," *Memory Studies* 9, no. 3 (2016): 306, DOI: 10.1177/1750698016645264.

[395] Kenneth Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story: Participating in God's Mission," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, ed. Wolfgang Vondey (London: Routledge, 2020), 42.

[396] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 42.

4.4 Massive Hermeneutical Background, *Habitus*, and the Patterned Self

This section on the narrativity of the mind is not intended to imply that the autobiographical self is all that constitutes the self. The self is complex. As Fivush describes it, the self consists of "multiple dynamically interacting aspects".[397] Some of those aspects include concepts mentioned in Chapter 3 like metaphor, domain, frames, and ICMs. As all of the various elements involved in cognition are retained in the self, they form what Gallagher calls a *massive hermeneutical background*.[398] The massive hermeneutical background is an overarching term for the "massive amount of background knowledge and know-how" about how the world physically and socially functions.[399] Thus, Bruner and David Kalmar state that events and circumstances that shape our understanding of "out there" and our sense of others "are themselves constructed products of self-generated meaning making shaped to fit our growing conceptions of our Selves".[400] Both the self and its mode of construction are *massively hermeneutic*.[401] Reflection akin to MHB has been recognized within Pentecostal scholarship. That narrative constitutes part of a hermeneutical background or filter is something that Pentecostal scholars like Archer, Scott Ellington, and Wolfgang Vondey recognize.[402] The theological and practical influences of the Pentecostal narratives are addressed in many ways. However, few scholars seem to venture into

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[397] Fivush, *Family Narratives*, 4.

[398] Shaun Gallagher, "Narrative Competence and the Massive Hermeneutical Background," in *Education, Dialogue and Hermeneutics*, ed. Paul Fairfield (London: Continuum, 2011), 21-38.

[399] Gallagher, "Narrative Competence," 21.

[400] Jerome Bruner and David A. Kalmar, "Narrative and Metanarrative in the Construction of Self," in *Self-Awareness: Its Nature and Development*, eds. Michel Ferrari and Robert J. Sternberg (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998), 309.

[401] Bruner and Kalmar, "Narrative and Metanarrative," 309.

[402] See for example: Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 131-171; Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story", 40-50; Kenneth Archer, "Pentecostal Story: The Hermeneutical Filter for the Making of Meaning," *Pneuma* 25, no. 1 (2004): 36-59. DOI: 10.1163/157007404776111090.; Scott A. Ellington, "Scripture: Finding one's place in God's story," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, ed. Wolfgang Vondey (London: Routledge, 2020), 63-72; Wolfgang Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology: Living the Fulness of the Gospel* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clar, 2017), 155-294; and John Goldingay, "Biblical Story and the Way it Shapes Our Story," *Journal of the European Pentecostal Theological Association* 17 (1997): 5-15. DOI: 10.1179/jep.1997.17.1.002.

the subject of hermeneutical background in the manner Gallagher suggests. The work of James K.A. Smith on embodiment and narrative epistemology stands as an exemplar of the kind of engagement that Interaction Theory can help further elucidate. While some of Archer's work speaks of a *hermeneutical filter* or *hermeneutical foil*[403], it is more of a precursor for the more extensive engagement that this thesis develops.

Our autobiographical retention is always with us and affects the nature of protention. Gallagher states regarding protention, "If the experiencing subject is always characterized by some affective disposition, that disposition will modulate anticipatory processes of perception and action."[404] This is part of a hermeneutical cognitive background that predisposes any given individual to ways of living in the world. Gallagher finds a correlation between MHB and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*. According to Bourdieu, the *habitus* is "the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations".[405] Accordingly, Gallagher describes *habitus* as "a system of long-term, acquired dispositions (habits, schemas) of perception, thought, and action".[406] Both Bourdieu and Gallagher's statements on *habitus* are useful for understanding the concept. Bourdieu's descriptor of *habitus* as "regulated improvisations" indicates agency in an individual in the process of *regulating*. Regulation occurs in response to the ever-changing stimuli experienced in the world, thus requiring improvisation. Just as Bourdieu describes these regulative improvisations as *durable*, Gallagher, in turn, describes it as "a system of long-term dispositions". Gallagher's notion of dispositions correlates to Bourdieu's understanding of *regulated improvisations* because, for Gallagher, dispositions include action, and action is not

[403] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 42; Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 224.
[404] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 33.
[405] Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78.
[406] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 172.

performed without interaction with the world. Dispositions produce patterned practices and regulated improvisations. Regulated improvisations generate practices based on normative conclusions an individual makes about the world while considering the unique circumstantial conditions of a present attended event.[407] These practices are not exclusive or wholly original but are conditioned by "historically and socially situated conditions" that influence the nature of their production.[408]

Gallagher utilizes Bourdieu's *habitus* to describe how MHB cannot be reduced to simply neurobiological processes. This "deeply hermeneutical" background widely includes embodied and embedded social, cultural, and normative practices.[409] It is an important detail that MHB includes embodied practices because it contextualizes the kind of conditioning that accrues in our *habitus* within our bodies or sensorimotor processes. Dispositional conditioning occurs not only in "the brain" but also in the body. Additionally, because we live in shared environments that form our perceptions, emotions, and interactions, a "shared *habitus*" is developed that "plays an essential role in regulating social practices and contributing to social reproduction".[410] The social contexts in which we are embedded play a role in developing an orientation towards the world that is intersubjective with other individuals that are embedded in the same or similar sociocultural environments. More on the social influence of the construction of the mind, narrative, and MHB is addressed in the following section.

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[407] Bourdieu, *Theory of Practice*, 78.

[408] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, originally published in French, 1980), 55. See also the theoretical connection James K.A. Smith has made between Bourdieu's *habitus*, Merleau-Ponty's *praktognosia*, and his own approach to embodied liturgy: Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 80-107.

[409] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 173.

[410] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 173.i

In other works, Gallagher describes the conditioned MHB and *habitus* as the *patterned self*. In addition to the concept of MHB, he has developed the *pattern theory of self* as a pluralistic way to bring together the vastly interdisciplinary conceptions of what constitutes a self.[411] For this reason, this thesis prefers the *patterned self* as a descriptor because the pattern theory of self has been used to engage the compendium of processes that help constitute the self. These processes include all embodied and narrative processes that, when dynamically engaged with one another, compose a self-pattern or consistent activation.[412] The patterned theory of self concords with what has been established already regarding conceptual metaphor theory, idealized cognitive models, and the malleability of memory. The patterned theory of self has also been recognized as a fruitful way of engaging the subject of the relationship between self and memory.[413] In an enactive view, the patterned self is never identical at one point in time versus another. The pattern is dynamic and changing. The pattern of the self has a kind of reasonable consistency. Otherwise, there would be little possibility of a concept of self, if at all. At the same time, the self is not identically replicated from one moment to another. As soon as we have experienced life, from one moment to another, we are already changed.

4.5 The Social Aspects of the Development of the Autobiographical Self and Narrative Identity

[411] Shaun Gallagher, "A Pattern Theory of Self," *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience* 7, no. 443 (2013): 1-7, DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00443; see also, Shaun Gallagher, "Narrative as an Interpretation of Self-Pattern," in *The Use and Abuse of Stories: New Directions in Narrative Hermeneutics*, eds. Hanna Meretoja and Mark Freeman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023), 136-153.

[412] Fabio Giommi, et al. "The (In)flexible self: Psychopathology, minfulness, and neuroscience," *International Journal of Clinical and Health Psychology* 23, no. 23 (2023), 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijchp.2023.100381.

[413] Albert Newen, "The Embodied Self, the Pattern Theory of Self, and the Predictive Mind," *Frontiers in Psychology*, 9, no. 2270 (2017): 8. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02270.

Fivush shows that narrative identity, or the autobiographical self, arises from reminiscing that occurs through social interactions.[414] Fivush offers a real narrative interaction to demonstrate this process. The following narrative is an interaction between a mother and her 8-year-old daughter, that were asked to recall a bike ride together:

> MOTHER: And we were all goin' on a bike and you didn't wanna go on a bike and so you were just going to jog but you got so tired—
> REBECCA: NOT TIRED! (very loud voice)
> MOTHER: [laughing] You didn't get tired. OK. You didn't get tired—
> REBECCA: [giggles]
> MOTHER: —but you wanted to sit on the bike seat I was peddling. What do you remember about that?
> REBECCA: Wanting you to go really, really slow. My legs were hurting.
> MOTHER: [Laughs] Why were your legs hurting?
> REBECCA: Cuz I was like this [spreading legs wide to show how she was riding on the mother's handlebars] all the time.
> MOTHER: Cuz your legs were spread apart like that.
> REBECCA: Yeah, but if you went slowly I could relax.
> MOTHER: Uh huh.
> REBECCA: And you went too fast.
> MOTHER: But you had fun, though, didn't you?
> REBECCA: It was great!
> MOTHER: What was that, a half mile or something?
> REBECCA: I was afraid I might, uh, you might go flying off the edge [both laughing], edge of the bridge and, umm, I just wanted to jog.
> MOTHER: And you were afraid of riding on the bike with me across the bridge, huh?
> REBECCA: Uh huh uh huh uh huh. [415]

This dialogue is what Fivush describes as a kind of reminiscing of the past. It is the product of mental memories between two people that intersect as a product of a shared physical environment and experience. Fivush observes in this dialogue that the mother and daughter do not simply dialogue about the past as if to examine an objective artefact. They are in a dialogue that demonstrates a negotiation of *how* to remember the past. The negotiation mostly concerns how to interpret and evaluate the experience of the event. Elements in this conversation implicitly identify personality characteristics of each individual and the nature of their relationship. Rebecca is portrayed as being more timid than the mother in feeling afraid and not

[414] Fivush, *Family Narratives*, 2.
[415] Fivush, *Family Narratives*, 24-25.

wanting to go too fast over the bridge. According to the dialogue, the mother bikes on, seemingly without fear. According to Fivush, though this event may not have been fun at the time of its occurrence, it appears that both the mother and daughter are enjoying reminiscing.[416] These are the kinds of social interactions that contribute to the dynamic development of the autobiographical self.

While the narrative examined between Rebecca and her mother demonstrates autobiographical development, intergenerational narratives also play a crucial role. Autobiographical memory plays an important role in creating an identity that persists across time and space. Intergenerational family stories play a role by offering an ecological context that shapes identity and "provide a foundation for navigating life events during adolescence and early adulthood".[417] Intergenerational narratives are the stories which families pass down memories of experiences from a distant past to their children. As a result, children can begin to have a sense of "ownership" over the stories that define personal and cultural narratives.[418] This frequently happens because stories passed on from parents to children are often offered for specific purposes, including helping adolescents make meaning of their personal experiences.[419] Narratives become amalgamated into a tapestry of what Fivush and Natalie Merrill describe as embedded "ecological niches".[420] The following is a diagram based on Fivush and Merrill's adaptation of Urie Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems theory[421]:

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[416] Fivush, *Family Narrative*, 25.

[417] Natalie Merrill, Jordan A. Booker, and Robyn Fivush, "Functions of Parental Intergenerational Narratives Told by Young People," *Topics in Cognitive Science*, 11 (2019), 752. DOI: 10.1111/tops.12356.

[418] Merrill, Booker, and Fivush, "Parental Intergenerational Narratives," 753.

[419] Yan Chen et al., "Mother, Father, and I: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Adolescents' Intergenerational Narratives and Well-Being," *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition* (2020), 6. DOI: 10.1016/j.jarmac.2020.08.011.

[420] Fivush and Merrill, "Ecological Systems Approach ," 307. See also, Urie actual min, *The Ecology of Human Development: Experiments by Nature and Design* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[421] Fivush and Merrill, "Ecological Systems Approach," 308.




Figure 2. Ecological Systems Model for Family Narratives.

According to Fivush, narratives within the micro-system consist of family narratives that both parent and child experience together. An example of this would be the experience between Rebecca and her mother. The exo-system includes narratives that have not been experienced by a child or narratives the child tells that have not been experienced by the parent. In general terms, the teller has experienced, but the hearer has not. An example of this includes when a child relays stories communicating to their parents how their day at school went. Parents can be involved in reforming these narratives as they offer a different perspective on the events experienced by the child. The exo-system also includes intergenerational narratives or narratives that parents tell about their own past.[422] The macro-system includes master narratives that include "larger cultural narrative frames".[423] An influential way that these cultural master

[422] Fivush and Merrill, "Ecological Systems Theory," 306.
[423] Fivush and Merrill, "Ecological Systems Theory," 308.

narratives are communicated is through media platforms like news stories, television, film, music, and social media.[424]

Within the ecological systems model, autobiographical memory is at the core while simultaneously interacting with shared family narratives, intergenerational narratives, and cultural history embedded in sociocultural contexts. Of all of these domains, intergenerational narratives offer an important context where cultural history, values, and traditions are passed on to another generation. These narratives are able to provide a network of stories that serve as a hermeneutical background through which to understand the world.[425] What this means when brought in conjunction with Gallagher is that retention is affected by narrative impressions. For example, in the case where parents help their children view the events of their day in new ways. Evidence has been demonstrated that children are aware of their parent's intention to teach them. In a study where children were asked to describe narratives passed down from their parents, adolescents provided narratives that were most often described as opportunities to learn from the stories provided by their parents.[426] The narrative primal impressions influence the way memory is retained and therefore change the nature of protention, or expectation of future experiences that relate to the events that the parents had helped their child re-evaluate.

These insights are helpful in the analysis of the Pentecostal community because of the powerful "household" frame within Scripture that extends to the community. Bonnie Howe explains how 1 Peter 2:4-8 uses the "house" concept metonymically to refer to the foundational and relational qualities of belonging to the household.[427] Christians are referred to as newborn

[424] Kate C. McLean and Andrea V. Breen, "Selves in a World of Stories During Emerging Adulthood," in *The Oxford Handbook of Emerging Adulthood*, ed. Jeffrey J. Arnett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 391.

[425] Chen et al., "Mother, Father, and I", 1.

[426] Merrill et al., "Parental Intergenerational Narratives," 766.

[427] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 284.

infants (1 Peter 2:2) in a spiritual house (1 Peter 2:5). This metonymic use of house and household is used to denote the following Scriptural conceptual metaphors: Christians Are a Household, and Christians Are the House of God.[428] Consequently, Christians can be referred to as children, siblings, heirs, and even elders within the household.[429] This Scriptural metaphoric use of the household translates to contemporary ecclesial settings. The modern Pentecostal movement saw itself as a restoration of Apostolic ministry. As such, Pentecostals were family. Cheryl Johns describes this dynamic by saying:

> Life centered on the church, and faithfulness to one's brothers and sisters was valued. When Pentecostal believers met in public there were open displays of affection. To be together in the bonds of fellowship in the Holy Ghost was better than anything the world would have to offer.[430]

Familial bonding occurred as early Pentecostals gathered and participated in church activities like singing, testifying, and evangelizing. Converts became part of a community of "brothers" and "sisters" that were part of God's family "making history toward the end time".[431] Howe argues that Household framing is a powerful cognitive feature of Christianity that shapes Christian moral teaching and identity.[432] These cognitive forming constraints are convincing evidence that Fivush's ecological systems approach can function beneficially to elucidate the intergenerational narratives that help form Pentecostal identity.

The Pentecostal scholar Kenneth Archer argues for a theory of the Pentecostal narrative tradition that situates Pentecostal meaning-making within an intergenerational scheme. Archer states, "The Pentecostal community or a collection of communities is bound together by their 'shared charismatic experiences' and 'shared story'".[433] By a "shared story", Archer refers to

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[428] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 285-286.

[429] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 286-288.

[430] Cheryl Bridges Johns, "The Adolescence of Pentecostalism: In Search of a Legitimate Sectarian Identity," *Pneuma* 17, 1 (1995), 5. DOI: 10.1163/157007495X00020.

[431] Johns, "The Adolescence of Pentecostalism", 5.

[432] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 291.

[433] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 133.

grand stories by which individuals and social groups "live and organize their lives in meaningful ways".[434] While Archer does not include an extensive categorization as the one proposed by Fivush, Archer's perspective of Pentecostal narrative tradition indicates an understanding of Pentecostal identity that correlates in part with the ecological systems theory. This connection is developed further in Chapter 7.

Beyond the context of family dynamics, Fivush has argued that our coherent narrative identity is an evolving socially constructed process involving our everyday social interactions.[435] While Fivush predominantly demonstrates this through family interactions, Lucas Bietti has shown that autobiographical memories can be communicated in a broad scope of dynamic social environments. This communication can be performed in both formal institutional settings and informal social relationships. He uses group remembering regarding the military dictatorship in Argentina between 1976-1983 as a case study.[436] His work elucidates how an integrative analysis of "the cognitive and discourse processes involved in individual and collective remembering"[437] influences the way that autobiographical memories are negotiated and synchronized in group settings. What this means for the development of narrative identity (i.e., the autobiographical self) is that it is influenced by the discourse in both family and broader communal contexts.

Lucas Bietti and Charles Stone provide a convincing "state-of-the-art" in the field of cognitive research on the dynamics and outcomes of conversational remembering. [438] They state,

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[434] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 133 no. 24.

[435] Robyn Fivush and Matthew Graci, "Memory and Social Identity," in *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory*, eds. Sven Bernecker and Kourken Michaelian (London: Routledge, 2017), 268-280.

[436] Lucas M. Bietti, *Discursive Remembering: Individual and Collective Remembering as a Discursive, Cognitive and Historical Process* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2014), 8-28. See also: Qi Wang, "Remembering the Self in Cultural Contexts: A Cultural Dynamic Theory of Autobiographical Memory," *Memory Studies* 9, 3 (2016): 295-304. DOI: 10.1177/1750698016645238.

[437] Bietti, *Discursive Remembering*, 1.

[438] Lucas M. Bietti and Charles B. Stone, "Remembering With Others: Conversational Dynamics and Mnemonic Outcomes," *Topics in Cognitive Science* 11 (2019): 592-608. DOI: 10.1111/tops.12443.

"Conversations can shape the way individuals and groups remember the past".[439] They contend that conversations are joint activities that involve *dynamics* and produce *outcomes* that influence how information is remembered. By *dynamics*, Bietti and Stone refer to conversational context, assumed roles, shared reality, and communication strategies employed.[440]

The context of conversation has to do with the kind of transmission chain that is occurring. For example, whether stories are being communicated in a socially interactive context or whether participants receive stories within a non-interactive condition. Bietti and Stone point out how recent research has indicated that socially interactive narrative transmission improves the transmission quality.[441] The improvement of transmission quality is likely because multimodal alignment, including manual gesture, postural sway, and eye gaze, can facilitate collaborative remembering.[442] Additionally, conversational roles influence dynamics as individuals take various roles as narrators, mentors, and monitors and how those roles are used in conversation.[443] A shared reality arises as a result of a participant's desire to experience a common orientation about the world. Gallagher's work on intersubjectivity and narrative competency is useful to recall here. The multimodal alignment of gesture, postural sway, and eye gaze can be correlated with primary and secondary intersubjective co-coupling. In combination with additional narrative dynamics that include both conversational roles and conversational content, conversation in social settings can become powerful tools for narrative transmission.

In Chapter 7, this thesis applies how all of these elements converge within the public practice of testimony. The interactive dynamics of public testimony expression can include

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[439] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 592.

[440] Biettie and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 593.

[441] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 594.

[442] Alan Cienki, Lucas M. Bietti, and Kasper Kok, "Multimodal Alignment During Collaborative Remembering," *Memory Studies* 7, 3 (2014), 354. DOI: 10.1177/1750698014530624.

[443] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 594-595.

multimodal coupling between the one speaking the testimonial and the community that is actively reacting to it. The community's active reaction co-regulates with the individual speaking, leading to confirmation or reassessment as to whether their story describes an event that genuinely demonstrates God's intervention. This thesis explores that dynamic with examples of actual events provided by Pentecostal scholars describing some discursive dynamics of public testimony transmission and a Pentecostal church service.

Research has suggested that shared reality occurs more frequently when an individual considers themselves as an "in-group" or communal member of the person or group that they are in conversation with. A shared reality can occur as members of a particular conversational group refer to things that have presumed meaning that the participants assume are intersubjectively held by other participants.[444] However, a shared reality is inhibited if the group of listeners consider the speaker a member of an "out-group".[445] In any case, communicative and narrative competency is required to engage in out-group and in-group dynamics.

Finally, conversational strategies include things like collaborative recall and transactive memory systems. Collaborative recall refers to the strategies employed to recall information as a group. According to Bietti and Stone, this can result in collaborative inhibition or collaborative facilitation. Both collaborative inhibition and facilitation are the results of embodied communicative cross-cues and collective mnemonic expressions that either support a more unified recall or idiosyncratic recollection between participants.[446] The particular situation of a

[444] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 595-596.

[445] Gerald Echterhoff, E. Tory Higgins, and Steven Groll, "Audience-Tuning on Memory: The Role of Shared Reality," *Journal of Personality and Psychology* 89, 3 (2005), 257. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.257.

[446] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 596-597.

conversation can create transactive memory systems that vary in the degree of influence a conversation has on an individual or group.[447]

According to Bietti and Stone, conversational *outcomes* refer to the way conversations about the past contribute to the formation of autobiographical memory, how social bonds are developed and supported through conversational remembering, memory within formal and informal settings, the social influence on the construction of false memory, and the social influence on reinforced memory or induced forgetting.[448] As established earlier, autobiographical memory is greatly influenced by how adults talk about past experiences. Conversations involved with developing autobiographical memory also fortify social bonds. Bietti and Stone state, "Remembering together in conversations is used to create a feeling of connection and intimacy with partners and strengthen social bonds more generally".[449] For example, Fivush, Helena McNally and Elaine Reese establish how communication of family stories and secrets passes on a sense of family and individual identity to the next generation.[450] Additionally, educational institutions and home dynamics are instrumental settings where conversations occur about how to remember the past and transmit cultural information.[451] The storytelling that occurs in these settings helps manipulate the listeners to consider the fitness of the teller as an authoritative constructor of information, helps maintain social bonds, and offers survival-relevant information that can help the listener avoid the cost of first-hand acquisition.[452] Memory within these settings can take different forms, leading to the creation and transmission of false memories. Bietti and

[447] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 597.
[448] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 593.
[449] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 599.
[450] Robyn Fivush, Helena McAnally and Elaine Reese, "Family Stories and Family Secrets," *Journal of New Zealand Studies* 29 (2019): 29-36. DOI: 10.26686/jnzs.v0iNS29.6259.
[451] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 599.
[452] Lucas M. Bietti, Ottilie Tilston, and Adrian Bangerter, "Storytelling as Adaptive Collective Sensemaking," *Topics in Cognitive Science* 11 (2019), 713-719. DOI: 10.1111/tops.12358.singing the

Stone describe the practice that leads to the creation of false memories as *social contagion*.[453] False memories can be implanted through the presentation of misinformation. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that false memory transmission can be experienced both on an individual level and in "collective memories of a network of people".[454] The final conversational outcome highlighted by Bietti and Stone is regarding the way that the selective nature of discussion often leaves out information and thus induces forgetting.[455] Various experiments show that the inherently selective nature of discussion can cause induced forgetting within both strangers and intimate couples.[456]

For Pentecostals, there are some unique discursive dynamics in play that are different from those of ordinary conversations. Thus, the transactive memory systems involved in forming narrative identity call for analysis of details that differ from that of Rebecca and her mother's discursive interaction. A clear place to analyse this transmission is the liturgical rituals within a Pentecostal church service. Pentecostals not only talk to one another, but they also sing, pray, and preach to one another. These typical elements of a Pentecostal church service create powerful transactive memory systems that help to inhibit and facilitate memory for the purpose of cultivating each other's testimony in an ideal way for Pentecostal narratives. However, much more theoretical consideration is required to address these issues thoroughly. This thesis shows in Chapter 7 that various influential elements are involved with the transmission and integration of autobiographical material into an individual in the Pentecostal community. Although many

[453] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 600.

[454] Raeya Maswood and Suparna Rajaram "Social Transmission of False Memory in Small Groups and Large Networks," *Topics in Cognitive Science* 11 (2019), 687. DOI: 10.1111/tops.12348.

[455] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering With Others," 600-601.

[456] Charles B. Stone, Amanda J. Barnier, John Sutton, and William Hirst, "Forgetting Our Personal Past: Socially Shared Retrieval-Induced Forgetting of Autobiographical Memories," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 142 (2013): 1084-1099, DOI: 10.1037/a0030739.

rituals can be examined, this study focuses on the act of formal testimonial storytelling, call-and-response discursive dynamics, and communal liturgical singing. When practised communally, these rituals provide discursive dynamics that help individuals construct how memory is recalled and transmitted between generations.

In the case of Rebecca and her mother, the conversation occurs in the context of a powerful family bond. There is typically an authoritative position that a mother has over a daughter. Additionally, the event that they participated in seems to have been a unique one for Rebecca. The mother's authoritative social position influences the transactive memory system in play, which helps Rebecca organize and reframe her scary experience as being fun. It can be assumed that the nature of the transactive memory system would differ if Rebecca had experienced riding over a bridge with a sibling or teacher, as social roles influence the kind of collaborative inhibition and facilitation that is practised. Their conversation was a socially interactive discourse between an in-group mother-daughter relationship. Their dialogue went beyond merely linguistic expression. It also includes multimodal alignment in describing how the event transpired. Multimodal alignment can be observed when Rebecca states that her legs were hurting, “Cuz I was like this”, and proceeds to physically spread her legs to demonstrate her bodily position in the attended event. Rebecca’s mother then verbalized that Rebecca’s message had been received by iterating, “Cuz your legs were spread apart like that”. Rebecca and her mother experienced multimodal alignment in both conversation and embodied re-enactment of Rebecca spreading her legs. The conversational dynamics also demonstrate a desire in mother and daughter to experience a shared reality. The shared reality includes how both remember the event and the desire to mutually communicate. Rebecca’s mother seems to redirect Rebecca’s

memory of being scared. Rebecca states, “And you went too fast”. However, her mother responds, “But you had fun, though, didn’t you?”. Ultimately, Rebecca responds with agreement.

The outcomes within Rebecca and her mother’s interaction give insight into the development of the kind of social bond present within a parent-child relationship. The mother established her place as an agent that is fit to reconstruct how Rebecca’s memory is recalled. Instead of reflecting on Rebecca's fear, she is guided by her mother to consider the fun they both experienced in riding their bike. One wonders whether Rebecca will perhaps experience induced forgetting of her fear in the future in light of the particular way that she experienced recall with her mother. Though Fivush does not elaborate more on this, this could be a reasonable outcome in light of Bietti’s work. Consequently, as Rebecca grows and possibly has a family of her own, it would be intriguing to see if she seeks to cultivate a similar experience with her children.

The conversational dynamics and outcomes described here, along with the concept of the autobiographical self, are crucial to this study as they will be used to extend analyses to the discursive nature of testimony within the Pentecostal community. This thesis demonstrates some important ways that the Pentecostal community participates in the kind of conversational dynamics that produce unique outcomes in narrative identity. This section is instrumental to the overall viability of this thesis because it has established the primary narrative nature of the mind. It provides a theoretical foundation for what will later be established as the narrative nature of the Pentecostal notion of *testimony*. However, before addressing the notion of testimony, it is important to recognize that what will be addressed in this thesis is how it is used within a specific community. Therefore, another vital aspect of the human mind to elucidate is the social contexts from which the mind emerges and is embedded. The following section addresses the social aspects of the mind along with what Gallagher defines as *cognitive institutions* and the influence

that cognitive institutions have to constrain or enable affordances in the world and our capabilities to make meaning and use of those affordances.[457]

4.5.1 Cognitive Institutions and Group Identity

An individual is not cognitively constructed alone. This has been progressively demonstrated within this thesis, beginning with the individual, the context of family, and the context of general social discourse. Cognition is socially and culturally distributed as it is embedded within, participates in, is supported by, and is "mutually co-constructed" with "social, institutional, normative, political, technological, and cultural systems and practices".[458] Furthermore, Gallagher posits that just as handheld technology like a smartphone or calculator may be understood as affording enhancement to human capabilities, so cultural and social institutions may afford structures that "support and extend our cognitive abilities".[459] The extended mind theory had its beginnings in the work of Andy Clark and David Chalmers.[460] However, Andy Clark and David Chalmers hold to a more representational view of the mind that is not entirely compatible with the enactive view for reasons stated earlier. Gallagher's work, and the enactive view in general, sees cognition as more "radically embodied" than the kind of extended cognition that was developed by Clark and Chambers.[461] The cultural and social institutions referred to here are described by Gallagher as "mental institutions" or "cognitive

[457] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 40-41.

[458] Mason Cash, "Cognition without Borders: 'Third Wave' Socially Distributed Cognition and Relational Autonomy," *Cognitive Systems Research* 25-26 (2013), 61, DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.007.

[459] Shaun Gallagher, "The Socially Extended Mind," *Cognitive Systems Research* 25-26 (2013), 4, DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.008.

[460] Andy Clark, *Supersizing the Mind: Reflections on Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," *Analysis* 51, no. 1 (1998): 7-19.

[461] Shaun Gallagher, "Critical Neuroscience and Socially Extended Minds," *Theory Culture and Society* 32, no. 1 (2015), 33-34, DOI: 10.1177/0263276414551996.

institutions".[462] Cognitive institutions are social structures that include mental practices that are "produced in specific times and places" and "activated in ways that extend our cognitive processes" when engaged with them.[463]

According to Mason Cash, some care should be taken on our understanding of mental institutions to not overly bifurcate the influence and identity between *us* and the social contexts in which we are a part. Cash clarifies this point by suggesting that mental institutions are best seen not as being beyond or bifurcated from ourselves but as institutions that are "collaboratively constructed and supported by the community's tools, institutions, and normative practices, and by the myriad ways in which we collectively maintain, support, and refine this socially and culturally distributed milieu".[464] The self is constructed as it interacts with the community's "tools" which include social and cultural practices and rituals. As an individual interacts with a community, the practices and rituals within the community and value-determining norms educate, enable, and constrain Idealized Cognitive Models in the individual.[465]

While the family is perhaps one of the clearest examples of a cognitive institution, Gallagher provides a great example of cognitive institutions within larger social structures in the form of the United States legal system. Specific practices within the legal system influence ways of making meaning of situations like contracts and laws. Contracts represent a document constructed where multiple people can gather guide thinking and behaviour. The agreements made within the legal system are social arrangements about what we have a right to do and what we are restricted from doing. As long as society agrees to participate in these legal social

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[462] Shaun Gallagher and Anthony Crisafi, "Mental Institutions" *Topoi* 28 (2009): 45-51. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0.; Gallagher, "Critical Neuroscience," 34-36; Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 213.

[463] Gallagher, "Critical Neuroscience," 35.

[464] Cash, "Cognition without Borders," 64.

[465] Gallagher, "Narrative as an Interpretation of Self-Pattern," 139.

agreements, the agreements are instruments and institutions that "extend and transform our cognitive processes".[466] The legal processes involved with criminal and civil court trials operate and depend on narratives that are driven by stories with varying levels of persuasive metaphorical language.[467] As Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner state:

> Law lives on narrative… Clients tell stories to lawyers, who must figure out what to make of what they hear. As clients and lawyers talk the client's story gets recast into plights and prospects, plots and pilgrimages into possible worlds… If circumstances warrant, the lawyers retell their clients' stories in the form of pleas and arguments to judges and testimony to juries… Next, judges and jurors retell the stories to themselves or to each other in the form of instructions, deliberations, a verdict, a set of findings, or an opinion.[468]

In addition to the narrative dynamic found within a trial, the common-law tradition depends on larger narratives established by legal precedent. Legal precedent connects present situations with the decisions made by prior judges and the judge's rationale for making those decisions.[469] In this sense, the legal system is significantly dynamically influenced by the public that passes laws and agrees on contracts, the lawyers and judges that interpret the laws and contracts, and the public that actively engages in their legal situations to interpret the law or legal precedent for their particular situations. These cognitive processes are dynamically constructed by the legal system, thus creating an institution for shared mental processes and normative behaviour.[470] Likewise, Petracca and Gallagher make a case for the notion of economic cognitive institutions. The market provides a context that allows for interconnected and interdependent economic systems that are populated by people who take on normative roles and behaviours.[471]

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[466] Gallagher, "Critical Neuroscience," 32.

[467] Raymond Gibbs, "Embodied Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Narrative," in *Narrative and Metaphor in Law*, ed. Michael Hanne and Robert Weisberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 90-110.

[468] Anthony G. Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner, *Minding the Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 110

[469] Michael Hanne and Rober Weisberg, "Introduction," in *Narrative and Metaphor in Law*, ed. Michael Hanne and Robert Weisberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1.

[470] Gallagher, "Critical Neuroscience," 36-37.

[471] Enrico Petracca and Shaun Gallagher, "Economic Cognitive Institutions," *Journal of Institutional Economics* 16 (2020), 758, DOI: 10.1017/S1744137420000144.

According to Gallagher, legal systems, schools and universities, government agencies, and cultural institutions are examples of "cognitive" or "mental" institutions that support cognitive processes and institutions that, without them, things like social cognition would not exist.[472] Groups within these institutions have the potential to form group identity through agreement on narratives that condition normative behaviour.[473] Accordingly, narratives and intentions can come together within a community to institute practices, rituals, and retrospective and prospective reflection. Similar to the kind of intergenerational narratives referred to above within families, cultural and social communities that extend beyond the family are communities of discourse that create unique linguistic and conceptual ways of understanding the world. These group narratives become a continual normative influence that produced a shared agency and stable concept of "we".[474]

While narratives are certainly central to the development of self-identity, they are also central to the formation of intentionality, action, and identity within groups. Gallagher refers to these as *we-narratives*.[475] We-narratives are narratives that unite groups to guide shared and group agency. According to Deborah Tollefsen, shared agency refers to actions or tasks shared with one or more people. Group actions like moving a heavy object or playing a board game with another are good examples.[476] For instance, in moving a couch, multiple individuals are unified by a shared intention. Cognition is extended into the couch. Fuchs's example provided earlier regarding how an individual couples with a pencil to form a cognitive functional unit is similar. Sensorimotor perception is extended through the fingers to the tip of the pencil as it writes.

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[472] Gallagher, "The Socially Extended Mind," 7.

[473] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 219.

[474] Deborah Tollefsen and Shaun Gallagher, "We-Narratives and the Stability and Depth of Shared Agency," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 47, no. 2 (2016): 95-110, DOI: 10.1177/0048393116672831.

[475] Gallagher and Tollefsen, "Advancing the '*We*'," 211-219.

[476] Deborah Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents* (Cabridge: Polity Press, 2015), 3.

Embodied perception of the pencil touching the paper is experienced in dynamic interaction between the individual, pencil, and paper is performed. Likewise, an intersubjective functional unit is created as various individuals move a couch. The push and pull of one individual are felt and reacted to by everyone else. The group perceives the shifting momentum and weight as the couch is carried with the shared intention of moving a couch from one place to another.

Group agency, on the other hand, refers to a group of individuals where the individual members have similar mental states. [477] According to Tollefsen, "Agency refers to the capacity to act, to bring about change in one's environment and to respond to stimuli in pursuit of goals based on states such as belief, intention, and desire".[478] Agency is a complex concept better understood as a spectrum rather than a binary concept of either having or not having. Tollefsen symbolizes the spectrum perspective as similar to a light dimmer rather than an on-and-off switch.[479] Shared and group agency are distinguished to give credence to a group identity that persists beyond more isolated shared intentions. In the example given above, a group comes together to move a couch. However, their shared agency of moving a particular couch will not persist beyond that particular couch. However, if they are part of a company that has hired them as workers, they are unified by an agreed-upon set of rules and expectations that persist beyond a particular event.

Groups can be as small as two individuals and as large as ethnic groups.[480] While constructed and supported by we-narratives, joint intentions and joint commitments provide the mechanism by which individuals develop group identity and agency.[481] Thus, according to

[477] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 50-65.
[478] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 53.
[479] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 53.
[480] Tollefsen and Gallagher, "We-Narratives," 102.
[481] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 58.

Gallagher and Tollefsen, "When a group of people jointly reflect on their joint actions, shared goals, and shared intentions they engage in communicative practices that are supported by narratives".[482] Furthermore, the same kind of extended cognition involved in a group moving a heavy object together can, in a way, apply to social groups. Gallagher argues that socially extended cognition occurs within cognitive institutions in that the group is involved in interpreting or making meaning of the world to its members.[483] Consequently, social groups often grant specific people the trust to interpret the world for the group. This dynamic is the reason why different groups of people grant various levels of trust to one news media organization over another or one news commentator over another. News media organizations are granted various levels of trust to interpret the events of the world. In a Christian context, this may be granted to a pastor or leader within the church group. Individuals can garner greater status within a church group as interpretive extensions of the group to provide authoritative meaning of the world to the church. Gallagher and Tollefsen's work on we-narratives and cognitive institutions grants a theoretical foundation to understand some of the ways that Pentecostal grand narratives produce group identity and how socially extended cognition is practised. This is explored further in Chapter 7 when enactivism is brought more fully into dialogue with Pentecostal identity and testimony.

Gallagher recognizes problems arise when institutions and conditioning narratives support behaviour that constrain autonomy. Just as living in a particular geographic environment will affect our physical condition and nature of movement (e.g., living in the mountains, desert, or city), what we are conditioned to do socially can be enabled or limited by the culture that we

[482] Gallagher and Tollefsen, "Advancing the '*We*'," 214.
[483] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 212.

live in. It contributes to and constructs our *habitus*.[484] Narratives can allow individuals to see environmental affordance and yet can "blind" us to possibilities and "carry our intentions and cognitive processes in specific directions".[485] The influence of these enabling or binding narratives can persist through intergenerational narrative communication that goes beyond the lifetime of any individual or group. Therefore, Gallagher proposes an ethical claim that it is vital to examine how social and cultural practices and institutions form narrative identity.[486]

Before continuing, it is necessary to address how some scholars have discussed the relationship between individuals and the group affiliations. The discussion revolves around the concept of ontological individualism, methodological individualism, and methodological collectivism. These subjects comprise various views revolving around the subject of social ontology. Ultimately, this thesis does not take a firm position on the viability of the various views. Nonetheless, recognising various views of social ontology is necessary to justify the use of Gallagher and Tollefsen to help explain the influence of the Pentecostal concept of testimony on forming Pentecostal identity.

Tollefsen begins to address what some may reject on the grounds of believing that groups do not exist. Tollefson defines ontological individualism as groups composed of "individual human beings and do not exist as entities 'over and above' these individuals".[487] In other words, it is the view that groups do not exist. Therefore, an individual cannot be held responsible for what a collective has done, only what that individual has done. For example, if an individual participates in a group project for a class assignment, the individual cannot claim to have completed the group assignment. An individual can only claim to have completed a portion of

[484] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 173.
[485] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 223.
[486] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 223.
[487] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 4.

the assignment. Tollefsen's objection to this train of thought is that just because groups are composed of individuals does not mean that groups do not exist.[488] A group worked together to complete a class assignment. The completed assignment exists because a group of individuals worked together to complete it.

Tollefsen defines methodological individualism as the view that "groups and their actions can be explained solely in terms of the psychological states and processes of group members and the relations between them".[489] This approach does not necessarily deny the existence of groups. However, as Gallagher describes it, methodological individualism is founded on the idea that social processes are best explained by the mental processes of individuals.[490] The study of individuals is important because groups cannot be studied as real entities. Instead, groups are theoretical entities. Gallagher responds to methodological individualism by highlighting that individuals experience a dynamical constitution due to reciprocal causal couplings that occur from primary intersubjectivity, secondary intersubjectivity, and narrative communication. That is not to say that examining the individual self is unnecessary. However, an exclusive methodological focus on the individual ignores the social situation in which an agent is embedded.[491]

The extent of the use of Gallagher and Tollefsen within this thesis is particularly for the purpose of explaining *how* the concept of testimony influences Pentecostal identity. It is not a wholesale adoption of Tollefsen's view that groups can potentially be genuine intentional agents who are held accountable for their actions. Nor is there a claim to the concept of "institutional moral agents" or the lack thereof. Such discussions require extensive involvement that is not

[488] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 4.
[489] Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents*, 4.
[490] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 61.
[491] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 42.

necessary for the focus of this thesis. What *is* a major claim, however, is that groups do exist. The individualistic focus of ontological and methodological individualism is not tenable when considering Gallagher's work on intersubjectivity and cognition and Gallagher and Tollefsen's work on group identity and we-narratives.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has contended that the autobiographical self refers to the stories we tell about ourselves that give us a stable sense of temporally extended identity. The autobiographical self is closely related to the idea of narrative identity, which proposes that the stories we tell about ourselves and our experiences are a significant contribution to the development of identity. These stories are part of the hermeneutical framework utilized to understand who we are and where we fit in the world. It is an important aspect of our psychological and social lives and plays a key role in shaping our relationships with others and the world around us. The autobiographical self is not just a compilation of facts and events. It is also shaped by our beliefs, values, and perspectives. These beliefs, values, and perspectives are passed down with the aid of intergenerational narratives.

An enactivist view of the autobiographical self and narrative identity proposes that the self is formed through the ongoing embodied process of constructing and maintaining our identities through interaction with the world. The stories we tell about ourselves and our experiences play a fundamental role in shaping our identities. These narratives are not just descriptions of events that have already occurred but are also active, ongoing processes that help to construct and maintain our sense of self. The hermeneutical background involved in the autobiographical self is the product of primal impressions, retention, and protention throughout time. Time-consciousness is ecological and substantially influenced by narrative. Studies in

autobiographical memory demonstrate that not only is the content of retention influenced by the past event itself but also *how* the past event is remembered. Gallagher, along with various scholars, have proposed the concept of the patterned self to offer a term that encompasses what different academic disciplines describe as the self. The pattern theory of self recognizes that the self is comprised of embodied and narrative processes. These processes form consistent activation to form a pattern of behaviour that is variously described as idealized cognitive models, massive hermeneutical background, or even *habitus*. Importantly, these processes are patterns and not identical replications. The patterned self is in constant interaction with environments that include embodied and socio-cultural elements. This approach is essential to this thesis because it helps to shed light on the complex and multifaceted nature of the self and can provide a valuable perspective for understanding how our identities are shaped and influenced by our experiences. This shaping includes the experiences the individuals have within the experiential and communal environments produced by the Pentecostal movement.

Lucas Bietti and Charles Stone assert that conversations play a pivotal role in shaping individual and group memories through conversational dynamics. They show how multimodal alignment, including bodily gestures, facilitates collaborative remembering in social settings. Conversational strategies, including collaborative recall and transactive systems, can inhibit or facilitate how memory is recalled and what aspects are forgotten. Bietti's work is brought into dialogue with Fivush to produce a robust set of tools for analysis of the discursive dynamics at play within Pentecostal liturgies in Chapter 7.

Chapters 3 and 4 have been developed to address an enactive view of cognition's individual and social aspects. Introductory details on the value of these insights to Pentecostal theology and narrative identity have been included as a precursor for what more extensively

developed in the final chapter. In the following chapter, this thesis presents how these theories relate to Smith's theoretical foundation.

CHAPTER 5: SMITH REVISITED AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION

5.1 Introduction

The parts of Smith's work that are addressed in this chapter that can benefit by contemporary scholarship in enaction, conceptual metaphor theory, and social science include his understanding of Pentecostals' worldview as affective, narrative epistemology and his use of Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu. In this chapter, I argue that Smith does not intend to use his theoretical foundation as a method of analysis for liturgical practice. He uses his theoretical foundation to persuade Christians about the benefits of more focused embodied participation in liturgical practice. Since this thesis seeks to analyze liturgical practice, it can demonstrate how this thesis extends beyond what Smith envisions in his work. This chapter develops an expanded theoretical framework to confirm Smith's arguments and introduces a method of analysing embodied aspects of liturgical practice. Notably, the work offered here on analytical methods should not be understood as an attempt to correct Smith's work. Instead, it opens the door to additional resources for scholarly engagement that is in harmony with Smith's embodied epistemology. Any correction or revision offered in this chapter addresses 1) the rare occasion where Smith's language implies a view of cognition that is incongruent with enactivist claims, 2) sources that he uses that do not work well with the embodied approach to cognition, and 3) ways that Smith's theoretical foundation connects to contemporary scholarship on embodied cognition, enaction, and narrative identity. The first point of revision is already dealt with more extensively in Chapter 2 and thus requires a simple overview. Sources that are used by Smith that do not work well with the embodied approach to cognition include scholarship that does not entertain a significant enough role for the body in cognition. Finally, this chapter demonstrates multifaceted ways that Smith's interlocutors harmonize and are significantly cross-referenced by

scholars within enactivism and cognitive linguistics. Demonstrating the interdisciplinary compatibility of Smith and enactivist approaches is important to support why enactive approaches can be combined with Smith to examine Pentecostal testimony. This chapter shows how various scholars have drawn similarities between one another's work. Because of the harmony between these various scholars, I propose that the enactivist approach advanced by this thesis is in foundational congruence with Smith's work, even if not originally pursued by Smith.

5.2 Social Imaginary, Cognitive Framework, and Self-Pattern

Smith states that his approach pushes back against intellectualist accounts of action that assume that what individuals do is the product of what individuals think. What "individuals think" for Smith stands in contrast to the unconscious meaning-making that occurs in the background.[492] There is a problem, however, with Smith's statement. To position "thinking" separate from unconscious meaning-making processes is to bifurcate two concepts that cannot be separated. The inseparability between thinking and unconscious meaning-making is a point that is extensively dealt with in Chapter 2, where the weaknesses of Shin's work are discussed, and Chapter 3, where the concept of embodied cognition and enaction is expounded. In short, an individual cannot think consciously about anything without it already being embedded within an unconscious prereflective hermeneutical background. Nevertheless, this weakness does not necessarily take away from Smith's intention to push back against an intellectualist account of action that assumes that our actions are a product of merely our propositional reflection. An essential part of meaning-making occurs prereflectively based on past experiences.

The problem of bifurcating conscious reflection from prereflective cognitive processes is also present in other areas of Smith's work. For example, Smith contrasts what he sees as

[492] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 33.

Pentecostals' affective understanding of the world and a cognitive framework. He suggests that what he means is that Pentecostal orientation is "more of a social imaginary than a cognitive framework".[493] There is inconsistency in speaking of the social imaginary as being unique from a "cognitive framework". The following section addresses the social imaginary. However, it is essential to stress that the nature of the social imaginary cannot be held separate from cognitive processing. Instead, the enactive view of cognition argues that the unconscious background aspects of meaning-making are a primary part of our cognitive framework. Furthermore, cognitive structures are, by nature, constructed by interaction with an individual's environment, which includes social environments.

Smith utilizes Charles Taylor's work on the "social imaginary" to speak about the aspects of Pentecostal's fundamental orientation that resides in the "background" of propositional reflection.[494] According to Taylor, the social imaginary is the aspect of an individual that imagines their place and effectiveness in social relationships and situations. It includes the background normative beliefs and images that underlie social expectations.[495] The social imaginary is a part of our understanding of the world that is unstructured and cannot be adequately articulated in "explicit doctrines" because it is "unlimited and indefinite" in nature.[496] That is not to say that the social imaginary is the background itself. Instead, it is part of a much more extensive background that aids in making meaning of the world. The social imaginary seems to correlate well with Fivush's work on the autobiographical self and McAdam's notion of narrative identity. Though it is not the whole of the background cognitive structures, it certainly is a significant part of how individuals make meaning of the world.

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[493] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 31.
[494] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 29.
[495] Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 23.
[496] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 25.

Additionally, Smith relates the imagination to Merleau-Ponty's concept of *praktognosia* or "know-how". *Praktonosia* is the way that the mind can understand and have meaningful access to the world.[497] Taylor references Hubert Dreyfus, John Searle, and Heidegger to support his notion of background.[498] Taylor's references are notable because both Dreyfus and Searle relate background to Bourdieu's notion of habitus.[499] The link between these philosophers is important because it situates each of their works as compatible with what Gallagher describes as the MHB (Massive Hermeneutical Background). The MHB serves as an essential foundation for meaning-making and the creation of useful self-patterns. Gallagher also finds similarities between his notion of MHB and Searle's notion of background.[500] Taylor describes habitus as always having an expressive dimension that gives meaning to things. These expressive dimensions are dispositions that shape how individuals perceive the world and help to give meaning to their experiences. The expressive dimension of habitus is what can be referred to as an enactive aspect of cognition that constitutes the patterned self. An individual is predisposed by past experiences to act upon stimuli in an attended event. The experiences are retained to help us make meaning of primal impressions and participate in useful protension to recall Gallagher's adaptation of Husserl's model of time-consciousness. The patterned self is the compendium of consistent and durable enactive expressions.

Convincing correlations between the theoretical concepts presented above and Fivush's work on the autobiographical self can be drawn. Fivush does not explicitly draw these

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[497] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 56.

[498] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 198.

[499] See: John Searle, *The Construction of Social Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 132; and Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time Division I* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991), 159-161.

[500] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 171.

correlations. Nevertheless, Fivush's work remains committed to the dynamic ecological nature of narratives and the way meaning is made in our lives.[501] Bourdieu states that:

> Habitus is the product of the work of inculcation and appropriation necessary in order for those products of collective history, the objective structures (e.g., of language economy, etc.) to succeed in reproducing themselves more or less completely, in the form of durable dispositions, in the organisms (which one can, if one wishes, call individuals) lastingly subjected to the same conditions.[502]

Habitus is a term used to describe the ways in which individuals internalize and embody the cognitive models of their society. Examples of this can include language, norms, values, and idealized cognitive models that guide expectations and behaviour. This process of embodiment is the result of the work of social ingraining, which is necessary for the reproduction of these cognitive yet dynamic structures. As a result, individuals develop durable dispositions that are shaped by the conditions of their environment. What can be seen here is that Bourdieu is referring in part to what Fivush would understand as the narratives embedded within macro, exo, and micro-systems that contribute to an individual's autobiographical self. That an individual's inculcations and appropriations become "durable dispositions", and the products of "collective history" speaks of the narratives and ways of making meaning of the world that are intergenerationally successful. As stated before, those narratives should be seen as much beyond what would be considered a propositional "story". Gallagher argues that we need more than basic perceptions and embodied interactions to make meaning of others and ourselves. Communicative and narrative practices build up competency within an individual by providing them with the skills and knowledge needed to understand and interact with others successfully. The skills and knowledge referred to here are beyond propositional discursive communication. It also includes prereflective embodied expression and perception. This competency is a bridge

[501] Fivush and Merrill, "An Ecological Systems Approach," 306-308; Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory and Narrative*, 15, 40.

[502] Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 85.

between the prereflective Massive Hermeneutical Background and the more propositional narratives embedded within social groups.[503]

By adopting Gallagher's approach to *habitus* and MHB, this thesis provides a religiously neutral theory of transcendence, immanence, and incommensurability by grounding these concepts in the embodied, prereflective, and social experience of human beings rather than in any specific religious or theological framework. In the thesis, the "patterned self" is described as a compendium of durable dispositions that shape one's identity. This transcendent aspect of self emerges from human interaction with the environment therefore producing a kind of self that is unique from any other person. It is this aspect of transcendent self that is embedded and constructed both in the more formal practice of sharing a testimony and other liturgical forms. At the same time, our embodiment of the world produces intersubjective cognitive models that provide the foundation for understanding between individuals. Smith has argued that an object will not truly be presented in articulation because language is not able completely express something that is fundamentally beyond understanding.[504] The approach provided in this thesis is in agreement with Smith's intent by constructing a method to speak authentically about subjects while simultaneously respecting their alterity and incommensurability. In contrast, Smith's approach constructs a kind of Christian realism that connects human identity and transcendence to God's action in the world through the incarnation. This thesis allows for broader dialogue across different disciplines without requiring adherence to a particular religious worldview. The intersubjective view of narrative development presented through Gallagher's enactive theory is also in agreement with work that Smith has presented through engagement with postmodern

[503] Gallagher, "Narrative Competence," 31.
[504] Smith, *Speech and Theology*, 6.

scholars to develop a Christian view of a storied community that co-constructs storytelling and story living.[505]

Smith recognizes the connection between liturgical practice and narrative identity by saying, "understanding how story works would also give us insight into the conditions of dynamics of liturgical formation".[506] By "story", Smith explicitly references an enactivist account of how narratives and stories help form a Christian worldview.[507] Like Gallagher, Smith sees this narrative epistemological makeup as more than propositional knowledge.[508] A broad view on the influence of liturgy and practice on identity formation is recognized by Smith, and likely the reason why he has creatively described humans as "homo liturgicus",[509] and why he argues that these practices are embodied and shape how we relate to the world more deeply than merely abstract propositional content.[510] However, as stated in Chapter 2, Smith's association with the Heideggerian view of "understanding" and "knowledge" provides some theoretical discontinuity with embodied approaches to cognition. In some areas of his work, Smith describes or implicitly assumes that pretheoretical know-how is a *precognitive* function rather than cognitive "knowledge" of the world.

In contrast, proponents of enactive and embodied views on cognition consider this perspective outdated considering that separating pretheoretical aspects of the mind from the concept of cognition is impossible. Our prereflective hermeneutical background is inherintely engaged and embodied within theoretical, reflective, or propositional activities. These activities include liturgical and narrative practices. What enables a liturgical practice to form narrative

[505] Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?*, 79.
[506] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 133.
[507] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 133 no. 7.
[508] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 64 no. 35.
[509] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 53.
[510] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 185.

identity is that we first have the narrative competency to link our embodied prereflective background to the liturgical practice.

For example, the Bible states in Matthew 5:13-16 that “You are the light of world. A city set on a hill cannot be hidden. Nor do people light a lamp and put it under a basket, but on a stand, and gives light to all in the house. In the same way, let your light shine before others”. That this passage is found in the Bible, and it situates its contents in a unique position to influence the reader according to what trusted individuals within the community have said about the usefulness of the Bible as an instructional authority for daily life. If the Bible is held in an authoritative instructional regard, then the reader is situated to make meaning and apply the contents. However, the cultural context that informed the Bible's writers differs from that of the reader. Since cultural environments influence our understanding of the world, this biblical passage has gone through unique characteristics, even though some of the meaning has been successfully passed intergenerationally. For instance, in this passage, Matthew speaks of a lamp. However, the lamp Matthew refers to may not be the kind of lamp that is commonly thought of in modern times. A contemporary reader may have an idealized cognitive model defined by an electrical lamp with perhaps a lampshade. Nevertheless, before the invention of the lightbulb, a lamp would often include an oil-based container with a wick that could be lit on fire. Each generation categorizes the concept of a lamp according to the prototypical lamp experienced within the cultural context of their generation. The intergenerational image and narrative of an oil lamp are intergenerationally constrained and inhibited by the invention of the lightbulb. As the primary source of light changes with new inventions, how a generation speaks about a lamp changes. Each generation can potentially change how a lamp is discussed and thus contribute to induced forgetting of a prior ICM that associated the concept of a lamp to an oil-based lamp. On

the other hand, since Matthew 5:13-16 includes a pervasive primary metaphor, aspects of the biblical passage successfully pass intergenerationally. The primary metaphor of LIGHT IS SEEING, and LIGHT IS UNDERSTANDING/MEANING-MAKING is utilized. Light gives individuals a similar sensorimotor experience. It is difficult to make meaning of the surrounding environment if it is dark. The surrounding environment can more easily be seen and understood if there is light. Since both contemporary and ancient human beings have similar bodies, the passage can have similar meanings. Thus, the embodied hermeneutical background of different individuals provides similar meaning that the biblical passage affords. Followers of Christ should not seek to live reclusively but should actively seek to position themselves within the social environment to enable others to make meaning of their lives.

There are limitations to speaking about the social imaginary, background, or habitus without additional methodological tools. That is why methods within embodied approaches to cognitive linguistics are helpful. Smith states that the "imaginary" descriptor is useful because it is the aspect of understanding that is not propositional and is "more like a story we know by heart".[511] Altogether, this seems to match quite well with what has been established by this thesis to be the enactive autobiographical self. However, Smith does not offer a clear way to pinpoint elements of the background and the social imaginary. Within the example offered above on the biblical passage found in Matthew 5:13-16, we can see exactly how to access both propositional literary narratives and background narratives embedded within the literary narrative. While the literary narrative includes concepts that may change over time, the embedded concepts of LIGHT IS SEEING, and LIGHT IS UNDERSTANDING/MEANING-MAKING provide a view into the hermeneutical background. The hermeneutical background, in turn, can help construct an

[511] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 30.

element of social imaginary that includes the assumption within a Christian that their Christian conduct should be visible to others. Thus, the hermeneutical background is accessed and can be examined through the methodological tools found in cognitive linguistics, of which conceptual metaphor theory is a part.

While habitus, background, and the social imaginary are valuable concepts that speak of an essential part of cognition, they merely speak of epistemological and ontological commitments. Because of this, cognitive linguistics and conceptual metaphor theory can serve as an effective approach to extend Smith's foundational work.

It is worth mentioning that Charles Taylor, along with Herbert Dreyfus, have explored certain philosophical issues regarding representationalism, realism, and embodiment.[512] It may seem natural to question why Taylor and Dreyfus were not substantively addressed in this thesis, especially considering that Taylor is a significant interlocutor for many Pentecostal scholars. While much of Taylor and Dreyfus's work certainly concords with this thesis, there are important reasons why it is not utilized as a significant element in the theoretical foundation for this thesis.

In their book *Retrieving Realism*, Dreyfus and Taylor move away from the detached, representational views that have dominated modern philosophy. They aim to retrieve a form of realism that recognizes the direct, practical, and socially embedded nature of our engagement with the world. While enactivist scholarship is not directly engaged, Dreyfus and Taylor make claims that are in alignment with enactivist assumptions. They state:

> We contend that we are able to form conceptual beliefs guided by our surroundings because we live in a preconceptual engagement with these surroundings which involves understanding. Transactions in this space are not causal process among neutral elements, but the sensing of and response to relevance.[513]

[512] Hubert Dreyfus and Charles Taylor, *Retrieving Realism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 10.

[513] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 10.

Dreyfus and Taylor argue that once the mediational picture of our being-in-the-world is deconstructed, what is left is "an embodied agent, embedded in a society, and at grips with the world."[514] Our preconceptual engagement with the environment does not simply occur representationally in the neural synopsis in the brain. Instead, our preconceptual background is in constant interaction with the world. For Dreyfus and Taylor, the mediational epistemological views espouse the idea that we do not interact with the real world but rather inner representations of the world.[515] Dreyfus and Taylor claim that a desire for useful critical methods propelled the turn to mediational epistemologies. They admit that much about mediational epistemologies is useful for breaking down claims and analysing evidence into essential components. However, the error was in ontologizing the method. Their work challenges the centrality of mental representations to knowledge.[516] They seek to replace the old picture of mediational views with the engaged or embedded one that involves contact with the world. For Dreyfus and Taylor, a doubt about the existence of things becomes incoherent in light of our embodied and embeddedness within the world.[517]

One of Dreyfus and Taylor's primary responses to mediational theories highlights the "primacy of conversation in human linguistic life".[518] They argue that humanity shares an inherent connection with the world. We all must navigate the same world through engaged coping, relying on the same types of bodies and fundamental capacities. [519] The result is life meanings and human meanings. For Dreyfus and Taylor, there is a difference between life

[514] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 91.
[515] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 3.
[516] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 102.
[517] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 93.
[518] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 106.
[519] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 107.

meanings and human meanings. Life meanings are understood as the kind of meaning that is developed as a result of our similar organic bodies. Human meanings are understood as meaning that develops as a result of socio-cultural and linguistic environments that address moral, ethical, or spiritual concepts. They are called "human meanings" because they are the kind of things found among humans and not among other animals.[520] They state that:

> But from the very beginning of human life, this upright posture also becomes the site of human meanings, of understanding dignity, for instance (as against the "humiliation" of being forced close to the ground), or of our relation to something higher, to heave, say; and this can be developed and embroidered in different ways in a philosophy or a theology.[521]

Dreyfus and Taylor make similar arguments to the ones in this thesis regarding both the similarity and uniqueness of human meaning and understanding. They claim that the investment of human meaning in bodily gestures demonstrates how it is possible to say that some human needs and actions can be recognized universally due to our biological constitution and that cultures invest meaning into bodily gestures that cultivate unique meaning.[522] In Chapters 6 and 7, specific examples are provided to show how the dynamic above plays out in the Pentecostal community.

Both Dreyfus and Taylor's realism and Lakoff and Johnson's embodied realism emphasize the importance of embeddedness in shaping human understanding. Nevertheless, Dreyfus and Taylor's realism is predominantly grounded in philosophical disciplines, while Lakoff and Johnson include cognitive science to further elucidate how our bodily engagement produces the conceptual models that influence our meaning-making of the world. Highlighting the difference between these approaches is not intended to demonstrate disagreement. Lakoff and Johnson's work simply offers more tools to analyse how bodily experiences shape thought and

[520] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 108.
[521] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 118.
[522] Dreyfus and Taylor, *Retrieving Realism*, 118.

language, providing a more detailed analysis of metaphor and conceptual systems that are examined in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis.

Though Taylor is not engaged in the same way Smith does, what is suggested here is not a radical departure from the approach argued by Smith. Mark Johnson is an essential part of Smith's work, highlighting the role of affect and emotions in mental processes[523] and embodiment of the world.[524] Smith even provides rudimentary remarks on the way that primary, complex, and conceptual metaphors develop and are a part of our meaning-making of the world.[525] Regarding this, Smith states that meaningful liturgies will "build on primary metaphors in order to habituate us to *conceptual* metaphors that will then seep into our background".[526] However, Smith does not utilize CMT to help analyze how. It is a missed opportunity to clarify further how meaningful liturgies can transform individuals on a fundamental level. This thesis seeks to capitalize on the opportunity for deeper analysis by envisioning how Smith's work could be further elucidated and by applying conceptual metaphor theory to analyse the concept of testimony.

What seems clear is that Smith sees precisely the kind of thing I am advocating will continue to be beneficial to Smith's approach if engaged further than what Smith has offered. In Chapter 2, it is argued that Smith does not neglect the role of intentional reflection in Christian formation, contrary to criticism by Shin and Frestadius. Smith uses the corporate practice of Christian worship and the mystagogical preaching of the fourth-century bishop Ambrose of Milan and Cyril of Jerusalem as examples of intentional reflection. That one should intentionally reflect on liturgical practice is one thing. *How* to intentionally reflect is what conceptual

[523] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 36-38.
[524] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 49.
[525] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 117-124.
[526] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 123.

metaphor theory can help achieve. For example, in later chapters, the liturgical practice of a congregation singing a song together is examined by analyzing the narrative content within a song and how that song is corporally liturgically performed in a religious event. What is suggested here revises Smith by adding more detail and interaction with cognitive processes than Smith offered. In short, this section extends Smith's use of Mark Johnson to Johnson's additional work in conceptual metaphor theory and extends Smith's use of Merleau-Ponty's embodied account of perception that has served as a precursor to contemporary theories on enaction.

5.3 Smith, Re-Storying the Imagination, and Sanctifying Perception

According to Smith, sanctifying our perception requires repetition. Smith sees the kind of repetition within Christian liturgical practice as a necessary venue through which to re-story and "rehabituate" our being-in-the-world. Smith suggests the importance of reflection that normatively enacts the story of the gospel.[527] An enactive approach to the narrativity of the mind can support this approach by highlighting that the nature of our understanding of the world can be impacted when an attended event or experience is contextualized by an individual into their sense of autobiographical narrative. Smith attempts to give an example of that kind of contextualization by offering the narrative of Alex. Alex is a middle-aged man who participates in the repeated liturgical practice of kneeling and confessing his sins to God. At times, Alex would recite the prayer of confession from *The Book of Common Prayer*: "We confess we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed, by what we have done, and by what we have left undone. We have not loved you with our whole heart; we have not loved our neighbours as ourselves… Have Mercy…"[528] Alex was constantly reminded of the mercy that God

[527] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 183.

[528] Cited in Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 184. See "Morning Prayer: Rite II," in *The Book of Common Prayer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 79.

demonstrates through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. That Jesus paid the price for our sins is founded on the conceptual metaphor FINANCIAL TRANSACTION IS MORAL INTERACTION. Bonnie Howe argues that the moral accounting metaphor is phenomenologically grounded in the experience of gain and loss in capital transactions.[529] In ancient times, this would have included both barter and monetary transactions. The conceptual metaphor FINANCIAL TRANSACTION IS MORAL INTERACTION is highlighted by Howe in the common statement that someone owes someone else an apology. When someone *gives* the apology that is owed, it implies that another has *gained* a commodity of moral and social capital.[530] That an apology can be a commodity is connected to the idea that IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. Chapter 3 analyses the concrete phenomenological foundation behind this conceptual metaphor. Since an idea can affect another in the same way an object can be given to another, ideas correlate to the concrete sensorimotor experience of giving or receiving an object. In the case offered by Howe, apologies are a kind of idea that includes a kind of debt; furthermore, just as one can accumulate debt, when an individual sins against God, it accumulates a debt.

In Smith's narrative about Alex, that Jesus paid the debt means that Alex had the opportunity of absolution without having to pay the price himself. Jesus' suffering, death, and resurrection amount to payment through suffering and allow for mercy that is not repayable by Alex.[531] Within the narrative, Alex's continued experience of absolution resulted in crucial reflection when he experienced his own son coming to him for forgiveness. The forgiveness Alex had encountered with God was used as an analogical experience for Alex's approach to perceiving and offering forgiveness to his son. Alex's life had been so deeply affected by the

[529] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 192.
[530] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 192.
[531] Howe, *Because You Bear This Name*, 200.

forgiveness of God that Smith describes Alex's response to his son's request for forgiveness "without hesitation, and without even having to think about it".[532]

In addition to the moral accounting metaphors involved in Alex's story, there is LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor along with MORALITY IS A PATH. Smith reveals that Alex would have more situations where he had to extend forgiveness to his son. However, according to the narrative provided, Alex used the biblical story of the prodigal son to understand that Alex was a prodigal son, as well, who repeatedly approached God to ask for forgiveness. Though Smith does not explicitly recognize a liturgical practice associated with Alex's use of the prodigal son narrative, Alex's familiarity with the biblical story indicates that the story was communicated or taught in the past.

The story of the prodigal son is the story of a son who asks for his inheritance from his father (Luke 15:11-32). The son is described as the prodigal son because he uses his riches to move to a far country, spending all of his riches on reckless, sinful living. The son was left in poverty and without food to eat. He then decided to return to his father's house and offer himself to his father as a servant and no longer a son. As the son returned, the father saw his son a long way off and ran to him to embrace him. Instead of making his son a servant, the father celebrates his son's return and says, "For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost and is found".[533] Alex's intentional reflection on this passage allowed him to integrate the identity of the son and the father within his narrative identity. Alex related his autobiographical self with the story of the prodigal son in that he also needed God's forgiveness repeatedly. As a result, Smith relays that "every single time the gracious Father, already looking for his arrival, met him at the

[532] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 185.
[533] Luke 15:24.

end of the lane and made the same announcement of forgiveness and mercy".[534] Smith's description seems to indicate that throughout Alex's liturgical reflection on the prodigal son, his own autobiographical memories were revisited and dynamically affected by the biblical story. In essence, liturgical reflection provided a vehicle for the narrative to pass through the macro, exo, micro, and autobiographical levels of Fivush's ecological systems model. Alex's integration can be represented in the following progression:

> Biblical authority (macro)→ Prodigal son narrative (exo) → Alex's understanding of the prodigal son narrative (micro) → Alex's correlation between his personal story and the prodigal son narrative

Alex's willingness to look to the Bible for guidance indicates that he likely believes that the Bible has instructional authority for his personal life. The extent of that authority is unknown. Nevertheless, his assumption leads him to look to the prodigal son narrative within the Bible to find a source for religious reflection. The repetitive liturgical action Alex participates in sets the prodigal son narrative in a position to be integrated further into his sense of identity. Alex's understanding of the narrative leads to a correlation between himself and the various characters in the story. At one point, Alex is the prodigal son who is mercifully received by the father, which is correlated to God. At another point, Alex correlates himself to the role of the father who needs to forgive his son. This dynamic demonstrates a deep and personal integration of the prodigal son narrative into Alex's own autobiographical sense of self.

The father of the prodigal son narrative was related to God for Alex as Father. God had already been looking for Alex's return, not a physical return, but a spiritual return. That Alex sought God's forgiveness indicates that he had participated in a moral failing at some point. Moral failing can commonly take the metaphorical meaning of straying from the bounds of a

[534] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 185.

path. According to Lakoff and Johnson, MORALITY IS A PATH/JOURNEY is an Event-Structure metaphor conceptualized by self-propelled motion towards an intentional direction.[535] The MORALITY IS A PATH/JOURNEY metaphor can be mapped as follows:

Conceptual Metaphor: MORALITY IS A PATH/JOURNEY

Source domain: PATH/JOURNEY		Target Domain: MORALITY
Traveller	→	A moral agent
Path	→	Permissible action
Route choices	→	A moral agent's actions
Straying from the path	→	an impermissible moral action
Returning to the path	→	an agent making decisions to rectify impermissible moral action

There are purposes and goals linked to the intentional action of propelling oneself to a destination. There is a path that must be maintained. When applied to morality, immoral acts stray from the permissible range of purposeful action. Behaviour deviating from permissible action boundaries is immoral because it is a movement to unsanctioned destinations.[536] If an individual chooses to rectify the immoral behaviour, it is seen as "returning to the path". The concepts here are beyond propositional in nature as they are embedded in the hermeneutical background of cognitive activity. It is what is embedded in the propositional narrative of the prodigal son. Alex is able to enact a particular embodied cognitive action because his narrative self was first transformed by the story of the prodigal son that was embedded with the powerful MORALITY IS A PATH/JOURNEY and MORAL ACCOUNTING metaphors.

Alex's embodied orientation was situated to immediately offer his forgiveness to his son without needing much if any, propositional reflection. Smith recognizes this is because "the repetition of the practice had effectively recruited Alex as a character in the same drama".[537]

[535] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 304.
[536] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 304.
[537] Smith, *Imaging the Kingdom*, 185.

These kinds of stories are useful because they help contextualize abstract ideas of re-storying into people's real narrative identities. Biblical narrative can serve as a formative influence on the autobiographical self by providing individuals with narratives that can shape beliefs, values, and perspectives. Alex analogically re-enacted the drama of the prodigal son within his personal life, therefore predisposing him to a particular orientation when encountering the failures of his own son. It is an intriguing proposition to consider how the biblical narrative, along with this event, will affect Alex's son. Alex's son is the recipient of Alex's actions towards him. These are precisely the kind of narratively reinforced events that contribute to the way that intergenerational narratives are passed from one generation to the other. Will Alex's son feel a deeper connection with God as a result of his father's forgiveness? Will his father become analogous to God's kind of love towards him? Will Alex's son also use his father's forgiveness as inspiration to forgive others? Though these questions are not answerable given the lack of information, they can reveal how the biblical narrative and present events influence the way family narratives are passed to others. If Alex's son chooses to integrate the prodigal son, it may have some of the same macro and exo qualities. However, Alex's son's understanding of the prodigal narrative will be nuanced by the experience of his father's forgiveness.

Smith sees human beings as liturgical animals.[538] Liturgies, for Smith, are the rituals and practices that shape the narratives that influence our embodied orientation towards the world.[539] Thus, re-storying the mind is akin to the kind of transformation that occurs from reassessing our past in light of present experiences. Reassessed and reoriented experience happens beyond propositional reflection. It includes embodied conceptual metaphors, autobiographical narratives,

[538] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 53.

[539] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 109; Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 185. This "re-storying" is a transformation of what Smith describes in other places as "story living," see: Smith, *Who's Afraid of Postmodernism?*, 79.

and idealized cognitive frames that aid us in prereflectively making sense of the world. The academic literature in Chapters 3 and 4 explains in detail that this happens dynamically, ecologically, and continuously. The autobiographical self goes through a dynamic transformation due to new experiences. It happens whether we like it or not. What Smith is encouraging is the development of methods for intentional intervention. The objective is to sanctify perception by re-storying Christians' being-in-the-world.[540] Perception involves meaning given to stimuli based on past experiences and projections (protention) on future experiences. In essence, Smith proposes to sanctify how Christians make meaning of the present through narrative reorientation. The narrative orientation proposed suggests something deeper than changing formal propositional stories. Narrative reorientation implies transforming conceptual metaphors and idealized cognitive models that drive us on a prereflective level. It is a transformation of the very essence of our being.

Gallagher has argued, along with other notable scholars, that this malleability is present even on a neurological level.[541] In recent research, Gallagher et al. argue that decreasing rigidity in how one views oneself seems to be an essential element in restoring and maintaining mental health. They present evidence in Mindfulness-Based Interventions (MBIs) within Clinical Psychology to show how the patterned self can be changed. The product is altered psychological and behavioural expression.[542] Smith suggests more intentional engagement in liturgical process to alter our storied orientations. Though the situation of MBIs and Clinical Psychology is different from Pentecostal liturgy's religious and less methodological environment, research by enactivist scholars like Gallagher demonstrates that transformation indeed occurs. However,

[540] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 161.
[541] Giommi, et al., "The (In)flexible self: Psychopathology, Mindfulness, and Neuroscience," 1-9.
[542] Giommi, et al., "The (In)flexible self: Psychopathology, Mindfulness, and Neuroscience," 1.

though Smith does include embodied, even neurological processes[543], in his understanding of re-storying, enactivist scholars like Gallagher will find greater interdisciplinary harmony under the banner of the patterned self. The concept of self-pattern is broad enough to include Smith's narrative epistemology and all the other forms of durably consistent embodied orientations of the self.

One of the primary claims of this thesis is that there is evidence that the kind of narrative reorientation presented by Smith is present in the Pentecostal community due to liturgical practice. Smith recognizes this reorientation in the Pentecostal community as a kind of narrative transformation that changes affective orientation.[544]In essence, the self-pattern of individuals are changed as they participate in communal interaction and Pentecostal religious practices. That change is specifically demonstrated through an analysis of the concept of testimony, the practice of public testimony, and key liturgical practices like preaching and singing songs together. Behavioural change occurs in Pentecostals largely because of engagement with liturgical practices that are embedded with communal discursive dynamics and deeply impactful ontological and cosmological significance.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates how the scholarship present in Chapters 3 and 4 is 1) compatible with Smith's work and 2) effectively expands and revises Smith's work. In exploring Smith's sources and the ones offered in this thesis, what can be seen is an exceptional amount of interdisciplinary compatibility. Scholars engage with each other and provide complementary theories addressing our being-in-the-world. Their congruence shows that there is a way forward

[543] See: Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom,* 115.
[544] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 65-66.

for integrating enactive and narrative approaches to Smith. At times, this happens in unique yet similar ways. What is additionally explored is some areas in Smith's work that benefit from additional theoretical analysis and methodological tools for accessing the pre-theoretical background that constitutes identity. Two examples are provided to demonstrate the use of the methodological tools. First, the biblical passage in Matthew 5:13-16 is examined. Second, Smith's example of Alex's use of the prodigal son narrative is further analyzed in ways not explored by Smith. These are tools that Smith's interlocutors do not offer.

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, the recent work of the Pentecostal scholars Yoon Shin and Simo Frestadius was explored. Both Shin and Frestadius critiqued Smith's work in arguing that his work did not satisfactorily address the relationship between theoretical and pre-theoretical cognitive domains. The lack of reflection on that relationship was observed to be true in general and regarding the contexts that apply to Pentecostal liturgical practice. This chapter is crucial in developing a more sustained and in-depth analysis. Smith's reference to the story of Alex and his son is provided as an example. Insights from the disciplines of enactivism, Fivush's work on the autobiographical self, and CMT were utilized to analyse Alex's experience more richly than what is provided in Smith's work.

I join Smith's goal to "foster intentional reflection *on* practice in order to encourage reflective immersion *in* practice".[545] Intentional reflection on practice involves actively thinking about and evaluating one's actions and experiences to learn from them and improve one's performance. Smith has provided great precursory examples of how to do this. However, as stated before, Smith's theoretical foundation is not used as a method of analysis for liturgical practice. Instead, it is used to persuade Christians of the benefits of more embodied participation

[545] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 186.

in liturgical practices. The use of Smith's ideas in this thesis goes beyond what he originally intended. It is contended here that the kind of analysis offered by CMT and enactive approaches to cognition can help foster rich reflective immersion in liturgical practice. Involvement in this kind of thoughtful reflection on experience is a crucial part of the re-storying that Smith advocates. This thesis seeks to more fully engage some of the methodological tools already recognized by Smith to specifically analyse the Pentecostal concept of "testimony" along with the public liturgical practice of sharing a "testimony".

In general, reflective religious practice refers to the process of thinking about and analysing one's own religious experiences and practices in order to gain a deeper understanding of one's faith and grow spiritually. To demonstrate the various tools proposed thus far, the following chapters examine the Pentecostal concept of testimony and how it is practised in communal settings. As delineated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Shin and Frestadius express concern that Smith does not address Pentecostal theology enough to be considered uniquely Pentecostal. Accordingly, this thesis concludes that if Pentecostal scholars are going to use Smith's work, the task of adequately contextualizing his scholarship for Pentecostal concerns is necessary. That is the primary purpose of the following chapter leading to the conclusion of this thesis.

CHAPTER 6: PENTECOSTAL TESTIMONY

6.1 Introduction

It has been observed that an "astonishing" amount of communication occurs in a Pentecostal worship service that is unlike other churches.[546] One of the ways that Pentecostals have communicated in the church setting is in the form of sharing their testimonies. Early Pentecostals devoted much time to expressing their testimonies to each other. By early Pentecostals, this thesis refers to the early Pentecostals of the modern Pentecostal movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s. Expressing personal testimonies often occurred in public settings like worship services, where Pentecostals shared their "personal faith stories". Public testimonies were commonly practised because Pentecostals believed their stories were evidence that they were part of the community and normative for others.[547] For this reason, Steven Parker states that "testifying":

> contributes to a shared story among the participants, to which others can join their stories. Thus, testimonies are a way to order one's experience, to begin to make sense of what has happened in the context of God's larger work in the world and in one's life. Testimonies participate in a shared construction of meaning. As a communal activity, testimonies also elicit social support and spiritual strengthening.[548]

As a community activity, testimonials also elicit social support and spiritual strengthening. Testifying contributes to constructing a common story among the participants, to which others might join their stories. Testimonies can become a powerful cultural tool through which to organise life's experiences and contribute to the joint production of meaning. The concept of *testimony* is essential to both Pentecostalism as a social group and Pentecostal scholarship as a field of study. It is important to Pentecostalism because it constitutes a part of

[546] Walter J. Hollenweger, *The Pentecostals* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1988), 466.

[547] Grant Wacker, *Heaven Below: Early Pentecostals and American Culture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 58.

[548] Steven E. Parker, "Tradition-Based Integration: A Pentecostal Perspective," *Journal of Psychology and Christianity* 33, no. 4 (2014), 316.

social practice that has forged Pentecostal identity. Accordingly, Ellington has recommended that since Pentecostals are "storytellers", testimony should be re-affirmed as an essential practice that classifies our personal lives as "extensions of the biblical story to which we add new chapters".[549] It is essential to Pentecostal scholarship as Pentecostal scholars seek to analyze the community, both past and present, and as scholars seek to develop productive ways of propagating Pentecostal identity that can transcend into generations to come.

Unfortunately, what public testimonies actually looked like in early Pentecostalism is not empirically documented. The lack of documentation is because Pentecostalism began as an oral community rather than a community that was concerned with historically documenting what occurred during the Pentecostal revival of the 1900s. However, there are sources of various book-length autobiographies and articles that express how a church service looks. Though it is far from a historical account, it is directly applicable for the purposes of this study because they are narrative accounts of how Pentecostals understood themselves. Grant Wacker, a scholar who provides an extensive treatment of early Pentecostal history, describes the difficulty of studying Pentecostal autobiographies as historical documents succinctly. The autobiographies often were written much later than the actual events as the individual looked back on their lives. They include descriptions of the circumstances that led the converts to seek a spiritual transformation, what occurred at the moment of conversion, and the notable evidence of the benefits as a result of the Pentecostal experience. Because of its arguably subjective character, there is nothing to prove or disprove regarding the authenticity of such self-reporting.[550]

[549] Scott Ellington, "Locating Pentecostals at the Hermeneutical Round Table," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 22 (2013), 225. DOI 10.1163/17455251-02202008.

[550] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 58-59.

What Pentecostal autobiographical material authoritatively entails, however, is narrative self-reflection on the past. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, *how* one remembers the past is just as significant as what actually happened. That is because how the past is remembered greatly influences how meaning is made of the present. The narrative self-reflection in testimonies is how Pentecostals have understood their stories. As a result, it can be counted as a significant influence on the community's present hermeneutical background and forward-looking narrative identity. For this reason, how Pentecostals have understood their stories is the primary concern of this thesis rather than a historical analysis of what really occurred. This chapter addresses various elements that characterize the storied nature of Pentecostal identity, including an analysis of what occurs individually and collectively when Pentecostals testify and how biblical narratives are used to provide grand narratives to develop a storied identity.

This chapter's intent is not to address or make prescriptions on the pros and cons of the use of "testimony". Such conversations have been addressed by scholars elsewhere and are worth further discussion.[551] They demonstrate that Pentecostal scholarship has an invested interest on how to proceed with a balance of intellectual integrity and faithfulness to Pentecostal identity. The purpose of this section, however, is to elucidate *what is* and not *what should be*. Defining what Pentecostals mean by *testimony* is essential before proceeding in a dialogue between current research on the role of narrative identity in developing the self.

Archer contends that, when comparing various Pentecostal communities globally, it can be observed that the Pentecostal story takes on unique forms. Nevertheless, there remains a "basic storyline" and "prominent controlling theological narrative" that guide Pentecostals'

[551] See: Scott A. Ellington, "History, Story, and Testimony: Locating Truth in a Pentecostal Hermeneutic," *Pneuma* 23, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 245-263. DOI: 10.1163/157007401X00195.; and Gerger Andersson, "To Live the Biblical Narratives: Pentecostal Autobiographies and the Baptism in the Spirit," *PentecoStudies* 13, no. 1 (2014): 112-127. DOI: 10.1558/ptcs.v13i1.112.

understanding of their story and identity. The story remains consistent enough to identify yet adaptable enough to translate into new contexts.[552] Though uniqueness can undoubtedly be observed when considering the various cultures that have received Pentecostalism, the various cultures also identify with stories that are similar to other Pentecostals. These similar stories help forge an identifiable and generally similar theological identity. The Pentecostal story Archer refers to is a teleological retelling that uniquely influences Pentecostals' understanding of Christianity. The primary narrative is through the Lukan narrative, entailing the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, this chapter examines the various ways in which the Lukan narrative influences Pentecostal identity.

Notably, though Pentecostals utilize the Bible to construct narrative identity, the Bible is not analyzed through a methodological historical-critical lens. Archer recognizes that the Pentecostal story is informed by stories "developed through personal experiences of divine encounter, exegetical appropriations of the Acts of the Apostles and the Gospels, and spiritual expectations among Pentecostal communities".[553] Therefore, the analyses provided in this chapter will not include historical-critical methodologies designed to study the Bible. This work focuses on the stories of the Bible as they have been understood and appropriated by the Pentecostal community. One of the most significant aspects of the Pentecostal identity goes beyond simply recognizing the significance of what occurred in the Bible. Pentecostals are known for reflecting on how their lives are a continuation of Christ's activity on earth. Testimony for Pentecostals is, in many ways, a declaration of how biblical narrative is being actively and analogically demonstrated in the present. In short, one's life testifies to its correspondence to biblical narratives.

[552] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 41.
[553] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 41.

Considering these influences on the concept of Pentecostal testimony, this chapter first highlights the concept of testimony, the practice of testifying, and what Pentecostal scholars have argued that testimony means for Pentecostals. Amanda Drury's scholarship on testimony is analyzed and is brought into discussion with Pentecostal testimony. This chapter then establishes how some core narrative tenets unify the Pentecostal community and how various Pentecostal cultural communities interpret Pentecostal narratives. An essential foundational element is provided in this chapter for the analysis provided in Chapter 7.

6.2 The Concept of Testimony

Though testimony can be understood as public expression, it is only because it has meaning to an individual that it can be shared publicly. For this reason, this thesis finds it more appropriate to speak of testimony as a concept and not merely a practice. The notion of testimony has both personal and communal elements. It is personal because testimony is something an individual has, regardless of its public expression. It is communal because when testimony is expressed within a religious setting, the community interacts with what is being said. Thus, it is argued below that the concept of testimony is used metonymically to figuratively refer to both the expression of a testimony and the possession of a testimony. Scholars on testimony have described public expressions of testimony as "articulation".[554] This thesis finds it more accurate to refer to it as an expression rather than articulation. Articulation may imply that testimony requires propositional exposition. However, even Drury, who prefers the term "articulation," recognizes that non-propositional verbal gesturing can fit within her understanding of articulation.[555] Considering this, there are many ways that Pentecostals express

[554] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 55.
[555] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 68.

their personal stories that do not include propositional expositions. They are better understood as embodied non-propositional expressions that communicate elements of their testimony.

Before addressing the Pentecostal movement directly, it must be acknowledged that the concept and practice of testimony are not unique to Pentecostalism. Although the historiographical origins of the modern Pentecostal movement are still debated, what is certain is that a variety of Christian traditions have influenced the Pentecostal movement.[556] Emphasis on personal testimony is characteristic of many Christian movements prior to the emergence of modern Pentecostalism.[557] This emphasis was especially true of the Wesleyan Holiness tradition that significantly influenced Pentecostal religious practice.[558]

A crucial aspect regarding testimony to address is the difference between having a testimony and the ecclesial practice of giving a testimony. Amanda Drury provides some helpful work in distinguishing the practice of testimony from other ecclesial practices. Drury states that the church often already directly or indirectly participates in activities relating to the practice of testimony. The practice of testimony is covertly integrated into common ecclesial activities like evangelism, praise, confession of faith, confession of sin, and preaching. For example, in evangelism, people often share stories of their own personal conversion to persuade a non-Christian to follow Christ. Preaching integrates testimony through sermon illustrations about an experience with God that leads the preacher or another to an understanding or decision.[559]

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[556] Cecil M. Robeck, "The Origins of Modern Pentecostalism: Some Historiographical Issues," in *The Cambridge Companion to Pentecostalism*, ed. Cecil B. Robeck, Jr and Amos Yong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 13.

[557] John L. Drury, "Barth and Testimony," in *Karl Barth and the Future of Evangelical Theology*, ed. Christian T. Collins Winn and John L. Drury (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2014), 104. Kindel Edition.

[558] David D. Daniels, "North American Pentecostalism," in *The Cambridge Companion to Pentecostalism*, eds. Cecil B. Robeck, Jr and Amos Yong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 73.

[559] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 145-146.

However, this particular communicative aspect of testimony requires a personal narrative. While it is pervasive in other practices, it is not automatically part of them.

There is a difference between an individual having a testimony and an individual practising a testimony. Since testimony is related to the autobiographical self, the term as it applies to an individual's life is immensely pervasive. Drury states that "testimonies require a personal narrative".[560] This overarching statement requires a more nuanced description, however. If by "testimonies", Drury is referring to the practice of communicating a formal story, the statement seems tenable. However, testimonies in their broadest sensedo not require formal personal narratives. A testimony simply requires an experience with God. An experience by nature produces a memory. That memory is part of a hermeneutical lens through which an individual can understand God and the community of believers. This process does not require a personal narrative because it is part of an embodied prereflective process. The construction of the autobiographical self does not require formal narratives. Since testimony is simply a Christian term for the autobiographical self within a religious frame, the concept of testimony does not require a formal personal narrative.

To illustrate her argument, Drury distinguishes between the expression "God is good" as a confession of faith that is not a testimony and the expression "God is good" that *is* a testimony. For Drury, the expression "God is good" only acts as a function of testimony when it includes an additional personal narrative. For example, when expressed as "God is good because God provided me with a job".[561] However, this contradicts some call-and-response church expressions commonly practised as a part of what Pentecostal churches would deem a testimony. Call-and-response is important to Pentecostal liturgy because it includes multiple methods

[560] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 148.
[561] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 149.

through which the Pentecostal community moulds idealized cognitive models and behaviour. The call-and-response dynamic is further analysed in the following chapter, where some examples are examined.

For example, if a preacher states that “God is good”, a call for response sometimes proceeds by asking the congregation, “Can I get a witness?”. The congregation commonly responds in a variety of ways that can range from formal affirmations like “amen” or “yes” to general praise like “hallelujah” and “glory to God”. In these instances, the congregation is allowed an opportunity to express what can be seen as their personal testimony of the goodness of God. However, they typically do not include a personal story at all. It is assumed that those who aurally express themselves have a personal experience that corroborates what is being said by the preacher. What is more, a congregational response is often more than merely an aural expression. There are embodied non-verbal responses that reinforce the call-and-response practice within a church service. When considering the fuller spectrum of congregational response, it seems reasonable to conclude that a potentially extensive amount of propositional and prereflective embodied activity is occurring.

Though the congregation's response may not be expressed within a propositional or even reflective narrative, the cognitive frame sets their responses within a prereflective narrative. The cognitive frame is that of an individual adopting the narrative being given by the preacher and affirming that the same narrative exists in themselves. Group identity is formed through the we-narrative shared within a group. As stated in Chapter 4, we-narratives bring together individuals to form a sense of shared and group agency. In the ecclesial practice of preaching a sermon, agency is shared in the group environment through call-and-response cultural frames. Recalling the illustration of moving a couch is helpful to remember here. When a group of individuals are

moving a couch, cognition is extended into the weight and physical dimensions of the couch. As individuals push and pull, they interact with each other. This brings each person's individual agency in dynamic relation to the others. Thus, it can be said that both the group and individuals moved the couch. In the act of congregational preaching, a congregation that is within a call-and-response frame interacts with the preacher, including the narratives that the preacher expresses. When an individual agrees with the preacher by expressing, for example, "Amen!" it indicates that the individual has adopted the narrative of the preacher as their own. Thus, group agency through a we-narrative is achieved. The individual is joined with both the preacher and the congregation, which affirms group agency with the message that is articulated.

Admittedly, individuals within a congregation can respond without a genuine belief that they have a personal narrative that corresponds with the preacher. Such situations may occur with individuals who vocally affirm the preacher merely because it is what the cultural frame calls for. Think of an individual who is half asleep within a service yet begins to clap and exclaim "Amen!" because they were awakened by excitement. One would be hard-pressed to conclude that such an affirmation of the preacher's exposition is genuinely a testimony. However, they certainly are able to embody and respond prereflectively because they are embedded within a cultural group that evokes a particular cognitive frame. Nevertheless, even this experience involves the autobiographical self. It is because the individual relates to the cultural group of people that they react in such a way as to include themselves within the group to which they identify. Thus, regardless of whether an individual is reacting to the preacher or what they assume the congregation should express in relation to the preacher, both situations are embedded within what may be considered testimony. Either an individual agrees with the

preacher, or they affirm that they are part of the cultural group that agrees with the preacher, regardless of whether the individual even knows what the preacher said.

Drury's attempts to distinguish testimony from various other ecclesial practices are not in complete accord with the position of this thesis. While the practice of formally expressing a personal story is certainly a testimony, testimony is too pervasive and embodied to lend itself to systematic parsing from other ecclesial practices. Testimony is intimately embedded within ecclesial practice. Autobiographical content is continuously integrated within numerous aspects of life on a constant basis. Thus, a systemic parsing of autobiographical content from lived enaction is impossible.

Before continuing to Pentecostal scholarship on testimony, it should be clarified what is meant by *practice* as it relates to the practice of testimony. By "practice", Drury adopts MacIntyre's definition. MacIntyre states that practice is:

> …any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved are systematically extended.[562]

For example, MacIntyre argues that skilfully throwing a football is not a practice, but playing the game of football is, and planting a turnip is not a practice, but farming is.[563] What MacIntyre means by practice is an organized activity that relates to a broader social context. MacIntyre further expounds on the concept of practice by saying that:

> A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice.[564]

[562] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 187.
[563] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 187.
[564] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 190.

By “excellence”, MacIntyre’s point seems to mean something similar to the concept of Idealized Cognitive Models or Fivush’s concept of canonical storied forms. When playing baseball, an individual does not know what a good pitch is without relating to what authorities within the sport have demonstrated is a good pitch. Therefore, if pitching is sought to be performed “better”, it is a “better” that is in relation to its function within the social activity of playing baseball. Thus, a pitcher must accept and follow the authoritative standards determined by the historical development of the sport. Various modes of pitching have developed over time that contribute to the establishment of best practices within the sport.

In light of MacIntyre’s theory of practice, it is important to consider both the communicative act of giving a testimony along with the community’s interaction with the act to give an account of how the Pentecostal movement establishes authority and “standards of excellence” on the delivery and content of an expressed testimony. In other words, how does the Pentecostal movement develop an ideal practice of individual and corporate testimonial expression? To use the analogy above, how does the Pentecostal movement orient the expression of testimonies the same way the authorities in baseball orient a pitcher to pitch better? These questions are given answers in Chapter 7.

6.2.1 Pentecostal Scholarship on Testimony

This section outlines Pentecostal scholarship on the meaning of testimony and how it is expressed. What can be observed is that while notable scholarship has been produced examining formal testimony articulation, the full spectrum of testimony expression is not significantly addressed. As argued above, the concept of testimony and how it is expressed is much more than merely articulation. The Pentecostal scholars in this section mainly refer to articulated testimonies. Consequently, the focus on articulated testimony limits the extent to which this

thesis is able to utilize Pentecostal scholarship within a more enactive approach. While this section is critical in connecting the concept of testimony to the autobiographical concept of narrative identity, further examination of the more embodied forms of testimony expression is explored in the final chapter.

Central to the formal articulation of a testimony is the autobiographical content relaying what is perceived to be God's activity in one's life. As such, memory, reflection and interpretation are inherently involved. [565] Reflection occurs as an individual selects and interprets information to convey to others. [566] Richie highlights this by recognizing that Pentecostals often add a descriptive qualification to this action as a *personal* testimony.[567] They often are doxological expressions of personal history[568] that interpret a moment in the past as evidence of God's activity in the here and now.[569] It has been noted that hearing the testimony of another can be a powerful experience for Pentecostals and can be seen as often surpassing the power of sermons.[570] Thus, Cartledge states, "the kind of rationality employed within Pentecostalism is more likely to be narrative in shape: a story about what happened and its consequences, rather than a set of abstract propositions".[571] That Pentecostal stories are "about what happened" indicates that hermeneutic processes are occurring as memories are examined both (1) in light of an individual's religious assumptions and (2) as a source of "rationality". Jackie David Johns and Cheryl Bridges Johns define this succinctly in stating:

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[565] Jackie David Johns and Cheryl Bridges Johns, "Yielding to the Spirit: A Pentecostal Approach to Group Bible Study" *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 1, no. 1 (1992), 126. DOI: 10.1177/096673699200100108.

[566] Mark Cartledge, *Testimony: Its Important, Place and Potential* (Cambridge: Grove Books, 2002), 7.

[567] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 138.

[568] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 130.

[569] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 138 and 143.

[570] Harvey Cox, *Fire From Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the Twenty-first Century* (Cambridge: De Capo Press, 2001), 199.

[571] Mark Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit: Rescripting Ordinary Pentecostal Theology* (London: Routledge, 2010), 17.

> Testimony also involves reflection and interpretation. Remembering is by its very nature a process of reflection… Testimony is a selective act in which specific event of the past are brought to bear on specific aspects of the present in an effort to give meaning to the present. It thus involves an interpretation of the present through a reinterpretation of the past.[572]

That reflection and interpretation are inherent in testimony means that it is a fundamentally hermeneutical task. As an attended event is reflected upon, certain assumptions are applied, thereby transforming the raw phenomenological experience of an event. Furthermore, since a testimony, or reinterpreted memory, is used to make meaning of the present, it enters into an ecological process of interpretation of the past and application in the present, which then reinforces the testimonial interpretation of the past. Hence, it can be observed that religious hermeneutic shapes autobiographical narrative and, subsequently, narrative identity.

Richie defines testimony as having functional-practical, transformational, and liturgical elements. In its functional-practical use, Pentecostals' use of the word testimony is not primarily concerned with its etymological definition.[573] It has the potential to be used as evidence to support the validity of a religious belief in the individual, community, or in many instances, likely at least implicitly both. They are reminders of God's work and are "an important functional part of retaining a profound spiritual and physical experience".[574] Remembering and sharing with others helps retain a quality of interaction with God.

In addition to Richie's description of its functional and practical uses, the concept of testimony is also used metonymically. It is a figurative word that refers to both the act of sharing a story and having a story, spoken or unspoken. If an individual testifies, that person is communicating regarding something that is already in existence. What exists is their story of

[572] Johns and Johns, "Yielding to the Spirit," 126.
[573] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 133.
[574] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 133.

God's intervention. Therefore, a testimony exists prior to the practice of testifying. Testimony can also refer to a currently developing story of one's life. For Pentecostals, God can be in the process of giving a person a testimony. That is, God is in the process of unfolding an event in an individual's life that will demonstrate His intervention. When the word "testimony" is used in the Pentecostal community, it is critical to be aware of the context that is shaping how the concept is being used metonymically.

Richie uses the work of Cheryl Bridges Johns to highlight the transformational element that occurs in an individual who shares their testimony.[575] Johns states, "Testimony is the means of meshing the realities of life with the ongoing story of the faith community".[576] This corporate liturgy is used within the community as a way of "decoding reality".[577] It is transformational because an individual who testifies is provided with both explicit and implicit feedback from the community. The transformation process occurs as the individual that has testified reflects and analyzes their life for future action, considering the community's reaction to their testimony.[578]

Richie describes the liturgical significance of testimony through the work of Johns and Jerome Boone.[579] Boone argues that the ritual practice of testimony is an important element of Pentecostal worship. Testimony is described as a confession in that an individual offers where they stand in response to an aspect of their life story. This aspect of their life story is offered to a group for shared reflection.[580] This shared reflection is part of what shapes the community's

[575] See Cheryl Bridges Johns, *Pentecostal Formation: A Pedagogy among the Oppressed* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2010), 126-127.

[576] Johns, *Pentecostal Formation*, 126.

[577] Johns, *Pentecostal Formation*, 126.

[578] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 134.

[579] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 134-135.

[580] R. Jerome Boone, "Community and Worship: The Key Components of Pentecostal Christian Formation," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 8 (1996): 140. DOI: 10.1177/096673699600400810.

members as they form the hearer's "virtues, expectancy, attitudes and experiences".[581] Therefore, it is more than simply storytelling. Storytelling within the act of public testimonials has a religious and prescriptive frame embedded within it. The religious frame is that the storytelling within testimony includes an example of God's participation. The prescriptive frame is that the community utilizes the public testimony to reflect upon how God can potentially participate in their own lives, thus creating a prescriptive intersubjective expectation of formation that includes a transformation of the hearer's life including but not limited to virtues, expectancy of God's participation, and faith-filled attitudes towards one's life.

The following section further elucidates the ritual act testimony through two examples of public testimony confession. These examples provide examples of storytelling that are embedded with religious themes and narrative elements that are useful for community reflection and transformation.

6.2.2 Examples of Articulated Testimony

It has been recognized that the practice of testimony was a strong contributor to the influence of the Azusa Street Revival. Pastor William J. Seymour, who became the leader of the Azusa Revival, created a religious climate that encouraged public testimony.[582] In September 1906, Seymour began publishing the periodical called *The Apostolic Faith*. The periodical was created to facilitate communicating the things that were occurring at the Azusa St. revival.[583] Many stories of the spread of the Pentecostal movement were included, as well as testimonies of miracles and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The following is a testimonial from a periodical.

[581] Steven J. Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality: A Passion for the Kingdom* (Clevland: CPT Press, 2010), 80.
[582] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 136.
[583] William J. Seymour, "Good News Spreads," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), September 1906, 2.

It is a letter written to the periodical by Sister John Woodruff entitled, *A Mother's Experience of Pentecost*:

> This my first writing to the dear *Apostolic Faith*. I will say that I am all under the Blood, and I have victory, complete victory. I do praise Him for convicting and converting my soul and sanctifying me wholly and giving me the blessed baptism of the Holy Ghost. I received it when I sought in earnest, over a year ago.
>
> I was fearful that it was hypnotism till I got right hungry for it; and I just went to the seeker's board and knelt there. I had with me my two month's old baby, and four older ones. They were sleepy, so I just got the baby down on the bench asleep, and asked God to take care of the children, and He did. My husband had been away from home at work, but I had been praying for God to give him work here at home in Whittier. So he was there when I got my baptism. But I did not know he was in the room. I believe God sent him right back to the meeting where I was seeking.
>
> I just said to Jesus, "Here I am before You." It seemed I could almost see myself lying on the altar. I said, "Lord, have your way; I don't want to be deceived about this matter. Lord, Just keep back the powers of darkness and have your way with me, and quicken the baptism, for you know my chance of coming to the altar. I don't know that I will ever get another chance—all those children and no help with them—so do the work right now." And I did believe. Praise His holy name! He wonderfully came to my rescue right then, and I spake in three different languages, and still do, O praise His holy name![584]

Sister John Woodruff begins her testimony by stating, "I am all under the Blood". This statement may cause confusion to an individual who has not been exposed to such religious expressions. At first sight, religious talk of "the blood" may indicate a morbid mystical invocation that rivals mythic occult practices. However, talk of "the blood" in Pentecostal expression is not a celebration of death. Rather, it is a recognition of the liberating power of God made possible by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross. When used in petitionary prayer, it refers to a desire to see God intervene in a situation. Sister John Woodruff's statement, however, likely indicates that the experience she is about to relay in the article is understood as something made possible to her by *the blood* of Jesus. Such expressions are not original to Pentecostalism. They were likely the product of the various denominations that many converts were a part of before joining the Pentecostal movement.[585]

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[584] Sister John Woodruff, "A Mother's Experience of Pentecost," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), May 1908, 3.

[585] Keith Warrington, *Pentecostal Theology: A Theology of Encounter* (London: T&T Clark, 2008), 2-4.

The concept of *the blood* is used as a metonym for all the ways God can intervene in the course of human life. This is reflected in the common theology expressed in testimonials and hymnals that have passed into Pentecostal practice. That Sister John Woodruff is *under* the blood includes a CONTAINER image schema where the blood is a physical boundary that one can enter or come under. As stated before, the image schema of a CONTAINER provides an influential preconceptual structure that informs many metaphorical statements. Hence, *the blood* follows what conceptual metaphor theorist Zoltan Kövecses would deem to be a STATES ARE CONTAINERS primary metaphor.[586] Since THE BLOOD IS A CONTAINER, everything that is meant by the blood can be conceptually understood as a border that supplies a barrier between that which is inside from that which is out. Thus, one can "cover" a situation, thing, or person in the blood. Of course, the analysis provided here is not an exhaustive explanation of all the various ways the concept of *the blood* can be used. It does, however, provide further clarity on what Sister John Woodruff likely meant by being *under the blood*.

What is indispensably important to Sister John Woodruff's statement for the purposes of this thesis is the hermeneutic shift in her perspective on her life. Namely, because she was *under the blood*, she also has "victory, complete victory". Her statements provide insight into how she views the testimony she is about to tell. In other words, her subsequent testimony is a narrative that entails a story about victory. Her victory is correlated to the "convicting and converting" of her soul, which includes the experience of baptism in the Spirit and her speaking in "three different languages". This story of victory is a story where her circumstances that limited and inhibited her opportunity to seek the baptism of the Spirit were overcome. Thus, the circumstance is not seen as a story of powerlessness. Rather, her circumstance is interpreted as a

[586] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory*, 9-15.

story of the capability that *the blood* or the grace of God has to overpower life's undesirable conditions. Sister John Woodruff concludes that she is *under the blood* and has *the victory* because the attended event of receiving the baptism of the Spirit is a demonstration of victory enabled by the blood. She acknowledges that she still speaks in other tongues, which can signify as present and continual evidence that she has the victory.

The periodical, *The Apostolic Faith*, supplies many examples of the ways that early Pentecostals used the concept of testimony to communicate autobiographical narratives. Many of the early Pentecostal testimonies of the Azusa revival continued even decades after the revival had ceased at Azusa Street.[587] Other early Pentecostal newspapers and magazines demonstrate the same.[588] However, while examining testimonies within these periodicals is useful, it is missing a crucial component important to autobiographical development. What cannot be seen is the embodied ways in which the community received the stories articulated within Pentecostal periodicals. To examine such a thing, one would have to have had insight into the individual reading these stories with their morning coffee or in the presence of others. The embodied reception and reaction to these stories are just as crucial as the story itself to the construction of narrative identity.

The concept of testimony as an autobiographical narrative expression is a practice that is also performed in the present. An example can be seen in Mark Cartledge's study on the effect

[587] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 136.

[588] Some examples of early Pentecostal publications include: *The Bridal Call Four Square* (Los Angeles, CA); *The Bridal Call Crusader* (Los Angeles, CA); *The Church of God Evangel* (Cleveland, TN); *The Christian Evangel* (Plainfield, IN), also known as *The Pentecostal Evangel* (Springfield, MO); and *The Pentecostal Holiness Advocate* (Falcon, NC); for digital access to these publications and more, see: Consortium of Pentecostal Archives, The General Council of the Assemblies of God, accessed August 1, 2021, www.pentecostalarchives.org. I am grateful to the digital archives in the Consortium of Pentecostal Archives for providing invaluable access to digital repositories of many early Pentecostal material including newspapers, magazines, church manuals, and meeting minutes.

that ordinary communal Pentecostal discourse has on Pentecostal identity. Cartledge provides a valuable look into how testimony is integrated into the ordinary discourse of Pentecostals. In the book, *Testimony in the Spirit*, Cartledge records and reflects upon what he refers to as the "ordinary theology" of Pentecostals to gain insight into Pentecostal identity.[589] By ordinary theology, Cartledge refers to Jeff Astley's use of the term to describe the theology or theologizing of the "ordinary" Christian theology of individuals with limited to no scholarly, academic or systematic theological education.[590] Cartledge's work holds significance for this thesis because he describes the kind of theologizing present within the ordinary Pentecostal community. The following is an excerpt from the testimony contribution of Beverley in a group setting organized by Cartledge[591]:

> Well, some years ago I was diagnosed with the very early stages of cancer and, to make this short, we went to [the] Minehead conference and there was an altar appeal and I went forward but it wasn't full healing as such. It was a different altar appeal for service, but I went forward and there were many pastors praying over a huge number of people. And my husband and I, we got prayed for and then this pastor walked away but he came back; and he prayed over me again. Now because there was such a noise around, I couldn't hear a single word of what he prayed. And then we went home and I'd had two tests about cancer and they said you're going to go for a third one and then if this proves positive I've got to go in for the operation. Anyway I phone up the doctors and my husband was standing at the side of me and he was praying over me and they said Mrs. Jones we've wonderful news for you. You're clear, it's all gone ['Praise God', affirmation by the group]. And they sent me the documentation and I've still got that documentation to state that I am clear… That's two years ago and nothing's ever come back.[592]

The testimony above follows the story of Beverley's cancer diagnosis. In her brief account, she indicates that this story of healing "wasn't *full healing* as such".[593] That she expresses that it was not *full healing* likely indicates the notion that healing should ideally include an instant result where the illness is removed from an individual. Her story, however, implies that she understands her healing to have happened over time and without an awareness of

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[589] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 10.

[590] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 15-16. See: Jeff Astley, *Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 56.

[591] The name Beverley is a pseudonym assigned by Cartledge for the sake of anonymity for the study.

[592] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 106.

[593] Emphasis mine.

the exact moment when the cancer was removed. Thus, she states that when she had gone home, by the time her doctor had administered the third test, the doctor stated she was clear of cancer and did not require medical intervention. Beverley understands the healing as being the result of prayer that occurred in a church conference while at the altar. The altar for Pentecostals is a significant space. It holds metaphorical value as a place of encounter with God. As such, it is a place where one can participate in a relationship with God and experience transformation.[594]

Beverley and her husband's participation in prayer at the altar is understood as the moment when God could have intervened and begun enacting the miracle. As Beverley culminates her story, she relays the doctor's statement, "Mrs. Jones we've wonderful news for you. You're clear, it's all gone". As a result of this climactic statement, those present reacted in affirmation of their belief that God had intervened by vocalizing praise to God. While Cartledge does not indicate the extent of this spontaneous group action, it can be surmised that their externalized expression communally reinforced Beverley's perspective of the event. There is evidence here of multimodal alignment, as those attending this testimonial session were not only hearing but also reacting bodily to the expression that the cancer was gone. Consequently, according to Bietti's work, it is likely that Beverley's recall of the event was likely reinforced in a particular way. Drury describes the dynamic of the community helping to maintain identity in the practice of testimony in two ways. First, the community can help affirm and reinforce what has been testified. Second, testimonies of others can help strengthen an individual's faith as the testimonies become analogous demonstrations of God's intervention.[595] Amanda Drury states, "My community helps train my eyes to see where God is at work in my life. My community

[594] Wolfgang Vondey, "Pentecostal Sacramentality and the Theology of the Altar," in *Scripting Pentecost: A Study of Pentecostals, Worship and Liturgy*, eds. by Mark J. Cartledge, and A.J. Swoboda (London: Routledge 2017), 98.

[595] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 75.

helps supply my mouth with language to narrate these experiences… One person might be speaking, but the community as a whole receives and participates in this testimony".[596] An interpretive interaction occurs between the community and the individual that influences a person's understanding and consequently articulation of an event. This dynamic is a kind of "articulacy loop" that can be seen in the following diagram[597]:




Figure 3. Revised Articulacy Loop.

In Drury's articulacy loop, an individual has an experience of some kind that is interpreted to be evidence of God's participation. The individual subsequently communicates the testimony, which is an articulation of the experience. Next, the community provides feedback to each other and the individual giving the testimony. It is important to note that the diagram I have provided diverts from Drury's diagram in that she labels the third section as "affirming feedback" and not "community feedback". The reason for the diversion is that Drury makes it clear in her work that the community can provide both affirming and critical feedback of an

[596] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 67.
[597] Adapted from Drury's articulacy loop in Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 76.

individual's testimony. Critical response to testimony can occur if the community either questions the veracity of the testimony or questions whether the testimony lines up with the community's understanding of God.[598]

Another important detail about Drury's articulacy loop is that it does not require entrance by way of an event. It may just as easily begin with a group affirming an aspect of an individual's life that an individual does not initially consider to be a demonstration of God's participation in their lives. This alternative entrance into the articulacy loop can occur in moments when an individual believes that an aspect of their life-story demonstrates evidence that God is *not* involved. Nevertheless, the community affirms that God is working, though it may be difficult to perceive it. In any scenario, the articulacy loop of communal testimony is clearly a hermeneutic exercise. A testimony that has been communicated is an articulated narrative of an event as an individual perceives it. The perception is affected by the community's interaction with the testimony. Consequently, the individual's perception of the event can be changed. The articulacy loop is not a linear model. It does not happen sequentially. It occurs dynamically, ecologically, and enactively. Lastly, the community's interaction with testimony transmission does not require formal propositional communication. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, call-and-response can be an integral part of a church service. Call-and-response behaviour can include both verbal and non-verbal forms. Consequently, this thesis takes Drury's articulacy loop as including both verbal and non-verbal community feedback.

In Beverley's case, the group expressed praise to God in response to Beverley's testimony. This indicates the shared hermeneutic that God had intervened. The cancer was gone. Whether this occurred in an immediate moment or not was of little concern. The removal of the

[598] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 78-79.

cancer was understood as a product of God's intervention and thus constituted a miracle. Beverley's understanding was reinforced by the community's expression of spontaneous communal praise to God. The affirming feedback from the community can now potentially reinforce Beverley's faith to believe that this was an authentic demonstration of God's participation. The affirming feedback is an excellent example of the kind of embodied group agency that helps form an individual's perspective on their personal story. Finally, Beverley expresses, "And they sent me the documentation and I've still got that documentation to state that I am clear… That's two years ago and nothing's ever come back." This statement seems to indicate that the documentation serves as a tangible reminder that her story is one of God's participation in her healing.

The analysis provided above is helpful for this study because it demonstrates authentic instances that faith can influence autobiographical narratives. The story presented by Beverley shows that Beverley understands this moment in her past as demonstrating evidence of God's involvement in her life. It is spontaneously reinforced in a communal setting. Importantly, a testimony functions as more than just a retelling of a story. It functions as "an act of interpersonal engagement" that is shared amongst the community for "shared critical reflection" as the group seeks to address tensions in life that are analogically in common with the one testifying. [599] According to Mark Cartledge, testimony is a "means of social knowledge construction" that incorporates cognitive domains such as perception, memory, consciousness and reason.[600] Stephen Parker describes the narrative structure of Pentecostal's autobiographical reflection as a "deep metaphor" that plays a role in shaping Pentecostal experience. Testimonies

[599] Johns and Johns, "Yielding to the Spirit", 126.

[600] Mark Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit: Rescripting Ordinary Pentecostal Theology* (London: Routledge, 2010), 17.

help “interpret for others and often for the one testifying what a proper Pentecostal life looks like” and help fortify the “shared story” of the community. Consequently, communities construct a shared narrative identity.[601] In constructing a “shared story”, Pentecostals develop what Gallagher describes as a *we-narrative*. We-narrative within the Pentecostal community is explored more explicitly in Chapter 7 of this thesis, where articulated testimony is analyzed in conjunction with the discursive dynamics of a Pentecostal service. Before examining Pentecostal communal narrative identity, however, it is essential to a comprehensive understanding of testimony to identify characteristics in Pentecostal narrative that are uniform while also considering characteristics that are unique. The purpose of the following section is threefold: 1) to identify some exemplary ways that local communities uniquely assimilate Pentecostal narratives, 2) to identify the kind of similarities that are developed despite cultural uniqueness, and 3) to demonstrate how cognitive linguistics can help elucidate the kinds of Pentecostal narratives that establish intergenerational and intercultural Pentecostal identity.

6.3 Pentecostal Uniqueness and Homogeneity

The purpose of this section is to support the ways that the conclusion of this thesis can broadly apply to the Pentecostal movement despite the multicultural contexts in which Pentecostalism has been received. For clarification, this section is not attempting to argue that all cultures are the same. However, its theoretical foundation provides evidence of similarities between how various people and cultures think. That means there is evidence that intersubjective discursive dynamics are embedded within the Pentecostal community, producing a level of categorical homogeneity in narrative identity. This homogeneity is important for the study of Pentecostalism because it is a global, multiethnic and multicultural movement. This thesis

[601] Parker, “Tradition-Based Integration,” 311.

provides a way to examine the similarities between people groups commonly associated with Pentecostalism without a claim to any form of universal meaning or identity.

Dale Coulter contends that testimony within the Pentecostal community emerged from an amalgamation between (1) the historical narrative of restoration, (2) the return of the apostolic faith, and (3) the identity of local communities.[602] Thus, an ecological process includes not just the individual's interpretation of their past but also the community in which that individual is embedded. The result is Pentecostal communities demonstrating unique and similar identity and liturgical practices. For example, Daniel Ramirez demonstrates how Pentecostalism spread throughout various Latin American communities, giving rise to culturally unique religious expression united by the Pentecostal message and narrative.[603] Some Spanish-speaking Pentecostal communities in the United States had even incorporated some African American call-and-response liturgical forms and ecclesiology.[604] Call-and-response in communal liturgical and ecclesial settings has become a hallmark of Spanish-speaking communities in the United States. It has also been observed in global contexts. An example is a prototypical call-and-response within ecclesial settings where an individual may call out publicly, "¿*Quien vive*?" (who lives?) with a subsequent group ecstatic response, "¡*Cristo*!" (Christ).[605] These call-and-response practices are not inherently biblical. However, their incorporation into various cultural

[602] Dale M. Coulter, "On Tradition, Local Traditions, and Discernment," *Pneuma* 36 (2014), 3. DOI: 10.1163/15700747-03601006.

[603] Daniel Ramirez, "Pentecostalism in Latin America," in *The Cambridge Companion to Pentecostalism*, eds. Cecil M. Robeck Jr. and Amos Yong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 112-131; see also Daniel Ramirez, *Migrating Faith: Pentecostalism in the United States and Mexico in the Twentieth Century* (Chapal Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015).

[604] Daniel Ramirez, "Alabaré a mi Señor: Hymnody as Ideology in Latino Pentecostal Protestantism," in *Singing the Lord's Song in a Strange Land: Hymnody in the History of North American Protestantism*, eds. Edith L. Blumhofer and Mark A. Noll (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2004), 201.

[605] Greg Burch has observed a unique version of this particular call and response in Venezuela as "¿*Quien vive*?", with a communal response, "¡*Cristo, a su gloria!*". See: Greg W. Burch, "Bi-modal Rhythms of Celebration in Venezuela," in *Scripting Pentecost: A Study of Pentecostals: A Study of Pentecostals, Worship and Liturgy*, eds. Mark J. Cartledge and A.J. Swobody (London: Routledge, 2017), 186.

contexts shows how practices can be passed from one group to another as a result of the we-narratives supporting Pentecostal experience.

A notable domain where both uniqueness and homogeneity of Pentecostal identity can be observed is musical expression.[606] In the case of the hymn, *Aleluya al Señor* (Hallelujah to the Lord) represents the emergence of original Spanish-language songwriting separate from translated traditional Protestant hymns.[607] In observing some of the verses and chorus of the song, uniqueness and homogeneity come to light:

Song: Aleluya al Señor

Verse 1
En esta vida esperamos la victoria
La que el Señor él mismo nos dará
Despues iremos a estar con él en gloria
Donde se goza de plena libertad

Chorus
¡Aleluya, aleluya, aleluya!
¡Aleluya, aleluya al Señor!
¡Aleluya, aleluya, aleluya!
El nos libra del tentador.

Verse 2
Muchas moradas Jesús ha prometido
De las que dijo nos iba a preparar
Dejando éstas por siempre en el olvido
Jamás de ellas nos vamos a acordar

Verse 3
Mil años dice, la paz será abundante,
Al que ha tenido gratuita salvación;
Su canto siempre dirá que fue triunfante,
Que fue librado de eterna perdición.

Verse 4
Vestido blanco, también corona y Palma,
Uno por uno al fin recibirá;
La vida eterna que Dios al alma da,
Esta promesa nunca faltará.

Translation:

Verse 1
In this life we await the victory

[606] Burch, "Bi-modal Rhythms," 189-192.
[607] Ramirez, *Migrating Faith*, 1.

Which the Lord himself will give to us
After we will go to be with him in glory
Where one enjoys of full liberty

Chorus
Hallelujah, Hallelujah, Hallelujah!
Hallelujah, Hallelujah to the Lord
Hallelujah, Hallelujah, Hallelujah!
He frees us from the tempter

Verse 2
Many dwellings Jesus has promised
Of which he said he would prepare for us
Leaving these forever in the forgetting
Never of them we will remember[608]

Verse 3
A thousand years says-He (God), the peace will be abundant,
To the one who has free (free-of-charge) salvation
That one's song forever will say they were triumphant
That they were freed from eternal perdition

Verse 4
White garments, also a crown and palms,
One by one in the end will be received,
The eternal life that God gives to the soul,
This promise will never fail

The hymn, *Aleluya al Señor*, was written by Marcial de la Cruz. The hymn can be found in the hymnal *Himnos de Consolacion*, which translated means *Hymns of Comfort*. The concept of *consolacion*, or "comfort" is not necessarily attempting to recall the sense of being made comfortable. Rather, it seems to be in reference to John 14:16 and 14:24, which describe the Holy Spirit as the *consolador* or "the comforter" in the King James Version of the Holy Bible. In short, the hymnal represented songs through which the Holy Spirit would demonstrate the kind of *consolacion*, comfort, or help that Jesus referred to in the book of John. The hymnal was composed in the mid-1930s by a notable Mexican Pentecostal revivalist, Antonio Castañeda Nava. According to Ramirez, the hymnal was Protestantism's first original

[608] Original translation with special reference to Ramirez's translation in: Ramirez, *Migrating Faith*, 1.

Spanish-language hymnal.[609] According to Nava, de la Cruz composed hymns that were concerned with alignment to Scripture. A documentary produced by the Pentecostal denomination to which de la Cruz was a member, it was his final hymn written on his deathbed.[610] The hymnal was the product of what Ramirez describes as an "explosion in musical and cultural production" within the apostolic movement.[611] The hymnal was part of a burgeoning musical culture within the apostolic movement. However, the musical culture by nature had an oral transmission characteristic as the hymn was not published to include guiding musical score sheets. The hymnal reinforced a collective musical culture that was supported by the need for involved embodied practice for successful oral transmission of melodies.[612]

Aleluya al Señor demonstrates both unique cultural expression and biblical narratives central to the Pentecostal movement. The analysis provided here is only lyrical. Its broader influence on the Pentecostal community can only be more fully understood if considered in conjunction with its actual practice. Though lyrical analysis is provided in this section, analysis of the performance of this hymn in an actual liturgical setting is provided in the next chapter.

Lyrically, *Aleluya al Señor* bears a theme of present sanctification along with even stronger eschatological themes of a future in heaven. It describes a victory that is expected going to be provided by God. In the chorus, it signifies that this includes freedom from being overcome by the tempter, presumably Satan. Verse two details life in heaven that will provide relief from the remembrance of a past life. The phrase "*Donde se goza de plena libertad*" is a statement with

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[609] Daniel Ramirez, "Antonio Castañeda Nava: Charisma, Culture, and *Caudillismo*," in *Portraits of a Generation: Early Pentecostal Leaders*, eds. James R. Goff and Grant Wacker (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002), 292.

[610] Jack Genero, director, *Nuestro Canto... Our Song: Apostolic History and Music from 1906 to Today* (Apostolic Assembly of the Faith in Christ Jesus, 1995): approx. min. 1:30-3:19. DVD.

[611] Ramirez, "Antonio Castañeda Nava,"303.

[612] Lloyd Daniel Barba, *Sowing the Sacred: Mexican Pentecostal Farmworkers in California* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 208-209.

meaning that goes beyond what can be conveyed in a word-for-word translation. A dynamic translation of the statement would be, "wherein, that place, joy is experienced as a result of a great fullness of liberty". The word *plena* indicates a sense of abundant fulness that is not typically conveyed by simply saying "full". Likewise, in verse two, the dwelling that Jesus has prepared is compared to the dwelling that one can experience while in this life. The expression, "*Dejando éstas por siempre en el olvido*," can be translated as "leaving these (i.e., dwellings) in oblivion". The concept of leaving the physical dwelling places in *el olvido* includes the STATE IS A PLACE conceptual metaphor. Therefore, *el olvido,* indicates a sense of place and location where forgotten things are. It is built on the conceptual metaphor examined earlier of LIFE IS A JOURNEY.

Conceptual Metaphor: CHRISTIAN LIFE IS A JOURNEY

Source Domain: JOURNEY		*Target Domain: CHRISTIAN LIFE*
Travellers	→	The believer and God
Vehicle	→	The believer's faith and victory
Journey: looking back	→	"el olvido" place-of-forgotten-things/oblivion
Journey: looking forward	→	victory that the Lord will give
Obstacles and road conditions	→	challenges to faith/the tempter
Destination	→	God in glory/promised dwelling place
Route choices	→	victory/being freed from the tempter

The hymn implies that as one journeys forward into the eschatological fulfilment of migrating to the land Christ has prepared, past events are left behind. Accordingly, then, *el olvido,* is used as a metonym for a location where things of the past are laid down and forgotten. In short, *el olvido* is the place-of-forgotten-things. That the past is in *el olvido* does not indicate a sense of denial that certain events occurred in life. It indicates that the past has come to a resolution despite its often painful circumstances. As such, the second verse is a declaration of overcoming or victory rather than a conscious attempt at mnemonic suppression.

In further analysis of the eschatological themes, this hymn expresses hope for a time and place where believers will experience *plena Libertad,* or abundant liberty that stands in contrast with the struggles of their past mortal lives. In verse two, the hymn says, "*Muchas moradas Jesús ha prometido, de las que dijo nos iba a preparar*", which translated means, "Many dwellings Jesus has promised, of which he said he would prepare for us". This hymnal verse is based on John 14:1-4:

> Let not your hearts be troubled. Believe in God; believe also in me. In my Father's house are many rooms. If it were not so, would I have told you that I go to prepare a place for you? And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to myself, that where I am you may be also. And you know the way to where I am going.

While the English Standard Version states that "In my Father's house are many rooms", the Spanish language version of the Holy Bible that this hymn seems to be based on is the Reina-Valera 1960 version. This version of the Bible states that the place that Jesus is going to prepare is not only rooms but dwelling places, relating directly to a living space and home. The heavenly *moradas* (dwelling places) that Jesus will prepare stand in contrast to the earthly dwelling places left behind in *el olvido,* which is the place-of-forgotten-things. The hymn doubles down on the place of *el olvido* by repeating, "*Jamás de ellas nos vamos a acordar*", which translates to "Never of them, we will remember". While "never" seems to be the most appropriate word in English, the word jamás is a way of saying "never" in Spanish with a stronger connotation. The word *jamás,* would perhaps be better expressed as never-ever rather than simply never. Therefore, earthly dwelling places implicitly stand inferior to the dwelling places that are prepared for believers in heaven. Subsequently, the chorus is sung in celebration of the promise that is to come by extolling "¡*Aleluya, aleluya, aleluya*!".

Within the joint intention practised in group worship, the music and lyrics of this song can potentially serve as a hermeneutical transformative experience of a past memory. Thus, the

group experience of worship can enter into an articulacy loop, as presented by Drury. As each individual sings the song, the song itself can become an autobiographical account expressed to the group and affirmed by each other as the group ecologically and dynamically interacts with one another. This communal intersubjective discursive practice is an element of the kind of coupling Gallagher describes. It includes primary intersubjectivity through group singing and lyrical recitation. It provides secondary intersubjectivity through the group's shared agency of following the style of performance and rhythm of the song that is typically led by an individual in front of the congregation. Group agency occurs as all individuals contemplate the meaning of the lyrics for their personal lives. The memories of the group can be moulded and shaped as a consequence of the we-narratives provided in the song. Thus, memories of negative past experiences can be hermeneutically contextualized as experiences that will be left "*en el olvido*". Additionally, one can have hope that future negative experiences will also be left "*en el olvido*".

The hymn, *Aleluya al Señor,* demonstrates a unique cultural appropriation of the biblical narratives that unite the Pentecostal movement. It is a characteristic observed in other Spanish-speaking communities as well. For example, Néstor Medina observes of Latina/o Canadian Pentecostals that the community recognize their story within the Bible story.[613] Consequently, they interpret biblical stories in terms of their own. Medina states, "they know they are not living in biblical times. But by way of analogy, reading the narrative and identifying with the Bible characters helps them identify and give significance to their own faith journey of migration, marginalization, and discrimination".[614] Thus, Coulter concludes that it is a narrative theological

[613] Néstor Medina, "Orality and Context in a Hermeneutical Key: Toward a Latina/o-Canadian Pentecostal Life-Narrative Hermeneutics," *PentecoStudies* 14, no. 1 (2015): 100-104, DOI: 10.1558/ptcs.v14i1.97.

[614] Medina, "Orality and Context in a Hermeneutical Key," 103-104.

construal of biblical accounts that have provided a coherent basis for forming Pentecostal identity despite the diversity of local communities.[615]

The theological narratives described here are narratives that, when stitched together, supply what Archer describes as a "grand story" or "general foundational narrative".[616] The grand narratives that help define Pentecostal identity are important because they permeate the religious practice of giving a testimony and having a testimony. That testimony is grounded in biblical narrative has a purpose beyond merely relating to ancient biblical stories. It is a "place" where current Pentecostals can relate to communities of faith that have done the same, thus creating a sense of community even with generations that have passed.[617] Accordingly, Grace Milton states that "each personal testimony serves as a building block continuing the biblical salvation story by filling in 'the gaps' between the history of the Epistles and the fulfilment of the events indicated in Revelation".[618] In other words, testimonies are seen as an intergenerational narrative bridge between the time of the Apostles and eschatological fulfilment.

That these theological narratives are expressed in the form of songs is significant to the development of narrative identity as well. Songs within religious contexts are often narrative in nature. Consequently, when sung communally, songs can serve as a vehicle for narratives that the group agrees appropriately represent them. Thus, Andy Lord concludes that sung worship is essentially theological and a place where Pentecostals "become aware of the close relationship they have with God" and that "sung worship draws into conversation practice and theology

[615] Coulter, "On Tradition," 3.
[616] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 42.
[617] Ellington, "Scripture," 71.
[618] Grace Milton, "Salvation: Participating in the Story Where Earth and Heaven Meet," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology* (London: Routledge, 2020), 231.

around the central reality of Jesus witnessed to in the Bible and lived out in the church".[619] For example, Ramirez states that some early Pentecostals composed songs for ritual occasions, including childbirth and child dedication, water and Spirit baptisms, ministerial initiations, marriages, and practically for every ritual occasion that potentially could be used to reflect on God and experience God relationally.[620] The song within a Pentecostal service is often a place of discourse, where congregants verbalize and show expressions of agreement with the song's content as it is sung together. Thus, in Latin American Pentecostal services, congregants are encouraged to express themselves as it creates personal confirmation of their beliefs represented in the song.[621] What can be observed here is that the concept of testifying is not relegated to formal public narrative expression. Testifying is integrated conceptually within the multiple aspects of a church service. This point is further examined in Chapter 7. It offers a study on the discursive dynamics of a Pentecostal service, with the aid of Bietti's theoretical foundation on conversational dynamics, to show how narrative identity is reinforced in a church setting.

The following section further analyzes these Pentecostal grand narratives. Identifying grand Pentecostal narratives is essential to the analysis provided later on, how they relate to Fivush's ecological model of family narratives and how these Pentecostal narratives construct communal narrative identity.

6.4 Grand Narratives: Narratives that Characterize Pentecostal Narrative Identity

It has been recognized that one of the most important aspects of the analysis of memory is the cultural and social context in which remembering is performed. Though there are many different approaches to analyzing society and culture in the social sciences, what is agreed upon

[619] Andy Lord, "A Theology of Sung Worship," in *Scripting Pentecost: A Study of Pentecostals, Worship and Liturgy*, eds. Mark J. Cartledge and A.J. Swoboda (London: Routledge, 2017), 92.

[620] Ramirez, "Alabaré a mi Señor," 206.

[621] Burch, "Bi-modal Rhythms of Celebration in Venezuela," 189.

is that remembering occurs in specific contexts that have a significant influence on how the past is recalled. MacIntyre states, "For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity… The possession of an historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide".[622] The individual and the social contexts in which an individual is embedded are foundational to constructing the narrative self. For this reason, a study of human cognitive activity benefits from a study of an individual's social context. Regarding this, Lucas Bietti, Charles Stone, and William Hirst express that:

> Moreover, if human cognitive activity is the result of contextualized interactions with culturally and historically organized material and social environments, then an explicit description of these contexts is essential toward understanding when and how individuals and groups remember the past at any particular moment.[623]

Bietti, Stone, and Hirst's statement indicates that to understand how individuals and groups remember the past, it is essential to investigate the contexts of the group's cognitive activity, which are shaped by their interactions with culturally and historically organized material and social environments. As I have argued above, the concept of testimony can be thought of as a human cognitive activity. This thesis has narrowed the study of cognitive activity of testimony to its cultural and historical use within the Pentecostal movement. What Bietti, Stone, and Hirst's statement means for this thesis is that if testimony includes a kind of remembering in the Pentecostal movement, and if one is to understand the notion of testimony fully, then the cultural contexts that characterize the Pentecostal movement should be analyzed. Hence, this section analyses some of the grand narratives that serve as a foundation for Pentecostal narrative identity.

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[622] MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 221.

[623] Lucas M. Bietti, Charles B. Stone, and William Hirst, "Contextualizing Human Memory," *Memory Studies* vol. 7, 3 (2014), 267. DOI: 10.1177/1750698014530617.

The format of this section follows an examination of narratives that inform Pentecostals' understanding of the past, present, and future. This section first examines the notion of Apostolic continuity in reference to the past. Apostolic continuity is vital to Pentecostal narrative identity because Pentecostals see themselves historically connected to the New Testament church. Archer states that Pentecostals, like other restorationist narrative movements, "desire to be both an authentic continuation New Testament Christianity and be a faithful representation of New Testament Christianity in the present societies in which they exist".[624] Thus, the "Pentecostal community's identity" is influenced by the biblical narrative in the book of Acts and the Gospels.[625] Second, this section will establish some tenets of the Pentecostal perspective on the future through the notion of *apocalyptic imagination*. An apocalyptic imagination is important to Pentecostal narrative identity because it informs the Pentecostals' assumptions on how the future will unfold and why the future is unfolding the way it is. Pentecostals' eschatological view of the future situates their projected futures within a teleological frame such that events in the present are given a particular meaning.

The present will take the majority of space in this section as it is the present that ties together Pentecostals' sense of past and future. The examination below includes some broad cosmological perspectives and, second, perspectives on Pentecostals' understanding of encounter with God. The cosmological considerations analyse what Pentecostal scholars describe as the already-not-yet dynamic of the kingdom of God. The notion of encounter is analyzed through the metaphor of the altar utilized by Wolfgang Vondey. Both encounter and kingdom are significant to Pentecostal identity because Pentecostals present experiential participation in encounter and

[624] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 133.
[625] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 134.

kingdom to provide a rationale for situating themselves as part of the continuation of the Apostolic church.

While the narrative elements presented are far from an exhaustive list, they are prototypical narratives that inform the practice of testimony. This dynamic is elucidated in Vondey's point on the meaning of Pentecost:

> Pentecostals in their present experience of Pentecost relate also to the biblical Pentecost and to the coming Pentecost of God's kingdom. Yet, this present 'lived' time is in an important sense neither the 'higher' time of the divine or the 'lower' time of the world; Pentecost is a time 'between': God's eternity is brought low, so to speak, into the world and into the secular, while ordinary time is lifted toward the eternal kingdom… At Pentecost, the times of promise and fulfillment overlap in the present realization of God's activity in the world. Pentecostal experiences, as much as they are religious markers of a liturgical time that belongs to the church, are the playful, irrational, unexpected, and foolish markers of the kingdom of God breaking into the secular.[626]

For Pentecostals, the present experience links them both to the past and the future. The original Pentecost in Acts was a fulfilment of God's promise. The Apostle Peter correlated the receiving of the Holy Spirit in the book of Acts with the promise of the outpouring of the Holy Spirit upon flesh, relayed in Joel 2:28, "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh". Peter declared, "But this is what was uttered through the prophet Joel".[627] However, according to Vondey, this dynamic is more than simply a narrative connection with the past or religious markers of a particular liturgical practice. Pentecostals believe they are connected to God's eternity. The eternal kingdom of God is brought into the time and space of the secular world. Thus, the Pentecostal experience is invested with deep transcendent meaning as they meet with the divine. According to Vondey, Pentecostal experiences are "playful" markers. They are deeply imaginative and creative spaces where a Pentecostals understanding of a biblical past and a prophetic future merge with the present. This merging is made possible by

[626] Wolfgang Vondey, "Religion at Play: Pentecostalism and the Transformation of a Secular Age," *Pneuma* 40 (2018), 26, DOI: 10.1163/15700747-04001033.

[627] Acts 2:16.

God's activity in the world. Thus, Pentecostal narrative identity cannot be appropriately understood without considering the dynamic narrative interaction between how the present is situated in biblical heritage and the eschatological unfolding of an apocalyptic end and rebirth of creation.

Likewise, Vondey and Chris Green have observed that Pentecostals practice a kind of *this is that* hermeneutic.[628] As such, "this is that" has become a kind of "rallying cry" as Pentecostals have sought to identify their experiences with the narrative in the book of Acts.[629] Naturally, *this is that* has transitioned into a conceptual metaphor used as a hermeneutical paradigm to view the present working of the Spirit.

Conceptual Metaphor: *This is That*

Source Domain: *This*	Target Domain: *That*
This (The Pentecostal experience in Acts)	→ Prophecy in Joel
This (Present spiritual event with God	→ An encounter analogous to biblical Pentecostal narrative

The narrative within Acts 2 describes the moment when the disciples received the promise of the outpouring of the Spirit. In reaction to the unorthodox behaviour demonstrated, observers supposed that the disciples must have been drunk. Peter subsequently responds by saying that they are not drunk as they supposed, but rather, it was the fulfilment of biblical prophecy. According to Vondey and Green, Peter's "this is that" statement should be understood in terms of Jesus' hermeneutic when describing the bread at the Last Supper in saying that "This is my body" (Mark 14:22). Jesus' declaration that the bread was his body was an invitation to

[628] Wolfgang Vondey and Chris W. Green, "Between This and That: Reality and Sacramentality in the Pentecostal Worldview," in *Pentecostal Ecclesiology: A Reader*, ed. Chris W. Green (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 211-232.

[629] Andrew Davies, "What Does it Mean to Read the Bible as a Pentecostal?" in *Pentecostal Hermeneutics: A Reader*, ed. Lee Roy Martin (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 250.

view that the bread had much more meaning than what is physically observable.[630] Similarly, when Peter declared "this is that" on the day of Pentecost, it was in juxtaposition to the conjecture of those observing that the disciples of Christ might be drunk. Peter responded with a rejection of their proposition. The tension between "this is that" (i.e., prophetic fulfilment) and "this is *not* that" (i.e., drunkenness) is an invitation by Peter similar to that of Jesus. One should see the outpowering of the Spirit on Pentecost as having more meaning than what can be immediately observed.[631] Smith has argued that it is the this-is-that dynamic that opens Pentecostal spirituality to spontaneity. Pentecostal worship makes room for the unexpected because the story of Pentecost occurred in unexpected ways. Regarding the story of Pentecost in Acts, Smith states:

> We need to appreciate the context here: the disciples have gathered in Jerusalem to await the promised Holy Spirit, as the Lord commanded (Acts 1:8). Ten days later, on the Sabbath, everyone is together and 'suddenly' very strange things begin happening: a loud noise like wind and a startling phenomenon that looks like fire.[632]

The disciples have gathered in Jerusalem to await the Holy Spirit. They are all together, and strange things begin to happen. A loud noise like the wind was heard, and a visual phenomenon that looked like fire appeared. This unexpected occurrence is analogous to the kind of surprising and unique ways that the Spirit can demonstrate activity in a church service. Therefore, when Pentecostals use a this-is-that descriptor, it is a hermeneutic invitation to observe a present event as encapsulating meaning similar to that which was experienced in the book of Acts. As such, Pentecostals do not deny that encounters with the Spirit may take on what other traditions may view as unorthodox expressions, such as jumping, exuberant shouting, and speaking in tongues. However, Pentecostals invite observers to look beyond *prima facie*

[630] Vondey and Green, "Between This and That," 213.
[631] Vondey and Green, "Between This and That," 214.
[632] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 33.

observations to find what God is doing in the midst of the encounter. Consequently, Pentecostals take Peter's *this*, as potentially meaning a multiplicity of things that may demonstrate God's participation in human affairs. Additionally, Vondey and Green highlight that *this is NOT that* is as equally important as *this is that*. Thus, Pentecostals rejected outsider's criticism that their behaviour was unbiblical, heretical, or demonic.[633]

An important element to consider that will aid in understanding Pentecostals' understanding of past, present and future is the role that Scripture plays in narrative construction. Acts is the primary source that Pentecostals study to come to conclusions about how Christ intended the Church to look.[634] However, the rest of the Scriptures also play an essential role in Pentecostals' daily lives. There is a vibrant interaction between Pentecostals and Scripture. It is believed that the Spirit divinely inspired the biblical authors to convey both teaching and narrative. Since this is the same Spirit that is present today, humanity can have access to hearing the voice of God today. Regarding this process, Scott Ellington states:

> Scripture is understood by Pentecostals to be a lively rather than sedentary speaking of God's word, in that the Spirit both spoke to and through the inspired authors and speaks anew to the contemporary hearers of the word. And because, for Pentecostals, the emphasis is decidedly on the latter, a right hearing of the word depends not simply on bridging the gap between the world of the original author and that of the present day hearer, but on being yielded to a Spirit who is able to speak into both worlds, drawing on the words of the original revelatory encounter and also speaking a new word that addresses a fresh context… Pentecostals are committed to the belief that the Spirit as the communicator of God's word both spoke to those who wrote (and edited) the Scriptures and speaks in the community of faith reading (and interpreting) the Scriptures.[635]

For Pentecostals, understanding Scripture requires an active and lively engagement with the word of God, which can be largely facilitated by the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit helps bridge the gap between the world of the original authors and the present-day hearers. Since the assumption is that it is the Spirit that spoke in the ancient world and is also speaking today, the

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[633] Vondey and Green, "Between This and That," 214.
[634] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 38.
[635] Ellington, "Scripture," 65

Spirit helps an individual draw on the words of the original revelation to speak new words or fresh application that address contemporary contexts. The "new words" can be seen by many Pentecostals to be an example of the "voice of God" because Pentecostals believe that the Spirit is the communicator of God's word, both to the authors of the Scriptures and to the community of faith that reads and makes meaning of them.

When Pentecostals refer to the "voice" of God or that the Spirit "speaks", it is not to say that they expect auditory or hallucinatory perception. Rather, it is meant in a way similar to the way one can say that a painting or a work of art speaks. It is a this-is-that hermeneutic applied to Scripture. Hence, Scripture is seen as endowed with transformative meaning.[636] When a Pentecostal discovers a profound meaning in Scripture, the assumption is that the Spirit aided in the process and will continue to aid in the process of making meaning of Scripture in a way that transforms the self. According to Ellington, a reader who looks into Scripture with the objective of minimizing personal experience goes on a distinct journey from the individual who intentionally seeks to relate the Bible to their own life. [637] The Pentecostal hermeneutic is unique to other methods in that it constantly anticipates the special meaning that the Spirit may bring to one's life.

Ellington recognizes that there is a continuous debate in Pentecostal scholarship on whether the locus of meaning for believers today rests primarily on the authorial intention, the reader's interpretation, the revealing of the Spirit, or in a combination of the three.[638] According to Ellington, Craig Keener exemplifies a moderate stance on Pentecostal biblical

[636] See Vondey and Green, "Between This and That," 215-222, for their comparison between the this-is-that Pentecostal dynamic with the surrealist art of René Margritte called "The Treachery of Images".

[637] Ellington, "Locating Pentecostals," 207.

[638] Scott Ellington, "Hearing and Speaking: Exploring the dialogue between Author and Reader in a Pentecostal Hermeneutic," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 28 (2019), 215. DOI:10.1163/17455251-02802005.

hermeneutics.[639] While Keener is hesitant to label his work on hermeneutics as Pentecostal, he clarifies that this is because he believes a "Pentecostal" hermeneutic is a hermeneutic that should characterize a general Christian Spirit-led hermeneutic.[640] Keener presents a useful example of the way Pentecostals value the Spirit. For Pentecostals, the Spirit is sent to believers by Jesus to do the work that Jesus did on earth. Accordingly, the Spirit convicts the world of sin and reveals Jesus to the world through the preaching of the Gospel and continues to reveal more about Jesus to believers. Keener describes the Spirit as a "re-presentation" of the identity and ministry of Jesus and is actively involved in the believer's process of understanding Scripture. [641] Keener resolves in his work to articulate the reasons for an experiential reading of the Bible.[642] Consequently, Keener states that "the Spirit that empowered the church on the day of Pentecost can and should dynamically shape our reading of Scripture".[643]

While Pentecostals believe the Bible enables them to think creatively about the ways God can be encountered in the present, it also helps constrain fanaticism and speculation.[644] While Pentecostals certainly did not discredit new experiences, they were also concerned with guiding their practice, beliefs, and affections by the Word.[645] Pentecostals desire to access everything that Scripture says about what the people of God can have. Therefore, a focus on the Bible is the primary focus of narrative identity formation.

Pentecostals' use of Scripture is important in understanding Pentecostal narrative identity because Scripture is used as a primary justification for their personal connection with the Church

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[639] Ellington, "Hearing and Speaking," 216.

[640] Craig Keener, *Spirit Hermeneutics: Reading Scripture in Light of Pentecost* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2016), 2.

[641] Keener, *Spirit Hermeneutics*, 157-158.

[642] Keener, *Spirit Hermeneutics*, 1.

[643] Keener, *Spirit Hermeneutics*, 4.

[644] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 66.

[645] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 67.

of the New Testament. For Pentecostals, their present life is considered a continuity of the Church of the past and a bridge of the past toward what the Bible says about the prophetic future. The following section provides some important ways, though certainly not all, that Pentecostals view the past, present, and future. However, the greatest attention is given to the present, as it is the locus where a sense of past and future meet.

6.4.1 The Past: Apostolic Continuity

The concept of apostolic continuity is a powerful narrative within Pentecostal faith that influences their view of the past. In the early 20th century, Pentecostals described themselves as an apostolic faith movement.[646] They understood themselves not as a new movement but as an authentic restoration of the brand of Christianity practised during the apostolic age.[647] In the first publication of *The Apostolic Faith* in 1906, William Seymour states that the Apostolic Faith Movement "Stands for the restoration of the faith once delivered unto the saints," which included belief in the baptism of the Holy Ghost as biblically evidenced by speaking in new tongues, and seeking miraculous healing.[648] They intended to recover the faith and power demonstrated in the apostolic church of the New Testament. Early Pentecostals inherited the theological and spiritual proclivities of the restorationist movement of the late 19th century.[649] The various interpretations of the restorationist movement are described as having emerged in drops and dribbles here and there throughout the world making it impossible to trace the modern Pentecostal movement to

[646] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 232;

[647] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 95; Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 6; Murray W. Dempster, "The Search for Pentecostal Identity," *Pneuma* 15, 1 (1993), 1. DOI: 10.1163/157007493X00013.

[648] William J. Seymour, "The Apostolic Faith Movement," in *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), September 1906, 2.

[649] David A. Reed, *"In Jesus' Name": This History and Beliefs of Oneness Pentecostals* (Blandford Forum: Deo Publishing, 2008), 113.

any one source.[650] According to Land, this was a "primitivistic, backward-looking" focus.[651] For this reason, the first issue of *The Apostolic Faith,* states that "It is our privilege to earnestly contend for the power that was in the early apostolic church—that men will be instantaneously healed and will be baptized with the Holy Ghost instantaneously"[652] and "That the Apostolic church had wonderful power, is evidenced by its remarkable growth, as well as by the record of the Word. We have the promise of the same power today."[653] The reasoning here is that if the Apostolic Church experienced the Holy Spirit and practised ministry in supernatural ways, the same experiences and practices are available for the Church today.

According to Land, Pentecostals demonstrated primitivistic faith in ecclesiastical, ethical, and experiential domains.[654] Their desire for recovering apostolic ecclesial practice gave way to a hermeneutic of suspicion regarding "man-made" creeds and institutions because the Holy Spirit did not recognize "man-made creeds, doctrines, nor classes of people".[655] Early Pentecostals resisted early Christian creeds despite believing in most of the creedal theological content.[656] The Spirit's outpouring in early Pentecostalism broke the traditional denominational boundaries. While some were suspicious of man-made creeds, others took more radical anti-creedal approaches. Oneness Pentecostals, for example, represent a group who looked to the Bible to recover an apostolic faith that took an anti-trinitarian stance on the doctrine of God. Furthermore, water baptism in the name of Jesus Christ was instituted by Oneness Pentecostals as the proper application of the baptism practised in the book of Acts. For them, being a continuation of the

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[650] Douglas Jacobsen, *Thinking in the Spirit: Theologies of the Early Pentecostal Movement* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 16.

[651] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 51.

[652] "Contend for the Faith," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), September 1906, 3.

[653] "The Promise Still Good," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), September 1906, 3.

[654] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 51.

[655] "Fire Falling at Hermon," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), September 1906, 3.

[656] Reed, *In Jesus' Name*, 113.

Apostolic movement meant denying the creeds that provided a theological foundation for Christianity for centuries.[657] As such, notable Oneness Pentecostal theologian David K. Bernard states that the apostles' experience and message are the starting and ending points of what the Church should believe and expect.[658] Though the emergence of Oneness Pentecostalism is commonly associated with the Arroyo Seco (Los Angeles, CA) camp meeting in the spring of 1913, evidence suggests that Oneness views had already been circulating well before that time. Thus, it has been suggested that it is more productive to view Arroyo Seco as the catalyst that united individuals who already were inclined to Oneness theology.[659]

In general, a widely accepted ethical primitivism encouraged a desire for holiness throughout the Pentecostal movement. Just as the church of the apostolic era demonstrated a consuming devotion to living holy, the church today should live holy. [660] Land concludes that it was their experiential primitivism that galvanized ecclesial and ethical domains because they believed that people today "can, should, and must evidence the same longing and power as the first Christians if they are to be in eschatological continuity with the beginning and end of the church of Pentecost". [661] Pentecostals believe that the church should strive to live in a way that is as devoted and holy as the apostolic church in the Bible. The Church today must evidence the same longing and power as the first Christians if they are to be in continuity with the eschatological progression of the Church within Scripture. This belief helps to drive individual and ecclesial behavioural change. The specific concept of ethical or behavioural transformation

[657] Reed, *In Jesus' Name*, 108-135.

[658] David K. Bernard, "Oneness Theology: Restoring the Apostolic Faith," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, edited by Wolfgang Vondey (London: Routledge, 2020), 197. See also: David K. Bernard, "Early High Christology in Oneness Pentecostal Perspective," *Religion and Theology* 26 (2019): 147-167.

[659] Jacobsen, *Thinking in the Spirit*, 194. See also, Reed, *In Jesus' Name*, 108-135.

[660] Willliam J. Seymour, "Sanctified on the Cross," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), May 1908, 2.

[661] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 52.

is an important theme for this thesis and is explored in conjunction with the concept of testimony in the following chapter.

The narrative quality of apostolic continuity situates Pentecostal identity with the church of the New Testament. As a result, the biblical stories and teachings become more than stories of things that occurred in the past. Biblical stories, especially those detailing the activity of the Church, gain the kind of value that is present in intergenerational narratives and cultural history according to the ecological systems approach for family narratives. As a connection to the past is made through a personal experience of a similar Pentecost of that of Scripture, Pentecostals develop a kind of we-narrative with the people described in the biblical narrative. In other words, in the mind of Pentecostals, the *this is that* conceptual metaphor unites the intentional behaviour of Pentecostals today with the intentional behaviour performed by the Church in the apostolic age. More will be developed in the following chapter on where the theoretical foundation on the narrativity of the mind is explicitly applied to testimony and the grand narratives examined in this chapter.

6.4.2 The Future: Apocalyptic Imagination

According to Vondey, Pentecostal theology includes a strong apocalyptic vision. The present, more "natural" realm is cognitively framed in terms of the greater, more determinative eschatological realm.[662] Because of this, some Pentecostals sometimes have not felt compelled to participate in creation care, as this world is seen in transitional terms. Since this world will pass away and a new one will be inaugurated, priority is placed on preaching the Gospel.[663] There are various ways Pentecostals can interpret the transitory nature of the present. One way of understanding transition is that the world will be destroyed and be made new. However, Vondey

[662] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 172.
[663] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 171-172.

proposes an apocalyptic eschatology that does not require destruction. Pentecostal urgency is directed toward the redemption of the present and dissolution of destruction and death.[664] One of the primary values of the kingdom is that it is inaugurated *now*. It is a soteriology that is not aimed at destruction but at the "redemption of spiritual powers and principalities" and the "civilization of the affected social, political and economic spheres".[665]

An apocalyptic imagination is present even in Pentecostals' view of the day of Pentecost. Pentecostals' understanding of the day of Pentecost is intrinsically tied to the prophecy in Joel, as quoted by Peter, that in the *last days*, God would pour out his Spirit on all flesh.[666] Likewise, the Pentecostal experience in Acts 2 was a direct fulfilment of what Jesus had promised in Acts 1. The disciples were to wait in Jerusalem for the baptism of the Spirit, which is the promise of the Father.[667] As a result, the disciples would "receive power" to be Christ's witnesses in Jerusalem, all of Judea, Samaria, and to the end of the earth.[668] This was interpreted by the early Pentecostals in the 1900s as the *latter rain*. Thus, Vondey describes classical Pentecostals as having a "biblicist hermeneutic" and a "strong apocalyptic urgency" that influenced an emphasis on mission and evangelization.[669] In an early Pentecostal document, Brother James is quoted by William J. Seymour as saying in what seems to be a prophetic utterance, "Be ye patient therefore brethren, unto the coming of the Lord. Behold the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath long patience for it, until ye receive the early and the latter rain".[670] In further commentary, Seymour expresses that:

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[664] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 221.
[665] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 204.
[666] Acts 2:17 and Joel 2:28.
[667] Acts 1:4-5.
[668] Acts 1:8
[669] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 156.
[670] William J. Seymour, "Signs of His Coming," *The Apostolic Faith* (Los Angeles), March, 1907, 6

> The early rain that God sent was on the day of Pentecost, in the early morning of the apostolic age, which is the outpouring of the Spirit. And in these last days, He is sending the refreshing times, the latter rain, another Pentecost. Bless His holy name![671]

The "Latter Rain" motif within the Pentecostal movement was inspired by the biblical promise that God would give a former and latter rain cycle for a plentiful harvest if Israel remained faithful.[672] The concept of a latter rain provided a way through which to understand God's relationship with the Church throughout time. The outpouring of the Spirit in Acts 2 was seen as the early rain, while the outpouring of the Spirit in the modern Pentecostal era was seen as the latter rain.[673] The Azusa Street Revival was a sign that the latter rain had begun and thus the eschatological inauguration of the "last days". Fulfilment of prophecy was occurring and the impending return of Christ was closer than ever.

In Smith's work on characterizing elements of a Pentecostal worldview, he highlights that Pentecostals' orientation toward eschatological fulfilment is a primary contributor to Pentecostal spirituality. It is part and parcel of speaking in tongues because the outpouring of the Spirit is a sign that we are indeed in the "last days".[674] The eschatological Pentecostal worldview generates a commitment to mission and "ministries of empowerment and social justice".[675] That an apocalyptic future is unfolding in the present has engendered rapid growth in the Pentecostal movement. Thus, Pentecostal theologians have proposed that there is a need to ensure that Pentecostal eschatology is always oriented toward mission.[676] Andrew Lord suggests that the present mission should be intentionally characterized by elements of the future kingdom. Eschatological fulfilment is not merely a matter of judgement and punishment. The coming

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[671] Seymour, "Signs of His Coming," 6.
[672] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 137.
[673] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 139.
[674] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 44.
[675] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 45.
[676] Andrew M. Lord, "Mission Eschatology: A Framework for Mission in the Spirit," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 11 (1997), 111, DOI: 10.1177/096673699700501106.

kingdom is a kingdom where Jesus is Lord, healing, justice and peace, unity in diversity, creation is set free, praise and worship are given to God, and love and fellowship exist. For Lord, each one of these future elements correlates to normative mission activities in the present.[677] The elements that characterize the future kingdom correlate to the present ecclesial mission means that when Pentecostals speak of the future, they simultaneously speak of potential symbols for what can be received in the present already-not-yet dynamic of life. Both what the Bible says about the past and the future have analogous meanings for Pentecostals in the present.

Pentecostals' vivid sense of apocalyptic imagination gives way to what Land describes as apocalyptic affections. Land states:

> The apocalyptic vision and transcendent presence of the power of the age to come alters the affective chemistry in significant ways. The sense of urgency concerning the missionary task and readiness for the soon coming of the Holy Lamb of God alters the affections not only in quantitative intensity but also in terms of the qualitative mix of characteristic gestalt.[678]

Pentecostal apocalyptic vision and a belief in a transcendent presence of the power of the age to come change the intensity and quality of people's affective orientation. The use of the term "apocalyptic vision" in Pentecostal theology is an intriguing one. It connotes that, by nature, apocalyptic biblical narrative affects the "vision" or hermeneutic lens through which Pentecostals view the world. In essence, the world is coloured by an apocalyptic hue. This hermeneutical lens leads to a sense of urgency about the missionary task and a readiness for the coming of Jesus Christ. Affection for Land means "abiding dispositions which dispose the person toward God and the neighbour in ways appropriate to their source and goal in God".[679] In other words, affections are abiding dispositions that guide a person's behaviour toward God and others in a way that is in agreement with their source (e.g., the Holy Spirit) and the will of God.

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[677] Lord, "Mission Eschatology," 119.
[678] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 133.
[679] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 132.

The concept of "abiding dispositions" here seems to be reminiscent of the concept of Bourdieu's habitus, which is the "durable dispositions", or what seems to correlate with the concept of our enactive being-in-the-world.

Pentecostals' dispositions are affected by a sense of urgency when it comes to both their mission and their personal relationship with God. The same apocalyptic anticipation that motivates Pentecostals to go out and preach the Gospel is the same anticipation that motivates their desire to be ready to meet the Lord. This eschatological tension is expressed in and through the Pentecostal community.[680] Apocalyptic narrative within the Bible affects Pentecostal affection even as the community cultivates a modern understanding of how the coming kingdom is being demonstrated in the present. Richie states, "Testimony also involves a sense of the future, as participants live in the present and anticipatory engagement with the coming reign of God in dialogue with the Scriptures".[681] Since God's intentionality and purpose are evident within the unfolding of prophetic events in the Bible, the events of a Pentecostal's life have the potential to hold meaning. Each event in the present can be held in an already-not-yet perspective, whether it be healing, deliverance, need, or flourishing.

The idea that Pentecostals relate to prophetic fulfilment is similar to the this-is-that dynamic that connects them to the story of Pentecost. Since Pentecostals identity with Pentecost, and since Pentecost within the Bible is the inauguration of a kingdom that is to come, the this-is-that dynamic has the potential to be extended to making meaning of how one's present life reflects the apocalyptic unfolding in Scripture. In his case study of some narrative patterns found in four important Pentecostal figures, Andersson suggests that when their experiences are interpreted, they often refer to biblical narratives. Their present experience is connected to a

[680] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 177.
[681] Richie, *Speaking by the Spirit*, 134.

restoration of biblical stories in present times. Hence, there is an intent to live out a self-narrative and personal experience that is in agreement with the developing Pentecostal community around them. Thus, Andersson highlights instances where early Pentecostal figures desired to experience the baptism of the Spirit in specific ways because of the specific features of Spirit baptism when experienced by fellow Pentecostals. Though Pentecostals have at times been criticized for using the stories in Acts for constructive theological development, Andersson argues that Pentecostals make theological claims bearing in mind that Acts relays the story of the work of the Spirit. Consequently, that same Spirit works in the Church today in similar ways to that of the book of Acts.[682]

6.4.3 The Present: Kingdom Inauguration and Encounter with God

As Jurgen Moltmann observes, Pentecostal movements are eschatological because "they anticipate the coming of Christ while expecting to be empowered by what Hebrews 6:5 describes as the "powers of the age to come".[683] Land describes how Pentecostals saw the "power of the age to come" as being poured out upon the church for a purpose. The purpose was to proclaim and inaugurate the redemption of Jesus Christ in the world. It is achieved by the proclamation of the word and the demonstration of Spirit and power in the present.[684] In light of present access to powers of an age to come, Pentecostals stand in a tension between a kingdom that has already been inaugurated yet has not come to its full form. Land describes the tension between present and future as "promise-fulfillment" and an "already-not yet" dynamic.[685] The power experienced in the present is evidence of a future time and place when everything will be made right.

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[682] Andersson, "To Live the Biblical Narratives," 114.

[683] See Jürgen Moltmann's forward in: Peter Althouse, *Spirit of the Last Days: Pentecostal Eschatology in Conversation with Jürgen Moltmann* (London: T&T Clark, 2003), vii.

[684] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 64-65.

[685] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 3.

Consequently, for example, since there will be no sickness in the age to come, Pentecostals can invoke the rectifying power of the future into the present to experience healing.

Through justification, sanctification, and the baptism of the Spirit, a door is opened for believers to live their lives in power and demonstration of the Holy Spirit. Pentecostal experience in both personal and public domains is seen as the result of the inbreaking of the kingdom of God into the earth, both on individual and corporate levels. From internal spiritual transformation to the working of miracles like healing or monetary provision, this spiritual activity is understood as a demonstration of the power of God for the purpose of the inbreaking of the kingdom. At the same time, it is in anticipation of the final apocalypse that will inaugurate in fullness what can only be accessed in part in the present. [686] Archer states, "In Luke's narrative, Jesus baptizes his followers with the Spirit so they will be able to carry on the mission of God until Jesus returns for his followers".[687] Accordingly, Pentecostals see themselves as playing a role in a grand narrative of the "mission of God" until the return of Jesus. Archer states, "The eschatological perspective of the Pentecostal story fits best with an inaugurated understanding of the coming Kingdom". [688] For a Pentecostal, the mission of God constitutes establishing the kingdom of God with an already-not-yet mindset. The Kingdom of Christ has already been inaugurated in the present. It is not comprised of geographical locations. The Kingdom of Christ resides in the lives of people. The Pentecostal concept of the Kingdom holds both the future and the present hand in hand, even as it is connected to the past when Christ inaugurated it through the Apostolic church in the New Testament.

[686] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 87.
[687] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story", 43.
[688] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story", 46.

According to Smith, Pentecostal spirituality has a theology of creation and culture that he describes as having a sense of "enchantment".[689] As such, Smith has argued that an essential aspect of the Pentecostal worldview is "a sense of radical openness to God, with a distinct emphasis on the continued operation of the Holy Spirit in the world and the church".[690] This ontological claim presupposes that the natural world must remain an open system to the participation of spiritual elements. According to Smith, this open system seems to set the Pentecostal worldview at odds with metaphysical and methodological naturalist philosophies that presume the universe is a closed system.[691] Though Smith has suggested that there are more productive ways of viewing the universe than others for Pentecostals,[692] what is not under question is that the Pentecostal worldview sees meaning in the universe that strict empirical analyses cannot access. Meaning-making beyond the empirical is assumed because for Pentecostal spirituality, "the Spirit operates *within* the created order" and is "marked by a deep sense of the Spirit's immanence".[693]

The notion of enchantment invoked by Smith is akin to the notion of enchantment expressed by philosopher Charles Taylor. Taylor states that the best way to understand how he uses the term enchantment is as an antonym to Max Weber's expression "disenchantment" or *entzauberung*. The enchanted world is an understanding of existence that includes spirits, demons, and moral forces.[694] Additionally, what Taylor describes as a main descriptor of this transition is "a condition in which our highest spiritual and moral aspirations point us

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[689] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 39.

[690] Smith, "Is the Universe Open for Surprise?" 880.

[691] Smith, "Is the Universe Open for Surprise?" 880.

[692] See: Smith, "Is the Universe Open for Surprise?" 887. Smith suggests here that the best way of viewing the Pentecostal perspective of the world is that it is an "enchanted naturalism" or "en-Spirited naturalism". See also: Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 97-99.

[693] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 40.

[694] Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2007), 25-26.

inescapably to God, one might say, make no sense without God, to one in which they can be related to a host of different sources, and frequently are referred to sources which deny God".[695] In a world of enchantment, the world is a porous cosmology susceptible to supernatural participation. According to Taylor, however, science helped disenchant the world and helped to open the way for an exclusive humanism to develop.[696] Taylor proposes that this was not achieved "overnight", but occurred over a long period of time and emerged in reaction to earlier Christian forms. Consequently, in the nineteenth century, fully formed alternatives to the enchanted cosmology of the past developed.

Like Smith, Vondey identifies Pentecostalism as having "an enchanted worldview, sociospiritual attachment, the festival of Pentecost, the transformation of secular time, and a porous cosmos".[697] Though Vondey develops this concept mainly in reaction to the philosophy of Charles Taylor, for the purposes of this section, the focus is primarily on his descriptors of Pentecostal worldview. Vondey describes the festival of Pentecost as *the festival of enchanted attachment*. The festivities of the ancient carnival inverted social and civil roles where even fools could become kings for a day.[698] Likewise, Pentecost is described by Vondey as a "Christian festival par excellence".[699] Pentecostals resist structured order in light of the Holy Spirit's spontaneity and the Spirit's role to empower all believers for the mission of God. This dynamic plays out in Pentecostal liturgical settings and beyond as the congregation leaves church services and into their daily lives. Important for the following chapter, Vondey's concept of the festival of

[695] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 26.
[696] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 27.
[697] Vondey, "Religion at Play," 17.
[698] Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 46.
[699] Vondey, "Religion at Play," 23.

enchanted attachment is observed in Pentecostal liturgical settings, especially in social role reversals present in call-and-response activity and spontaneous worship.

The festival is enchanted by its porous cosmology that is open to God's participation. Nevertheless, as Vondey establishes, Pentecostals are in a state of attachment with the world because "Pentecostalism as a religious festival is a necessary part of the secular in order to bring the whole world into the rhythm of God's time and promise".[700] Likewise, Smith states that there is a desire in Pentecostalism, not to escape the world, but "to embody and model the coming kingdom, and even to foster the transformation of *this* world".[701] Thus, there is a necessary attachment to the world. Pentecostals recognized their embeddedness within the real world. However, the world is also saturated with meaning that goes beyond what can be empirically observed in the traditional meaning of the physiological five senses. Vondey states, "Pentecostals belong to what we might call 'enchanted secular religious' movements, a porous entanglement of spirits that reaches from the secular to the religious and back again…".[702] The notion of the existence of other spirits takes all aspects of created existence seriously. This created existence is not the product of two worlds, one spiritual and the other physical. It is the existence of one world in which the spiritual is mixed and interacts in the world in ways that cannot be bifurcated. All of created existence is enchanted with spiritual meaning. Spiritual meaning can indicate evidence of God's participation, the participation of evil spirits, or the interplay of both.

According to Smith, Pentecostal spirituality includes the assumption that "the Spirit operates *within* the created order" and, thus, "a deep sense of the Spirit's immanence".[703] That the Spirit works in the here and now situates their brand of eschatological reflection in a desire,

[700] Vondey, "Religion at Play," 25.
[701] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 45 (emphasis original.
[702] Vondey, "Religion at Play", 20.
[703] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 39, emphasis original.

not to escape the world we live in now, but a desire to embody the coming kingdom now and promote the notion that it's God's will to change this world, *now*. Consequently, the world is endued with a hermeneutic of enchantment, as the perceivable world is full of meaning beyond that cannot be perceived with the natural eye. [704] As stated at the beginning of this study, this is perhaps the primary reason Smith views Pentecostalism as a kind of postmodernist religion. It is not because Pentecostals do not have a sense of realism. It is because Pentecostal realism is invested with meaning that goes beyond what can be empirically observed. Pentecostal realism brings them at odds with the empiricist ideology that defined aspects of the modern era. On the other hand, Smith observes what he describes as a "mis-enchantment" as well:

> However, there is a flip side to this sense of the Spirit's enchantment of creation: Pentecostal spirituality is also deeply attentive to what we might describe as the mis-enchantment of the world by other spirits. And this, too, is present in the prayers and practices of Pentecostal spirituality. Pentecostal praxis is sometimes almost overwhelmed by a concern with spiritual warfare and the demonic that finds expression in ministries of 'deliverance' and liberation. There is a deep sense that multiple modes of oppression—from illness to poverty—are in some way the work of forces that are not just 'natural.' Thus the 'full gospel' of Pentecostal salvation sees Christ's triumph over 'the powers' expressed in the Spirit's ministry of deliverance. Prayer and worship are a mode of struggle against 'the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in heavenly places' (Eph. 6:12). [705]

Pentecostal spirituality has a cosmological awareness of what may be considered the corruption of the world by other spirits. Pentecostal prayers and rituals reflect this as well. Concern for spiritual conflict with the devil at times manifests itself in ministries of "deliverance" and "liberation." The concept of mis-enchantment follows the idea that aspects of the world can be enchanted corruptly. Corrupt enchantment involves the notion of evil cosmic powers that can influence individuals, groups, and human systems. The dynamic of spiritual forces actively participating in the systems of the world is an idea that has at times inspired creative illustrations. Thus, "deliverance" and "liberation" go beyond personal liberation from

[704] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 45 (emphasis original).
[705] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 41.

things like bad habits and addictions. There is an assumption that satanic forces are influencing an individual's participation in ungodly actions. Hence, an individual must be liberated and delivered from the spiritual forces of darkness that are attempting to keep people bound to sin. Prayer and worship play a role in the struggle between the light and darkness that goes beyond that of ritual practice. Prayer and worship are opportunities for an encounter with God that can result in spiritual liberation.

An example of this can be found in Frank Peretti's novel, *This Present Darkness*.[706] Peretti's fiction novel both reflected a popular interpretation of spiritual warfare[707] and greatly influenced the thinking of Pentecostals and Evangelicals on what might be occurring in spiritual warfare.[708] Peretti's novel describes the battle between demonic powers of darkness and angels of light as they parallel the lives of a believing church and a New Age movement attempting to take over the town. One of the protagonists includes a pastor, who, through prayer, affects the positive outcome of spiritual warfare. Peretti was a primary figure in further popularizing the notion that demonic forces can influence neighbourhoods, cities and nations.[709] Notably, some Pentecostals staunchly reject the cosmology present within Peretti's fictional depiction. Thus, Pentecostal scholarship has done substantial work to correct and refine dramatized cosmology like Peretti's.[710] Nevertheless, the concept of spiritual warfare continues to be an essential metaphor for the Pentecostal movement. For example, spiritual warfare in some contexts is

[706] Frank Peretti, *This Present Darkness* (Carol Stream: Tyndale House, 2002; first published 1986).

[707] Cecil M. Robeck, "Signs, Wonders, Warfare, and Witness," *Pneuma* 13, 1 (1991), 1, DOI: 10.1163/157007491X00015.

[708] Robert A. Guelich, "Spiritual Warfare: Jesus, Paul, and Peretti," *Pneuma* 13, 1 (1991), 33, DOI: 10.1163/157007491X00033.

[709] Thomas D. Pratt, "The Need to Dialogue: A Review of the Debate on the Controversy of Signs, Wonders, Miracles and Spiritual Warfare Raised in the Literature of the Third Wave Movement," *Pneuma* 13, 1 (1991), 28, DOI: 10.1163/157007491X00024.

[710] Warren, "'Spiritual Warfare'," 278-297.

applied to spirits of poverty and oppression.[711] However, various interpretations of the significance of spiritual warfare remain, and there is no agreement in the Pentecostal movement on the details.[712]

Despite the various cosmological interpretations, what is clear is that just as there is divine enchantment, there is also a notion of corrupted enchantment in the world (mis-enchantment). That Christ triumphed over the powers of this world (Col. 2:15) and is far above all rule and authority and power and dominion (Eph. 1:21) means that Christ has the power to liberate believers from the evil powers that oppress them. Furthermore, this warfare imagery has an important relationship with the inbreaking of the Spirit and the mission of God.[713] Andrew Lord states, "A battle is steady and yet is only experienced in specific incidents where good and evil clash. If the mission is about bringing characteristics of the future kingdom to birth in the present, then clearly Satan will be opposed to any mission endeavor."[714] Jesus Christ is king in the future kingdom and exercises complete dominion over creation. Pentecostals believe they can participate in inaugurating the dominion of Christ's kingdom in the present. For Pentecostals, however, there can be conscious consideration that this is something that Satan will attempt to resist at all costs. Satanic resistance can be seen on both communal and individual levels. Opposition is likely what Sister John Woodruff felt she experienced was attempting to interrupt her seeking the baptism of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless, in seeking the Spirit at the altar, she received her baptism experience.

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[711] Allan H. Anderson, *An Introduction to Pentecostalism: Global Charismatic Christianity*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 291.

[712] Anderson, *An Introduction to Pentecostalism*, 230-231.

[713] Lord, "Mission Eschatology," 115.

[714] Lord, "Mission Eschatology", 115.

Pentecostals tend to have a keen desire to interpret activities and events in the present as opportunities for an encounter with God. Opportunities for encounter include liturgical practices but can also include any aspect of life. Smith describes this as being a radical openness to God. Smith states, "pentecostal faith constitutes a community characterized by a radical openness to God that pentecostal communities emphasize the continued ministry of the Spirit, including continuing revelation, prophesy, and the centrality of charismatic giftings in the ecclesial community."[715] Pentecostals' radical openness to God is why the continued ministry of the Spirit is emphasized, including the role of continuing revelation, prophecy, and the centrality of charismatic giftings in the church community. This radical openness to God is supported by this-is-that dynamic that invites observers to interpret even uncommon religious expression as evidence of an encounter with God. Tongues, in particular, provide a powerful symbol of this. That the Spirit gives utterance through an individual to the extent that it does not flow from the individual's mind but through the mind of God through the Spirit is a powerful standard of experience. That standard of experience is that Pentecostals have been used as a vessel through which God has produced divine creativity. The Pentecostal theologian Frank Macchia describes this as "theophanic signs and wonders of the divine self-disclosure".[716] God, as an agent, is involved as well. Thus, Macchia states, "If glossolalia symbolizes a divine action that is mysterious and free, it implies the same concerning human existence that is open to God".[717] When that standard of experience becomes the representative symbol of what is intended by God to guide the rest of the entirety of an individual's life, it gives powerful meaning to the concept of kingdom inauguration in Pentecostals' lives. Pentecost is a primary narrative for identity

[715] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 38.

[716] Frank Macchia, "Sighs too Deep for Words: Toward a Theology of Glossolalia," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 1 (1992), 55. DOI: 10.1177/096673699200100105.

[717] Macchia, "Sighs too Deep for Words," 61.

formation because it represents a potent example of God's creative work through an individual. Since a hermeneutical lens often informs an individual's worldview, the concept of divine creativity through a human vessel is extended to the rest of an individual's life. Pentecostals' daily lives can thus be transformed from being that which is common to humanity to a place where even the most seemingly mundane is invested with an enchanted meaning of God's potential participation. Speaking in tongues is a reminder that liberation and redemption is not only prophetically to come, but glossolalia also "is an 'evidence' that such has already begun and is now active".[718]

The aspects of Pentecostal faith presented above are considered important for the community's life and identity. During worship, a "shift" in the atmosphere is often experienced that leaves the community with a sense of the divine presence. The perceived change can be linked to certain elements of the worship experience, such as music, prayer, or the sermon, and is often perceived as a sudden and profound change in the spiritual energy of the environment. This phenomenon is often attributed to the power and presence of God.[719] According to Cartledge, worship services are part of a grander cosmological perspective that worship is heavenly. Worshipers can draw heaven down to experience a divine amalgamation between heaven and earth.[720]

A conceptual metaphor that Pentecostals often utilize to conceptualize encounter is the *altar*. Vondey states, "The altar is a sacramental symbol and archetype of Pentecost that marks a place of gathering and sending—both for the Spirit of God and for the church into the world".[721] The altar is a significant symbol in the Pentecostal tradition because it represents the moment

[718] Macchia, "Sighs too Deep for Words," 70.
[719] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 36.
[720] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 36.
[721] Vondey, "Pentecostal Sacramentality," 104.

when the Holy Spirit descended upon the disciples, as recorded in the Book of Acts. This is considered the birth of the Christian church and the beginning of its mandate to share the gospel with others. The altar, therefore, embodies the idea of both coming together as a community of believers and being sent out into the world to serve and proclaim the message of Christ.

From a cognitive linguistic perspective, going to the altar is a concrete sensorimotor experience used to represent the more abstract ways that God can participate within the world and in individual lives. In other words, the act of physically approaching the altar and engaging with it through one's senses (e.g., sight, touch) can serve as a way of symbolizing and experiencing the intangible presence of God. The sensorimotor experience can help people connect with and understand the divine in a more tangible and accessible way. God's participation is abstract because of the various and, at times, unorthodox ways that God participates in the world. Vondey states: "Pentecostals return to the altar because it is the encounter with God who calls, sanctifies, anoints, heals, and commissions us to continue on our journey."[722] The altar is considered a sacred place where believers connect with God and receive his blessings. At the altar, believers can pray, ask for forgiveness, and seek healing and guidance from God. It is an important place where radical openness to God can occur. Believers can be filled with the Holy Spirit and receive spiritual gifts, such as the ability to speak in tongues or perform miracles.

The metaphor of the altar aids in conceptualizing what Peter Neumann describes as a sense of "mediated immediacy" of experience. According to Neumann, "experience is a foundational element of Pentecostal spirituality that can be identified as a mystical encounter

[722] Wolfgang Vondey, "Pentecostal Theology: A Conversation on the Full Gospel," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 28 (2019): 34. DOI: 10.1163/17455251-02801004.

with the God who is calling Christian believers into mission".[723] Neumann is a Pentecostal theologian who characterizes Pentecostals' desire for spiritual encounter as a Christian mystical tradition.[724] In Pentecostal scholarship, though mysticism and spirituality are strongly linked, they are not synonymous. Mysticism is a subtheme of Christian spirituality. As such, mysticism is related to the Christian encounter with God, and spirituality includes the "activities and practices that anticipate both the encounter itself and the outcomes and obligations stemming from it".[725] The altar and "altar call" can be seen as a Christian mystical metaphor for the encounter one can have and is invited to in Pentecostalism.

According to Vondey, the "altar call" and subsequent response is the "climax of traditional Pentecostal worship".[726] The altar is a place where the intentional actions of two or more entities of distinct agency can come together and meet. It is described here as "two or more entities of distinct agency" because the altar is not merely a place where an individual can meet God. It is also a place where the group agency of the Church, the congregation, or any group of people, can meet with God. It is also a place where angels can join the attended event and make their presence known. According to Cartledge, Pentecostals are open to believing that humanity can unite in worship together with the heavenly host. That open belief means that humans do not always worship alone but can be joined by angels in their worship of God. This belief is part of a Pentecostal cosmological perspective, which views worship as a way to connect with the heavenly realm and experience God's presence on earth. The idea that worship is "heavenly"

[723] Peter D. Neumann, "Experience: The Mediated Immediacy of Encounter with the Spirit," in *The Routledge Handbook of Pentecostal Theology*, ed. Wolfgang Vondey (London: Routledge, 2020), 92.

[724] See Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 15; and Daniel Castelo, *Pentecostalism as a Christian Mystical Tradition* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2017).

[725] Castelo, *Pentecostalism*, xviii-xix.

[726] Wolfgang Vondey, "Religion as Play: Pentecostalism as a Theological Type," *Religions* 9, 3 (2018), 10, DOI: 10.3390/rel9030080.

comes from the belief that the presence of the Lord can be felt on earth and that when this happens, angels are involved in the worship.[727]

According to Vondey, Pentecostals have a "theology of the altar" which is an archetype of the biblical Pentecost.[728] A sacramental reading of Pentecost facilitates Pentecostals' use of Pentecost as a prototype of the kinds of encounters that can be experienced by Pentecostals today. Hence, Pentecost in the book of Acts is an event that becomes a hermeneutical frame through which encounter is idealized. Likewise, Land describes Pentecost as a "liturgical paradigm" and an "existential reality".[729] It has a continual purpose for meaning-making and religious practice. When a Pentecostal has an experience that is interpreted as an encounter with God, it recalls the frame of Pentecost. Important to consider, however, is that it is not necessary to recall Pentecost in a spiritual encounter. The mental space invoked by Pentecostals' altar theology can exclude Pentecost and recall other personal events that stand as categorical frames when an individual had an encounter with God. As stated earlier, mental spaces in cognition can include a complex multiplicity of frames and categories (see Chapter 3). Each frame within the category of encounter for Pentecostals does not necessarily become consciously recalled. However, they are likely at least prereflectively implicated in the Massive Hermeneutical Background involved with embodied cognition.

A sacramental reading of Pentecost recognizes that the day of Pentecost was a ritual Jewish event commemorating the reception of the Law of Moses. However, this ritual event in the Luke-Acts narrative was interrupted by the outpouring of the Spirit.[730] The outpouring of the Spirit was accompanied by unexpected forms of visible and audible expressions by the

[727] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 36.
[728] Vondey, "Pentecostal Sacramentality," 95.
[729] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 173.
[730] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 39.

participants.[731] However, the outpouring of the Spirit first necessitated a gathering. It was a gathering commissioned by Jesus at a place described as an "upper room". The gathering of Jesus' disciples in the upper room was for the purpose of encountering the Spirit (comforter), and thus the promise. It was an encounter between humanity and the divine. As a result, the disciples of Christ are empowered by the Spirit to go out and be witnesses of Christ and the Spirit "to the end of the earth" (Acts 1:8). Consequently, Vondey states that Pentecostals see this event along with its manifestations as a sacramental environment in the Church. Vondey takes this basic plot as the core narrative as the sacramental symbol of the *altar* or the *altar call*.[732] It includes participation and transformation of the people as a result of their encounter with God. It is this sacramental environment that Pentecostals symbolize as the altar.[733]

For example, in the story of Beverley, many typical themes are present within the story described in her testimony. She was part of a Pentecostal community that made an "altar appeal" or "altar call". Beverley recognizes that the original altar call was not specifically designated for healing. However, that did not deter her. The altar is a place that is always open for spontaneous and unexpected encounters with God. The altar is a metaphor for something much bigger. Because of this, Beverley felt the liberty to go forward to the altar area to participate, along with the rest of the community, in prayer and take advantage of the opportunity for an encounter with God. A pastor prayed for her and her husband. Additionally, it is likely that this perspective was also at work when she called her doctor to get an update on her cancer diagnosis. While she spoke to her doctor, her husband was praying for her. An assumption of the possibility of an

[731] Vondey, "Pentecostal Sacramentality," 95-96.
[732] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 40.
[733] Vondey, "Pentecostal Sacramentality," 98.

encounter was embedded in the moment. The doctor told them that she was clear of cancer and did not require medical intervention. Consequently, they attributed it to God's intervention.

The altar is both a theological metaphor for encounter and the kingdom of God.[734] The amalgamation of altar, encounter, and kingdom is because Pentecostals not only received the Spirit, but it was also an inauguration of the empowerment required as a prerequisite to be witnesses of Christ to the end of the earth. Likewise, in the present setting, believers are empowered at the altar to become witnesses of what they have received. That they are empowered to go "to the end of the earth" can indicate travelling to a particular place to preach the Gospel. However, it can also mean that "the end of the earth" is their workplace, neighbourhood, friends, or family. Thus, just as the apostolic church expanded the Kingdom of God by travelling to preach the Gospel, modern Pentecostals go out into their personal world to share what they received.

The use of altar theology is by no means original to the Pentecostal movement. Forms of altar theology were already developed as early as the mid-nineteenth century by, for example, Phoebe Palmar. Palmar described her approach, however, as "altar phraseology". She proposed the altar as a metaphorical concept representing a place where one could be free from the "old self". Thus, by laying oneself on the altar through prayer, one could be redeemed by the power of God and participate in holiness and sanctification.[735] On the other hand, Pentecostals' approach postulates that the outpouring of the Spirit in Acts is understood as the prototype of altar experience. This prototype situates Pentecostals with the experience of the altar and the purpose of the altar to empower a believer to be a witness.

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[734] Vondey, *Pentecostal Theology*, 41.

[735] See Phoebe Palmar, *The Way to Holiness* (New York: Piercy and Reed, 1843), 41; cited in: Theodore Hovet, "Pheobe Palmar's 'Altar Phraseology' and the Spiritual Dimension of Woman's Sphere," *The Journal of Religion* 63, 3 (1983), 268.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter elucidated the meaning of testimony and some characteristic ways in which testimony is practised in the Pentecostal community. Testimony for Pentecostals is a practice of reflection and hermeneutical interpretation of their lives. Reflection and interpretation included holistic interpretations of their lives in general or specific attended life events. Their interpretations, however, are more than personal subjective interpretations. Pentecostals believe that the act of sharing one's testimony is a powerful form of religious experience and can have a transformative effect on both the speaker and the audience. Testimonies contribute to the formation of a shared story. It provides an intersubjective avenue to join individuals together by fostering social support and spiritual strengthening. Testimonies are seen as a way of connecting with others and building community. They are often viewed as a vital source of support and encouragement for those seeking to grow in their faith. Although there is limited empirical documentation of what public testimonies look like in early Pentecostalism, sources such as autobiographies and periodicals provide a view into how Pentecostals understood God, themselves, and their personal stories. While subjective and often written retrospectively, these accounts offer valuable insights into how personal and communal narratives are formed.

What is further elucidated in this chapter is the way that testimony is often expressed in unique ways depending on the community in which an individual is embedded. Thus, testimony is the product of an ecological process influenced by theological narratives of restoration, the return of apostolic faith, and how local communities interpret and enact those narratives in their cultural context. The result is Pentecostal expression representing both uniqueness and unity within Pentecostal identity. In the example of the Latin Pentecostal community, some liturgical characteristics were examined along with the hymn, *Aleluya al Señor*.

Subsequently, this chapter highlights what Kenneth Archer describes as general foundational narratives that help define Pentecostal identity. Pentecostals use Scripture to support their belief in a personal connection with the Church of the New Testament. For them, their present life is seen as a continuation of the Church of the past and a bridge to the prophetic future described in the Bible. The past includes notions of apostolic continuation. An apocalyptic imagination nurtures the perspectives on the future, and the present includes notions of enchantment, encounter and the conceptual metaphor of the altar. This understanding of the past, present, and future influences the construction of their narrative identity as Pentecostals. The present is given the most attention because it is seen as the meeting point of the past and the future.

While certainly not exhaustive of all Pentecostal narratives, the grand narratives mentioned within this chapter represent narratives that help act as *we-narratives* that unite Pentecostal identity. As discussed in Chapter 4, we-narratives are narratives that unite groups to guide shared and group agency. In sharing testimonies with one another the Pentecostal community reflects on the events of their life and their reactions to them. Participation in communicative practices enables the opportunity for the community to support reflection with the narratives that unite the community.

An important thing to note is that though the grand narratives presented here certainly impact Pentecostal hermeneutical backgrounds, that does not mean that they are constantly explicit in the daily lives of individuals. For example, in Beverley's story, though many themes were present that involve various narratives like the ones mentioned above, what is not seen in her testimony is a clear connection to apocalyptic imagination. It is not required, however. It is *her* testimony and *her* story. What it does demonstrate, however, is apostolic continuation,

encounter, and the metaphor of the altar. Additionally, Pentecostal narratives are still situated within the expansive hermeneutic background that is coloured by many other narratives, some of which can compete for influence with Pentecostal narratives. Land states the difficulty in unifying the Pentecostal movement given the rapid expansion and diversity of Pentecostalism. Rapid expansion and diversity mean that Pentecostal narratives have been situated within various cultures that already have existing narratives that influence narrative identity formation. Land offers that intentional contemporary reformulation of Pentecostal testimony be revisited in light of the biblical narrative of Pentecost along with the apocalyptic goal as possible narratives that can unite the various manifestations of Pentecostalism given geography, race, class, culture and gender.[736] Furthermore, he argues that Pentecostal theology would benefit from further research on how Pentecostals can live in a tension of the already-not-yet dynamic that fulfils a mission to souls while accommodating the progress of technology in society.[737]

The narrative concepts of apostolic continuity, apocalyptic imagination, kingdom inauguration, and encounter are analysed in preparation for the following chapter, which analyses these elements in conjunction with actual Pentecostal events. Overall, this chapter serves as a crucial foundation for comprehending the role of testimonies and narratives in Pentecostalism. It explores how testimonies contribute to constructing shared narrative and communal identity. In the final chapter, the subject of Pentecostal testimony and an enactive approach to autobiographical narrative is brought together. Every chapter preceding has provided essential elements required to analyse how Pentecostal testimony forms narrative identity and transforms the individual.

[736] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 221.
[737] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 222.

CHAPTER 7: TESTIMONY AS ENACTIVE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE AND NARRATIVE IDENTITY

7.1 Introduction

The concept of testimony within a religious setting has meaning that is unique from that of other contexts. Apart from its religious use, the term "testimony" is commonly used in the legal field. A testimony within a court of law is a formal setting where an individual is called upon to give a report on things experienced firsthand on elements pertinent to a legal case. Who and how a testimony is delivered is generally determined by the kind of witness (e.g., an eyewitness, character witness, or expert witness).[738] Individuals are not given full liberty to express their opinions on the case as they see fit. Instead, they are guided by the court of law to answer as specifically and impartially as possible.[739] The cultural frame that follows the concept of testimony in legal contexts is guided by the stipulations involved. In legal studies, there is significant scholarship that has cast doubt on the accuracy and validity of a testimony. Empirical studies have shown that testimony within a court of law is not as reliable as some may assume, considering eyewitnesses are susceptible to revising their understanding of an event.[740]

Testimony within a religious context, which includes Pentecostalism, varies significantly from the legal context. When an individual has experienced conversion, testimony is legitimated as authentic and something that an individual *has*, regardless of whether it is publicly expressed or recognized. Furthermore, testimony is rarely, if not ever, scrutinized to the extent that it can be in a courtroom. Rather than a hermeneutic of suspicion that can come with legal testimony, Pentecostal testimony is connected to a sense of divine activity and is regarded with sacred

[738] Joseph Shieber, *Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 10.
[739] Axel Gelfert, *A Critical Introduction to Testimony* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 14
[740] Katherine Puddifoot, "Re-evaluating the Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Misinformation Effect and the Overcritical Juror," *Episteme* 17, no. 2 (2020): 255-279, DOI: 10.1017/epi.2018.42.

significance that insulates the testimony from doubts of a testimony's veracity. This insulation does mean that the Pentecostal community does not guide or form testimonies in notable ways. A personal testimony and how it is expressed is formed in relation to an individual's social interaction with the community. This chapter seeks to elucidate how testimony is formed and how testimony is expressed within Pentecostal communities.

This final chapter brings together all of the research presented thus far. It is the culmination of what a revised and expanded Smithian approach could look like when applied to the concept of testimony and its liturgical practice. The flow of this chapter takes a big-picture view of Pentecostal identity and then proceeds to how the broader elements of narrative and community influence the narrative identity of the individual. It begins with an ecological systems approach to Pentecostal narrative identity. The dynamic between Pentecostal master narratives, intergenerational narratives, the local community, and the autobiographical self are examined. The notion of Pentecostalism could be considered what Gallagher describes as a cognitive institution.

For clarification, I do not argue that testimony or testifying is synonymous with other liturgical forms. Nevertheless, a great deal of conceptual blend occurs in this chapter because Pentecostal's formation of the autobiographical self is moulded by various liturgical forms. Due to the transformative power embedded in liturgical practices, testimony transcends liturgical forms. As stated in Chapter 2 regarding prereflective thought and reflective thought, though prereflective thinking is not synonymous with conscious reflective thinking, prereflective hermeneutical processes still occur and always enable reflective thought. Similarly, though various liturgical forms are not directly religiously labelled as testifying or building an individual's testimony, formation of the self is occurring thereby impacting a person's testimony

or autobiographical self (i.e., narrative identity). This transcendent aspect of self arises through interaction with socio-cultural environments. It is shaped and expressed both in formal practices, such as sharing a testimony, and in other liturgical forms just as Gallagher's concept of the patterned self is formed. Though I am drawing from the example of the pervasiveness of prereflective thinking on reflective thought, I do not intend to claim that testimony formation is as pervasive as prereflective thinking. Prereflective thinking is always involved with conscious reflection. It is not clear whether that is also the case with testimony formation. A hypothesis on that matter would require more investigation than this thesis is able to offer. Nevertheless, autobiographical reformation is pervasively embedded in liturgical practices, despite my hesitance to claim the testimony is as pervasive as prereflective thought. For this reason, this chapter seeks to provide specific examples to demonstrate how discursive dynamics within various liturgical practices provide a space for implicit and explicit testimony sharing, and testimony formation.

After a broad view of narrative identity, this chapter then analyses how individuals experience formation due to discursive relationships within the community. The concept of testimony and the practice of testifying are comprehensively addressed. The concept of testimony as an autobiographical concept is analysed in relation to the discursive dynamics of the community. These discursive dynamics include the social dynamics and narratives involved in singing songs, sermons, altar calls, and call-and-response characteristics. The concept of the practice of testifying is further expounded as not only including formal storytelling but also the participation of individuals in the call-and-response dynamics of the service. It is argued that these call-and-response dynamics can be understood as an individual's confession of faith and participation in the we-narratives that unite the Pentecostal community. Multimodal alignment

occurs as the Pentecostal community interacts, creating an intersubjective space where we-narratives cultivate narrative identity. Examples of how this plays out in real scenarios are explored to further illustrate how narrative identity is formed within the community.

Finally, this chapter seeks to elucidate how changes in Pentecostals' sense of narrative identity influence behavioural change. The autobiographical concept of testimony is a vehicle through which the individual presumes that one is in a constant process of change. It is argued that behavioural change occurs because narrative identity is in continuous transformation. Thus, testimony and the narrative communicative characteristics that support testimony within the community cultivate behavioural change. This behavioural change can be correlated to the re-storying that Smith suggests, along with Gallagher's concept of the patterned self.

This chapter is the culmination of this thesis because it integrates the interdisciplinary elements provided throughout. Smith introduces a form of the enactive view of Christian formation and Pentecostal identity. This thesis expands Smith's work to include a broader, more contemporary theoretical foundation on enactivism. Various tools provided by conceptual metaphor theory are employed to examine words and concepts used by the Pentecostal community. This level of analysis allows scholarly access to the meaning of these concepts and how they contribute to Pentecostal narrative identity formation. The ecological systems approach developed by Robyn Fivush is applied to demonstrate the relationship between master narratives, intergenerational narratives, the local community, and the individual. The result is a rigorous analysis of the concept and practice of testimony that adds to the scholarly dialogue on Pentecostal identity.

7.2 Ecological Systems Approach to Pentecostal Narrative Identity

A Christian's life story consists of a theological interpretation of their life, which is derived from the Christian community's collective perspectives and the Bible. These beliefs also find much of their origin in the Scriptures for Pentecostals. Scriptures provide a vibrant resource for belief. Between the community and the Bible, master narratives are adopted by an individual that provides for what Archer describes as a "grand story or hermeneutical horizon" through which to interpret their personal life story.[741] The content of these grand stories can be developed through things like hearing sermons, testimonials, and hymns, along with dialogue within the Pentecostal community. Archer states that:

> For Pentecostals, participating in communal worship is not merely a social encounter but a spiritual event involving the emergence and articulation of one's own and the community's narrative identity. As the life stories of individuals and the community intersect, they begin sharing a common perspective, thus allowing the identity and perspective of both to be shaped ("narrating") and (re)shaped ("narrated") by the other.[742]

Singing songs together, sharing stories of God's participation or anticipated participation, and the joint attention that occurs within Pentecostal worship provide group formation. Fivush on mother-daughter dialogue here. From communally shared testimonies emerge foundational narratives in which one's particular story might be included. According to Archer, biblical stories that an individual has encountered through liturgical practices greatly influence their relational understanding of Jesus and how they fit into the greater narrative of the Christian community.[743]

What can be observed here is that Pentecostal scholars present Pentecostal theology and identity formation in terms similar to the concepts presented by Fivush on grand and intergenerational narratives. Fivush has developed a table called the "ecological systems

[741] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 42.
[742] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 42.
[743] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 42.

approach to family narratives". What is proposed here is an ecological systems approach to Pentecostal narratives:




Figure 4. Ecological Systems Model for Pentecostals.

For Fivush, master narratives are a critical element in the intersection between culture and narratives and the individual and culture. Fivush explains that master narratives "express canonical storied forms of world-making and constrain the forms and functions of individual storytelling in ways that create conformity among members of the same storytelling group".[744] Fivush sees canonical storied forms as relatively stable narratives that are used as tools in social groups to express and evaluate personal experiences, organize personal memory, and create an interface between an individual and culture.[745] By "canonical", what is intended is not the

[744] Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory*, 15.
[745] Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory*, 2.

religious frame that the word "canonical" may evoke in relation to the sacred canon of Scripture. It is a useful metaphor to describe narratives that a group of people has received to be normative of what one would experience or assume about a life event. A life story, also conceived as a "life script", is understood as "culturally shared expectations as to the order and timing of life events in a prototypical life course".[746] The life script of an individual is those aspects of one's life that seem to concord with canonical narratives. Life scripts function as a generalized schema that helps categorize events in an individual's life.

It has been recognized that biblical narrative integration is more than just optional for Pentecostals. There is a normative expectation that one's life story should reflect an analogical similitude to biblical narratives, as one's life is a continuation of the biblical story of God's activity on earth.[747] For example, in the case of Sister John Woodruff's personal story of her baptism in the "Holy Ghost". In her story, she not only states as a matter of fact that she received the baptism of the Spirit, but she also provides a canonical narrative of what would be expected by the Pentecostal community of one who is baptized in the Spirit. She states that she spoke in three different languages. The three different languages represented the demonstration of *glossolalia* or speaking in tongues, similar to what was experienced in the Book of Acts. From the moment of receiving the Baptism of the Spirit, Sister John Woodruff is further enabled to view normative religious events within the schema of the Pentecostal life script that has been integrated into her narrative identity. Her mention of three different languages seems likely to have been included in her testimony to evoke normative categorization within the canonical prototype of biblical Pentecost, thus giving her experience a higher likelihood of being

[746] Dorthe Berntsen and David C. Rubin, "Cultural Life Scripts Structure Recall from Autobiographical Memory," *Memory and Cognition* 32, no. 3 (2004), 427, DOI: 10.3758/BF03195836.

[747] Milton, "Salvation," 227.

understood as an Idealized Cognitive Model by the Pentecostal community. Furthermore, the fact that her experience is included in the periodical is significant. As stated in Chapter 6, Seymour began the periodical to communicate things that were occurring at the Azusa Street Revival to the broader Christian community that was following the activities at Azusa. The stories were likely versions of narratives that described what Seymour saw as authoritatively representing what was occurring in the emerging Pentecostal movement at Azusa. Thus, both the content within Sister John Woodruff's narrative and the fact that it was included within the periodical helps constitute her testimony as an ideal storied form of Pentecostal experience. The testimony's inclusion in the periodical is an example of the kind of socially extended cognition argued by Gallagher and Tollefsen. Those following the Azusa Street Revival through the periodical could potentially grant trust in the story as authoritative because Seymour first included it within the periodical. Seymour was the frontline of hermeneutical meaning-making that delivered the story to the world through the periodical. Consequently, stories like Sister John Woodruff's helped form authoritative, storied forms of Pentecostal testimony.

Before moving forward into exploring some canonical Pentecostal narratives through an ecological systems approach, it is beneficial to keep in mind that the normative nature of master narratives and life scripts should be seen from an enactive perspective. Though the concept of "canonical" suggests a sense of consistency, canonical narratives are in constant, even if slow, transformation within individuals and social groups. Life scripts and master narratives evolve alongside sociohistorical change.[748] Furthermore, as demonstrated in the figure on the ecological systems model of Pentecostal Narrative, each domain has the capability to affect other domains. An individual's testimony is not isolated from the community. As soon as it is expressed, it

[748] Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory*, 16.

forms part of the context of the local community story. An individual's testimony informs the way master narratives and intergenerational narratives are contextualized in the present. The present Pentecostal community will understand Sister John Woodruff's testimony of receiving the baptism of the Spirit in a unique way to that of the early modern Pentecostal movement. For example, the purpose of testimonies within the periodical *Apostolic Faith* were intended to inform the world about the new and miraculous things occurring at Azusa St. In the present, her story is seen as historically part of a purpose that has already been achieved. It is not as "new" anymore. Pentecostalism is now a global phenomenon, meaning that speaking in tongues is not necessarily seen as something extraordinary. That is not to say that it is not given special or meaningful significance. That it is not extraordinary merely means that speaking in tongues is a common characteristic of a movement that has proliferated globally. Importantly, despite the evolving characteristics of canonical narratives, it does not negate that master narratives shape how our personal stories and experiences are relayed to others both inside and outside our social groups.[749]

In the ecological systems approach for Pentecostal narratives, master narratives can include some of the narratives already mentioned in the prior chapter. In the macro-system, this model has placed master narratives like biblical stories, Book of Acts narratives, apocalyptic vision, Apostolic continuity, the altar, and kingdom inauguration. Archer mentions "grand stories" that can fit within the domain of what Fivush classifies as master narratives. For Archer, Grand narratives are referred to as "meta-narrative", which are the narratives "by which human societies and their individual members live and organize their lives".[750] Archer includes the narrative of restoration (related to Apostolic continuity), the story of Pentecost in Acts, and the

[749] Fivush, *Autobiographical Memory*, 16.
[750] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 133, no. 24.

latter rain motif.[751] It is a challenge to categorize precisely how the grand narratives mentioned by Archer fit within the ecological systems approach. However, it is unnecessary to compartmentalize Archer's examples of grand narratives into a particular category. The ecological systems approach is intended to be understood within an enactive dynamic. Narratives within one category are not necessarily crystalized to a macro, exo, or micro domain. This model is designed to show how narratives can work to help form an individual's autobiographical sense of self and the extent to which their life story concords with canonical narratives within their community.

The exo-system represents more immediate intergenerational narratives like the already-not-yet prophetic fulfilment, Azusa St. Revival, the latter rain motif, and stories of Pentecostal pioneers. Through the exo-system of intergenerational narratives, master narratives are given significance within the community. The eschatological themes with biblical narrative remain relevant for Pentecostals because the present stands in an already-not-yet tension. The present is still inaugurating the fulfilment of a prophetic reality to come. Therefore, apocalyptic narratives within the Book of Revelation are invested with significance that is carried from the present to the next generation. biblical narratives are given significance because, according to Archer, the Pentecostal story is the primary hermeneutical context for reading the Bible.[752] At the same time, Archer states that the "Pentecostal community's identity is forged from its reading of Biblical narratives".[753] Hence, the Bible and the Pentecostal community exist in an ecological effect. Pentecost reinforces the community's value of the Bible, and the Bible influences Pentecostal's identity and back again.

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[751] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 133-136.
[752] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutic*, 134.
[753] Archer, *A Pentecostal Hermeneutics*, 134.

The master narrative of the kingdom is sustained by the already-not-yet dynamic that contextualizes the kingdom into the present. Since the cultural frame of kingdom includes concepts of war, invasion, and struggle with the spiritual rulers of this world because, according to Ephesians, "we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers over this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places". Thus, the conceptual metaphor of *the church as a kingdom* influences Pentecostal's view of what it means to participate culturally in society and affects how and to what extent a Pentecostal participates in various forms of entertainment, career, and family relationships.

One of the most immediate influences on autobiographical memory is the local church community. Some of those influences can include the historical stories of how the local church came to be and testimonies that are foundational to the church's identity. The local community enables conversation and discursive dynamics that integrate master and intergenerational narratives within the individual. Discursive elements can include conversational communal reminiscing on how one's life has been changed or congregational reminiscing on the prototypicality of local experiences with that of the Azusa St. Revival or the Book of Acts. In other words, the extent to which "this-is-that" which was seen in other prototypical Pentecostal events. The local churches serve as facilitators of the canonical narratives that support narrative identity formation. It is a critically important element of identity formation because it greatly influences how local communities interpret Pentecostal narratives. The local church takes the position of what Fivush has labelled family narratives because it enables the development of a personal testimony in people's lives. That is not to say that the role of an individual's family is removed from people's lives. On the contrary, people's familial dynamics, or even lack thereof,

have already created irreversible identity in individuals. The church simply provides an additional transformative element with the potential to make deep and meaningful changes that last individuals a lifetime.

An example of this of a local community's contextualization of Pentecostal narrative is the community in which the Spanish language hymn, *Aleluya al Señor,* was written. Pentecostal scholar Lloyd Barba in his book, *Sowing the Sacred,* provides crucial research on a group he refers to as *Apostólicos*, or "Apostolics".[754] *Apostolicos* were part of a Mexican Pentecostal movement described as outsiders of society, many of whom were farmworkers who had migrated to Northern California to work in agriculture.[755] Interestingly, the name of the hymn stands in contrast to the way the word "*aleluya*" was used derogatorily by other members of the Mexican community to refer to the members of this Pentecostal denomination.[756] The hymn was part of a hymnal that served as a powerful medium to communicate Pentecostal narrative. The strong oral tradition within the community reinforced the memorization of religious principles and doctrinal teaching. Group identity was formed even as the migratory experience facilitated doctrinal dissemination.[757] According to Lloyd Barba, Pentecostals throughout the 20th century drew from the biblical agricultural metaphor of the harvest based on biblical passages like one found in John 4:35: "Do you not say, 'there are yet four months, then comes the harvest'? Look, I tell you, left up your eyes, and see that the fields are white for harvest".[758] Barba points out that the migrant agricultural labour circuits provided the backdrop for the beginning of *Apostólico* leader's ministerial careers.[759] The embodied experience of converted Mexican farmworkers

[754] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred,* 4
[755] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred,* 4.
[756] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred,* 199.
[757] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred,* 209.
[758] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred,* 30.
[759] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred,* 39.

provided powerful resonance with these biblical metaphors. Mexican farmworkers witnessed the grand scale of massive fields propelled by the impetus of flourishing agribusiness farming. Their hands planted the fields, watched them grow, and then "pruned and plucked" the fruit of their labour.[760] Ironically, the masses of Mexican migrants that poured into the borderlands were the very "fields" of evangelism that Mexican Pentecostal converts sought to harvest. Thus, Barba states, "For Mexican Pentecostals whose enterprise evangelism took root, germinated, and flourished at this time, agriculture had indeed taken on new meaning and novel implications".[761]

When Mexican Pentecostal farm workers hear biblical passages that state, "The harvest is plentiful, but the laborers are few"[762], the embodied reaction will be different than that of individuals who only know industrial and commercial labour of the inner city. The need for labourers in the midst of an overabundant harvest is the very reason why Mexican migrants travelled the various agricultural centres throughout California. The apocalyptic urgency of preaching the Gospel to the world, which is the location of the harvest, finds a unique characteristic among those who frequently actually worked the fields. Eschatological fervency was met with the physical resilience that it takes to work under strenuous conditions in the field. In this way, Pentecostal narrative meets the local community, even as the local community interprets biblical narrative that informs Pentecostal life. It is astonishing how Pentecostal Mexican farmworkers found religious motivation through their work despite the desperate conditions. Barba states that the conditions in industrial agriculture in California were notorious and dehumanizing as field workers were subjected to things like wage exploitation, poor housing, and other basic human rights.[763] Nevertheless, the ICMs of harvest and fieldwork were

[760] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred*, 31.
[761] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred*, 39
[762] Matthew 9:38.
[763] Barba, *Sowing the Sacred*, 8.

integrated into Pentecostal farmworkers to symbolize the work that must be done to preach the Gospel and win souls to the kingdom of God. Their suffering within such oppressive conditions likely reinforced their vigorous desire to introduce the Pentecostal experience to others. Just as work in the field ravaged their bodies, sin ravaged the souls of those who did not know Jesus. Their mission was to introduce their community to a source of relief that could be found in God.

In considering the usefulness of the ecological systems approach for Pentecostal narratives, it is important to consider that these narratives need not be extensively expressed within communities to have an impact on identity formation. The extent to which the Pentecostal narratives mentioned in this thesis are explicitly mentioned or taught in a given Pentecostal community varies. The extent to which various Pentecostal communities engage various Pentecostal narratives contributes to the unique variations of identity formation. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand that explicit mention of these narratives is not necessary for them to be a part of identity formation within an individual. For example, there are many common phrases and concepts that are founded upon the conceptual metaphor that THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS. This includes concepts like "constructing a strong argument". One need not have explicitly explained the concept that THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS to understand the statement. Embodied prereflective knowledge of construction and building naturally leads individuals to understanding that ideas can be joined in a way that is resistant to contradiction. For this reason, Pentecostals do not need ever to have explicitly heard the concept of "already-not-yet" or "promise fulfilment". In verse four of the hymn, *Aleluya al Señor*, it states that believers in the life to come (i.e., the afterlife) are to receive white garments and celebrate with crowns and palms. However, it also speaks of an eternal life God gives the soul in the present. Eternal life is expressed in terms of "*Esta promesa nunca faltará*," which means, "This promise will never fail". Eternal life

is granted to a soul in the present through God's salvation, that is, "*gratuita*" or free-of-charge (see verse 3 of the hymn *Aleluya al Señor*). At the same time, it is part of a greater promise that will be completed in the life to come. Therefore, the promise can be experienced "already", even if the fulfilment of the promise is "not yet". Furthermore, though there is a "promise" of eternal life, it is already in partial "fulfilment" in the present life. Thus, the already-not-yet and promise fulfilment narratives are integrated within a hymn that was carried throughout a Pentecostal community. Even as it was integrated within a unique cultural context, it still provided a similar narrative identity to other Pentecostals that were neither Mexican nor spoke Spanish. Nevertheless, cultural groups like the ones analysed above received and integrated the powerful already-not-yet dynamic of the inaugurated kingdom of God.

7.3 Pentecostalism as a Cognitive Institution

Wacker describes an element of testimony that provides insight into how giving testimonies contributes to how the Pentecostal movement can be understood as a cognitive institution. Within the community, shared testimony helps strengthen collective identity by helping to dispel remaining indecision an individual may have felt about being Pentecostal and indecision the group may have in receiving an individual into the group. The individual who has then been received into the "We" of the Pentecostal community has been narratively inaugurated into the group narrative.[764] Additionally, Wacker states that "testimony clothed individual lives with timeless significance" and that "Believer's incessant talk of skirmishes and sieges and bloodied warriors of the faith erased the boundary between the petty realities of the present and the ultimate realities of the eternal".[765] It is not that believers believe themselves to be in a

[764] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 68.
[765] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 69.

physical war. That believers describe themselves as being involved in sieges and battles is a testament to the enchanted worldview described in the prior chapter. Their present situations and struggles are invested with spiritual meaning. At times this includes the assumption that circumstances that affect them spiritually are the product of a spiritual battle with a spiritual enemy that is attempting to weaken their faith. Pentecostals can overcome private circumstances due to their understanding of a bigger picture or story that "spanned the millennia".[766] Furthermore, Archer states that the "interconnectedness of narrative identity" is notable as individuals are corporately involved in the "shared mission of Jesus"[767].

Wacker states that in the process of conversion to Pentecostalism, many individuals faced what Wacker describes as "the Terrible Test".[768] According to Wacker, "the terrible test" took various forms, leading to a final yielding to the baptism of the Holy Spirit. While the fear of financial loss burdened some, pastors of other movements feared that their ministerial careers would be in jeopardy if they were seen as associated with Pentecostals.[769] In the early Pentecostal periodical, *The Latter Rain Evangel*, a pastor named William H. Piper gave a sermon first delivered on December 12, 1909, which was subsequently published by the periodical.[770] In the published sermon, Piper speaks of the first years of opening the church. He states, "The opening of this church was an act of faith… I consulted no human being as to the advisability… I believed I was led of the Spirit, and yet there was a little hesitancy and uncertainty".[771] He describes how, as soon as the church began to embrace what he describes as the "latter rain

[766] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 69
[767] Archer, "Pentecostal Theology as Story," 43.
[768] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 59.
[769] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 60-61.
[770] William H. Piper, "The Third Anniversary of the Stone Church: What God Hath Wrought!", in *The Latter Rain Evangel* vol. 2, no.4 (January 1910).
[771] Piper, "What God Hath Wrought!", 2.

truths", a notable amount of people received the baptism of the Holy Spirit and praised God in other tongues. Amid the church's revival, Piper says that they were "severely tested" by the illness of his son with pneumonia. He described his son as having "went down to the very gates of death".[772] Nevertheless, he states they "laid hold on God", and his son was wondrously healed. Piper goes on to list various other testimonies of individuals that had received the baptism of the Holy Spirit and had been miraculously healed.

The purpose of including Piper's sermon in this study is not to consider the validity of these stories but to consider the way that these testimonies could have been integrated into the community. This sermon is clearly influenced by overarching master narratives found within the biblical Pentecostal story. In mentioning the "latter rain" movement, Piper embeds his experience in narratives that are temporally closer to Piper and the church's present time. Piper and his church choose to give a specific autobiographical account of their experience. The local church has a unique interpretation and experience of master Pentecostal narratives by remembering the first moments of their church's experience with Pentecost in their community. Though we only have Piper's personal description of these events, these stories are likely to be the very stories that influenced other individual members of Piper's congregation. The church's joint experience of the past three years united them with narratives that, at the same time, formed communities throughout America. The narratives help constitute the cognitive processes of the Pentecostal community. Therefore, it can be observed how narratives scale within the ecological model of Pentecostal narratives from macro to micro, to individual levels while still maintaining a kind of enactive communal cognitive form.

[772] Piper, "What God Hath Wrought!", 3.

The intergenerational narratives that are cultivated in sermons like Piper's are powerful because they not only help re-story autobiographical narratives. They also help individuals project a future that is formed after the ICMs of testimony. Tony Richie states, "Testimony also involves a sense of the future, as participants live in the present and anticipatory engagement with the coming reign of God in dialogue with the Scriptures".[773] This statement is invested with a multi-level narrative. It is verified in the concluding statements of Piper's testimonial sermon, "With His help we go on to a larger place of usefulness, and believe, should He tarry, that by His grace the next three years will be filled with deeper and larger blessings".[774] In this statement, Piper articulates an anticipation of more significant things that will occur. The descriptors used are that the next three years be "filled" with "deeper and larger" blessings from God. There are multiple conceptual metaphors at work here. The anticipation that the following *three years* will be *filled* indicates a CONTAINER image schema. The temporal boundary of three years is a container that Piper desires to be filled with the blessings of God. This is the same kind of image schema that is mentioned in Chapter 3 when individuals say that they are *in love*, and the one mentioned in Chapter 6 regarding Sister John Woodruff's use of THE BLOOD IS A CONTAINER metaphor. The blessings of God in reference here are likely to be patterned in Piper and the community's mind after the kinds of miraculous experiences relayed in the larger narrative of the sermon. Additionally, the blessings that Piper hopes for are "deeper and larger". Piper uses an IMPORTANT IS BIG primary metaphor to construct the conceptual metaphor of deeper and larger blessings. In essence, Piper is stating that he hopes to experience miraculous demonstrations of God's participation that are of greater significance to both him and the congregation. Pentecostal

[773] Tony Richie, "Translating Pentecostal Testimony into Interreligious Dialogue," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology*, 20 (2011), 134, DOI 10.1163/174552511X554627.

[774] Piper, "What God Hath Wrought!", 7.

scholar Grace Milton describes the connection between the individual and corporate sense of the future as a sense of corporate destiny.[775] For example, the salvation story of the individual Pentecostal is building towards climactic destiny. However, it is also embedded with a sense of promise-fulfilment of the climactic destiny. This sense of destiny includes a personal destiny that is being fulfilled in the present life, will be fulfilled in life after death, and is and will be fulfilled in the corporate body and creation.[776] Hence, Milton states, "Believers' personal testimonies are drawn back into line with the biblical narrative, especially through a focus on the eschatological dimensions of salvation". The eschatological element referred to by Milton is present in Piper's concluding statement when he says, "should He tarry". The statement, "should He tarry", means should Jesus Christ not return in the span of time in reference by Piper. In the meantime that Christ does not return, Piper expects God's deeper and larger blessings to fill the years to come. These are blessings that will not only be for Piper but also for the congregation as a whole.

Pentecostals are drawn into the community as a cognitive institution through powerful narratives. These narratives permeate talk about the Bible, assumptions about the community in the Bible, how the contemporary Pentecostal community can identify as being an extension of that community, and how as individuals, Pentecostals demonstrate that identity in their personal lives. This cognitive unity is cultivated through communication that was established as canonical or ideal through socially authoritative sources. Some sources mentioned in this section include the early Pentecostal periodicals like *Apostolic Faith* and *The Latter Rain Evangel*. In these periodicals, testimonies informed the community of idealized storied forms of God's participation in the community. As an example, this section explains why these storied forms have influenced the broader Pentecostal community.

[775] Milton, "Salvation," 231.
[776] Milton, "Salvation," 231-232.

While this section is useful in analyzing examples of how the Pentecostal identity is formed more broadly, what is missing is more individual analysis. Furthermore, there are limitations with this current analysis in that the reader's reaction to the periodicals mentioned is not immediately observable. The following section addresses more individualized identity formation by analyzing discursive elements involved with demonstratable instances of church liturgical practice.

7.4 Discursive Dynamics and Call-and-Response

In the context of a church service, the call-and-response activity is often practised during the event. Though call-and-response can be traced to African music traditions, within a church, it can be seen in various activities, including preaching and public testimony articulation. It is claimed by Gillian Richards-Greaves that “calls and responses can emanate from any position in the sanctuary and from any source”.[777] Additionally, call-and-response activities have become embedded in churches from various Christian traditions throughout the world. In a church preaching context, call-and-response involves the preacher or minister delivering a statement, question, or phrase, known as the "call," and the congregation responding with a short phrase or affirmation, known as the "response." The response can be given both individually and corporately. This back-and-forth interaction creates a dynamic atmosphere that promotes active participation from the congregation. Call-and-response can create a sense of unity and shared experience among the congregation as the message being preached is affirmed communally.

In her work on the practice of call-and-response in the Black Church, Richards-Greaves examines call-and-response behaviour that is often overlooked. Call and response originate from

[777] Gillian R. Richards-Greaves, ““Say Hallelujah, Somebody” and “I Will Call upon the Lord”: An Examination of Call-and-Response in the Black Church,” *The Western Journal of Black Studies* 40, 3 (2016), 192.

the "pulpit" and the "pew" through communal affirmation and encouragement of the speaker.[778] The "pulpit" and "pew" are used by Richards-Greaves as metonyms here. The "pulpit" represents the individual or group that is communicating from the front of the church to the general congregants (audience). The pulpit can include people like a preacher or speaker or groups like a choir. The "pew" represents the congregation that is being spoken to. However, in a service where call-and-response is in effect, the concept of who is speaking and being spoken to is sometimes blurred. Richards-Greaves understands a "call" as "a sound or a gesture that is deliberately or inadvertently executed and attracts attention".[779] A response is a reaction to an initial "call" that can also be a sound or gesture. Both calls and responses can be generally verbal and non-verbal. Scholars understand the ecological interaction between call and response as a feedback loop.[780] Verbal calls can include when a speaker explicitly asks the congregation, "Can I get an amen?". Non-verbal calls can include moments when the speaker summons the congregation to respond in a certain way.[781] This can include actions like social cues like pointing the microphone toward the congregation, therefore implicitly and visually indicating that the congregation should respond in a certain way.

The way different congregations both call and respond will vary between various congregations. Nevertheless, call-and-response feedback loops are a hallmark of many Pentecostal congregations. Instances of call-and-response feedback loops are explored throughout this section, considering that call-and-response dynamics form a notable part of the kind of church discourse that helps form individual identity in the community. It is helpful to draw a similarity between the feedback loop involved in call-and-response behaviour and the

[778] Richards-Greaves, "Say Hallelujah Somebody," 193.
[779] Richards-Greaves, "Say Hallelujah, Somebody," 193.
[780] Richards-Greaves, "Say Hallelujah, Somebody," 193.
[781] Richards-Greaves, "Say Hallelujah, Somebody," 202.

articulacy loop developed by Amanda Drury. Drury's use of the articulacy loop deals primarily with testimony on a more macro scale since formal testimony expression is primarily addressed. The kind of discourse that this thesis seeks to analyze includes a broader spectrum of discursive liturgical activities beyond what Drury examines, like the call-and-response dynamic.

Before proceeding, it will be beneficial to recall some of the earlier theoretical foundations of this thesis. Bietti's work on dynamics and outcomes in conversational discourse is a useful tool for analysis (See Chapter 4). The dynamics in reference in this section follows Bietti. Dynamics within discursive communication include the conversational context, assumed social roles of the participants, the shared reality of the attended event, and the communicative strategies employed. The call-and-response characteristics in a church service indicate a socially interactive context. Multimodal coupling and alignment help cultivate a shared reality of the activities that are occurring within the service. Assumed roles include, for example, what Richards-Greaves pinpoints as those that have the socially accepted role of calling for a response to the congregation. Finally, conversational strategies can include the embodied practices embedded in the Pentecostal community that help aid the retention or reinterpretation of memories (i.e., testimonies). For example, memory retention is encouraged if the memory presented is an ideal presentation of what is expected of a testimony. If the community senses that what is being spoken does not entirely accord with the community's ICMs. This kind of collaborative facilitation occurs in the collaborative call-and-response dynamic within a given group. The "umms", "amens", and nods that occur demonstrate cross-cued reinforcement. Drury acknowledges this kind of group narrative construction that goes beyond precise aural speech. Rather, even verbal gesturing can be an articulation of one's own testimony.[782] Drury states that

[782] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 63.

when one testifies, one testifies to events that have been experienced and interpreted "through the lens of my community," thus, the community is always ecologically informing an individual's understanding of the experienced event.[783]

The influence of the community on an individual's understanding can be observed in two significant ways in Mark Cartledge's narrative of Beverley's testimony. Firstly, according to Beverley's testimony, she interacted with a community of believers at the altar. It is at the altar that she receives prayer for her situation. She states that at the altar, she made her way to a location at the alter where many pastors were praying for a large number of people. There was also much noise. The noise seems to indicate that many people were praying together and praying aurally. In this moment of group agency, the community first interacted with Beverley and her need. The master and intergenerational we-narratives supporting the notion of encounter in the altar enabled the community to come together and supported a specific pastor's capability to join Beverley in prayer. The practice of going to the altar was a liturgical practice that allowed the community's intentional actions to come together with powerful embedded Pentecostal narratives.

Secondly, in Cartledge's study, Beverley relays her testimony regarding her cancer diagnosis to the group. She shares that the doctor said, "You're clear, it's all gone". As a result, the group expresses verbal praises to God in response.[784] What may seem like a rudimentary, almost insignificant social dynamic is actually what makes Pentecostal discourse so powerful in the transformation of identity. To recall Fivush's analysis of the interaction between Rebecca and her mother, what can be observed is a discursive negotiation about how to remember the event of bike riding over a bridge. At one point, Rebecca's mother directs Rebecca from the fear of how

[783] Drury, *Saying is Believing*, 68.
[784] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 106. See Also: Charlotte 33,

fast they were going to consider, “But you had fun, though, didn’t you?”. A similar kind of reinterpretative negotiation occurs in a group testimonial setting. The group’s response to Beverley’s story is a communal discursive reinforcement of Beverley’s mnemonic recollection. They not only encourage her storied account of healing, but they also reinforce her story with powerful theological narrative frames. Their verbal praise to God as a response implicitly reinforces the idea that God intervened in Beverley’s situation. Furthermore, it is not only an affirmation for Beverley herself but also an affirmation of the group to each other. The agreement contributes to narrative construction within the group as they participate in embodied affirmation. Multimodal coupling and alignment can be observed in conversational context (i.e., formal testimony articulation), assumed social roles (i.e., speaker vs listeners), and shared reality (i.e., communal response).

Cartledge recognizes that this dynamic occurs beyond the public practice of sharing a testimony. It also happens during a sermon when members of the congregation at times shout, “Praise the Lord! Thank you, Jesus!” or “Amen!”.[785] This is because spontaneity and creative worship expression is encouraged in the Pentecostal movement. As such, Cartledge states that “the Pentecostal tradition is appreciated for its orality, enabling active participation by its members… it is dynamic and emerging, and the congregation exerts liturgical leadership, not just the pastors”.[786] Cartledge’s statement here refers to the same dynamic that Richards-Greaves describes in call-and-response. The social role of who is normatively expected to speak versus who is expected to be spoken to changes and is often blurred in Pentecostal services. The interchangeable roles are why Cartledge states that liturgical heteronormative activity is not solely relegated to formal positions of religious authority like the pastor, minister, or presider of

[785] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 31.
[786] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 41.

the service. The congregation can become the liturgical leader in expressing worship to God by shouting, clapping, or many other forms of spontaneous worship. These spontaneous expressions are not seen as merely occurring due to an individual's emotional, expressive response. Spontaneous worship is often seen as emerging from the Holy Spirit's leading of the group.[787] There is a porous cosmological belief that the Holy Spirit is influencing spontaneous worship. To recall an early section of this thesis, the porous cosmological inbreaking of the Holy Spirit is the reason Vondey describes a Pentecostal service as a *festival of enchanted attachment*. In a Pentecostal service, it is not unordinary for the social role of pastor, preacher, and worship leader to be exchanged momentarily with the congregation, not by the will of man, but by the will of God through the leading of the Holy Spirit. The following sections are devoted to examining this dynamic in various liturgical settings. The examples analyzed will provide further social context to understand the kind of multimodal coupling and alignment that occurs within Pentecostal liturgical practices.

7.5 Articulated Testimony within the Discursive Dynamics of a Pentecostal Church Service

Up until this point, the practice of formal testimony expression has only been analyzed in alternative forms from that of an actual Church service. This includes Sis. John Woodruff's narrative within the *Apostolic Faith* periodical and the formal study practice by Mark Cartledge. Stephen Parker describes testimonies in a Pentecostal service as "a way to give space for people to voice their victories, concerns, and laments. This time helped people recognize and acknowledge the joys and sadness that are the fabric of life; they provided space for processing the healings that came and those that did not".[788] Stories of lament or need often result in the

[787] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 41.
[788] Parker, "Tradition-Based Integration," 311.

community coming together to pray for one another. In this social action, Pentecostals are supported by others as attention is given to an individual's sickness or various needs.[789] An excellent example of how testimony is practised in a church service can be found in an ethnographic study of a local Pentecostal congregation performed by Parker.[790] As stated in the introduction, Parker's case study is not designed to specifically address the topic of an enactive view of the autobiographical self or testimony. Nevertheless, Parker's narration of the event provides descriptors that clearly demonstrate the kind of liturgical practices that cultivate the autobiographical self.

The church service Parker observes is a congregation located in a small town called Antioch, North Carolina.[791] The church service begins with a song led by the minister of music, Ed Rollins. Ed goes to the pulpit and invites everyone to stand and sing the song "I Will Enter His Gates with Thanksgiving". Many church members clap and sing along to the lively song. Ed's position behind the pulpit and the congregational response indicate that the group has accepted particular assumed roles. Ed will lead the call to participate in worship and facilitate aspects of the service. Parker states that the lively singing "generates a positive energy among the congregation and brings a sense of harmony of purpose and expectation".[792] This communal dynamic is likely a crucial element that brings the congregation in multimodal alignment and joint intention to the various activities in the service. The congregation is not simply clapping to the song. They clap and sing together. The joint intention practised likely facilitates what Gallagher and Tollefsen describe as *group agency*.

[789] Parker, "Tradition-Based Integration," 316.
[790] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 105-114.
[791] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 71
[792] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 106-107.

At a certain point, the individual leading the service, Ed, takes some time to invite the congregation for impromptu participation in giving a testimony after singing a testimonial song called "Living By Faith" and "I Feel Like Traveling On". A woman, Patricia, around 30 years of age, who is receiving cancer treatment, is the first to stand and speak, "The Lord has been so good to me. Living by faith is so much better than living by sight. Living every day – day by day. God has been so good to me."[793]

Subsequently, Linus, a man about 55 years of age, stands and speaks. This is his first time coming to the church service after being diagnosed with cancer, along with a prognosis that he did not have much time to live. He says, "It is good to be in the house of the Lord and to know that in the midst of so much bad news that God is good. I thank God for the health that I do have this morning."[794]

Finally, after a few others stand to testify, Iva, a woman in her late 20s, stands teary-eyed to speak, "The devil has been fighting me over this. 'What would people think about you'? (a pause) I have a special need in my home and need the church to pray."[795] After she finished sharing, Ed invites her up to pray. As Iva makes her way forward, another woman joins her, indicating that she also wants to receive prayer. A general invitation is made by the minister of music for others to come forward if they have a need. According to Parker, the invitation "affirms for Iva that her speaking up was in order. The prayer on behalf of those who had gone forward is an opportunity for the congregation to express special concern".[796] Considering this, some individuals come forward to be prayed for, and others come forward to support those in need with prayers, often with a hand on the other's back or shoulder. In this particular instance,

[793] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 107.
[794] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 108.
[795] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 110.
[796] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 111.

Linus is one of the individuals praying for others. Importantly, there is an aspect of prayer in the altar call that is not only one "praying for" another. Participants are both praying for and praying *with* each other. There is a powerful we-narrative in play here that is further explored below.

Though Parker provides much more detail regarding this particular service, the information provided here is sufficient to analyze some significant discursive dynamics. In Patricia's account, she expresses that "living by faith is so much better than living by sight". Considering that this statement was expressed after singing the song "Living By Faith," it indicates that her statement may have been, at least in part, influenced or reinforced by the song. Patricia's statement expresses evidence of a proclivity to hold on to her religious belief, even if it may challenge what others may see as a contradiction of her belief that God can miraculously intervene in people's lives. That she contrasts this with "living by sight" indicates that she is willing to interpret her current circumstance with an understanding that goes beyond what can be empirically observed. Here, *sight* is used as a conceptual metaphor that is common to the human expression: UNDERSTANDING/KNOWING IS SEEING. The metaphor of UNDERSTANDING being correlated to SEEING is based on the concrete physical experience of seeing something. For example, when a light is turned on in a dark room, details about the objects within the room can be observed that were previously not afforded due to the lack of light. The increased perceptual affordance is correlated to the experience of not understanding something at one point, understanding something at a future point in time, and consequently realizing that the new understanding has afforded the understanding that there are new horizons of perception. As a result, correspondence can be created between the concrete physical

experience of seeing and more complex conceptual metaphors.[797] Examples include statements like, "The statement is clear" and "You shed some light on the subject".

That one can *live* by *faith* as opposed to living by sight implies what one is seeking to purposefully act upon faith rather than what can be empirically observed. Consequently, what Patricia is expressing in a simple sentence is much more complex. That Patricia has expressed that it is better not to live by sight implies that she is intentionally seeking not to make, or at least limit, decisions based on what can be empirically observed about her circumstances. To recall the this-is-that narrative, that which can be empirically observed about a situation can be "not-that". The circumstance that seems to be in reference here is her cancer diagnosis and likely all the changes in life that typically are required with treating cancer. To live by faith means that Patricia seeks to make decisions motivated primarily by her religious assumptions about God, which in the Pentecostal movement often includes that God is a healer and performer of miracles. To live by faith, "is-that". That God is a healer does not mean that Patricia has decided not to receive medical treatment for cancer. Rather, it is an expression describing a hermeneutical perspective that affects the way she interprets her actions, whether that be medical treatment or religious practice. That likely means that despite receiving medical treatment, she is receiving it with the underlying assumption that God can act through the avenue of medicine or the avenue of miraculous intervention.

Linus expresses a hermeneutical perspective in saying that despite his medical prognosis, "God is good" and "I thank God for the health that I do have". This is an exceptionally moving testimony as Linus has received news that he does not have much time to live. Few things can impact an individual, like a terminal disease. Nevertheless, Linus's confession demonstrates the

[797] Kövecses, *Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory*, 41.

kind of resilience that religious narratives can help construct even in the midst of dire circumstances. Linus has chosen to continue recognizing the goodness of God and recognize with gratitude the good health that he *does* have rather than focus on his terminal prognosis. Parker expresses how this moment brings a notable intensity to the service as most of the congregation is aware of both individuals' medical conditions. As their testimonies are given, Parker notes there are members of the congregation who audibly express support for those testifying with short prayers that God would bless them and mumbled praises to God for his goodness even in light of the challenging circumstances of their medical condition. Parker notes that Linus's testimony serves as a public reaffirmation of his faith in God despite Linus not receiving "answers to his prayers". That he has not received an answer to his prayers likely implies that he has not received healing from cancer.

Iva, alternatively, does not express herself in terms of a willingness to offer her need as an opportunity for God's intervention through prayer. Iva says, "The devil has been fighting me over this". Her statement seems to imply that the devil does not want her to pray or receive prayer from others. Prayer for Pentecostals is a practice that is used as an avenue to motivate God's intervention in one's life. Therefore, Ed calls her up to the altar to pray. This occurrence in the service seems to be a good candidate for the kind of collaborative inhibition that Bietti refers to in discourse. Iva's testimony does not seem to follow the confessional nature of the other testimonies completely. For example, Linus professes that God is good, and that Linus is thankful despite what may seem like a negative medical prognosis. Ed, being in a position to lead the service, opens an impromptu opportunity to mitigate whatever conclusions may be present in both Iva and the community about Iva by adding to the moment an opportunity for God's intervention through a call to the altar. On a spiritual level, they anticipate that God will

intervene in Iva's life to complete Iva's narrative, possibly similar to the kind of "eyes of faith" confessed by Patricia. She demonstrates her needs to the community by stating through tears that she needs the church to pray for her situation.

Importantly, though this seems to be a clear situation of collaborative inhibition, Ed's and the congregation's reaction should not be seen as a negative reaction to Iva's narrative. The community gathers to revise or augment Iva's thinking, but it is not because her thinking is interpreted as being wrong. Rather, her thinking is unfulfilled. In these real-life moments, the grand narratives of promise-fulfilment and already-not-yet dynamics come to play. Though Iva is not in a position to fully confess that God is intervening in her situation, it is merely *not yet* what it needs to be. Consequently, it is interpreted by the congregation as an opportunity for God to show his miraculous intervention. This is why Parker states that her prayer request, though not accompanied by the kind of confession professed by Linus or Patricia, is still received and accepted by the community as acceptable and appropriate.[798]

The discursive dynamics presented above form those who participate in the altar call and those who remain in their seats observing. Those who remain seated may include people like children, youth, family members, or visitors to the church. They have the opportunity to observe the idealized behaviour included in the act of presenting a need or going to the altar to pray. If or when those who remain in their seats find themselves in a similar circumstance as Ed, Patricia, Linus and Iva, they have been given the capability of recalling events similar to this one to serve as a model of communally accepted behaviour. The capability of recall and enaction is enabled because the behaviour observed in events like these has been received by the community and those considered authoritative within the community like the worship leader Ed.

[798] Parker, *Led by the Spirit*, 111.

The altar can also be understood as a place of intentional, collaborative inhibition as an individual seeks intervention from God on their current situation and the group's participation to pray with and for them. As stated earlier, Bietti and Stone have argued that conversations have a significant potential to shape individuals and how groups remember that past. Conversations function through a turn-taking system where individuals take turns affecting one another's thought processes.[799] The situation of the conversation, including social roles and narrative setting (e.g., frame and script), helps constitute the quality and nature of the transactive memory system.[800] However, the altar differs from a typical conversation for Pentecostals because participants are not necessarily understood as speaking to each other. Rather, part of the ICM of the altar is that it is a place to speak to God and encounter his presence primarily. The transactive memory system in play in the altar differs from the ones seen in the event of Rebecca and her mother and formal testimony expression. Nevertheless, some significant human discursive activities remain. In the case of those who went to the altar to pray, they were both being prayed for and praying with others. Both dynamics are essential discursive elements. When individuals come to help Iva pray, they are helping to intervene in Iva's situation through prayer to God. The group's intervention indicates that the group has transitioned to unique social roles to the ones practised earlier as listener-participants. Now members of the congregation have taken more of an authoritative role by praying for those like Iva who have come to the front for prayer. However, those taking an authoritative role of praying for others are also praying *with* them. Both individuals who need prayer and those providing supportive prayer are directing their attention to God and awaiting God's spiritual response to their plea. A we-narrative is at play that situates all praying individuals as potential recipients of God's intervention. As one places a

[799] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering with Others", 592-593.
[800] Bietti and Stone, "Remembering with Others", 597.

hand on the shoulder of another and joins their intention with one another, they unite in a conversational dynamic. Though this conversational dynamic is directed to God, indirect conversational dynamics influence each other because since they are praying together, they are socially granted permission to listen to one another's prayers that are mutually directed to God. In other words, the culturally unethical practice of "eavesdropping" on someone else's private conversation does not apply here. In an altar call, the group is in the group practice of praying to God together. Communicative expressions belong to the group. As such, an individual's prayer affects the other at the altar as the group prays to God.

Within the event presented by Parker, testimony can be observed to have provided what Cartledge describes as "a mechanism of reinforcement and commitment, whereby the worldview is both legitimated and energized in the community".[801] However, adding a third activity to this description is important: revision. The practice of public testimony is an opportunity for an individual's worldview to be revised by the community's interaction. In Iva's testimony, the need is offered to the community so that the community can help provide perspective and reinforce the idea that the need still resides within the frame of the grand narratives embedded within the Pentecostal community. All three elements of what Pentecostals would refer to as testimonies in Parker's example are not simply expressions of what God has done. They are expressions that demonstrate that these individuals have achieved a proper Pentecostal hermeneutic regarding the circumstances of their need for life events. They are also implicit confessions that they believe God is able to intervene. In the service, the confession transcends from individual to communal practice as the church comes together in the front to pray for one another.

[801] Cartledge, *Testimony in the Spirit*, 17.

The events reinforce broader cognitive models that individuals utilize to understand the world. The cognitive model in mind here is the group dynamic of socially extended cognition. Shaun Gallagher has argued that cognitive institutions are groups that engage in cognitive practices that are activated at specific times and places. Through these activities, individuals extend cognitive processes through other individuals to help them make meaning of the world.[802] Thus, the activity described by Parker constitutes a specific time and place where members of the Pentecostal community came together as a cognitive institution. Participants like Iva offered their narrative of their situation to intentionally extend their cognitive understanding of the situation to the community and to God. The community came together to offer interpretations of the situation through their group prayers. Iva's admission of perceptive struggle becomes a group endeavour to reinterpret the situation regarding accepted Pentecostal narrative frames. It is for this reason that this event is an excellent example of socially extended cognition that is commonly practised by the Pentecostal community.

7.6 *Aleluya al Señor*: Identity Formation Through Singing Together

In the recent work, *Musical Minds, Musical Bodies*, Dylan van der Schyff, Andrea Schiavio, and David J. Elliott argue for an enactive perspective on musical meaning-making.[803] In their description of the embedded musical environment, a deeply ecological environment occurs as individuals perform music in a group. They provide a two-person piano and drum ensemble as an example. Within this environment, the performers cognitively extend their music performance through instruments. They enactively share independent yet dynamically collaborative musical expressions, transforming their individuality into group agency through

[802] Gallagher, *Action and Interaction*, 213.

[803] Dylan van der Schyff, Andrea Schiavio, and David J. Elliott, *Musical Bodies, Musical Minds: Enactive Cognitive Science and the Meaning of Human Musicality* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2022).

joint intention. It is a kind of co-regulated coupling that is influenced by things like musical genre, socio-cultural setting, skill capabilities, and extended instrumental affordances.[804] Thus, van der Schyff, Schiavio, and Elliot conclude that this kind of participatory musical sense-making involves "rich, cross-modal networks of bodily, emotion, sonic, social, cultural, technological, and material scaffolding". [805] Similarly to Richards-Greaves on call-and-response, van der Schyff et al. use the term *feedback loops* to describe the cognitive "neural, muscular, behavioural, body-instrumental" coupling that enables performers to "engage self-regulative process across personal and interpersonal domains".[806] At first glance, Richards-Greaves and van der Schyff et al. seem to address different kinds of human behaviour. However, there are certainly some ontological dynamics that they share. By feedback loop, these scholars are addressing the ecological dynamics of human interaction. However, van der Schyff et al.'s extension of this ecological dynamic into musical expression can help our understanding of what corporate musical worship does in a church setting.

So far, analysis of the early Pentecostal hymn, *Aleluya al Señor,* has only been provided for the lyrics. In Chapter 6, an analysis of the lyrics shows how Pentecostal narratives cultivate uniqueness and homogeneity in multicultural Pentecostal communities. This section takes the analysis of this hymn a step further. The argument is made that something significant occurs when songs like *Aleluya al Señor*, are sung within the community. Individual contemplation on the lyrics of a song is only one aspect of how a song transforms an individual. How it is sung in a community is a significant part of the cultivation of the autobiographical concept of testimony.

[804] van der Schyff, Schiavio, and Elliott, *Musical Bodies, Musical Minds*, 46.
[805] van der Schyff, Schiavio, and Elliott, *Musical Bodies, Musical Minds,* 122.
[806] van der Schyff, Schiavio, and Elliott, *Musical Bodies, Musical Minds,* 122.

The event describe below can be found in a documentary entitled, *Nuestro Canto… Our Song: Apostolic History and Music from 1906 to Today*.[807] The situation analysed below is a particular part of the documentary where a congregation of believers worship together, singing the song, *Aleluya al Señor*. [808] The documentary was filmed and produced in 1995. It is narrated in large part by notable scholar Daniel Ramirez. It includes first-hand accounts of the development of the history and music of the Latino Apostolic movement. In addition to historical accounts, the documentary includes intermittent communal church singing that accompanies the hymns or events being addressed. This documentary is important as it documents a historical account of a Pentecostal movement about themselves. In other words, it is not a scholarly historical inquiry of the movement. It is the movement's history, as they have chosen to remember it. As established in Chapter 4, this kind of memory recall is part of an essential process of developing the autobiographical self. It is not merely defined by what actually occurred. It is significantly defined by how past events are remembered and why they are significant to current ICMs.

The setting of the communal singing included within the documentary is recorded in what seems to be a full church building of members of the denomination. When looking towards the front, a few notable details can be observed. An intergenerational choir sits at the back of the platform comprised of both men and women. In front of the choir, stage right and stage left, are middle-aged and older men sitting around a grand piano that is stage centre of the platform. There are two pulpits for the historical narrators on the far end, stage right and far stage left. Throughout the documentary, the narrators provide details about the composition of the hymns

[807] Jack Genero, director, *Nuestro Canto... Our Song: Apostolic History and Music from 1906 to Today*, Apostolic Assembly of the Faith in Christ Jesus, 1995. 1 hr., 58 min. DVD.

[808] Genero, *Nuestro Canto*, approx. 53:26-56:47.

being sung and historical background information that undergirds the development of the movement. Various instruments can be heard accompanying the singing, including the grand piano, organ, bass, and drums. Nevertheless, only the grand piano can be explicitly seen as it sits in the middle of the platform as the epicentre of the worship that occurs throughout. Soloists occasionally stand next to the grand piano as they lead what seems to be a carefully selected group of songs that represent movement.

The documentary describes, *Aleluya al Señor*, as the final song written by the prolific Spanish language hymn writer Marcial de la Cruz. It was written on his deathbed at the age of 50 years old. However, the documentary does not simply state that death came to Marcial de la Cruz. Rather, "*El Señor quiso recojerlo* (the Lord desired to pick him up)" at 50 years old.[809] This statement indicates an interpretation of the event of his death that assumes God's intentional decision not to end his life but to pick him up from this one and carry him to the next to be with the Lord. The congregational singing begins with the hymn's chorus, "*Aleluya, Aleluya, Aleluya*". Everyone is sitting, tapping their feet, or clapping their hands synchronously to the beat of the song. The only individuals standing are two narrators behind two pulpits on separate sides of the platform. Various clusters of people are swaying from side to side. Sporadically, individuals here and there lift their hands or point to heaven, presumably to God, as an embodied expression in parallel with the lyrics that state, for example, "*El nos libra, del tentador* (He frees us from the tempter)". After singing the chorus together, the congregation sings the first verse that says, "*En esta vida esperamos la victoria* (In this life we await the victory)". This verse speaks of the victory the Lord will give them in this life while they await the moment they will be with the Lord in glory. As the group sings the chorus again, the energy with which the

[809] *Nuestro Canto*, min. 2:54.

congregation sings together seems noticeably more intense. Subsequently, the congregation sings a second verse of the song that says, "*Vestido blanco, también corona y palma* (White garments, also a crown and palms)". This verse speaks about the believer's arrival in heaven and how they will finally receive the promise of eternal life. As they proceed to sing the chorus for the last time, the congregation simultaneously stands together more vibrantly and energetically than before with exuberant synchronic clapping, hands lifted, and eyes closed in a worshipful posture. As the song ends, the congregation continues their worship. Spontaneous Pentecostal worshipful expression occurs, giving way to a clapping ovation accompanied by shouts of "Aleluya!" and "Ooooh!". Hands that were lifted begin to tremble in some as tears can be seen in the eyes of others. The organ can be heard in the background, mimicking the worshipful cries of the congregation with gospel chords, scales, tremolo, and periodic volume dynamics. The congregation is allowed space for liturgical creativity. There is no song to be sung anymore. No one is explicitly leading from the pulpit. It is simply the congregation spontaneously lifting their voices in unscripted worship to God.

Singing together is a practice that can powerfully affect the way individuals live. Studies have shown that there is a significant prosocial effect on singing and making music together in adults.[810] Through various group musical and rhythmic tasks in adults, trust, greater liking, and enhanced altruistic behaviour can be cultivated. Psychologists Valescolo Piercarlo and David DeSteno conclude that when groups of adults perform synchronous rhythmic tasks, it cultivates the feeling that another is similar to themselves and altruistic feelings towards the other.[811] They theorize that this could stem from the context of having to interact with one another to produce a

[810] Verena Buren, Franziska Degé, and Grudrun Schwarzer, "Active Music Making Facilitates Prosocial Behaviour in 18-month-old Children," *Musicae Scientiae* 25, no. 4 (2021), 451. DOI: 10.1177/1029864919892308.

[811] Valdesco and DeSteno, "Synchrony," 264-265.

synchronic rhythm.[812] Recent studies have shown that dancing together facilitates intersocial memory[813]and prosociality toward outgroup members[814]. Importantly, this principle seems to occur as a fundamental part of our interaction with others, even in the earliest moments of intersubjective interactional activity.

Prosocial bonding through music-making and interpersonal movement synchrony has been seen in children and infants. In the realm of child development, interpersonal synchrony is a social cue that is able to cultivate prosocial behaviour towards others. Interpersonal synchrony refers to the coordinated synchronic movement between two or more individuals. Recent research has shown that these prosocial effects can influence the behaviour of infants as young as 14 months old. Laura Cirelli and others have produced research showing that infants tend to offer more assistance to partners with whom they have experienced interpersonal synchrony as opposed to asynchronous partners.[815] In older children, prosocial behaviour may even extend across social group boundaries.[816] Social celebrations often involve music and dance as they are considered highly social activities. Even listening to recorded music in a group setting can evoke a sense of unity. Recent research suggests that joint music-making can promote prosocial feelings and behaviour in children and preschoolers. Additionally, active music-making has been

[812] Valdesco and DeSteno, "Synchrony," 265.

[813] Matthew H. Woolhouse, Dan Tidhar, and Ian Cross, "Effects on Inter-Personal Memory of Dancing in Time with Others," *Frontiers in Psychology* 7 (2016): 1-8. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00167.

[814] Paul Reddish, et al., "Collective Synchrony Increases Prosociality Towards Non-Performers and Outgroup Members," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 55 (2016): 722-738. DOI:10.1111/bjso.12165.

[815] Laura K. Cirelli, "How Interpersonal Synchrony Facilitates Early Prosocial Behavior," *Current Opinion in Psychology* 20 (2018), 35. DOI: 10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.009. See also: Laura K. Cirelli, Zuzanna B. Jurewicz, and Sandra E. Trehub., "Effects of Maternal Singing Style on Mother-Infant Arousal and Behavior," *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 32, no. 7 (2019): 1213-1220. DOI:10.1162/jocn_a_01402.; and Laura K. Cirelli, Sandra E. Trehub, and Laurel J. Trainor, "Rhythm and Melody as Social Signals for Infants," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1423, No. 1 (2018): 66-72. DOI: 10.1111/nyas.13580.

; Cirelli, Trehub, and Trainor 2018; and Buren, Degé, and Schwarzer 2021

[816] Bahar Tunçgenç and Emma Cohen, "Movement Synchrony Forges Social Bonds across Group Divides," *Frontiers in Psychology* 7, (2016): 1-12. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00782.

shown to be more effective in promoting prosocial behaviour than non-music activities with infants that were 18 months old.[817] Scholars investigated whether joint music-making in a natural multimodal way can elicit prosocial behaviour in infants. The experiment included active music-making, passive music, or non-musical activity in the form of joint book reading. Results showed that joint music-making led to more helping behaviour (prosocial) compared to listening to music or joint book reading.[818] Beyond music-making, interpersonal movement synchrony has been shown to facilitate prosocial behaviour in children's peer-play.[819] Cirelli agrees with Piercarlo and DeSteno that on a cognitive level, interpersonal synchronic activities seem to create a sense of self-similarity as they are a social cue for group membership.[820] In turn, these conclusions also agree with Gallagher's interaction theory. On an intersubjective level, individuals who participate in synchronic activities experience group co-regulated coupling. To recall the analogy in Chapter 4, this is similar to an individual walking with a dog on a leash. However, making music can include intricacies that are different. Human social narratives include ingroup and outgroup complexities that are not similar to walking a dog. Powerful grand narratives and intergenerational narratives can have an additional influence on co-regulation and joint intentions.

Despite the behaviours that may be observed directly in a worship service, there is still a deeper analysis to be done. The more indirect, but no less influential, narrative elements should be considered, something that Vondey recognizes. Vondey argues that though analysis of Pentecostal worship may reveal direct observations like praying, shouting, jumping or dancing,

[817] Buren, et al., "Active Music Making," 449-464.
[818] Buren, et al., "Active Music Making," 458-459.
[819] Bahar Tunçgenç and Emma Cohen, "Interpersonal Movement Synchrony Facilitates Pro-Social Behavior in Children's Peer-Play," *Developmental Sciences* 21, no. 1 (2018): 1-9. 1-9. DOI: 10.1111/desc.12505.
[820] Cirelli, "How Interpersonal Synchrony Facilitates Early Prosocial Behavior," 35.

another domain of analysis needs to interpret Pentecostal events beyond what can be seen empirically. There are important cultural and theological frames within a Pentecostal liturgical activity that should be considered to evaluate literal actions more accurately.[821]

In the case of the group worship of the hymn, *Aleluya al Señor*, group singing initiates a powerful group dynamic, including joint intentions and synchronous co-regulation. By nature, this compels everyone willing to be involved into a state of mind that carries them beyond a personal internal reflection to an outward social ecological interaction. All synchronic group dynamics are potentially involved in synching the individuals into group agency from foot tapping to hand clapping to singing; joint intentions are cultivated alongside parallel religious narratives embedded within the liturgical event and the lyrics of the hymnal. However, as Vondey argues, much more should be considered beyond the observation of literal actions. The event is embedded with the religious narratives and frames involved with musical worship. Worship is directed to God by the congregation, so it culturally frames participants within a script that includes an ethical obligation to express themselves in ways the community has normatively established as appropriate. These normative expressions draw on the kind of grand Pentecostal narratives analyzed before. Themes like what Pentecostal theologians and philosophers have described are a radical openness to an encounter with God, and spontaneous bodily expression can be anticipated. The hymn's lyrics provide specific narratives besides the cultural narratives and scripts embedded within the situation. As congregants sing the lyrics together, it provides an opportunity for the group to agree upon the theological propositions that "*El nos libra, del tentador* (He frees us from the tempter)," and that "*En esta vida esperamos la victoria* (In this life we await the victory)". As more and more individuals spontaneously yet

[821] Vondey, "Religion as Play," 2.

jointly begin to express themselves more vibrantly, it indicates their synchronicity, along with Pentecostal experiential openness, is leading to new group behaviour. The congregation believes the hymn's lyrics and yet is coming into a more profound belief in them. The simultaneous action of standing together without an explicit verbal prompt indicates the synchronicity and joint intention achieved in the event. Nevertheless, in irony to such a powerful synchronous performance, the congregation breaks out into spontaneous individual shouts of joy in agreement and anticipation that they are eschatologically destined to be with Jesus someday. Trembling hands and streaming tears in some indicate the depth to which this group dynamic and religious themes have potentially penetrated the soul.

Given the research that correlates interpersonal movement synchrony and pro-social play in children, it is apparent that the interpersonal synchrony of liturgical practices like singing and clapping together contributes to openness within the Pentecostal movement. This pro-social openness to each other and the Holy Spirit predisposes individual congregants to spontaneous and creative expressions of worship similar to the creative spontaneity that occurs in the action of play. Such creative spontaneity seems to support scholarly analysis by Vondey on comparing Pentecostal worship to play. Vondey defines play as "a primordial pattern of individual action and interaction distinguished by its qualities of transformation and consummation as well as its unpredictable outcomes".[822] In play, individuals come together to participate in a voluntary co-regulated and co-creative activity that is unique from the rules, time, space and equipment than that which is used in ordinary life.[823] The kind of play-act activities that help form narrative competencies in childhood are carried into adulthood.[824] The stakes for Pentecostals are

[822] Vondey, "Religion as Play," 2.
[823] Vondey, "Religion as Play," 2.
[824] Gallagher, "Narratives as Interpretation of Self-Patter," 147.

nonetheless higher than the kind of stakes present in a game. For Pentecostals, the Holy Spirit is involved in the creative space. The Holy Spirit transforms ordinary practices, religious rituals, and theology to create transformative experiences within the community.[825] The purpose of the participation of the Spirit is often connected to powerful ontological and cosmological Pentecostal grand narratives.

Research has indicated a link between the memory-based process of feeling shaped by significant events together. Social cohesion occurs when a group experiences and reacts to highly stimulating and euphoric events together. This social cohesion supports ingroup identification, which can have far-reaching behavioural effects ranging from greater ingroup kindness to remarkable acts of self-sacrifice.[826] Considering the powerful group experiences that can be included in preaching, testifying, and singing together, it follows that individual and group identity are distinctly shaped by Pentecostal liturgy.

This section has analyzed how discursive dynamics within Pentecostal liturgical practice help form Pentecostal identity. Smith has described liturgy as rituals that are full of narratives that influence an individual's view of the world.[827] Additionally, Smith argues that liturgies are a special kind of ritual practice that aims to shape identity.[828] As such, liturgies like the ones presented above are ritual containers that house transformative narratives. They are vehicles that enactively transport narratives from a meaningless hermeneutical horizon to the embodied self. Singing that was once deprived of deeper meaning can be invested with Pentecostal narrative

[825] Vondey, "Religion as Play," 5-6.

[826] Martha Newson, Michael Buhrmester, and Harvey Whitehouse, "Explaining Lifelong Loyalty: The Role of Identity Fusion and Self-Shaping Group Events," *PLoS ONE* 11, vol. 8 (2016): 1-13. DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0160427. See also: Elaine Reese and Harvey Whitehouse, "The Development of Identity Fusion," *Perspectives on Psychological Science* 16, no. 6 (2021): 1398–1411. DOI: 10.1177/1745691620968761.

[827] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 139.

[828] Smith, *Desiring the Kingdom*, 87.

that touches the core of what an individual can ever hope and dream. Shared stories from an individual's past can be transformed by reframed mnemonic models, giving people new ways of seeing themselves and what they can expect protensively for what is to come.

The embodied and reflective discursive dynamics described above contribute to a significant process of cultivating and reinforcing testimony or autobiographical identity. As expounded upon earlier, Gallagher and Tollefsen argue that when joint intention comes together with we-narratives, group agency and identity are reinforced. Testimonies in Pentecostal communal settings are opportunities for joint intentions and joint commitments supported by Pentecostal we-narratives that provide the mechanisms by which Pentecostals develop group identity and agency.

The final section of this chapter describes why the powerful communal narratives, in combination with more individually contextualized discursive dynamics, produce significant behavioural change. What is argued is that the transformation of an individual's understanding of their autobiographical self occurs.

7.7 Conclusion: From Re-storying to Behavioral Change in Pentecostals

In Smith's work, he proposes what he deems is a re-storying of the self through liturgical practices.[829] Of course, as stated earlier, Smith's view of liturgy is very broad and includes ritual cultural practices that are invested with narratives that help individuals cultivate identity.[830] Nevertheless, Smith's concept of liturgies certainly includes a more specific view of liturgy within this thesis. Considering this, Smith's view of re-storying and transforming the self applies to the practices that are analysed in the section above.

[829] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 150.
[830] Smith, *Imagining the Kingdom*, 139.

Smith's view of re-storying the self goes beyond simply changing the stories that one recapitulates in the mind. The kind of re-storying proposed by Smith is more primal and embodied. The transformation that occurs through re-storying is a fundamental change in the way that one enacts within the world such that even basic prereflective perceptive and reactive feedback loops undergo change. Smith uses a narrative about Alex to explain how this might work. This thesis provides additional examples of how and what mechanisms can be used to compel this transformation to occur within the context of the Pentecostal community. Behavioural change occurs within the Pentecostal community largely because of narratives embedded within their religious lives that touch the very core of their identities. Their patterned selves become reoriented in new ways. Pentecostals self-identify with biblical narratives and integrate them as significant factors that compel them to behavioural change. For this reason, Pentecostal historian Steven Land says:

> When men and women came into Pentecostal services and experienced this eschatological power, this restoration of the apostolic age, they saw the Scriptures, themselves, and the world differently: the resurrection of Jesus as their own resurrection, the first Pentecost as their own 'Pentecost', the crucifixion of Jesus as their own crucifixion.[831]

There is a direct connection between the stories that Pentecostals read in the Bible, stories they hear about intergenerational integrations of those stories, and themselves. Pentecostal liturgical practices within Church settings and beyond promote the amalgamation of these chronologically distant narratives into the autobiographical self. The desire for personal change undergirds nearly all Pentecostal rituals. Daniel Albrecht states, "Transformation symbols that permeate the rites, the testimonies, the songs, the sermonic illustrations and altar calls, to name a few, express the language of transformation".[832] The ups and downs of daily life find greater

[831] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 52.

[832] Daniel E. Albrecht, *Rites in the Spirit: A Ritual Approach to Pentecostal/Charismatics Spirituality* (Sheffiled: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 216.

ontological meaning as an individual incorporates the story of redemption in the Spirit into their testimony. Through the Holy Spirit, they can experience walking with the children of Israel, the prophets, the apostles, and early church believers to learn and be motivated by those stories for their personal lives.[833] This process is more than optional. There is a normative expectation that interaction with the Holy Spirit should produce change.

For Pentecostals, part of the evidence of a genuine visitation of God is individual transformation that progresses into social transformation. This transformation is so powerful it even has broken social barriers ahead of its time. For example, early Pentecostals like William Seymour propose that breaking the colour barrier is additional evidence of the eschatological outpouring of the Spirit in the early 1900s. The social implications for receiving Pentecost were a countercultural witness of how the world can be changed in the present and will be changed in the future.[834] The socio-cultural patterns that were inculcated by corrupt cognitive institutions promoting racial prejudice were interrupted by Pentecostal revivals epitomized by what occurred at Azusa Street. That there was an interruption does not mean that change was complete and without fault in the area of race. Nevertheless, change occurred in significant ways. Self-patterns were reoriented to the concerns of the kingdom of God.

Testimonies of early Pentecostals reveal the kind of actions that proceeded after conversion. Wacker describes an "ethically rigorous community" that led to clearing up old debts and restored family relationships.[835] Others testified of deliverance from what was described as various kinds of addiction, including chewing tobacco, smoking, drinking alcohol, racist prejudice, and even deliverance from cussing.[836] Additionally, stories of miracles and healing

[833] Land, *Pentecostal Spirituality*, 65.
[834] Smith, *Thinking in Tongues*, 46.
[835] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 64.
[836] Wacker, *Heaven Below*, 64.

offered an opportunity for Pentecostals to reassess their perception of life's challenges. Their current situations were seen as opportunities for God to demonstrate his power rather than circumstances they would have to live as victims of for a lifetime. These perspectives were aided within communal testimonies by the implicit assumption that "Because God has done it for me, that means he will do it for you too".[837] Cartledge states, "As a group interacts with an individual's narration of an aspect of their testimony, the group's members are encouraged to process their own memories and situations."[838] This is a profoundly narratological process. The act of processing one's own memories and situations involves remembering, acknowledging, and anticipating God's participation and intervention.

In the liturgical context, testimony is seen as a valuable part of the Pentecostal worship experience. It is often shared in church services or other religious gatherings. It is seen as a way of connecting with others and building communal identity. In this view, testimony is not just a way of sharing information or spreading the gospel but is also a fundamental aspect of the religious experience itself. It is not a unique practice to that of broader human social behaviour. It can be included within the umbrella of narrative identity construction. The act of sharing one's testimony is an enactive process. It has a transformative effect on both the speaker and the audience. By engaging in this enactive discursive storytelling, individuals can better understand their religious experiences and place in the world, especially as the community engages with and reacts to the testimony. The concept of testimony as an enactive autobiographical narrative offers a dynamic and embodied understanding of the role of testimony in Pentecostal religious practice.

[837] Richie, "Pentecostal Theology as Story", 133 in quoting: French L. Arington, *Encountering the Holy Spirit: Paths of Christian Growth and Service* (Cleveland: Pathway, 2003), 463.

[838] Cartledge, *Testimony*, 7.

This approach can offer valuable insights into the ways in which our religious experiences shape our sense of self and our relationships with others.

Compelling evidence exists for the kind of narrative reorientation and re-storying proposed by Smith within the Pentecostal community. The behavioural change significantly stems from the community's socially shared discursive engagement with liturgical practices. The enactment of public testimonies, preaching, and communal singing are presented here as clear examples of what can happen to individuals as they engage in these practices. In essence, Pentecostals behave differently because of authentic transformation that occurs at the level of the patterned self and narrative identity.

CONCLUSION

8.1 Cumulative Summary

In Chapter 2, this thesis begins with a defence of James K.A. Smith's scholarship and its usefulness for furthering Pentecostal scholarship. A defence is necessary because of the substantial concerns Yoon Shin and Simo Frestadius raised on the theoretical foundation of Smith's work and its usefulness for Pentecostal theology and philosophy. After critical examination, areas of agreement and dissent were discovered in Shin and Frestadius's evaluation of Smith's embodied epistemology and Pentecostal philosophy. It is recognized that Smith's work cannot stand alone as the foundation for advancing Pentecostal scholarship. Further contextualization in the socio-historical and cultural elements of the Pentecostal movement is required. On the other hand, this thesis identified areas where Shin and Frestadius's work misunderstand or misrepresent Smith's work, especially concerning the primacy of prereflective cognitive processes and narrative epistemology. After the crucial work performed in Chapter 2, this thesis provides clear direction on the ways that the work presented in this thesis can revise and expand Smith's work for effective use in Pentecostal theology and philosophy.

The concept of Embodied cognition is pivotal to this entire project because it elucidates the ways that a cognitive individual comes to be what they are from more primal prereflective domains (e.g., image schemas and primary metaphors) to reflective domains (e.g., narrative competencies and intergenerational narratives). The embodied mind is a foundational concept to understanding why what is perceived from and about the world has direct access to modify and transform who we are. Chapter 3 begins the process of investigating key concepts in embodied cognition. The work of Shaun Gallagher is expounded to establish an enactive approach to embodied cognition. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's scholarship in cognitive linguistics is

offered as a tool to access the way that language serves as a means to influence the embodied self. It is argued that words have profound meaning because they are conceptually connected to how we embody the world. This connection is demonstrated through the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, ARGUMENT IS WAR, and IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. Throughout the chapter, these conceptual metaphors are correlated to Pentecostal theological concepts to foreshadow the integration that occurs in Chapters 6 and 7 (e.g., MORALITY IS A PATH/JOURNEY, and THE BLOOD IS A CONTAINER).

Chapter 4 continues the work done in Chapter 3 by taking analysis from the individual to analysis of the ways that social interaction and interaction with communities contribute to identity formation. Gallagher's Interaction Theory is used to expound on how the mind develops as a result of primary and secondary intersubjectivity along with narrative competency. What is discovered is that cognition cannot be understood in isolation. To understand the self, one must also understand the environments in which an individual is embedded. The work of Robyn Fivush is brought into the dialogue to explain how narratives within communities are key elements that comprise an environment. How an individual remembers the past is greatly affected by communal influence. Consequently, the autobiographical self and narrative identity are affected. The work of Lucas Bietti on conversational dynamics is presented as a tool for the analysis of church service discursive dynamics that is performed in Chapter 7.

In Chapter 5, the theoretical foundation describing an embodied and enactive interaction theory is brought into dialogue with Smith's work. Evaluation and analysis are performed on how Smith has described his narrative and embodied epistemology. Some examples highlight ways that contemporary embodied and enactive scholarship can further develop Smith's work beyond what Smith has offered. Importantly, it is argued that though this thesis departs from the terms Smith uses to describe narrative and embodied epistemology, this thesis is still in

agreement with Smith's work. Nevertheless, though this thesis departs in terminology, it is necessary to cultivate an interdisciplinary approach that is friendly to contemporary scholarship in phenomenology, embodiment, and cognitive studies.

This thesis begins to focus its analysis of the Pentecostal community in Chapter 6. It explores the significance of testimony in the Pentecostal community. It is expounded that testimonies are more than merely public articulations; it is a religious autobiographical view of the self. Thus, testimonies are more than just articulated stories. It is what an individual has, regardless of articulation. Nevertheless, when testimonies are articulated, Pentecostals contribute to the formation of a shared story and foster social support within the community. Insights were drawn from examples of articulated testimony within early Pentecostal periodicals and Mark Cartledge's study on testimony. Additionally, Chapter 6 discusses foundational narratives that shape Pentecostal identity primarily through the work of Wolfgang Vondey, James K.A. Smith, and other Pentecostal theologians to elucidate historical and current characteristics.

Chapter 7 begins its analysis by integrating some of the narratives presented in Chapter 6 into Fivush's ecological systems model. The ecological systems approach to Pentecostal narratives helps demonstrate how identity-forming narratives have been passed down intergenerationally and still influence the Pentecostal community today. These sociocultural narratives demonstrate why the Pentecostal movement could be considered what Gallagher deems a cognitive institution. The concept of testimony as an enactive autobiographical narrative suggests that the stories we tell about our religious experiences are not just descriptions of events that have already occurred but are also dynamic, ongoing processes that help to construct and maintain the autobiographical self. Personal narratives about religious experiences are not just a matter of individual beliefs or mental states. They are also embodied in the interactions between

the self and the world. Enactive change is the change that occurs in the patterned self. It is more than just reorientation. It is a change in the consistent way that an individual exists in the world. Pentecostal liturgies like testifying, singing, and preaching help access and altar self-patterns by transforming the autobiographical self. How individuals view their past and present fundamentally changes the patterned self because the assumptions about the future are affected by the patterns that individuals have experienced in the past. Thus, behavioural change occurs because assumptions that once were have changed in light of the powerful narratives embedded within religious liturgy. Examples of this change were shown in Chapter 7 by examining the discursive dynamics within authentic Pentecostal liturgical settings. The Pentecostal practice of public testimony, altar calls, and singing together are cultural rituals invested with narratives that shape narrative identity. This idea is proposed by Smith when suggesting that liturgy can be used to re-story the self, even basic prereflective perceptual and reactive processes.

8.2 Prospects for Future Research

Perhaps some of the greatest significance of this thesis can be found in the potential for future engagement with various academic fields. As stated in the introduction, great interest has been demonstrated within theology and biblical studies in embodied approaches to cognitive linguistics. The integration of cognitive linguistics, theology, and biblical studies is yet to be introduced to the Pentecostal academy in a substantial way. This is also true of embodied phenomenological approaches and analysis of Pentecostal spirituality. An area that Pentecostal scholars may be uniquely positioned to tackle is the role of tongue talking as a discursive dynamic of Pentecostal religious events. Public expression of tongues can evoke a cultural frame that God is participating in the event. It is a plausible hypothesis that when it is heard in the community, the community is indirectly prompted to become aware of God's creative activity

within that particular moment. In other words, a this-is-that hermeneutic is recalled. Divine participation is occurring, and the community should be aware that even seemingly common human expression may be enchanted with spiritual meaning. In particular, it would be intriguing to combine some of the approaches within this thesis with the work of Frank Macchia's work on *glossolalia*[839] and the research conducted by Randal Ackland in his recent dissertation on *glossolalia*.[840]

A particular area of personal interest is further study of musical liturgy and the synchronic dynamics of singing and worshipping together. This thesis provided an analysis of the lyrics and group performance of the Spanish-language Pentecostal hymn *Aleluya al Señor*. I hypothesise that this kind of research will produce incredible results if further directed to more Pentecostal musical group singing, especially as it relates to personal transformation and identity formation. Moreover, the research within this thesis may be beneficial for Pentecostals seeking to integrate identity formation more intentionally within their liturgical practices.

Arguably a promising area for future research is in the area of psychology and counselling. Research is provided in this thesis that states that children who have been explanatory descriptors regarding traumatic events tend to have better mental health than those without explanations. Furthermore, projects like *The Body Keeps the Score*[841] convincingly demonstrate the power that traumatic events have on a person's whole being. According to Bessel Van Der Kolk, trauma often causes a fundamental reorganization of the way an individual makes meaning of the world.

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[839] Frank Macchia, "Tongues as a Sign: Towards a Sacramental Understanding of Pentecostal Experience," *Pneuma* 15, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 61-76, DOI: 10.1163/157007493X00059.
Macchia, "Sighs Too Deep for Words: Toward a Theology of Glossolalia,".

[840] Randal Ackland, "Toward a Pentecostal Theology of Glossolalia," (PhD diss., Bangor University, 2019). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses Global.

[841] Bessel Van der Kolk, *The Body Keeps the Score: Mind, Brain, and Body in the Transformation of Trauma* (New York: Penguin Group, 2014).

It influences the way people think and embody the experiences of the present.[842] Despite the real ramifications of traumatic experiences, there are options for active intervention that can help individuals overcome the often-crippling effect of trauma. Narrative construction that helps situate an individual in the present life has been recognized as essential to healing. In his book, Van der Kolk states, "Trauma causes people to remain stuck in interpreting the present in light of an unchanging past. The scene you re-create in a structure may or may not be precisely what happened, but it represents the structure of your inner world: your internal map and the hidden rules that you have been living by".[843] As a prescriptive speculation, Kolk considers that perhaps the best way forward is integrating methods that put a traumatic event "into its proper place in the overall arc of one's life".[844] Van der Kolk's hypothesis has translated into recent, more direct approaches to therapy.[845] Seeing that the concept of testimony is immensely autobiographical, and considering that testimony is constructed in conjunction with larger overarching religious intergenerational narratives, it seems what Van der Kolk suggests is a process that is at least in part already intuitively practised by Pentecostal communities. It may be beneficial to consider that more intentional approaches to cultivating vibrant testimonies may lead to better mental health and healthy spiritual formation.

Considering the propositions for further research stated above, I am currently in discussions with an experienced professional therapist to cultivate a bridge between the academic language found within the psychological community and the language of lay ministry in Pentecostalism. Idealized Cognitive Models are important elements for cultural communities. As

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[842] Van der Kolk, *Body Keeps the Score*, 21.

[843] Van der Kolk, *Body Keeps the Score*, 307.

[844] Van der Kolk, *Body Keeps the Score*, 225.

[845] Mordechai Gofman, et.al. "Narrative Reconstruction as an Intervention for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Pilot Delayed Intervention Quasi-Randomized Controlled Trial," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 34 (February 2021): 92-103. DOI: 10.1002/jts.22537.

a result, it is our assumption that it is crucial to maintain a level of linguistic homogeneity with concepts that are native to Pentecostal identity while simultaneously introducing methods derived from therapeutic practices that can help cultivate mental and spiritual health. The challenge that we seek to overcome is motivated by the question, how can we translate academic concepts into words and concepts that can be understood by Christians with entry-level education while remaining faithful to accepted standards of therapeutic practice? Currently, we are specifically engaged in translating psychological literature on mindfulness meditation to concepts of prayer and spiritual formation.

Additionally, the research within this thesis is being used to teach practical methods for cross-cultural identity formation for a college course on cross-cultural communication within a Pentecostal college. Conceptual metaphors often provide a foundation for intersubjective meaning between different cultural groups. The college course on cross-cultural communication seeks to identify conceptual metaphors and narratives within the Bible and liturgy that can be utilized to cultivate Pentecostal identity within multicultural congregational contexts in the United States.

Lastly, it has been demonstrated that enactive and embodied theories of cognition can provide crucial insights into understanding the nature of neurodiversity. The concept of neurodiversity in academia values neurological, neurophysiological, and neuromorphological differences as natural and essential variations within the human genome and resulting neurophysiology. It includes conditions such as autism, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and dyslexia. These variations are understood as an important part of human diversity,

contributing to the richness of different cognitive and behavioral expressions.[846] Neurodiversity is often understood in contrast to what is commonly known as "neurotypicals," or those whose cognitive characteristics align with an established norm.[847] Importantly, though the terms "neurodiversity" and "neurodivergence" have been used interchangeably in the past, the concept of neurodiversity is preferred by some due to the marginalizing implicit in the concept of neurodivergence.[848]

An enactive and embodied framework shifts the perspective on neurodiversity from one that sees neurodiversity as something negative or deficient to one that values these variations as adaptive and contextually meaningful. For instance, behaviours typically associated with autism are often framed as impairments within traditional models. Additionally, Hanne De Jaegher has discussed how some standard cognitive theories have lacked the ability to fully explain important elements in the lived experience of neurodiverse individuals due to their neglect of the role of the body. De Jaegher analyzes how these theories show minimal concern for the embodiment and situatedness of the autistic individual. Additionally, even when investigating social deficits, interactive factors are not given an explanatory role, leading to methodologically individualistic theories.[849] These gaps in the theories reveal a disconnection between the social and embodied

[846] Francisco J. Parada et al., "Applied Human Neuroscience: Fostering and Designing Inclusive Environments with the 3E-Cognition Perspective," *European Journal of Neuroscience* 60 no. 3 (July 2024), 4149. DOI: 10.1111/ejn.16463.

[847] Mylène Legault, Jean-Nicolas Bourdon, and Pierre Poirier, "From Neurodiversity to Neurodivergence: the Role of Epistemic and Cognitive Marginalization," *Synthese* 199 (2021), 12844. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03356-5.

[848] Legault, Bourdon, Poirier, "From Neurodiversity to Neurodivergence," 12845. See also, Mylène Legault, Amandine Catala, and Pierre Poirier, "Breaking the Stigma Around Autism: Moving Away from Neuronormativity Using Epistemic Justice and 4E Cognition," *Synthese* 204 (2024): 1-23. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-024-04730-9.

[849] Hanne De Jaegher, "Embodiment and Sense-Making in Autism," *Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience* 7 (March 2013), 1-3. DOI: 10.3389/fnint.2013.00015.

aspects of autism that require further attention.[850] These behaviours can include heightened sensory sensitivity or focused interest. From an enactive and embodied cognition viewpoint, these behaviours are integral to how autistic individuals navigate and make meaning of their environments in ways that reflect their unique embodied experiences.[851] Heightened sensory awareness, a common trait in autism, allows for a more nuanced perception of the world, with individuals often detecting subtleties that neurotypical people might overlook. Neurodiverse individuals have a kind of practical knowledge that uniquely situates them within the environment. They are able to perceive particular affordances in the environment as a result of their specific perceptual capacities.[852] These capacities are part of a broad process of embodied meaning-making where neurodiverse individuals engage with the world in ways that align with their cognitive capacities and embodied needs.[853] Thus, research has underscored the need for environments designed to support these unique ways of processing and engaging with the world.[854] Some questions that might be useful for the Pentecostal community include, how do neurodiverse individuals experience Pentecostal church services? Can Pentecostals offer environments that are more conducive to positive experience in a wider range of neurodiverse individuals? In what ways are unique neurodiverse capabilities overlooked? In what ways can neurodiverse Pentecostals offer unique capabilities to the Pentecostal community?

Much work can be done to apply the various concepts within this thesis to constructive academic projects and broader popular applications. It is work that is not able to be achieved individually. It requires engagement from theologians, philosophers, psychologists, and those

[850] De Jaegher, "Embodiment," 4-5. See also, Hanne De Jaegher, "Seeing and Inviting Participation in Autistic Interactions," *Transcultural Psychiatry* 60, no. 5 (2023), 852-853. DOI: 10.1177/13634615211009627.

[851] De Jaegher, "Embodiment," 1.

[852] Legault, Catala, Poirier, "Breaking the Stigma Around Autism," 83-84.

[853] De Jaegher, "Seeing and Inviting Participation," 857-858.

[854] Parada et al., "Applied Human Neuroscience," 4154-4156.

who can represent common communities with limited educational exposure. Ultimately, my hope is that this thesis will be utilized to further knowledge and transformation within people's lives.

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