CIVIL - MILITARY RELATIONS IN POST- SOVIET RUSSIA: THE CASE OF 'MILITARY POLITICIANS'

by

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The issue of Russian politicians with a military background has often been addressed throughout the post-Soviet era, but has rarely been analysed on its own. This thesis provides a systematic study of the role of 'military politicians' to further our understanding of this important area of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia.

This thesis argues that the role and influence ascribed to such figures has often been overstated due to the theoretical constraints and the normative viewpoints of the civil-military relations concepts and theories of democratic transition, within which the subject of 'military politicians' is commonly framed. Identifying and assessing a number of important and previously unexplored areas connected to the subject of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, this thesis contributes to a fuller understanding of the role of such personalities.

The main areas assessed in the thesis are: a) the importance of Russian discourses on 'military politicians', which differ considerably from those in the West; b) the precise institutional backgrounds of such personalities in a detailed study of the Russian military system; and c) the interpretation of the role of politicians with a military background in the Russian body politic. Showing that in consideration of these areas the role and influence of politicians with a military background is more modest than often asserted, the thesis concludes by proposing a conceptual approach to the study of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BND (*Bundesnachrichtendienst*) German intelligence service

CIA United States Central Intelligence Agency

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

COE Council of Europe

DEA United States Drug Enforcement Administration

FAPSI (*Federal'noe Agenstvo Pravitel'stvennoi Sviazi i Informatsii*) Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information

FMS (*Federal'naia Migratsionnaia Sluzhba*) Federal Migration Service

FSIN (*Federal'naia Sluzhba Ispolneniia Nakazanii*) Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences

FSK (*Federal'naia Sluzhba Kontrrazvedki*) Federal Counterintelligence Service

FSN (*Federal'naia Sluzhba po Kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv*) Federal Service for the Control of the Trade of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

FSOZ (*Federal'naia Sluzhba po Oboronnomu Zakazu*) Federal Service for Defence Orders

FPS (*Federal'naia Progranichnaia Sluzhba*) Federal Border Guard Service

FSO (*Federal'naia Sluzhba Okhrany*) Federal Guard Service

FSB (*Federal'naia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti*) Federal Security Service

FSZhV (*Federal'naia Sluzhba Zheleznodorozhnykh Voisk*) Federal Railroad Troops Service

GDR German Democratic Republic

GFS (*Gosudarstvennaia Fel'd''egerskaia Sluzhba*) State Courier Service

GPS (*Gosudarstvennaia Protivopozharnaia Sluzhba*) State Fire Service

GUIN (*Glavnoe Upravlenie Ispolneiia Nakazanii*) Main Directorate for the Execution of Punishments

GUO (*Glavnoe Upravlenie Okhrany*) Main Directorate for Protection

GUSP (*Glavnoe Upravlenie Spetsial'nykh Programm pri Prezidente*) Main Directorate for Special Programmes under the President

IMEMO (*Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii*) Institute for World Economics and International Relations

KGB (*Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti*) State Security Committee

KND (*Kongress narodnykh deputatov*) Congress of People's Deputies

KPRF (*Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii*) Communist Party of the Russian Federation

KPSS (*Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza*) Communist Party of the Soviet Union

LDPR (*Liberal'no-Demokraticheskaia Partiia Rossii*) Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

MChS (*Ministerstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delam grazhdanskoi oborony, Chrezvychainym Situatsiiam, i likvidatsii stikhiinykh bedstvii*) Ministry for Civil Defence, Emergency Situations, and Liquidating the Consequences of Natural Disasters

MIC Military-Industrial Complex

MID (*Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del*) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Miniust (*Ministerstvo Iustitsii*) Ministry of Justice

MO (*Ministerstvo Oborony*) Ministry of Defence

MVD (*Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del*) Interior Ministry

NDR (*Nash Dom – Rossiia*) Our Home is Russia

NRPR (Narodno-respublikanskaia Partiia Rossii) Russian Republican People's Party

OVR (*Otechestvo – Vsia Rossiia*) Fatherland – All Russia

RSFSR Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic

SBP (*Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Prezidenta*) Presidential Security Service

SPS (*Soiuz Pravykh Sil*) Union of Right Forces

Spetsstroi (*Federal'noe Agentstvo Spetsial'nogo Stroitel'stva*) Federal Agency for Special Constructions

SSR Security Sector Reform

SVR (*Sluzhba Vnezhnoi Razvedki*) Foreign Intelligence Service

TsIK (*Tsentral'naia Izbiratel'naia Komissiia*) Central Electoral Commission

UN HCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

A note on transliteration

Transliteration from Russian in this thesis is based on the Library of Congress transliteration scheme for Cyrillic.

Introduction

The study of civil-military relations in Russia has been subject to much scholarly debate throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. This thesis concentrates on an aspect of the debate that has often been addressed in the context of post-Soviet Russia, but has been rarely analysed on its own. This aspect is the participation of individuals with a military background in politics in appointed or elected office. Throughout the history of post-Soviet Russia, many figures with a military background have stood in elections and have been appointed to governmental posts. Due to the considerable amount of attention that has been paid to this issue, both in Russia and in the West, the theme merits a detailed and systematic study contributing to a broader understanding of the role of politicians with a military background in post-Soviet Russia. Such a study is provided in this thesis.

The issue of Russian politicians with a military background has been addressed in the work of two groups of Western analysts.[1] Firstly, and predominantly, it has been covered in the work of analysts focusing on civil-military relations.[2] The area of civil-military relations as a sub-field of political science is concerned with the theorisation and analysis of the relationship between the political leadership of a state and its military. The core dilemma it addresses is how to prevent a situation arising whereby a military organisation, tasked with protecting the state, can threaten the interests of that state by influencing the direction of policy as determined by the civilian leadership, or, in extreme cases, by actually supplanting the government in a military coup. The fundamental tenet

[1] Western analysts are defined in this thesis as scholars based at academic institutions predominantly in the United States, but also, and to a lesser degree, Great Britain and other countries of Western Europe. As will be discussed in chapter one, this definition is appropriate, because much of what has been written on civil-military relations is based on theories and concepts generated in the United States. Included in this term are also a number of Russian scholars basing their analyses on political science concepts and theories originating in the West, and writing for a Western, predominantly English-speaking audience.

[2] See, for example, Robert V Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics: Duty, Dictatorship, and Democracy under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 1998; John P. Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State: Political Power and the Russian Military under Gorbachev and Yeltsin,Westport, CO and London: Praeger 2003; Brian D. Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000, New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

of what constitutes a 'good' civil-military relationship within the context of the modern nation-state, thus, is the assertion that, in order to prevent such a situation from arising, the military ought to be beyond politics and stay within the realm of its intended position as an instrument created by, integral to, and utilised by a society in order to protect itself from external threats.[3]

With regard to post-Soviet Russia, some civil-military relations analysts have perceived this fundamental tenet of 'good' civil-military relations as violated due to the numerous instances of figures with a military background becoming involved in the day-to-day running of the country's politics in elected and appointed posts. In many instances, this perception has been expressed in conjunction with warnings about the negative consequences of such a tendency on Russia's process of democratic transition. Eva Busza, for example, asserted that in post-Soviet Russia, 'military challenges to civilian authority... undermine the effective governing of the civilian-led state in all policy spheres'.[4] Thomas Nichols likewise argued that, 'the [Russian] military is emerging as a forceful broker in Russian politics, capable of altering domestic and foreign policy priorities to suit its own values and interests'.[5] According to Robert Epperson, 'the military, either as an institution or those within it, may begin to believe in their own notion of national interest and to see itself as the guardian of the state and the government in power as the enemy'.[6] In the words, also, of John Moran, 'factional and autonomous activities of the Russian military may open the floodgates to the exercise of violent activities against Russian civilian authorities'.[7]

The second, and smaller group addressing the issue of Russian politicians with a military background have been analysts studying broader developments in post-Soviet

[3] For a good outline of the core concerns and rationale of civil-military relations theory, see Peter D. Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian Control', Armed Forces and Society, 23 (2), winter 1996, pp. 149-178.
[4] Eva Busza, 'Transition in Civil-Military Relations in Poland and Russia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29(2), 1996, p. 169.
[5] Thomas M. Nichols, '"An Electoral Mutiny?" Zhirinovsky and the Russian Armed Forces', Armed Forces and Society, 21(3), Spring 1995, p. 327.
[6] Robert H. Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics, 1991-1996', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10(3), September 1997, p. 102.
[7] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation State, p. 208.

Russian politics. In the main, such analysts started to focus on this issue mainly in connection with Vladimir Putin's rise to political prominence.[8] In the work of these authors, politicians with a military background tend to be portrayed not as representatives of the military-as-institution posing a potential force of opposition to the civilian leadership of the country, but as an important pillar of power of the latter and as an expression of a more authoritarian policy-direction pursued by Putin. Nikolai Petrov, for example, interpreted Putin's appointment of officials with a military background to head five of the seven federal administrative districts created in 2000 as evidence for the fact that, 'what is really happening is the insertion of police-state mechanisms into a delegative and declarative democratic state'.[9] In a 2003 study, Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White described the drawing of a 'stream of people in uniform into Russia's power structures', which they saw as characteristic of the leadership of Vladimir Putin. Terming the system Putin sought to create, in their eyes, a 'militocracy', their message was unequivocal: 'The more it becomes a militocracy, the more post-communist Russian politics will take on the characteristics of the wholly formal democracy of the Soviet period'.[10]

This thesis posits that the warning tone of these conclusions of both groups of analysts can be overstated as a result of the authors' normative positions and the theoretical constraints of Western concepts of civil-military relations and democratic transition. These cannot always adequately address aspects of essential importance for the understanding of the role of what will be termed 'military politicians' within a specific post-Soviet Russian context. Identifying and exploring these essential aspects, this thesis will argue that, if viewed from an alternative angle, the role and influence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is more modest than that generally asserted.

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[8] See, for example, Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Steven White, 'Putin's Militocracy' in Post-Soviet Affairs 19(4) 2003, pp. 289-306; Nikolai Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia: Federal Districts and the New Level of State-Territorial Composition', Security Dialogue, 33(1), 2002, pp. 73-91; Peter Reddaway, Gail W. Lapidus, Barry W. Ickes, Carol Saivetz, and George Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', Post-Soviet Affairs, 20(1), 2004, pp. 1-45; Richard F. Staar, 'KGB & Other Buddies in Putin Apparat', Perspective, 10(4), March-April 2000, 'Toward a Police State?', Perspective, 11(3), January-February 2001, 'Siloviki Inside', Perspective, 14(3), March-April 2004.

[9] Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia', p. 73.

[10] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', quotes on pages 289 and 304.

Definition of 'military politicians'

The term 'military politicians' covers individuals in post-Soviet Russia engaged in political activities, who have previously served in the armed forces and armed services and who have retired from active duty in these structures. Russian legislation does not permit the political participation of *active* military personnel. A detailed analysis of the legal regulation for the participation of military figures in political posts is provided in chapter four.

The meaning of the term 'military politician' as applied in this thesis is broadly defined. Unless the particular institutional background of a figure is specified explicitly, this definition includes politicians with a career background in the regular armed forces (that is, the army, navy, air force, and strategic rocket forces), as well as in other elements of Russia's armed services system, commonly termed the 'power ministries' or 'force structures' ('*silovye struktury*'). In Russia itself such figures are described by the term '*siloviki*'. In order to avoid the excessive repetition of the term 'military politicians', alternative labels conveying the same meaning are used throughout the thesis. These are 'politicians with a military background', 'politicians with a force-structure background', or simply, *siloviki*. A more detailed definition of 'military politicians', explaining also why this inclusive understanding of the word is both appropriate and legally correct in the case of post-Soviet Russia, is provided in chapter three.

How the study was approached

The idea for this thesis was conceived at the beginning of 1999. In the preceding years the retired general, Aleksandr Lebed', had generated a considerable amount of fascination and interest in the West.[11] Despite the fact that in the 1996 presidential

[11] In contrast to the politically far more successful leader of the KPRF, Gennadii Ziuganov, to whom not a single biography or book was dedicated in the West, a large volume of work was published on Aleksandr Lebed'. See, for instance, Harold Elletson, The General and the Kremlin, London: Warner Books, 1998; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia, Santa Monica and London: Rant Publishers, 1996; Elisabeth Heresch, Alexander Lebed: Krieg oder Friede, Munich: Herbig Verlag, 1997; Jacob Kipp, 'Aleksandr Lebed: The Man, His Program, and His Political Prospects', Problems of Post-Communism, 46(5), September/October 1999, pp. 55-63; Wladimir Ostrogorski, Alexander Ivanovich Lebed: Der Weg

elections he had received less than 15 percent of the popular vote, it was widely believed that the general was to become a prominent player in Russian politics. Some analysts appeared to be alarmed about the prospect of the rise of the former general to political power in Russia, evaluating Lebed's activities as epitomising of 'the politics of a country which is still far from democracy'.[12] A review of academic work on civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia revealed that the involvement of retired military personnel in politics appeared to be, as the analyst David Betz has called it, 'a curious aspect of Russian civil-military relations',[13] which merited detailed attention. The initial aim of the research was to theorise the role and place of such figures in the political process.

The early stages of the research involved a literature review of studies of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia and a review of Russian newspaper coverage dealing with 'military politicians'. It quickly became apparent that the discourses within which this issue was treated in Western academic literature and in the Russian newspapers differed considerably (this review of newspaper coverage is presented in chapter two). Whilst, as mentioned above, the presence of such figures in Western assessments was evaluated predominantly as a problem of the country's civil-military relationship, its evaluation in Russian newspapers was multi-faceted, ranging from negative to indifferent to outright positive. This difference was perceived as important and formed the starting point for the study presented in this thesis.

In seeking to avoid the distortion of evidence and interpretations with regard to the role and influence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, the framing of the study within an existing theoretical framework was not perceived as the most fruitful approach, as the developing hypothesis of the research was precisely that existing Western frameworks underplayed key aspects of the Russian case. Whilst available literature on civil-military relations theory constituted a starting point and assisted the formulation of possible fields for enquiry, exploratory fieldwork research in Russia (for

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zur Macht, Berlin: Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus, 1996; Wolfgang Pfeiler and Swetlana Pogorelskaja, 'Aleksandr Lebed' als "dritte Kraft"?', Osteuropa, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 3 – 17.

[12] From the cover sleeve of Elletson, The General and the Kremlin.

sources and data collection see below), which entailed the interviewing of practitioners and observers in the area of 'military politicians', preceded the final decision as to the aspects chosen for investigation in this thesis. Four important areas of enquiry with regard to 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, which have not previously been addressed within the framework of commonly applied approaches to the issue, crystallised as a result of the fieldwork research conducted in Moscow. These areas, which will be elaborated in more detail in chapter one, form the basis of the empirical chapters, and the set of interrelated research questions assessed in this thesis. They are as follows:

- *The importance of Russian perceptions of 'military politicians'*
  How are these figures perceived in Russia itself?
  What are the reasons for differences in Western and Russian perceptions?
  How can varying interpretations of 'military politicians' in Russia enhance the explanatory power of Western concepts commonly applied to the study of this issue?

- *The institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians'*
  What are the distinctive features of the Russian military system?
  What are the precise institutional backgrounds of Russian 'military politicians'?
  What does the diversity of the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' mean for the evaluation of such figures within the framework of Western concepts of civil-military relations theory?

- *The specific features of the Russian political system*
  Civil-military relations assessments of Russian 'military politicians' can tend to concentrate on the military component of the relationship and to conceptualise the political system in post-Soviet Russia within the framework of democratic

[13] David Betz, 'If they are ordered "Die of hunger!" they will die': Russian Defence Analysts Speak on Civil-Military Relations', The Glasgow Papers No. 2, 1999, p. 21.

transition. What can alternative conceptualisations of post-Soviet politics add to our understanding of the role played by 'military politicians' in Russia?

- *Recurrent features in Western assessments of civil-military relations and politics in post-Soviet Russia*

  What are the reasons for what some respondents interviewed for this thesis perceived as an overstated interpretation of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia in the work of Western authors?

  How should the study of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia be approached?

Rationale of the thesis

The study presented in this thesis is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, due to its investigation of aspects related to the issue of 'military politicians' not addressed previously, such as the systematic analysis of Russian perceptions on the issue and a comprehensive study of the Russian military system, the new empirical data presented in this thesis contributes towards a broader understanding of an important area of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia.

Secondly, in identifying the constraints of theoretical concepts commonly utilised to frame the issue of civil-military relations and 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, this thesis will serve as an empirical basis for further theoretical development. As will be discussed in chapter one, the inclusion in studies of civil-military relations of components of Russia's military system other than the regular armed forces is a recent development and has not yet been fully theorised. The clear typology of the Russian military system provided in chapter three will inform efforts to develop further conceptual frameworks for civil-military relations and security sector reform in post-Soviet Russia.

Thirdly, the analysis of 'military politicians' provided in this thesis will create greater understanding as to the political component of the civil-military relationship in post-Soviet Russia. Thus, this thesis is relevant not only for students of security studies, but also of political science.

Fourthly, the relevance of this thesis is particularly timely, because since the election of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency in 2000 the issue of Russian 'military politicians', or *siloviki*, has received renewed and increased attention both in Russia and in the West. In studying the issue of Russian 'military politicians' throughout the post-Soviet era, this thesis will link the work of analyst focused on critical junctures in the Russian civil-military relationship and on figures with a background in the regular armed forces, with those works focused mainly on actor-based explanations of 'military politicians' during Putin's years in office.

Sources and data-collection

Qualitative methods were chosen as the most appropriate for this research, because they are able to capture meaning and context.[14] As discussed in chapters one and four, quantitative methods have been employed elsewhere to the study of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia.[15] Whilst a quantitative approach is indicative of the amount and changes in numbers of such figures, it does not allow for an understanding of their motives, position, and influence. It is questions of this kind that this thesis explores.

The major empirical sources used in this thesis are documentary material and expert interviews. Fieldwork research for this thesis was carried out in Moscow from November 2001 until January 2002. A number of follow-up interviews were conducted in October 2002 and in May-June 2003.

[14] Alan Bryman, Quantity and Quality in Social Research, London: Unwin Hyman, 1998, p. 62.
[15] See particularly Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'.

In-depth interviews were conducted with thirty-eight respondents – a sample size corresponding to the norm of 30-40 expert interviews in social science qualitative research.[16] Interview respondents were chosen to include a broad variety of backgrounds and opinions. Sampling of the respondents was purposive and did not rely on the 'snowball effect', which is the establishment of 'access to other individuals through contact with a particular interviewee'.[17] As discussed in more depth in chapter five, interviews in Russia, particularly at the elite level, face a danger of selection bias in that those politicians, journalists, and academics with pro-Western views are easier to access and more willing to give interviews than those more suspicious of the West. Whilst respondents of pro-Western views were interviewed also, a step taken to counter in-built bias was to approach specifically chosen individuals representing a broad variety of political and institutional views instead of relying on the technique of 'snowballing'. Interviews were arranged with the assistance of a Russian colleague based in Moscow. She was able to be appropriately persistent over several weeks in securing interviews with those less inclined to be interviewed by a Western researcher (for example, deputies from the Russian Communist Party (KPRF) and the pro-Kremlin party *Edinaia Rossiia*).

Three major groups of respondents were approached (a list of interviewees is supplied at the end of the thesis).

- *Political actors*

  These were mainly parliamentary deputies of the Russian State Duma. Interviewees both with and without a military background were chosen. Representatives from all major political parties represented in the State Duma were interviewed, as were a number of independent deputies. Additionally, representatives of political parties and organisations not represented in the State Duma were approached for interview, if these groups appeared particularly relevant for this thesis (for example, the Russian Union of Officers and the Movement in Support of the Army).

[16] Fiona Devine, 'Qualitative Methods', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 142.

- *Russian journalists*

  Journalists writing for newspapers representing a range of ideological or institutional points of view were interviewed (commercially-owned and liberal-oriented newspapers; official publications, such as the newspaper of the Russian government and of the ministry of defence; periodicals with a communist ideological orientation).

- *Russian analysts*

  Academic and policy-oriented analysts writing on civil-military relations and post-Soviet politics were approached. Respondents were interviewed from Russian state institutes, such as IMEMO, the Institute of Socio-Political Research and the Institute of Military History of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and from independent think-tanks, such as the Moscow Carnegie Centre, the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarianism in Russia, and the Russian Public Policy Centre.

The interviews were aimed largely at identifying the subjective beliefs of the respondents, seeking to evaluate potentially competing discourses explaining the role, activities and influence of 'military politicians' and the meaning given by the respondents to the phenomenon under investigation. For this reason, the interviews were designed to be heuristic and exploratory and questions were posed as prompts in order to enable respondents to talk freely. A few key questions were posed to most of the respondents in order to prompt them to deal with a core of common issues. These questions were:

- The concept of *siloviki* has no corresponding meaning in the West. What do you associate with this concept? What, in your opinion, unites these figures?

- How would you describe the state of civil-military relations under both presidents El'tsin and Putin? Do you see fundamental differences in this respect?

[17] David Richards, 'Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls', in Politics, 16(3), 1996, p. 200.

- In speaking about *siloviki* in political posts do you perceive it as important whether these people were elected or appointed?

- Do you perceive the participation of retired military figures in politics as a specific feature of the political system of post-Soviet Russia?

In addition to the core questions, specific questions were posed on the basis of the respondent's background, position, or expertise. Politicians with a military background were asked, for instance, for autobiographical details, explaining their decision to exchange their profession in the military for a political career. Russian academics aware of Western civil-military relations concepts and with English-language work on the issue were asked to express their opinion about the applicability of these concepts to the case of post-Soviet Russia.

With a few exceptions, all interviews were conducted and recorded in Russian. The interviews were then transcribed and translated with the assistance of a native speaker. Due to the subject of this thesis, which is exploring issues that were previously taboo in the Soviet Union and have the potential to be perceived as controversial or intrusive, ethical issues were considered important in the interview process. Interviewees were informed in advance about the purpose and content of the interview and a list of specific questions was supplied, if requested, several days before the interview. The honest disclosure of the project's nature and aims, as well as the researcher's status as a PhD student and institutional affiliation, were made a priority. Each interviewee was asked whether they objected to the disclosure of their identity and the content of the interview within the framework of this thesis and in potential published work based on this research. In most cases interviewees were happy to be named. However, a small number of statements cited in the thesis are treated anonymously, where it was judged that there could be a potential of negative rebound on a particular interviewee.

It was found that most respondents were happy to freely express their beliefs about a number of themes related to the topic of 'military politicians'. In the case of respondents that came from a military background themselves, they were ready to disclose autobiographical details, both of their military career and of their decision to go into politics. If difficulties in engaging with interviewees were encountered, the author perceived these to be due not to the subject of the questions asked, but to the following two issues. Firstly, as mentioned above, interviews conducted in Russia by Western researchers face a danger of selection bias. Some of the respondents appeared to be aware of this. A number of respondents from the nationalist or communist end of the political spectrum were initially reluctant to be interviewed by a Western researcher, because they apparently expected a 'biased' approach to their activities and opinions. It was usually found, however, that after an initial period of caution, most respondents overcame the suspicion that the aim of the interview was to criticise, rather than attempting to understand their respective points of views. Secondly, a small number of interview respondents, the vast majority of whom were male, appeared to display a sceptical attitude towards a woman studying security and military-related subjects. In one particular instance a respondent did not appear to be able to accept the professional interest of the interviewer in the subject of the discussion, due to the latter's gender. As a whole, however, the interview respondents constructively engaged with the questions asked and clearly tried to answer them to the best of their abilities.

Documentary analysis in the thesis drew on a variety of published and openly available sources. Publications from a broad range of Russian newspapers and journals are widely used throughout the study and were important particularly for the review of the representation of 'military politicians' in Russian newspapers in chapter two. For this particular study, four specific national Russian newspapers were chosen to represent a range of ideological and institutional viewpoints. These were the publication of the Russian government, Rossiiskaia gazeta, the mouthpiece of the Russian ministry of defence, Krasnaia zvezda, the pro-communist and patriotic newspaper, Sovetskaia Rossiia, and the commercially owned and pro-Western daily, Segodnia (more detail concerning the methods of this particular study is provided in chapter two).

The regular scanning of a range of Russian print-media outlets was also paramount in the provision of basic facts and figures, such as the election, appointment or dismissal of 'military politicians', or information regarding the lesser known Russian force structures discussed in chapter three. A particularly useful source for information on specific issues and events was the Eastview electronic database, giving access to full coverage from more than fifty Russian national newspapers.

Another important source of empirical evidence was official documentation, such as Russian federal laws and presidential decrees, and information made available on official governmental internet sites. This, in particular, informed the study of the Russian military system and of the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' in chapter three. Where possible and appropriate, public opinion polls conducted and published by Russian agencies were used for the corroboration of some of the interpretations offered in this thesis.

Plan of chapters

The aim of chapter one is twofold. Firstly, it provides a comprehensive overview of existing literature on civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia, focusing especially on the way in which politicians with a military background have been portrayed in these works. Secondly, the chapter is setting up the arrangement of the subsequent thesis chapters in pointing out four important areas related to the issue of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, which have not been studied previously within the framework of commonly used approaches. These are: a) Russian perceptions of 'military politicians'; b) the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, whose diversity is difficult to accommodate within traditional concepts of civil-military relations theory; c) the benefit of increased cross-referencing between civil-military relations concepts and conceptualisations of the wider political system in post-Soviet Russia; and d) the concern that the role of 'military politicians' can be overstated not only as a result of the theoretical constraints of the concepts used to frame this issue, but also as a result

of a number of recurrent features in Western approaches to the study of politics in post-Soviet Russia. In addressing these areas in turn, chapter one is setting up the theoretical background and rationale for the empirical chapters and the final chapter, in which a conceptual approach to the study of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is proposed.

Chapter two addresses Russian perceptions of civil-military relations, and of the role of 'military politicians' in particular. It uses a detailed analysis of Russian newspaper coverage, as well as an overview of Russian academic writing on the issue and its reflection in the opinion of Russian political actors. The chapter concludes that the dominant Western discourse on Russian politicians with a military background, which, in the main, evaluates their existence as a problematic aspect of politics in post-Soviet Russia, is not a consensus within Russia itself. Whilst critical perceptions of 'military politicians' are apparent also in Russia, they exist alongside other less critical or outright positive views.

Chapter three provides a detailed study of the Russian military system in order to increase our understanding of the precise institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians'. This aim is arrived at by way of a review of the military system, of service in that system, and the legislative base on which they are both arranged. The review of this whole system addresses in turn its individual components, assessing their tasks and missions and function in the country's overall defence structure. The chapter shows that the Russian understanding of a military figure and of the military itself differs considerably from the traditional Western understanding of the same concepts. The Russian understanding is much broader and includes a number of militarised institutions in addition to the regular armed forces (the army, navy and air force). This conclusion is of considerable significance with regard to the portrayal of Russian 'military politicians' in the work of many analysts as a single analytical entity.

Chapter four offers an interpretation of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia based on the amalgamation of civil-military relations approaches with

conceptualisations of the political system in post-Soviet Russia. This is achieved by addressing a number of concerns voiced by civil-military relations analysts with regard to politicians with a military background, and exploring them in the light of specific individuals and events. The chapter consists of two parts. The first part addresses the assertion implicit in many assessments of Russian 'military politicians' that such figures are more undemocratic because of their specific institutional background. The second part of the chapter analyses the nature of the role of 'military politicians' within the context of the political system of post-Soviet Russia by distinguishing personalities elected to their posts from those appointed by the civilian leadership. The chapter concludes that if approached from this alternative angle, the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is considerably less clear-cut than is often asserted.

Chapter five of the thesis constitutes the analytical conclusion of the thesis. Having assessed in the empirical chapters Russian perceptions of 'military politicians', the precise institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians', and their role in the political process of post-Soviet Russia respectively, a conceptual approach, which can contribute to a fuller understanding of 'military politicians' and of wider political developments in post-Soviet Russia is proposed. The chapter argues that, although it is paramount to consider cultural and institutional factors specific to the situation in post-Soviet Russia, Russia should be treated as a 'normal' country. In analytical terms this means that unrealistic expectations and essentialist ideas have to be eschewed in favour of an assessment, which evaluates developments in all their complexity. In assessing a number of recurrent features in Western studies of post-Soviet Russia, the chapter proposes a number of analytical ways in which this approach can be applied to contribute to a broader understanding of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia.

1

Analyses of civil-military relations and 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia

The participation of serving and retired military officers in politics as elected representatives is a curious aspect of Russian civil-military relations.[1]
David Betz, civil-military relations analyst

What concerns all these theoretical things, we can talk and talk. This is the bread of theoreticians. But life is more complicated than that.[2]
Anatolii Pokrovskii, defence correspondent, Pravda

The aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it provides an overview of existing literature on civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia with particular emphasis on interpretations of 'military politicians'. Secondly, it establishes the structure of the thesis by identifying problematic areas in the theoretical and methodological approaches commonly taken to study this issue, which will be subsequently addressed in the empirical chapters. Four problematic aspects regarding Western perceptions and interpretations of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia will be identified below. The first three are linked to constraints of the theoretical approaches used by Western scholars to study civil-military relations and politicians with a military background within a specific post-Soviet Russian context. The fourth area is broader, concerning recurrent features in Western assessments post-Soviet Russian politics, including 'military politicians' in particular. Arguably these features have contributed to an incomplete understanding and overstatement of the role of such personalities in Russian politics.

The following section briefly outlines these four problematic aspects, which will be assessed in detail below.

[1] Betz, 'If they are ordered "Die of hunger!" they will die', p. 21.
[2] Interview with Anatolii Pokrovskii conducted in Moscow on 18 December 2001.

1 – Considering Russian perceptions of 'military politicians'

The first difficulty in the existing Western portrayals of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is the tendency of analysts, especially of those utilising civil-military relations approaches, to apply concepts to the Russian case that have been extrapolated from Western, and predominantly American, experience. In order to understand the position of 'military politicians' in the political system of post-Soviet Russia, it is important to consider how this issue is perceived in Russia itself.

2 – Studying the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians'

The second problematic area is the tendency of Western analysts to underemphasise the specific structure of the Russian military system. If the issue of 'military politicians' is addressed by political scientists studying the wide political situation, their definition of 'military politicians' tends to include members of uniformed services other than the regular armed forces, such as the FSB or the MVD. Whilst this is commendable given the particular structure of the Russian military system, such analysts do not appear to explain why, in their view these figures ought to be beyond politics. They apparently conclude intuitively that the presence of a non-specific entity of military figures in Russian politics presents an unspecified threat to democracy. In contrast, civil-military relations scholars have often tended to focus on members of Russia's regular armed forces (that is, the army, navy, air force and strategic rocket forces). In order to understand the role of Russian 'military politicians' in the political system, a study of the precise institutional backgrounds of such figures in the Russian military system is required.

3 – Civil-military relations concepts and the study of Russian politics

The third important issue requiring additional analysis is the low degree of cross-referencing by Western analysts focusing on a civil-military approach with developments in the study of post-Soviet Russian politics more widely. Civil-military relations analysts specialise in the theoretical intricacies of the relationship between the civilian and military leaderships. At the same time to an extent they disregard wider developments in the study of post-Soviet Russian politics. Some conclusions, as a result, can tend towards presenting the civilian leadership as the 'good guys' and defenders of democracy,

whereas their military equivalents are represented as the 'bad guys', guilty of interfering in the political process, and hindering the process of democratisation in the country. A closer consideration of the post-Soviet Russian political system is required.

4 – Recurrent features in Western assessments of post-Soviet Russia

The last aspect regarding Western assessments of 'military politicians' in contemporary Russia is not a theoretical shortcoming, but a concern connected to Western approaches to the wider study of post-Soviet Russia. This aspect is linked to the impression that the concerns expressed by some Western authors about post-Soviet Russian political developments, particularly about the issue of civil-military relations and 'military politicians', can be overstated as a result of unrealistic expectations and essentialist ideas, leading to an incomplete understanding of events. To avoid the danger of creating the impression in Russia of intentional anti-Russian bias in Western analyses, the relevant section of the chapter argues in favour of an interpretation of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia eschewing unrealistic expectations and essentialist ideas in favour of an assessment, which analyses developments in all their complexity.

The chapter continues by addressing the expression of the four aspects outlined above in a review of Western academic literature dealing with the presence of figures with a military background in Russian politics. The thesis then proceeds in its subsequent chapters to evaluate the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia in view of the theoretical considerations laid out in this chapter. In the final and concluding chapter, in which recurrent features in Western assessments of post-Soviet Russia are assessed, a conceptual approach contributing to a fuller understanding of civil-military relations and 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia will be suggested.

Considering Russian perceptions of 'military politicians'

In the main, the subject of Russian politicians with a military background has been addressed by Western analysts as a matter of civil-military relations. To paraphrase the definition given in the introduction, the civil-military dilemma can be summarised as the

'challenge to reconcile a military that is strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorise them to do.'[3] The participation of active military personnel in politics is seen as a dysfunction of the civil-military relationship of a state. Although 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia are required by law to leave active military service and are, thus, retired or in the reserves,[4] some Western analysts have tended to interpret the political engagement of such figures as a sign of an unhealthy civil-military relationship.

Analyses of civil-military relations are a cross-disciplinary effort and are studied by both political scientists and sociologists. Political science analyses of civil-military relations study the exchange of power between the state and the military as institutions, or in other words, between the civilian and military leaderships. Sociological approaches, in contrast, are concerned with the integration of military and civilian institutions and values, rather than with the distribution of power between them.[5] In addressing the participation of figures with a military background in Russian politics, the aspects of civil-military relations theory most relevant to this thesis clearly fall within the sphere of the former approach.

The choice of theoretical frameworks and concepts for political science approaches to the study of civil-military relations is limited. The first comprehensive theoretical framework for the study of civil-military relations in the late modern era was Samuel Huntington's 1957 monograph The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations.[6] Ever since its first publication, his theoretical approach has occupied a paramount place in the field of civil-military relations and many subsequent studies can be classified as variations of the themes developed in this particular work. Peter Feaver wrote about Huntington's work that 'most of what has been

[3] Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematique', p. 149.
[4] The specific legal regulations with regard to the political activities of military personnel in post-Soviet Russia will be discussed in detail in chapter four.
[5] Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematique', pp. 157 and 166.
[6] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, MA and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.

written since has been an explicit or implicit response to his argument'.[7] According to Huntington's framework, the key mechanism to ensure a good civil-military relationship revolves around two factors – military professionalism and an efficient system of civilian control. Professionalism in the Huntingtonian sense signifies a definition of the military as an organisation characterised by work-ethics not unlike that of other professional groups. These are characteristically driven by the principle of making 'the practitioner's own interests dependent on his serving the interest of his clients to the best of his abilities'.[8] Huntington argues that military professionalism precludes the military's incentive to influence the political process, because the military professional limits himself to his field of expertise – military science – and recognises that 'politics is beyond the scope of military competence.'[9]

According to Huntington's approach, military professionalism is the indispensable basis for a good civil-military relationship. The actual quality of the relationship is subject to the civilian leadership's methods of ensuring military subordination and attempting to minimise the military's influence over the political process. Huntington cites two variants – subjective and objective civilian control.[10] Subjective civilian control results in the politicisation of the military and subsequently in civil-military conflict, since it is achieved by the maximisation of the power of civilian groups in relation to the military. Consequently, conflict and military politicisation resulting from subjective civilian control are affected by the professional military's resentment of the civilian leadership's impinging on its decision-making powers within its field of expertise, and by its attempts to regain professional autonomy. Objective civilian control, in contrast, ensures a 'good' civil-military relationship. It is achieved by the maximisation of military professionalism, by a clear division of labour between civilian masters and the military, and by the granting of autonomous decision-making powers to the military in its field of expertise – military science. An ideal case of high professionalism and an effective system of objective civilian control can render the military 'politically sterile and

[7] Peter D. Feaver, 'Civil-military Relations', Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999, p. 212.
[8] Peter M. Blau and Richard W. Scott, Formal Organisations, San Francisco: Chandler, 1962 p. 60.
[9] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 71.
[10] ibid. pp. 80-85.

neutral', because the expectations of both the civilians and the military with regard to their role and functions coincide.[11]

During the Cold War, Soviet civil-military relations received a considerable amount of attention. This came particularly from American scholars, in light of 'the obvious U.S. need to understand its enemy'.[12] The three major schools of thought concerning Soviet civil-military relations were generated by American scholars: Roman Kolkowicz, William Odom, and Timothy Colton respectively.[13] Termed 'conflict', 'congruence', and 'participatory' respectively, these models argued in favour of fundamentally different interpretations of communist civil-military relations. This was due to the fact that they were generated in part as a response, critique or revision of each other. In a retrospective assessment of the three models' usefulness, Dale Herspring concluded in 1996 that rather than constituting different 'schools of thought'[14] about the nature of Soviet civil-military relations, the usefulness of each of these models varied, depending on the experiences of the time period from which they were extrapolated (the Khrushchev years, the early Brezhnev era, and the late Brezhnev era and Gorbachev's first years respectively), as well as on the specific issues under analysis.[15] Despite their differences, however, these models all used Huntington's concepts of professionalism and objective civilian control as a starting point to explain the varying degrees of quality of the civil-military relationship in the Soviet Union as perceived by their authors.

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[11] ibid. p. 84.

[12] Paul Bracken, 'Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations', in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds.), U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Crisis or Transition?, Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 152.

[13] Kolkowicz, Roman, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press; Kolkowicz, Roman and Andrzej Korbonski, Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, Boston: G. Allen and Unwin, 1982; Odom, William E., 'The Party-Military Connection: A Critique', in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Vogyles (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, Boulder: Westview Press: 1978; Timothy J. Colton, 'The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model', in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Vogyles (eds.), Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, Boulder: Westview Press: 1978; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979; Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson (eds.), Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

[14] Colton, Soldiers and the Soviet State, p. 12.

[15] Dale R. Herspring, Russian Civil-Military Relations, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996.

According to Herspring, 'no one has had as much impact on the study of civil-military relations in communist polities as did Huntington'.[16]

With regard to Russia in the post-Soviet era, the Huntingtonian concepts of civil-military relations have continued to enjoy immense popularity among Western scholars. The participation of figures with a military background in post-Soviet Russian politics has sometimes been linked to the Russian military's politicisation, which was perceived to have been determined by a lack of professionalism of the Russian officer corps, or by flaws in the civilian control system over the armed forces. There are a few examples worth citing here. In her 1999 monograph on 'democratising' the Czech and Russian armed forces, Marybeth Peterson Ulrich drew on her own interpretation of Huntington's notion of professionalism. She concluded that the norms of military professionalism in Russia ought to be 'democratised', if the army was to become a supporter of the country's democratic transition.[17] Calling the participation of active military figures in politics 'disturbing',[18] Peterson Ulrich wrote that 'some [military figures] justify the increased direct political involvement as fulfilling their duty to ensure that the problems of the armed forces are adequately addressed in order to protect the state. Such rationalizing is the result of the evolution of postcommunist military professionalism within a context of ambiguous ideological allegiance'.[19] David Betz ascribed the representation of former military personnel in parliamentary politics to the lack of civilian specialists on defence and security policy, the presence of which he described as 'crucial' for the establishment of democratic civilian control over the Russian military.[20] Pavel Baev, with direct reference to Huntington's concepts of professionalism and distinction between subjective and objective civilian control, argued that 'the two main

[16] Dale R. Herspring, 'Samuel Huntington and Communist Civil-Military Relations', in Armed Forces and Society 25(4), summer 1999, p. 557.
[17] Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999.
[18] As will be discussed in chapter four of the thesis, the participation of Russian military personnel in politics is clearly regulated in the country's laws. Active military personnel is allowed to campaign, but is required to retire or join the reserves if a political office is taken up.
[19] Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, p. 144.
[20] Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?', p. 482.

obstacles for establishing efficient political control over the army were the weakness of political institutions and the extended professional independence of the military'.[21]

To date, Huntington's concepts of military professionalism and objective civilian control as the key features of a good civil military relationship remain the basis for much of the writing on civil-military relations in the United States, Russia, and other countries. Peter Feaver rightly pointed out that – as is the case with this thesis – 'even modern analyses of civil-military relations feel obliged to begin with a reference to Huntington's theory'.[22] Feaver asserted that although major studies of civil-military relations have been conducted since the 1950s, their innovation has been based mainly on empirical findings, rather than on theoretical developments, which he described as limited.[23] Other authors, such as Paul Bracken, have criticised the study of civil-military relations on the grounds that it 'has petrified into a sort of dogma, so that conceptual innovation and new problem identification earn the reproach of not having applied the theory correctly.'[24] A good example for this dogmatic interpretation of the Huntingtonian paradigm can be found in John Moran's 2002 study on the Russian military and politics. Moran explained his chosen theoretical approach in the following words: 'Because the language and concepts of civil-military relations have largely been based upon the language of Huntington's first work, this research will keep with this standard.'[25]

Huntington's landmark work on civil-military relations provided a theoretical framework that was intended to be universally and comparatively applicable. However, it is essential to recognise that his concepts are paradigms characterised by the specific time and the specific place of their generation. Firstly, although Huntington intended to provide a general theory of civil-military relations by writing The Soldier and the State, the empirical data from which the theoretical framework was deducted is based on the

[21] Pavel K. Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, London: Sage Publications, 1996, p. 52. Despite being of Russian origin, Baev is classified as a Western analysts of Russian civil-military relations, as he relies heavily on Western analytical approaches, is based at a Western academic institution, and publishes predominantly for the English-speaking audience.
[22] Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematique, pp. 158.
[23] ibid., pp. 172.
[24] Bracken, 'Reconsidering Civil-Military Relations', p. 146.
[25] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State', p. 7.

experience of civil-military relations in the United States.[26] Further developments of Huntington's concepts by other scholars, such as Kolkowicz or Colton, writing on civil-military relations in the Soviet Union, or the long list of authors writing on the military and politics in post-Soviet Russia, share the characteristic of having been devised by academics with an Anglo-Saxon background. Claude Welch commented on this. He saw the common democratic heritage of civil-military relations scholars working largely in the United States or Great Britain as significant in as much as it 'may unconsciously have shaped the evidence they seek or the conclusions they draw.'[27] According to Feaver, 'the American case has figured prominently in the theoretical development of the field [of civil-military relations]'.[28]

Secondly, it is significant that The Soldier and the State was written in the political climate of the Cold War and heightened East-West tensions. As John Lepingwell argued, Huntington's objective/subjective civilian control dichotomy 'was intended to throw into sharp relief the difference between civil-military relations in democratic and communist polities'.[29] Whilst Huntington's theory prescribed a set of conditions that would, in his view, avoid the military's interference in politics in any given state, the concern of his book was not the interference of the United States Armed Forces in the state's civilian affairs, but the provision of U.S. military capabilities strong enough to ensure national security in the face of considerable East-West tensions.

By studying civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia within the framework of Western concepts, which are often derived from Huntington's theory, Western scholars seem to be implicitly positing a Western model of civil-military relations as the only option open to Russia. Conclusions drawn by such analyses are by default negative, as the civil-military relationship in post-Soviet Russia does not correspond to the

[26] Huntington establishes his theoretical framework in the first part of the book, whilst parts two and three of the book deal with pre- and post-WWII civil-military relations in the United States.
[27] Claude E. Welch, Jr., 'Military Disengagement from Politics: Paradigms, Processes, or Random Events', in Armed Forces and Society, 18(3), Spring 1992, p. 324.
[28] Feaver, 'Civil-military Relations', p. 213.
[29] John W. R. Lepingwell, 'Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup', in World Politics, 44, July 1992, p. 541. According to Huntington, Marxist ideology is inherently incompatible with military professionalism and objective civilian control: see Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 92-93.

understanding of a 'good' civil-military relationship in Western states. Unfavourable depictions of the situation in post-Soviet Russia, therefore, are the result of Russia's failure to correspond to the expectations of Western analysts. The possibility that expectations in Russia are merely different is seldom considered. What unites the body of Western literature on post-Soviet civil-military relations discussed in this chapter is the analysts' reliance on Western concepts and paradigms of civil-military relations, and the selective taking into account of Russian perceptions of the issues in question. To address this issue, one chapter of this thesis is devoted specifically to Russian perceptions of civil-military relations and, in particular, of 'military politicians' in Russian politics.

Studying the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians'

Another common feature of many Western analyses of Russian military figures in politics is the lack of a clear definition of what is meant by a 'military politician'. This shortcoming is linked to the fact that Western notions of civil-military relations at times appear to be applied with insufficient rigour. Western theoretical frameworks, such as Huntington's, within which the participation of figures with a military background in post-Soviet Russia is usually addressed, have been devised for the study of the relationship between a country's civilian leadership and the regular armed forces, defined as the army, navy and air force. Huntington's theory of civil-military relations and later variations on his work suppose the presence of a clear analytical divide between two groups: the civilian leadership and the regular military. Huntington's theory has it that the civilian part of the equation is a coherent group, subject to definition on a case-by-case basis (the distinct ideological make-up of the civilian leadership is of crucial importance for the potential quality of the civil-military relationship).[30] The military, on the other hand, as a group is unified by a professional military ethic, which is 'realistic and conservative' as well as 'concrete, permanent and universal'.[31]

[30] Huntington tested the compatibility of liberalism, fascism, conservatism and Marxism with the professional military ethic. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 89-97.
[31] ibid. pp. 79 and 89.

The fundamental factor uniting the military as a group, in Huntington's eyes, is unequivocal: 'The existence of the military profession depends upon the existence of nation states capable of maintaining a military establishment and desiring to maintain such an establishment because of [external] threats to their security'.[32] In Huntington's view, military professionals are united by a feeling of responsibility for providing military security from external threats to their client, the state. Huntington's definition of the military is limited to the regular armed forces, whose task it is to defend a state from external enemies. According to Huntington, the military ought to be beyond politics, because political involvement, regardless of the reason, is incompatible with military professionalism and ultimately leads to the military's decreased ability to provide security from external threats.[33]

Some Western analysts of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics have failed to explain their definition of a 'military politician' and why it is desirable to keep these figures out of politics. Kryshtanovskaia and White asserted, for example, that by 2003 'generals' accounted for '15 to 70 percent of the membership of a variety of elite groups.'[34] According to their estimation, this 'mass movement of military personnel' into politics and business resulted in a 'militocracy'.[35] They loosely defined this as being made up of figures with a background in the regular armed forces or in the other uniformed services in Russia, often termed 'power ministries' or 'force structures'. In citing percentages of military figures in different elite groups, Kryshtanovskaia and White fail to specify the nature of these figures' military background. It is not clear, for instance, whether these percentages include men who were affiliated to the military only during their obligatory conscript service. Such personalities cannot be called military professionals. They also do not specify the institutional backgrounds of these military figures (that is, whether they are from the regular armed forces, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Interior Ministry (MVD), et cetera). The authors do not clearly specify what they perceive to be the consequence of this developing 'militocracy' for the Russian

[32] ibid. p. 65.
[33] ibid. p. 95.
[34] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', p. 303.
[35] ibid. p. 302.

political system as a whole.[36] In speaking about 'Putin's Militocracy', Kryshtanovskaia and White's article does not refer to the work of Stanislav Andreski, who first coined the term 'militocracy'. He described this as one of four necessary attributes of 'militarism'. In accordance with Andreski's definition, 'militocracy' describes a situation where the authority of the military exceeds that of civilians.[37] Asserting the authoritarian tendencies of military and security officials without further elaboration on this issue to some extent undermines the analytical viability of the conclusions drawn in the work of Kryshtanovskaia and White.

A similarly unspecific definition of 'military politicians' is apparent also in other works. Examples are Isakova's account of the military in domestic Russian politics,[38] and Robert Barylski's study, The Soldier in Russian politics.[39] The tendency of some Western analysts to perceive Russian military figures from different institutional backgrounds as a single interest group can be illustrated best of all by the example of the plenipotentiaries appointed by Vladimir Putin to head the seven newly created federal administrative districts in 2000. Five of the seven initial appointees came from a military/security/force structure background – a fact that was seen as highly significant by many Western authors. A typical response to those appointments was along the following lines: 'The army has been selected as a key force in the Kremlin's exercise of authority over the fractious regions. Certainly, the credentials of the leaders of these federal districts…leave few illusions about whom Putin sees as his allies – of the seven leaders two are army generals, two are career intelligent officers, and one is a representative of the police'.[40]

Three possible reasons for this seemingly unclear theoretical definition of Russian 'military politicians' by some Western authors can be identified. Firstly, area studies

[36] ibid. p. 304.
[37] Stanislav Andreski, Military Organisation and Society, second edition, London: Routledge, 1968.
[38] Irina Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002, pp. 220-224.
[39] Robert V. Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics'. See, for instance, his list of politically active generals on p. 350/351 includes representatives from the regular armed forces and the former KGB.
[40] Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?', p. 484. See also Peter Reddaway, 'Will Putin be able to Consolidate Power?', Post-Soviet Affairs, 17(1), 2001, p. 32.

specialists concentrating on general developments of the political situation in Russia might perceive the presence of politicians with a military background as an issue worthy of consideration, but might not base their analysis on the concepts of civil-military relations theory. As a result, as appears to be the case with Kryshtanovskaia and White, for example, the notion that military figures ought to be beyond politics might be applied without explaining sufficiently why this should be the case. Secondly, the tendency to consider military structures other than the armed forces in the study of civil-military relations and of political involvement of military figures in post-Soviet Russia systematically is a rather recent phenomenon. The recognition by Western scholars that a more inclusive definition of the military sphere in post-Soviet Russia was required appears to be linked to an extent to Vladimir Putin's rise to political power starting in late 1999.

The third reason can be found in the beginnings of a theoretical shift concerning the study of civil-military relations in contemporary Russia and other postcommunist states. The major works on Russian civil-military relations dealing with the early post-Soviet era were largely limited to the relationship between the civilian leadership and the regular armed forces. Examples for this are the monographs by John Moran, Brian Taylor and Marybeth Ulrich Peterson.[41] If other components of the Russian military system were mentioned, they were often portrayed as a counterbalancing measure used by the civilian leadership to keep the regular armed forces in check.[42] Whilst most Western authors writing on civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia sought to adapt traditional civil-military relations concepts to the Russian case, they tended to keep intact the 'original' civil-military relations definition of the military as the regular armed forces. Over the years, however, it was increasingly recognised that in view of the numerical strength of Russia's other armed services in relation to the regular armed forces,[43] a limitation of analyses to the regular armed forces would mean ignoring an important component of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. In a comparative study of the democratic

[41] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State; Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army; Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries.
[42] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, pp. 75 – 111.

control of postcommunist militaries, Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster wrote in 2002:

> In some countries…the core challenge for democratic control of the military revolves essentially around the regular armed forces. In contrast, many of the other former Soviet and former Yugoslav republics inherited (or developed in the 1990s) other armed forces (internal security forces, paramilitary forces, border guards, armed intelligence forces and the like) which are as large as (in some cases even larger than) the regular armed forces, are quite heavily armed and have greater political impact and influence than the regular military. The roles and mechanisms for political control of such forces, further, are often highly opaque. Thus in Russia, Ukraine and the FRY, control of these non-regular armed forces is arguably as great a challenge for democratisation as control of the regular military.[44]

Having recognised the inevitability of including force structures other than the regular armed forces in the study of civil-military relations in contemporary Russia (as well as in other post-Soviet states), analysts faced the dilemma of lacking a theoretical framework that was able to account for these additional factors. Subsequently, a new sub-field of political science termed 'security sector reform' (SSR) has started to emerge in recent years.[45] Only in its initial stages of development, there is not yet a 'comprehensive, holistic perspective that is integral to SSR'.[46] However, two broad definitions of the security sector have emerged:

> The first is concerned with those militarised formations authorised by the state to utilise force to protect the state itself and its citizens. This definition limits SSR to organisations such as the regular military, paramilitary police forces and the intelligence services. The second view takes a wider view of SSR, defining it as those organisations and activities concerned with the provision of security

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[43] According to The Military Balance, 103(1), 2003-2004, pp. 89 and 95, the numerical strength of Russia's regular armed forces is 960,600, and the active personnel of its paramilitary forces is 409,100.
[44] Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe, p. 5.
[45] According to Marina Caparini and Philipp Fluri, 'the emergence of the concept of security sector reform coincided with the shift from transition to consolidation of post-communist and post-authoritarian states.' Marina Caparini and Philipp H. Fluri, 'Introduction: The Relevance of Democratic Control of the Security Sector', DCAF Working Paper Series No. 24, Geneva Centre for The Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva, July 2002, p. 5.
[46] Caparini and Fluri, 'Introduction', p. 4.

(broadly defined), and including organisations and institutions ranging from, for example, private security guards to the judiciary.[47]

Studies of security sector reform have concentrated on contemporary central and eastern European states.[48] They have, though, also looked at the developing world,[49] and, to an extent, the situation in Western states after 9/11, especially in the United States.[50] The majority of authors writing on security sector reform write 'from a background in and perspective of civil-military relations',[51] having recognised that, with regard to central and eastern Europe, a more 'holistic approach' to civil-military relations, going beyond the study of the regular armed forces, is needed.[52]

The fact that the concept of security sector reform emerged directly from theories of civil-military relations distinctly shaped the outlook and direction of scholars engaging in this new field of inquiry. As a result, the conceptual and theoretical framing of studies of the security sector is highly reminiscent of the one that characteristically shaped the study of civil-military relations in the traditional sense.[53] A tendency towards conceptual stretching was revealed implicitly by Heiner Hänggi who, writing on the priorities of democratic security sector governance, asserted that the two major concerns of security sector reform are 'the strengthening of democratic control over security institutions by the state and civil society' and 'the professionalisation of the security forces'.[54] Although the study of security sector reform tends to be touted as a new field of academic inquiry,

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[47] Timothy Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation', DCAF Working Paper Series No. 5, Geneva Centre for The Democratic Control of Armed Forces , Geneva, March 2002, p. 1.
[48] This is apparent in the large volume of publications on security sector reform published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces. Publications are posted on the centre's website www.dcaf.ch.
[49] See, for instance, Alice Hills, 'Defence Diplomacy and Security Sector Reform', Contemporary Security Policy, 21(1), April 2000, pp. 46-67; Alice Hills, 'Security Sector Reform and some comparative issues in the police-military interface', Contemporary Security Policy 21(3) December 2000, pp.1-26; Rama Mani 'Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding' International Peacekeeping 6(4) Winter 1999, pp. 9-26.
[50] Jonathan Stevenson, 'US "Homeland Security" Reforms in the Aftermath of 9/11', in Heiner Hänggi and Theodor H. Winkler (eds.), Challenges of Security Sector Governance, Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003.
[51] Caparini and Flur,i 'Introduction', p. 5.
[52] Edmunds, 'Security Sector Reform', p. 1.
[53] Claude E. Welch wrote as early as 1992 that although students of transition and democratisation had recognised the roles of intelligence, paramilitary and police services in civil-military relations (that is, in potential intervention in politics), 'recognition of this importance has not resulted in abundant literature on this point'. Welch, 'Military Disengagement from Politics', p. 328.

the customary professionalisation and civilian-control paradigms of 'traditional' civil-military relations appear to persist but were simply 'stretched' in order to include in the analysis militarised organisations other than the regular armed forces.[55]

Militarised organisations other than the regular armed forces are an important component of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. The recognition in recent years that the traditional focus on the regular armed forces would mean to ignore a considerable sector of the entire Russian military system is commendable and timely. However, theoretical developments to take account of these additional components of civil-military relations have been stunted by the persistent popularity of the Huntingtonian concepts of professionalisation and civilian control for the study of the security sector as a whole. The abovementioned edited volume on democratic control of postcommunist militaries by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster was pioneering inasmuch as it advocated an approach that went beyond the traditional focus on the regular armed forces. However, the lack of a clear theoretical approach for taking into account 'non-regular armed forces' led to insufficient clarity of the analyses in the chapters on different postcommunist states comprising the main body of the text.

Examples of this include Isakova's chapter on the military and domestic politics in post-Soviet Russia. She asserted that 'the security sector of the Russian state is…a potentially very powerful force in the country's emerging electoral politics.' Her definition of the security sector includes the regular armed forces, as well as employees of other 'power ministries', such as the police and intelligence services. What unites them, in her view, is their common 'military frame of mind' – a notion she failed to define further.[56] As outlined above, Huntington's definition of the professional military

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[54] Heiner Hänggi, 'Introduction' in Hänggi and Winkler, Challenges of Security Sector Governance, p. 18.
[55] The term 'militarised' as used in this thesis is to denote the fact of the favouring of military-type ranks, titles, and uniforms over the civilian arrangement of some organisations in post-Soviet Russia (this will be discussed in more detail in chapter three). It is not meant to express the negative connotations often attached to the notions of 'militarism' and 'militarisation' when they are applied to describe the perception of military dominance over specific spheres of society. For a discussion of the ambiguity of the terms 'militarism' and 'militarisation' see Stephen L. Webber, 'The Society-Military Interface in Russia', in Jennifer G. Mathers and Stephen L. Webber (eds.), Society-Military Relations in Russia, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005 (forthcoming).
[56] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221.

mind is clearly intended to be characteristic of the regular armed forces, who are united in their professional quest to provide national security from external threats. Whilst Huntington's notion of the military mind itself has been criticised as essentialist,[57] the theoretical viability of a widely defined application of his notion, used to describe a common ethic shared by employees of any militarised organisation, as in Isakova's case, requires further investigation.

Elements of another influential work on civil-military relations, which has not enjoyed the popularity of Huntington's theory for the study of post-Soviet Russia, appears instructive for the study of Russian 'military politicians', despite the fact that it was also written in 1960 and with the regular U.S. armed forces in mind. In his 1960 work, The Professional Soldier: A Political and Social Portrait, the military sociologist Morris Janowitz posed a challenge to the portrayal of military professionals as a single analytical entity.[58] He argued that in addition to seeking common characteristics shared by military professionals, the analysis of divergence in the conduct and opinions and even of conflict between members of the military profession was essential. According to Janowitz's research, such divergences were accounted for predominantly by changes in the military profession starting in the middle of the 20th century. These were conditioned by the new tasks facing modern military organisations, which required an increasing diversity and level of skills for its personnel. As a result, the number of military professionals with purely 'military' occupational specialities, and 'military mindset' was decreasing.[59]

In Janowitz's view, the characterisation of the military professional as a 'heroic leader', as 'the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit', in the modern era was increasingly challenged by the importance of the 'military manager', whose major concern was the scientific and rational conduct of war, and the 'military

[57] 'This is the whole weakness of Huntington's thesis. All is made to hang upon a very special definition of professionalism, and by pure deduction from this, of a so-called 'military mind' – Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, London: Pall Mall Press, 1962, pp. 21.
[58] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Political and Social Portrait, Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960.
[59] ibid. pp. 8 and 12.

engineer', maintaining and running the increasingly sophisticated machinery of warfare.[60] Janowitz found that military professionals increasingly thought of themselves as members of specific skill groups, rather than as a part of a distinct group of military professionals, because of their high level of specialisation in different skills.[61]

Janowitz pointed out the deteriorating impact on group coherence of the highly specialised skills and wide range of tasks fulfilled by members of the military profession in the modern era. As a challenge to the perception of a universal 'military mind', this was an important analytical and theoretical adjustment. Janowitz's work among military sociologists remains relevant and has been developed further by Charles Moskos, John Allen Williams and David Segal in their 2000 work, The Postmodern Military.[62] In their view, the 'heroic leader' as the dominant type of military professional in the cold-war era has been challenged further by the ascendancy of the 'soldier-scholar' (attaining advanced civilian degrees) and the 'soldier-statesman' (officers skilled in handling the media and adept in international diplomacy).[63]

It has been noted by a number of Russian civil-military relations specialists since the mid-1990s that, far from being a cohesive institution, the regular Russian armed forces was divided along a number of fault lines (ideological, regional, rank, branch of service).[64] Given the institutional variety of the military structure of contemporary Russia, and the equally varied skills and tasks fulfilled by its employees, an analytical differentiation between 'military politicians' originating from different institutional backgrounds and fulfilling a variety of tasks, which are often compatible with civilian life, appears all the more important. In order to come to conclusions about the extent to

[60]ibid. pp. 21-22.
[61] ibid. p. 7.
[62] Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, David R. Segal (eds.), The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
[63] Charles C. Moskos, 'Toward a Postmodern Military', in Moskos, Williams, Segal, The Postmodern Military, p. 19.
[64] Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles; Hans-Henning Schröder, 'The Russian Army in Politics', in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds.), Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1998; Lilia Shevtsova, 'Russia's Fragmented Armed Forces', in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (eds.), Civil-military Relations and Democracy, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

which the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia can be perceived as the exertion of influence by a single analytical entity, a detailed study of each of the institutions making up the Russian military system from which they emanate, and the tasks fulfilled by them, is necessary.

Civil-military relations concepts and the study of Russian politics

As noted above, the presence of figures with a military background in post-Soviet Russian politics has been studied, bar a few exceptions, predominantly by scholars specialising in the theorisation of the civil-military relationship. Whilst throughout the El'tsin presidency the existence of politicians with a military/force structure background was rarely systematically discussed by political 'generalists',[65] more attention started to be paid to the issue with Putin's rise to political prominence. His intelligence background and apparent reliance on force-structure representatives, or the so-called *siloviki*, became a focus of attention.[66] Given the fact that the issue has been addressed by civil-military relations analysts *throughout* the post-Soviet period, it appears surprising that politicians with a military background were not generally singled out as a vitally important issue by analysts concentrating on studies of wider political developments in post-Soviet Russia. Did political analysts misread the importance of the issue in question? Is a purely agency-centred explanation, centred on the personality of Vladimir Putin sufficient? Were the

[65] Seminal volumes and textbooks on Russian politics do not mention the issue of 'military politicians'. Examples are Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics: a Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Thomas Remington, Politics in Russia, New York: Longman, 1999; Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics 4, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997; Stephen White, Russia's New Politics: The Management of a Postcommunist Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000.

[66] The major work on this issue by political scientists has been Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'. In contrast, their joint work on elites under the El'tsin leadership did not address the issue of politicians and officials with a force-structure background. See, for instance, Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite', Europe-Asia Studies, 48(5), 1996, pp. 711-733. Peter Reddaway picked up on the notion of *siloviki* in three journal articles: Reddaway, 'Will Putin be Able to Consolidate Power?'; 'Is Putin's Power More Formal than Real?', Post-Soviet Affairs, 18(1), 2002, pp. 31-40; (with Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer) 'Russia in the Year 2003'. Recent political textbooks and volumes on politics under the Putin presidency tend to broach the issue of politicians with a force-structure background (mainly FSB). See, for instance, Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004, p. 4. The index of Richard Sakwa's monograph Putin: Russia's Choice, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, includes *siloviki* as an entry.

conclusions of civil-military relations analysts predetermined by the application of the theoretical concepts framing their studies?

Civil-military relations analysts indicate the issue of Russian 'military politicians' as problematic because, they argue, the presence of such figures denotes an irregularity in the civil-military relationship and a dysfunction of the system of civilian control over the armed forces.[67] As implied by the discipline's label, approaches to the study of civil-military relations presuppose a clear civil-military dichotomy. Consequently in the case of the involvement of retired military figures in Russian politics the military component of the relationship is seen to denote an interference in civilian affairs. Particularly with reference to post-Soviet Russia, analysts have described the military component as a major factor inhibiting or even threatening its civilian counterpart's effort to further the country's progress towards democracy. Jennifer Mathers called the involvement of Russian retired military figures in politics 'an encroachment by the armed forces into electoral politics'.[68] According to Eva Busza, 'the new roles and behaviours adopted by Russian military officers are disturbing because they threaten the integrity of the Russian state and serve as an impediment to democratic consolidation'.[69] Peterson Ulrich wrote in 1999 that 'democratic gains achieved by civilian institutions are threatened by postcommunist militaries that are not similarly transformed'.[70] Moran concluded in 2002 that 'for Russia to ensure that its military never resorts to autonomous or violent powers, the country's democratic leaders must ensure that the military does not participate in factional activity'.[71]

Whilst being intimately familiar with the intricacies of civilian control mechanisms, some civil-military relations analysts appear to be less concerned with

[67] See, for example, Eva Busza, 'Transition and Civil-military Relations in Poland and Russia', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29(2), p. 180-181.
[68] Jennifer G. Mathers, 'Outside Politics? Civil-Military Relations during a Period of Reform', in Anne C. Aldis and Roger N. McDermott (eds.), Russian Military Reform: 1992-2002, London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003; p 28.
[69] Eva Busza, 'State Dysfunctionality, Institutional Decay, and the Russian Military', in Valerie Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State: Institutional Crisis and the Quest for Democratic Governance, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000, p. 124.
[70] Peterson Ulrich, Democratising Communist Militaries, p. 186.
[71] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, p. 201.

broader developments in post-Soviet Russian politics. Simply speaking, the impression arises that the military component of the civil-military relationship tends to be favoured in terms of analytical effort and theoretical framing at the expense of its civilian counterpart. As a rule, Western academic works on civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia and other postcommunist states start with detailed deliberations on the theoretical framework most appropriate, in their eyes, for the study of civil-military relations in these countries. Rarely, however, do they include an explicit definition of the political system within which the civil-military relationship is acted out. The predominant conceptualisation of the post-Soviet Russian political system used by civil-military relations scholars is Russia as a country in transition towards democracy. Whilst explaining the relevance of their studies by the fact that reforms of the armed forces and of civil-military relations are important elements of democratic transition, the nature of the political system of the transitional states in question often remains vaguely defined.[72]

In contrast, in the work of many political analysts, who are concerned with wider political developments, the inclusion of retired military figures in the political process has not tended to be discussed as a major impediment to democratisation. For example, pondering the 'sources of low-caliber democracy' in post-Soviet Russia, Steven Fish explicitly stated that 'a politically meddlesome military did not cause the problem.'[73] The theoretical conclusions of many scholars interested in political developments in post-Soviet Russia more widely indicate why in their analyses the issue of 'military politicians' has not been – or at least to a much lesser degree – represented as an important issue. Firstly, the democratic transition approach to the study of post-Soviet Russia, which continues to frame many analyses of civil-military relations, has increasingly been modified by many political analysts in recent years.[74] Caution has been voiced particularly regarding the expectation of liberal democracy as the end-point of

[72] See, for example, the introductory chapters to Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe; Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State; and Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries.
[73] M. Stephen Fish, 'Conclusion: Democracy and Russian Politics', in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (eds.), Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 226.
[74] See especially Thomas Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', in Journal of Democracy, 13(1), 2002, pp. 5-21.

transition.[75] In the words of Graeme Gill, the unrealistic expectations concerning the development of post-Soviet Russia gave way to the realisation that 'early aspirations for democracy in post-Soviet Russia have not been realised'.[76]

Such expectations have also given way to the realisation that transitional regimes can consolidate after a process of only partial democratisation. This creates a 'grey zone' or 'hybrid regimes', which are characterised by the display of some attributes of a democracy, but also by considerable democratic deficits.[77] Many observers of the Russian political scene have come to concur that Russia's post-Soviet transition is more or less completed and the state has consolidated into a fairly stable, but imperfect democratic political system. This is not to say that prospects for further democratisation are ruled out entirely,[78] but that the political system of contemporary Russia no longer evokes early post-Soviet era anticipations of dramatic or revolutionary change in either a positive or negative sense.[79] In the words of Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul, writing in 2003, 'the most likely outcome for the near future is neither more democracy nor more autocracy – neither liberal democracy nor dictatorship – but a stable regime somewhere in between.'[80]

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[75] McFaul, Petrov and Ryabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 12.

[76] Graham Gill, 'The Failure of Democracy in Russia', in Perspectives in European Politics and Society ,3(2), 2002, p. 169.

[77] Carothers, 'The End of the Transition Paradigm', p. 9; see also Larry Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', in Journal of Democracy, 13(2), April 2002, pp.21-35. A multitude of new labels for Russia's hybrid system have been invented by political analysts in recent years, which differ according to the degree of democracy the individual analysts observed. Such labels for Russia's partial democracy resulted in the proliferation of 'adjectival democracy'. Hence, 'electoral, virtual, illiberal, pseudo, managed, delegative, ruled, partial, guided or incomplete democracies.' See Neil Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy', Political Studies Review, Vol. 1, 2003, pp. 149-166; David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research', World Politics, Vol. 49, April 1997, pp. 430-451; Harley Balzer, 'Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin's Emerging Regime', Post-Soviet Affairs,19(3), 2003, p. 190.

[78] Kenneth Wollack cautioned that the 'hopeful vision' of the transition paradigm should not be abandoned and post-communist states, such as Russia, should not be abandoned merely as failed democracies. See Kenneth Wollack, 'Debating the Transition Paradigm: Retaining the Human Dimension', Journal of Democracy, 13(3), July 2002.

[79] Neil Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy'; p. 158.

[80] Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, 'Russian Democracy under Putin', Problems of Post-Communism, 50(4), 2003, p.

Political analysts tend to differ in their evaluation of the level of democracy apparent in post-Soviet Russia, and in their visions of the potential for further democratisation. However, there appears to be agreement with regards to the key factors perceived to be responsible for the creation of the democratic deficits of the political system of contemporary Russia: the institutional choice of a strong presidency made with the adoption the Russian Constitution in 1993 and the conduct and choices made by elite actors within this institutional framework. The resulting political order has been described by some political analysts as 'Superpresidentialism'.[81] The major characteristics of Superpresidentialism can be summarised as far-reaching formal and informal powers of the president, the fostering of patronage, the personalisation of state power, and a weak system of inter-branch checks due to the dominance of the executive with its large and bureaucratic presidential apparatus.[82] A decisive lack of accountability by the ruling elite to society has been seen as a major outcome.[83]

With this in mind, some reasons for the lesser concerns usually raised by political analysts studying wider political developments about the presence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia suggest themselves. The conceptualisation of Russian politics by many political analysts is at odds with the tendency of the civil-military relations analysts discussed above to interpret politicians with a military background as standing in opposition to a civilian leadership striving for democratisation. Such an interpretation can only apply if the civilian leadership's dedication to democratic reforms (including its commitment to establishing a system of objective, or democratically accountable, civilian control over the armed forces) is taken for granted. In the eyes of political analysts studying wider political developments, this condition is not present in

[81] The term 'superpresidentialism' with regard to post-Soviet Russia was coined by Timothy J. Colton, 'Superpresidentialism and Russia's backward State', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11(2), 1995, pp. 144-148; and M. Steven Fish, 'The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics', in Sperling (ed.), Building the Russian State, p. 177-192.

[82] See, for instance, Fish, 'Conclusion', pp. 215-253; Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 207-228; Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy', p. 150; Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia (3rd ed.), New York: Pearson Longman, 2004, pp. 56-60; John P. Willerton Jr., 'Presidential Power', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics 4, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 35-55.

post-Soviet Russia. Their analyses suggest that a major reason for Russia's partial democracy has been the conduct of the ruling civilian elite.[84]

In contrast to the concerns voiced by civil-military relations specialists over the presence of figures with a military background in Russian politics, political analysts studying wider political developments have tended to express concerns about the generally limited potential for institutional checks and political opposition to the ruling regime, rather than about backward-looking political forces or individuals, such as 'military politicians', that could potentially pose a threat to the democratic course pursued by a popularly elected leadership.[85] What is absent, in the eyes of many political analysts, is a much wider-ranging societal control over the governing structures at large, and not merely civilian control over the military. The predominantly important cleavage is 'the remoteness of political to civil society' at large.[86] This is quite different from, if not incompatible with, the presumption of a conflict between a backward-looking military and a popularly accountable and representative civilian leadership.

In view of this observation, it is questionable whether it is fruitful to study the 'transformation of Russian civil-military relations to a new democratic level'[87] in isolation from a discussion of the democratic credentials of the civilian leadership and from wider conceptualisations of the post-Soviet political system. Some civil-military relations analysts have expressed their awareness of this crucial issue. David Betz, who intensively interviewed members of the Russian military and defence community, found that 'it was felt that, though there are severe problems in civil-military relations, Russia's main political problem has been as much or more in building effective societal control over the executive branch of government as it has been in achieving civilian control over

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[83] Archie Brown, 'Evaluating Russia's Democratization', in Archie Brown (ed.), Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 557-560.
[84] Graeme Gill, 'The Failure of Democracy in Russia', Perspectives in European Politics and Society, 3(2), 2002, p. 170.
[85] Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy'.
[86] ibid. p. 159.
[87] Christopher C. Locksley, A Russian Citizen in Uniform? Assessing the Applicability of the German Model of Civil-Military Relations to the Armed Forces of a Democratising Russian State, Citizenship Studies, 4(2), 2000, p. 168.

the military'.[88] The problem was very poignantly expressed by the veteran Russian military sociologist, Vladimir Serebriannikov, in his direct critique of Western approaches to the study of civil-military relations in Russia: 'Why do they always just speak about civilian control over the military? Why does nobody question the necessity of controlling the president, the presidential administration, or the government?…Yes, the army should be controlled, of course. But civilians should be controlled, too.'[89]

As mentioned above, following Vladimir Putin's rise to political prominence, a number of political analysts have started to discuss the issue of politicians with a background in the military or other force structures. However, they did so to substantially different effect than analysts of civil-military relations. Instead of portraying the role of 'military politicians' as a potential source of interference in civilian affairs, the predominant conceptualisation during the Putin-era of force structure representatives, or *siloviki*, has been their description as a tool in the hands of the president pursuing a more authoritarian policy direction.[90]

In view of the above discussion, traditional Western concepts of civil-military relations, which presuppose clearly defined civilian and military spheres and are mainly based on the premise that the civilian component of the relationship needs to be protected from intrusion by a potentially antagonistic military, appear appropriate for the study of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia only to a limited extent. However, due in particular to the increase in the number of politicians with a force-structure background throughout Putin's presidency, which has been rightfully noted by many political analysts in recent years,[91] the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia requires systematic analysis. In studying civil-military relations and the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia the consideration of wider political developments in the country is important. The low degree of cross-referencing between studies of civil-military relations and of studies of the political situation more widely is an issue not only

[88] Betz, 'If they are ordered "Die of hunger!" they will die', p. 4.
[89] Interview with Vladimir Serebriannikov conducted on 22 January 2002.
[90] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'; Staar, 'KGB & Other Buddies in Putin Apparat'; 'Toward a Police State?'; 'Siloviki Inside'.

with respect to post-Soviet Russia. In an article on the state of civil-military relations scholarship published in 1996, Peter Feaver pointed out that 'the political scientists interested in civil-military problems have been uninterested in American politics and those interested in American politics have been uninterested in civil-military relations'.[92]

There is a problematic commonality of both civil-military relations scholars and political analysts, who have addressed the role and influence of Russian politicians with a military background. This is the tendency to apply the issue as an explanatory factor in macro-level analyses of the state of democracy in post-Soviet Russia. That is, if seen through the prism of Western civil-military relations concepts, the participation of military figures in Russian politics tends to be represented as symptomatic of the greater malaise of a backward-looking military system posing a potential obstacle to democratisation.[93] As a result, analysts who have addressed the issue of 'military politicians' have not, as a rule, engaged in a micro-level analysis of the beliefs, motives and roles of such figures in their respective political positions. Similarly, in some works of political analysts studying wider political developments, increasing numbers of force-structure representatives have been implicitly portrayed as symbolic of a move towards a more authoritarian system of leadership under Putin.[94]

As pointed out in the previous sections, the mere fact of a politician's background in the military or in another force structure by itself does not appear to be a sufficient basis on which to draw conclusions about his political conduct, unless conclusions are based on essentialist ideas about the inherent 'military mindset' of such figures. The observation of a 'growing role of the FSB, police and military in society in general' does not explain the motivation, role, and impact of an increasing number of force-structure

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[91] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'.
[92] Feaver, 'The Civil-Military Problematique', p.157.
[93] See, for instance, Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics'; Busza, 'State Dysfunctionality, Institutional Decay and the Russian Military', p. 124; Moran, From Garrison State to Nation State, p. 201.
[94] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia', Petrov; 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'; Staar, 'KGB & Other Buddies in Putin Apparat'; Staar, 'Toward a Police State?'; Staar, 'Siloviki Inside'.

representatives in the political system of post-Soviet Russia.[95] For instance, a retired general elected as a Duma deputy on a party ticket in opposition to the ruling regime is likely to differ considerably in political influence and policy preferences from a military figure appointed to a governmental position by the civilian leaders of the ruling regime. To exemplify this point with a real-life example, it is difficult to see what unites retired army general Eduard Vorob'ev, who served as a Duma deputy affiliated to Russia's Democratic Choice and the Union of Right Forces from 1995-1999, and Rashid Nurgaliev, a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Militia, who was appointed Minister of the Interior by Putin in 2004 and whose background is with the KGB and FSB. A micro-level analysis of factors such as the circumstances of these figures' political activities (for example, have they been appointment or elected? What is their political agenda?) can lead towards a better understanding of their position in the political system than percentages of figures with a military background in the Russian parliament, executive, or in the entire political system.[96]

To answer the normative question of 'what ought to be?', it is important to first assess 'what is actually going on'. In order to do so, chapter four evaluates the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia on a micro-level. At the same time, it amalgamates the concerns about the involvement of such personalities in politics voiced by civil-military relations analysts with conceptualisations of the post-Soviet political system created by political scientists. Specifically, chapter four will address the question as to whether politicians with a military background can be assumed to be less democratic than their civilian counterparts, and will assess their role firmly within the context of the political system of post-Soviet Russia.

Recurrent features in Western assessments of post-Soviet Russia

There is a last aspect to be discussed with regard to Western assessments of 'military politicians' in contemporary Russia. This is not a theoretical shortcoming as are the

[95] Nikolai Petrov, 'Politicization versus Democratization: 20 Months of Putin's 'Federal' Reform', PONARS Policy Memo, No. 241, January 2002.

issues discussed above, but a concern connected to Western approaches to the study of post-Soviet Russia more widely. This aspect is linked to the impression that the concerns expressed by some Western authors with regard to developments in post-Soviet Russian politics, and the issue of civil-military relations and 'military politicians' in particular, can be overstated as a result of a number of recurrent features in these assessments. This can arguably result in an incomplete understanding of events. The consideration of this issue is particularly important, because accusations against some analysts in the West of providing 'unfair' assessments of the political situation in post-Soviet Russia have been voiced within Russia at the highest level. In 2002, for example, Sergei Iastrzhembskii, a presidential aide, gave a speech at the Russian Economic Forum in London in which he accused Western observers, and in particular the Western media, of continuing to display Cold War sentiments or a new form of Russophobia. He criticised, for instance, the proliferation of negative stereotypes, such as the attribution to Russians of such 'alleged hereditary characteristics as cruelty [and] laziness', and the perception that many observers 'expect only the worst'.[97] In 2004 Putin also remarked in an address to Russian ambassadors that their host countries 'all too often have the wrong ideas of Russia', which he partially interpreted even as 'planned campaigns to discredit this country'.[98]

Focusing on the issue of civil-military relations, similar concerns were repeated with regard to Western studies of civil-military relations by numerous respondents interviewed in Moscow for this thesis. Even on introducing the topic of the interview, the liberal Duma deputy, Sergei Iushenkov, asserted the following:

> I consider the notion of a large quantity of military people coming to political power in Russia exaggerated… I would not speak about a serious representation of the military in politics. Of course the president himself is a military person, from the KGB. And many others, like the defence minister, are also from the KGB. The MVD minister, however, is a complete civilian. This is not a question of personalities. We also know cases in the West when generals have become

[96] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', pp. 289-306.
[97] Excerpts from Iastrzhembskii's interview were published in The Moscow Times on 24 April 2002. (Sergei Iastrzhembskii, 'Russophobia still Rampant').
[98] Vladimir Simonov, 'Russophobia again?', RIA Novosti, 16 July 2004.

presidents. This is quite normal. One should not say that there is anything special about this.[99]

Even more explicitly, Andrei Zakharov from the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarianism in Russia, pointed out: 'I do not agree with the level on which this topic is generally discussed in the West. Your colleagues, and especially journalists, present a hypertrophied view of those *siloviki* in Russian politics'.[100] Several respondents also pointed out that the election or appointment of retired military figures to political posts was not a phenomenon limited to post-Soviet Russia. Particularly with reference to the focus by some Western analysts on Putin's FSB background, some respondents expressed the concern that a different yardstick of democracy was applied to measure democracy in Russia than in the West. Viacheslav Nikonov, for instance, pointed out that 'George Bush's father, for example, was the head of the CIA, so what was the big deal about that? Nothing.'[101] In a very similar manner, Ida Kuklina, an academic and member of the co-ordinating council of the Russian Union of Committees of Soldiers' mothers, asserted 'it would be the same if we asked whether Bush is influenced by the CIA or FBI. Yes and no!'[102] When asked what he perceived to be the reason for the seeming one-sidedness of some Western observers in their analyses of Russia, Nikonov remarked laconically, 'there is still the tendency to regard Russia as a "bad boy" – whatever it does is bad'.[103]

To provide a brief overview of Western interpretations of civil-military relations and 'military politicians' that could have led to such reactions in Russia, the quotations below represent a small sample of excerpts taken from academic sources published between 1995 and 2004.

- 'Step by step, the military are assuming power, replacing civilians in a peaceful

[99] Interview with Sergei Iushenkov conducted in Moscow on 13 November 2001.
[100] Interview with Andrei Zakharov conducted in Moscow on 12 December 2001. Andrei Lebedev (Deputy head of Izvestiia's political department) and Viktor Baranets (Military correspondent of Komsomol'skaia pravda) similarly expressed the opinion that Western analysts tend to overemphasise the problem posed by 'military politicians'.
[101] Interview with Viacheslav Nikonov conducted in Moscow on 15 October 2002.
[102] Interview with Ida Kuklina conducted in Moscow on 8 October 2002.
[103] Interview with Viacheslav Nikonov conducted in Moscow on 15 October 2002.

military takeover.'[104]

- 'The takeover by the militocracy is nearly total…Russia's militaristic elite resents American power; seeks the unattainable revival of Russian regional hegemony over Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia; and supports arms sales to states like Iran and until recently Iraq.'[105]

- '[The Russian armed forces are] the type of army from which coups and military dictatorships are made…precisely the type of military that carries out *coups d'etat*.'[106]

- 'All previous assumptions of military loyalty must be discarded by political figures in Moscow as well as political analysts in the West.'[107]

An indicator of the one-sided approach to the study of Russian civil-military relations in the work of some Western authors is apparent in the frameworks chosen for the evaluation of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. With the advent of the post-Soviet era, a specific body of civil-military relations literature that evolved from the theorisation of military coups and interventions in Iberian Europe, Africa and Latin America starting in the mid-1960s, experienced a revival. In particular Samuel Finer's influential 1962 work on military coups, The Man on Horseback, enjoyed renewed popularity in some works on Russian civil-military relations, particularly concerning analyses of the early post-Soviet period.[108] Finer sought to theorise the phenomenon of military coups – cases where governments are overthrown as a result of the forceful intervention by the country's own military. According to Finer, a military coup becomes likely if a state's armed forces have both the motive (actor-based disposition) and the opportunity (structural disposition) to intervene in the political process. Such motives can be the military's perceived need to protect its corporate status and privileges, to preserve

[104] Nikolai Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia', p. 88
[105] J. Michael Waller, 'Putin Resorting to Cold-War Threats', Insight on the News, 30 March 2004
[106] Richard B. Spence, 'Servants or Masters? The Military in the "New Russia"', in Constantine Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds.), Civil-military relations in Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p. 24
[107] Thomas M. Nichols, 'An Electoral Mutiny? Zhirinovsky and the Russian Armed Forces', Armed Forces and Society, 21(3), Spring 1995, p. 331
[108] Finer, The Man on Horseback. In application to Russia see, for example, Kimberley Marten Zisk, Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Centre, 1993; Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics'.

its autonomy, or a feeling of injured self-respect. Opportunities are provided by instances of increased civilian dependence on the military, domestic crises, or a disproportionately high degree of prestige of the military in contrast to that of a discredited civilian leadership.[109]

Some Western analysts observed the presence of a number of these motives and opportunities for military intervention especially during that highly troublesome period which marked the break-up of the Soviet Union and the formative years of the Russian Federation. As a result, they concluded that Latin America's experience was instructive for the study of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. According to Robert Barylski, the borrowing of these concepts and the adaptation of them to the study of the late Soviet and early post-Soviet era was a 'natural scholarly response to the political changes that have taken place in the former Soviet Union'.[110]

As previously mentioned in the discussion of the Huntingtonian paradigm, theoretical apparatuses are deducted from empirical experiences that are specific in terms of time and place. A carefully selected theoretical and conceptual framework can serve to provide a clearly structured scholarly argument and enables an analyst to explain processes at work. However, the specific choice of a theoretical and conceptual approach to an extent predetermines the research questions at the heart of an analysis, as well as the evidence sought. In the case of the application of theoretical frameworks centring on the analysis of military intervention to the Russian case, this meant that the concepts of military coups and military intervention developed into a focal point of many discussions of civil-military relations by Western scholars. Consequently, the participation of retired military figures in appointed or elected office has been seen as an expression of the military's considerable, or rising, political influence. Especially in the earlier post-Soviet period, Western analysts warned that a military takeover in Russia was likely. Kimberley Marten Zisk, for instance, wrote in 1993 that 'according to most standard theories of civil-military relations, the Russian military officer corps should have attempted to

[109]Finer, The Man on Horseback, pp. 20-77.
[110] Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics, p. 26.

overthrow the Yeltsin government by now…whether a coup occurs depends largely on the political strategy followed by Boris Yeltsin'.[111] According to Richard Spence, whose work was cited earlier in the selection of examples above, the Russian armed forces are 'the type of army from which coups and military dictatorships are made…precisely the type of military that carries out coups *d'etat*'.[112]

When, over the years, the Russian military failed to overthrow the civilian government, analysts moved on to explain why this had never occurred 'against all odds'.[113] According to Moran, 'the fact that Russia has never experienced a military coup is somewhat amazing'.[114] Zoltan Barany described the absence of successful military coups in post-Soviet Russia as 'a puzzling phenomenon'.[115] In 2002 and 2003, two entire monographs on Russian civil-military relations were devoted to the explanation as to why the Russian military had not attempted to overthrow the civilian government in the post-Soviet era, or indeed in more than 200 years.[116] In their expression of surprise at the absence of violent military intervention in post-Soviet Russian politics, analysts fail to take into consideration that the absence of a military coup appears surprising only if seen through the prism of Western literature on civil-military relations and military intervention. These would predict a coup if the circumstances are right and seem to start from the assumption that coups are inevitable unless the military is constrained by a specific set of circumstances. Again, such assumptions are based on theoretical constructs and not simply 'common sense'. If, as so many Western analysts rightly pointed out, Russia lacks a history of military coups and its military lacks a history of praetorian behaviour, why do Western analysts persistently engage in studies concerning the probability, or lack of probability, of military intervention? If the assumption is that the application of theoretical approaches generated from the study of military coups to a state

[111] Marten Zisk, Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia, p. 3.
[112] Spence, 'Servants or Masters?', p. 24.
[113] On the back-cover of Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army, Zoltan Barany writes in his appraisal of Taylor's work that it explains 'a fascinating phenomenon: the absence of successful military coups in Russia, seemingly 'against all odds'. See also David Mendlehoff 'Explaining Military Quiescence: The Paradox of Disintegration and the Myth of a Military Coup', Communist and Post-Communist Studies 27(3) 1994, pp. 225-246.
[114] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, p. 203.
[115] Barany, 'Politics and the Russian Armed Forces', p. 203.
[116] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State; and Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army.

without a history of military intervention can lead to significant conclusions in the case of post-Soviet Russia, why has nobody tested these models' explanatory power with regard to, for instance, contemporary Britain or the United States?

In fairness to the authors criticised in this section, it has to be pointed out that some of the cited analyses were centred on critical junctures of Russian civil-military relations. On the other hand, however, the same authors saw it as feasible to draw general conclusions about the Russian civil-military relationship from the study of such extreme situations. The application of theories of military coups and intervention to the study of the military in post-Soviet politics involves the risk of an *a priori* overstatement of the influence and potentially malevolent intent of 'military politicians'. In discussing the problems of the post-Soviet military, therefore, some Western analysts choose to expect the worst, starting from the assumption that the glass of civil-military relations is half empty rather than half full.

Another possible reason for the seeming overemphasis of 'military politicians' as a problematic aspect of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia in the work of some Western analysts is the normative outlook underlying their studies. As a result, the inclusion of 'military politicians' in political posts can tend to be depicted as just one of many problematic aspects of civil-military relations. In his study of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia, which he described to be in a dire state, Barany, for instance, concluded that

> [The Russian military's] generals and officers run for and hold political office, condemn elected politicians with impunity, and occasionally stonewall their policies. There is no legal instrument requiring the military's exclusion from political life. The accountability of the military to state authorities is not above suspicion, given its abysmal material situation, widespread distrust of politicians and its particularly troubling rivalry with other uniformed services. In the meantime, crime and corruption are rampant in the armed forces, while their training, discipline and social prestige have vastly deteriorated.[117]

[117] Barany, 'Politics and the Russian Armed Forces', p. 214.

Other authors have similarly chosen to analyse the issue of 'military politicians' on a par with other problematic aspects concerning Russia's military and civil-military relationship. Among these are the deteriorating material situation of the military, the military's involvement in crime and corruption, decreasing discipline and *dedovshchina*.[118] Whilst each of these problems might exist, and belong in some form or other to the category of civil-military relations, the link between the lawful participation of retired military personnel in electoral campaigns and, for instance, the theft and sale of weapons by armed forces personnel is not immediately apparent. In representing the phenomenon of 'military politicians' as part and parcel of a 'general crisis of the Russian military',[119] the expectation of malevolent intent and motivation of Russian politicians with a career background in the military is taken as the basis for the analysis of their role in the political system more widely.

In an interesting article discussing what they perceived as ten misunderstandings or 'myths' about Russia in the West, David Foglesong and Gordon Hahn expressed concern about the tendency displayed by some Western authors to see Russia 'through monochromatic glasses' and to perpetuate 'myths and polarised perspectives' in their work.[120] As mentioned previously, similar concerns have been expressed in Russia itself. In the opinion of the Russian journalist, Viktor Loshak, 'the last few years have seen the emergence of publications that are so blatantly anti-Russian that it is clear that they are simply not interested in what is actually happening in this country'.[121] It is, of course, acknowledged that an attempt to provide a fully 'objective' account of any situation is an unattainable objective. However, in order to avoid the risk of adding to the impression in Russia of intentional anti-Russian bias in Western analyses, the final chapter of the thesis

[118] *Dedovshchina* is the brutal bullying of mostly conscript soldiers by their older comrades or superiors. This catch-all approach is apparent in the following works: Busza, 'State Dysfunctionality, Institutional Decay, and the Russian; Deborah Yarsike Ball, 'The Pending Crisis in Russian Civil-Military Relations', PONARS Policy Memo No. 4, October 1997; Locksley, A Russian Citizen in Uniform?.
[119] Stephen J. Blank, 'The General Crisis of the Russian Military', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 16(2), June 2003, pp. 1 – 26.
[120] David Foglesong and Gordon M. Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia: Understanding and Dealing with Russia's Complexity and Ambiguity', Problems of Post-Communism, 49(6), November/December 2002, p. 13.
[121] Viktor Loshak, 'Obratnaia sviaz: zapugali', Moskovskie novosti, 10 December 2002.

will put forward a conceptual approach to gaining a fuller understanding of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia.

Concluding remarks

This chapter should not be understood as a wholesale dismissal of existing Western analyses of civil-military relations in contemporary Russia. Neither does it intend to imply that any of the four problematic areas in Western assessments of Russian 'military politicians' discussed above are the result of conscious attempts to provide a biased account of the situation. In view of the above discussion, however, it can be concluded that some aspects of Western approaches to the study of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics are in need of re-evaluation. The first problematic aspect is the wide-ranging application of Western concepts of civil-military relations to the study of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. Whilst the circumstances in terms of time and place of these concepts' generation tend to be underestimated, specific Russian attitudes towards the issue in question often appear to be presented selectively. If Western analysts perceive the presence of Russian 'military politicians' as undesirable, there might not necessarily be a corresponding understanding of this in Russia. Specific Russian perceptions of 'military politicians', thus, require detailed analysis, which will be provided in chapter two.

Secondly, the application of Western concepts of civil-military relations to the Russian case is problematic in as much as they are limited, in the main, to the study of the regular armed forces characterised by their mission to provide defence against external threats. The Russian military system, however, is made up of numerous other militarised services, not all of which are specialists in ensuring external defence. The failure to include these services in the analysis, on the one hand, would mean ignoring a considerable part of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. On the other hand, existing civil-military relations theories are ill-equipped to study military structures other than the regular armed forces. In order to draw conclusions about the role of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics, a clear study of the precise institutional

backgrounds of ‘military politicians’, and of the tasks they fulfilled in these organisations is required. Such a study will be provided in chapter three.

Thirdly, the low degree of cross-referencing between civil-military relations analysts and scholars concentrating on broader political developments in post-Soviet Russia has arguably led to one-sided conclusions as to the position of military figures in Russian politics. Specifically the formers’ continuing reference to Russia as a country in transition and their strict distinction between the military and civilian spheres has, in the main, led to a sometimes simplified representation of the military as the ‘bad guys’ hindering the civilian leadership’s efforts to democratise the country. An in-depth study on a micro-level of the role of ‘military politicians’ in the political system of post-Soviet Russia will be provided in chapter four.

The fourth factor is the overstatement of the role and influence of ‘military politicians’ resulting from recurring features in Western assessments of political developments in post-Soviet Russia. Some Western analysts arguably appear to expect the worst case scenario in their assessment of developments in post-Soviet Russian politics and of civil-military relations in particular. This factor will be assessed in the concluding chapter of the thesis within the framework of a proposed conceptual approach to the study of civil-military relations and post-Soviet politics, which can contribute towards a fuller understanding of the questions addressed in this thesis.

The approach taken by many of the analysts discussed above is normative in that it is aimed at generating a prescriptive approach for creating a civil-military relationship in Russia, which can prevent the military from becoming a threat to the developing democracy. In their normative understanding, Western forms of civil-military relations are the most desirable, as they have proved adept in largely preventing the military from attempting to intervene in issues lying outside its sphere of competence. The discussion of civil-military relations in post-Soviet states within the framework of Western concepts is therefore understandable. Furthermore, this normative emphasis concerning the development of civil-military relations in Russia (and other post-Soviet states) is not

limited to academic writers. It also corresponds to, and stems from policy efforts made by the United States and other Western democracies in assisting the development of democratic civil-military relations in democratising states, which is in the interest of both parties.[122]

This thesis does not seek to present an unconstructive criticism of previous evaluations of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. Moreover, it does not deny in general the desirability of normative work aimed at improving a specific situation. However, normative approaches, by default, tend to emphasise the question 'what ought to be?' at the expense of 'what is actually going on'. In order to evaluate 'what ought to be?', however, an assessment of 'what is going on' is inevitable. The following chapters attempt to alleviate the problematic areas identified above and seek to provide a fuller understanding of the role of military figures in the politics of post-Soviet Russia.

[122] See, for instance, 'A Survey of Overall U.S. Democratization Programs and Military Democratization Efforts in Postcommunist States' and 'Conclusions and Prescriptions for Improving Democratization Outcomes in the Postcommunist States' in Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, pp. 44-70 and 182-189.

2

Russian perceptions of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia

I think there is something wrong with the statement that military people should not participate in politics.[1]
Vladimir Serebriannikov, Russian military sociologist.

This chapter provides an introduction to the way in which civil-military relations, and in particular military figures in post-Soviet politics, are perceived in Russia. The main aim of the chapter is to show the extent to which perceptions of 'military politicians' in Russia differ from or coincide with the interpretations of the same issue in the work of Western analysts. This chapter also looks at the reasons for this and its impact on how the role and influence of such figures might be better understood. As established in the respective section in the preceding chapter, Western analysts engaging with this question tend to frame the presence of Russian politicians with a military background within concepts of Western civil-military relations theory and argue that the presence of these figures is undesirable. Russian attitudes towards the issue tend to be represented insufficiently or selectively in these analyses. The awareness and understanding of analysts concerning the way in which 'military politicians' are perceived in Russia itself, however, are essential in providing the foundation on which any potential normative study of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia can be based.[2]

[1] Interview with Vladimir Serebriannikov conducted in Moscow on 22 January 2002.
[2] Aleksander Kennaway asserted, for instance, that Western aid efforts to the former Soviet Union, including support for the creation of a system of democratic civilian control over the armed forces, have often failed to achieve the desired results, because insufficient attention is paid to the 'realities' in the territories they are seeking to improve. According to Kennaway 'It is up to the west to perceive clearly the errors, illusions, expectations and the real needs of the recipients and to understand the reasons for them. The failure of the western aid agencies and of many of the advisers, especially academics and publicists, to do so, lies at the heart of western failures to achieve useful aims in the territories.' Aleksandr Kennaway, 'What is wrong with western aid to the FSU & Central & Eastern Europe and how to improve it', in Collected Writings 1990 – 2000, Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Document M 20, p. 176.

This chapter consists of the following parts. The first and major part engages in a detailed case-study analysis of Russian newspaper coverage concerning attitudes towards the question of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. The second and third sections seek to frame these attitudes within both Russian academic writing on civil-military relations and the opinions expressed by political actors about the issue. It will be concluded that, whilst the critical approach to Russian 'military politicians' displayed in Western analyses is apparent in contemporary Russia to an extent, it is by no means a paradigm or common-sense assumption. It exists alongside other, less critical or outrightly positive attitudes towards the involvement of these figures in the running of day-to-day politics.

A case-study of Russian media perceptions of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia

A note on sources and method

A case study of Russian newspaper coverage was chosen for the establishment of a detailed impression of the ways in which participation of military figures in the political process is perceived in Russia itself. The case-study below is based on the analysis of newspaper coverage taken from four national publications. It seeks to provide a detailed picture of the respective representations of 'military politicians' in the dailies Krasnaia zvezda, Sovetskaia Rossiia, Segodnia and Rossiiskaia gazeta.

- Krasnaia zvezda is the official mouthpiece of the Russian ministry of defence and was chosen to gain an impression of the military viewpoint on the issue in question.
- Sovetskaia Rossiia was chosen to represent the views of the communist and nationalist left, as it propagates the political line of the KPRF.
- Segodnia was selected for its image as an independent newspaper with a liberal-democratic outlook. It was affiliated to and financed by the business magnate Vladimir Gusinskii's Media Most group until summer 2001, when its publication was discontinued at short notice.

- Rossiiskaia gazeta is the organ of the Russian government and is thus seen to be close to the official views of the government of the Russian Federation.

Four newspapers were selected for the analysis to facilitate the inclusion of a range of potentially competing ideological, political and institutional viewpoints with regard to the presence of 'military politicians' in contemporary Russia. In order to contrast attitudes towards 'military politicians' in the four newspapers, the analysis focused on one central issue: the qualitative attitudes expressed in the respective newspaper with regard to such figures, that is, whether 'military politicians' were portrayed in these publications in a predominantly neutral, negative or positive light.

Whilst care was taken to focus on the editorial lines of the chosen newspapers, statements made by interviewees were also included in the analysis. This choice was made due to the hypothesis that interviewees tend to be chosen for their compatibility with a newspaper's line, or are being prompted by journalists to give an 'appropriate' answer via leading questions. The search for 'source-credibility'[3] is a well-known practice of communication in which a credible or well-respected source is chosen to speak in favour of an idea in order to create the impression of objectivity based on the fact that 'other people are thinking in the same way'. As the Russian journalist Marina Kalashnikova pointed out, she and many of her colleagues often dealt with contentious debates in the form of interviews with experts in the field. Potential problems arising from covering controversial issues can be avoided in this way.[4]

The content of each edition of the four selected newspapers was analysed between 1st October 1999 and 31st December 1999, and between 1st October 2000 and 31st December 2000. The first time period coincided with the unfolding of the second Chechen campaign, which was launched at the end of September 1999. It also coincided with the run-up to, and campaign for, the elections to the Russian State Duma in

[3] James W. Severin and Werner J. Tankard Jr., Communication Theories: Origins, Methods, Uses (2nd ed.), London: Longman, 1988, p. 98.
[4] Personal conversation with Marina Kalashnikova, journalist for Nezavisimaia gazeta, in Moscow on 11 November 2001.

December 1999. The second time period was marked by the campaigning for a number of gubernatorial elections in Russia's regions. The choice of the indicated periods of time was made for two reasons. Firstly, the analysis seeks to focus not on specific events or personalities, but tries to isolate the newspapers' broader attitudes and perceptions of a number of issues. From this point of view the chosen time period for analysis was not a central concern. The decision was made to cover periods of political campaigning, however, because it was assumed that the newspapers' respective preferences concerning, for instance, desirable and undesirable attributes of a politician, or their expectations concerning future developments of the political process, would be more pronounced. Due to the restriction of the newspaper sample to four media outlets and to two specific time periods, the conclusions drawn in the course of the analysis can be generalised only to a limited extent. However, the analysis can provide a broad insight into the way in which portrayals of 'military politicians' in a selection of Russian media outlets differ from the representation of such figures in the work of Western authors discussed in the previous chapter.

The newspapers' definitions of 'military politicians'

As discussed in the previous chapter, the systematic inclusion of figures with a background in Russian military structures other than the regular armed forces is a rather recent development in the work of Western analysts of civil-military relations that has not yet been fully theorised. This is due to the predominant use of concepts derived from Western theories of civil-military relations that were generated, in the main, from the theorisation of the relationship between a country's civilian leadership and the leadership of the regular armed forces. In contrast, the coverage of all four Russian newspapers chosen for this analysis revealed a predominantly 'inclusive' definition of 'military politicians'. In many articles, politicians and officials with a background in any component of the Russian military system (a detailed analysis of this will be provided in the next chapter) were referred to simply as a 'military person' (*voennyi*). Although this term often referred to figures with a background in a variety of institutions (that is, the regular armed forces, the FSB, MVD, et cetera), the particular institutional affiliation of these figures was not always specified in the newspapers' coverage.

Whilst this inclusive definition of a military person might be put down to a lack of attention to detail on the part of the journalists, or to their presumption that the institutional affiliation of these figures was known to the reader, the newspapers' coverage in some articles implied that representatives of all force structures were often knowingly perceived as being of one and the same kind. This observation manifested itself especially in the practice of describing such figures collectively as 'people with epaulets' (*liudi v pogonakh*),[5] or 'power figures' (*siloviki*).[6] In other cases, their institutional affiliation was simplified by referring to their attachment to one of the 'force structures' (*silovye vedomstva*),[7] or the 'force hardcore' (*silovaia oboima*).[8]

The following newspaper excerpts implied that that the inclusive definition of 'military politicians' utilised by many journalists was not the result of a lack of attention to detail. The first excerpt is taken from an interview conducted by Krasnaia zvezda with Viktor Cherkesov, who served as the presidential representative of the North-Western federal district from March 2000 – March 2003. The second excerpt is from Sovetskaia Rossiia, and the third from Segodnia:

- Question: As far as I know, many leading posts both in St. Petersburg and other places were filled with representatives of the force structures. What were the reasons for this choice?
  Cherkesov: It so happened that a considerable part of the major federal inspectors served in the armed forces, the organs of security or domestic affairs (MVD), or in the tax police. And this choice was not accidental. Firstly, military service is a form of state service.[9]

[5] See, for instance, Krasnaia zvezda, 26 November 1999; 4 October 1999; 19 October 1999 and 20 October. 1999; Segodnia, 5 October 199; 2 November 1999 and 26 December 2000.
[6] Segodnia, 26 December 2000. In Russian the term *siloviki* is a traditional abbreviation used to describe employees of Russia's force structures. During the course of Vladimir Putin's presidency the term has changed its meaning and has also entered the lexicon of Western analysts. Whilst earlier the term was used to merely describe the profession/institutional affiliation of a person, under Putin it has gained an additional political meaning and is often used to describe politicians/state officials with a military background that have been brought into office and are perceived to be allied with the president.
[7] Krasnaia zvezda, 19 October 2000 and 1 November 2000.
[8] Segodnia, 26 November 1999 and 26 December 2000.
[9] Krasnaia zvezda, 1 November 2000.

- At a meeting of military veterans with the leaders of the electoral association KPRF, an appeal was issued to the veterans of the armed forces, the MVD, and the organs of state security.[10]

- In some regions, people with epaulets are among the most highly rated candidates – representatives of the army, the navy, and the FSB. These military figures have two important characteristics…[11]

The following quote describing Vladimir Putin, whose career background is in the security services – the Soviet KGB and Russian FSB – provided further evidence for the fact that employment in the force structures other than the regular armed forces in post-Soviet Russia is perceived as a form of military service. A journalist writing for Krasnaia zvezda, for instance, wrote that 'being a military professional and specialist in the area of national security, Putin demonstrated a wide range of views on issues concerning the country's defence.'[12] Some negative assessments of 'military politicians' in the newspapers, too, did not focus on figures with a career background in the regular armed forces only, but were aimed at a more inclusive group of politicians coming from a variety of force structures. A Sovetskaia Rossiia journalist, for example, equated Putin's political style with bonapartism, which he described as a 'dictatorship…acting on soldiery'.[13] Segodnia, similarly, drew a parallel between Putin and former army General Aleksandr Lebed', condemning the 'Lebedisation' of Putin in his position as a 'military prime minister'.[14]

The section above evaluated the definitions of 'military politicians' provided in the four newspapers covered in this analysis. In the course of the analysis it became evident that the newspapers did not fundamentally distinguish between the specific institutional backgrounds of such figures. Furthermore, as will become evident also in the analysis below, the specific institutional background of a 'military politician' did not influence a newspaper's attitude towards such figures. For example, an officer from the regular armed forces did not tend to be portrayed more positively or negatively than an

[10] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 25 November 1999.
[11] Segodnia, 2 November 2000.
[12] Krasnaia zvezda, 24 November 1999.
[13] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 13 November 1999.

officer from the Interior Ministry troops or of the FSB. This also means that the political participation of representatives from one force structure (for instance, the regular armed forces) did not tend to be perceived as more 'problematic' than that of others (for instance the MVD or FSB). This conclusion supports the proposal made in the previous chapter that Russian politicians with a military background in force structures other than the regular armed forces should be included in analyses of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. Although some Western analysts have recently started to approach a more inclusive definition of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, civil-military relations analyses of post-Soviet Russia tend to remain focused on the regular armed forces. This is because the concepts traditionally used for the study of this issue have been generated using a conception of the regular armed forces as a cohesive institution.

The newspapers' attitudes towards 'military politicians': neutral, positive, negative

As discussed in the corresponding section in chapter one, the normative postulate of the interpretation of Russian 'military politicians' in the work of Western civil-military relations scholars is that the inclusion of these figures in the political process is undesirable. The following sections seek to analyse whether this evaluation of Russian 'military politicians' in the work of Western authors is mirrored in the coverage of the four newspapers included in the study.

In order to achieve this aim, the study below investigates potential variations in attitudes towards 'military politicians' expressed in the four publications. Three possible basic types of attitudes towards this issue were assessed. Firstly, a neutral attitude, whereby the existence of 'military politicians' is acknowledged, but not commented on or critically assessed. Secondly, a positive attitude towards such figures, and thirdly, negative or critical representations. It will be concluded that the predominant negative consensus with regard to Russian 'military politicians' in the work of Western literature on civil-military relations represents only one of a number of competing attitudes towards these figures in the newspapers analysed.

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[14] Segodnia, 6 October 1999.

Neutral representations of 'military politicians'

Two types of neutral representations will be discussed below.

- *'Military politicians' as a regular or 'normal' feature of the political process*

Instances of implicit or neutral discussions of military figures in Russian politics were encountered only in Krasnaia zvezda and in Rossiiskaia gazeta. Implicit or neutral here means that 'military politicians' were mentioned, but were not critically assessed in either a positive or negative way. It was found that Krasnaia zvezda represented the existence of 'military politicians' as a factual matter, that is, as a regular feature of the political process in several instances. Such a representation was apparent, for instance, in the following question and answer cited from an interview with Vasilii Volkov, a general working for the Central Electoral Committee in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 1999:

> Journalist: How high do you think the number of military service personnel represented in the new Duma will be?
> Volkov: I think that it will be slightly lower than in the current legislative. I hope that these people will be competent and enjoy an authority that is well deserved, have respect for the armed forces and, most importantly, want to change not only the army but the whole of Russia for the better.[15]

Krasnaia zvezda's representation of the participation of military figures in politics as a 'normal' practice was made explicit also in the following quote: 'Some [service personnel] are running for a seat in the Duma. About 80 of them are included on the federal lists of electoral collectives and blocs. This is normal.'[16]

Similarly, Rossiiskaia gazeta reported the candidacy of 'military politicians' in several instances from a neutral point of view. For instance, a short article about military candidates standing in regional elections was published in Rossiiskaia gazeta under the headline 'the generals are coming to power'. In the body of the article's text this fact was

[15] Krasnaia zvezda, 30 October 1999.
[16] Krasnaia zvezda 23 November 1999.

not commented upon in either positive or negative terms.[17] Furthermore, in October and November 1999, the same newspaper published several factual reports about the candidacy of Admiral Egorov for the governorship in Kaliningrad region, without explicitly discussing his military background as a desirable or undesirable trait.[18]

- *Dismissal of the existence and relevance of 'military politicians'*

During the time periods covered by the analysis of newspaper material conducted for this chapter, Rossiiskaia gazeta discussed the issue of 'military politicians' the least frequently and the least critically in comparison to the other newspapers. As discussed further below, the publication evaluated 'military politicians' in a positive manner only once. In addition to this, there were another few – yet interesting – examples in which their political activities were criticised. Two articles in Rossiiskaia gazeta that took an implicitly neutral approach hinted at the reason for the newspaper's apparent reluctance to engage in a discussion of the issue in question. In the following excerpts, the existence and/or the significance of 'military politicians' was dismissed entirely. The existence of military figures in Russian politics was neither represented as normal, nor condemned or endorsed. Instead, the allegation of increased military participation in politics under Putin in the following example was dismissed as an invention of political opponents, designed to ruin Prime Minister Putin's reputation and career:

> [Media Most alleged that] Putin is neither dealing with the economy, nor is he leading the country. He wants to enter the presidential race on the back of the horse of victory in Chechnya…It is absolutely obvious that all of this is about something else [not the economy]. They want to turn Putin into a field soldier for a completely different reason. Somebody, for some reason, really wants to stop the federal forces' operation and the fight against the terrorists. Somebody, for some reason, wants to complete the moral and psychological disintegration of the Russian army and the Russian soldiers – from the private to the general… This…was preceded by an intensive propaganda campaign in the mass media over the past days, alleging that Putin strongly affiliated himself with the generals leading the anti-terrorist campaign in Chechnya, and that these generals will enter the Kremlin on the back of the horse of victory in Chechnya. In fact, the Russian prime minister is accused of no less than the intention of attempting a coup.

[17] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 October 1999.
[18] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 October; 3 November and 21 November 1999.

> Simply speaking, they are trying everything to cause a collision between him and the president.[19]

In the next excerpt taken from Rossiiskaia gazeta, the existence of 'military politicians' was not so much dismissed as an invention, but represented as irrelevant. In an interview with an official representative of the central federal district, Viktor Denikin, a journalist repeatedly inquired about the alleged closeness between Putin and the generals running in the regional elections in 2000. Denikin repeatedly disputed such a correlation:

> Journalist: A lot of the candidates in the gubernatorial elections are generals. Does the Kremlin really support none of them, not even [former General] Rutskoi?
> Denikin: No...
> Journalist: From what you are saying, the Kremlin has an interest in his [Rutskoi's] re-election.
> Denikin: …The presidential structures do not have an interest either in the victory, or in the defeat of Aleksandr Vladimirovich [Rutskoi]. I repeat: we are absolutely indifferent as to who is governor of Kursk region, or of any other region. It goes without saying that we firstly want this to be an honest person, who feels for Russia with all his heart. But we will work with anybody.[20]

In effect, Denikin dismissed both Putin's alleged closeness to military figures and his endorsement of their political activities.

Neutral representations of 'military politicians', portraying the existence of such personalities as a matter of fact and as a regular feature of the political process were found in Krasnaia zvezda and Rossiiskaia gazeta only. The latter newspaper furthermore dismissed the issue as relevant in several instances.

Positive representations of 'military politicians'

Three types of positive representations of 'military politicians' have been found in the newspapers, which will be discussed in the following section.

[19] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 November 1999.
[20] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 31 October 2000.

- *Superior personal and professional qualities*

Explicit endorsements of 'military politicians', maybe unsurprisingly, were found predominantly in the mouthpiece of the Russian Ministry of Defence, Krasnaia zvezda. According to the newspaper's line of argument, the skills gained from a military education serve to equip a person with the professional and personal qualities required of a politician. Also, in the newspaper's view, these essential skills are often absent in what it termed 'traditional politicians', such as 'university teachers, …entrepreneurs, …fellow townsmen', and other civilians constituting the cadre of politicians 'of the first wave'.[21] The positive and professional qualities gained from a military education, according to the newspaper, were the knowledge required for understanding the 'tasks met by a state'.[22]

In the words of a number of 'military politicians' themselves, the professional responsibility and determination of military figures was another positive asset. Former general and candidate in the gubernatorial elections Aleksandr Lebed', for instance, expressed this idea in an interview: 'I honestly believe that in order to achieve anything – no matter what – one needs professionals… [The army has given me] a strict toughness and the ability to take a blow. Therefore the demanding timetable of a governor does not bother me. I am used to it'.[23] Viktor Cherkesov, a presidential representative with a military background, remarked in an interview: '[In the military] a person is educated to be…a leader…who is also used to fulfil very difficult and multi-facetted tasks, is used to a big work load and responsibility for the work he has been entrusted with'.[24] Writing about a military candidate in the gubernatorial elections, Krasnaia zvezda wrote: 'Knowing General [Shamanov] as a courageous soldier and a strong-willed and determined person, the collective of journalists is convinced that Ul'ianovsk region will under his leadership develop into a prosperous Russian region, of which other subjects of the Federation will be envious'.[25] In another article, a member of the pro-presidential

[21] Krasnaia zvezda, 20 October 2000.
[22] Krasnaia zvezda, 1 November 2000.
[23] Krasnaia zvezda, 6 November 1999.
[24] Krasnaia zvezda, 1 November 2000.
[25] Krasnaia zvezda, 26 December 2000.

party *Edinstvo*, for instance, was quoted as emphasising the fact that 'many of [our members] have in fact gone through the good school of the army.'[26]

In a less explicit manner, this type of positive perception could be found also in Rossiiskaia gazeta. However, in line with its reluctance to discuss the issue of 'military politicians' as a feature of the Russian political system, this newspaper limited its endorsements to individual 'military politicians', rather than to ascribe their positive qualities to the military profession as a whole. In an article about a military candidate running in the regional elections for Chitinskii region, Viktor Voitenko, a Rossiiskaia gazeta journalist firstly emphasised the fact that 'a complex programme for pulling the region's economy from a clearly tightening crisis' had been worked out by the candidate. By doing so, the journalist emphasised Voitenko's pragmatic skills required for leading the region. Secondly, he positively portrayed his personal qualities. According to the journalist, these were the patriotic concern for Russia as a whole (during his military career, Voitenko was prepared to go '…wherever military service sent him'), and the genuine concern for the 'simple people', whose lives Voitenko was intent on 'making better and more dignified'.[27]

- *Pragmatism versus ideology*

Professionalism, pragmatism and patriotism – qualities attributed to 'military politicians' in the examples above – were represented by Krasnaia zvezda as the direct antithesis to characteristics inherent in many 'traditional' politicians engaging in ideological party-political struggles. The analysis also found that the newspaper tended to portray the ideological orientation it perceived as typical of 'traditional' politicians as an inhibiting factor, as it questioned the ability of 'ideological politicians' to represent the interests of the Russian state and society as a whole. As a result of their ideological orientation, the newspaper argued, such politicians were expected to defend a limited range of interests specified by the content of their respective ideological beliefs.

[26] Krasnaia zvezda, 14 October 2000.
[27] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 25 October 2000.

As an example, an article in Krasnaia zvezda about the pro-Kremlin party *Edinstvo* lauded the fact that the party's pre-election platform was 'not inflated with ideology.'[28] In another article, Sergei Shoigu, one of the party's leading figures, endorsed the absence of ideology as a positive factor by asserting that it was *Edinstvo*'s aim to 'bring in politicians…representing the interests not of parties, but of the entire state'. Shoigu stressed the following: 'As I understand it, politics is not only the presentation of ideas and platforms and the permanent appearance on TV, but the ability to do one's job and to do it well for the benefit of Russia.' The author of the article from which this quote was taken, concluded by again emphasising the fact that 'concerning ideology, Shoigu's companions consider a strict ideological line and engagement for the party insufficient for its candidates.'[29]

The military candidate, Viktor Voitenko, whose portrayal in Rossiiskaia gazeta was discussed above, also campaigned as a member of *Edinstvo*. Asked by a journalist for his thoughts about the increasing number of 'people with epaulets' entering a political career, he told Krasnaia zvezda that 'the regions understand perfectly that the time has come for politicians revealing a healthy patriotism next to pragmatism.'[30] In an article about Admiral Egorov, Rossiiskaia gazeta favourably pointed out that the candidate, unlike his civilian predecessor, 'can accommodate both the left and the right.'[31] The portrayal of politicians in a positive light based on the positive attribution of pragmatism and the absence of an ideological position was apparent only in Krasnaia zvezda and Rossiiskaia gazeta. Although these characteristics were presented as generally desirable qualities in a politician, they were often attributed to politicians with a military background in particular.

A further signifier used by both Krasnaia zvezda and Rossiiskaia gazeta for the distinction of 'good' and 'bad' politicians, was the concept of the honest pursuit of 'real deeds' by pragmatists, in contrast to the empty 'words and promises' of politicians driven

[28] Krasnaia zvezda, 1 October 1999.
[29] Krasnaia zvezda, 4 November 1999.
[30] Krasnaia zvezda, 20 October 2000.
[31] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 October 2000.

by ideology. The intention to honestly pursue 'real deeds' was either expressed by 'military politicians' themselves, or attributed to them in several instances in both publications. Former General Boris Gromov, the governor of Moscow region, for instance, asserted the following in Krasnaia zvezda: 'I can impose great tasks upon myself and I intend to fulfil them'.[32] In another newspaper a journalist asserted that '[a military person] is used to taking responsibility for the work he has been entrusted with'.[33] Rossiiskaia gazeta asserted that Admiral Egorov's 'style of leadership distinguishes him as a friend of constructive decisions'.[34]

In both newspapers, the intention to pursue 'real deeds' was attributed especially to *Edinstvo* and to one of its leading figures, Sergei Shoigu, in particular. Krasnaia zvezda expressed the opinion that '*Edinstvo* is seriously setting out to achieve the goals it set itself. In any case, the movement's declaration clearly contains an appeal to their kindred spirits to only send those candidates into the Duma who…are seriously pursuing real deeds'.[35] In the run-up to the December 1999 elections, Rossiiskaia gazeta published a front-page with pictures depicting several prominent politicians (Chernomyrdin, Iavlinskii, Zhirinovskii, Primakov, Luzhkov, Ziuganov, Kirienko) laughing, drinking wine, or being engaged in conversation. A much larger picture depicted Shoigu talking into a two-way radio with a serious and concerned facial expression. The headline asks the reader 'What type of Duma do you have in mind: words or deeds?'[36] This portrayal corresponded to the following observation made by Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul concerning *Edinstvo*'s 1999 pre-electoral programme: 'Eschewing ideology, it said it placed no faith in such abstract concepts as socialism or capitalism.'[37]

The practice of portraying the lack of ideology as a positive characteristic of a politician was apparent neither in Sovetskaia Rossiia, nor in Segodnia. This is not surprising, as both newspapers broadly can be seen as proponents of specific ideological

[32] Krasnaia zvezda, 15 October 1999.
[33] Krasnaia zvezda, 10 November 1999.
[34] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 28 October 2000.
[35] Krasnaia zvezda, 5 October 1999.
[36] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 17 December 1999.

orientations – communism and liberalism respectively. Sovetskaia Rossiia condemned the positive portrayal of non-ideological politicians as a deceptive practice, which it perceived to be abused by some military-affiliated politicians for claiming the ability to represent the interests of the nation as a whole. For instance, the newspaper criticised former governor of the Kursk region, retired General Aleksandr Rutskoi, for 'hiding under the mask of the party-less "leader of the people"'.[38] Similarly, it accused Putin of hiding his 'true face' behind 'patriotic rhetoric'. The author of this quote wrote further that 'there is a danger that this camouflage is only aimed at one thing: …to create the basis for the triumphal rise to power of a new adherent to "values" that are "common to everyone"'.[39] Another article in Sovetskaia Rossiia likened Putin's style of leadership to bonapartism, explaining that: 'a special feature of bonapartist regimes is their attempt at appearing to be above party politics, and at winning the people's sympathies with petty bribes and promises of a better life. This is what Putin is doing.'[40]

Segodnia equally described an identifiable ideology as an important asset of a politician, because, in its view, ideology can serve to make the rating of a politician 'more stable' than that of a politician campaigning on the basis of being merely 'decisive and energetic.'[41]

- *Society's demand for 'military politicians'*

A third type of positive portrayals of 'military politicians', which was found mainly in Krasnaia zvezda, was the assertion that such figures were trusted by the population, not least because of their professional superiority over 'traditional' politicians. Asked by a journalist for the reasons that motivated him to leave the military in favour of a political career, former General Aleksandr Lebed', for example, remarked: 'Today, the most important problem, both in the regions, as well as in the country as a whole, is the people's chronic distrust of those in power. Power has deceived terribly, and too often.

[37] Timothy J. Colton; Michael McFaul, 'Reinventing Russia's Party of Power - 'Unity' and the 1999 Duma Election', Post-Soviet Affairs, 2000 12(3), p 209.
[38] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 23 October 1999.
[39] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 2 November 2000.
[40] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 13 November 1999.
[41] Segodnia, 21 October 1999.

Practically nobody trusts those in power. And while nobody trusts them, those in power cannot achieve anything.'[42] To a similar effect, a journalist writing for Krasnaia zvezda asserted the following marking Putin's first 100 days in office:

> Being a military professional and specialist in the area of national security, Putin demonstrated a wide range of views on the problems of the country's defence. …For the head of the government of a great power, whose traditions have always included the military affiliation of its leaders, this is absolutely essential. In any case, such qualities always work in favour of a politician and provide him with a credit of trust from the masses.[43]

When asked for his opinion on the increasing number of military figures standing for political office, Viktor Voitenko, a candidate with a military background, answered that in his opinion it is 'a natural tendency. In times that are difficult for Russia, its people have always entrusted power primarily to statesmen, who put the interests of the country before their own. The people are tired of demagogues and the infantilism of 'traditional' politicians,…who often confused their own pockets with those of the state.'[44]

The explicit endorsement of a military politician in Rossiiskaia gazeta – Admiral of the Baltic Fleet Vladimir Egorov – revealed a similar sentiment:

> At times of extreme change in history, Russia survived and revived itself thanks to the selflessness of the people with epaulets. They took upon themselves the most difficult and thankless of tasks, because they understood that Great Russia would cease to exist if people resigned themselves to sitting on their hands. In exchange for managers mired in corruption and theft, honest people are coming in. Admiral of the Baltic Fleet, Vladimir Egorov, is one of them. …He can bring order where a guiding hand is missing, and can provide a worthy life for all citizens of Kaliningrad, just as he did for the Baltic sailors.[45]

Positive representations and endorsements of 'military politicians', referring to their superior professional qualities, the benefit of their lack of ideology, and the demand for such personalities from the side of the population, were found predominantly in the

[42] Krasnaia zvezda, 6 November 1999.
[43] Krasnaia zvezda, 24 November 1999.
[44] Krasnaia zvezda, 20 October 2000.
[45] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 3 November 2000.

Ministry of Defence's newspaper, Krasnaia zvezda and to a lesser extent in Rossiiskaia gazeta.

Negative representations of 'military politicians'

Four reasons for negative representations of 'military politicians' were found in the newspapers. These are discussed in the following section.

- *Misuse of military imagery for political ends*

Leading the way in the publication of negative interpretations of military figures entering political office were the communist newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia and the liberal-oriented daily Segodnia. Their coverage was similar in that both publications condemned the use of military imagery and the candidacy of military figures during the ongoing electoral campaigns as unsubstantiated rhetoric, misused for political purposes. In an article published in Segodnia, for instance, Putin's political style was described as 'militarised patriotic rhetoric'.[46] According to both Segodnia and Sovetskaia Rossiia, the use of military imagery was nothing more than a campaign strategy aimed at boosting the popular image and prospective electoral success of specific politicians and political movements. The practice was ridiculed by both newspapers in several instances. Sovetskaia Rossiia, in an article about the political movement *Edinstvo*, took a distinctive line:

> Let us now have a look at the leaders of Medved': 1: S. Shoigu. A colonel-general. The leader of the Ministry for Emergency Situations, who was decorated by El'tsin with the title Hero of Russia on the eve of [*Edinstvo*'s] founding congress… The television channel ORT has never praised a minister…as highly as it recently has been praising Shoigu, during all those years of 'democratic' reform. Wherever there is a fire or an explosion, Shoigu is already there ten minutes later. Generally, watching Shoigu's participation in the rescue efforts, the viewer is supposed to see him as no less than the rescuer of the fatherland. 2: A. Karelin. A colonel of the tax police. A sportsman. 3: A. Gurov. A general-major in the militia. He is represented as a fighter (again a fighter) against crime. All

[46] Segodnia, 14 October 1999. See also Segodnia, 10 October 1999: 'the semi-military PR…is already bearing fruits'; and 14 October 2000: 'The promise to create order is becoming the determining feature of the army generals participating in the electoral marathon'.

> 'democrats' have been talking about the struggle with corruption for many years, but every year there is more and more crime.[47]

In another article covering the congress of the Russian Pensioner's Party, Sovetskaia Rossiia observed the following:

> This congress…exceeded all reasonable limits of vanity. It took place in the great palace of the Kremlin on the 8th October. The delegates and guests were met by a military orchestra playing spirited songs. …Then, even more solemnly, the party's banner was carried onto stage. It was carried by a commander, who was assisted by two senior lieutenants. One almost could have thought that this is not the banner of a party, but the holy battle relic of an actual army.[48]

In a similarly sarcastic manner, Segodnia wrote about ex-General Aleksandr Gurov, another leading figure of the pro-Kremlin movement *Edinstvo*, in an article entitled 'The Legends and Myths of the Bloc *Medved'*:[49]

> He is good at everything – he is a general, an academic, and he fights against crime. Gurov's…image is of a legendary nature. The cycle of stories about the knight without fear and reproach – Lieutenant-Colonel Gurov – by Nikolai Leonov is very famous. Here we are dealing with the rather rare phenomenon when a literary figure gets confused in the public consciousness with a real person. This means that a part of the electorate will vote as much for the real General Gurov as for his literary 'double'.[50]

The Segodnia columnist Leonid Radzikhovskii described *Edinstvo*'s style with another literary reference:

> In contrast to *Otechestvo*'s 'nomenclature' there are the elegant liberal-democratic *Medvedy*. – But we need some sort of evidence. – No, evidence is not necessary... It is easy: in a white gown... Rephrasing Bulgakov it is easy: in the red overall of the saviour of Russia, S. K. Shoigu runs down the gangway of his aeroplane with the determined pace of a minister. To date we haven't seen any clearer evidence of the true liberalism of the Hero of Russia, commander General Shoigu, the Hero

[47] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 14 October 1999.
[48] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 4 November 1999.
[49] The name *Medved'* (bear) was also used during the early stages of the creation of *Edinstvo*/Edinaia Rossiia. It is short for '*Mezhregional'noe dvishenie* '*Edinstvo*'' (Inter-regional movement '*Edinstvo*'), the electoral block that later made up the *Edinstvo* faction in the State Duma.
[50] Segodnia, 19 October 1999.

of Russia, of commander-liberal Karelin, and also of Major-General Gurov. They have not been chosen…as *Medved*'s symbols in vain.[51]

In the articles cited above, Sovetskaia Rossiia and Segodnia condemned the misuse of military imagery for political purposes by representing it as empty and politically unsubstantiated rhetoric used to manipulate the electorate's voting preferences. The examples from both newspapers criticised what they perceived as a populist and undesirable political strategy pursued by the current leadership. Notwithstanding this similarity, however, it will be discussed below that the essential rationale for displaying a negative attitude towards 'military politicians' of Segodnia and Sovetskaia Rossiia differed substantially.

- *'Military politicians' entering politics for the wrong reasons.*

In addition to rejecting the misuse of military imagery for campaign purposes, Sovetskaia Rossiia created a negative image of specific 'military politicians'. In particular, it accused some 'military politicians' of selling out for selfish reasons to 'the West', which it perceived as being in charge of ruling Russia under the cover of the El'tsin/Putin regime. Thus, in effect, it accused such politicians of betraying the country and its people. This kind of negative assessment of 'military politicians' in Sovetskaia Rossiia was expressed in the following excerpts discussing a number of specific 'military politicians':

- Ex-General Gromov is quietly sitting there. There is only one thing that can be said about him: he used to pay attention to the people of Russia – he used to be of the same order as one of our most respected heroes, V.I. Varennikov. He used to be a favourite of the people and then everything changed. He even went so far as to become an orderly of Kozyrev, being fully aware of the fact that he dealt blow after blow to Russia in favour of the USA. And it took another two generals: Rutskoi and Borod'ev. Under the shadow of the leather cap [Luzhkov], decorated with Eltsin's medals, intelligence for sale started to pull the strings.[52]

- In a time of crisis, only rulers **enjoying the trust of the people and the force structures** [newspaper's emphasis] can create order. Lebed' does not enjoy this trust. …Aleksandr Ivanovich! Do not take over! An attempt to use the 'iron hand' without sufficient popular trust will lead to a catastrophe. You compare yourself

[51] Segodnia, 7 December 1999.
[52] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 7 October 1999

> to De Gaulle. De Gaulle was a politician with a capital P. …In the days of crisis in 1958, the people called on De Gaulle to rule the state. And who is calling you, A. I.? General Lebed' is nominated by the dictators of the West and by Berezovskii.[53]

In these excerpts, Sovetskaia Rossiia condemned individual generals for having moved close to the regime it opposed. It portrayed them as 'deviants' betraying the people that elected them in the first place, and whom they claimed to represent. Echoing this sentiment, in a letter to the editor a former Soviet officer accused the same generals of 'forgoing their conscience', labelling them perjurers.[54]

The condemnation of individual 'military politicians' in Sovetskaia Rossiia, however, does not mean that the newspaper portrayed the participation of military figures in politics as generally undesirable. On the contrary, Sovetskaia Rossiia used the appeal of military imagery and of specific military figures for rallying the support of the readership in favour of the KPRF. The following excerpt from the newspaper, for example, asserted that:

> Unprecedented lawlessness rules Russia, and only the Russian people themselves, together and united as they were at the time of the Great Patriotic War, can put an end to it. We therefore support the appeal of military general V.I. Varennikov, president of the Russian Association of Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of Russia, holder of the Holy Medal of the Third Order, who is known all over the country. He called for the unification of all patriotic movements and parties, of all patriotic forces to unite into a single electoral bloc, 'The Communist Party of the Russian Federation', with the slogan 'For Victory!'… We summon everybody under the banner of victory, under which we won the war, because together we will be victorious again today in the struggle for our rights and social justice.[55]

The personality frequently quoted as a centrally important supporter of the party's course was the above mentioned former Soviet general and Duma deputy, Valentin Varennikov.[56] It can be concluded that Sovetskaia Rossiia represented the participation of military figures in politics as undesirable if these figures were affiliated to the regime or

[53] Sovetskaia Rossiia , 21 October 1999.
[54] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 28 October 1999
[55] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 5 October 1999
[56] Sovetskaia Rossiia, 5 October 1999; 7 October 1999; and 11 November 1999.

to political forces they opposed. In the case of figures loyal to the KPRF (equated by the newspaper with 'enjoying the trust of the people'), the participation of military figures in politics was neither ruled out as undesirable (see the positive portrayal of De Gaulle above), nor was it portrayed as a controversial issue.

A similar line of argument surfaced at times in Rossiiskaia gazeta. During the time period covered by the analysis, two 'military politicians' – Aleksandr Lebed' and Vladimir Shamanov – were represented as 'deviants', whose participation in politics was portrayed as having been determined by selfish career reasons. Their main target of blame was General Lebed', whom it accused explicitly of betraying the country, its people and the military:

- Sanctimonious Basaev and the hooray-patriot Lebed' seemingly agree: [Basaev] accused the Russian authorities of having organised the explosions [in Moscow] in order to solve their political problems. Thus, he practically repeated the opinion of General Lebed'.[57]

- Can one use the people's suffering to reach one's own goals? Can politics, large-scale or small, be built on blood? Can a man tailor himself the costume of a dare-devil and defender of the truth from a national tragedy and display it shamelessly to the whole world? For many people, these are rhetorical questions. But Aleksandr Lebed', in the meantime, achieved what he wanted – to once again be at the centre of noisy fame, again on a horse, again ashamed for those in power, while filling his pockets with foreign money.[58]

Rossiiskaia gazeta attributed the same ruthless and selfish career pursuit to Vladmir Shamanov, a general who entered his candidacy for the gubernatorial elections in Ul'ianovsk region in the winter of 2000:

> Shamanov entered as the only alternative candidate to Goriachev... Of course, he could not base his electoral campaign on anything else. Being completely detached from the quiet region's problems, what else could the noisy 'Varangian' utilise but sharp declarations about an 'uncompromising battle' with those in power (whilst evidently striving for this same power himself)? Moreover, his staff

[57] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 1 October 1999.
[58] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 1 October 1999. For further criticism of Lebed' see Rossiiskaia gazeta, 10 November 1999.

> does not conceal that they are looking at Ul'ianovsk region merely as a trampoline for bigger politics. Shamanov is enjoying nation-wide popularity as a decisive and tough commander of the Chechen campaign. …But the war is practically over, and his popularity will inevitably fall in times of peace. It is therefore not surprising that Shamanov is entering politics at this very point, being at the height of his military career. He himself is welcoming comparisons to A. Lebed'.[59]

Similarly to Sovetskaia Rossiia, Rossiiskaia gazeta condemned the political involvement of individual military figures, based on the fact that their political activity was motivated by the wrong reasons. Being the official organ of the Russian government, however, Rossiiskaia gazeta did not make a connection between these 'deviant' generals and the regime, instead portraying their political activities as a personal career pursuit, acting against the interests of the state. However, this type of negative portrayal of the issue in Rossiiskaia gazeta, too, did not rule out the general acceptability or desirability of the involvement of military figures in politics as a whole.

- *Lack of essential political skills*

The vehemence with which the participation of retired military figures in politics was rejected in Segodnia was substantially stronger than in Sovetskaia Rossiia. As will become evident in the two following sections, Segodnia was the only newspaper to condemn the political activities of such figures as inappropriate by using a reasoning similar to that displayed in many Western works on civil-military relations addressing the issue of Russian 'military politicians'. One of the arguments put forward in Segodnia was the assertion that – in direct contradiction to Krasnaia zvezda's standpoint – military figures are lacking the skills required of a politician. In several instances, Segodnia criticised the appointment of Putin as a 'military prime minister'.[60] One journalist, for instance, wrote:

> What Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is doing and who he is meeting clearly shows what the current head of government is and is not allowed to do.… It is not only within his power to talk about Chechnya, but in fact to lead the conduct of all military actions. Everything else – from economics to key appointments – is not

[59] Rossiiskaia gazeta, 2 December 2000.
[60] Segodnia, 6 October 1999.

> within the power of the prime minister… Economics is a new area of which he has little understanding. [61]

In a general statement about the merit of 'military politicians', Iurii Kobaladze, a former head of the SVR's bureau of public relations, in an interview with Segodnia asked rhetorically:

> Why do they only appoint people who are devoted and patriotic, but lack the necessary knowledge of economics or experience in cooperating with industrial collectives? …Wherever there are new elections, a general will appear without fail. However, in order to rule a region several times the size of France, one needs specific skills. The fact alone that a person is loyal, devoted, sharing the party line and moving with it, is too little these days. Today we have a completely different economy.[62]

In addition to arguing against the suitability of military figures to act in political positions dealing with civilian affairs, Segodnia extended its negative argument to politicians specialising on defence policy and military reform: 'Experience shows that field generals of merit simply do not know how to approach military reform and they prefer to act within the framework of old schemes.'[63]

- *A threat to democracy*

Whilst the negative perceptions of 'military politicians' discussed above were of a sarcastic nature, condemned individual personalities, or declared the unsuitability of military figures for the conduct of civilian politics, Segodnia went a step further in presenting this phenomenon as potentially dangerous, uncivilised, and inappropriate for a state based on democratic principles. Firstly, Segodnia cautioned that the abuse of military imagery to boost the rating of a politician might lead to an excessive use of this practice. The newspaper saw it as a potential danger since, having initially been intended as a campaign strategy, the practice could take on a life of its own and lead to dangerous side-effects. One such effect, the newspaper argued, could be the neglect of the country's economy: 'Putin is sticking to the Chechen trenches in order to make up for his

[61] Segodnia, 9 November 1999
[62] Segodnia, 1 November 2000.

unsuccessful direction of the economy.'[64] However, according to Segodnia an even more serious danger was the threat to democracy in Russia posed by a disproportionate growth of military influence over politics as a result of the presence of a large number of 'military politicians', even if unintended. This line of argument was expressed in the following excerpts:

- Public mood might develop more and more into the direction of a "fascistisation". This is partially made possible by the current propaganda concerning Chechnya. Those in power can use this hooray-patriotism, but it will inevitably equal suicide. …Strengthening the power of a "military prime minister" can have unexpected consequences for society. …However, if Putin is sacked before the parliamentary elections…, this would create a political situation that could explode at any minute.[65]

- [Putin] not only enjoys high public ratings, but is also a great authority among the military, and his authority is considerably stronger than that of the military leadership or of the commander-in-chief [El'tsin]…Vladimir Putin…is turning into a politician who is completely independent from the Kremlin and has the potential to become the new factual commander-in-chief without appointment by the Family.[66]

Another Segodnia journalist remarked that, what he perceived as the 'controlled' involvement of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics over the past decade, might take a dangerous turn in the future:

> With regard to 'bonapartism' Russia is lucky, because generals that might have thought about it refrained from selling their souls to the devil. They were educated in the Soviet tradition, which excluded putschism of the Latin American or Turkish kind. Therefore, the absolute majority of them supported neither the State Committee for Emergency Situations [during the August 1991 coup attempt], nor Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. But times are changing, old "taboos" are history, and a new generation of field generals could turn out not to be so indecisive.[67]

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[63] Segodnia, 22 November 2000.
[64] Segodnia, 9 November 1999.
[65] Segodnia, 6 October 1999.
[66] Segodnia , 26 October 1999.
[67] Segodnia, 22 November 2000.

In addition to posing a potential threat to democracy in Russia, Segodnia saw what it perceived as the growing political role of the military in the country as repeating old mistakes regarding foreign policy, as it could alienate potential Western partners. One journalist, for instance, interpreted the military doctrine adopted in 1999 as a concession by the Kremlin to the military. Condemning the fact that this doctrine again defined NATO and the US as hostile forces and did not exclude the possibility of a nuclear war, he wrote: 'As soon as [the words] have sunk in, everybody will understand clearly that the Russian generals have not learned anything from the recent past.'[68]

Similarly, another article proclaimed that 'nuclear-patriotic rhetoric is becoming the general political line of the Kremlin. A week before the elections it is suddenly clear that in the ten years following the opening of the iron curtain [the Kremlin] has retained no powerful resource apart from the nuclear button. It is time to open the curtain...'[69] Claiming in another article that the military leadership was bribed with promotion and military honours by the regime into supporting the pro-Kremlin movement *Edinstvo* at the parliamentary elections in December 1999, a journalist wrote: 'Judging by the number of decorated generals…one could think that war is going on literally everywhere. For example, more than a hundred generals and admirals were created in Kaliningrad region following the recent presidential decrees. Each of them ought to have at least one division behind him... Now prove to the world that we are a peaceful people'.[70]

It should be pointed out at this stage that Segodnia's coverage of 'military politicians' and the political influence of the military was not always as alarmist as in the examples cited above. In the run-up to the gubernatorial elections taking place in December 2000, for instance, it pointed out that 'the regions in which generals and admirals are running are not that numerous. By far not all of them are popular'.[71] When the outcomes of the elections had become clear, it furthermore conceded that 'a mass

[68] Segodnia,15 October 1999.
[69] Segodnia, 10 December 1999.
[70] Segodnia, 25 December 1999.
[71] Segodnia, 2 November 2000

emergence of *siloviki* did not occur'.[72] Overall, however, the newspaper tended towards describing the involvement of military figures in politics as an undesirable practice. Its journalists interpreted the increasing number of politicians with a military background foremost as the result of a campaign strategy, rather naively employed by a ruling regime struggling to consolidate its power, but incapable of judging the unintended, yet dangerous consequences.

In effect, Segodnia judged the involvement of military figures in politics as uncivilised, essentially contradictory to a democracy and averse to Russia's integration into the international environment. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 1999, one of the newspaper's journalists called on the Central Electoral Commission to act against the excessive use of the military factor in *Edinstvo*'s campaign, which he perceived as unconstitutional.[73] The following quote from an interview with Iurii Kobaladze discussing the increasing number of military people entering political posts succinctly summarised Segodnia's view on the matter: 'The main concern is that this tendency again could lead us down a blind alley. …The FSB should deal with its own business…or we will never enter the path of civilisation.'[74] Segodnia's attitude towards 'military politicians' corresponds largely to the predominantly negative way in which the role of these figures tends to be portrayed in the work of many of the scholars discussed in the previous chapter. In portraying the inclusion of military figures in politics as being encouraged and endorsed by the civilian leadership, however, the newspaper's interpretation differs from the clear division between the civilian and military spheres in many Western assessments. The latter tend to portray the military element in the relationship in a rather more active sense, interpreting the activities of Russian 'military politicians' as an unwarranted encroachment into civilian politics.

Summation

The analysis of four Russian newspapers above was conducted in order to assess the extent to which their perceptions and assessments of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet

[72] Segodnia, 26 December 2000.
[73] Segodnia, 15 December 1999.

Russia coincide with the representation of the same issue in Western civil-military relations literature discussed in the previous chapter. In an overview of the newspapers' definitions of 'military politicians' it was concluded that the journalists tended to display an inclusive definition of such figures, including figures not only with a background in the regular armed forces, but also in other elements of Russia's military system. In particular, it was the aim of the analysis to assess the extent to which the predominant negative consensus about Russian 'military politicians' apparent in Western academic literature was mirrored in the newspapers chosen for analysis. It can be concluded overall that the interpretation of Russian 'military politicians' as an undesirable phenomenon in the work of many Western authors discussed above is only one of a number of competing views on the same subject represented in the four publications included in the analysis.

Three of the four newspapers analysed – Krasnaia zvezda, Rossiiskaia gazeta, and Sovetskaia Rossiia – did not represent the participation of military figures in Russian politics as an undesirable practice and even welcomed it, albeit sometimes under specific circumstances. The official newspaper of the Russian ministry of defence, Krasnaia zvezda, displayed predominantly neutral or explicitly positive representations of this issue. It portrayed such figures as 'regular' participants in the political process on a par with civilian politicians. In some cases it depicted them as superior to civilian politicians in terms of their professional and personal qualities. The governmental publication, Rossiiskaia gazeta, appeared reluctant to acknowledge the presence of 'military politicians' as a matter for discussion, downplaying concerns voiced in other publications as being exaggerated. In connection with this, the newspaper seemed reluctant to explicitly endorse the participation of military figures in politics, but did so in individual cases of positive approval, as well as condemning other 'military politicians' it perceived as negative. Rossiiskaia gazeta, thus, regarded such personalities as regular participants in the political process, whose success or failure as a politician had to be assessed on an individual basis.

[74] Segodnia, 1 November 2000.

The portrayal of 'military politicians' in Sovetskaia Rossiia was more overtly critical. It perceived the inclusion of such figures in politics as a tactic used by the regime it opposed. Its negative assessments of the issue did not, however, extend to 'military politicians' in support of the political course of the KPRF. In effect, therefore, the newspaper did not rule out the legitimacy and desirability of retired military figures in political office if the circumstances were right.

The liberal-oriented newspaper Segodnia was the only publication covered in the analysis to portray 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia in similar terms as the civil-military relations scholars, whose work was reviewed in the preceding chapter. Segodnia interpreted what it perceived as the presence of a considerable amount of politicians with a military background in post-Soviet Russia as contradictory to a state based on the principles of democratic rule. The next section seeks to address the extent to which the interpretations of 'military politicians' in the newspapers above appears to be mirrored in the studies of the same issues by Russian scholars.

Russian academic perceptions of civil-military relations and the military in post-Soviet Russian politics

Reference to Russian academic work on the issue of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians' in particular plays a secondary role to the analysis of the Russian media. This is because the volume of scholarly literature available on the issue is limited. The study of civil-military relations as the exchange of power between the state and the military institution is a fairly young field of inquiry in Russia, having started to develop only at the time of the break-up of the Soviet state. During the Soviet period, the question of civilian control over the military and also of the participation of military figures in politics, in the words of Aleksei Arbatov, 'naturally did not arise', as 'there was a single leadership consisting of military and civilian leaders.'[75] Whilst Western analysts,

[75] Aleksei G Arbatov, 'Parlamentskii kontrol' nad voennoi organizatsii i politikoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii', in Aleksandr I Nikitin (ed.), Demokraticheskii kontrol' nad voennoi sferoi v Rossii i stranakh SNG, Centre for Political and International Studies (Moscow) and Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (Geneva). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Eslan" 2002, p. 14.

predominantly based in the United States, have produced a considerable volume of literature on civil-military relations in the Soviet state, the subject, as it was studied in its 'Western' form, did not exist in the Soviet Union itself. This is because, as Lev Gudkov points out, the country did not have 'the institutional mechanisms for representing different group interests'.[76] The veteran Russian military sociologist Vladimir Serebriannikov elaborated:

> Until the beginning of the 1990s, the study of civil-military relations in our country was more or less forbidden. Singling out this problem for analysis itself was considered dangerous, as it was an *a priori* assumption that the military and civilians coexist in full understanding of each other, that military and civilians constitute equal masters (*khoziaeva*) of the state, that both support the state's politics in unity, have the same ideology, and that their interests fully correspond with each other.[77]

Having said this, some Soviet literature on party-military relations did exist, but it did not amount to a critical assessment of the relationship in the Western sense.[78] With regard to 'military politicians' in particular, the inclusion even of active military figures in the political system of the Soviet Union was a regular occurrence and was encouraged, rather than perceived as controversial. This meant that in the Soviet Union, active military personnel had unlimited rights to take up political positions in all elected bodies of the state.[79] According to V. G. Strekozov, 13-14 thousand soldiers were elected to regional Soviets every year, because, in his words, 'under the conditions of a totalitarian state, such numbers confirmed the thesis about the unity of the army and the people'.[80] Mark Galeotti wrote that the incorporation of military personnel at all levels of the Soviet

[76] Lev Gudkov, 'Armiia v postsovetskoi Rossii', Indeks: Dos'e na tsenzuru, No. 19, 2003. Internet edition. www.index.org.ru. Last accessed: 24 March 2004.
[77] Vladimir Serebriannikov, 'Voennye v grazhdanskom obshchestve', in Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 6, 1995, p. 44.
[78] See, for instance, A A Episheva (ed.), Partiia i armiia 2nd edition, Moscow: Politizdat, 1980. For a retrospective historical study of civil-military relations in the Soviet Union by a Russian scholar, see Andrei A. Kokoshin, Armiia i politika, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1995.
[79] Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics, pp. 27-28.
[80] V G Strekozov, 'Konstitutsionnye osnovy Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Mesto vooruzhennykh sil v gozudarstve', Voennaia mysl', No. 3 1993, p. 18.

political structure 'signified not the dominance of the military but the extent to which it was just another element of the establishment.'[81]

Civil-military relations scholarship in Russia only started to develop towards the end of the Soviet Union's existence when Russia embarked upon the creation of a state structure based on democratic principles. Subsequently, questions concerning the military's place in the nascent Russian Federation started to emerge. In particular, the role played by some elements of the Soviet military in the attempted coup in August 1991 stimulated debate concerning the creation of an appropriate system of civilian control over the military organisation and the exclusion of the Russian military from domestic political struggles.[82]

Due to the lack of a tradition of civil-military relations scholarship and, consequently, the absence of domestic expertise in this area, Russian academics and policy-makers looked beyond Russia's borders in order to fill the vacuum of theory and practice they faced. According to Vadim Solovev, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 'when these democratic slogans arose, nobody knew how to understand the principles of civilian control and what to do with them. An important role here was played by foreign science and research. Seminars about these issues took place twice a year. They were organised with [foreign] military people who explained what civilian control is and what its functions in our state are supposed to be'.[83] At the beginning of 1993, some articles by Western academics studying the militaries of transition states were published, for example, in Voennaia mysl', the Soviet and Russian

[81] Mark Galeotti, The Age of Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, London and New York: Longman, 1995, p. 37.
[82] See, for instance, Vladimir Serebriannikov, 'Armiia i putch', Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, No.5, 1992.
[83] Interview with Vadim Solov'ev conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001. Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie is a weekly publication attached to Nezavisimaia gazeta, aiming to provide independent and critical coverage of military affairs. For the proceedings of such conferences/seminars see: O. A. Kolobov (ed.), Armiia i obshchestvo v usloviiakh peremen. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Nizhni Novgorod: NNGU, 1997; Voennoe sodrunichestvo mezhdu Rossiei i NATO. Materialy konferentsii, Moscow: Russian Centre for Strategic and International Research, George C. Marshal European Centre for Security Studies, 1997; G. Khageny and A. Savinkina (eds.), Grazhdanskii kontrol' nad vooruzhennymi silami: Inostranny opyt i spetsifika Rossii (Materials of a TACIS project from 1997-1998), Moscow: Russkii Put', 1999.

journal of military theory.[84] A little later, Russian specialists on military and defence started publishing their own work with reference to Western concepts of civilian control and military professionalism.[85]

Considering the importance ascribed to Russian civil-military relations by Western scholars, which is evident in the relatively substantial body of theoretical and empirical literature discussed in the preceding chapter, the field of study in Russia itself remains relatively marginal. Studies of different aspects of civil-military relations in a specifically post-Soviet Russian context appear to be published by three major groups of scholars. On group appears to be based at Western universities, or are supported financially by Western funds.[86] As indicated in the preceding chapter, the work of such authors is framed predominantly within Western concepts of civil-military relations and can thus be considered to represent a specific 'Russian school' of civil-military relations only to a limited extent. A second group are analysts from a military background, who are affiliated predominantly to military academies.[87] A third, smaller group of scholars engaged in the study of civil-military relations appears to approach the issue from a human rights perspective. These are analysts predominantly grounded in sociological aspects of the civil-military interface, studying, for instance, problematic aspects of

[84] Garcia Prudencio, 'Vooruzhennye sily v usloviakh perekhoda ot totalitarnogo gosudarstva k Demokraticheskomu', Voennaia mysl', No. 8-9 1992, pp. 59-63; 'Armiiu nel'zia reformirovat' po abstraktnoi skheme' (Interview with Bruce Parrott), Voennaia mysl', No. 12, 1992, pp. 58-62.
[85] Some of the earliest of such articles in Voennaia mysl' were Strekozov, 'Konstitutsionnye osnovy Rossiiskoi Federatsii; V. M. Rodachin, 'Armiia i Politicheskaia Vlast'', Voennaia mysl', No. 5, pp. 12-19; V. I. Mironov, 'Gumanizatsiia voinskoi deiatel'nosti i dukhovnoe vozrozhdenie rossiiskoi armii', Voennaia mysl', No. 8, 1993, pp. 7-9.
[86] The work of Pavel Baev and Irina Isakova was discussed in the preceding chapter. Dmitrii Trenin, who has also written on civil-military relations, is based at the Carnegie Centre in Moscow. A Russian-language edited volume on democratic control was financed by the Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) in Geneva (Nikitin, Demokraticheskii kontrol' nad voennoi sferoi v Rossii i stranakh SNG). A Russian-language monograph on civil-military relations in operations other than war was published with the support of the Macarthur Foundation (Ekaterina A Stepanova, Voenno-grazhdanskie otnosheniia v operatsiiakh nevoennogo tipa, Moscow: Prava Cheloveka, 2001). Both books were financed under the condition that they be distributed free of charge and they are not available in Russian bookshops.
[87] The journal, Voennaia mysl', publishes predominantly the work of authors attached to military academies. Vladimir Serebriannikov, working in the civilian Institute for Socio-political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, is a military officer. Vladimir Zolotarev, who has also written on civil-military relations, is the head of the Russian Ministry of Defence's Institute of Military History.

conscript life, such as the issue of *dedovshchina*.[88] To date, no single Russian-language monograph devoted entirely to the systematic and theoretical study of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia has been published. If issues relevant to this thesis, such as civilian control over the armed forces or the participation of military figures in the political process are discussed, this is done in the course of wider-ranging studies on military history, military sociology, civil society, or traditional security studies.[89]

Of particular relevance to this thesis is an interesting difference between the work of Western and Russian analysts. The latter, with few exceptions, rarely discuss the issue of politicians with a military background in the country as an aspect of civil-military relations, as is done extensively in the work of their Western counterparts.[90] This is an important point, since it might indicate that the participation of retired military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics in Russia itself appears to be perceived as considerably less contentious than in the eyes of many Western civil-military relations analysts. The impression arises that, whilst some Russian analysts do indeed ascribe paramount importance to the establishment of an efficient system of civilian control in contemporary Russia, the exclusion of individual figures with a military background from participation in the political process is not seen as necessary in order to achieve this goal.[91]

This difference notwithstanding, an overview of Russian scholarship on civil-military relations in contemporary Russia, although relatively limited in terms of volume, displayed some interesting and relevant tendencies distinguishing this body of work from

[88] See, for example, the work of Ida Kuklina , an academic and leading figure in the human rights organisation the Russian Committee for Soldiers' Mothers, and of Lev Levinson, an experts with the Institute for Human Rights (see list of references).

[89] There is a chapter on civilian control in Vladimir A. Zolotarev, Voennaia bezopasnost' gosudarstva Rossiskogo, Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole, 2001 (military history); Iu. I. Deriugin and R. G. Ianovskii (eds.), Armiia Rossii: Sostoianie i perspektivy, Moscow: Institute for Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1999 (military sociology); V. G. Khoros, Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo. Mirovoi opyt i problemy Rossii, Moscow: Institute for World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998 (civil society); Aleksei Arbatov Bezopasnost': Rossiiskii vybor, Moscow: EPItsentr, 1999 (security studies).

[90] The exception more or less is Vladimir Serebriannikov, who has consistently included the issue of military politicians in his work. Although this is not indicated in the specific volumes, he is the author of the chapters on military politicians in Deriugin and Ianovskii, Armiia rossii: Sostoianie i perspektivy, pp. 282-286; Osipov, Reformirovanie Rossii: Ot mifov k real'nosti, pp. 253 – 260.

Western analyses. These tendencies are firstly a less pronounced distinction between the civilian and military spheres, and secondly, a more inclusive definition of the military system, which were both also detected in the review of media coverage above. The perception of a clear civil-military boundary, which is at the heart of Western approaches to the study of civil-military relations, appears to be less developed in the work of some Russian analysts. Possibly, this is linked to the above mentioned Soviet perception of the civilian and military leadership as a united group. That this might be the case was indicated by Aleksei Arbatov, who wrote that '[in the Soviet Union] the leadership was unified and consisted of military people and of civilian leaders. It is not by chance that the term 'military-political leadership' [*voenno-politicheskoe rukovodstvo*] was used regularly, and continues to be used today. In democratic states, by definition, such a term does not exist.'[92]

That the strict division of the civil and military spheres by Russian analysts is not automatically taken for granted was also noted by Serebriannikov, who expressed surprise at the fact that 'some Western researchers dealing with civil-military relations do not explain the categories "military" and "civilians", supposing them to be self-explanatory. Others, conversely, take them as absolute opposites, evidently assuming that they constitute different worlds – "the military world" and the "civilian world"'.[93] The perception of a less-pronounced boundary between the civilian and military spheres in Russia might be responsible for the fact that some Russian academics attach less importance to politicians with a military background. To quote Serebriannikov again, 'I think there is something wrong with the statement that military people should not participate in politics. This statement expresses a degree of mistrust towards these people, some suspicion that military people would inevitably act malevolently at some point, that they might be a threat to civil society. I think this Western approach is wrong. I think they should participate.'[94]

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[91] See, for instance, Vladimir Animisov, 'Grazhdanskii kontrol' za voennymi strukturami' Polis 14(4), 1995.
[92] Arbatov, 'Parlamentskii kontrol' nad voennoi organizatsii i politikoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii', p. 14.
[93] Serebriannikov, 'Voennye v grazhdanskom obshchestve', p. 88.

A similar attitude towards the involvement of figures with a military background in politics was also expressed by Strekozov. He conceded in 1993 that, on the one hand, the election of military figures to the organs of the newly democratic Russian state facilitated the involvement of service personnel in the struggle of different political forces, while on the other hand he asserted that the election of such figures bore 'obvious merits'.[95] In two volumes published by the Institute for Socio-Political Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which are devoted to the contemporary Russian military and the wider reform process respectively, the chapters on the military and politics dealt with the issue in a matter-of-fact way, and did not conclude with either a positive or a negative evaluation.[96]

The perception of a closer affiliation between the civilian and military spheres might also account for the fact that Russian analysts, who are not explicitly in favour of the participation of military figures in politics, do not attach too much importance to the issue overall. In the eyes of such authors, both civilians and the military might be perceived as a part of the same 'evil'. For instance, Ida Kuklina, a Russian security studies specialist affiliated to IMEMO-RAN and a member of the coordinating council of the Russian Union of Committees of Soldiers' Mothers, asserted that although she is critical of the increasing number of military people entering politics under Putin, this fact should not be overemphasised. 'Of course', she said, 'he is very interested in supporting all those military structures. …But I think it is not the main thing. It is not the main thing! There are too many forces around Putin and every clan or group wants to be more influential than the other'.[97] In an article on military reform in Russia, Kuklina used the term 'military-political leadership', explained by Arbatov above, in several instances. She did not explicitly distinguish between the civilian and military leaderships, as she seemingly perceived the slow progress towards the creation of professional armed forces in Russia to be the result of an equal degree of disinterest on the part of both the civilian

[94] Interview with Vladimir Serebriannikov conducted in Moscow on 22 January 2002.
[95] Strekozov, 'Konstitutsionnye osnovy Rossiiskoi Federatsii', pp. 18.
[96] Deriugin and Ianovskii, Armiia Rossii: Sostoianie i perspektivy, pp. 282-286; Osipov, Reformirovanie Rossii: Ot mifov k real'nosti, pp. 253 – 260.
[97] Interview with Ida Kuklina conducted in Moscow on 8 October 2002.

and military leaderships.[98] In a similar manner, Lev Gudkov asserted in 2003 that in his opinion the excessive political role played by the military in contemporary Russia is to be ascribed to the close relationship between the civilian and military leaderships: 'The army in the broad sense of the word (the command of the different force structures and military formations, and first of all, of course, the general staff and the ministry of defence) not only remains an important resource for those in power and for the support of a specific political course, but is also a source for leadership cadres'.[99]

The less clear-cut perception of the military sphere by Russian analysts of civil-military relations might also be connected to the fact that the military sphere in Russia is much more ambiguous and fluid than is the case in the U.S. and in Western European states, where the basic concepts of civil-military relations theory have been generated. In an article summarising the first decade of post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations, Dmitrii Trenin pointed out the importance of 'keeping in mind the whole complexity of the "military" concept in Russia, where shoulder to shoulder with the "first army" – the regular armed forces – there is a second one. This second army includes the domestic troops of the MVD, the border guards, the railway troops, formations of the emergency ministry, FAPSI, FSO.'[100] As discussed in the preceding chapter, Western analysts, in the main, have only recently begun to include military structures other than the regular armed forces in their analyses of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia systematically, as the theoretical concepts and approaches used were constructed solely for the study of the regular armed forces.[101]

In contrast, for many Russian analysts discussing the political influence of the military and the need to establish a system of civilian control over the armed forces, a

[98] Ida Kuklina, 'Krizis vooruzhennykh sil Rossii i ikh reformirovanie', Pravo zashchitnik ,No. 2, 2002, pp. 72-82.
[99] Gudkov, 'Armiia v postsovetskoi Rossii'.
[100] Dmitrii Trenin, 'Desiatiletie nevyuchennykh urokov: Grazhdansko-voennye otnosheniia v 90-e gody i perspektivy novogo raunda voennykh reform', Politiia, 20(2), Summer 2001, p. 72. The Russian word '*armiia*' is not only applied to describe the ground forces of the regular armed forces, but is also used colloquially to describe other branches of the Russian armed forces.
[101] As discussed in chapter one, the majority of Western analyses of civil-military relations in contemporary Russia are based on the concepts of professionalism and objective/subjective civilian control developed by Samuel Huntington in his 1957 work The Soldier and the State.

more inclusive definition of the military appears to have been a natural approach from the early post-Soviet years. In an article on the attempted coup in August 1991, written in 1992, for instance, Serebriannikov defined the armed forces as 'the army, as well as military subunits, units and formations of the KGB and MVD'.[102] In 1995, Vladimir Animisov emphasised the importance of establishing an effective system of civilian control over the force structures, as well as over the armed forces.[103] Rejecting the idea of direct 'army interference' in Russian politics as highly unlikely, Rustem Sevortian wrote in 1997 that in his view such a possibility would arise only in the hypothetical case of a consolidation of the leadership of all force structures (MoD, MVD, border guards, FSB) around a single political centre.[104] The same, inclusive definition of the armed forces can also be found, for example, in the work of Georgii Mirskii, Vladmimir Anisimov, Vladimir Ostankov and Lev Gudkov.[105] In line with this, if the issue of 'military politicians' is discussed by Russian authors at all, they tend to display the 'inclusive' understanding of such figures as coming from either component of the Russian military system.[106]

This section outlined Russian academic perceptions of 'military politicians' in view of the conclusions drawn in the analysis of newspaper coverage above. It can be concluded that no single 'Russian school' of civil-military relations exists and this area remains understudied in some respects. Nevertheless, three main features distinguish the assessments of 'military politicians' in the work of Russian authors from those of many of their Western counterparts discussed in the previous chapter. Firstly, as was concluded in the analysis of newspaper coverage on the same question, many Russian academics appear to take a comparatively moderate approach to the involvement of military figures in Russian politics and do not mirror the predominant negative consensus with regard to

[102] Serebriannikov, 'Armiia i putch', p. 59.
[103] Animisov, 'Grazhdanskii kontrol' za voennymi struktyurami', pp. 152-157.
[104] R. Sevortian, 'Potentsial uchastiia voennykh v sovremennoi rossiiskoi politike', Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 4, 1997, p. 60-61.
[105] G. Mirskii, 'Armiia v rossiiskoi politike', Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, No. 3, 1997, p. 105; Anisimov, 'Grazhdanskii kontrol' nad voennymi strukturami Rossii', p. 86; V Ostankov, 'O sovershenstvovanii planirovaniia voennogo stroitel'stva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Polis, 20(2), Summer 2001, p. 133; Gudkov, 'Armiia v Postsovetskoi Rossii'.
[106] Ianovskii and Deriugin, Armiia Rossii: sostoianie i perspektivy, pp. 282-286; Osipov (ed.), Reformirovanie Rossii: ot mifov k real'nosti, pp. 253-260.

this issue apparent in the work of many of their Western colleagues. Secondly, as with the work of journalists analysed above, Russian academics appear to take an inclusive understanding of the military as a basis for analysis, which diminishes the perception of 'military politicians' as a single interest group. Thirdly, Russian observers of civil-military relations tend to see the civilian and military spheres as less distinct entities than analysts approaching the issue within the framework of Western concepts of civil-military relations. This distinction, too, can contribute towards an explanation for why the issue of 'military politicians' in their work is portrayed as less controversial. The final section of this chapter provides an overview of political attitudes towards 'military politicians' before concluding in an analysis of the significance of the findings of this chapter on the interpretation of such figures in a wider context.

Political perceptions of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia

The sections discussing Russian newspaper perceptions and academic representations of 'military politicians' both pointed to the fact that the existence of these figures in Russia appears to be generally considered as a less controversial issue than by some Western analysts. On a political level, as represented by perceptions of political actors in Russia, a similar picture presents itself.

Valerii Cheban, an adviser to the chairman of the Russian Duma's defence committee, wrote in 2003 that the issue of civilian control in contemporary Russia is nothing but a 'fashionable topic for political demagoguery'. In his opinion, 'the current situation with regard to civilian control over the armed forces in our country does not stand up to criticism of any kind. The problem of civilian control became a fashionable political topic a long time ago, but it has not developed into an important cause for the state.'[107] According to Pavel Zolotarev, an academic and president of the Foundation for the Support of Military Reform, the general 'formation of civil-military relations in

[107] Valerii Cheban, 'Modnaia tema dlia politicheskoi demagogii: Grazhdanskii kontrol' nad voennymi strukturami dolgie gody ostaetsia chisto virtual'nymi', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 7 February 2003.

Russia, like the process of forming civil society as a whole, is only in its initial stages.'[108] In the eyes of Andrei Zakharov, vice-president of the Foundation for the Development of Parliamentarianism in the Russian Federation, the normative aims of establishing an institutionalised system of civilian control in contemporary Russia only constitute 'a question of the future'.[109]

At the level of the Russian legislature, issues such as civilian control over the armed forces are generally of a marginal concern. In an interesting study of military-related issues in the programmes of post-Soviet political organisations conducted in 2001, Iurii Korguniuk asserted that, although all political parties paid a considerable amount of attention to military-related issues, they did so to considerably different effect.[110] As a result of his analysis, he concluded that the positions and arguments of Russian political parties could be divided into three basic viewpoints. The first he called the 'general viewpoint', which included the addressing of problems such as the social protection of military personnel and the needs of the military-industrial complex. According to Korguniuk's research, problems addressed in the 'general viewpoint' were addressed in the programmes of all political parties.

The second viewpoint he termed the 'civil viewpoint'. This included issues such as military professionalisation and alternative military service. A fundamental concern of this viewpoint was the establishment of an effective system of civilian-control over the regular armed forces and over the other power structures. Although none of the party programmes explicitly specified the need to exclude individual military figures from becoming involved in politics, a pre-electoral platform of Iabloko emphasised the importance of 'keeping the army out of political struggles'.[111] Crucially, the main political parties represented in the State Duma supporting the civilian viewpoint, which expressed the desirability of institutionalising civilian control over the armed forces in a

[108] Pavel Zolotarev, 'Puti povysheniia statusa i ulucheniia imidzha voennykh v obshchestve', in Nikitin (ed.), Demokraticheskii kontrol' nad voennoi sferoi v Rossii i stranakh SNG, p. 53.
[109] Interview with Andrei Zakharov conducted in Moscow on 13 December 2001.
[110] Iurii Korguniuk, 'Problemy vooruzhennykh sil v programmakh i prakticheskoi deiatel'nosti politicheskikh organizatsii Rossii', Politiia, 20(2), Summer 2001, pp. 171-196.
[111] ibid., p. 177.

Western understanding of the term, were those belonging to the liberal-oriented opposition, specifically Iabloko or SPS, who constituted a small minority until they failed to be re-elected in the parliamentary elections in December 2003.[112] The third of Korguniuk's viewpoints, the 'conservative viewpoint', was, in his words, 'the straightforward rejection of the demands included in the "civil viewpoint"' – the rejection of changes of any kind to the Russian military organisation. This viewpoint was expressed predominantly by nationalist and patriotic parties, such as the LDPR and KPRF.[113]

Whilst Korguniuk described the achievements of supporters of the 'civil viewpoint' during the legislature periods from 1993 -1995 and 1995 - 1999 as modest, no supporters of the 'civil viewpoint' overcame the five percent barrier to achieve parliamentary status in the elections of 2003. Eduard Vorob'ev, a member of SPS and former deputy chairman of the Duma committee on defence, wrote before the parliamentary elections in 2003 that a law on civilian control prepared by his faction, 'even in view of the most optimistic prognoses will not be discussed before the new Duma has been elected. And nobody is supporting our initiative, apart from maybe Iabloko'[114] Due to the fact that neither SPS nor Iabloko was represented in the Duma that was elected in December 2003, the parliament's impetus for the creation of a western-type system of civil-military relations in contemporary Russia seemed to remain a question for the future.

On the level of the Russian executive, concerns about civilian control over the military organisation have remained marginalised to an even higher degree. Speaking about the executive's approach to dealing with issues of civil-military relations, Zolotarev wrote the following:

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[112] Korguniuk asserts in his article that 'centrist' parties, such as *Edinstvo,* also belong to the supporters of the civil viewpoint. This is true to the extent that the establishment of a professional military does figure in their political programmes. The establishment of a system of civilian control, however, is not mentioned.
[113] Korguniuk, 'Problemy vooruzhennykh sil', p. 179.
[114] Eduard Vorob'ev, 'Peremeny dolzhny stat' neobratimymi', Indeks: Dos'e na tsenzuru, No. 19, 2003. Internet edition. www.index.org.ru. Last accessed: 24 March 2004.

> Responsible organs in the ministry of defence…until today have not acknowledged the existence of problems and ways for their solution in this respect. At the level of the presidential administration, neither the Security Council, nor the directorate for domestic policies, nor any other structure is dealing with the question. At the governmental level merely operational problems are addressed.[115]

In line with Arbatov's explanation of the continued perception in Russia of a 'military-political leadership' and the close interconnection between the civilian and military spheres discussed above, civilian control in post-Soviet Russia has been restricted to a large extent to an unofficial contract between the executive and the military leadership. That is, civilian control under both Presidents El'tsin and Putin can be described as presidential rather than broader civilian control over the armed forces.[116] According to Vorob'ev, little more than lip-service has been paid to issues of civilian control at the level of the executive and the military leadership. Moreover, he pointed out that the failure of moving towards a democratic system of civilian control in post-Soviet Russia should not be put down only to the military leadership's conservatism and unwillingness to change. In his opinion, due to the strong position of the president in Russia's political system, the disinterest towards the issue displayed by both El'tsin and Putin meant that all efforts for the establishment of an efficient system of civilian control were destined to fail from the outset.[117]

As with the tendency of Russian academic writers on civil-military relations not to perceive and portray the participation of military figures in politics as an issue related to civilian control over the military, even those political forces in post-Soviet Russia speaking out in favour of the establishment of a system of civilian control of the Western type do not appear to be opposed to the involvement of military figures in Russian politics. For instance, representatives of both the SPS and Iabloko factions interviewed for this thesis did not tend to see the exclusion of military figures from participating in politics as an essential feature of their normative aim to institutionalise a democratic

[115] Zolotarev, 'Puti povysheniia statusa i ulucheniia imidzha voennykh v obshchestve', p. 53.
[116] Arbatov, 'Parlamentskii kontrol' nad voennoi organizatsii i politikoi Rossiiskoi Federatsii', p. 13; Trenin, 'Desiatiletie nevyuchennykh urokov', p. 77.
[117] Vorob'ev, 'Peremeny dolzhny stat' neobratimymi'.

system of civilian control. Instead, some of these respondents saw the involvement of individual military figures in politics as minimally controversial. Valerii Ostanin, a former Iabloko deputy said the following about 'military politicians':

> I cannot make a clear statement about my preferences with regard to this issue. Fortunately, we have positive examples of military people participating in politics in Russia. Marshal Kulikov from OVR. He is the head of the veterans' movement in the state Duma. I respect this person very much. He is a person who made it through the Great Patriotic War, who fought against the fascists in Germany. The other person is the former deputy minister of defence of the USSR, Vorob'ev Eduard Arkadevich… I respect this type of politician. Nothing is that simple in this area.[118]

Igor Artem'ev, also of Iabloko, expressed a similar attitude, implying that the merits of 'military politicians' had to be judged on a case-by-case basis. He noted that 'some of our federal administrative regions are ruled by generals. A large number of generals became eager to come to power and found their places as governors of the regions and in the Russian parliament. The generals' achievements in their respective political positions are varied. Generals working in the federal regions made some progress. I mean Cherkesov and other generals who are doing a good job'.[119]

The SPS itself had a rather 'famous' 'military politician' in its ranks – General Eduard Vorob'ev. The former SPS deputy Sergei Iushenkov was one of the most vocal advocates of the need for the establishment of a system of civilian control over both the regular armed forces and the other force structures in contemporary Russia. He expressed in an interview his perception that the lack of such a system was the most significant threat to Russian security and democracy.[120] But even he did not categorically speak out against the existence of 'military politicians': 'I consider the idea that in Russia a large number of military people is coming to political power to be exaggerated.'[121]

[118] Interview with Valerii Ostanin conducted in Moscow on 6 December 2001.
[119] Interview with Igor Artem'ev conducted in Moscow on 20 November 2001.
[120] Interview with Sergei Iushenkov conducted in Moscow on 29 October 2002.
[121] Interview with Sergei Iushenkov conducted in Moscow on 13 November 2001.

With respect to executive perspectives on 'military politicians', no official views have been voiced explicitly. However, as will be discussed in detail in chapter four of this thesis, it is obvious that both post-Soviet Russian presidents encouraged the participation of military figures in the domestic political process, as both El'tsin and Putin appointed military figures to political positions throughout their terms in office.

Concluding remarks

This chapter outlined overall perceptions of civil-military relations with a particular emphasis on attitudes towards 'military politicians' in a sample of Russian newspaper coverage, in Russian academic work, and in the opinion of political actors. The main aim of the chapter was to evaluate the extent to which these perceptions of 'military politicians' differ from the Western approaches discussed in the preceding chapter. It can be concluded that the predominant negative evaluation of Russian 'military politicians' in the work of Western civil-military relations analysts is by no means the prevailing discourse in post-Soviet Russia itself.

The analysis of Russian newspaper coverage dealing with the issue of 'military politicians' in four Russian newspapers firstly established that the publications displayed an inclusive understanding of 'military politicians', including in this term not only representatives of the regular armed forces, but also of other components of the Russian military system. The analysis further revealed that only Segodnia, a newspaper with a liberal and pro-Western outlook, evaluated 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia in a language and outlook similar to that of Western analysts. In the eyes of Segodnia, the presence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russian politics is undesirable, and it was described as incompatible with the principles of a democratic state. It differed from many Western assessments of the issue, however, inasmuch as it portrayed the involvement of military figures in politics as accepted and even encouraged by the civilian leadership and not as an encroachment into politics by a military component in opposition to it.

The discourses in the remaining newspapers – Sovetskaia Rossiia, Rossiiskaia gazeta, and Krasnaia zvezda presented a fundamentally different picture of 'military

politicians'. Despite including a considerable amount of negative coverage of politicians with a military background it perceived to have entered politics for the wrong reasons, Sovetskaia Rossiia welcomed the political activities of such personalities supporting the political course it propagated. Rossiiskaia gazeta tended to cover the presence of 'military politicians' as a regular feature of Russian politics and evaluated their merit on an individual basis. Krasnaia zvezda, unsurprisingly, displayed the highest amount of explicit endorsement of 'military politicians', whose capabilities for ruling the state it portrayed as superior to those of civilian politicians.

In the academic work on civil-military relations reviewed above, some Russian analysts have negatively evaluated the military's position in the political system. Generally, however, the issue of 'military politicians' appears to be presented as considerably less controversial. The majority of Russian scholars on civil-military relations displayed an inclusive definition of 'military politicians' and included in this group figures coming from force structures other than the regular armed forces. This approach further decreased their perception of the military sphere and of 'military politicians' as a clearly defined group and, thus, lessened their perception of the issue as problematic. As was also concluded with regard to the issue's treatment in four Russian newspapers, some academic observers have treated the existence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia as a matter of fact. In a few instances their existence has even been evaluated in a positive manner. Even analysts critical of what they perceived as the excessive influence of the military-as-institution in post-Soviet Russia attached less importance to the presence of individual military figures participating in politics, as they appeared to perceive of such figures as an integral part of the country's leadership, rather than as a force posing a potential opposition to the civilian masters of the state.

On a political level in post-Soviet Russia issues treated as a priority in Western analyses of civil-military relations, such as the need for the institutionalisation of a system of civilian control over the armed forces, appear to be of a rather marginal concern. On the level of the executive and the military leadership, little more than lip-service has been paid with regard to the establishment of civilian control mechanisms.

Both Presidents El'tsin and Putin actively endorsed the presence of 'military politicians' by appointing such figures to official positions. The political forces favouring a Western model of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia and advocating the institutionalisation of democratic civilian control over the armed forces are liberal political parties represented in the Russian legislature, that is, *Iabloko* and SPS. However, despite agreeing with the normative concern expressed by many Western authors that civilian control in post-Soviet Russia is in need of improvement, these political parties, unlike many Western analysts, did not seem to perceive the participation of retired military figures in politics as an overall negative aspect in the country's civil-military relationship. Instead, a number of interview respondents representing these parties argued that the merits of such figures must be evaluated on a case-to-case basis.

The predominant negative assessment of Russian politicians with a military background in the work of Western civil-military relations analysts is not mirrored in the academic, media, and political perceptions of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. Although ideas corresponding to the Western discourse on the issue do exist in post-Soviet Russia, such views and ideals, expressed by pro-Western Russian politicians and analysts, lie outside of the Russian dominant discourse and are even perceived as marginal and extreme. In a discussion of SPS's programme for the restructuring and reform of the Russian military, for instance, the *Edinaia Rossiia* deputy Maksim Korobov asserted that his faction's attitude towards their plans was 'reserved' and he dismissed the credibility of their efforts by pointing out that 'in general, the faction of SPS is known for its excessive radicalism'.[122]

Arkadii Lapshin, the deputy editor-in-chief of the journal Vlast', which describes itself as independent but ideologically close to *Edinaia Rossiia*,[123] asserted in an explanation of the journal's relationship with the pro-Kremlin party: 'We are similar in our vision of problems. We do not appreciate marginal liberal values, as SPS does,

[122] Interview with Maksim Korobev conducted in Moscow on 23 January 2002.
[123] According to Lapshin, two members of the journal's editorial board are leading members of Edinaia Rossiia.

Nemtsov and so on… We think that such approaches are not acceptable for Russia.'[124] In a discussion of the portrayal of 'military politicians' in the Russian press, the KPRF deputy Vladimir Volkov dismissed the criticism of 'military politicians' displayed in newspapers, such as Segodnia, with the following words: 'I think that the dominant attitude amongst society – and I am not talking about journalists here, we have different journalists and they will write anything for money – the attitude of society towards military figures in politics is normal! Fully civilised! And those fulfilling orders, they are writing negative things.'[125]

Perceptions in Russia of the role and influence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia differ considerably from the interpretations provided by many Western analysts discussed in the previous chapter. A number of implications, both methodological and theoretical, can be concluded from the study presented in this chapter. Firstly, the impression of a fundamentally different Russian discourse on 'military politicians' is likely to be of importance with regard to the normative approaches to the study of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia taken by many Western analysts. It has to be born in mind that the different perceptions of the issue in Russia are not due merely to the fact that the importance of the issue is not sufficiently known in Russia. As discussed above, Western points of view on this issue are expressed both in some parts of the Russian media, as well as in the platforms of some 'Western-thinking' politicians and political parties. However, this viewpoint is marginal in Russia and exists alongside other, competing discourses.

With regard to this thesis, the theoretical implications of the conclusions drawn in this chapter are of utmost importance. Due to the fact that the concerns voiced by some Western analysts with regard to the involvement of military figures in politics throughout the post-Soviet era have not been realised, the more moderate interpretation of the role and influence of 'military politicians' proposed by many Russian analysts appears to be well grounded. In seeking to interpret the issue of politicians with a military background

[124] Interview with Arkadii Lapshin conducted in Moscow on 30 October 2002.
[125] Interview with Vladimir Volkov conducted in Moscow on 26 December 2001.

in a Russo-specific context, thus, the taking into consideration of how this issue is evaluated in the country itself has the potential of enhancing the explanatory power of Western approaches and can contribute to a more rounded interpretation of the issue.

Concluding from the analysis above, two basic factors appear to determine the more moderate evaluation of 'military politicians' in the eyes of many Russian analysts. These are, firstly, the distinct structure of the Russian military system, and secondly, a less pronounced perception of distinct civilian and military spheres. Due to the multi-layered structure of the military system in post-Soviet Russia, the perception of the 'military' and of 'military figures' in Russia is associated with a much less monolithic institution than is the case in most Western states. As a result, Russian observers of politics might be less inclined to see 'military politicians' as a united group than their Western counterparts. A link between the possibility of concerted intervention or even influence exerted by the military-as-institution on the political process and the visible presence of politicians with a military background, thus, does not automatically suggest itself, and the merits of 'military politicians' tend to be assessed instead on a case-to-case basis. Similarly, the perception of a less clear-cut division between the civilian and military spheres in Russia makes the perception of the influence exerted by politicians with a military background as a quasi interest group standing in opposition to a civilian-led regime seem less defined. As a result, even analysts critical of the inclusion of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics, such as Kuklina, whose attitude was discussed above, have tended to display the opinion that both civilian and 'military politicians' are a part of 'the same evil'. In line with this perception, the fact of the existence of politicians with a military background as such might be interpreted by many Russian observers as an issue of little relevance in terms of political developments, in either a positive or negative sense.

The following chapters provide a detailed engagement with these two important factors. In the next chapter, a study of Russia's military system is provided, and its specific features are assessed with regard to their significance for the applicability and explanatory power of Western civil-military relations concepts concerning the

interpretation of the role and influence of ‘military politicians’ in post-Soviet Russia. Chapter four engages with the interaction of the civilian and military spheres, assessing firstly, whether it can be assumed that ‘military politicians’ in post-Soviet Russia are less democratic than their civilian counterparts, and secondly, to what extent the activities of ‘military politicians’ can be perceived as an encroachment into politics that is deemed unwarranted by the civilian leadership.

3

Understanding the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia

It is important to keep in mind the whole complexity of the meaning of a 'military person' in Russia.[1]
Dmitrii Trenin, security analyst, Moscow Carnegie Centre

In order to conduct further analysis of the role of figures with a military background in the political system of post-Soviet Russia, and their potential influence on the political process, a clear understanding of these figures and of the institutions from which they originate is required. Such a study is provided in this chapter. As discussed in chapter one, studies of civil-military relations in Russia, particularly in the early post-Soviet era, and particularly by Western analysts, focused predominantly on the regular armed forces.[2] The systematic inclusion in studies of civil-military relations of other elements of Russia's military system – the force structures – is a recent development and has not yet been fully theorised.[3] As a result, in addressing 'military politicians', figures from a variety of institutional backgrounds are sometimes portrayed as constituting a single analytical entity.[4] Such a position can overstate their influence in the Russian body politic. In order to provide future analytical cogency, this chapter studies the precise institutional backgrounds of Russian 'military politicians' and will stress that such personalities do not constitute an undifferentiated 'bloc'.

The rationale for depicting Russian politicians from a variety of defence and security related institutional backgrounds as an entity has been put down by some authors

[1] Trenin, 'Desiatiletie nevyuchennykh urokov', p. 74.
[2] See, for instance, Herspring, Russian Civil-Military Relations, Marten Zisk, Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia.
[3] As discussed in chapter one, Security Sector Reform (SSR), studying both the regular armed forces and other elements of the security sector is a recent field of enquiry.

to what they describe as the common 'military frame of mind' or the 'common…military-style traditions' shared by such figures.[5] As discussed in chapter one, the military sociologists Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos argued with regard to the U.S. regular armed forces that the presumption of a unified military ethic of military professionals was questionable, because of the increasingly specialised and varied tasks fulfilled by military professionals.[6] Given the institutional diversity of the force structures in post-Soviet Russia, and the multitude of tasks fulfilled by its personnel within these organisations, a similarly differentiated approach appears to be fruitful especially in the Russian case. This chapter will indicate that the portrayal of Russian force-structure personnel as being characterised by a common 'military mind' requires further investigation.

Initially, this chapter looks at legal and official definitions of the Russian military and of military figures through an analysis of the appropriate legislation, presidential decrees and other official documentation. This establishes that Russian 'military politicians' originate from a variety of organisations alongside the regular armed forces. The chapter then proceeds to explore each of these institutions in concentrating particularly on their tasks and missions. To date, little detailed research has been conducted on Russian force structures other than the regular armed forces.[7] In providing a comprehensive study of the entire military and security system in post-Soviet Russia, this chapter fills an important empirical gap. If these institutions were addressed by civil-military relations analysts they tended to be portrayed as a counterbalance to regular Ministry of Defence forces, which were created and maintained as a divide-and-rule strategy to prevent any single force structure, and the Ministry of Defence in particular, from becoming too powerful.[8] The small body of work on the force structures in post-Soviet Russia is likely to be due also to the fact that not much information in this sphere

[4] See, for instance, Isakova,'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia'.
[5] See, for instance, Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221; Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.
[6] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier; Moskos, 'Toward a Postmodern Military'.
[7] A notable exception is the work of Gordon Bennett at the Conflict Studies Research Centre at Sandhurst, the work of Mark Galeotti, whose work on Russia's force structures has been published predominantly in Jane's Intelligence Review, and the Russian analyst Aleksei Mukhin. For details, see list of references.
[8] See, for instance, Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, pp.75 – 111; Shevtsova, 'Russia's Fragmented Armed Forces', p. 126.

is publicly available. The outline of ten Russian force structures below is based predominantly on the analysis of openly available laws and statutes regulating the activities of these institutions. Russian newspaper coverage, particularly published interviews with leading force-structure personnel, served as a further source for information on which the study is based.

The aim of this chapter is three-fold. Firstly, it provides new empirical information about the organisations which produce politicians with a military background. Secondly, the chapter also clarifies the legal basis for these military structures and the degree to which these legal statutes delimit their activities. This knowledge is important with regard to the study of *siloviki* in post-Soviet Russia, because the definition of these personalities is often vague. Thirdly, in analytical terms, the systematic study of military figures and of their institutional backgrounds allows for the drawing of conclusions at the end of the chapter in terms of the extent to which such figures can be perceived and portrayed as a common group.

Legal and official definitions of the Russian military and of its employees.[9]

The Russian military has a triple-structure. The first structural component is three services (*vida*) of the armed forces – the ground forces, the air force and the navy. Secondly, the Russian armed forces incorporate three branches (*roda*) of forces (*voiska*) – the strategic rocket forces, the space forces, and the airborne forces. The third structural element of the Russian armed forces is made up of the forces (*voiska*) not included in the three forms of the armed forces constituting the first structural element.[10] A more detailed clarification of the Russian military system can be found in relevant Russian federal legislation. The laws of particular interest in this respect are the federal law, 'On defence'

[9] A number of the legal acts analysed in this chapter have been translated into English and published in A. G. Arbatov and E. L. Chernikov (eds.), Russian Federation Legal Acts on Civil-Military Relations. Collection of Documents, Moscow: Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Geneva) and Foundation for Political Centrism: 2003. The citations from laws, statutes, and decrees in this chapters are the author's own translations from the Russian versions.

[10] Official website of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. Last accessed: 29 March 2004.

from 1996, and the federal law, 'On military duty and military service', adopted in 1998.[11]

The federal law, 'On defence', distinguishes between the 'Armed Forces' (*Vooruzhennye Sily*), 'other forces' (*drugie voiska*), troop formations (*voinskie formirovaniia*), and 'bodies' (*organy*). The specific constitution of these definitions is explained in article one, beginning at paragraph four:

> 4. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation are created with the purpose of defence.
> 5. The border troops of the Russian Federation, the domestic troops of the Ministry of the interior of the Russian Federation, the railroad troops of the Russian Federation, the forces of the Federal agency of governmental communications and information under the President of the Russian Federation, civil defence troops (hereafter – other forces) are to be used for defence.
> 6. The troop formations for technical engineering and road-construction under the federal bodies of executive power (hereafter – troop formations), the foreign intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, bodies of the federal security service, bodies of the border guard service of the Russian Federation, the federal bodies for government communications and information, the federal body for providing preparation for the mobilisation of bodies of state power of the Russian Federation (hereafter – the bodies), and special formations created during wartime are to be used for the fulfilment of specific tasks in the area of defence.
> 7. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other forces, troop formations and bodies fulfil their tasks in the area of defence in accordance with the Plan for the Deployment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

With direct reference to this typology of the Russian military, the Russian federal law ,'On military duty and military service', defines military service as 'a specific form of federal state service carried out by citizens in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, (…) in other forces, (…) in troop formations, (…) in the bodies, and in special formations created during wartime'.[12] The terms of service of military personnel in all these institutions are defined in the federal law, 'On the status of military personnel'.[13]

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[11] Federal'lnyi zakon, 'Ob oborone'; Federal'nyi zakon 'O voinskoi obiazannosti i voennoi sluzhbe'. For full details of the laws cited in this chapter, see list of references.
[12] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O voinskoi obiazannosti i voennoi sluzhbe'; article two, paragraph one.
[13] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O statuse voennosluzhashchikh'.

Employees in the law-enforcement agencies are not included in the legal definition of the military and of military personnel. Personnel of the law-enforcement agencies are defined as 'employees in the bodies of the procuracy, employees in the bodies of the interior, the customs service, bodies for the control of narcotics and psychotropic substances, institutions and bodies of the penal system (*ugolovno-ispolnitel'naia sistema*), and other bodies dealing with tasks of law-enforcement'.[14] According to the law, 'On the system of state service', three types of state service exist in the Russian Federation: civil service, military service, and law-enforcement service.[15] Within this system, personnel in military service are distinguished by military ranks (*voinskie zvaniia*), whereas other special ranks and classifying titles (*spetsial'nye zvaniia i klassnye chiny*) are conferred on personnel in law-enforcement service.

Individuals leaving active military and law-enforcement state service, and also on retirement, preserve their military rank or other titles conferred on them during their service, and can be deprived of titles and ranks only by court decision.[16] The military system and the system of law-enforcement in post-Soviet Russia are known collectively by the unofficial term *silovye struktury* or *silovye vedomstva*, which in English translation tend to be referred to as the 'power ministries', 'power structures', or 'force structures'.

The Russian legal and official definitions of the military and of military personnel are as follows. In addition to the regular armed forces, or Ministry of Defence troops, the Russian military system includes numerous other organisations. Subsequently, Russian legislation defines personnel employed in either component of the military system, in this wide sense of the word, as military figures (*voennye*). The Russian definition *siloviki* is

[14] Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 'O metodicheskikh rekomendatsiiakh o poriadke realizatsii izbiratel'nykh prav voennosluzhashchikh i sotrudnikov pravookhranitel'nykh organov v period podgotovki i provedeniia vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii chetvertogo sozyva'. The CEC's resolution of the same name, which was adopted before the parliamentary elections in 1999 (N 15/114-3), included the tax police service (dissolved on 11 March 2003) and excluded the FSN (created on 11 March 2003).
[15] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O sisteme gosudarstvennoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii', article two, paragraph one.
[16] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O sisteme gosudarstvennoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii', article thirteen, paragraph three.

an unofficial term.[17] It collectively describes both employees of the military organisations and of the law-enforcement agencies. Another Russian term often used to collectively describe personnel in the military and law-enforcement structures is 'people in epaulets' (*liudi v pogonakh*). Although the institutional status of *siloviki* specifies such figures' affiliation to either a military or law-enforcement agency, official documents and legislation on electoral rights treat personnel of both military and law-enforcement agencies as a common group by ascribing them joint electoral rights and regulations.[18] From this point of view, the definition *siloviki*, referring to both military and law-enforcement personnel, is indirectly laid out in official legislation.

The Russian military and law enforcement agencies

This section considers the individual components of the Russian military system and law enforcement agencies, which together make up the unofficial entity of Russian force structures and their employees, the *siloviki*. The study focuses particularly on the tasks of the military and of the law-enforcement structures.

Due to the fact that the term 'force structures' is an unofficial description, different definitions for the exact make-up of the Russian force structures have been suggested by a number of analysts. Some analysts have given the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Security Council force-structure status, explaining this by the

[17] In 2004 Peter Reddaway defined the term *siloviki* as 'politically motivated individuals who are linked by their common (broadly speaking) former or present profession and its military-style traditions'. Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2. However, *siloviki* are not necessarily politically motivated. The term *siloviki* is traditionally used in Russian jargon to describe employees of the military and law-enforcement agencies. Only with Vladimir Putin's rise to political prominence the term was increasingly used to denote politically motivated individuals with a force-structure background.

[18] Federal'nyi zakon, 'Ob osnovnykh garantiiakh izbiratel'nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article forty-one, paragraph one; Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (adopted periodically before elections); Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vyborakh prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (adopted periodically before elections); Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 'Ob obespechenii izbiratel'nykh prav voennosluzhashchikh, sotrudnikov organov vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, federal'nykh organov nalogovoi politsii i rabotnikov organov prokuratury Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii,'O metodicheskikh rekomendatsiiakh o poriadke realizatsii izbiratel'nykh prav voennosluzhashchikh i sotrudnikov pravookhranitel'nykh organov v period podgotovki i provedeniia vyborov deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii chetvertogo sozyva'. The active electoral rights of military and law-enforcement personnel are discussed in more detail in chapter four.

considerable amount of influence and decision-making power in the area of defence and security wielded by these institutions.[19] This thesis adheres to the following definition of post-Soviet Russian force structures: force structures are ministries and institutions within the federal system of executive power that have under their command uniformed personnel and/or command of their own militarised or armed formations.[20] A similar definition was used by Brian Taylor, who described the Russian force structures as 'Russian government bodies whose personnel carry weapons or wear uniform'.[21] In the Soviet Union, the number of force structures was limited to three entities (the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry [MVD], and the KGB). The amount of force structures in post-Soviet Russia has risen, due to the break-up of the KGB, the MVD, and the Ministry of Defence into numerous separate institutions, and fluctuated up to fourteen entities. As discussed below, entirely new force structures have also been created. In the course of wide-ranging reorganisations of the force structures during Putin's presidency, the number of force structures was again reduced to ten entities at the time of writing.[22] As detailed in the textbox below, four of these entities are ministries, five are federal services, and one is a federal agency.[23]

The main aim of the study below is increase the level of understanding of the backgrounds of 'military politicians', to demonstrate the diversity of their institutional affiliations, and the variety of tasks carried out by *siloviki*. It also sheds light on the tasks

[19] See, for instance, Edwin Bacon, 'The Power Ministries', in Neil Robertson (ed.), Institutions and Political Change in Russia, London: Macmillan, 2000.
[20] See, for instance, Nikolai Petrov, 'Power Ministries and Federal Reform in Russia', PONARS Policy Memo No. 282, October 2002, p. 1; Roustam Kaliyev, 'Can 'Power Ministries' be reformed?', Perspective, 8(1), September-October 2002.
[21] Brian D. Taylor, 'Strong Men, Weak State: Power Ministry Officials and the Federal Districts', PONARS Policy Memo No. 284, October 2002, p. 1.
[22] For good analyses of the creation of Russia's power ministries in the early post-Soviet era, see Gordon Bennett, 'The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation', Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre Document No. C102, March 2000; Dennis Desmond, 'The Restructuring of the Security Services in post-Communist Russia, 1991 – 1994', Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 4(1), Summer 1995, pp. 133 – 153; and chapter three on the power ministries in Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, pp. 75 – 111.
[23] In accordance with the extensive administrative restructuring stipulated by a presidential decree from 9 March 2004 (Ukaz ,'O sisteme i strukture federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti'), the Russian system of executive bodies of state power are strictly divided into ministries (some directly answerable to the president, and others in the sphere of competence of the government as a whole), federal services (some subordinate to specific ministries, and others answerable directly to the president), and federal agencies (some subordinate to specific ministries, and others answerable directly to the president).

and activities of some of Russia's less well-known force structures. The numerical strengths of the respective force structures vary widely according to different sources. The estimates provided below indicate the range of figures that have been quoted by different analysts. As estimated by the Russian military analyst Viktor Litovkin in 2003, more than three million uniformed personnel are serving in the Russian force structures.[24] The components of the Russian defence and security system discussed in this chapter are briefly detailed in the textbox below and then individually assessed in a detailed study.

[24] Viktor Litovkin, 'Vremiia armii: vsiia rossiiskaia rat'', Vremia MN, 21 May 2003.

Textbox 3.1: The Russian Force Structures

Ministerial level

1. Ministry of Defence – MO
In March 2004, two previously separate force structures were added to the MO's sphere of competence by presidential decree. It then incorporated the functions and material basis of the disbanded Federal Railroad Troop Service (FSZhV), and was assigned as the ministry in charge of the renamed Agency for Special Constructions, formerly the Federal Service for Special Constructions (*Spetsstroi*). Estimated numerical strength of armed personnel: 960,600, plus approximately 50,000 railroad troops and 14,000 special construction troops since March 2004.[25]

2. Ministry of Interior – MVD
In accordance with a presidential decree of March 2003, the functions of the disbanded Federal Tax Police Service (FSNP) were incorporated into the MVD. Estimated numerical strength: 649,000 uniformed personnel, including 151,100 – 186,300 military personnel.[26]

3. Ministry for Civil Defence Matters, Emergency Situations and Liquidating the Consequences of Natural Disasters – MChS
Overall establishment strength: 70,000 plus about 300,000 personnel of the State Fire Service (GPS), which was subordinated to MChS in January 2001. Estimated numerical strength of military personnel (civil defence troops): 23,000.[27]

4. Ministry of Justice – *Miniust*
Special forces of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (FSIN) under *Miniust*. This service was created in March 2004 by presidential decree on the basis of the ministry's former Main Department for the Execution of Sentences (GUIN), which had been transferred to *Miniust* from the MVD in 1998. The service's law-enforcement personnel includes about 251,600 uniformed employees.[28]

Federal services answerable to the president

5. Federal Security Service – FSB
According to a presidential decree of March 2003, parts of the functions and material basis of the disbanded Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) and the functions and material basis of the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS)

[25] The Military Balance, 103(1), 2003 – 2004, p. 89 and 95; Nikolai Petrov 'Power Ministries and Federal Reform in Russia', PONARS Policy Memo No. 282, October 2002, p. 1.
[26] Litovkin, 'Vremiia armii: vsiia rossiiskaia rat''.
[27] Mark Galeotti, 'Emergency Presence', Jane's Intelligence Review, January 2002, p. 50; official MChS website (www.mchs.gov.ru).
[28] Nikolai Petrov,'Power Ministries and Federal Reform in Russia', PONARS Policy Memo No. 282, October 2002, p. 1; Litovkin, 'Vremiia armii: vsiia rossiiskaia rat''.

were incorporated into the FSB. Estimated numerical strength: 66,200 'people with epaulets', including 4000 armed special forces (*spetsnaz*), plus an estimated 140,000 – 200,000 border guard troops since March 2003.[29]

6. Foreign Intelligence Service – SVR

According to a presidential decree of March 2003, parts of the functions and material basis of the disbanded Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) were incorporated into the SVR, a federal service. Estimated establishment strength: 10,000 – 15,000, including about 300 – 500 armed special forces (*spetsnaz*).[30]

7. Federal Guards Service - FSO

According to a presidential decree of March 2003, parts of the functions and material basis of the disbanded Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information (FAPSI) were incorporated into the FSO, and a new Service for Special Communications and Information (SSSI) was created within the FSO. Estimated establishment strength: 10,000 – 30,000, including about 3000 military personnel in presidential guards regiment. The majority of the personnel strength of FAPSI, which was estimated to number between 38,000 and 55,000 personnel, was reported to have been transferred to the FSO.[31]

8. Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade and Trade with Psychotropic Substances – FSN

This service was created in accordance with a presidential decree of March 2003. It was founded on the material basis of the Federal Tax Police Service (FSNP), which was disbanded in the same month. Estimated establishment strength: 40,000, including 20,000 operatives engaging in active law-enforcement.[32]

9. State Courier Service – GFS

The GFS as a federal service was created by presidential decree in September 1997. The organisation was first created in November 1991 on the basis of the Courier Service of the Soviet Ministry of Communications and existed as the Directorate for Courier Communications/State Courier Service under the auspices of the Russian Federal

[29] Litovkin, 'Vremiia armii: vsiia rossiiskaia rat''; Petrov 'Power Ministries and Federal Reform in Russia', p. 1; The Military Balance, 103(1), 2003 – 2004, p. 89.

[30] Gordon Bennett, 'The SVR: Russia's Intelligence Service', Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre Document No. 103, March 2000, p. 15; Aleksei Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii i "bol'shaia" politika, Moscow: SPIK-Tsentr, p. 65; Vadim Saranov, 'Critical Mass: There are too many Armed Formations in Russia', Versiia, 11 – 17 December 2001 [via WPS-Monitoring Agency].

[31] The Military Balance, 103(1), 2003 – 2004, p. 89; Petrov 'Power Ministries and Federal Reform in Russia', p. 1; Aleksandr Khinshtein, 'FAPSI razdelili na troikh', Moskovskii komsomolets, 31 March 2003.

[32] Ukaz, 'Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv', paragraph 3; 'Viktor Cherkesov, glava Sluzhby po kontroliiu za oborotom narkoticheskich sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv: Professional'naia ustanovka chekistov – ne presechenie, a preduprezhdenie', Izvestiia, 25 March 2004.

Ministry of Communications from September 1992 – September 1997.[33] Estimated numerical strength: 4576, including about 3500 'people in epaulets'.[34]

Federal agencies answerable to the President

10. Main Directorate for Special Programmes under the President – GUSP
This organisation received federal agency status in March 2004. Previously it was known as the Main Department for Special Programmes of the President. Estimated numerical strength: between 8,000 and 20,000.[35]

[33] Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii, pp. 58-59.
[34] Ukaz, 'O gosudarstvennoi fel'd''egerskoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; Konstantin Volkov,'Lichno v ruki: VIP-kur'ery', Itogi, 24 December 2002.
[35] Petrov, 'Power Ministries and Federal Reform in Russia', p. 1; Vladimir Urban, 'Mertvye Shtyki', Novye izvestiia, 16 January 2003; Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii, p. 57.

The Ministry of Defence (MO)[36]

Although the Russian MO is included in this chapter in a list of ten force structures, it is important to note that, having under command over a million military personnel, this ministry is the largest and arguably most important of the Russian force structures. Yet, because of the specific purpose of this chapter, the discussion of the MO here is relatively brief. The functions and tasks carried out by the Russian MO and by the military forces it oversees correspond largely to the 'traditional' understanding of the purpose of a military. This is the fighting of wars and the armed defence of the country from external threats. As discussed in chapter one, it is this type of military concept to which Huntington's notion of the universal military ethic referred.[37] The exploratory study of ten force structures in this chapter studies the precise institutional backgrounds of *siloviki* in order to evaluate the extent to which it can be assumed that politicians with a military background in the widest sense can be perceived to be of a 'common military frame of mind'. The tasks and missions of Russia's lesser known force structures are therefore of principal interest.

In accordance with the statute, 'On the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation', the ministry's primary function is to provide for 'the development and adoption of measures in preparation for the defence of the Russian Federation and the integrity and inviolability of its territory', and 'to prevent and repel aggression directed against the Russian Federation'.[38] The MO is in charge of the regular military services – the Ground Forces, Air Force, and Navy, as well as of three additional branches of arms. These are the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Space Forces, and the Airborne Forces. Additionally, in March 2004, the Federal Railroad Troops Service (FSZhV) and the Special Constructions Service (*Spetsstroi*),[39] both of which had been a part of the MO during Soviet times, were re-subordinated to the ministry in the course of a wider process of streamlining the system of executive power in March 2004. Whilst the railroad troops

[36] Official website: www.mil.ru
[37] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 79.
[38] Polozhenie, 'O Ministerstve oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 6.
[39] *Spetsstroi* has its own website at www.spetsstroy.ru. Last accessed: 10 June 2004.

were reintegrated into the ground forces, *Spetsstroi* was given the status of a federal agency under the jurisdiction of the MO.

Although Russia's other force structures do not have official and permanent representatives in the MO, the defence ministry has a certain oversight function with regard to the country's overall system of defence. Being the federal executive body in charge of the implementation of state policy and state authority in the area of defence,[40] the MO has a limited coordinating role over the functioning and cooperation of all components of the Russian military system.[41] For example, the MO is in charge of Russia's unified system of conscripting citizens into military service. It also organises the distribution of conscripts to other force structures with a military component.[42] In March 2003, a State Committee for Defence Orders was created under the jurisdiction of the MO (it was reorganised and renamed Federal Service for Defence Orders (FSOZ) in March 2004). The purpose of this service is to implement a 'unified state policy in the sphere of developing, producing, unifying and standardising arms and military technology'. The FSOZ is also in charge of developing, producing, and supplying weapons and military technology for both MO troops and for other force structures with a military component.[43]

The concentration of control over the armed forces is predominantly in the hands of the Russian president – a system of 'presidential' or 'executive control', rather than 'civilian control' in a more inclusive sense – has been singled out as a problematic aspect of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia by a number of analysts.[44] In accordance with the Russian Constitution, the president of the Russian Federation is the supreme

[40] Polozhenie, 'O Ministerstve oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 1. The MO also participates in the formulation of Russia's military policy and military doctrine: article 7.
[41] This will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.
[42] This function is carried out via Military Commissariats, which are the territorial organs of the MO in the Russian Federation subjects. See Polozhenie 'O voennykh komissariatakh'.
[43] Ukaz, 'O Gosudarstvennom Komitete Rossiiskoi Federatsii po oboronnomu zakazu pri Ministerstve oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 2.
[44] See, for instance, Robert Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics 1991-1996', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10(3), September 1997, p. 100 Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, pp. 70-107; Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?'; Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', pp. 216-220.

commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces.[45] Furthermore, he 'supervises all activities of the Ministry of Defence', and appoints and dismisses the minister of defence.[46]

The parliament's right to influence military affairs is limited. Its powers in this sphere are the approval and examination of the defence budget (State Duma and Federation Council), and the approval of presidential decrees ordering the deployment of Russian troops abroad, and introducing martial law or a state of emergency within the territory of the Russian Federation (Federation Council).[47] The appointment of a civilian minister of defence has been considered an essential factor for improving the system of civilian control over the Russian military.[48] Whilst being standard practice in many Western states, Russia does not have a tradition of civilian ministers of defence.[49] The Russian minister of defence appointed in March 2001, Sergei Ivanov, is post-Soviet Russia's first civilian defence minister. Coming from an intelligence services background, however, he conceded in an interview that the term 'civilian minister of defence' applies to him only in a limited fashion:

> [I am both a bureaucrat and a politician]. They call me a 'civilian minister', but I really am a hybrid. I never served in the armed forces, but underwent special *spetsnaz* training. Still, I am approaching the armed forces from the point of view of a politician. I understand what type of armed forces we need. At the same time I am a retired general – lieutenant-general. Notions such as military discipline and carrying out orders are not news to me. I have not been wearing epaulets for the majority of my life, but I was a person of a military organisation of the state. Therefore it is difficult in my case to make the clear distinction – black or white, politician or bureaucrat. In this sense I am probably grey.[50]

[45] Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii; article 87, paragraph 1.
[46] Polozhenie, 'O Ministerstve oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 3 and 8.
[47] Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii; article 102 and 103. Federal'lnyi Zakon, 'Ob oborone'; article 5.
[48] See, for instance, Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?', p. 482.
[49] Coming from a career background in the MIC, Dmitrii Ustinov, the Soviet minister of defence from 1976 until 1984 was the only civilian figure to ever head the Soviet ministry of defence. During his tenure as defence minister, however, he was given the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, despite his absence of military experience.
[50] 'Agent natsional'noi bezopasnosti', Moskovskii komsomol'ets, 27 October 2003.

The Interior Ministry (MVD)[51]

The post-Soviet Russian MVD is the institutional successor of the Soviet MVD, which existed as a separate force structure alongside the MO and KGB. In December 1991 El'tsin established the Russian Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs, merging the MVD and the KGB. However, the Russian Constitutional Court found this edict illegal and the MVD was reinstated as a separate institution a month later.[52] The post-Soviet MVD can be described as a hybrid of law-enforcement agency and military organisation. Its law-enforcement element is tasked with the fighting of small- and large-scale crime and other 'traditional' police assignments.[53] It also includes a militarised element, the internal (or domestic) troops (*vnutrennye voiska*), whose principal mission is the containment of violent disorder on the territory of the Russian Federation. Having been a part of the MO forces for most of the Soviet era, the internal troops were subordinated to the MVD only in 1989.

Service in the police elements of the MVD is considered law-enforcement service in accordance with the federal law, 'On state service', discussed above. The Russian federal law, 'On the police', decrees that MVD law-enforcement personnel are distinguished by special ranks and titles, ranging from private of the police (*riadovoi militsii*) to lieutenant-general of the police (*general-polkovnik militsii*).[54] In contrast, the MVD's internal troops are described by the federal law, 'On defence', as a part of the Russian military system. Subsequently, service in the MVD's internal troops is considered military service in accordance with the laws, 'On military service' and 'On the status of military personnel', which also apply to personnel of the regular armed forces. The special ranks and titles conferred on service personnel of the domestic troops

[51] Official website: www.mvdinform.ru

[52] For a good outline of the MVD's late and post-Soviet developments see Gordon Bennett, 'The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation', Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre Document No C106, October 2000. For a detailed account of the attempts to restructure the MVD up until 1998 see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Restructuring and Reform in Russia's MVD: Good Idea, Bad Timing?', Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 7(2), autumn 1998, pp. 96-106.

[53] The MVD has at its disposal several special assignment units, such as the riot police OMON and the rapid response unit SOBR. For details see Mark Galeotti, 'Policing Russia: Problems and Prospects in Turbulent Times', Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No 15, September 1997.

[54] Zakon, 'O militsii'; article 17.

are listed in the statute, 'On service in the bodies of the interior of the Russian Federation.'[55]

The array of tasks fulfilled by the MVD's numerous departments is probably the most wide-ranging of all the force structures discussed in this chapter. According to the ministry's statute, which was signed by the president in 1996, the ministry's overall purpose is defined as follows: 'The Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation…is the federal body of executive power in charge of implementing, within its area of competence, state policies in the sphere of protecting human rights and freedoms, preserving order, and providing societal security.'[56] The MVD is tasked with the following functions: combating street crime, large-scale organised crime on a national and international level (the Russian Interpol bureau is located in the MVD's central apparatus),[57] and tax fraud. Furthermore, the MVD is responsible for road traffic safety, vehicle registration and the issuing of driving licenses, passports, visas, and registrations of residence. In October 2001 the MVD was put in charge of the Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS), which deals with all issues related to refugees and migration.[58]

According to the federal law, 'On the domestic troops of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation', the tasks of the domestic troops are as follows: firstly, the interior troops are tasked with the support of the other organs of internal affairs (that is, the police) in the maintenance of public order and in the insurance of public security. Secondly, the domestic troops are tasked with guarding important state facilities and special cargoes, participating in the defence of Russian territory, and providing support to the border guard troops.[59] In recent years, the activities of the domestic troops have been

[55] Polozhenie, 'O sluzhbe v organakh vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[56] Polozhenie, 'O Ministerstve vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 1.
[57] Since 2003, the fighting against large-scale drug-related crime is organised by the FSN. See below.
[58] From 1992 – 2000 the FMS existed as a separate institution. In 2000 it was incorporated into the newly set-up Ministry for Federation Affairs, Nationality and Migration Policy. This ministry was dissolved in October 2001, when the FMS was transferred to the jurisdiction of the MVD. When the new system of executive power was revealed in March 2004, the position of the FMS as a federal service under the jurisdiction of the MVD was confirmed. For a detailed outline of the MVD's structure see www.mvdinform.ru, 'struktura'.
[59] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vnutrennykh voiskakh Ministerstva vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii"; article 2.

visible mainly during the course of their participation in the Chechen conflicts. Gordon Bennett argued that, although the efficiency and conduct of the interior troops in Chechnya has often been criticised, such troops should not be compared to military forces in the conventional sense of the word. He wrote:

> made to look like a small army, the MVD is not able to fight a war… The multitude of MVD bodies set up to maintain public order, combat large, well-organised and equipped criminal groups and to contain occasional violent demonstrations are not trained, equipped or co-ordinated for low-intensity conflicts.[60]

The MVD as a federal ministry is answerable directly to the president. The interior minister and his deputies are appointed and dismissed by the president. No provisions exist for the necessity of a civilian minister. Historically, the MVD is headed by a minister with experience in the Interior bodies or in another force structure. An exception to this rule was the interior minister from March 2001 until December 2003, the pro-Kremlin politician and member of *Edinaia Rossiia*, Boris Gryzlov.

Control over the activities of the law-enforcement bodies of the MVD is laid out in the law, 'On the police'. Control functions over the MVD are exerted firstly by the president, but also by the federal assembly, the government, and the executive and legislative bodies of the federation subjects within their respective areas of competence. The control functions assigned to each of these institutions are vaguely defined. The law clearly declares, however, that control functions do not include the right to interfere in the police's procedural and investigative activities, or in investigations of administrative violations of the law. The general procurator oversees the legality of the police's activities.[61] Control functions over the activities of the domestic troops of the MVD are concentrated in the hands of the president and the government 'within their respective areas of competence'. The general prosecutor oversees the legality of the activities of the domestic troops.[62]

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[60] Bennett, 'The Ministry of Internal Affairs', p. 15.
[61] Zakon, 'O militsii'; articles 37 and 38.
[62] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vnutrennykh voiskakh Ministerstva vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; articles 52 and 53.

The Ministry for Civil Defence Matters, Emergency Situations and Liquidating the Consequences of Natural Disasters (MChS)[63]

The MChS was created as a federal ministry in January 1994 on the basis of the Russian civil defence apparatus. From 1971 until the end of the Soviet era, the civil defence troops were under the auspices of the MO. In 1991 these troops were split from the ministry and established as a separate institution. The MChS's fundamental tasks are to organise and provide civil defence, to protect Russian territory and its population from natural and technological disasters, and to provide a fire-fighting service.[64] Russian law defines civil defence as 'activities aimed at the preparation and provision of the defence of the population and of cultural and material commodities located on the territory of the Russian Federation from military threats and from the consequences of military activities.'[65]

It has been noted that since its establishment as a separate institution in 1994, the ministry has increasingly acquired the features of a military organisation.[66] On a superficial level, for instance, it is apparent in the photographic evidence provided on the MChS's official website that the wearing of camouflage by its military personnel is favoured over the traditional blue uniforms.[67] The MChS's military personnel serve in its 23,000 strong civil defence troops and also in special sub-units of the State Fire Service (GPS), which was subordinated to the MChS by presidential decree in 2001. The terms of military personnel serving in the latter institution are regulated in accordance with the legislation on military personnel serving in the domestic troops.[68]

It is clear from the ministry's statute that the basic functions of the MChS clearly focus on tasks in the sphere of security and defence. Constituting a component part of the

[63] Official website: www.mchs.gov.ru
[64] Ukaz, 'Voprosy Ministerstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delam grazhdanskoi oborony, chrezvychainym situatsiiam, i likvidatsii stikhiinykh bedstvii'.
[65] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O grazhdanskoi oborone'; article 1.
[66] Mark Galeotti, 'Emergency Presence', p. 50
[67] www.mchs.gov.ru.

Russian military system, the ministry's areas of competence in the sphere of defence and the scope of its cooperation with MO troops and with other force structures is extensive. These areas of competence focus primarily on the organisation and coordination of Russian military forces for the purpose of civil defence in times of war and during manmade and natural disasters.[69] In addition to the military elements of the MChS's activities, however, the ministry's tasks are extremely wide ranging. As mentioned above, the GPS is a substantial subunit of the MChS, providing a federal network of fire services throughout the Russian Federation. The MChS's rescue forces are charged with responding to the federal emergency telephone service that can be dialled nationwide under the number '01', similar to '999' or '911' calls in the United Kingdom or the U.S.[70]

The provision of humanitarian help in emergency situations on an international scale is another area where the MChS is actively involved. In 2003, the ministry provided aviation equipment and personnel to France in support of the French authorities' efforts to extinguish devastating forest fires in the southern area of the country. In 2002, MChS specialists supported the German authorities in dealing with the effects of massive floods on the territory of the former GDR. In the aftermath of the NATO coalition war in Afghanistan in 2001, a MChS deployment erected a mobile field hospital in Kabul. Furthermore, the MChS has played an important role in providing help for Chechen refugees. The aid it provided to Chechnya ranged from the building of refugee camps to the provision of water, food, medicines, and the removal of landmines.[71]

The MChS's overall mission is to provide aid and organise rescues. Due to this 'positive' emphasis, its activities have been widely evaluated as 'laudable and uncontroversial'.[72] This is also reflected in attitudes towards the ministry amongst the Russian public. In public opinion polls, the MChS has periodically been voted by far the

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[68] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O pozharnoi bezopasnosti'; article 7.
[69] Ukaz, 'Voprosy Ministerstvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii po delam grazhdanskoi oborony, chrezvychainym situatsiiam, i likvidatsii stikhiinykh bedstvii'; articles 7 – 12.
[70] According to the MChS's website, the '01' emergency service was instituted in 2003 and will be operational nationwide by the end of 2004.
[71] Details of the MChS missions abroad are available on the website.
[72] Mark Galeotti, 'Emergency Presence', p. 50.

most trusted Russian force structure and the most efficient Russian ministry.[73] The MChS can be described as a hybrid organisation. On the one hand it is a military organisation with the corresponding training, arms, vehicles and aviation at its disposal. On the other hand, it fulfils missions of an entirely humanitarian character and its military training and equipment are utilised only for the purpose of self defence and in a non-combat oriented manner.[74]

In the West, where hybrid militarised humanitarian organisations are an unusual concept, the deployment of the MChS troops to war-torn areas has sometimes provoked suspicion and has at times been interpreted as a 'cover' for Russian military or intelligence agents entering a war zone under false pretences.[75] The Russian civil-military relations expert, Ekaterina Stepanova, has argued, however, that 'intermediate' force structures, such as the Russian MChS, could serve as a model for foreign states and for international organisations. In her opinion, such structures could help to avoid the over-militarisation of humanitarian aid provided by regular armed forces not accustomed to this role. They could also diminish the potential for civil-military conflict between humanitarian organisations and the military in situations when the former are reliant on protection and support of the latter in carrying out work in dangerous areas.[76]

Control mechanisms over the MChS's militarised elements are vaguely defined. In March 2004, its status as a federal ministry subordinated directly to the president of the Russian Federation was confirmed. As the commander-in-chief of all Russian forces, the president is at the helm also of the civil defence troops. The minister in charge of the MChS is appointed and dismissed by the president. There are no legal provisions determining the background of the emergency minister (that is, whether he ought to be a

[73] For instance, in 2001, more than 54 % of respondents expressed their full trust in the MChS, whilst only 17 % and 12.9 % fully trusted the FSB and MVD respectively (Natal'ia Shcherbanenko, 'Esli vy slishkom komy-to doveriaete…', Profil', 9 April 2001). In 2002, 37 % of respondents perceived the MChS as the most effective ministry. The closest runner-up was the MID with 8 % ('Most Russians think Shoigu is the best minister', Interfax, 2 August 2002).
[74] Laura Hooper, 'The Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations', unpublished paper presented to the 4th Baltic Peace Research Conference, St. Petersburg, Russia, 11-13 September 2003.
[75] Michael Steen, 'A Hospital? An Embassy? Russian Camp Mystifies Kabul', Reuters, 21 November 2001; Peter Baker, 'Russians Back in Kabul, to Surprise of Many', The Washington Post, 28 November 2001.
[76] Stepanova, Voenno-grazhdanskie otnosheniia, pp. 210- 218.

military professional or civilian). Since its creation in 1994, Sergei Shoigu has been the minister in charge of the MChS. He is the most well-known Russian politician with a background in this force ministry. Having trained as an engineer and also acted as a KPSS official, Shoigu was appointed chairman of the Russian Rescue Corps in 1991, and chairman of the State Committee for Emergency Situations later that year. Shoigu has not undergone professional military training. The title of Army General was conferred on him in May 2003 to honour his services as the minister in charge of the MChS.

The Ministry of Justice (Miniust)[77]

Miniust is one of the less obvious force structures of contemporary Russia. It is addressed in this chapter because it is the ministry in charge of the federal service dealing with the administration of Russia's penal system, the FSIN. This service is in charge not only of a large number of uniformed prison service personnel, but also of militarised special assignment units, which are subordinated to its regional branches. *Miniust* was placed in charge of the GUIN (transformed into the FSIN in March 2004) by presidential decree only in December 1998. Previously, this organ was under the jurisdiction of the MVD. The transferral was undertaken in response to a request by the Council of Europe (COE), which had made this first step towards Russia's conformation with European prison rules,[78] a condition for Russia's membership in the COE, which commenced in 1998.[79]

Whilst the early prison services of many countries were based on a military model, the majority of Western European states, in opposition to the Soviet Union and other European communist states transferred their prison services from the interior ministry to the justice ministry after the Second World War.[80] This was done in order to both delineate the functions of prison administration from the police and secret services

[77] Official website: www.minjust.ru. The FSIN predecessor GUIN has its own website at www.guin-uis.ru. Last accessed: 8 June 2004.
[78] Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, Recommendation, No. R (87)3, of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the European Prison Rules.
[79] Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 'Honouring of obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation', Information Report No. 8127.
[80] '"Demilitarisation" in Prison Services in Central and Eastern Europe: A Position Paper', International Centre for Prison Studies, Kings College, London, March 2003. Downloadable from www.prisonstudies.org. (Last accessed: 8 June 2004).

and to bring them closer to the authority of the courts. The 'demilitarisation' of the Russian prison service initiated by its transferral to the interior ministry has been seen by international organisations as the key component of prison reform in Russia and in other former communist states in Europe.[81]

Miniust has been included in this chapter because, despite the transferral of the penal system from the MVD, the prison administration in contemporary Russia cannot be considered completely 'demilitarised'. As asserted by the International Centre for Prison Studies based at King's College in London, the institutional transfer of a penal system and its 'demilitarisation' are two separate processes. In a position paper on prison reform in Eastern Europe it wrote that 'transfers between Ministries have generally occurred with little or no change in the military structure, hierarchy, ethos and attitudes at various levels in the system'.[82] This assertion appears to apply also to the situation in post-Soviet Russia. The FSIN's activities are regulated by the law, 'On institutions and bodies implementing prison sentences'.[83] Crucially, however, FSIN personnel continue to be bound by MVD regulations, and in particular by the statute 'On service in the bodies of the interior of the Russian Federation'.[84] This statute was confirmed as applicable to the FSIN's predecessor, the GUIN, in 2002 by a *Miniust* order.[85]

It is explicit from the content of this order that the FSIN continues to be a militarised law-enforcement agency, at least in appearance. FSIN personnel are uniformed and distinguished by special ranks and titles, ranging from private of justice (*riadovoi iustitsii*) to lieutenant-general of justice (*general-polkovnik iustitsii*).[86] Furthermore, the FSIN commands militarised special assignment units. Details of these units are not laid out in the publicly available legal documentation. However, some

[81] ibid.
[82] ibid.
[83] Zakon, 'Ob uchrezhdeniiakh i organakh, izpolniaiushchikh ugolovnye nakazaniia v vide lisheniia svobody'.
[84] Polozhenie, 'O sluzhbe v organakh vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[85] Prikaz Ministerstva Iustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 'Ob utverzhdenii instruktsii o poriadke primeneniia polozheniia o sluzhbe v organakh vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii v uchrezhdeniiakh i organakh ugolovno-ispolnitel'noi sistemy Ministerstvo iustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[86] Polozhenie, 'O sluzhbe v organakh vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 1 and 6.

insight into their activities can be gained from the official website of the FSIN's institutional predecessor, the GUIN. On this website, *Miniust* published the pictures and biographies of several officers of the GUIN *spetsnaz* groups who in 2000 were decorated, many of them posthumously, with the highest Russian state order, 'Hero of Russia', for their services during the second Chechen conflict.[87] According to the website, the *Miniust* GUIN officers participated in the expulsion of terrorists from Dagestan, liberated villages in Dagestan and Chechnya from bandits, prevented the fighters' attempts to move between Chechen and Georgian territory, and cooperated with MO and MVD troops in the liberation of populated areas and the organisation of passport control points.

Control mechanisms over the bodies of the Russian penal system under *Miniust* are laid out in the law, 'On institutions and bodies implementing prison sentences'.[88] The immediate control over the functioning of prisons is carried out by *Miniust* and the central and regional bodies of the Russian penal system. Bodies of executive power in the federation subjects and regions, as well as public organisations, are fulfilling a limited control function over the prisons on their territory. The law further lists a number of individuals and organisations entitled to carry out inspections of Russian prisons without special permission. These are the president, the prime minister, the Russian ombudsman for human rights, representatives of international organisations dealing with human rights, members and deputies of the Federal Assembly and of regional parliaments, heads of regional executives, the Prosecutor General and his representatives in charge of observing the legality of the prison system.

The Federal Security Service (FSB)[89]

Although the FSB is only one of four contemporary Russian force structures that emerged from the Soviet KGB (along with the SVR, FSO and GUSP), this organ can be correctly described as the institutional successor of the Soviet KGB. After several rounds of reorganisation throughout the post-Soviet period, the contemporary FSB is in charge of

[87] www.guin-uis.ru. 'Fotogalereia' – 'Geroi Rossii'. Last accessed: 9 June 2004.
[88] Zakon, 'Ob uchrezhdeniiakh i organakh, izpolniaiushchikh ugolovnye nakazaniia v vide lisheniia svobody'; article 38.
[89] Official website: www.fsb.ru

many of the functions carried out by its predecessor during the Soviet era. Having been a part of the short-lived Russian Security Ministry from January 1992 until December 1993, it was briefly remodelled as the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) and created as the FSB by a federal law in April 1995.[90] A new statute for the FSB was adopted by presidential decree in August 2003, in order to account for the reintegration of Federal Border Guards Service (FPS) into the FSB, which had been decreed in March of the same year.[91] According to the FSB's new regulations, the fundamental rationale of its activities is the following:

> The Federal security service of the Russian Federation is the body of executive power realising, within its area of competence, state administration in the sphere of providing the security of the Russian Federation, protecting and preserving its state borders, protecting internal sea bodies and the territorial sea with the exception of economic zones, protecting the continental shelf of the Russian Federation and its natural resources, and insuring the information security of the Russian Federation. It is also immediately responsible for supervising the activities of the bodies of the federal security service as determined by Russian law, and coordinates the counterintelligence activities of the relevant bodies of executive power.[92]

According to the law, 'On the bodies of the federal security service in the Russian Federation', the FSB employs both civilians and military personnel and has the right to develop, produce, procure and use weapons and other military equipment.[93] The number of military personnel in the FSB's ranks has multiplied with the integration of the functions and assets of the disbanded FPS into the service in March 2003. The FSB's most publicly visible elements are its special military units (*spetznaz*), Alfa and *Vympel*, which were subordinated to the service's anti-terrorism centre in August 1995. These

[90] For a detailed outline of the early post-Soviet era developmental process of the security service see Bennett, The Federal Security Service. The law is Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob organakh federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[91] Polozhenie, 'O Federal'noi sluzhbe bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii'. The FSP under the FSB has its own website at www.fps.ru.
[92] Polozhenie, 'O Federal'noi sluzhbe bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 1. The new statute replaced an older set of regulations of the same name adopted on 6 July 1998 (No 806). In addition to including changes referring to the newly incorporated border troops, the reference to information security was not included in article 1 of the old version. The new statute furthermore gives a less detailed account of the FSB's structure. Whilst the old statute provided a list of the service's departments and directorates, the new statute does not, and only outlines the basic features of its structure.

units were fighting in the Chechen conflicts and also carried out the storming of the theatre in Moscow in October 2002, and the school in Beslan in September 2004.[94]

The FSB's responsibilities are manifold and its basic tasks include the following:

- Informing the president and the head of government about threats to the Russian Federation.
- Investigating and preventing intelligence work and other activities posing a threat to the security of the Russian Federation by foreign intelligence services or other organisations, or by individuals.
- Coordinating activities in the sphere of counterintelligence and personal security carried out by the bodies of executive power.
- In cooperation with other bodies of state power, the FSB is dealing with organised crime, corruption, contraband, money laundering, illegal migration, illegal trade with weapons, drugs, and 'special technical means intended for the acquisition of secret information'. The FSB is tasked with counteracting extremist activities conducted by illegal armed formations, criminal groups, individuals, and public organisations intending to stage an armed revolt, a violent change of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, or a violent attack on the authorities (*vlasti*).
- Fighting terrorism and sabotage.
- Engaging in intelligence activities in cooperation with the SVR.
- Protecting and preserving the state border of the Russian Federation.
- Within its area of competence, developing and realising state policies and scientific-technical policies in the sphere of information security.
- Within its area of competence, ensuring the cryptographic and technological security of telecommunications systems and of encrypted and secret special-communications systems in the Russian Federation and in its establishments abroad.[95]

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[93] Federal'nyi zakon, 'Ob organakh federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; articles 16 and 21.

[94] Responsibility for upholding security in the Chechen republic was handed from the MO to the FSB in January 2001 and was transferred again to the MVD in July 2003. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

The FSB is directly answerable to the president. The president also approves the FSB's statute and its structure by decree, and appoints and dismisses its director.[96] Further control mechanisms are vaguely defined. The federal law, 'On the bodies of the federal security service of the Russian Federation' includes a chapter on control and oversight over the activities of the FSB. This chapter lists the president in the first instance as being in charge, and further mentions the control exerted by the Federal Assembly, the government and the judiciary, 'in accordance with the rules laid out in Russian law'. The procurator general observes the legality of the FSB's actions, but is not entitled to receive information about the organisation, tactics, methods and means employed by the service, or about individuals cooperating with the FSB on a confidential basis.[97]

The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)[98]

The SVR is another successor organisation of the Soviet KGB. It was created in December 1991 on the basis of the KGB's first main directorate, which ran foreign intelligence. The SVR is the post-Soviet Russian intelligence service fulfilling functions similar to that of its foreign counterparts, the U.S. CIA, the British MI6, or the German BND. The law, 'On foreign intelligence', which was adopted in January 1996, is the only publicly accessible legal document on the SVR. Presidential decrees and statutes discussed in this chapter with regard to other force structures are not openly accessible in the case of the SVR.

The law, 'On foreign intelligence', defines the SVR as 'a component part of the forces providing security of the Russian Federation, which are tasked with protecting the security of the individual, of society, and of the state from external threats'.[99] Service in

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Newsline, 17 June 2003. See also, Martin Malek, 'Der Föderale Sicherheitsdienst Russlands', Europäische Sicherheit, April 2003.

[95] Polozhenie, 'O Federal'noi sluzhbe bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 8.

[96] Polozhenie, 'O Federal'noi sluzhbe bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; articles 3 and 10.

[97] Federal'nyi zakon 'Ob organakh federal'noi sluzhby bezopasnosti v Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; chapter V (articles 23 and 24).

[98] Official website: www.svr.government.ru

[99] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vneshnei razvedke'; article 1.

the SVR is considered military service. Its personnel's terms of service are laid out in the laws, 'On military service' and 'On the status of military personnel', which also apply to personnel of the regular armed forces. Although SVR agents are legally military personnel, their missions differ considerably from what one would associate with military tasks. The emphasis of training for SVR personnel is on the acquisition of political and technical knowledge, language study and analytical skills.[100] According to the SVR's director, Sergei Lebedev, 'Being an intelligence agent means using your head. It means ability. And first of all, the ability to think.'[101]

According to the law, 'On foreign intelligence', the SVR carries out intelligence work with the following aims:

- To provide the president, the government and the Federal Assembly with intelligence information necessary for the taking of decisions in the political, economic, military-strategic, scientific and technical, and ecological spheres.
- To ensure the conditions necessary for the successful implementation of the Russian Federation's policies in the sphere of security.
- To assist economic development, the country's scientific and technical progress, and the technical provisions necessary for the military security of the Russian Federation.[102]

The SVR's directorates and departments are divided into three main groups: operational departments (internal security, technical intelligence, economic intelligence, et cetera), analytical departments in charge of eight geographical regions covering the globe, and support departments (foreign liaison, technical support, liaison with other force structures, administration, finance, et cetera).[103] Whilst the struggle against foreign intelligence services continues to be the major aspect of the SVR's activities, in recent years the importance of co-operation with foreign counterparts in specific areas has increasingly been acknowledged. According to Lebedev, 'in recent years our partners in

[100] Gordon Bennett, 'The SVR: Russia's Intelligence Service', Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre Document No. C103, March 2000, p. 17.
[101] 'Sergei Lebedev, nachal'nik Sluzhby venshnei razvedki Rossii: S Putinym ia ne byl znakom', Izvestiia, 20 December 2000.
[102] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vneshnei razvedke'; article 5.
[103] www.svr.government.ru, 'struktura'; Bennett, 'The SVR', p. 18-19.

the West have come to accept that whilst we continue to carry out intelligence work against each other, we are developing our cooperation in specific spheres of common interest at the same time. These are the fight against international terrorism, organised crime, the drug business, the spreading of nuclear weapons, et cetera.'[104]

Control mechanisms over the SVR's activities are addressed in the law, 'On foreign intelligence'. The overall leadership of the SVR is in the hands of the president, who determines and controls the service's organisation and operational activities. The president also appoints and dismisses the SVR's leadership, and is in control of co-ordinating its intelligence work with the intelligence departments of the MO and those of other force structures.[105] The law's article outlining control mechanisms over the SVR stresses the role of parliamentary control. Parliamentary control, however, is limited to the monitoring of the SVR's finances via the budgetary process and through the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation. Questions of organisation and operational issues of the SVR are not within the parliament's sphere of competence. Members and deputies of the Russian Federal Assembly have the right to receive information concerning the SVR's financial matters through reports delivered by the parliamentary security committees. Members of these committees have the right to put questions to the SVR leadership.[106] No provisions exist laying down the need for a civilian head of the SVR.

The Federal Guard Service (FSO)

The FSO is another successor organisation of the Soviet KGB. It was established on the basis of the former ninth KGB directorate, which was responsible for the protection of government officials. The FSO's major task is the protection of the president and of other high-ranking officials of the Russian Federation, but also the protection of buildings and other strategically important objects. The FSO is one of the lesser known force structures in contemporary Russia. At the time of writing, for example, the FSO and GUSP were the only institutions covered in this chapter without an official website. The first of only a

[104] 'Sergei Lebedev, nachal'nik Sluzhby venshnei razvedki Rossii: S Putinym ia ne byl znakom', Izvestiia, 20 December 2000.
[105] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vneshnei razvedke'; article 12. FAPSI and FPS, both of which were dissolved in March 2003, also were in charge of their own intelligence departments.

handful of official interviews with the director of the FSO was published by Komsomol'skaia pravda as late as August 2000. In this interview, the service's director, Major-General Evgenii Murov, justified the secrecy of the service's work in the following words: 'The less people know about our work, the safer it is for the president and for the other individuals we protect.'[107]

The post-Soviet era FSO was first founded as the Main Directorate for Protection (GUO) in 1992. The Soviet assets it inherited were the 27th Motor Rifle Special Purpose Brigade, the Presidential/Kremlin Regiment, the 119th Air Assault Regiment, and the former KGB special units *Alfa* and *Vympel*. These latter units were transferred to the FSB in 1995. The GUO was renamed and restructured into the FSO by presidential decree in April 1996. A separate Presidential Security Service (SBP) existed under President El'tsin from December 1993 until June 1996, when its tasks and material basis were re-integrated into the FSO.[108] The FSO's status as a separate federal service not subordinate to a specific ministry, but answerable directly to the president, was confirmed when the new system of executive state power was revealed in March 2004.

According to the Russian federal law, 'On the Guarding of the State', and to the statute, 'On the Federal Guard Service', the federal bodies in charge of guarding the state in the form of the FSO are a component part of the forces providing the security of the Russian Federation. The FSO consists of both military and civilian personnel.[109] The terms of service of the FSO's military personnel are covered accordingly by the federal laws, 'On military service', and, 'On the status of military personnel'. Constituting a part of the Russian military system, the FSO has the right to employ physical and armed

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[106] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vneshnei razvedke'; article 24; see also Bennett, 'The SVR', pp. 9-10.
[107] Aleksandr Gamov, 'Evgenii Murov: U okhrany prezidenta net prava na oshibku', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 4 August 2000. The only other interviews with the head of the FSO were published on 21 June 2001 in Komsomol'skaia pravda; and on 23 June 2001 in both Moskovskaia pravda and Kraznaia zvezda (same interview).
[108] Mukhin, Spetssluzhby, p. 117; Bennett, The Federal Security Service, p. 17.
[109] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O gosudarstvennoi okhrane'; article 12, paragraph 1; Polozhenie, 'O federal'noi sluzhbe okhrany Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 4. A new FSO statute was signed by presidential decree on 7 August 2004 to replace the old statute from 2 December 1998 in order to take into account the structural changes to the institution resulting from the incorporation of some assets and tasks of the dissolved FAPSI.

force.[110] The FSO can be considered a heavily militarised force structure as it includes a brigade and two regiments. Conscripts are employed in the FSO's military units, and military service in the Presidential regiment is seen as especially prestigious.[111] The Presidential Regiment constitutes the service's fighting core and, although its activities are visible mainly in the ceremonial guarding of the Kremlin and the parading at special events, the quality of military combat training of its recruits is reportedly high and compatible with that of MO troops.[112]

'Uniformed' military units, however, are only one aspect of the overall forces available to the FSO. The service is responsible for the co-ordination of the efforts of all Russian military and law-enforcement agencies in the sphere of state protection. Since the inclusion in the FSO of some of the tasks of the disbanded FAPSI in March 2004, another sphere of its activities is special communications and information.[113] According to the FSO's director Murov, the service's activities are often conducted in close co-operation with the FSB, the SVR and the MVD.[114] A major task of the FSO is to provide personal protection for the Russian president and for other official dignitaries. The protection of the president is carried out by the Presidential Protection Service (SBP), a subunit of the service, which has been the subject of the bulk of the admittedly small amount of information about the FSO published in the Russian media.

The rationale of combat training for FSO personnel employed in personal protection units differs considerably from what one would expect from the training of personnel in the regular armed forces. In an interview, an FSO employee even negated the usefulness of previous experience in regular military units for new recruits into the SBP. In his words, 'combat experience can be useful, of course, but in our specific case it can be even irreconcilable with our tasks'. According to this source, psychological factors and mental aptitude, for example, the ability to think ahead and to anticipate and contain

[110] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O gosudarstvennoi okhrane'; articles 24 – 27.
[111] Ekaterina Beliaeva, 'Prizyvnik dlia prezidenta', Moskovskii komsomolets, 3 November 2003.
[112] Vadim Saranov, 'Critical Mass'.
[113] Polozhenie, 'O federal'noi sluzhbe okhrany Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 9.
[114] Aleksandr Gamov, 'Evgenii Murov: U okhrany prezidenta net prava na oshibku', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 4 August 2000.

danger, are more crucial to the work of an SBP operative than physical tasks, such as the ability to shoot and engage in hand-to-hand combat. The FSO employee stated that 'at war you are on the attacking side yourself. The only task of a bodyguard is to protect what is entrusted to him from hidden threats… Our main objective is to protect the president'.[115]

Other activities of the FSO are rarely discussed in the media, but are indicated in the Russian federal law, 'On the Guarding of the State', and in the statute, 'On the Federal Guard Service'. The provision of personal protection extends to the president for life, to his family during his tenure, to visiting foreign officials during their stay on Russian territory, to a set list of seven other Russian state officials,[116] and to officials upon which the right to personal protection is conferred by a special presidential decree.[117] According to a Russian newspaper report, a total of forty individuals were under FSO protection in January 2004.[118]

In addition to acting as body guards, the FSO is responsible for the protection of the following buildings: the official residence of the Russian president; the Kremlin; the official residence of the Russian government; the buildings of the Federation Council and the State Duma; other state residences; governmental dachas and mansions in Moscow, in the Moscow region, and in other subjects of the Russian Federation; buildings and installations located on the areas of land or water on which these objects are located.[119] The physical protection of persons and buildings carried out by the FSO is supported by a department engaging in preventive investigative activities aimed at the uncovering, deterrence, and containment of planned crimes on individuals or on objects covered by

[115] Larisa Kaftan and Mikhail Falaleev, 'Kak okhraniaiut Putina?', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 31 January 2004.
[116] These are the prime minister, chairman of the Federation Council, chairman of the State Duma, chairman of the Constitutional Court, chairman of the Supreme Court, chairman of the Arbitration Court, and the General Procurator.
[117] According to FSO director Murov, this list includes the presidential plenipotentiaries in Russia's seven administrative regions. (Gamov, 'Evgenii Murov'). See Federal'nyi zakon, 'O gosudarstvennoi okhrane'; articles 8 and 9.
[118] Kaftan and Falaleev, 'Kak okhraniaiut Putina?'.
[119] Polozhenie, 'O federal'noi sluzhbe okhrany Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 11, paragraph 13.

FSO protection.[120] In this sphere, the co-operation with Russia's intelligence services, the FSB and the SVR, is especially important, because information about potential planned attacks on objects or persons protected by the FSO is often uncovered by these organisations.

The FSO has been described as a 'high-tech' organisation.[121] The deployment of special technology is required in the organisation and maintenance of the presidential communications system, which is a further task of the FSO. Its activities in the sphere of information security and technology were broadened considerably when, in March 2003, a large part of the tasks and assets of FAPSI were transferred to the FSO. As a result of the dissolution of FAPSI as a separate force structure, the FSO reportedly received the main department for governmental information, FAPSI troops, the main department for information resources (providing for the work of state bodies), and information systems (pre-electoral monitoring).[122] Following the transferral, a new service within the FSO, the Service for Special Communications and Information (SSSI), was created by presidential decree, and put in charge of the organisation, development, maintenance, and security of the system of special communications of all state bodies.[123]

A characteristic feature of the FSO is that some departments of the service are obliged by law to co-operate with its international counterpart organisations.[124] Due to its task of protecting both Russian state officials during travels abroad, and foreign state officials during their stay on Russian territory, international dialogue and co-operation of the FSO is necessary by default. According to the FSO's head Murov, good co-operation between international protection agencies is at the heart of his service's efficient work:

> I would like to point out that the relationship between the guard services of different countries is not subject to potential problems between states. [This relationship] is always benevolent, because everybody involved understands the

[120] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O gosudarstvennoi okhrane'; article 13, paragraph 6.
[121] Andrei Varlamov, 'Uspet' na prezidentom', Krasnaia zvezda, 23 June 2001.
[122] Khinshtein, 'FAPSI razdelili na troikh'.
[123] Ukaz, 'O merakh po sovershenstvovaniiu gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v oblasti bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[124] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O gosudarstvennoi okhrane'; article 11.

> decree of responsibility they have for the safety of a head of state and for his delegation. I can honestly say that there is no conflict of interest in this sphere. If both sides are working on the same job, they carry it out conscientiously.[125]

According to the federal law, 'On the Guarding of the State', control over the federal bodies in charge of state protection (FSO) is exerted by the president, the Federal Assembly, the government and the judiciary within their respective areas of competence as laid out in the constitution. The legality of the FSO's activities is observed by the general procurator and his plenipotentiaries. Procurators are entitled to receive information about persons collaborating with the FSO on a confidential basis, but cannot request information about the organisation, tactics, methods and means employed by the FSO.[126] The director of the FSO is appointed and dismissed by presidential decree.[127] When the new system of Russian executive power was revealed in March 2004, the FSO's position as a separate federal service answerable directly to the president was confirmed.

The FSO and its subunit, the SBP, are rarely discussed publicly and are not involved in media scandals characteristic of some other force structures, such as the contemporary FSB. This was not always the case. A notorious and well-known Russian politician with a career background in the guard services is Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Korzhakov, who was involved in the personal protection of former president Boris El'tsin from 1985 until 1996. He has been serving as a deputy in the Russian State Duma since 1997.[128] Throughout Korzhakov's tenure as the head of the SBP, both as a part of the GUO and as an independent structure, the service was considered highly politicised due to the close personal relationship between Korzhakov and El'tsin.[129] In several instances Korzhakov was believed to have interfered in executive decision making. For example, the initial hesitation of Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev to provide military support for the president in his stand-off with the parliament in October 1993 was seen to have been

[125] Varlamov, 'Uspet' na prezidentom'.
[126] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O gosudarstvennoi okhrane'; articles 31 and 32.
[127] Polozhenie, 'O federal'noi sluzhbe okhrany Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 13.
[128] A. Zapeklyi and P. Kozlov, Tret'ia Gosudarstvennaia Duma: Anatomicheskii atlas, Moscow: TsPI, 2001, p. 171.
[129] 'Kto upravliaet stranoi: El'tsin, Chernomyrdin, ili general Korzhakov?', Izvestiia, 22 December 1994.

overcome thanks to the persuasiveness of Korzhakov. In the run-up to the presidential elections in the spring of 1996, Korzhakov controversially called for a postponement of the vote and was rebuked by El'tsin for meddling in politics as a result.[130] Korzhakov was dismissed from service in the SBP in June 1996.

Federal Service for the Control of the Trade of Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (FSN)[131]

The FSN is post-Soviet Russia's newest force structure. It was created in the course of the wide-ranging restructure of Russian force ministries by presidential decree in March 2003.[132] As implied in the service's title, the FSN is the federal body of executive power in charge of controlling the trade of illegal substances. The FSN's institutional predecessor was a state committee created in 2002, which acted under the auspices of the MVD.[133] It was established as a federal service answerable directly to the president as a part of a wider restructuring of the system of executive power in March 2004. The newly created service was built on the personnel and material assets of the Federal Tax Police Service (FSNP), the disbandment of which was announced in the same presidential decree.

The FSN is a law enforcement agency, and the type of state service fulfilled by its staff is classified as law-enforcement service.[134] FSN law enforcement staff, which constitutes about half of the service's 40,000 employees,[135] are uniformed and are

[130] Stepan Kiselev, 'Predupreditel'nyi vystrel v golovu', Izvestiia, 7 May 1996.
[131] Official website: www.narkotiki.ru
[132] Ukaz, 'Voprosy sovershenstvovaniia gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v Rossiiskoi Federatsii'. See also Edwin Bacon and Bettina Renz, 'Restructuring Security in Russia: Return of the KGB?', The World Today, 59(5), May 2003, pp. 25 – 26.
[133] 'The Committee for Counteracting the illegal trade with narcotic and psychotropic substances' under the MVD was founded in September 2002 by presidential decree. (Ukaz 'O sovershenstvovanii gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v oblasti protivodeistvia nezakonnomu oborotu narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchenstv'.
[134] See Ukaz, 'O pravookhranitel'noi sluzhbe v organakh po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv'.
[135] 'Viktor Cherkesov, glava Sluzhby po kontroliiu za oborotom narkoticheskich sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv: Professional'naia ustanovka chekistov – ne presechenie, a preduprezhdenie', Izvestiia, 25 March 2004.

distinguished by special ranks, ranging from warrant police officer (*praporshchik politsii*) to police general (*general politsii*).[136]

A curious feature of FSN personnel is the fact that it is made up, in the main, of former tax police officers, who were simply transferred to the newly created body after the FSNP's dissolution. Reportedly, recruitment into the tax police itself had been made up partially by direct entry into the service by personnel from other force structures (MVD, KGB, GRU, armed forces).[137] Doubts expressed in the Russian media about the transferability of tax police officers' skills to an organisation with fundamentally different tasks were disputed by the FSN, which claimed that the former tax police officers' experience in operational work was compatible with the work carried out by the FSN. It also argued that the economic awareness of former tax police personnel was an advantage for the fight on large-scale organised drug crime.[138]

The FSN was created as the federal body of executive power in charge of dealing with illegal drug business, and coordinating the activities of other federal and regional executive bodies in this sphere.[139] Its basic tasks are to control the trade of illegal substances; to expose, prevent, suppress, uncover and investigate crimes within its sphere of competence; to participate in the making and realisation of state policies in the sphere of illegal drug trade; the creation of a unified database concerning the trade of illegal substances; and to organise cooperation and the exchange of information with international organisations in the sphere of illegal drug trade in accordance with Russia's commitments to international agreements. Furthermore the FSN is tasked with engaging in prophylactic work, that is, it is providing information about the illegality of using and

[136] Ukaz, 'O pravookhranitel'noi sluzhbe v organakh po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv'; paragraph 8.
[137] Frank Gregory and Gerald Brooke, 'Policing Economic Transition and Increasing Revenue: A Case Study of the Federal Tax Police Service of the Russian Federation 1992 – 1998', Europe-Asia Studies, 52(3), 2000, p. 440.
[138] Article published by the Krasnoiarsk regional FSN branch published on the FSN's official website (www.narkotiki.ru/gnk_5654.html. Last accessed: 13 May 2004); 'Viktor Cherkesov, glava Sluzhby po kontroliiu za oborotom narkoticheskich sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv: Professional'naia ustanovka chekistov – ne presechenie, a preduprezhdenie', Izvestiia, 25 March 2004.
[139] Ukaz, 'Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv'; paragraph 1.

trading drugs and psychotropic substances. The FSN is equipped to engage in the criminal investigation of individuals, who are involved in the production or distribution of drugs.[140]

In several instances, Viktor Cherkesov, the head of the FSN, compared the purpose and tasks of his service with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).[141] In accordance with its mission statement, the tasks of the DEA are indeed similar to that of the FSN. However, the institutional size of the DEA amounts to only a quarter of that of its Russian counterpart and the American drug enforcers act under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Justice.[142]

The necessity of creating a 40,000 strong force structure dealing exclusively with the illegal drug business was explained by Cherkesov with reference to two particular problems. Firstly, the scale of the drug problem facing contemporary Russia, and secondly, the inefficiency of previous agencies tasked with this problem. According to Cherkesov, the establishment of a federal structure devoted entirely to the fight against drugs was Russia's timely response to a new and lethal threat facing the country. In his words, the rate of drug abuse in Russia is growing rapidly and the country has transformed over the past decade from being a transit route for drug trade into a lucrative market for their sale.[143] Cherkesov also explained that the establishment of a separate federal executive body in charge of regulating and fighting the illegal trade of drugs was not an off-the-cuff decision but was already envisaged in the 1998 law, 'On narcotic and psychotropic substances'.[144]

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[140] Ukaz, 'Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv'; paragraphs 7 and 8.
[141] Aleksandr Bekker, 'Interv'iu: Viktor Cherkesov, predsedatel' Goskomiteta po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv', Vedomosti, 4 September 2003; Anton Trofimov, 'Nasha Zadacha – sderzhat' razvitie narkosistemy', Profil', 9 February 2004.
[142] www.dea.gov. 'Mission statement'; 'Staffing and budget'. In 2003 the DEA's overall numerical strength was 9629, about fifty percent of which were special agents. Last accessed: 13 May 2004.
[143] 'Viktor Cherkesov, glava Sluzhby po kontroliiu za oborotom narkoticheskich sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv: Professional'naia ustanovka chekistov – ne presechenie, a preduprezhdenie', Izvestiia, 25 March 2004.
[144] Aleksandr Bekker, 'Interv'iu: Viktor Cherkesov, predsedatel' Goskomiteta po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv', Vedomosti, 4 September 2003; Iaroslav Zorin, 'Otbor s pristrastiem. Viktor Cherkesov komplektuet sluzhbu bortsov s narkomafiei', Vremia novostei, 27

As mentioned above, before the FSN was created as a separate service, its functions were fulfilled by a subunit of the MVD. According to Cherkesov, the MVD's anti-drugs committee was preoccupied with achieving a high crime-solving quota, which it sought to fulfil by way of prosecuting drug users and small-scale dealers.[145] Whilst instances of petty drug crime continue to remain within the MVD's sphere of competence, Cherkesov pointed out that the creation of the FSN was necessary in order to enable concerted efforts in tackling the drug-problem at its roots, and to attack the economic basis of the drug mafia.[146]

Mechanisms of accountability and control over the FSN remain vaguely defined in the available documentation. According to a presidential decree on the FSN, 'the president of the Russian Federation is leading the activities of the Russian FSN in accordance with the Constitution and federal law. The president confirms the FSN's statute on recommendation by the government'.[147] When the new system of executive power was confirmed in March 2004, the FSN's status as a federal service accountable directly to the president, on a par with the other federal service and agencies discussed in this chapter, was confirmed.

The State Courier Service (GFS)[148]

Not much detail is available about the State Courier Service as force structure. Its main task is the handling and delivery of sensitive and secret official documentation and of other goods for the federal bodies of state power. The service's activities are rarely discussed in the Russian media, and in a survey concerning the openness and accessibility

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June 2003; Boris Iamshanov and Andrei Sharov, 'Viktor Cherkesov: Ostanovit' narkoagressiiu', Rossiiskaia gazeta, 16 April 2003. For the respective law see Federal'nyi zakon, 'O narkoticheskikh sredstvakh i psikhotropnykh veshchestvakh'; paragraph 1.

[145] 'Viktor Cherkesov, glava Sluzhby po kontroliiu za oborotom narkoticheskich sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv: Professional'naia ustanovka chekistov – ne presechenie, a preduprezhdenie', Izvestiia, 25 March 2004.

[146] Iaroslav Zorin, 'Otbor s pristrastiem. Viktor Cherkesov komplektuet sluzhbu bortsov s narkomafiei', Vremia novostei, 27 June 2003.

[147] Ukaz, 'Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po kontroliu za oborotom narkoticheskikh sredstv i psikhotropnykh veshchestv'; paragraph 4.

[148] Official website: www.gfs.ru

to information of the websites of federal bodies of state power, conducted by Kommersant-Daily in 2003, the GFS occupied the last place of 62 websites surveyed.[149] The historical origins of the GFS are in the militarised Courier Corps founded by Peter I in 1796. A militarised state courier service existed throughout the Soviet period in different institutional forms.[150] The only attempt at civilianising the service during its two hundred-years of existence occurred during the Khrushchev era for economic reasons, but changes were revoked after a mere ten days.[151]

From 1960 until 1995, the GFS's institutional predecessor acted under the jurisdiction of the Soviet and Russian Ministries for Communications. The GFS in its current form, that is, as a federal service not subordinate to a ministry, was created by presidential decree in January 1995. It was also then that the service was officially included in the Russian military system. Despite President Putin's wide-ranging reorganisation of the power ministries in March 2003, and the restructuring of the system of executive power in March 2004, the GFS has retained its status as a federal service not subordinate to a specific ministry, but, on a par with the FSB, SVR, FSO, and FSN, answerable directly to the president.

According to the GFS's statute, which was confirmed by President Putin in August 2000, the GFS, like all other military and law-enforcement agencies, is 'a component part of the system of forces and means ensuring the security of the Russian Federation'.[152] Reportedly, the majority of the GFS's corps of personnel consists of officers with previous experience in other components of Russia's military system. Preferably this background is in the FPS or in FAPSI.[153] GFS officers are uniformed and

[149] 'Reiting otkrytosti saitov federal'nykh organov vlasti RF', Kommersant-daily, 22 April 2003. All other power structures covered in this chapter rated higher in terms of accessibility to information in the survey, with the exception of the FSO and GUSP, which do not have a website at all.
[150] For a brief chronological history of the GFS see, 'K vam otbyl fel'd''eger'', Vek, 17 December 1999.
[151] Aleksandr Dobrovol'skii, 'Za sem'iu zamkami. Telokhranitel'dlia sekretov', Moskovskii komsomolets, 12 March 2004.
[152] Polozhenie, 'O gosudarstvennoi fel'd''egerskoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[153] Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii', p. 58; Konstantin Volkov, 'Lichno v ruki: VIP-kur'ery', Itogi, 24 December 2002.

their basic training includes weapons training and special combat techniques.[154] By law, the GFS is entitled to employ 'physical force, special measures, hand-held guns and light combat weapons', particularly if its employees and the official deliveries entrusted to them are under threat.[155]

Although the GFS has some features of a military organisation, the rationale for this is very specific. The training of its staff differs considerably from what one would associate with training of personnel in the regular armed forces. In the words of a journalist writing for the Russian weekly Itogi, 'the basic task of a state courier is not to defeat an opponent, but to transport his 'delivery' (and hopefully himself) safe and sound.'[156] The use of weapons or other physical force by the GFS is envisaged to be of an exclusively defensive and protective nature. A more detailed account of the GFS's tasks and missions can be found in the Russian federal law, 'On courier communications'.[157] According to this law, the basic task of federal courier communications is 'the delivery and return of deliveries of special importance, of top secret, secret, and other official deliveries to the administrative centres of Russian federation objects, and to the capitals of the member-states of the Intergovernmental Agreement of Courier Communications.'

The GFS's clients are the president, the three power branches on a federal and regional level, military-administrative bodies, including the defence minister and chief of the general staff, as well as the administrations of important industrial or military objects.[158] The nature of the deliveries entrusted to the GFS is manifold, but they are united by the fact that the strictly confidential nature of their contents prevents them from being sent electronically or by regular courier or postal services. Such deliveries can be the president's announcement of a new candidate for prime minister to the State Duma, drafts of the annual budget, documents concerning projects for new aviation and rockets, or governmental announcements for immediate dissemination in the media. Deliveries are

[154] Dmitrii Pushkar', 'Srochno i lichno', Moskovskie novosti, 24 December 2002; Aleksandr Dobrovol'skii, 'Za sem'iu zamkami. Telokhranitel'dlia sekretov', Moskovskii komsomolets, 12 March 2004.
[155] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O fel'd''egerskoi sviazi'; article 11.1 – 11.5.
[156] Konstantin Volkov, 'Lichno v ruki: VIP-kur'ery', Itogi, 24 December 2002.
[157] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O fel'd''egerskoi sviazi'.
[158] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O fel'd''egerskoi sviazi'; article 2, paragraph 1.

made by armed and uniformed state couriers by car, train, or plane on specifically assigned routes, predominantly within Russia, but also within the CIS and, in certain circumstances, such as in connection with matters of military-technical co-operation with foreign states, worldwide. Constituting a component of the security and defence system of the Russian Federation, the GFS has agreements with other force structures, which are obliged to assist the state couriers on their missions if the need for specific support arises.[159]

Control mechanisms over the GFS's activities remain vaguely defined. According to the law, 'On courier communications', control over the activities of the federal executive body in charge of courier communications (GFS) is exerted by the president and the government of the Russian Federation within their respective areas of competence. The legality of the service's activities is observed by the general procurator.[160] The director of the GFS is both appointed and dismissed by presidential decree.[161] As mentioned above, the GFS's status as a federal service answerable directly to the president was confirmed in March 2004. Although the GFS in all its forms has never been a part of the MVD, the law, 'On courier communications' and the GFS's statute adopted by the Russian government in 2000, stipulate that the terms of service of leading GFS staff are subject to the legislation regulating the terms of service of employees of the executive bodies of internal affairs in the statute 'On service in the bodies of internal affairs'.[162] Although militarised to an extent, employees of the GFS are not covered by the law, 'On military service' or the law, 'On the status of military personnel'. The GFS is not a component of the Russian military structure, but a law-enforcement agency.

Main Directorate for Special Programmes under the President (GUSP)

The GUSP is also a successor organisation of the Soviet KGB. It originated from the latter's fifteenth main directorate, which was responsible for the construction,

[159] This is decreed in the GFS's regulations. Pravitel'stvo Rossiiskoi Federatsii Postanovlenie, 'Voprosy gosudarstvennoi fel'd''egerskoi sluzhby Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[160] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O fel'd''egerskoi sviazi'; article 14.
[161] Polozhenie, 'O gosudarstvennoi fel'd''egerskoi sluzhbe Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; paragraph 8.

maintenance and protection of important state objects, such as governmental bunkers for the country's highest leaders.[163] Due to the specificity of its tasks, few details about the GUSP's structure and activities are publicly available. The agency neither has its own website (the only other force structure without a website is the FSO), nor has there ever been a publication of an interview with its director or other personnel, or any other substantial article about the organisation, in the Russian media.[164] The date of the GUSP's initial creation is not clear. The first presidential decree about the institution was issued in 1996,[165] but it has been argued that the GUSP originated in the early post-Soviet years when the KGB's other successor organisations were founded.[166]

Some indications as to the GUSP's tasks and structure can be found in a presidential decree, and also in the agency's statute. Both documents were signed in 1998 and some excerpts have been made public.[167] These documents contain references to both the GUSP's pre-1998 status and to its current structure. According to the presidential decree signed in 1998, the GUSP's status as a state organ located within the realm of the presidential administration was to be changed. Its director was no longer to hold the position of deputy head of the presidential administration. Instead the decree announced that the GUSP was to be assigned the status of a federal organ of executive power, and to receive the status of an agency answerable directly to the president. The GUSP has two major subunits: the Service for Special Objects and the Directorate for Applied Technology (*Ekspluatsionno-technicheskoe Upravlenie*). The GUSP's personnel are made up of both civilians and military personnel. The GUSP's broad purpose is it to fulfil the president's orders concerning the 'planning and organisation of mobilisation', as set

[162] The corresponding document is Polozhenie, 'O sluzhbe v organakh vnutrennykh del'.
[163] Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii', pp. 56.
[164] This assertion is the result of extensive searches on the Russian newspaper database Eastview, and of the Russian-language search engine www.aport.ru. A small amount of information has been published in Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii', pp. 56; on the Russian website www.agentura.ru; and on the website of the Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org.
[165] Ukaz, 'Voprosy glavnogo upravleniia spetsial'nykh programm prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[166] Elena Ovcharenko and Evgenii Umerenkov, 'Direktor Federal'noi sluzhbe bezopasnosti Rossii Nikolai Patrushev: Esli my "slomaemsiia" i uidem iz Kavkaza – Nachnetsiia razval strany', Komsomol'skaia pravda, 20 December 2000.
[167] Ukaz, 'Voprosy glavnogo upravleniia spetsial'nykh programm prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.

out in the law of the same name.[168] The planning of mobilisation entails activities during times of peace aimed at ensuring the preparedness of the Russian federal bodies of state power in the case of an armed attack on the country. Mobilisation itself is the realisation of these peacetime plans in the eventuality of an actual hostile attack.[169]

The basic tasks and functions of the GUSP as specified in its statute are summarised below:

- Planning the transition of the Russian Federation to wartime conditions.
- Planning, constructing and maintaining special objects (buildings, transport routes, underground bunkers) and alternative administrative posts for the Russian federal and regional bodies of executive power.
- Supporting and protecting the federal authorities when they are based at special objects during wartime or emergency situations.
- Preventing the leaking of information through technical channels at special objects and alternative administrative points.
- Planning and carrying out scientific research needed for the fulfilment of its tasks.[170]

No control mechanisms over the GUSP are specified in the available documentation.

[168] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O mobilizatsionnoi podgotovke i mobilizatsii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii'.
[169] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O mobilizatsionnoi podgotovke i mobilizatsii v Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 1, paragraphs 1 and 2.
[170] Ukaz, 'Voprosy glavnogo upravleniia spetsial'nykh programm prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; articles 11 and 12.

Diagram 3.1.

The Russian force structures in the system of executive power*

Federal ministries, services and agencies led by the **president**	Federal ministries and bodies of executive power under the authority of the **government**

FEDERAL MINISTRIES

MVD	**-Health and Social Development**
MChS	**Culture and Mass Communications**
MID	**-Education and Science**
MO	**-Natural Resources**
Miniust	**-Industry and Energy**
	-Agriculture
	-Transport
	-Information Technologies and Communications
	-Finance
	-Economic Development

FEDERAL SERVICES

GFS	**-Federal Anti-monopoly Service**
FSB	**-Federal Service for Tariffs**
SVR	**-Federal Service for**
FSO	**Hydrometeorology and the**
FSN	**Monitoring of the Environment**
	-Federal Service for State Statistics
	-Federal Service for Finance Markets
	-Federal Service for Ecological, Technological, and Nuclear Supervision

FEDERAL AGENCIES

GUSP	**-Federal Atomic Energy Agency**
UDP	**-Federal Space Agency**

* This structure is based on the presidential decrees No 314 and 0649, 'On the system and structure of the federal bodies of executive power', signed 9 March 2004 and, 'Questions concerning the structure of the federal bodies of executive power', signed on 20 May 2004. Force structures included in this chapter's analysis are highlighted in grey.

Concluding remarks

There are three clear aims of the study provided in this chapter. Firstly, it provided new empirical information about the organisations which produce politicians with a military background. Secondly, the chapter also clarified the legal basis for these military structures and the degree to which these legal statutes delimit their activities. This knowledge is important with regard to the study of *siloviki* in post-Soviet Russia, because, as discussed in the corresponding section in chapter one, the definition of these personalities is often vague. Thirdly, the aim of the study was to facilitate conclusions in terms of the extent to which politicians with a force-structure background can be portrayed as a single analytical entity with a shared 'military frame of mind' or 'common…military-style traditions'.[171]

The first part of the chapter showed that the understanding of military figures in contemporary Russia is not limited to personnel of the regular armed forces, but includes personnel of a variety of other organisations making up the Russian military system as a whole. According to Russian legislation in the area of defence, numerous bodies of executive power, in addition to the MO, have the right to maintain and command militarised formations. The terms of service of military personnel serving in either component of the Russian military system are subject to the same laws.

The understanding of what constitutes a military figure in Russia is further complicated by the existence of several law-enforcement agencies, some of which include quasi-military organisations. In legal terms their personnel are not 'military figures', because they are not subject to the laws governing the terms of service of military personnel. However, personnel serving in both the Russian military and in law-enforcement agencies are described by the collective term *siloviki*. Although this term is not an official legal definition, the treatment of such figures as a common group, which was also observed in the analysis of newspaper coverage in the preceding chapter, is apparent in some official documents addressing the electoral rights of military and law-

[171] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221; Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.

enforcement personnel.[172] The second part of the chapter outlined the ten institutions in which *siloviki* are active.

The concluding paragraphs of this chapter consider the extent to which politicians with a force-structure background can be portrayed as an analytical entity by discussing possible factors acting in favour and against this proposition. A feature common to all the force structures discussed in this chapter is that each is contributing to the state's internal and external security and defence. As discussed above, the degree of co-operation between different force structures in specific areas is considerable. A second common feature is the answerability of all force structures – as ministries, federal services, or federal agencies – directly to the president (see figure 3.1. above). As discussed with regard to each force structure, the predominant location of civilian control over these institutions is the president. This factor can serve as the empirical basis for possible future research in the sphere of civilian control over the Russian armed forces. Previous studies in this area have concentrated primarily on civilian control over the regular MO troops.[173]

A third aspect of possible commonality is apparent in the regular occurrence of cross-appointments between institutions, in particular at the level of the highest leadership. An example of this is Nikolai Bordiuzha, who headed the personnel directorate of the KGB's 8th directorate during the late Soviet era. He was in the FAPSI personnel directorate from 1991 – 1992, and was appointed first as deputy director and then director of the FPS in 1992, where he remained until 1998. Sergei Stepashin also started his career in the Soviet MVD, was a deputy minister in the short-lived Security Ministry of the Russian Federation from 1992 – 1993, acted as the deputy director and director of the FSB predecessor, FSK, from 1993 – 1995, and served two short terms as both minister of justice and interior minister between 1997 and 1999. Many commanders of the internal troops throughout the post-Soviet era started their professional military careers in the regular armed forces.[174] Cross-appointing on a massive scale occurred in March 2003, when a large number of personnel of the dissolved FSNP were transferred

[172] This will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.
[173] See, for example, Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?.

wholesale to a newly created force ministry, the FSN. In part, cross-appointments between institutions appear to be historically determined. The force structures in post-Soviet Russia, which increased in number to over a dozen during the El'tsin era, all emerged from three Soviet force structures, the MO, MVD and KGB. Many leading figures of contemporary Russia's force structures started their careers in the Soviet era. This is a further possible commonality of *siloviki*. These commonalities are not a sufficient basis, however, to assume that former personnel from a variety of institutional backgrounds would pursue common goals in their civilian careers.

Factors speaking against the portrayal of politicians with a force-structure background as a common group are numerous and appear more 'weighty' than the possible commonalities outlined above. These factors include the following. Firstly, as clearly shown in the body of the chapter, the tasks and missions carried out by post-Soviet Russian force structures can be extremely varied even within individual institutions. Military personnel employed in the FSB, for example, can be tasked with the physical fighting of illegal armed formations, for example in Chechnya, whilst other personnel are engaged in the development and application of cryptographic technology. The MVD includes both a military and a law-enforcement element. Its missions range from the deployment of troops to Chechnya, to the issuing of driving licenses. As discussed in more detail in the next chapter, in many cases the tasks learned and fulfilled by Russian *siloviki* during their active service in the force structures are compatible with the roles they later fulfilled in civilian administrative or political positions. This chapter posits that due to the extremely wide-ranging tasks fulfilled by the Russian force structures, the presumption of a shared mentality or 'military frame of mind' uniting, for instance, a commander of the armed forces and a specialist on cryptography, requires further investigation, which will be provided in the next chapter.

A further factor complicating the perception of Russian military figures from different institutional backgrounds as a common group is the issue of the interrelationship between the numerous post-Soviet era force structures. The fragmentation of interests

[174] Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army, p. 306.

within the regular armed forces has led some analysts to conclude that even the regular armed forces in post-Soviet Russia cannot be seen as a unified actor.[175] As pointed out by Dmitrii Trenin, military-military relations are as important a factor for analysis as questions related to the civil-military relationship in contemporary Russia.[176] This factor further supports the argument that representatives from different force structures should not be perceived as speaking with one institutional voice. Instances of tension and conflict between individual force structures have been noted throughout the post-Soviet era. Usually, these conflicts revolve around matters of resource allocation and the division of labour and authority. With regard to resource allocation, retired general and Duma deputy, Eduard Vorob'ev, pointed out the following possible source for institutional tension between the different components of Russia's military structure:

> We have about ten military organisations and the peculiar thing about this is that all of them are subject to some of the same laws… So the same laws unite all service personnel, no matter in which organisation they serve. But there are some irregularities in this. For example, a company commander serving in the domestic troops of the MVD and a company commander serving in the armed forces earn different salaries. And so it starts: "How come? Why is he different from me?" And really, he isn't. Both are commanders of a subunit of almost the same size. They are using almost the same equipment and their service conditions are no different. So why does one of them earn less than the other?[177]

Differences in terms of payment were also reported with regard to KGB successor organisations during the El'tsin era. Personnel of the organisation in charge of presidential protection, for example, reportedly received salaries that were high above average.[178] Lobbying for a desirable share of the budget has been an important issue of competition between the leaders of the force structures.[179] As Hans-Henning Schröder pointed out, 'the scarcity of funds creates fertile ground for conflicts within the military.'[180]

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[175] Schröder, 'The Russian Army in Politics', p. 54 – 56; Shevtsova, 'Russia's Fragmented Armed Forces'.
[176] Trenin, 'Desiatiletie nevyuchennykh urokov', pp. 79-80.
[177] Interview with Eduard Vorob'ev conducted on 11 January 2002.
[178] Bennett, 'The Federal Security Service', p. 17.
[179] Khinshtein, 'FAPSI razdelili na troikh'.
[180] Schröder, 'The Russian Army in Politics', p. 54. Inter-service rivalry linked to resource allocation is not a uniquely Russian phenomenon. Janowitz, for example, cited such inter-service rivalry amongst branches

In addition to financial matters, another source of potential conflict between post-Soviet Russia's force structures has been noted with regard to the division of labour and authority. One such issue is the duplication or overlap of functions across several force ministries. In the word of a Russian defence analyst, this factor has led to 'constant competition and interagency "war"'.[181] Rumours have been circulating with regard to conflicts of interest in the sphere of intelligence activities between the MO's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the SVR.[182] Inter-force structure conflict was especially apparent during the Chechen conflicts, where numerous force structures were represented and the authority over the operations was shared. In the second phase of the conflict (since 1999) authority over operations was first passed from the MO to the FSB and then to the MVD. Overlapping functions and lack of co-ordination reportedly resulted in 'fierce disputes over which agency should be responsible for particular functions'.[183]

Competition amongst force structures has also been linked to potential reforms of Russia's military and defence system. MChS's proposals for the establishment of specially trained peacekeeping troops, for example, were vetoed by the MO, which feared the encroachment of other force structures into its sphere of authority.[184] The leadership of Russia's force structures was reminded of the importance of lobbying for influence on behalf of their institution when three force structures were dissolved in March 2003.[185] The reforms came as a surprise not only to the public, but also to the organisations immediately affected by the changes. Reportedly, the senior leadership and employees of the disbanded FSNP learned of their dismissal from media reports. Other reports alleged

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of the U.S. regular armed forces as having a deteriorating effect on the group coherence of the military as a professional group. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 139.

[181] Kalyiev, 'Can "Power Ministries" be Reformed?'.

[182] Interview with SVR director Sergei Lebedev (Title: 'Lebedev: Razvedka nevozmozhno bez romantiki') conducted by the *Podrobnosti* programme of the Russian television channel RTR on 20 December 2000. Published on the interview database of the Russian electronic archive www.integrum.ru.

[183] Mark Kramer, 'Oversight of Russia's Intelligence and Security Agencies: The Need for and Prospect for Democratic Control', PONARS Policy Memo No. 281, October 2002, p. 3. For an outline of the conflict between the MVD and the MO and FSB during the first and second Chechen war see Bennett, 'The Ministry of Internal Affairs'.

[184] Galeotti, 'Emergency Presence', pp. 51-51.

that as a result of its integration with the FSB, the ranks and standing of the leading personnel of the FPS were downgraded.[186] Institutional tension and military-military relations in post-Soviet Russia are a further factor making the idea of a united *siloviki* influence on politics less intuitive.

As discussed above, the shared institutional legacy of the post-Soviet Russian force structures, many of whom originated from components of the Soviet MO, MVD, or KGB, constitutes a potential area of commonality for these institutions. However, the degree of institutionalisation of individual post-Soviet force structures and creation of distinct organisational identities should not be overlooked. This was argued by the Russian military sociologist, Vladimir Bondarenko, who wrote that 'having been institutionalised as the result of specific processes of specialisation, these components are not closely linked to each other. They have their own history of development and are lead with specific tasks in mind.'[187] All force structures discussed in this chapter have their own academic institutions for the training of future leadership cadres,[188] which is likely to contribute to the distinct organisational identity of each individual component of the Russian force structures.[189] This factor also serves as an argument against the portrayal of *siloviki*-turned-politicians as pursuing common interest.

As pointed out again by Trenin in the introductory quotation to the chapter, the understanding of a 'military person' in Russia is complex. The term 'military person' and *silovik* in post-Soviet Russia includes personnel from a wide variety of institutional backgrounds fulfilling an array of different tasks. The Russian military analyst, Vladislav

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[185] As discussed above, the dissolved structures were FAPSI, the FPS and FSNP.
[186] Bacon and Renz, 'Restructuring Security in Russia', p. 26; Khinshtein 'FAPSI razdelili na troikh'.
[187] Vladimir F. Bondarenko, Spetsialisatsiia i diversifikatsiia vnutri voennoi organizatsii', Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, No 12, December 2002, p. 74.
[188] According to Aleksandr Khinstein, the FSO was the last force structure to receive its own academy in March 2003, when a large part of FAPSI's personnel and assets were subordinated to it. Khinshtein, 'FAPSI razdelili na troikh'.
[189] The deteriorating effect of academy education on the group-coherence of the military profession has been pointed out by Morris Janowitz. In his 1960 study of the U.S. military he wrote that 'since the [military] academies have necessarily emphasised service loyalty, rather than identification with the national military establishment, the fierce inter-service rivalries of the American military profession have been fostered by academy education.' Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 139.

Shurygin, argued that the understanding of a military professional in Russia differs historically from European countries. He wrote the following:

> For Europeans a general is first of all a "man of war", whose main task is to fight…Europe is used to perceiving a general as a military professional, as a "dog of war"… In Russia this has always been different. For us a general always has been not only, or even not as much a "dog of war", as an administrator, an organiser, and "tsar's eye". Generals built factories, cultivated Siberia, laid roads, engaged in science, cartography and built mines.[190]

Vadim Solov'ev, the editor-in-chief of Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, described the structuring of officialdom in accordance with military, or military-type, ranks and titles as a typically Russian phenomenon. He said, 'this is a Russian specificity. If people today call, for example, Putin a military person, they have in mind the fact that he used to belong to a force structure. Being 'military' and belonging to either one of the force structures are synonyms in Russia. This is because of our country's history'.[191] The historical importance in Russia of having a military rank (not necessarily as a result of military training) in order to 'get done serious work' in the spheres of security and defence is supported by the fact that Soviet Central Committee members working in the armed forces' main political administration were given 'high military rank to prevent them from being regarded by the army as *shpak* (a contemptuous military term for civilians)'.[192]

The tendency to favour military-type ranks, titles, and uniforms over the civilian arrangement of some organisations appears to be a feature distinguishing Russia from many states in the West. Inevitably, the number of individuals with a military title in Russia is high. In a discussion of what he called 'Russia's redundant generals', the Pravda journalist Igor' Iarovoi pointed out that 'in other countries uniforms and epaulets are worn only by specific categories of officials: military personnel, the police, diplomats (sometimes), and border guards (not always). All other categories of bureaucrats fulfil

[190] Vladislav Shurygin, 'Rossiia v lampasakh: voenno-politicheskii obzor', Zavtra, 12 January 2001.
[191] Interview with Vadim Solov'ev conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001.
[192] Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet Ruling Class, London: The Bodley Head, 1984, p. 108.

their tasks in civilian clothes. But not in Russia'. Iarovoi also questioned the necessity of decorating figures such as MChS minister, General of the Army Sergei Shoigu or the leader of the MO's military music corps, Nikolai Mikhailov, with the highest military ranks despite the fact that they 'have never participated in a war'. He concluded that 'the symbol of a general's stars in our country no longer means anything.'[193]

In speaking about post-Soviet Russian *siloviki*, it is important to consider that the multitude of tasks fulfilled by these organisations also needs to be fulfilled in the West. What appears to be a crucial difference between the Russian organisations tasked with the missions described above and some of their Western counterparts is the specific military-type arrangement of some Russian force structures, which tend to be arranged as civilian organisations in the West. This difference was pointed out by Solov'ev, who said, 'in America, for example, people in the intelligence services are civilians. But in Russia, people active in the intelligence service have military titles. This is essential. If they didn't have such a title, they wouldn't get access to any serious work'.[194] In Russia, a large number of personnel fulfilling tasks that are fulfilled by civilians in other states are distinguished by a military title. An equivalent English term or understanding of *siloviki* does not exist. Subsequently, personnel of the military, the police, and the intelligence services do not tend to be treated as an analytical unity in the case of the U.S. or in the United Kingdom. It appears questionable whether a military title or the wearing of uniform alone is a sufficient condition for the presumption of a 'military frame of mind' or 'military-style traditions' shared by all force structure personnel in post-Soviet Russia. In assessing the issue of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia it is important to consider the specific features of the military system from which they emanate and the specific understanding of a military person in post-Soviet Russia, both of which differ considerably from corresponding institutions and understandings in Western states.

This chapter provided an understanding of the exact institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. It showed that, in view of the institutional

[193] Igor' Iarovoi, 'Bez pobed, no s lampasami: Rossii durno ot izbytka generalov', Pravda, 20 August 2004.
[194] Interview with Vadim Solov'ev conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001.

diversity of these figures and the wide range of tasks fulfilled by them, the treatment of such figures as an analytical entity, based on the presumption of a shared military ethic, requires further investigation. Having established in this chapter how 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia are to be understood in theory, the following chapter, with reference to specific examples, engages in a more micro-level analysis of these figures' role in the political system of post-Soviet Russia.

4

Understanding the role of 'military politicians' in the Russian body politic

I do not think that there is resentment or desire for revenge or corporate spirit within the military. Is it our intention to discuss military people in power or the power of the military? These are absolutely different things.[1]
Andrei Nikolaev, former commander of the border guard troops and Duma deputy

Military people are somehow equal with civilians in politics. But this does not mean that they are dictating politics.[2]
Sergei Mulin, former Segodnia journalist

Having looked at Russian perceptions of 'military politicians' and at their precise institutional backgrounds, the previous empirical chapters have now set the scene for a micro-level analysis of these figures' role in the political system of post-Soviet Russia. As discussed in the relevant section in chapter one, little attention has been paid to the career backgrounds, motives and conduct of individual 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, because their existence is often implicitly portrayed as symptomatic of a greater malaise. Some civil-military relations analysts, for example, have depicted 'military politicians' as symptomatic of a military system overly influential in the political system and posing an obstacle to democratisation.[3] Other analysts, more recently, have portrayed the increasing numbers of figures with a force-structure

[1] Quoted in Anna Ostapchuk and Andrei Stepanov, 'Genodriad. Liudi v pogonakh idyt vo vlast', Moskovskie Novosti, 27 March 2001.
[2] Interview with Sergei Mulin conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001.
[3] See, for instance, Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics'; Busza, 'State Dysfunctionality, Institutional Decay and the Russian Military', p. 124, Moran, From Garrison State to Nation State, p. 201.

background in Russian politics as symbolic of a move towards a more authoritarian system of leadership under Putin.[4]

This chapter argues that in order to understand the *role* of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, a micro-level analysis of factors surrounding these figures' political activities, such as their backgrounds, their motives, and their conduct in particular situations, is required. The empirical basis of the analysis in this chapter therefore draws predominantly on interviews with 'military politicians', on autobiographical accounts, and on biographical details, in order to produce rich accounts of such figures' beliefs and attitudes towards their roles and of their conduct with regard to particular events and processes.

This study is presented in two parts. The first part of this chapter engages with the presumption underlying many evaluations of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia that such figures are less democratic than their civilian counterparts. A number of analysts appear to be alarmed by the anticipation of a more undemocratic or authoritarian policy-direction as a result of the presence of such figures, setting them apart from civilian politicians as a result of their 'military frame of mind',[5] embodied in 'common…military-style traditions'.[6] It has been argued that such figures are accustomed to 'command oriented bureaucratic styles' and 'rigid hierarchies of military-style organisations', which are perceived to be a 'poor school for the logrolling and compromise of modern state bureaucracies'.[7] Robert Epperson, for example, asserted that 'it is important to distinguish civilian politicians from 'military politicians'. Military politicians are used to risking lives, including their own. Military politicians are less willing to compromise on issues involving the state than career politicians'.[8] In a nutshell, the concern has been expressed that as a result of the participation of ex-force structure

[4] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'.
[5] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221
[6] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.
[7] Brian D. Taylor, 'Strong Men, Weak State: Power Ministry Officials and the Federal Districts', PONARS Policy Memo No. 284, October 2002, pp. 1 and 5.
[8] Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics', p. 99.

personalities in the political process of post-Soviet Russia, 'the authoritarian methods that are inherent in military structures might be transferred to society as a whole'.[9]

It will be argued that the significance of a politician's background in the military or in another force structure is not obvious. It is insufficient, for example, as Robert Barylski did, to point towards the 'political psychology' of a 'military politician' without further elaborating this assertion.[10] In order to come to a fuller understanding of the role of politicians with a military background, the study of individual personalities in the first part of the chapter will differentiate such figures according to their previous rank and the tasks they fulfilled during active military service. The time lapsed since retirement from active military service, and also the conduct of 'military politicians' in particular situations are further factors that will be assessed. It will be shown that an institutional background in the force structures alone is not a sufficient explanation for why such figures should uniformly be more authoritarian or have a less democratic outlook than civilians.

The second part of this chapter assesses the nature of the role of politicians with a military background in post-Soviet Russia. As discussed in the relevant section in chapter one, presupposing a clear civil-military divide and framing their studies predominantly within the framework of democratic transition,[11] some civil-military relations analysts have interpreted the political activities of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia as the expression of an overly politicised military-as-institution, interfering in civilian affairs and posing an obstacle to democratisation. Jennifer Mathers, for example, spoke of an 'encroachment by the armed forces into electoral politics'.[12] According to Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, 'democratic gains achieved by civilian institutions are threatened by postcommunist militaries that are not similarly transformed'.[13] Similarly, John Moran concluded that 'for Russia to ensure that its military never resorts to autonomous or

[9] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', pp. 303-304.
[10] Barylski, The Soldier in Russian Politics, p. 238.
[11] See, for example, the introductory chapters to Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (eds.), Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe; Moran, From Garrison State to Nation State; and Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries.
[12] Mathers, 'Outside Politics?', p. 28.

violent powers, the country's democratic leaders must ensure that the military does not participate in factional activity'.[14] This portrayal is in contrast to that provided by analysts, who have evaluated the role of politicians with a military background in a different way. Linking their existence predominantly to Vladimir Putin's rise to political power, these figures have been portrayed as a tool in the hands of the president and as an expression of a more authoritarian policy direction pursued by him.[15]

The second part of this chapter goes on to assess the extent to which either of these contrasting interpretations accurately depict the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, or how their role can be understood alternatively. In order to achieve this aim, a range of factors will be considered. Firstly, the extent to which the activities of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia can be perceived as an interference in civilian affairs and as an obstacle to democracy. This is achieved by assessing instances in post-Soviet Russia, in which the conduct of 'military politicians' can be interpreted as attempts at illegal intervention or interference in the political process. Secondly, the legal framework regulating the political participation of figures with a military background will be outlined in order to assess the legality of their activities. Thirdly, the issue of elected and appointed 'military politicians' will be assessed with regards to the significance of this for understanding the nature of the role of such personalities in the political system. It will be concluded that, rather than to denote an interference of the military-as-institution in politics, or to constitute a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president, the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is that of regular participants in the political process.

This chapter fulfils three clear functions. Firstly, in engaging in a micro-level analysis of the political activities of figures with a military background, it provides a wealth of empirical evidence contributing to our understanding of an important area of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. Secondly, it amalgamates the studies

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[13] Peterson Ulrich, Democratising Communist Militaries, p. 186.
[14] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, p. 201.
[15] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'; Staar, 'KGB & Other Buddies in Putin Apparat'; 'Toward a Police State?'; 'Siloviki Inside'.

conducted by civil-military relations analysts throughout the post-Soviet era with the assessments of 'military politicians' linking their presence predominantly to the Putin's rise to political power. Thirdly, it addresses the above mentioned tendency of civil-military relations analysts to frame their studies within concepts of democratic transition and assesses the extent to which alternative approaches to, and conceptualisations of, post-Soviet politics, such as features of elite transition and regime politics, can add to our understanding of the role of 'military politicians'.

PART I
'MILITARY POLITICIANS' IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: LESS DEMOCRATIC THAN CIVILIANS?

Distinguishing the former ranks and roles of 'military politicians'

As discussed above, the institutional background of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia has been a cause of concern for a number of analysts, who were alarmed at the introduction of a more authoritarian policy direction by figures who, in the words of Kryshtanovskaia and White, were used to 'the authoritarian methods that are inherent in military structures'.[16] Due to a considerable level of elite continuity since the Soviet era, similar preconceptions about the persistence of an institutionalised authoritarian sentiment could be, and indeed have been, voiced (particularly in the early post-Soviet era) about a large part of the Russian civilian political elite.[17] That is, if the logic of institutional background as a permanent basis for the formation of an individual's ideological orientation is perceived as applicable to force-structure representatives wholesale, due to their 'military frame of mind',[18] the same logic could be applied to the not inconsiderable part of the civilian political leadership in post-Soviet Russia with a 'communist frame of mind', as they started their careers in the Soviet communist party (KPSS). However, whilst the institutional background of Vladimir Putin and of other former force-structure-representatives-turned-politicians is often noted even if this fact is not necessarily relevant to the context of the discussion, the past membership in the KPSS of many prominent politicians such as, for example, Grigorii Yavlinskii or Irina Khakamada, does not tend to be depicted as being of lasting significance.

In seeking to assess the significance of the former ranks and roles fulfilled by 'military politicians' for their conduct and activities in civilian posts, studies about the conduct of former Soviet political elites within a post-Soviet context reveal an interesting insight. In a study, for instance, of the post-Soviet political elite in Russia, Sharon Werning Rivera argued against the tendency displayed by some analysts of elite

[16] Kryshtanovskaia and White, p. 303-304.
[17] See, for instance, Martin Malia, 'From under the Rubble, What?', Problems of Communism, 41(1-2), January-April 1992, p. 92.
[18] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221

transformations, particularly in the early post-Soviet era, to portray members of the former Soviet elite that continued to be politically active in post-Soviet Russia as a monolithic unity.[19] She argued that the mere fact of previous membership in the KPSS, applied by some analysts as the relevant norm for measuring continuity of the Soviet regime, is not a sufficient condition of commonality that would allow for the evaluation of such politicians as a distinct group with permanent and identical political orientations. In Werning Rivera's opinion, 'in comparison with other activities [party membership] should rank low on the continuum of association with the previous regime'.[20] In her view, an approach limited to the consideration of party membership would lead to 'exceedingly high' conclusions in terms of elite continuity from Soviet times. Instead, she argued in favour of 'a more finely tuned, differentiated view of what constitutes membership of the old elite in order to evaluate levels of continuity'.[21] Werning Rivera suggested in particular that an analysis of the respective ranks and tasks attached to the party or governmental posts held by such figures during the Soviet era could contribute to a more balanced view of their degree of association and identification with the Soviet political order.

Werning Rivera's consideration of analytical differentiations in terms of rank and tasks is informative for a more detailed definition of representatives with a former affiliation to the military or other force structures. In view of the wide array of possible functions and positions carried out by *siloviki* during active service in the force structures, their respective previous ranks and tasks are likely to be important for their degree of association with the military system at large and their attachment to 'military-style traditions'.[22] The usefulness of differentiating military personnel by rank was also pointed out by Morris Janowitz in his study of the U.S. military. In studying political opinions of soldiers across the ranks, he found that the higher the rank held in the military

[19] Sharon Werning Rivera, 'Elites in Post-communist Russia: A Changing of the Guard?', Europe-Asia Studies, 52(3), 2000, pp. 413-432.
[20] ibid. p. 418.
[21] Ibid. p. 417.
[22] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.

hierarchy by an individual, the more likely he was to identify himself as having a conservative outlook.[23]

Applying this approach of differentiation according to rank to Russian *siloviki*, categories of association with the military system could start with persons having fulfilled conscript service, ranking up to the highest leading and commanding positions. One example of the significance of this is that of President Vladimir Putin. Whilst his career background in the KGB is regularly pointed out, it is rarely clarified that he did not hold a leading position in this particular institution, reaching merely the rank of lieutenant-colonel. The Russian defence analyst Vladislav Shurygin viewed the following differentiation as significant:

> Putin should not be regarded as a fully-fledged figure of the secret services. He used to work there, but has not become a part of them. He isn't Kriuchkov, who knew everybody and everything there, who had his generals and his system… No. Putin is a regular lieutenant-colonel, who finished his career in a small sub-unit on the territory of the former GDR and he knew, at best, this small area of work. And when he succeeded in getting to the top of the FSB hierarchy, he arrived there as a person who only just started to get experience. You know how cadres work. If a person gets appointed to a post, even to that of director of a polyclinic, he needs at least one and a half years until he knows what is going on, even if he was the registrar for fifteen years. He is acting on a completely different level… Putin, who was taken from a civilian post, which he held for seven or eight years, was made director of the FSB. But he remained in that position for less than a year. Putin could not really manage to get to know this system fully, despite the fact that he knew it already.[24]

In asserting that figures with a military background accounted for '15 to 70 percent of the membership of a variety of elite groups' in 2003, Olga Kryshtanovskaia and Stephen White crucially did not indicate the degrees of seniority of the military personnel included in these comprehensive figures.[25] Differentiating Russian 'military politicians' along the line of their previous ranks and positions in the force structures is likely to

[23] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 236.
[24] Interview with Vladislav Shurygin conducted in Moscow on 11 January 2002.
[25] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', p. 303.

provide a fuller understanding of the significance of their institutional background on their conduct in civilian posts.

In terms of the specific tasks fulfilled by *siloviki* during active service in the force structures, the need for differentiation is equally important. As discussed in the previous chapter, such roles can vary widely and the only common denominator of the force-structures' activities is a loosely defined concern with the defence and security of the Russian Federation. Looking at a number of examples of the 'military' activities previously carried out by some well-known *siloviki* in contemporary Russian politics, it becomes evident that the degree and substance of their 'military frame of mind'[26] and attachment to 'common military-style traditions',[27] such as a 'command-oriented style',[28] is likely to differ considerably.

Politicians who were termed in the language of the Russian journalist Sergei Mulin, 'real military figures or field generals',[29] or in the language of Janowitz, 'heroic types',[30] correspond closest to the Western or Huntingtonian concept of a 'military mind'[31] in terms of the former positions employed and tasks fulfilled by them. Examples are, for instance, the governors of the Moscow and Ul'ianovsk regions, Boris Gromov and Vladimir Shamanov respectively. Also, the presidential plenipotentiaries in the Southern (formerly North-Caucasus) and Far Eastern federal regions, Viktor Kazantsev and Konstantin Pulikovskii, or the Duma deputy of the Union of Right Forces (SPS) faction until 2003, Eduard Vorob'ev.[32] All five figures are united first of all by long professional careers as commanding officers in the Soviet and Russian regular armed forces. Moreover, all of them are distinguished by actual 'in-theatre' experience of

[26] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221.
[27] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.
[28] Taylor, 'Strong Men, Weak State', p. 1.
[29] Interview with Sergei Mulin conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001.
[30] As discussed in chapter one, Janowitz distinguished the 'heroic type' of military professional, perpetuating 'the warrior type, the mounted officer who embodies the martial spirit and the theme of personal valor', as only one possible characterisation of a modern military professional. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 21-22.
[31] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. 79-89. This concept was discussed in detail in the corresponding section in chapter one.
[32] Viktor Kazantsev was replaced by Vladimir Iakovlev in March 2004.

military conflict and war, having commanded armies and divisions in Afghanistan during Soviet times, and in Tajikistan and Chechnya in the post-Soviet era.[33]

'Military politicians' of the 'heroic type',[34] who spent their military careers with the fulfilment of the 'traditional' tasks of a military professional, such as the commanding of armies and the fighting of wars, constitute only one element in the overall number of *siloviki* in contemporary Russian politics.[35] In contrast to these 'heroic types', many prominent Russian politicians and officials distinguished by a military title correspond more closely to Janowitz's concept of the 'military manager', or Moskos' concept of the 'soldier-statesman' or 'soldier-scholar'.[36] Although distinguished by a military title, the previous careers of many prominent *siloviki* politicians in contemporary Russia were spent on highly specialised activities. These were often compatible with tasks required of civilian specialists, and not commonly associated with traditional military training, tasks, and discipline.

One example is retired Colonel-General Valerii Manilov. He was a member of the Russian Federation Council representing Primorskii region from 2001 until 2004. Manilov started his career in the Soviet armed forces, but achieved several higher education decrees in the humanities in civilian academic institutions. Throughout his entire career, which included leading positions in the Ministry of Defence and General Staff, Manilov practiced journalism and specialised in public relations. For instance, he was deputy editor-in-chief of the Ministry of Defence's publication, Krasnaia zvezda, from 1972 – 1978. He headed the ministry's coordinating council on information resources for military reform from 1997 until 2000, and directed the information centre of the federal forces' operational staff in the North Caucasus from 2000 – 2001. It seems

[33] The sources for bibliographical details of the examples cited here and throughout the chapter are drawn from a variety of sources. A large collection of bibliographies of the Russian federal and regional elite is available on the Russian-language documentary archive www.nns.ru.
[34] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 21-22
[35] Other examples are the presidential candidate in 1996 and former governor of Krasnoiarsk region, Aleksandr Lebed'; the Russian vice-president from 1991-1993 and former governor of Kursk region, Aleksandr Rutskoi; and the governor of Kaliningrad region since 2000, Vladimir Egorov.
[36] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 21-22.; Charles C. Moskos, 'Toward a Postmodern Military', in Moskos, Allen Williams, Segal, The Postmodern Military, p. 19.

likely that his experience in the sphere of information and public relations was at least as important for his appointment than his mere institutional attachment to the armed forces. A Russian military analyst even refused to view Manilov as a 'proper military person' on a par with Shamanov or Egorov discussed above. In the words of Viacheslav Izmailov, the defence correspondent of Novaia gazeta, 'Manilov worked in the polit-organs and in educational work. He did not command.'[37]

A similar career path was pursued by Colonel-General Andrei Chernenko, the head of the Federal Migration Service under the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) since 2002.[38] With a varied career background in the Soviet and Russian force structures, and having served as the director of the State Courier Service (GFS) from 1999 – 2002, Chernenko fits the description of a *silovik*-turned-politician. A closer look at his biography reveals, however, that Chernenko's career involved the fulfilment of 'military tasks' only in a very loose sense. Before entering service in the MVD's public relations department in 1989, Chernenko had worked as a journalist for different publications since 1972. Before his appointment as director of the GFS, Chernenko held a number of positions related mainly to publishing and public relations, both in the commercial sphere and in both force-structure and 'civilian' state bodies.[39] Again, his experience in the area of journalism and public relations, which as a skill was transferable to his civilian posts, made him a suitable candidate for the positions he held. When accused by a Russian journalist of being a 'Putinite' *silovik*, Chernenko countered that his military title did not change the fact that he is 'a person…who will always be a reporter in his mind'.[40]

[37] Interview with Viacheslav Izmailov conducted in Moscow on 10 December 2001.
[38] Chernenko served as deputy interior minister and head of the FMS under the MVD from February 2002 – April 2003. Having served as a deputy to Valentina Matvienko first in her position as the presidential envoy to Russia's North-Western administrative region and then as governor of St. Petersburg in the intervening period, he was re-appointed to head the FMS in June 2004.
[39] 1993 – 1994 deputy director of the publishing house *Russkaia Kniga*; 1994 – 1995 deputy chairman of the Press Committee, 1995 – 1997 deputy minister for nationalities and federal relations; 1997 – 1999 head of the information and public relations directorate of the MVD. Biography: www.grankin.ru.
[40] Aleksandr Gamov, 'Direktor Gosudarstvennoi fel'd''egerskoi sluzhby RF Andrei Chernenko: Lampasy na vlasti – eto ne khunta, a diktatura zakona'. Komsomol'skaia pravda, 19 February 2000.

A third example to be cited within this context is again that of Putin, whose career background makes shared 'military-style traditions'[41] as a link between him and other *siloviki* seem tenuous. Having avoided conscript service due to his university studies in law, Putin went on to serve in the foreign intelligence section of the Soviet KGB from 1975 until 1990, reaching the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Far from what one would associate with a 'traditional' military officer, leadership qualities of foreign intelligence agents were noted to have been 'organisational abilities, a certain degree of tact, and a businesslike manner'.[42] Similarly remote from 'traditional' military tasks, the work carried out by Putin throughout his intelligence career, which he spent predominantly in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was 'recruiting sources of information, obtaining information, analysing it, and sending it to Moscow'.[43]

Due to the wide range of tasks fulfilled by *siloviki* in post-Soviet Russia, the commonality of their 'military-style traditions'[44] and respective attachment to 'authoritarian methods inherent in military structures'[45] are relative. Already in 1960, Janowitz pointed out that the traditional understanding of military discipline based on authoritarian domination was shifting. This was in line with the increasing specialisation and widening skills fulfilled by the military professional meaning a 'greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus'; or 'from domination to initiative'. All-embracing control and rigid discipline traditionally associated with military organisations was no longer seen as appropriate for the management of the increasingly complex military establishment.[46] If this was to apply to the U.S. armed forces, which, in comparison to the post-Soviet Russian military system, always have been relatively institutionally coherent, it is easy to see that the degree of adherence to 'military-style traditions'[47] and military discipline by representatives of Russia's numerous force-

[41] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.
[42] This is according to Mikhail Frolov, a former instructor of Vladimir Putin in the Andropov Red Banner Institute (Academy of Foreign Intelligence). Quoted in Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self Portrait by Russia's President, London: Random House, 2000, p. 53.
[43] ibid. pp. 69-70.
[44] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.
[45] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', pp. 303-304.
[46] Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, pp. 38-53. Quotes on p. 38 and 40.
[47] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.

structures is likely to differ considerably. Such a distinction was made intuitively by the Russian journalist Vitali Dymarskii when he deliberated on the extent of commonality between former force-structure personnel in political careers:

> I think that generally the armed forces and intelligence services are a different category altogether. They are working according to different principles... [Intelligence agents] are also wearing epaulets and they also have a system of subordination, but, as far as I know, their interrelationship on a purely professional level is based on different principles. Of course they also get orders and have to fulfil them, but I think people there work differently, their cooperation is different. If we are made to march together every day on the parade ground, this is one thing... But if we sit together in an office every day and think about how to catch a criminal or a spy, then the process and outcome of our work is more mind-oriented, more intellectual to some degree. Of course we also need guns and have to run around, but it seems that the nature of the interrelationship is different. I neither served in the one, nor in the other, so I don't know... but this is how I imagine it.[48]

In furthering the aim of adding to the general level of understanding about the actual role of 'military politicians' in the political system, this section has addressed the question of their democratic credentials. It is considered whether Russian politicians with a force-structure background are less democratic in their outlook than their civilian counterparts as a result of their previous institutional affiliation. It has been shown that, similar to a previous affiliation to the KPSS or Soviet political order by civilian politicians in post-Soviet Russia, the mere fact of a person's previous institutional affiliation to a force structure does not automatically allow for wholesale conclusions in terms of their authoritarian or anti-democratic outlook. Both the previous rank and role fulfilled by a *silovik* are likely to be an important indicator of his degree of attachment to 'military-style traditions'.[49]

Once a military person, always a military person?

Samuel Huntington has argued that the political military ethic is 'permanent and universal'.[50] A similar perception has been expressed implicitly by authors writing on

[48] Interview with Vitalii Dymarskii conducted in Moscow on 9 January 2002.
[49] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.
[50] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p 89.

post-Soviet Russia, who have characterised retired military personnel in political posts as having a 'military frame of mind',[51] and supposing, for example, that even in civilian positions such figures continue to adhere to the 'command-oriented bureaucratic styles' of their previous employer.[52] The concern has been expressed that, as a result, 'the authoritarian methods that are inherent in military structures might be transferred to society as a whole'.[53] This section argues, however, that it cannot be assumed that the previous experience of 'military politicians' in a command-oriented military organisation is of lasting importance for their conduct in a civilian post, or that they will permanently act in line with the undemocratic *modus operandi* of their former employer. As will be shown below, many Russian 'military politicians' have long since retired from active service in the force structures and have revealed great potential for adapting to the more compromise-based and less command-oriented environment of 'civilian politics'. Furthermore, many such personalities have gained considerable political experience and/or have made a conscious effort at acquiring the skills required of them in their new positions. As a result, the delineation between a 'military politician' and a 'civilian politician' is often blurred.

With regard to this argument it is useful to again look for parallels in academic studies of civilian elite transformations from the Soviet to the post-Soviet eras. Similarly to Werning Rivera, David Lane argued in favour of a differentiated approach to the study of elite circulation during Russia's post-Soviet transformation.[54] Lane contended that the position taken by some writers that 'a "reproduction of the nomenklatura"…means that the forms of previous domination continue – the Communist political elites have been reconstituted in a new political form and the post-communist political order is merely a new shell legitimating the previous forms of domination', is actually a poor indicator of elite change.[55]

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[51] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221.
[52] Taylor, 'Strong Men, Weak State', p. 1.
[53] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', pp. 303-304.
[54] David Lane, 'Transition under Eltsin: the Nomenklatura and Political Elite Circulation', Political Studies, 45, 1997, pp. 855-874.
[55] ibid. p. 855. The positions criticised by Lane were expressed, for example, in the following works: Ivan Szelenyi and Szonia Szelenyi, 'Circulation or Reproduction of Elites during the Post-Communist Transformation', Theory and Society, 24, 1995, pp. 615-638; Eric Hanley, Natasha Yershova and Richard

Instead, Lane proposed that, rather than taking the occupational origin of a former member of the Soviet political elite as the single determinant factor for their political activities within a post-Soviet context, differentiation in terms of political values, political culture and ideological affiliation was crucial for the drawing of significant conclusions when studying the paradigm of elite change.[56] Crucially, Lane pointed out that the political outlook of a person cannot be presumed to be constant and permanent: 'Sections of the elite may undergo a political "conversion" to different policies from the traditional. Political leaders may change their policies: they may learn from past mistakes, from other countries, they may recognize deficiencies in existing structures and procedures'.[57]

Due to the fact that *siloviki*-politicians in post-Soviet Russia have, as a rule, retired from active military/law-enforcement service, similar considerations of the possibility for changes in an individual's political values and outlooks over time are also an important differentiation to make in an analysis of the role of 'military politicians'. Instead of simply presuming a permanent attachment to 'authoritarian methods inherent in military structures', [58] possible changes in the political outlook and behaviour of retired *siloviki* have to be considered. In cautioning against the involvement of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics, some analysts appear to imply that the negative factor of these people's force-structure background is exacerbated in the Russian case due to their previous affiliation to not only military or other force structures per se, but to *Soviet* military or force structures in particular. For instance, Brian Taylor noted the following:

> There are, of course, many examples around the world of officers becoming successful politicians. In general, though, the rigid hierarchies of military-style organizations are poor schools for the logrolling and compromise of modern state bureaucracies. The Soviet KGB and Armed Forces were particularly poor training

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Anderson, 'Russia – Old Wine in a New Bottle? The Circulation and Reproduction of Russian elites, 1983-1993', Theory and Society, 24, 1995, pp. 639-668; Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'From Soviet Nomenklatura to Russian Elite'.

[56] ibid. pp. 860 and 856.

[57] ibid., p. 861.

[58] Kryshtanovskaia and White 'Putin's Militocracy', pp. 303-304.

> grounds in this respect, marked by a secretiveness and separation from civilian life that is inappropriate for current requirements.[59]

Such an assertion implies that the outlook of representatives of the Soviet force structures was, and continues to be, of a Soviet regime-supporting nature, or at least remains permanently attached to the 'customs' of the Soviet institutions to which they belonged, such as secretiveness and the separation from civilian life.

A look at the biography of a number of prominent *siloviki*-politicians in post-Soviet Russia, who started their careers in the Soviet military or other force structures reveals that such an assumption cannot necessarily be taken for granted. For example, Sergei Stepashin, who reached the military rank of lieutenant-colonel and has been described as a 'Putin man',[60] was appointed by the State Duma as the head of the Russian audit chamber in 2000.[61] His career background is in the Soviet MVD, where he worked from 1973 – 1990. Throughout the post-Soviet period Stepashin served in a number of parliamentary, ministerial and other official posts, including director of the FSB, minister of justice, interior minister, and prime minister. Whilst clearly fitting the image of a *silovik* emerging from the Soviet force structures, Stepashin's actions at the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union and his further political and official career do not indicate that he has been permanently attached to the institutional 'customs' of his former *alma mater*.

During the August 1991 coup attempt, Stepashin was firmly on the side of the civilian leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev, and actively participated in the defence of the White House. Moreover, after the collapse of the coup attempt, Stepashin, in his position as the chairman of the defence and security committee of the Russian Supreme

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[59] Taylor, 'Strong Men, Weak State', p. 5. An emphasis of the particularly Soviet institutional background as a negative indicator for the activities of politicians in post-Soviet Russia was also displayed by Richard F. Staar, 'KGB & other Buddies in Putin Apparat', Perspective, 10(4), March-April 2000. (Internet version)
[60] Gordon Bennett, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Special Services, Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre Document No. C108, August 2002.
[61] At time of writing the head of the Russian Audit Chamber was selected and appointed by the Russian State Duma. In summer 2004 efforts were underway to adopt a legislative bill that would allow the Russian president to nominate a candidate to head the Audit Chamber, who would then be subject to approval by

Soviet, was put in charge by Boris El'tsin to head a state commission established to investigate the activities of the KGB. This was the so-called 'Stepashin Commission'. On this commission Stepashin worked closely with a number of reformist Supreme Soviet members. In addition to determining the role of the KGB in the coup attempt, the commission was also tasked with the development of proposals to reform and restructure the KGB.[62] Although the commission's full report was never published – reportedly at the request of the Procurator General, Valentin Stepankov – Stepashin declared the major finding to have been the fact that the KGB leadership had played an important role in the lengthy period of preparation and the carrying out of the attempted coup. Both in his position as the chairman of the Supreme Soviet defence and security committee, and in his later posts in the Russian Security Ministry, Stepashin was actively involved in the dismantling of the Soviet KGB structure and in the creation of the Russian post-Soviet force structures that emanated from it.

In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Stepashin ran and was elected on the party list of the liberal democratic party Iabloko, whose leaders and programme he described as 'close to his heart.'[63] None of Stepashin's late Soviet and post-Soviet career developments indicate a persistent backward-looking stance and adherence to the institutional 'customs' of the Soviet force structures. [64] In response to Western coverage of Stepashin's appointment as prime minister in May 1999, the British journalist Thomas DeWaal was critical of the fact that, in his view, Stepashin was prematurely 'acquiring the tag "hardliner" in the same rather thoughtless way Primakov became a former "spymaster"'. In the eyes of DeWaal such an evaluation of Stepashin was unbalanced, because his 'record on law and order, security and Chechnya is mixed but by no means all black'.[65]

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the State Duma. The first reading of this bill was conducted in July 2004. Parlamentskaia gazeta, 20 July 2004.

[62] For more detail on the 'Stepashin Commission' see J. Michael Waller, Secret Empire: The KGB in Russia Today, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 80-82.

[63] From an interview with Sergei Stepashin. 'Brak po vsaimnoi simpatii storon', Obshchaia gazeta, 2 September 1999.

[64] Detailed bibliography on the journalists' archive, www.grankin.ru.

[65] Thomas DeWaal, contribution to Johnson's Russia List published on 12 May 1999.

Another example to be cited within this context, again, is that of Putin. With particular reference to this figure the implicit presumption of 'once a KGB man always a KGB man',[66] has led many analysts to make 'fearful comments about his service in the KGB, and gloomy predictions about his future governing methods, which, considering his past, were expected to be semi-dictatorial'.[67] Again, however, a closer look at his biography reveals that, already towards the end of the Soviet era Putin, 'the KGB man', started to lose his affinity with the *modus operandi* of his former employer. After returning from his lengthy deployment in the GDR, following its fall in January 1990, Putin went to Leningrad where he first started to work on a doctoral dissertation in international law. He then took up the position of assistant to the then-chairman of the Leningrad city council and later mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatolii Sobchak. Remaining an 'active reservist'[68] of the KGB initially, Putin claimed that he soon felt his institutional affiliation to be a disadvantage for the furthering of his new political career and ultimately made a decision in favour of the latter.[69] Having written his letter of resignation earlier that month, the coup attempt in August 1991 happened before Putin's resignation had been accepted. Despite the fact that he continued to be on the payroll of the KGB, Putin was no longer prepared to accept the discipline and subordination structure of his employer. Describing his personal experience of the events of August 1991, Putin said:

> I was no longer a KGB officer. As soon as the coup began I immediately decided whose side I was on. I knew for sure that I would never follow the coup-plotters' orders. I would never be on their side. I knew perfectly well that my behaviour

[66] Richard Sakwa criticised this approach in, 'The Overall Trend is Toward Democracy', RFE/RL Russian Political Weekly, 4(26), 7 July 2004.
[67] Such a simplified approach was criticised by Gordon Bennett, Vladimir Putin and Russia's Special Services, p. 4 (quote); and by Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', pp. 7-9.
[68] According to Olga Kryshtanovskaya 'this status implies that an officer is posted to a position into an outsider department, but his wage is retained as well as the privileges from the "parent" organization'. Olga Kryshtanovskaya, 'The President's Dangerous Personal Preferences', The St. Petersburg Times, 4 July 2003.
[69] In his autobiography Putin wrote: 'Relations in the city council were not always smooth, mostly because they lobbied someone's interests. Once a deputy came up to me and said. […] "There are bad people here – all sorts of enemies – and they've sniffed out that you are a KGB agent. You have to foil them. I am prepared to help you, but you have to do me a favour." I realized that they wouldn't leave me alone. They would blackmail me, pure and simple. So I made a difficult decision and wrote my letter of resignation.' Putin, First Person, p. 91.

> could be considered a crime of office. That's why on August 20, I wrote a second statement resigning from the KGB.[70]

A last example in favour of the argument that the former employment of 'military politicians' in a force structure does not permanently preclude their possible appreciation of democratic values is that of retired general Eduard Vorob'ev. As mentioned above, Vorob'ev's background is in the Soviet armed forces, where he pursued an active military career first as a rank-and-file soldier and then in various commanding positions from 1957 until 1995. In 1995, Vorob'ev resigned from the armed forces as a result of his disagreement with El'tsin's decision to use military intervention in order to resolve problems in the Chechen republic. After his resignation he served as a Duma deputy from 1995 until 2003, having been elected first on the party list of Russia's Democratic Choice and then SPS. Although Vorob'ev has been depicted as a 'token' military figure, used by these political parties as a way of appealing to the 'military electorate' and to the electorate more widely,[71] a closer look at his decision to take up a political career reveals a rather more thought-out change of political outlook. When asked for the reasons why he decided to enter politics, Vorob'ev answered:

> Speaking about my political activities, I have been politically active all my life, or at least since the moment I became a military person. In 1968 I practically executed the political decisions of the highest leadership of the Soviet Union. I went into Czechoslovakia in 1968. I was a direct executor of political activities. In 1991, I was the last commander of the central group of forces in Czechoslovakia. [...] I was the representative of the Soviet government with regard to the presence of our forces in Czechoslovakia. While I was serving, I was a deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. [...] I was a Communist for thirty years. Therefore, speaking about 1995, it would be more logical to ask the following question: How did a general, a [Communist] Party member for thirty years, end up in a liberal-democratic movement?
>
> At the time [of my retirement], the party, Russia's Democratic Choice, was headed by Egor Gaidar. As he was also the acting head of government, I was familiar with this person both in my capacity as a commander of the joint peacekeeping forces, and as the presidential ombudsman for developments in Tajikistan. Being the head of government, Gaidar periodically...invited me to

[70] ibid. p. 93.
[71] See, for instance, Jacob Kipp, The Russian Military and the 1995 Parliamentary Elections: A Primer, Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), October 1995.

> Moscow in order to hear my personal reports about events. It is one thing if a person is getting reports from his subordinates, and it is another thing if he gets them from the person in charge. And this is how I got to know him. I saw that he, the head of government, was working in his office all weekends. I realised that he even slept there... The closer I got to know him the more respect I had for him, for his approaches and his ability to work with people... This is one thing.
>
> Russia's Democratic Choice also was the only party to speak out against the use of force in Chechnya... So, as I had left the army, but had been linked to politics all my life, for me there simply wasn't another political movement than Russia's Democratic Choice, if I can put it like this. Gaidar's approach and the party's position with regard to Chechnya at that point in time were closest to mine, and as a result of all these coinciding factors I ended up in Russia's Democratic Choice.[72]

The examples above were cited in order to reveal the potential of 'military politicians' for a change in political outlook. In doing so, it was showed that these personalities' previous institutional affiliation to a force structure does not preclude their appreciation of democratic values and their adaptation to the less command-oriented and more compromise-based mode of operation of a modern state.

In addition to the presumption of the permanent attachment of Russian 'military politicians' to the *modus operandi* of their previous employer, it has been argued that the employment of such personalities in civilian posts is undesirable, because they lack the 'economic and legal experience' required of a politician.[73] Such caution is understandable if a military person enters high-ranking public office immediately upon retirement with no prior relevant experience for the new position. The same concern could be voiced, however, with regard to any individual entering a high-profile political career without any previous political experience. Recognising that immediately entering into a political career could pose a problem, the Russian military sociologist Vladimir Serebriannikov, for example, suggested the following: 'Speaking from experience, it might be useful to institute a 4-5 year gap after retirement [from military service] as a requirement necessary for gaining the right to be elected to a leading state post. During that time [such figures]

[72] Interview with Eduard Vorob'ev conducted in Moscow on 11 January 2002.
[73] Taylor, 'Strong Men, Weak State', p. 5.

can gain experience of civilian public and political life, can overcome their professional limitations, and can develop the skills necessary for the role of a political actor'.[74]

Some examples of Russian 'military politicians', who have entered a political career immediately upon retirement from active military service, appear to substantiate such a concern to an extent. However, their subsequent conduct in civilian posts showed that in addition to adapting to the less authoritarian style of their new work environment, they were also able to acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to carry out the tasks required of them. One such example is Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov, who commanded Russia's 58th Army until he was elected governor of Ul'ianovsk region in December 2000. Shamanov took up his first commanding position in 1978 and pursued an active professional military career until 2000. Having participated in the first and second Chechen wars, Shamanov was decorated with Russia's highest honorary title, Hero of Russia, in December 1999. Due to his outspoken and uncompromisingly tough approach to the second Chechen war in particular, Shamanov acquired controversial fame and notoriety.[75] Despite his initial electoral success, in August 2003 the Russian public opinion foundation FOM found Shamanov to be the most unpopular governor in Russia (73 percent of respondents evaluated him negatively). FOM attributed negative ratings of governors mainly to the perceived deteriorating economic situation and living standards.[76] Therefore, Shamanov's extremely negative evaluation could support the thesis that he lacked the economic experience necessary to run a Russian region.

A similar example of the direct entrance from a military position into the career of a state official with no previous experience in such a role is that of Viktor Kazantsev,

[74] Vladimir Serebriannikov, 'Voennye v politicheskikh protsessakh Rossii', p. 257.
[75] Many interviews in newspapers and on television with Shamanov were broadcast throughout the second Chechen war, turning him into a prominent general. For a taste of Shamanov's 'tough stance' see his interview with Anna Politkovskaia, 'Ia – Shamanov', Novaia Gazeta, 19 June 2000. The attitudes towards Shamanov of respondents of the interviews conducted for this research were clearly split. Whilst one political analyst asserted that 'I liked him when he very strictly punished the Chechen bandits and extremists, I used to be on his side and I admired his actions, because I have always been sure that we will never ever achieve anything in Chechnya without the methods used by Shamanov', another analyst described him as follows: ' Shamanov is a criminal – it is the truth, he is a real criminal. Because what he did in Chechnya was a crime'. (Names withheld)

who, after a life-long career in the armed forces, commanded the joint group of federal forces in the North Caucasus until 2000, when he was appointed presidential plenipotentiary in the North-Caucasus federal region.[77] Similarly, Mikhail Grishankov, a Duma deputy since 1999, was an active officer in the Cheliabinsk branch of the FSB from 1991 until his election in a single mandate district in his home town.

Despite the seamless change from military to political career of the latter three examples with no previous experience in such roles, however, their activities in their new positions indicated their willingness and potential for acquiring the skills required of them in their new civilian posts. In a roundtable discussion about 'military politicians' Shamanov argued the following:

> Why are *siloviki* portrayed as people with a tunnel vision conditioned by their professional background? Personally I finished a military school and two academies, one of them was the Academy of the General Staff. These establishments train statesmen in the broad sense of the word. I have a PhD in sociology and am now working on my doctorate. The best representatives of the force structures don't just stew in their own bubble, but also come into contact with politics and science. I think it is wrong to portray them as people who easily step over democratic principles.[78]

In what Nikolai Petrov called 'a neophyte enthusiasm for the job', Kazantsev made a conscious effort to learn his new trade by obtaining a PhD in political science and attending courses on regional studies at a local university.[79] Grishankov, who already held two previous higher degrees in engineering, obtained an economics degree from Cheliabinsk university in 1998 in preparation for his political career. Similar to Shamanov, Grishankov defended his suitability for the post he held in the following words:

> I have three university degrees. Two of them with a distinction. I have a gallantry medal. I always worked for the country. What is wrong with that? Yes, I really

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[76] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), 'Rossiiskie gubernatory – sekrety populiarnosti', 16 October 2003. Document available on the foundation's website at www.fom.ru.
[77] Kazantsev was replaced by Vladimir Iakovlev in March 2004.
[78] Quoted in Ostapchuk and Stepanov, 'Genodriad'.
[79] Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia', p. 82.

> believe that today I am more useful for the state working as a Duma deputy, where I can express my position openly and in public. I don't think that where I worked earlier matters.[80]

Having established that Russian 'military politicians' have the potential to both adapt to the more 'democratic' style of their new work environment and to acquire the skills necessary to carry out the tasks required of them in their civilian posts, a last question to be addressed is the following. When does a retired military person in a political career cease to be a 'military politician' and turn into a 'civilian politician'? In discussing a number of prominent 'military politicians' with Russian analysts in 2001 and 2002, several respondents no longer saw some of the figures, who are often cited as examples of 'military politicians', as representatives of the military system. With regard to the then-governor of Krasnoiarsk region, Aleksandr Lebed', for example, several respondents pointed out that in their opinion, Lebed' over the years had turned into a 'regular' politician: 'I think the fact that he used to be in the military hardly influences his activities in the present'; 'he turned into a standard regional *tsarik* and as a politician he is not interesting'; 'in starting a political career people – such as Lebed' or Shamanov – turn into regular governors like all the others… After a year or two they are just as grey as all the others.'[81] In discussing the merits of military figures performing as regional governors, Nikolai Petrov described retired General Gromov, a Duma deputy from 1995 and governor of Moscow region since 1999, as 'basically transformed into a civilian politician.'[82]

An example of a prominent post-Soviet politician, whose definition as either a *silovik* or civilian is also unclear, is Evgenii Primakov. Although Primakov is often traded as a *silovik*, due to his period of leadership in the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), it seems more appropriate to describe him as a civilian and career politician. Primakov, who has not undergone military training and does not possess a military rank or title, himself rejected accusations of the 'militarisation of politics' that were voiced by some Russian

[80] Interview with Mikhail Grishankov conducted in Moscow on 23 October 2002.
[81] *Tsarik* = little tsar. Interviews with Vitalii Dymarskii, Andrei Zakharov, and Viktor Iliukhin conducted in Moscow on 9 January 2002 and 12 December 2001, and 24 January 2002.
[82] Nikolai Petrov, 'Desiat' negritiat v lampasakh', Moskovskie novosti, 16 September 2003.

and Western journalists throughout his tenure as foreign minister from January 1996 until September 1998, and as prime minister from September 1998 until May 1999.[83] Before his appointment as the head of the SVR in 1991, Primakov worked as an academic and journalist. Amongst other positions he worked for the Soviet broadcasting institution, *Gosteleradio*, from 1953 – 1962, he gained his PhD in economics from Moscow State University in 1956, and acted as the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian academy of sciences from 1985 – 1989. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 1999 Primakov occupied, along with Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov and the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, one of the three leading places on the party list of *Otechestvo* (OVR). Primakov was a Duma deputy from 1999 – 2003 and was elected president of the Russian chamber of commerce (*Torgovo-promyshlennaia palata*) in December 2001.

Similarly, the delineation of Putin as a 'civilian politician' or a 'military politician' is not straight forward. Putin, whose force structure background is so regularly pointed out, appears to perceive himself as a civilian rather than as a military person. As pointed out above, Putin resigned from active service in the KGB in August 1991. Throughout the decade from 1990 until his election as president in March 2000, Putin served in a variety of official and political positions, first in the Leningrad and St. Petersburg regional executive, and from 1996 onwards in the federal executive in Moscow. In St. Petersburg Putin held different positions in the administration of the mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatolii Sobchak, and in 1995 he headed the regional branch of the political party Our Home is Russia (NDR). After Sobchak's electoral defeat in 1996, Putin resigned from the city administration and took up the offer of a position in El'tsin's presidential administration, where he held different positions, lastly as first deputy head of the administration, until 1998.

In July 1998 Putin was appointed director of the FSB, a position in which he remained for about one year. By then, Putin appeared to perceive himself to be a civilian bureaucrat, rather than a military person. As El'tsin recalled Putin's appointment as FSB

[83] Evgenii Primakov, Vosem mesiatsev plius, Moscow: Mysl, 2002, pp.23-25.

director in his autobiography, 'I sat down for a serious conversation with Putin. I proposed that he return to military service and obtain the rank of general. "What for?" Putin asked. "I resigned from the agencies on August 20, 1991. I don't want to return to full-time service. I am a civilian. It's important that such a power ministry be headed by a civilian".'[84] El'tsin's account coincides with Putin's own recollection of his appointment as FSB director: 'I had completed my service as a lieutenant colonel ten years earlier. During those ten years, I had a different life. And when I came to work at the FSB, it was not as a colonel but as a civilian, who held the position of first deputy to the chief of the presidential administration'. When asked whether he thus saw himself as a civilian leader of the security agency, he replied: 'Of course, but nobody paid attention to that, either because they were stupid or ignorant, or because they didn't want to.'[85]

Having been asked in an interview with an American radio station for his opinion about the high level of importance attached to his KGB background, Putin answered the following: 'I never regretted having worked for the foreign intelligence service of the Soviet Union. I served my country and I don't think I did a bad job of it. Having said this, however, we should not forget that back then we lived in an entirely different world that no longer exists.'[86] In the words of David Foglesong and Gordon Hahn, 'Putin's pre-presidential background…[does not] match the caricature of him as an untrustworthy KGB spook turned would-be-dictator'.[87] The examples above showed that it cannot be assumed that the conduct of a military person will always be defined by the institutional customs of his previous employer. With many years of experience in civilian roles, the delineation of many politically active *siloviki* as 'military politicians' or 'civilian politicians' is not clear cut.

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[84] Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, London: Phoenix, 2000, pp. 327-328.
[85] Putin, First Person, p. 133. During his career in the KGB Putin reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Historically, only generals were appointed as chairmen or directors of the KGB and FSB. Due to Putin's previous rank and current status as a civilian, high-ranking officers of the FSB reportedly did not easily accept his appointment as FSB director. Discontent amongst FSB staff was furthered when as a result of reorganisations of the service under Vladimir Putin up to a third of long-serving officers were sent into retirement or located into the regions. Aleksander Rahr, Wladimir Putin: Der "Deutsche" im Kreml, München: Universitas, 2000, p. 173.
[86] Interview with Vladimir Putin on the American radio station National Public Radio on 15 November 2001. Transcript published on the presidential website www.kremlin.ru.
[87] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 9.

In addressing the overall question as to whether 'military politicians' are less democratic than their civilian counterparts, it has been showed above that, just as it cannot be assumed that the political outlook of civilian politicians in contemporary Russia with a background in the KPSS is permanently fixed to the party line even within the context of post-Soviet politics, the experience gained by an individual in a military organisation should not be presumed to be the only lasting determinant factor of such a person's conduct in a political position. It is acknowledged that a seamless career change from the military into politics might give cause for concern with respect to an individual's economic management and other skills, which are necessary for the successful fulfilment of a high political post. However, it should not be ignored that many *siloviki*-politicians in contemporary Russia have gained transferable skills in the course of their military careers. Many of these personalities have made conscious efforts to acquire skills appropriate for their new positions, or have been active in civilian positions for so long that their status as a military person is becoming increasingly blurred.

Military control over 'crazy civilians'?

The conduct of individual Russian 'military politicians' in particular situations is a further factor that can lead towards an answer to the question, are 'military politicians' less democratic than their civilian counterparts? In a discussion in early 2002 of the role played by 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, a Russian political analyst who did not wish to be identified as an interviewee, but who is well-known both in Russia and in the English-speaking security studies environment, asserted that the civil-military dichotomy underlying Western concepts of civil-military relations can lead to distorted conclusions when applied to the study of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. In her view, several instances in Russia's post-Soviet history revealed that, rather than pose an obstacle to democratisation, the action of some politicians with a military background, bluntly speaking, could instead be interpreted as 'military control over "crazy" civilians'. One such instance singled out by this analyst was the conduct of Army General Anatolii Kulikov, during his tenure as minister of the interior and deputy prime minister from

1995 – 1998.[88] In the spring of 1996, rumours were reported in the Russian and Western media concerning plans hatched by El'tsin and his entourage to ban the Communist Party, to disband the current convocation of the State Duma, and to postpone the presidential elections due to the president's low popularity ratings and poor chances of emerging as the victor in the presidential elections scheduled for June of that year. Rumour also had it that Kulikov had played a central role in preventing the president from carrying out this unconstitutional act.[89]

Several years later, El'tsin himself substantiated these rumours in his autobiography: 'I had to take a radical step. I told my staff to prepare the documents. Decrees were written to ban the Communist Party, dissolve the Duma, and postpone the presidential elections.'[90] Although El'tsin's account reduces Kulikov's intervention to the latter's '[speaking] out unexpectedly sharply against the plan', due to concerns about the security implications of such an activity,[91] Kulikov's own autobiography presents a somewhat more principled basis for his decision to prevent the realisation of El'tsin's plans, which he perceived as clearly unconstitutional:

> I knew that at the end of the day the majority of Russians would vote for the continuation of reforms, no matter how incomplete and one-sided they had turned out. This is a natural historical choice. It is a choice determined by the wish to live in peace and quiet…and in the surroundings of political, economic and spiritual freedom.

[88] Kulikov started his career in the Soviet MVD in 1963 and continued to serve in the MVD during the post-Soviet era, commanding the joint group of federal forces in the Chechen republic in 1995 before his appointment as interior minister. Kulikov was appointed interior minister in July 1995, and in February 1997 to the simultaneous position of deputy prime minister. He was dismissed in March 1998 as a member of the cabinet of Viktor Chernomyrdin. With the appointment of the new prime minister, Sergei Kirienko, Kulikov and Chernomyrdin were the only members of the outgoing cabinet not to be reinstated to a new ministerial post. Following his dismissal, Kulikov, who is a doctor of economics, was appointed as the chief research fellow in the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for socio-political research in 1998. He has been a Duma deputy since 1999, first in the faction of OVR and then as a member of the faction of *Edinaia Rossiia*.

[89] For an early account of this see Timothy L. Thomas, 'Anatoliy Sergeevich Kulikov: Policeman, Power Minister, Deputy Prime Minister…Politician?', Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 7(1), 1998, p. 151.

[90] Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries, p. 24.

[91] ibid.

> I didn't want El'tsin, with whom the people linked the transition to extended democratic liberties, to make an irreversible step and to usurp in the name of higher ideals whatever little his fellow citizens had left. I wanted honest elections. I wanted all Russians without exception to express their will in them: both democrats and communists and also those, who had not yet made up their minds.[92]

Kulikov's conduct in this situation clearly speaks against the assumption that 'military politicians' are necessarily less democratic than civilians.

Another more well-known instance that can be interpreted at least as an attempt at 'military control over "crazy civilians"', occurred during the initial stages of the first Chechen war. When the decision was made by the civilian leadership under El'tsin to use military force for the suppression of separatist tendencies in the Chechen republic in the autumn of 1994, severe criticism of this decision was voiced from within leading elements of the armed forces.

Three vocal critics of military intervention at the time were generals Aleksandr Lebed', Boris Gromov and Eduard Vorob'ev, all of whom later went on to become prominent 'military politicians'. Gromov and Vorob'ev were particularly outspoken in their opposition to the use of the regular armed forces within its own territory. They perceived this to be contrary to what they understood as their professional calling.

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[92] Anatolii Kulikov, Tiazhelye zvezdy, Moscow: Voina i Mir, 2002, p. 420. In this autobiography, Kulikov also seeks to set the record straight with regard to El'tsin's recollection of the events in March 1996 in accordance with his own autobiography, the Midnight Diaries. El'tsin alleged that the meeting with government officials, his administration and some ministers of the force structures concerning the cancellation of the elections and the ban of the Communist Party had taken place on 23 March. He depicted the gathering as a 'preliminary meeting' that was called in order to 'bounce ideas off each other' and to engage in an open debate about the merits and disadvantages of his plans. According to El'tsin, the meeting ended in a majority decision to realise the plans, and his decision to reverse them was made only after his daughter Tania and Anatolii Chubais had convinced him not to commit a mistake (pp. 24-25). Kulikov, on the other hand, asserts that the meeting discussed by El'tsin took place on 18 March and that he had already spoken out sharply against the plans on the previous day. Kulikov also rejects El'tsin's claim that there had been a majority decision to implement the plans. According to Kulikov, 'nobody committed themselves to extol the plans. This is an invention.' (p. 422). Of course, both El'tsin and Kulikov want to write interpretations that suit them. However, Kulikov's account, unlike El'tsin's, gains credibility due to the fact that it coincides with the reports published in Russian newspapers at the time of the events. See, for example, Timothy L. Thomas, 'Anatoliy Sergeevich Kulikov', p. 151. Thomas's article is interesting inasmuch as it seeks to dispel the depiction of Kulikov at the time in both the Russian and Western press as a hawkish military politician.

According to Gromov, the military was not intended to be used as a police force,[93] and Vorob'ev asserted to similar effect: 'I was and am of the opinion that the army should not be used within its own country. It is supposed to deal with external tasks, in connection with the provision of military security, to avert aggression and to defeat the enemy.'[94] As a result of their outspoken opposition, Gromov was demoted from his position of deputy minister of defence. Vorob'ev, who at the time was the first deputy commander of the Russian ground forces, refused to take command of the operations in Chechnya and was, as a result, dismissed from his position for his refusal to carry out his military duty.

In viewing this episode through the prism of Western concepts of civil-military relations, Roy Allison interpreted the generals' outspoken criticism of the civilians' plans for Chechnya as a crisis of military control. John Moran saw it as a form of military intervention and insubordination, and as 'inappropriate behaviour for a civilian-controlled military'. Lyle Goldstein took it as a sign of insufficient military professionalism in Russia and as 'a real challenge to civilian control in Russia's fledging democracy'.[95] Whilst military subordination to civilian decision-making is an indisputable necessity, these conclusions are in need of modification due to the specificities of this particular case. Firstly, 'intervention' appears to be an ill-chosen description of the generals' actions, as the concerned officers' insubordination was expressed in their passivity or refusal to participate in the operations. Also, the generals dealt with the consequences of their conduct and accepted demotion or dismissal. Secondly, the generals' crime of violating the principle of civilian supremacy was matched, if not caused, by the civilian leadership's violation of the principle of the non-involvement of the Russian regular armed forces within the territory of the state.

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[93] Quoted in Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, p. 46. In a similar manner, Gromov was a vocal critic of the use of military force to solve the conflict between the Russian executive and legislature in October 1993 with military force. He also refused to participate in the MO collegium session, where the decision to storm the White House was taken. Detailed bibliography: www.grankin.ru

[94] Interview with Eduard Vorob'ev conducted in Moscow on 11 January 2002.

[95] Roy Allison, 'The Chechenia Conflict: Military and Security Policy Implications' in Allison and Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, p. 247. Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, pp. 190-191; Goldstein, 'Russian Civil-military Relations in the Chechen war', p. 109.

Thus, even from within Western civil-military relations concepts, the apportioning of blame to the military generals and civilian masters in this case is at least not straightforward.[96] Moran concluded that as a result of this Chechen episode, 'a solid, resolute military opposition had been formed. Three general colonels, widely respected in the army, had been thrown into this opposition.'[97] Whilst it is true that all three generals embarked on a political career after their demotion, dismissal and retirement (though not as a part of a political force representing a united military opposition), all three of them did so in a fully democratic and constitutional manner – via the ballot box.

Kulikov's conduct in 1996 and the behaviour of Generals Lebed', Gromov and Vorob'ev in the run-up to the first Chechen war clearly shows that these personalities' employment in the Soviet and Russian force structures did not preclude their appreciation for democratic values. In the instances discussed above, this appreciation even exceeded that of the civilian authorities.

Summation

The first part of the chapter argued that it cannot be assumed that 'military politicians' are necessarily less democratic than their civilian counterparts. The role they play is not a simple case of the military transferring what might be seen as military values to the political sphere. In considering a number of examples of post-Soviet politicians with a force-structure background, it can be concluded that rather than let the fact of an individual's institutional background speak for itself, several analytical modifications can lead to a fuller understanding of the intentions, conduct, and outlook of such figures. As is the case with civilian politicians with a career background in the Soviet political elite, the former rank and tasks fulfilled by such figures, as well as the possibility of their adaptation to a changing work and political environment, are important factors of differentiation.

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[96] See, for instance, Kenneth W. Kemp and Charles Hudlin, 'Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its Nature and Limits', Armed Forces and Society, 19(1), Fall 1992, pp. 7-26. In this article Kemp and Hudlin explore the nature and limits of respect for civilian control as a kind of moral obligation of soldiers discussing, for instance, legal and moral reasons for disobedience of orders that are illegal, violate international law or are immoral.

[97] Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, p. 47.

Moreover, the last sub-section emphasised that there were at least two instances during El'tsin's presidency when a number of prominent *siloviki* sought to prevent what they perceived as unconstitutional steps undertaken by the civilian leadership. This can serve as further evidence against the assumption that 'military politicians', as a rule, are less democratic than their civilian counterparts. Instead, their credentials are better assessed on an individual basis. To conclude with the words of Serebriannikov:

> There are many extremists among civilians. There are many civilians who like to give orders, like to take over, like to dictate their will, just enjoy commanding. So, yes, I agree with people that say it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of a military person, yes, I agree. However, I also believe that it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of any personality, not only those of military people.[98]

[98] Interview with Vladimir Serebriannikov conducted in Moscow on 22 January 2002.

PART II
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF 'MILITARY POLITICIANS' IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: REGULAR PARTICIPANTS IN POLITICS?

The second part of this chapter assesses the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. As discussed above, when assessed within the framework of civil-military relations concepts, the political activities of figures with a military background throughout the post-Soviet era have sometimes been interpreted as an interference, or 'encroachment by the armed forces into electoral politics',[99] and as an obstacle to the process of democratisation.[100] More recently, some analysts have linked their presence predominantly to Putin's rise to political power, and have portrayed 'military politicians' as a tool of the president used for implementing a more authoritarian policy direction.[101] It is argued in this chapter that in order to understand the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia it is necessary to assess to what extent these contrasting interpretations accurately depict the nature of the role of these figures, or how their role can be interpreted alternatively. In order to achieve this aim, the second part of this chapter firstly traces instances that can be evaluated as attempts at intervention or interference by Russian 'military politicians' in civilian affairs. Secondly, it assesses the legal framework regulating the political participation of military figures in post-Soviet Russia in order to evaluate the legality of their activities. Thirdly, the significance of elected and appointed 'military politicians' is addressed, which can lead to a fuller understanding of the nature of the role of such personalities in post-Soviet Russia. It will be concluded that rather than to constitute an interference in politics or a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president, the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is that of regular participants in the political process.

'Military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia: interfering in politics?

A number of instances of 'military opposition' in post-Soviet Russia can be interpreted as attempts at illegal and unwarranted military intervention in civilian political affairs.

[99] Mathers, 'Outside Politics?', p. 28.
[100] See, for instance, Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State, Peterson Ulrich, Democratising Communist Militaries, p. 186.

However, this section argues that these instances have, as a rule, been linked to critical junctures in post-Soviet politics and also have been unsuccessful and unpopular with civilians and the military alike. These instances should not be understood as being exemplars for the phenomenon of 'military politicians' and for the state of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia as a whole.

During the constitutional crisis in October 1993, a prominent 'military politician' played an important role in escalating this conflict. He attempted to get the military institution involved in putting up armed resistance in support of the defenders of the White House,[102] and against the civilian leadership that attempted to dissolve the parliament. The key 'military politician' in this event was retired General Aleksandr Rutskoi, who had been elected as El'tsin's vice president in the 1991 Russian presidential elections. In the conflict between the president and the Supreme Soviet, which evolved throughout 1993, Rutskoi sided with El'tsin's opponents, led by the parliamentary speaker, Ruslan Khasbulatov. When El'tsin decreed the dissolution of the parliament on 21 September 1993, the Supreme Soviet appointed Rutskoi as acting president, in effect creating a parallel executive which mirrored the powers of President El'tsin, including his position as commander-in-chief of all Russian armed forces.

In a detailed and meticulously researched account of the October 1993 events, Brian Taylor apportioned a considerable amount of blame to Rutskoi in terms of the escalation of the crisis into an armed conflict involving military forces.[103] In the eyes of Taylor, a crucial mistake made by Rutskoi was the appointment of retired Colonel-General Vladislav Achalov as an 'alternative' minister of defence. This attempt at creating a parallel command structure over the regular military produced a real danger of a split in the armed forces – a situation of which the military leadership at the time was acutely aware and tried to avoid at all costs. Whilst during the initial stages of the crisis the military's loyalty to El'tsin in the case of an escalation had not been viewed as

[101] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy' and Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'.
[102] Until the October 1993 crisis, Russia's parliament, the Supreme Soviet, was accommodated in the White House. Today the White House is the seat of the Russian government.

guaranteed, according to Taylor, 'the appointment of Achalov, then, drove the high command into Yeltsin's arms'.[104] Additionally, the attempts of Rutskoi and his supporters to actively involve military personnel in the political struggle, which resulted in an armed attack on the military headquarters of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Mayor's office and the Ostankino television centre in Moscow, left the civilian leadership with little choice but to retaliate in resolving the conflict by violent means.

Throughout the 1993 constitutional crisis, and until the storming of the White House by military forces at the command of President El'tsin, which resulted in the arrest of Rutskoi, Khasbulatov and other opposition leaders on 4th October, Rutskoi appealed to officers and soldiers to come to the defence of the White House and attempted to issue orders to commanders of troops in the Moscow military district demanding their support. By actually calling on the military not to remain 'outside politics', General Rutskoi's actions, which aimed to achieve the active interference of the military in a political dispute, clearly denoted an abuse of his status as a 'military politician'. His conduct exemplifies why the involvement of military figures in Russian politics has often been interpreted as problematic.[105]

The constitutional crisis of 1993 that culminated in the shelling of the White House represented, what Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin called, the 'locus-of-loyalty question – to whom is [the military's] obedience owed?'[106] Yeltsin's dissolution of the parliament was anti-constitutional and the grounds for the group of parliamentarians led by Khasbulatov and Rutskoi for believing they were the supreme locus of power were not insubstantial. Although the locus of power in the institutional struggle was not clear, the military-as-institution obeyed the orders of El'tsin. Rutskoi's attempt at involving the military-as-institution in the political struggle did not come to fruition. In accordance with both official and unofficial reports that were later verified by Rutskoi himself, no

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[103] Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army, pp. 282-301.
[104] ibid. p. 284.
[105] ibid. p. 285. Taylor writes that, 'there was some reason to think that Rutskoy and the Supreme Soviet might be successful in their efforts to gain the support of the officer corps. Rutskoy was a general and a Hero of the Soviet Union due to his service in Afghanistan'.
[106] Kemp and Hudlin, 'Civil Supremacy over the Military'; p. 9.

more than 80 – 200 soldiers at any one time of the October 1993 conflict heeded his call and actively supported the defenders of the White House. Moreover, none of the soldiers who actively became involved in the conflict on the side of the Supreme Soviet did so as a part of a military unit, but as individuals or as participants in privately organised armed formations. The very limited popular success of Rutskoi's attempt to garner the military's support was furthermore indicated by opinion polls conducted in late September 1993, when the vast majority of both military personnel and civilians interviewed asserted that the military should not be used to solve the conflict – not in favour of El'tsin, but even less so in support of the opposition in the Supreme Soviet.[107]

The events of October 1993 were the only serious instance in the post-Soviet era when a 'military politician' actually attempted to abuse the military institution to which he used to be affiliated to his political advantage. However, it was not the last attempt to create a military opposition, or at least the last time 'military politicians' inclined to involve the military-as-institution in political struggles in post-Soviet Russia were active. It is true, for example, that some key military figures associated with Rutskoi and the supporters of the Supreme Soviet, including Rutskoi himself, continued to be politically active after having been amnestied by the State Duma in February 1994 for their participation in the armed stand-off. But this political activity, while appearing, on initial inspection, to be provocative and destabilising, has to be seen in context. After his release, Rutskoi founded the 'social-patriotic' movement *Derzhava* and registered as a candidate for the presidential elections in 1996. He withdrew his candidacy in April 1996 calling on his supporters to give their vote to El'tsin's main opponent, Gennadii Ziuganov. In 1996, Rutskoi was elected governor of Kursk region and acted in this capacity until 2000.[108]

Similarly, the 'military politician' and supporter of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov was Colonel-General Al'bert Makashov is still politically active. He played the role of deputy minister of defence in Rutskoi's parallel government during the October 1993 crisis and

[107] Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army; pp. 286, 288 and 294.
[108] Biography, see www.nns.ru and www.grankin.ru.

played a 'key role in the attack on both the Mayor's office and Ostankino'.[109] After his amnesty in February 1994, Makashov, who ran in the presidential elections in 1991 and joined the Russian Communist Party (KPRF) in February 1993, was elected as a Duma deputy in 1995, 1999 and 2003 in single-mandate districts and has been a member of the KPRF faction throughout.[110] Makashov has since acquired notoriety for his outspoken anti-Semitic views.[111]

Another controversial 'military politician' is Lieutenant-Colonel Stanislav Terekhov. He also was a staunch supporter of Rutskoi and Khasbulatov during the October 1993 crisis. In late 1991 Terekhov created the Union of Officers, 'an organisation of military personnel with a communist and national-patriotic orientation',[112] and was elected as its chairman at its founding conference in February 1992. Terekhov, and between 100 and 200 officers of his organisation, joined the defenders of the White House and were responsible for 'the one active step involving armed force taken by pro-Rutskoi forces in the early days of the crisis' – the attack on the CIS military headquarters in Moscow.[113] Nine members of the Union were killed and many more were injured.[114] Terekhov, like Rutskoi and Makashov, was arrested on 4 October 1993 for his involvement in the armed resistance, and amnestied in February 1994. Terekhov and the Union of Officers remain politically active.

Terekhov's Union of Officers is the embodiment of (attempted) unwarranted military intervention in politics about which some civil-military relations analysts appear to be alarmed when they critically assess the existence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. Again, however, the activities of this organisation have to be seen in

[109] Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army; p. 290.
[110] In July 2004 Makashov reportedly was removed from the Samara Oblast Communist Party Committee for his sharp criticism of the leader of the KPRF, Gennadii Ziuganov. He continues to be a member of the KPRF faction in the Duma, however. See Rustem Faliakhov and Denis Farov, 'Raskol: Kommunisty chistiat partiiu', Gazeta, 13 July 2004.
[111] See, for instance, Christian Lowe, 'Duma refuses to rebuke deputy for insulting Jews', The Moscow Times, 5 November 1998. Biography, see www.nns.ru and www.grankin.ru.
[112] Aleksandr Verkhovskii, Vladimir Pribylovskii, Ekaterina Mikhailovskaia, Natsionalizm i ksenofobiia v Rossiiskom obshchestve, Moscow: Panorama, 1998; pp. 88-90.
[113] Taylor, Politics and the Russian Army; p. 287.

context. The Union of Officers was registered by *Miniust* as a social organisation in 1995, re-registered in March 1998 as a nationwide political organisation and, after the adoption of the federal law, 'On political parties', in 2001, acquired again the status of a social organisation, due to its inability to conform to the legal requirements for registering as a political party.[115] In the 1995 elections, the Union of Officers participated in the political bloc, Power to the People, which received 1.6 percent of the party-list vote. In the 1999 elections, Terekhov's organisation joined the political bloc of Stalin's grandson, Stalin's Bloc for the USSR, which received 0.61 percent of the party-list vote.[116] In 2003, the Union of Officers sought to run in the parliamentary elections as a component of the newly created National Power Party of Russia (NDPR), which had received official warnings by *Miniust* for the openly anti-Semitic remarks of some of its leaders and in May 2003 was finally denied registration, and thus participation in the December elections, for not having the required number of 45 regional branches.[117] In January 2004 Russian newspapers reported that Terekhov had been elected to the political council of the nationwide public political organisation, the People's Patriotic Union (NPS) "Rodina" created by Sergei Glazev.[118]

Although in accordance with the law, 'On Political Parties', the Union of Officers did not qualify as a self-contained political party, the aims of Terekhov's organisation, as evident in the continued participation in electoral blocs, are clearly of a political and, moreover, of a politico-military nature.[119] A pamphlet for activists of the Union of Officers produced in 1999 introduced the organisation's manifesto under the heading 'The Union of Officers (is a) Military Opposition'.[120] Underneath was the slogan, 'If

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[114] This is according to the unpublished pamphlet, Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia Soiuz Ofitserov, Moscow: 1999, p. 4.
[115] Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia Soiuz Ofitserov, p. 4. Interview with Stanislav Terekhov conducted in Moscow on 21 December 2001. According to article 9, paragraph 3 of the Russian law 'On political parties' the formation of parties based on profession is prohibited.
[116] www.russiavotes.org
[117] RFE/RL Newsline, 7(179), 19 September 2003.
[118] Iolanta Kachaeva, 'Transformatsiia "Rodiny"', Trud, 31 January 2004.
[119] In an interview conducted in Moscow on 21 December 2001, Terekhov clearly pointed out that, from the outset, the tasks of the Union of Officers were of a political nature and are not, as is the case for other social organisations with a military theme, limited to social issues with regard to military personnel, their families, and military pensioners.
[120] Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia Soiuz Ofitserov, p. 6.

those in power don't take care of the army, the army has to take care of (those in) power'.[121] Again under the heading, 'Military Opposition', the manifesto continues:

> Under the conditions of economic crisis, social instability, the inability of those in power to effectively rule the country, and the basic incapacity of the civilian opposition to lead and guide society, the creation of a MILITARY OPPOSITION [original emphasis] in the avant-garde of the political process is legitimate.
>
> In a crisis situation the military can take and maintain power with support of the working masses for as long as it is necessary in order to overcome the crisis and solve the wide range of problems facing the nation.
>
> The coming to power of progressive soldiers is not an aim in itself, but a means for the further transfer of power to representatives of the working people. Therefore the social base of a military regime has to be the working class, and its political foundation – a military-civilian union of leftist and patriotic forces.[122]

The readiness of Terekhov and his organisation to engage in anti-constitutional and illegal political activities, such as the armed interference in civilian affairs, was revealed by their behaviour during the October 1993 crisis. Additionally, the Union of Officers seeks the inclusion of active military officers in its ranks, which is contrary to Russian legislation concerning the political activities of military personnel (the legal regulation of the participation of military figures in post-Soviet Russian politics is discussed in the next sub-section).[123]

The examples given above – the behaviour of some 'military politicians' during the October 1993 crisis, the presence of 'military politicians', who have revealed the inclination to interfere illegally in civilian affairs, and the existence of the Union of Officers – are extreme cases and rare examples. They do appear, to an extent, to provide a basis for what Western analysts sometimes fear would be the outcome of the participation of Russian military figures in politics. However, the role of the military actors here is not

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[121] 'Esli vlast' ne zanimaetsia armiei, to armiia dolzhna zanimat'sia vlast'iu', Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia Soiuz Ofitserov, p. 6.
[122] Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia Soiuz Ofitserov, p. 7.
[123] According to the pamphlet Obshcherossiiskaia politicheskaia organizatsiia Soiuz Ofitserov, p. 8, 'the basis [of the Union of Officers] is middle-ranking officer staff of the army and other force structures, both active and retired.' The inclusion of active military personnel in the Union of Officers was confirmed by Terekhov in an interview conducted in Moscow on 21 December 2001.

as clear-cut as it might be. The October 1993 events were the result of a crisis in the early post-Soviet years, which occurred amidst the extreme political uncertainty and instability that inevitably accompanied the rapid transition process, which followed the break-up of the Soviet Union. It should be seen as an extraordinary event conditioned by extraordinary circumstances.

After the adoption of the Constitution in 1993, no other comparably critical situation involving the aggressive behaviour of 'military politicians' has posed a threat to the political stability of post-Soviet Russia. Whilst clearly serving as a negative example of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, which would verify some of the more alarmist interpretations by Western analysts, the Union of Officers is an extremely marginal group, whose activities have to be seen in context. The organisation and politicians close to it do not seem to enjoy popularity amongst society or the military and should not be taken too seriously. The cases discussed above are rare exceptions and should by no means be taken as a pointer to the state of civil-military relations and the political conduct of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia on a general level.

'Military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia: lawful participation in politics?

The political activities of figures with a force-structure background are clearly regulated in Russian legislation. From a legal point of view, thus, these personalities' participation in electoral politics and other state offices constitutes a lawful practice and is not interference. A law with particular relevance in this respect is the law, 'On the status of military personnel'.[124] This law applies to all individuals employed in the military as defined in the law, 'On Defence',[125] and it contains an article defining the conditions for, and the rights of military personnel to 'participate in the administration of the state and in public organisations'.[126] The law stipulates that 'military personnel, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation and normative legal acts of the bodies of local self-administration,

[124] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O statuse voennosluzhashchikh'.
[125] The law, 'On Defence,' decrees that military personnel in Russia are active in the regular armed forces, as well as in several other force structures, such as the MVD, FSB, MChS, et cetera. This issue was discussed at length in the previous chapter.

have the right to elect and be elected to bodies of state power and bodies of local self-administration, to participate in referenda, and also in other forms in which local self-administration is realised'.[127] As discussed below, specific conditions apply to the election of military personnel to political posts. Whilst military personnel have the right to participate in public organisations, including in religious groups, they are not allowed to seek membership in political parties whilst on active service.[128]

No separate law on the status of law-enforcement personnel exists. However, the active (right to elect) and passive (right to be elected) electoral rights of law-enforcement personnel were put on a par, and were defined in conjunction with those of military personnel in a number of legal documents. Three federal laws, covering the electoral rights of the citizens of the Russian Federation, the elections of deputies of the State Duma, and the elections of the Russian president assert that candidates serving in both the military and law-enforcement agencies are entitled to unlimited leave for the duration of an electoral campaign, and until the official results of the elections are declared. This right is also supported in a presidential decree on the electoral rights of personnel serving in the military and law-enforcement agencies, and in a resolution on the same topic periodically issued by the Central Electoral Commission in the run-up to federal elections.[129]

The federal law, 'On the status of members of the Federation Council and the status of deputies of the State Duma', specifies that both military and law-enforcement personnel elected or appointed to a representative post in the Russian Federal Assembly

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[126] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O statuse voennosluzhashchikh', article 9.
[127]ibid. article 9, paragraph 1.
[128] ibid. article 9, paragraph 2.
[129] Federal'nyi zakon, 'Ob osnovnykh garantiiakh izbiratel'nykh prav I prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 41, paragraph 1; Federal'nyi Zakon 'O vyborakh deputatov Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (adopted periodically before elections); Federeal'nyi zakon, 'O vyborakh prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii' (adopted periodically before elections); Ukaz, 'Ob obespechenii izbiratel'nykh prav voennosluzhashchikh, sotrudnikov organov vnutrennykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, federal'nykh organov nalogovoi politsii i rabotnikov organov prokuratury Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; Postanovlenie Tsentral'noi izbiratel'noi komissii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 'O metodicheskikh rekomendatsiiakh o poriadke realizatsii izbiratel'nykh prav voennosluzhashchikh i sotrudnikov pravookhranitel'nykh organov v period podgotovki i provedeniia vyborov deputatov

have to suspend their service in their respective military/law-enforcement institution for the entire duration of their tenure. The same regulation applies for military/law-enforcement personnel employed as assistants to a Duma deputy or Federation Council member.[130] The same requirement is stipulated in the abovementioned presidential decree to all cases of military/law-enforcement personnel elected to any federal or regional post. As specified in the federal law, 'On the status of members of the Federation Council and the status of deputies of the State Duma', no individual serving as a member or deputy of the Russian Federal Assembly is allowed to simultaneously occupy a position as a civil servant, which, as specified in the Russian Constitution and in the above law, 'On the system of state service', includes service in the military or law-enforcement agencies.[131] Finally, the law specifies that the duration of suspension of service in the military or law-enforcement agencies is to count towards the individual's overall term in service, but no monies or additional military ranks and titles can be conferred throughout the duration of the suspension granted in order to take up political office.[132]

In sum, personnel of both the military and law-enforcement agencies in post-Soviet Russia have the right to be elected and appointed to political posts. If running for an elected position, military/law-enforcement candidates can choose to remain in active service throughout the entire period of the campaign. Once elected or appointed, active service in the respective military/law-enforcement agencies has to be suspended, as the law forbids the simultaneous occupation of posts in different aspects of state service. The same is true for military/law-enforcement personnel employed as assistants to political figures. The duration of such a suspension counts towards the individual's overall term in military/law-enforcement service, which means that such a figure can choose to remain in the reserve ranks of his/her respective organisation and is free to re-join active service on completion of the tenure in a political capacity. Military ranks or other titles conferred on employees in Russia's military or law-enforcement agencies remain with the individual

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Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii chetvertogo sozyva' (released periodically before elections).

[130] Federal'nyi zakon, 'O statuse chlena Soveta Federatsii i statuse deputata Gosudarstvennoi Dumy Federal'nogo Sobraniia Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 6, paragraph 3; article 37, paragraph 8.

[131] ibid. article 6, paragraph 2. Article 97, paragraph 3.

[132] ibid. article 6, paragraph 4.

when their service is suspended temporarily (unless suspension is the result of disciplinary measures), and when they retire. When speaking about 'military politicians' or *siloviki* participating in politics, thus, it should be born in mind that these figures can be described as representatives of military or law-enforcement service only in the capacity of reservists or retirees.

Russian legislation on the participation of military personnel in political posts is broadly similar to that of many other states. As is the case, for example, in the United States and the United Kingdom, Russian active duty military personnel are prohibited from taking up political office. Russian legislation on the political activities of military personnel, however, differs inasmuch as military personnel may opt to remain in active service throughout an electoral campaign. In both the U.S. and in the United Kingdom, retirement, discharge, or release from active military service has to be granted before the announcement of a candidacy becomes legal.[133] Some Russian politicians with a career background in the military or law-enforcement agencies continue to appear publicly in military uniform after their retirement or suspension of service. A few Russian politicians, for instance, choose to appear in uniform in everyday situations, for example, when fulfilling their duties as deputies of the lower house of parliament (see illustration below).[134]

It is possible that some Western analysts assume that the occasional wearing of uniform by some Russian politicians with a military background means that they continue

[133] U.S. Department of Defense Directive Number 1344.10, 'Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces on Active Duty', 2 August 2002; 'The Queen's Regulations for the Army', 1996, paragraph J5 585. A specific set of Queen's Regulations is issued for each branch of service. However, regulations regarding the political activities of service personnel apply to all branches.

[134] Regulations on the wearing of uniforms were issued in an MO order in 1997 (Prikaz 'Pravila nosheniia voennoi formy odezhdy voennosluzhashchimi Vooruzhennykh Sil RF', No. 218, 28 March 1997). However, the regulations were never made publicly accessible. This is unconstitutional, because in accordance with article 15 of the Russian Constitution normative legal enactments affecting human rights, freedoms and duties cannot be applied unless they have been officially published. Subsequently the regulations were declared invalid by the Military Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court on 21 June 2000 (court decision N VKPI 00-26. A. L. Burkov, 'Sudebnaia zashchita prav grazhdan, narushennykh nedeistvuiushchimi normativnymi normativnymi aktami', in Sudebnaia zashchita prav grazhdan v ee naibolee effektifnykh formakh: materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii , Ekaterinburg: Izdatel'stvo Ural'skogo universiteta, 2003, p. 76). At the time of writing the regulations did not yet appear to have been made public.

to be in active military service.[135] Potentially this is linked to the fact that the wearing of military uniform by retired military personnel in political office, for instance in the United States and in the United Kingdom, is not allowed.[136] The habit of some politically active retired military servicemen, for example of Duma deputies, making occasional public appearances in military uniform differs from what is practiced in many Western states. However, it should not be confused with the manifestation of a 'militarised regime' or 'military rule'.

In assessing the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, it also has to be borne in mind that the entering into political office of retired military personnel is not a specific Russian phenomenon, but a regular occurrence also in other states. Throughout the history of the United States, for example, retired military men have stood and sometimes been successful in elections for the highest political office.[137] Dwight Eisenhower's presidency in the 1950s is a famous example. More recently, retired general and former NATO commander, Wesley Clark, participated in the 2003 presidential primary elections for the U.S. Democratic Party.[138] There have also been examples of politicians who had previously held high posts in the intelligence services.[139] Prominently, President George Bush Sr. headed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), albeit briefly, from 1976 until 1977. Similarly in Germany the former justice and foreign

[135] Eva Busza, for instance wrote: 'On balance, the new roles and behaviours adopted by Russian military officers are disturbing, because they threaten the integrity of the Russian state and serve as an impediment to democratic consolidation… It is instructive to note that traditionally democratic states have not allowed officers on active duty to hold political offices. When a soldier puts on a uniform and goes to the podium, she or he is making a political statement, indicating affiliation with – or even representation of – a powerful institution. This sets a dangerous precedent, for it helps to legitimise the idea that the military has a role to play in domestic politics.' See, Busza 'State Dysfunctionality, Institutional Decay, and the Russian Military', pp. 124-125.

[136] The U.S. Department of Defense Directive No. 1334.1, 'Wearing of the Uniform', 12 May 2004, allows the wearing of uniform by retired military personnel exclusively for ceremonial purposes. The 'Queen's Regulations for the Army', 1996, paragraph J 5 368, decrees that 'uniform is not to be worn by prospective or adopted parliamentary candidates at political meetings, or while canvassing, appearing in public or engaged in any other activities connected with their candidature'.

[137] For a historical account see James M. Perry, Touched With Fire: Five Presidents and the Civil War Battles that Made Them, New York: PublicAffairs, 2003.

[138] Jim VandeHei, 'Clark criticises Bush, Declares Bid for White House', The Washington Post, 28 September 2003.

[139] As discussed in the previous chapter, employees of the intelligence services in many Western states such as, for instance, the U.S., the United Kingdom, or Germany, are civilians and not distinguished by military ranks or titles.

minister, Klaus Kinkel headed the German intelligence service, the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* (BND) from 1979 – 1982. These figures, as do their Russian counterparts, performed as regular participants in the political process and not as representatives of the institutions to which they were previously affiliated.

Russian legislation clearly defines the rights of military personnel and of *siloviki* as a whole to engage in political activities. The coincidence of active military service and membership in political parties and holding of a political or other official civilian post is prohibited. In discussing the role of Russian military figures participating in politics, it has to be born in mind that these figures have either suspended active military service, or are retired, and that their political activities are, as a rule, a lawful practice.

Illustration 4.1.

Deputies in Uniform



Nikolai Bezborodov
Edinaia Rossiia



Iurii Rodionov
Edinaia Rossiia



Valentin Varennikov
KPRF



Aleksandr Gurov
Edinaia Rossiia

Pictures from the official website of the Russian State Duma 2003 convocation
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The role of elected and appointed 'military politicians'

Finally, in order to assess the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in the political system of post-Soviet Russia, the final section of the chapter will distinguish between military figures elected to their posts from those appointed by the civilian leadership. As will be discussed below, civil-military relations analysts addressing the issue of 'military politicians' have focused predominantly on those personalities elected to their political

posts.[140] Within this context, the political activities of such figures have been interpreted as undue activism of a politicised military-as-institution. The issue of appointed 'military politicians' in these works has, as a rule, not been explored. The subject of 'military politicians' appointed to their posts, however, is important for understanding the overall nature of the role of these figures in the political system. In recent years, some analysts have emphasised the significance of 'military politicians' appointed to their posts.[141] These studies depicted the role of such personalities as a tool in the hands of President Putin in pursuit of a more authoritarian policy direction. In assessing firstly the issue of elected 'military politicians', and secondly, the issue of their appointed counterparts, this chapter argues that neither of these interpretations accurately portrays the nature of their role. Instead, it is argued that, within the context of post-Soviet politics, both elected and appointed 'military politicians' constitute regular participants in the political process rather than an interference by the military-as-institution in civilian affairs, or a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president.

Elected 'military politicians' and post-Soviet Russian politics

Throughout the post-Soviet era, Western civil-military relations analysts addressing the question of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia have emphasised the issue of elected *siloviki*, and particularly of those elected to the State Duma, whilst rarely mentioning their appointed counterparts. To cite a few examples, in her section on 'The military and domestic politics', Irina Isakova only addressed the 'participation of military/security personnel as candidates in elections'.[142] Similarly, in writing on 'The military's political activism', Zoltan Barany addressed only the participation of military personnel in parliamentary elections and Aleksandr Lebed's candidacy for the presidency in 1996, both of which he interpreted as expressions of a politicised military. Despite addressing civil-military relations during Putin's tenure as president, the issue of

[140] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', pp. 220-221; Barany, 'Politics and the Russian Armed Forces', pp. 196-205; Mathers, 'Outside Politics'; p 28.
[141] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'; Staar, 'KGB & Other Buddies', 'Toward a Police State?', 'Siloviki Inside'.
[142] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', pp. 220-221.

appointed politicians or officials with a military background is not mentioned.[143] In a chapter on Russian civil-military relations published in 2003, Jennifer Mathers wrote about 'The military, elections and party politics', which she perceived as an 'encroachment by the armed forces into electoral politics'. In her study, too, the significance of appointed 'military politicians' remains unexplored.[144]

As discussed below, 'military politicians' throughout the post-Soviet era have participated, and have at times been victorious, in elections to the Russian State Duma, and also to the federal presidency and governorship of some of Russia's 89 regions. However, this section argues that the role of elected 'military politicians' should not be overemphasised for a variety of reasons. Their role is not the expression of a politicised military interfering in civilian affairs, but constitutes the regular participation of ex-military figures in the political process on a par with civilians.

- Elected 'military politicians' do not pursue a coherent agenda of opposition

In determining the nature of the role of elected 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, an important aspect is the fact that such personalities cannot be seen as pursuing a common agenda. In addition to the institutional diversity of their backgrounds discussed in chapter three, the difference in their ideological outlook is a further important aspect in this respect. As some civil-military relations scholars analysing the participation of military figures in Russian electoral politics have shown, elected 'military politicians' can be found throughout the post-Soviet era across the political and ideological spectrum – from pro-regime to anti-regime, and from 'left-wing' to 'right-wing'.[145] In the words of Sergei Iushenkov, a former officer and liberal Duma deputy:

> [Deputies with a military background] constitute less than ten percent of all deputies. And I don't think that one can speak of these people as a united monolith, working on a common programme. Just look at some concrete examples: three from an overall number of 38 SPS deputies have a military

[143] Barany, 'Politics and the Russian Armed Forces', pp. 196-205.
[144] Mathers, 'Outside Politics'; p 28.
[145] See, for instance, Schröder, 'The Russian Army in Politics'; Mathers, 'Outside Politics?'.

> background. Moreover, these people support democratic ideals and have fully liberal views. Iabloko does not have deputies with a military background, but they have people professionally dealing with military issues. For example, Aleksei Arbatov, the chairman of the defence committee. His views, of course, are again different from 'military deputies' belonging, for example, to the KPRF. It is right to say that [in this faction] there really are some traditionalists, in terms of their views and opinions. The so-called centrist factions, like OVR and Edinstvo, do not express what one could call an independent point of view. They do not express the interests of the military organisation, but represent the view of the government as a whole. The same things can be said about military people amongst the deputies' groups. Some support the views of the political left, but most of the time they do not vote according to what the military wants, but what the government wants.[146]

This diversity of 'military deputies' is illustrated well in table 4.2., which shows the distribution of Duma deputies with a force-structure background in different factions.

Table 4.2. Distribution of Duma deputies with a force-structure background in the parliamentary factions of the 1993, 1995 and 1999 convocations

1993		1995		1999	
New Regional Politics	7	KPRF	9	OVR	7
Rossiiskii Put'	4	Narodovlastie	4	Edinstvo	5
LDPR	3	Russia's Regions	5	Narodnyi Deputat	5
Russia's Choice	2	NDR	2	Russia's Regions	2
Agrarian Party	1	Iabloko	1	KPRF	3
KPRF	1	LDPR	1	SPS	1

Source: Lists compiled for this thesis by a Russian think tank that wished to remain anonymous (see Appendix I).

Representatives of all major factions of the 1999 convocation were interviewed for this thesis between 2001 and 2003.[147] None of the respondents, both with and without a former military career, perceived the presence of Duma deputies with a military background as unwarranted. As discussed in chapter two, instead of interpreting the existence of 'military politicians' as an expression of a politicised military-as-institution interfering in civilian affairs, in Russia itself such figures are, as a rule, seen as individual personalities pursuing a personal political career and not as expressing the interests of the institution to which they used to be attached. The ideological diversity of elected

[146] Interview with Sergei Iushenkov conducted in Moscow on 13 November 2001.

'military politicians' indicates that they participate in electoral politics on a par with civilians and are not the expression of a politicised military-as-institution encroaching into it.

- In numerical terms, the number of elected 'military politicians' is not great

The relatively small quantity of elected 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is a further factor speaking against the overemphasis of the potential influence exerted by such personalities. In assessing the number of former military figures elected to the post-Soviet Russian parliament, analysts have come to different conclusions (see table 4.3. below). Specifically for this thesis, a Russian think-tank specialising in parliamentary affairs in early 2002 compiled lists of Duma deputies with a military/force-structure background for the parliamentary convocations of 1993, 1995 and 1999.[148] The think-tank analysts found that the 1993 Duma had 18 such deputies, constituting 4 percent of their overall number of Duma deputies. The 1995 Duma had 24, or 5.3 percent of the deputies; and the 1999 Duma had 23, or 5.1 percent of deputies with a military/force structure background. In comparison, Kryshtanovskaia and White's analysis concluded that there were 6.3, 6.8, and 9.4 percent of Duma deputies with a military/force structure background in the 1993, 1995 and 1999 convocations respectively.[149]

Table 4.3. Percentages of Duma deputies with a force-structure background in the work of two analysts

	1993	1995	1999
Think-tank	4	5.3	5.1
Kryshtanovskaia and White	6.3	6.8	9.4

Source: Lists compiled for this thesis by a Russian think tank that wished to remain anonymous (see Appendix I); Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'.

[147] Representatives of the Edinstvo, KPRF, Iabloko, SPS, and Peoples' Deputy factions were interviewed. For a full list of interviewees, see List of References at the end of the thesis.
[148] The think-tank did not wish to be identified for the compilation of these lists. The lists are attached to the thesis in Appendix 1.
[149] Kryshtanovskaia and White 'Putin's Militocracy'; p. 294.

Differences in the numbers cited by these analysts can be explained by the differing definitions of what constitutes a 'military politician'. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Kryshtanovskaia and White's definition appears to include all individuals with former affiliations to any component of the military system, disregarding their former rank and the time lapsed since their retirement.[150] The smaller percentages presented by the think-tank, on the other hand, are the result of the application of different parameters in their assessment of what constitutes 'military politicians'. When asked, for instance, why their list of 'military deputies' of the 1999 convocation did not include retired Colonel Viktor Alksnis, an analyst asserted that in his view Alksnis, who was discharged from military service in 1992, no longer qualified as a representative of the military.

Even if one accepts the slightly higher percentage of 'military deputies' cited by Krysthanovskaia and White, however, the number of military figures represented in the Russian lower-house does not appear to be particularly high, especially given the fact that many of these figures have long since retired and have now gained a considerable amount of political experience. In the State Duma elected in December 2003, only nine out of 450 deputies entered their political career directly from a force-structure background. According to the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, Aleksandr Veshniakov, two newly elected deputies had served in the military and seven in a law-enforcement agency until their election.[151] In terms of numbers, thus, the potential influence of 'military deputies' serving in the State Duma appears limited.

A similar picture presents itself with regard to military figures elected as the heads of some of Russia's 89 federation subjects. A number of military figures, and in particular well-known 'field generals' such as Aleksandr Lebed', Boris Gromov, or Vladimir Shamanov, have been elected to the post of governor throughout the El'tsin and Putin eras. The number of 'military governors' increased after Putin's accession to the presidency, but at no point exceeded about 10 percent, that is, nine to ten individuals

[150] Kryshtanovskaia and White do not provide lists of names, so the exact content of their analysis is difficult to verify.
[151] Quoted from Veshniakov's speech to the newly elected State Duma on 29 December 2003. Published on the CEC's website (www.cikrf.ru) on 6 January 2004.

from an overall number of 89 governors.[152] This number furthermore included 'military governors' with considerable experience of political life, such as Krasnoiarsk governor Aleksandr Lebed', the governor of Moscow region, retired General Boris Gromov and Khakassia region governor, retired Colonel Aleksei Lebed'.[153] The fact that the role of elected politicians with a force-structure background is sometimes overstated can be illustrated with the events that took place at the end of 2000 and beginning of 2001, when elections for regional heads took place in 34 of Russia's federation subjects.

As shown in the analysis of media coverage in chapter two, the participation of military figures in the gubernatorial elections was a 'hot topic' for discussion, and also drew the attention of Western journalists and analysts.[154] In the words of the analyst Andrew Konitzer-Smirnov, at the time of these elections, many observers argued that:

> Vladimir Putin is somehow orchestrating the outcome in the majority of Russia's regions with a goal to establish a new network of largely security organ oriented…regional leaders… On any given day in the Russian and Western press one may find references to the "Kursk variant" [Rutskoi was 'military governor' of Kursk region at the time], a "wave of generals sweeping over the regions", and Putin's "black list of governors".[155]

The outcome of the elections told a different story, however. From the 40 generals and high-ranking officers running for the 34 seats, only three individuals with a force structure background were elected (army general, Vladimir Shamanov, in Ul'ianovsk;

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[152] Kryshtanovskaia and White 'Putin's Militocracy'; p. 294; Nikolai Petrov, 'Desiat' negritiat v lampasakh', Moskovskie novosti, 16 September 2003.

[153] Both Boris Gromov and Aleksei Lebed', the brother of Aleksandr Lebed', have been involved in politics since 1995, when they were elected deputies of the State Duma.

[154] See, for instance, Guy Chazan, 'Russian Military Runs for Office', The Sunday Telegraph, 29 October 2000; Maura Reynolds, 'Russia's "Cruel" Soldier Comes Home', Los Angeles Times, 19 January 2001; Steven Main, 'Kaliningrad: The Role of the Military in Regional Politics', in Graeme P. Herd (ed), European Security and Post-Soviet Space: Integration or Isolation?, Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Document No. G 87, December 2000, pp. 59-65.

[155] This approach was criticised by a PhD student, Andrew Konitzer-Smirnov, from the University of Pittsburgh, who had carried out extensive research into the regional politics of post-Soviet Russia. Konitzer-Smirnov found no evidence that, for instance, in Ul'ianovsk the 'military governor', Vladimir Shamanov, was elected because of his military background or that Shamanov's candidacy was openly endorsed by the Kremlin. Konitzer-Smirnov contributed a well-argued and well-referenced critique of the overemphasis of the participation of military figures in electoral politics to Johnson's Russia list, published under the title 'Putin's Generals "Take" the Regions?' on 22 January 2001 (JRL #5043). The quote is cited from this contribution.

navy admiral, Vladimir Egorov, in Kaliningrad; and FSB officer, Vladimir Kulakov, in Voronezh). Of these three individuals, only Egorov was openly supported by the Kremlin.[156] Instead of an orchestrated 'wave of generals sweeping over the regions', in over 75 percent of these regions the incumbent governors were re-elected.[157]

With regard to the potential influence exerted by regional leaders with a military background, it also should be noted that military and security-related issues do not fall within their sphere of competence, because these issues are dealt with entirely on a federal level. According to Viktor Baranets, a military analyst for Komsomol'skaia Pravda, the former institutional affiliation of a 'military governor' has little impact on his activities as a politician: 'A general commanding armies and divisions in the military does not play the role of a general in politics. He has to play his functional role and try to fulfil the responsibilities of the position he got himself into. He now is a governor – that means his worries now are pensions, coal, bread, and the economy.'[158] The election of regional leaders with a military background is not a common phenomenon. Thus, in numerical terms their potential influence should not be overemphasised.

Neither the ideological diversity, nor the amount of ex-military figures elected to political posts in post-Soviet Russia indicate that these personalities' political activities denote the interference by a politicised military in civilian affairs. Instead, such figures are regular participants in politics, on a par with civilians.

Appointed 'military politicians' and post-Soviet Russian politics

Despite the predominant emphasis by civil-military relations analysts on elected 'military politicians', it is argued in the following section that an assessment of the role of individuals appointed to their positions is necessary in order to understand the overall nature of the role of such personalities in post-Soviet Russia. The importance of this aspect was emphasised also by the editor-in-chief of Krasnaia zvezda, Nikolai Efimov:

[156] Serebriannikov, 'Voennye v politicheskikh protsessakh Rossii', p. 257.
[157] Konitzer-Smirnov, 'Putin's Generals "Take" the Regions?'.

> ['Military politicians'] have gone mainly into the state apparatus and not so much into politics. Not that many military people have been elected to political posts. One can count the amount of 'military governors', for instance, who really came to power through elections on one hand. The majority of these people were appointed to posts by the president.[159]

The issue of appointed 'military politicians' during the Putin era has been addressed by a number of analysts concerned with wider political developments, who have interpreted the presence of such figures as an expression of a more authoritarian policy direction pursued by the president.[160] However, it will be argued in the section below that, seen within the context of the political system in contemporary Russia, appointed 'military politicians' have been regular participants in the political process throughout the post-Soviet era and not a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president.

The key to the assessment of the role of appointed 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia can be found in the reason why civil-military relations analysts have not perceived this issue as important. This reason appears to lie in the preferred conceptual framework applied by civil-military relations scholars for conceptualising the political process in post-Soviet Russia. As discussed in the relevant section in chapter one, this is the framework of democratic transition.[161] A transition approach emphasises formal institutional aspects of politics, such as the development of parliament and political competition within the framework of a pluralist party system. Especially at the beginning of the post-Soviet period, when democratic transition approaches had an obvious appeal for the study of post-Soviet politics, the possibility of an authoritarian backlash enhanced the concentration of analysts on the persistent presence of backward-looking forces on the political scene, and in the parliament in particular.[162] Within this framework, civil-military relations analysts have tended to focus primarily on figures elected, or seeking to

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[158] Interview with Viktor Baranets conducted in Moscow on 16 January 2002.
[159] Interview with Nikolai Efimov, conducted in Moscow on 29 November 2001.
[160] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'; Staar, 'KGB & Other Buddies', 'Toward a Police State?', 'Siloviki Inside'.
[161] See, for example, the introductory chapters to Cottey, Edmunds and Forster, Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe; Moran, From Garrison State to Nation-State; and Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries.

be elected to political posts, and predominantly as parliamentary deputies. Moreover, and possibly in line with the Huntingtonian presumption of a universal 'conservative military ethic',[163] some analysts have focused on a perceived link between 'military politicians' and the more backward-looking and nationalistic end of the political spectrum, as this fits the notion of 'military politicians' as an obstacle or even threat to the process of further democratisation in post-Soviet Russia.[164]

As also discussed in chapter one, the transition approach to contemporary Russian politics has been increasingly modified in recent years. Alternative conceptual frameworks have been generated, which are more appropriate for capturing the essential features that make the system work within the particular context of post-Soviet Russia. Such alternative conceptualisations acknowledge a degree of institutional and political pluralism, for example, with regard to the legislative input of the lower house of parliament that is based on party representation. However, the influence of opposition parties and the parliament has been found to be slight in the overall determination of the political course pursued by the executive leadership.[165] Contemporary Russia's system of governance is dominated by the executive. However, instead of simply being labelled a strongly presidential system it has been labelled by many political analysts as 'superpresidential'.[166] This is because, in addition to institutionally bestowing the executive with extensive formal powers in relation to other branches of government, informal aspects of the conduct and choices made by political actors within the framework of this system have even further enhanced the centrality of the presidency.

The informal powers of the president have often been portrayed as predominantly responsible for shaping the partially democratic post-Soviet Russian system of rule.[167]

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[162] See, for example, Nichols, 'An Electoral Mutiny'.
[163] Huntington The Soldier and the State, p. 79.
[164] Links between 'military politicians' and the national-patriotic camp were discussed by Nichols, 'An Electoral Mutiny?'; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, 'Marching to a Different Drum? Political Orientations and Nationalism in Russia's Armed Forces', The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17(1), March 2001, pp. 43-64; and Mathers, 'Outside Politics?'; pp. 32-33.
[165] Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy'; pp. 154 and 160; Richard Sakwa, 'The Regime System in Russia', Contemporary Politics, 3(1), 1997; p. 9.
[166] Colton, 'Superpresidentialism and Russia's backward State'; Fish, 'The Executive Deception'.
[167] Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy'; p. 150.

Within this context, political opposition to, and inter-branch checks on the ruling regime are perceived as a concern because of their generally limited potential, rather than as a possible threat to the democratic course pursued by the country's leadership.[168] Viewed from this angle, the potential of elected 'military politicians', for example in the State Duma, to interfere in the policy direction determined by the civilian leadership is of marginal concern. This is because, as the Russian defence analyst Vladislav Shurygin pointed out, 'even if there are deputies prepared to speak out in the name of the military as an institution, the Russian State Duma does not have that much influence today.'[169]

The notion of superpresidentialism usefully indicates the predominant traits of the political system in post-Soviet Russia. Among these are the marginalisation of political opposition, the dominance of the presidency over other branches of government, and the personalisation of politics. Its focus, however, on the agency of the presidential officeholder can lead to an oversimplified representation of the system. A variation on this concept, which incorporates the basic ideas of superpresidentialism, but allows for a more differentiated analysis of the political system, is Richard Sakwa's concept of the 'regime system'.[170] This concept is also a useful framework for understanding the nature of the role of appointed 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. In Sakwa's approach, the regime is embodied not only by the presidential officeholder, but:

> is defined as the network of governing institutions that is broader than the government and reflects formal and informal ways of governing... The regime in Russia is focused on the presidency, but is broader than the post of president itself. It can be seen as a dynamic set of relationships that include the president, the various factions in the presidential administration, the government…, and the informal links with various powerful oligarchs, regional bosses and other favoured insiders.[171]

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[168] See, for instance, Fish, 'Conclusion', pp. 215-253; Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2001, pp. 207-228; Robinson, 'The Politics of Russia's Partial Democracy', p. 150; Thomas F. Remington, Politics in Russia (3rd ed.), New York: Pearson Longman, 2004, pp. 56-60; John P. Willerton Jr., 'Presidential Power', in Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman (eds.), Developments in Russian Politics 4, Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997, pp. 35-55.
[169] Interview with Vladislav Shurygin conducted in Moscow on 21 January 2002.
[170] Sakwa, 'The Regime System in Russia', pp. 7-25; Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (3rd ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 2002, pp. 454-458; and Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, , pp. 86-88.
[171] Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 86.

The post-Soviet Russian regime is characterised by a 'supraparty technocratic government of "professionals" subordinated to a strong presidency', in which the parliament and the different political parties represented in it have little influence on the composition of the government.[172] Furthermore, 'the pluralism of the system (however distorted) is not in doubt; what is questionable is the degree to which open democratic forms of adjudicating these interests have been institutionalised'.[173]

In the regime system of rule, which emerged in post-Soviet Russia under the leadership of Boris El'tsin, former military personnel were sometimes appointed to political or administrative posts and formed a part of the 'supraparty technocratic government of "professionals"'.[174] Such figures were included, for instance, in the structures of Russia's first 'party of power', NDR. The long-serving chief of staff of former Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, was former KGB officer Gennadii Petelin. Ex-KGB official, Nikolai Svanidze, was appointed head of the state television channel RTR, whilst KGB lieutenant, Eduard Gendeliev, was put in charge of the news programme Vesti.[175]

The appointment of military figures to high-level political or administrative posts was relatively common, particularly in the second half of El'tsin's presidency. General Aleksandr Lebed' was appointed to the post of secretary of the Security Council, albeit for a short time, in August 1996. El'tsin appointed three prime ministers with a force-structure background. These were Evgenii Primakov in September 1998; Sergei Stepashin, who had previously served as interior minister and deputy prime minister in Primakov's government, in May 1999; and Vladimir Putin in August 1999. Furthermore, a number of former FSB officials were appointed to key positions in El'tsin's administration. From December 1998 until March 1999, the administration was headed by Nikolai Bordiuzha, a former KGB military counter-intelligence officer and leading

[172] Sakwa, 'The Regime System in Russia'; pp. 9 and 20.
[173] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, p. 454.
[174] ibid. p. 9.
[175] Aleksei A. Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii i 'bol'shaia' politika, Moscow: Spik Tsentr, 2000; p. 17.

figure of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) and the Federal Border Guard Service (FPS). From 1998 until 2000, Vladimir Makarov, who had served in the KGB and successor organisation, FAPSI, until 1994, served as deputy head of the presidential administration. Vladimir Osipov, who served in the KGB and FAPSI from 1975 until 1998, was appointed head of the administration's directorate of cadres in 1998. The current director of the FSB, Nikolai Patrushev, served as deputy head of the main control directorate and deputy head of the administration from May until October 1998. Indeed, it should not be forgotten that Vladimir Putin himself started his career in the federal state structures in Boris Yeltsin's presidential administration: he was appointed to the administration in June 1996 and rose to the position of first deputy head before his appointment as FSB director in July 1998.

This said, it cannot be overlooked that the number of force structure representatives in leading positions throughout the El'tsin era was lower than has been the case under the Putin presidency.[176] However, within the particular context of regime politics, this numerical difference is not down to the fact that El'tsin, unlike his successor, sought to exclude military figures from the political process as a matter of democratic principle.[177] It has been noted that the formation of government under El'tsin was only tenuously linked to the outcome of elections, the parliament and or to the number of political parties represented in the latter.[178] Instead, political appointments made by El'tsin 'were tactical combinations to maintain a balance pivoted on himself', which included the 'playing off of groups and institutions against each other'.[179] Whilst a balance of different interests had to be maintained, the key group in politics and the predominant power base of the El'tsin regime was centred on the so-called 'Family' – a fluid group of Kremlin-insiders. These included powerful oligarchs like Boris

[176] According to Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', p. 294, the average of force structure representatives in El'tsin's 'cohort' (including the categories 'national leadership', 'government', 'regional elite', and 'upper and lower house of parliament') was 11.2 percent in 1993 and 17.4 percent in 1999. The percentage of 'military politicians' in Putin's 'cohort' in 2003 was 25.1 percent.
[177] This assumption would be at odds with the observation made by Sakwa that the insulation of the authorities from democratic accountability was a major characteristic of the El'tsin led regime. Sakwa, 'The Regime System in Russia', p. 10.
[178] ibid. pp. 19-20.
[179] Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society, p. 458.

Berezovskii and Roman Abramovich, but also less prominent figures, such as Berezovskii's former business partner and head of El'tsin's presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, El'tsin's daughter, Tatiana Diachenko and her husband Pavel Borodin, a high-ranking state official.[180]

Whilst important political appointments naturally focused on figures and allies of El'tsin's 'team' or inner circle, the appointment of persons outside this group, including force-structure figures, to political posts was a part of El'tsin's strategy of maintaining power and balancing interests. For instance, the above mentioned appointment of General Lebed' as national security adviser and secretary of the Security Council can be interpreted as a pay-off for Lebed's withdrawal of his candidacy for presidency in favour of El'tsin in the second round of the 1996 elections. The appointment of Primakov as prime minister in 1998 can be perceived as a compromise in the face of the refusal of the Communist-dominated Duma to accept the reappointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin to the post. However, the point is that 'military politicians' and civilian appointees alike were subject to the same arbitrary 'hire-and-fire' strategy that accompanied the highly personalised system of governance of the El'tsin regime. The above mentioned figures of Kulikov, Lebed', and Primakov were brought into politics by appointment and had to accept their dismissal that sometimes occurred not long after. If seen within this context, appointed 'military politicians' were regular participants in the political process already under the El'tsin regime.

When Putin emerged as El'tsin's chosen successor for the presidency at the end of 1999, some political analysts interpreted the rising number of politicians and officials with a force-structure background as a conscious policy choice and strategy of the new president. In their eyes, this both embodied and realised his striving for a more authoritarian leadership-style and system of rule. Kryshtanovskaia and White described this development as a '"military-president" project',[181] and Petrov even went as far as to

[180] Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 64.
[181] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', p. 290.

suggest that it denoted a 'peaceful military takeover'.[182] If seen within the framework of regime politics, however, the increasing number of 'military politicians' and officials under Putin's leadership was determined by a different reason. This reason can be found in the way the country is governed, rather than in a conscious policy choice pursued by an authoritarian president. Within the framework of the regime system of rule Putin inherited, the 'military politicians' he appointed were regular participants in the political process.

When Putin became president, he was faced with a political system dominated by the characteristics of the regime system of rule described above. That is, the central polity was focused on representatives of El'tsin's 'Family', whilst the institutionalisation of the political process was underdeveloped at the expense of personalised and informal practices of governance. Having become acting president in December 1999, with his election occurring only three months later, Putin owed his position to this regime and was thus a part of it, at least in the initial stages. Seeking a degree of autonomy from the El'tsin regime in order to be able to pursue his own policies, Putin established his own power base utilising the possibilities at his disposal, within the framework of the political system he inherited.

Having served as prime minister from August until December 1999, Putin had only five months experience in a federal public political post. He therefore lacked a ready-made political base of his own that was ready to run the federal state machine. Putin, like his predecessor and the vast majority of Russian politicians in the executive, was not a member of a political party and, due to the nature of the regime he inherited, could not resort to institutionalised channels of recruitment via the parliament and political parties. It should therefore not come as a surprise that especially in the initial stages of his presidency, in addition to retaining key figures of the El'tsin regime, Putin had no choice but to build his own power base on trusted individuals he had previously worked with. In the words of Vadim Solovev, editor-in-chief of Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, '[Putin] was nominated by El'tsin and not by a political party. Therefore he is

[182] Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia', p. 88

not going to choose people from political parties. As we do not really have political parties, there is only one way: to rely on the people he used to work with. This might be good or bad, but this just is how it works.'[183] These people came predominantly from St. Petersburg, where they had worked with him in his early career as a KGB officer and later in the administration of Mayor Anatolii Sobchak.[184]

It is true that several high-profile posts went to Putin's former colleagues in the Leningrad KGB and to other FSB officers, some of whom had served under his directorship from July 1998 – August 1999. The most prominent politicians and officials of Putin's early KGB years, all of whom are viewed as key figures in Putin's 'team', were: Sergei Ivanov, Secretary of the Security Council from 2000 and defence minister since 2001; Viktor Cherkesov, presidential plenipotentiary in the North-Western region from 2000 – 2003, then director of the Federal Service for the Control of the Drugs Trade (FSN); and Viktor Ivanov, one of eight presidential aides in Putin's administration.[185] Putin's reliance on former colleagues in building his own 'team' was cited by many respondents interviewed for this thesis as the obvious explanation, in their eyes, for the increasing number of 'military politicians' with a force-structure background. The decisive factor for the appointments, in their opinion, were personal links and loyalty typical of the personalisation of the political system of post-Soviet Russia, rather than these persons' military background as such. According to Valerii Ostanin, a Iabloko deputy and former MVD employee:

> the mechanism [of elite appointment under El'tsin and Putin] is the same. They included people in their entourage who were personally devoted to them, who came from the same institution, the same community, on the basis of nepotism. Nepotism is our specific tradition here in Russia…There is nothing new about it. Both El'tsin and Putin used the same mechanisms to arrange their entourage.[186]

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[183] Interview with Vadim Solovev conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001.
[184] See also Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 61-62.
[185] All three were appointed to high-ranking positions in the FSB previously, when Putin was its director from 1998-1999. Until the restructuring and streamlining of the presidential administration in March 2004 (reportedly the administration was downsized from 1,500 to about 1,200) Ivanov and the other presidential aides had the post of deputy head of the administration. Pavel Aptekar', 'Konets reforme. Kamen' za kamnem', Gazeta, 5 August 2004.

With regard to a specific appointment of one FSB person to a political post, Andrei Lebedev, an Izvestiia journalist, asserted that 'Yes, he used to wear epaulets. But it probably mattered more that he is a former colleague of Putin.'[187] According to Aleksei Salmin, director of the Russian Public Policy Centre, 'Of course [Putin relies] on those he understands and knows. This is absolutely natural. If a professor happened to become president, he, too, would invite some people from his environment'.[188] In a similar vein, Iurii Korguniuk argued that 'if [Putin] had been a representative of a municipal bureaucracy, he probably would have brought his people from there. The point is Putin's background. I wouldn't say that he necessarily has all his trust in representatives of the force structures as such'.[189] The 'common background' explanation for the increasing number especially of former FSB officers in political and administrative posts under Putin is significant, because it further supports the assertion that the increasing number of 'military politicians' is a product of the way the country is governed, rather than the result of a conscious strategy to establish a 'well-ordered police state'.[190]

When the seven new federal administrative districts were created in 2000, and *siloviki* were appointed to head five of these regions, some analysts interpreted this as evidence that the increased inclusion of former military personnel was a conscious strategy pursued by the new leadership, particularly when it was noticed that these plenipotentiaries' administrations were staffed 'largely by security or military people'.[191] A closer examination of what occurred, however, questions this interpretation. Having studied the seven administrative districts and their leaders in detail, Nikolai Petrov asserted that 'one might conclude that the envoys have considerable freedom of choice in the staffing of their teams'. In line with the 'common background' explanation, Petrov found that, rather than following a plan for the 'rapid advance of the military' in the regions,[192] the former bureaucrat and politician, Sergei Kirienko, had surrounded himself with 'businessmen and retired politicians', Putin's former KGB colleague, Viktor

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[186] Interview with Valerii Ostanin conducted in Moscow on 6 December 2001.
[187] Interview with Andrei Lebedev conducted in Moscow on 4 December 2001.
[188] Interview with Aleksei Salmin, conducted in Moscow on 27 November 2001.
[189] Interview with Iurii Korguniuk conducted in Moscow on 22 November 2001.
[190] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; p. 303.
[191] See, for instance, Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?', p. 484.

Cherkesov, with 'KGB colleagues', and army general, Viktor Kazantsev, with 'fellow officers'.[193] The rise of ex-military and force-structure personnel staffing the regional administrations, thus, appears to have been determined by the mechanism of personal loyalty, rather than by the fact of these personalities' military background as such.

Putin's appointments of former colleagues from his years in the Leningrad KGB and directorate of the FSB to create his own power-base in the absence of more institutionalised channels of elite recruitment, however, cannot account for what many analysts have perceived as his general reliance on representatives from the whole range of force structures, including the regular armed forces. Personal contacts and loyalty in this case cannot serve as an explanatory factor.

The abovementioned creation of seven federal districts and the appointment of five *siloviki* to head them (that is, *siloviki* were put in charge of over 75 percent of the districts) appears to have contributed considerably to the opinion of some Western political analysts that Putin's reliance on force-structure representatives was a strategic plan. An analyst at Radio Free Europe, for example, wrote 'Russian President Putin's recent decisions to make his new federal districts correspond to military district lines and to appoint generals to all but two of them open a new era in that country's civil-military relations, one likely to lead to the militarisation of politics and the politicisation of the military'.[194] The impression of a policy of 'militarising' Russian politics seems to have been strengthened by the fact that these federal districts coincided largely with the territories of Russia's seven MVD districts.[195] However, there is evidence that it is not a conscious strategy. As will become apparent below, such force-structure appointments were less evident in relation to other important institutions. Even with regard to the federal districts, however, subsequent events showed that the appointment of *siloviki* to head them was *not* a long-term strategy. In 2003 and 2004 respectively, two of the initial

[192] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; p. 300.
[193] Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'; p. 83.
[194] Paul Goble, Militarising Politics – Politicising the Military', RFE/RL Russian Federation Report, 2(21), 7 June 2000.

appointments – Putin's former KGB colleague Cherkesov and army general Kazantsev, were later moved from their positions and replaced with civilian career politicians and administrators.[196]

Within the context of the regime system inherited by Putin, in which the large bureaucratic presidential apparatus is an important centre of decision-making, a consciously pursued strategy of government based on force-structure representatives would be evident within the presidential administration. However, this does not appear to be the case. Firstly, Putin's chosen head of the administration, who replaced El'tsin-appointed Aleksandr Voloshin in 2004, was the civilian and lawyer, Dmitrii Medvedev. From the 42 leading officials in Putin's administration in 2004,[197] seven had a force-structure background. None of these seven officials were in the top three positions of the administration (chairman and two deputy chairmen).[198] Three of these seven officials were presidential plenipotentiaries in the federal districts discussed above. Two figures with a force-structure background in the administration were presidential advisers (of an overall total of nine advisers). These were Aleksandr Burutin, a former army officer and administrator in the General Staff advising on military-technical policies and the Military Industrial Complex, and Gennadii Troshev, a former army officer in charge of preparing information and analyses concerning Cossacks. Due to the distinctly military-related subject area of their advisory role, their appointments appear appropriate (other advisers, for example, appear to have been picked for their appropriate specialisation, too. One such example was the appointment of a native Chechen and former Duma deputy for

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[195] No implications as such can be drawn from this action. Rather than to indicate a 'militarisation' of Russia, could it not simply mean that the division chosen for the MVD districts was simply the most appropriate and obvious way of dividing the country into larger entities?

[196] Cherkesov was replaced with Putin's colleague from Sobchak's administration, the engineer and former minister Il'ia Klebanov, and Kazantsev was replaced with the former governor of St. Petersburg, Vladimir Iakovlev.

[197] These 42 individuals were named on the website of the presidential administration in August 2004 (www.kremlin.ru). They include the head and two deputy heads of the administration, eight presidential advisers, the seven presidential plenipotentiaries in the federal districts, nine presidential advisers and eleven additional heads of sub-units of the presidential administration.

[198] Igor Sechin, a deputy head of the administration, is often presumed to have a KGB background. However, unlike the other force structure representatives in the presidential administration, his biography does not indicate such an occupation. Instead, the presumption of his KGB background is based on rumours circulated in the press that he might have been on KGB missions during his time as an interpreter (see, for

Chechnya as adviser on questions of the North-Caucasus. Another example was the appointment of a musician and theatre director as adviser on cultural issues).

The remaining two 'military figures' in Putin's administration in 2004 were Vladimir Osipov, the administration's head of the directorate of cadres and state orders. He is a former KGB officer, who had been in charge of the directorate of cadres in FAPSI from 1991 until 1998, when he was appointed to El'tsin's presidential administration in charge of the directorate of cadres. He thus was not brought into the administration by Putin. The last *silovik* in Putin's administration was Viktor Ivanov, one of nine presidential aides. He also is a former KGB officer who worked with Putin in the administration of St. Petersburg mayor, Anatolii Sobchak. From this point of view, there does not appear to be a clear indication of a policy consciously pursued by Putin to strengthen the role of 'military politicians' in the presidential administration.

With regard to federal ministries, too, the numbers of *siloviki* in leading positions do not clearly support the supposition that the appointment of force-structure representatives to key posts is a conscious policy choice pursued by Putin. In 2004, four years into his presidency, only four of eighteen federal ministers were of a force-structure background.[199] One was Rashid Nurgaliev, the interior minister, who served in the KGB and FSB from 1981 until 2002, when he was appointed first deputy interior minister to the civilian minister, Boris Gryzlov. When Gryzlov was elected as speaker of the State Duma in January 2004, Nurgaliev was first appointed acting interior minister and then interior minister in March 2004. A second federal minister with a force structure background was the minister, since March 2004, of transport and communications, Igor' Levitin. After a long career in the Soviet and Russian railway troops, he gained further

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instance, Profil, 17 December 2001; Vedemosti, 20. March 2002; and Novaia gazeta, No 50, July 2003). Sechin worked with Putin in Sobchak's administration from 1991-1996.

[199] This figure was correct in August 2004 in accordance with the official governmental website (www.government.ru). It includes the prime minister and the deputy prime minister. In the first half of 2004, the number of federal ministers was reduced from about 30 to 18 due to a number of presidential decrees initiating the wide-ranging restructuring and streamlining of the Russian system of federal executive power. (Presidential decrees No. 314 'O sisteme i strukture federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti' signed 9 March 2004 and, No. 0649 'Voprosy struktury federal'nykh organov ispolnitel'noi vlasti' signed on 20 May 2004).

experience relevant for his current position as deputy director of the large Russian transport company 'Severastal'trans' from 1996-2004. In this company he was in charge of railroad transport and the operation of seaports. The third force-structure minister was Sergei Shoigu, heading the Ministry for Emergency Situations (MChS). Not coming from a military background, he was appointed chairman of the Russian rescue corps in 1991 and became the first and so far only, the MChS minister when the ministry was created in 1994. For his service as the MChS minister, he was awarded the highest military rank, army general (*general armii*), in 2003. The fourth federal minister with a force-structure background was Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov. Having closely worked with Putin before he became president, Ivanov is widely believed to be one of Putin's closest allies and a key member of the president's 'team'.

Shoigu is a figure of the El'tsin era, Levitin's previous experience and expertise qualified him for his position notwithstanding his military background, and Ivanov is a personal ally of the president. Therefore, Putin's reliance on 'military politicians' to fill the highest governmental posts in federal ministries does not appear to be a conscious strategy. The institutional background in a force structure as such does not appear to be the centrally important factor in appointments made by Putin. Moreover, it is important to note that three of the four 'military ministers' are at the helm of ministries belonging to the block of force structures. The heading of such ministries by military figures, rather than by civilians, is traditional in Russia and not a characteristic of the Putin era. El'tsin's interior ministers, for example, all were *siloviki* with a background in the interior ministry.[200] Not unlike Nurgaliev, Sergei Stepashin, El'tsin's interior minister from 1998-1999, was previously affiliated to the FSB, having acted as its director from 1993-1995.[201]

Putin's apparent reliance on former force-structure personnel should not be overemphasised. In the words of Sergei Mulin, a former journalist of the liberal

[200] General of the Army Viktor Yerin from 1993-1995, General of the Army Anatolii Kulikov from 1995-1998.
[201] From 1993 until the creation of the FSB in its current form, Stepashin headed the FSB predecessor, the FSK.

newspaper Segodnia, 'Putin does not only rely on military people. He is a much more subtle politician than that'.[202] A number of respondents interviewed for this thesis expressed the view that Putin's inclusion of former military figures in his 'team' was characteristic of his early presidency, when his pool of cadres was limited, but should not be interpreted as a long-term strategy.[203] This corresponds to the argument that, within the framework of the regime system Putin inherited and his lack of sufficient experience in federal politics, his pool of cadres was limited until he had established a wider support base. Such an assertion also appears to be supported, for instance, by the later replacement with civilians of two *siloviki* plenipotentiaries in the federal districts, whose appointments at the time were used to support the argument that Putin pursued a conscious policy of 'militarisation'. Moreover, when it came to replacing key members of the El'tsin elite with his own people, arguably two of the most significant posts in the executive (after the presidency) – that of prime minister and head of the presidential administration – were given to civilians and not to ex-force-structure personnel.[204]

In conclusion, two important issues have to be addressed with regards to the portrayal of appointed 'military politicians' as a tool in the hands of the president pursuing a more authoritarian policy direction. Firstly, such an interpretation can at best provide a simplified explanation of events. According to Sakwa, 'the concept of a struggle between the "*siloviki*" and "the family"' was invented by Gleb Pavlovskii, a key political consultant during Putin's first presidential campaign, 'as a way of explaining the difficulties and impediments in the way of implementing Putin's policies'.[205] Therefore, it should not be taken too literally. In discussing the usefulness of the concept of such a struggle with Andrei Ryabov of the Moscow Carnegie Centre, he asserted the following:

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[202] Interview with Sergei Mulin conducted in Moscow on 15 November 2001.
[203] This opinion was expressed by the Iabloko deputy Iurii Artem'ev and the director of the Russian Public Police Centre, Aleksei Salmin (interviews conducted in Moscow on 20 and 27 November 2001 in Moscow).
[204] El'tsin's former head of administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, resigned in October 2003 and was replaced by Dmitrii Medvedev, an academic and lawyer, who had worked with Putin in Sobchak's administration. Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov was sacked shortly before the presidential elections in 2004 and was replaced with Mikhail Fradkov, an economist and long-serving state official. Fradkov was also appointed by Putin from 2001 – 2003 as a civilian director of the FSNP.
[205] Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 64.

> I agree with the view that Eltsin's family still plays a big role – but not only Eltsin's clan, also other clans that formed around big oil companies. Yukos, for example, is a very influential clan. Then around other big vertically integrated companies. But as for other elements of this construction – FSB people and the St. Petersburg group – I think today it is a very common picture, as we say. A general picture. Because these political groups are very heterogeneous.[206]

An observation made by Peter Reddaway is significant in this respect: 'the *siloviki* appear…not to have a leader or leaders, not to meet in even a semi-public way, and not to have any means of coordinating their goals and plans.'[207] This is an important point. If the appointment of military figures to key posts is assumed to be a conscious strategy, it should also be presumed that this strategy is pursued with a specific goal in mind. Due to the widely varied posts (both in terms of tasks and location) held by such individuals, however, the likelihood of a co-ordinated and common '*siloviki* project' appears minimal.

Secondly, in discussing the nature of the role of 'military politicians' appointed by Putin, there is an important distinction to be made. This is the distinction between the activities of *siloviki* in political posts and the actions of force structures as institutions. As pointed out by Andrei Nikolaev in the introductory quotation to this chapter, these are 'absolutely different things'. It is possible that due especially to the reportedly close personal ties between President Putin and FSB director, Nikolai Patrushev, for instance, the visibility and importance of this particular institution under the Putin leadership has risen. However, it has to be born in mind that the Russian president's potential for abusing the country's force structures in pursuit of his political goals does not require the inclusion of *siloviki* in the political process, or indeed a president with a military background. If El'tsin abused his position as the single most important individual in charge of Russian force structures for the forceful settlement of his conflict with parliament in October 1993, Putin might task the FSB with supporting his attempts at removing oligarchs of the El'tsin-era regime from the centre of political decision-making. As discussed in chapter three, the Russian president has wide-ranging formal powers over the country's force structures. There is little to stop a civilian president with similar

[206] Interview with Andrei Ryabov conducted in Moscow on 22 May 2003.
[207] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 4.

policy preferences from acting in the same way. The use of a force structure by a president for pursuing a specific goal is not the same as a president pursuing a political goal on behalf of, or because of, the force structures.

The discussion above clearly questions the assumption that the nature of the role of 'military politicians' appointed by Putin is that of a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president. Approached from the point of view of Sakwa's conceptualisation of the regime system of rule, which emerged in post-Soviet Russia during the leadership of Boris El'tsin, the rising number of figures with a force-structure background in Putin's government and apparat was the result of the way in which the country is governed, and not of a conscious policy. Putin inherited a political system that both allowed him to and, to an extent, left him no other choice but to rely, at least in part, on representatives of the force structures. No institutionalised channels of elite recruitment were available to Putin and due to his rapid elevation to power, he lacked a ready-made 'shadow government',[208] able to run the federal Russian state machine. In order to create his own 'team', Putin relied on trusted individuals he had previously worked with. Inevitably, some of these personalities came from the security services. Whilst 'military politicians' were appointed also by El'tsin, their number rose under Putin because of the nature of the political system he inherited, and not as a result of a consciously pursued strategy of establishing a 'well-ordered police state'.[209]

The study of *siloviki* in Putin's government above should not be interpreted as a wholesale defence of the policies pursued by Putin. Instead, the analysis aimed to make explicit that the presence of politicians with a military background in post-Soviet Russia cannot be explained by a particular project pursued by a single actor. In the words of the veteran Moscow correspondent of the German public television channel ARD, Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, 'people attempting to evaluate Putin and his policies unidimensionally risk getting it wrong altogether'.[210]

[208] Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 61.
[209] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', p. 303.

Summation

The second part of the chapter discussed the nature of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia in assessing to what extent the explanations of their presence as an interference by the military-as-institution in civilian affairs, or as a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president accurately describe this role. In view of the discussion above the answer to this question is – neither. Instead, 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia are regular participants in the political process. As discussed in the first sub-section, examples of actual 'military opposition' to the civilian leadership emanating from 'military politicians', have been apparent in post-Soviet Russia. However, these are rare exceptions to the rule and should by no means be used as the basis for the drawing of general conclusions about the state of the country's civil-military relationship. The second sub-section showed that the participation of military and law-enforcement personnel in Russian political life is clearly regulated in the country's legislation, in terms which are broadly similar to those in the U.S. or in the United Kingdom. From that point of view the political participation of figures with a force-structure background has to be seen as a lawful practice, rather than as interference in civilian affairs or encroachment into politics.

The third and last sub-section dealt with the difference between elected and appointed 'military politicians'. It was argued that the role of both elected and appointed 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is that of regular participants in the political process. The number of appointed 'military politicians' under Putin's leadership has risen. However, if these appointments are evaluated within the framework of the specific mechanisms of the political system in post-Soviet Russia, their presence should be more accurately depicted as being a result of how the country is governed, rather than presuming them to be the embodiment of Putin's strategy to 'militarise' politics as a whole. Within the regime system of rule in post-Soviet Russia, appointed 'military politicians' are regular participants in the political process on a par with civilians.

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[210] Gabriele Krone-Schmalz, 'Jenseits der Klischees', Rheinischer Merkur, No. 15, 8 April 2004.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The aim of this chapter was three-fold. Firstly, in engaging in a micro-level analysis of the political activities of figures with a military background, it provided a wealth of empirical evidence contributing to our understanding of an important area of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia. Secondly, it amalgamated the studies conducted by civil-military relations analysts throughout the post-Soviet era with the assessments of 'military politicians' during the Putin-era provided. Thirdly, it alleviated the tendency of civil-military relations analysts to frame their studies within concepts of democratic transition and assessed the extent to which alternative approaches to and conceptualisations of post-Soviet politics, such as studies of elite transition and regime politics, can add to our understanding of the role of 'military politicians'.

The overall conclusion of this chapter is simple. Due to the widely varying backgrounds, motives and reasons for going into politics, and political positions held by figures with a background in Russia's force structures, the existence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia cannot be evaluated as a single issue question. The issue is multifaceted and has to be treated as such. The role of 'military politicians' in the Russian body politic is to be understood neither as an interference by the military-as-institution in civilian affairs, nor as a tool in the hands of an authoritarian president. Instead, within the context of the political system in post-Soviet Russia, 'military politicians' participate in politics on a par with civilians.

5

Studying civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia as a 'normal' country

Why won't the world believe what we say about ourselves? …The last few years have seen the emergence of publications that are so blatantly anti-Russian that it is clear that they are simply not interested in what is actually happening in this country.[1]
Viktor Loshak, Moskovskie novosti journalist

Russia is a kaleidoscope of interacting positive and negative trends…Scholars should spend more time investigating what is really happening and less time judging how the transition measures up according to some predetermined finish line.[2]
David Foglesong and Gordon M. Hahn, American scholars

The previous empirical chapters provided an oversight of Russian perceptions of 'military politicians', studied the institutional background of such personalities and then assessed the role of these figures in the political system of post-Soviet Russia. This final chapter of the thesis addresses an issue, which is of importance both for understanding and studying the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. As discussed in the relevant section in chapter one, this concern is linked to recurring features in Western assessments of civil-military relations and of wider developments in post-Soviet Russian politics. These appear to contribute towards the overstatement of concerns voiced in the work of some Western analysts in this area. In discussing these recurrent features, this chapter constitutes the analytical conclusion of the thesis. Reflecting on the insights provided in the previous chapters it proposes a conceptual approach to the study of post-Soviet Russian politics with particular consideration of the issue of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians'.

[1] Loshak, 'Obratnaia sviaz: zapugali'.
[2] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 3.

Despite repeated warnings about the political role played by military figures and, in a broader sense, about the 'failure of democracy in Russia'[3] more widely, more than a decade into the post-Soviet era no military coup has occurred and the country continues to be ruled by a popularly elected leadership. As discussed in the relevant section in chapter one, the exclusion of what Foglesong and Hahn termed 'unrealistic expectations', 'oversimplifications', 'essentialist ideas', and 'exaggerated notions'[4] in analysing Russia is vital also in consideration of the concerns voiced in this regard within Russia itself. It is acknowledged that a fully 'objective' interpretation of events is an unattainable undertaking. However, the conceptual and analytical proposals put forward in this chapter can contribute towards a fuller understanding of the role and influence of politicians with a military background in post-Soviet Russia. The chapter firstly proposes a conceptual approach to the interpretation of developments in post-Soviet Russia, and subsequently outlines three practical suggestions for its application to the study of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians' in particular. These are the consideration of Russian perceptions of the issue, the analysis of developments in all their complexity, and the eschewing of essentialist ideas and 'neo-Kremlinological' approaches.

Conceptualising post-Soviet Russia: 'renegade' or 'normal' country?

The predominant conceptual debate concerning the study of Russia throughout the first decade of the post-Soviet era was dominated largely by the area studies versus transitology question.[5] Indications, however, of a new debate started to emerge during the course of Vladimir Putin's first term in office as president. A small circle of Western academics, and also journalists, increasingly began to voice concerns with regard to what they perceived as a consensus for predominantly pessimistic assessments of political developments in post-Soviet Russia. For example, the

[3] Gill, 'The Failure of Democracy in Russia', pp. 169-197.
[4] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 3.
[5] This debate, crudely speaking, concerned the issue whether post-Soviet Russia can and should be analysed within the framework of Western and comparative theories of political science, or whether the country's 'uniqueness' is making such theoretical frameworks inappropriate in this case. See, for instance, Valerie Bunce, 'Should Transitologists be Grounded?' and 'Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers' in Slavic Review, 54(4), pp. 111-127 and 1-8; Terry L. Karl and Phillipe C. Schmitter, 'From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists or Students of Postcommunism?', Slavic Review, 54(4), pp. 965-978; Robert D. Marckwick, 'A Discipline in Transition? From Sovietology to

American scholars Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman asked, 'why the dark, at times almost paranoid view? Why the hyperbole about kleptocracy, economic cataclysm, and KGB takeovers?'[6] David Foglesong and Gordon Hahn were worried about 'the gloomy appraisals of the incorrigible authoritarianism', and the portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a 'KGB operative…seeking to return Russia to a police-state', in the work of Western journalists and scholars.[7]

A number of these critics were driven by the perception that the often one-sided emphasis of Western analyses of post-Soviet Russia was due to the revival or persistence of what they termed 'cold war rhetoric' and 'Russophobia of old',[8] 'clichés and stereotypes',[9] 'pre-conceived notions',[10] 'ideological and overtly political [factors]',[11] and 'double standards'.[12] According to Anatol Lieven, 'the cold war created a mood of pathological suspicion and fear of Russia in sections of the West that has been very slow to fade'.[13] Seeking to find an explanation for the persistence and/or revival of such sentiments, some critics pointed to the disappointment of unrealistically high expectations about Russia's democratic transition in the early post-Soviet era. As Foglesong and Hahn argued, having measured up post-Soviet Russia's transformation 'according to some predetermined finish line' and ideal model of democracy, some analysts seemingly extrapolated 'disappointment over negative trends in [some] area[s] onto the Russian government or people as a whole'.[14] In the words of Lieven, 'there is a widespread ideological belief in the West that every society in the world is inherently capable of adopting successful Western democracy and economics virtually overnight; and in consequence, if countries fail to

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Transitology', Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 12(3), pp. 255-276; Richard Sakwa, 'Russian Studies: A Fractured Mirror', Politics, 16(3), pp. 175-186.

[6] Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, 'A Normal Country?', Foreign Affairs, 83(2), March/April 2004, p. 37.

[7] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 6.

[8] Eric Kraus, 'The Wrongs of Spring and the Western Media', The Moscow Times, 15 April 2004.

[9] Krone-Schmalz, 'Jenseits der Klischees'.

[10] Patrick Armstrong, 'The Fallacy of Neo-Kremlinology', JRL Research and Analytical Supplement, Issue No. 23, March 2004.

[11] Shleifer and Treisman, 'A Normal Country?', p. 37.

[12] Eric A. Heinze and Douglas A. Borer, 'The Chechen Exception: Rethinking Russia's Human Rights Policy', Politics, 22(2), 2002, pp. 86-94. Heinze and Borer evaluated the construal of Russian human rights policies and practices ' through a historicist lens of tsarist and Soviet-era authoritarianism' as a double standard of Western analysts (p. 86).

[13] Peter Lavelle, 'Q&A: Lieven: a different view of Putin', UPI, 23 August 2004. (Via Johnson's Russia List).

[14] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 13.

achieve this it is not because of the state of their social, economic, political and cultural systems, but is the work of wicked individuals and groups'.[15] Engaging in the construction of catch-all explanations depicting post-Soviet Russia as an eternally backward authoritarian state, some analysts arguably represented an incomplete view of Russia's post-Soviet transformation. With regard to the topic of this thesis it is easily conceivable that the presence of politicians with a military and security background supported, in the eyes of some analysts, the view of Russia as an 'irredeemable land of cruel masters and servile subjects'.[16]

The gist of the arguments brought forward by the above mentioned critics of such an approach was to call for a different assessment of political developments in post-Soviet Russia. As the journalist Eric Kraus argued, instead of treating it as 'some sort of renegade – the reactionary Slavic backwater',[17] Russia should be treated as a 'normal' country. This is not to suggest that the analysts advocating such an approach suggested a glossing over of existing problems. However, they proposed that it was necessary to take into account developments in all their complexity in order to avoid the 'presumption that Russia's historical fate or natural evolutionary endpoint can be seen in advance'[18] and to put the 'extreme forecasts [of either textbook democracy or fully-fledged authoritarianism] in perspective'.[19] Rephrased in the words of the American analyst Ralph Peters, 'A decade ago, we heard exuberant predictions of Russian glory waiting just around the corner. Next, we heard predictions of Russian doom…The truth lies in between…The glass is dirty, but it is nearly three-quarters full'.[20]

Shleifer and Treisman's have argued that 'data on Russia's growth, macroeconomic stability, income inequality, and corporate finances – as well as on its elections, press freedom, and corruption – suggest there is a large gap between the overwhelmingly negative assessments of the country and the facts'.[21] Given Russia's past and its relatively short post-Soviet history, they concluded in 2004 that in

[15] Lavelle, 'Q&A: Lieven'.
[16] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 6.
[17] Kraus, 'The Wrongs of Spring'.
[18] Foglesong and Hahn, 'Ten Myths about Russia', p. 13.
[19] Shleifer and Treisman, 'A Normal Country?', p. 38.
[20] Ralph Peters, 'The Riddle of Russia', The New York Post, February 16 2004.
[21] Shleifer and Treisman, 'A Normal Country?', p. 21.

consideration of both the achievements and problems of its transformation, the country at its present state of development was 'quite normal'[22] when compared not to an ideal model of democracy, but to other middle-income countries at a similar stage of development. It was also 'normal' inasmuch as its future course of development is not certain. In line with this argument, in evaluating Russia's post-Soviet transformation in consideration of its present state of development (that is, the severity of the problems facing the country),[23] the creation of the impression that 'Russia still seems to attract more solidly negative coverage than many other countries, and to more damaging and distorting effect', can be avoided.[24]

Richard Sakwa spoke of the 'normalisation' of Russia in a different context, but to a similar effect. In accordance with Sakwa's evaluation, the search for the 'normalisation' of Russian politics can be seen as a consciously pursued policy and a predominant characteristic of Putin's leadership. Seeking to 'normalise' the political process and to achieve the country's standing as a 'normal' country also on the international stage, Putin sought to repudiate 'the extraordinary and extra-legal, and at the international level the emergency and the confrontational'.[25] In simple terms, Putin's attempts at 'normalising' politics were aimed at increasing the institutionalisation of governance and the predictability of the political process. Whilst Sakwa evaluated Putin's intentions as genuine, he also conceded that Putin's policy of normalisation was beset by a degree of ambiguity and contradictions: 'between the recognition of the necessity to encourage civic activism and attempts to control this activism, between the attempt to develop the rudiments of a liberal economy and society while strengthening the role of the state, and between institutionalising the powers of democratic accountability while engaging in personalised leadership activism'.[26] This 'polymorphism' of Putin's presidency, in Sakwa's view, was 'capable of varying interpretations and driving simultaneously in different directions'. For this reason, also, Sakwa asserted that 'his leadership was capable of such

[22] ibid. p. 22.
[23] As Edwin Bacon pointed out, 'the conclusions we reach with regard to the growth of authoritarianism in Russia are likely to depend on whether we choose to focus on the problems facing Russia or on the regime charged with tackling these problems'. Edwin Bacon, 'Conceptualizing Contemporary Russia', The Slavonic and East European Review, 81(2), April 2003, p. 299.
[24] Mary Dejevsky, 'Don't always believe the worst about Russia', The Independent, 19 July 2002.
[25] Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 54.
[26] ibid. pp. 58-59.

dramatically divergent evaluations'.[27] He pointed out that the evaluation of Putin's leadership entirely within the model of authoritarian development is mistaken. Instead, he proposed that 'the final proof of his commitment' to normalisation would become evident only in view of the stability of this policy beyond Putin's term in office.[28]

The treatment of Russia as a 'normal' state can lead towards a greater understanding of the country's developments. Treating it as a 'normal' state is important also particularly with respect to the topic of this thesis, which is to further our understanding of the role played by military figures in the political process. The issue of 'military politicians', more so than many other political phenomena, can understandably tend to be approached from a negative point of view from the outset. It can evoke the image of military regimes and military take-over. With regard to politicians with a background in the Soviet intelligence services, it can evoke the image of KGB suppression. In view of the work of the previous chapters, however, the role ascribed to these figures by some Western authors is overstated for a variety of reasons. Having discussed the merit of treating post-Soviet Russia as a 'normal' country, the sections below will outline a number of practical proposals by which this conceptual consideration can be operationalised with regard to the evaluation of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia, and of 'military politicians' in particular.

Evaluating Russian civil-military relations and 'military politicians' within the framework of Russia as a 'normal' state

In reviewing existing Western analyses of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians', and also in carrying out research for this thesis, three major practical issues linked to the need to treat Russia as a 'normal' country have crystallised. These three issues will be discussed in turn below. They are firstly the necessity to analyse Russian perceptions and attitudes towards specific issues that might differ from Western perceptions. Secondly, this is the necessity to take into account developments in civil-military relations in all their complexity. The third and last aspect to be

[27] ibid. p. 245.
[28] ibid. p. 250.

discussed is the need to exclude essentialist ideas and catch-all explanations in assessing the political influence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia.

Analysing Russian assessments of 'military politicians'

As presented in detail in the media analysis in chapter two of the thesis, the consensus in Russia itself with regard to the presence of figures with a military background in the political process is by no means unanimous. Whilst there are Russian voices evaluating 'military politicians' in equally unfavourable terms as their Western counterparts, the perception that retired military personnel in the state's political system pose a problem is not a common-sense assumption in Russia. In line with the review of newspaper coverage provided in chapter two, such a view is even marginal, existing alongside other, less critical or even welcoming evaluations of politicians with a military background. The generally less critical evaluation of 'military politicians' in the Russian media or by Russian analysts should not be put down to media censorship or to a possible fear of analysts of engaging with this issue. The highly critical work of Olga Kryshtanovskaia, for instance, which has been discussed in detail in the preceding chapters, has been widely cited and published in the Russian media and in Russian academic journals.[29] However, as also discussed in chapter two, alternative opinions about the issue exist and are equally distributed in the Russian media. Some Russian newspapers approached the issue by presenting a range of opinions in publishing, for instance, a 'roundtable' discussion in which twenty academics and politicians, both with and without a military background and picked from across the political spectrum, were invited to express their opinion.[30] Another newspaper pitched the opinion of Duma deputy Mikhail Grishankov, who has an FSB background, against the opinion of Liudmila Alekseeva, the director of the well-known human rights organisation, the Moscow Helsinki Group.[31] The subject of *siloviki* in politics is not a taboo in post-Soviet Russia. It is widely discussed in the

[29] See, for instance, Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia, 'Vremiia sotsialogii: Elita v pogonakh', Vremiia MN, 18 September 2002; Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia, 'Politicheskie reformy Putina i elita', Obshchestvo i ekonomika, No 004, 31 May 2003; Anatolii Kostiukov, 'Vlast' tsveta khaki: Putinskuiu elitu otlichaet voennaia vypravka', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 19 August 2003 (Interview with Kryshtanovskaia); Dmitrii Oreshkin, 'Logika putcha', Novoe Vremiia, No 040, 5 October 2003; Mark Deich, 'ChKGB: Siloviki v zakone', Moskovskii komsomolets, 13 October 2003; Ol'ga Kryshtanovskaia, 'Opasnye liudi v shtatskom', Ezhenedel'nyi zhurnal, 15 March 2004; Vitalii Iaroshevskii, 'Operatsiia "vnedrenie" zavershena!', Novaia gazeta, 30 August 2004 (Interview with Kryshtanovskaia).
[30] Ostapchuk and Stepanov, 'Genpodriad'.
[31] Liuba Zharii, 'Razvedka vlasti'iu', Moskovskii komsomolets, 25 June 2002.

Russian media, and the interview respondents chosen for this thesis, who came from across the spectrum of political opinion and from both military and civilian backgrounds, were ready to openly discuss the subject with a foreign researcher.

In interpreting the issue of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia it is necessary to acknowledge that in Russia there is a variety of opinions on this issue. In the collation of empirical material, the selection of sources exclusively from Russian proponents of ideas similar to the Western consensus about 'military politicians' should be avoided. The favouring of such sources has an obvious appeal, as these opinions can be easily accommodated within Western civil-military relations concepts applied to frame the study of this issue. Also, politicians and analysts positively disposed towards Western political thinking might be easier to access and more interested in, or more used to, being interviewed by a foreign researcher. As concluded in the media analysis provided in chapter two, however, the usually critical Western interpretation of the participation of ex-military personnel in Russian politics is by no means a consensus in Russia. The exclusion of competing discourses from the analysis of civil-military relations and of 'military politicians' results in an incomplete understanding of the Russian case.

The Russian political commentator, Iurii Filippov, remarked upon the tendency displayed by some Western analysts towards the favouring of sources whose opinions coincided with their own: 'Personally, I think that Russian democracy and the situation in Russian society are viewed differently in Russia and the West right from the start. The West (meaning Europe and North America) interprets democracy, democrats and liberals in Russia as above all organisations and people who have been encouraged or at least recognised by the West'. Filippov pointed out that as a result of this uneven selection of sources the predominantly pessimistic consensus with regard to political developments in contemporary Russia in Western publications did not mirror the variety of opinions in Russia.[32] Viacheslav Nikonov, somewhat sarcastically, remarked the following about some Western analysts' choice of sources:

> Analysts tend to be friends with people…who are marginal, but at the same time are critical of whatever the government is doing. They have felt more

[32] Iurii Filippov, 'Democracy Russian Style', RIA Novosti (via Johnson's Russia List).

> comfortable with dissidents since Soviet times. Sometimes the same analysts are still meeting their Soviet friends. Dissidents are dissidents all the time, no matter what the regime is like – they are just against whatever it does. Whatever is going on, they are just like, "bloody dictatorship"![33]

The favouring of Russian sources whose opinions about 'military politicians' coincide with the consensus of Western analysts should be avoided, because this can result in an incomplete understanding and overstatement of the role of such personalities in post-Soviet Russian politics.

Crucially, however, possible alternative opinions about 'military politicians' not only should be heard, but be fed into the analysis. Due to the predominant normative approaches taken by many Western analysts of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia, however, this is difficult to achieve. As discussed previously, seen through the prism of Western civil-military relations approaches the participation of post-Soviet Russian figures with a force-structure background in politics is presented as a dysfunction of the state's civil-military relationship. In Russia itself the presence of these 'military politicians' is not inevitably evaluated as undesirable, or at least not as the significant issue seen by many Western analysts. Thus, the outlook of such an approach means that alternative Russian views on the issue are not easily incorporated into the analysis. There is a danger, therefore, that such an approach can evoke negative responses, or even indignation at the perceived implication that 'the Russians simply do not understand what is good for them'. Sergei Iastrzhembskii, a presidential aide to both Boris El'tsin and Vladimir Putin, asserted in an address to the annual Russian Economic Forum in London in 2002: 'It's high time the West stopped treating Russia as a mischievous student in the school of democracy'.[34]

The taking into consideration of alternative views on the role of military figures in politics voiced in Russia appears to add a useful explanatory component to the evaluation of the issue through the prism of Western concepts of civil-military relations theory. For example, whilst, as discussed in chapter one, the absence of a military coup in post-Soviet Russia might be surprising to some Western analysts because such a scenario would have been predicted by the applied theoretical models,

[33] Interview with Viacheslav Nikonov conducted in Moscow on 15 October 2002.
[34] Sergei Iastrzhembskii, 'Russophobia still Rampant', The Moscow Times, 24 April 2002.

for many Russian analysts, who perceive of the issue in different terms, this conclusion merely states the obvious.

Assessing developments in and aspects of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia

As discussed in the conceptual considerations above, the application of unrealistic expectations concerning Russia's post-Soviet transformation can lead towards an incomplete understanding of events and developments. This concern also applies to the understanding of the role of 'military politicians' and of the state's civil-military relations more widely. Shortcomings of the country's civil-military relationship, particularly with regard to the establishment of a democratic system of civilian control, continue to be apparent. However, it would be wrong to conclude that developments in the civil-military relationship throughout the post-Soviet era have been entirely stagnant.

Firstly, the appointment of Sergei Ivanov as minister of defence in March 2001 can be evaluated as an encouraging factor of development in Russian civil-military relations. The absence of civilian ministers of defence has been interpreted by Western civil-military relations analysts as a major shortcoming of the civil-military relationship in post-Soviet Russia. It was evaluated as one expression of the unduly high level of political influence exerted by the armed forces as an institution by the way of the appointment of military representatives to political posts. It was assumed that 'one of their own' could not but lobby on behalf of the armed forces instead of exerting a civilian control function and overseeing the implementation of governmental policies on defence.[35] With the appointment of Ivanov, the defence ministry in post-Soviet Russia for the first time was not headed by a general of the armed forces.[36] Although because of his background in the KGB and FSB Ivanov cannot be classified as a 'pure' civilian, he entered his position as defence minister as a civilian, having retired from active military service in November 2000.[37]

[35] See, for instance, Betz, 'No Place for a Civilian?', pp. 481-504.
[36] Boris El'tsin himself briefly held the position of defence minister when the Russian armed forces were first created, from March – May 1992. Dmitrii Ustinov was the only civilian minister of defence of the Soviet Union, from 1976 until 1984.
[37] Igor Korotchenko, 'Sergei Ivanov v grazhdanskom. Kakoe naznachenie posleduet vsled za etim?', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 November 2000.

In portraying the appointment of Ivanov as the defence minister, the fact of his background in the KGB/FSB, and thus of his belonging to Putin's 'group of *siloviki*' should not be singled out as the only significant aspect of this development. Such a focus would neglect the fact that his appointment denoted the important change of bringing an outsider into the position of defence minister. This can be evaluated as a step in the 'right' direction of institutionalising a more democratic system of civilian control over the regular armed forces if seen from the point of view of the Western understanding of a 'good' civil-military relationship. In Russia itself the appointment of a semi-civilian as defence minister has been greeted as significant, for instance, by several interview respondents. As Rossiiskaia gazeta editor, Vitalii Dymarskii, pointed out, 'in this position [Ivanov] is closer to civilians than to the military'.[38] In the words of Nikolai Efimov, the editor-in-chief of Krasnaia zvezda,

> [Ivanov] came from the outside. He does not belong to a clique, so it is easier for him to actually achieve something. He is not a commander like Grachev, he is not a pilot like Shaposhnikov, and he is not a rocketeer like Sergeev. He came from outside, so he can make more objective judgments. He did not serve or study with anybody in the armed forces. He can approach problems in the interest not only of the armed forces.[39]

In addition to the appointment of Ivanov as the first defence minister without a career background in the regular armed forces, another substantial development of an institutional rather than merely personal character can be seen as noteworthy. This is in regard to the normative aim of decreasing the political influence of the military as an institution. This development is institutional reform with regard to the Russian General Staff that were implemented by amendments to the federal law, 'On defence', signed by the president in July 2004.[40] Throughout the post-Soviet era the relatively high degree of influence of the General Staff and of its leading figure, the Chief of the General Staff, has been evaluated as an essential problem of civil-military relations in

[38] Interview with Vitalii Dymarskii conducted on 9 January 2002.
[39] Interview with Nikolai Efimov, conducted in Moscow on 29 November 2001.
[40] The changes were implemented as a part of a broad-ranging law on improvements to the system of state administration: Federal'nyi zakon, 'O vnesenii izmenenii v nekotorye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii i priznanii utrativshimi silu nekotorykh zakonodatel'nykh aktov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v sviazi s osushchestvleniem mer po sovershenstvovaniiu gosudarstvennogo upravleniia' (N 58-FZ; 29 June 2004). Amendments to the law 'On defence' were covered in article 37 of this law.

contemporary Russia.[41] A particular concern in this respect was the ambiguous division of labour between the MO and the General Staff. Although the Chief of the General Staff was nominally subordinate to the defence minister,[42] the respective and partially overlapping functions assigned to each institution resulted in a quasi-duality of control.

Whilst the MO, in accordance with its statute, constitutes the main body of military control,[43] the General Staff was given the role of the main body of operational control.[44] Furthermore, the federal law, 'On defence', put the two institutions on a par in assigning them joint responsibility for overall military control.[45] The law further defined the basic functions of both the MO and of the General Staff,[46] assigning the latter institution a considerable degree of authority in the sphere of administration and planning as well as operational control over the armed forces. This ambiguity led to numerous instances of publicly voiced disagreements between post-Soviet ministers of defence and chiefs of the General Staff, which has been evaluated as a severe form of military insubordination.[47] The implementation of decisions taken by the nominally superior minister of defence was often blocked by resistance from the General Staff.[48]

When Ivanov was appointed as post-Soviet Russia's first civilian minister of defence, the influence of conservative elements in the regular armed forces remained

[41] See, for example, Andrei A Kokoshin. "Defense Leadership in Russia: The General Staff and Strategic Management in a Comparative Perspective." BCSIA Discussion Paper, Discussion Paper 2002-15, Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 2002.
[42] Polozhenie, 'O General'nom shtabe Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 7.
[43] Polozhenie, 'O Ministerstve oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 6.
[44] Polozhenie, 'O General'nom shtabe Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii'; article 1.
[45] Federal'nyi zakon, 'Ob oborone'; article 13 paragraph 2.
[46] Federal'nyi zakon, 'Ob oborone'; articles 14 and 15.
[47] Kokoshin. "Defense Leadership in Russia'; pp. 56 – 66. A famous instance of a public clash between the defence minister and the Chief of the General Staff occurred in the summer of 2000. The chief of the General Staff, Anatolii Kvashnin, publicly voiced severe criticism about then-defence minister Igor Sergeev in the course of a dispute over plans for military reform. See, for instance, Anna Dolgov, '"Revolt" against Sergeyev seen', The Russia Journal, 15 July 2000. Another public dispute between the MO and the General Staff was carried out between Kvashnin and Minister Sergei Ivanov at the beginning of 2004. The conflict concerned the nature of the relationship between the two institutions, as Ivanov perceived Kvashnin's outspokenness and conduct as undermining the unity of the military control system. See Steven Main, 'Couch for the MoD or the CGS? The Russian Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, 2001 – 2004', Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Russian Series 04/09, June 2004.
[48] Vadim Solov'ev, 'Brakorazvodnyi protsess Minoborony i Genshtaba vstupil v reshaiushchuiu fazu', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 23 July 2004.

high and found a voice in the form of then Chief of the General Staff, Anatolii Kvashnin. In an article on military reform in Russia, for example, Rod Thornton described the resistance and influence exerted by Kvashnin and his allies as a crucial obstacle to the implementation of military reforms envisaged by the civilian leadership. He concluded that 'no matter what the civilian authorities want in terms of military reform, they will, for the foreseeable future, continue to be thwarted by conservative generals'.[49]

The above mentioned amendments to the Russian federal law 'On defence' in June 2004 removed the ambiguities with regard to the division of labour between the MO and the General Staff. This was achieved by placing the leadership and control over the armed forces clearly under the jurisdiction of the MO. The reference to the General Staff in the law's article defining the control over the armed forces was deleted, leaving the MO as the sole body of military control.[50] The law also did away entirely with the article defining the functions of the General Staff.[51] Within the new system, in which the General Staff is clearly defined as a structure subordinate to the MO, it is the task of the minister of defence to both determine the General Staff's tasks, as well as to appoint the department's chief.[52] The removal of Kvashnin as Chief of the General Staff by presidential decree on 19 July 2004, and his replacement with his deputy – the less established and thus more likely to accept the authority of Ivanov – Iurii Baluevskii, will lead to a minimisation of the General's Staff control function over the armed forces. This, allied to its strict placement under the command of the MO, is likely to denote a further step by post-Soviet Russia towards a 'good' civil-military relationship by decreasing the regular military's influence on the political process.

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[49] Rod Thornton, 'The Political-Military Interface and Organizational Change: The 'Professionalization' of the 76th Airborne Division', The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17(3), September 2004, p. 1.
[50] Federal'nyi Zakon, 'O vnesenii izmenenii v nekotorye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii i priznanii utrativshimi silu nekotorykh zakonodatel'nykh aktov Rossiiskoi Federatsii v sviazi s osushchestvleniem mer po sovershenstvovaniiu gosudarstvennogo upravleniia'; article 37, paragraph 5a.
[51] ibid. article 37, paragraph 6.
[52] Vladimir Mukhin, 'Voennykh tozhe perestroiat. Administrativnaia reforma dobralas' do Minoborony', Nezavisimaia gazeta, 15 July 2003; Oleg Odnokolenko, 'Reforma: General'noe srazhenie', Itogi, 3 August 2004.

Last but not least, instead of puzzling over the reasons for why the Russian military did not verify the predictive qualities of Western theories on military intervention,[53] the absence of a military coup in Russia for many hundreds of years supports the assertion that the concerns voiced by some authors with regard to the country's civil-military relationship might be overstated. This is particularly so, because the Russian armed forces as an institution had at several critical junctures of post-Soviet history, both the motives and opportunities to intervene.[54] Despite the failure of the military to intervene in politics even during that highly troublesome period of the early post-Soviet years, expressions of concern with regard to the Russian civil-military interface did not cease. For example, a popular depiction of Vladimir Putin in the West defines his political leadership by his 'military' background and his reliance on the *siloviki* – characteristics which are implicitly or explicitly taken by some analysts as the explanation for what they perceive as authoritarian developments, for instance, in the spheres of the media or political pluralism.[55]

The comparison of Putin to the former Chilean military dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, has been used in several instances as the basis for a condemnation by both Russian and Western critics of what they perceived to be the essence of Putin's political leadership. According to the chess player turned politician Gary Kasparov, 'Democracy is under threat in Russia…Putin is worse than Pinochet'.[56] The Baltimore Sun wrote, '[Putin] is edging Russia toward an authoritarian set-up that, by design, resembles Chile under dictator Augusto Pinochet…Among Western liberals, Augusto Pinochet's 16-year dictatorship in Chile is largely remembered for gross human rights violations, including the liquidation of more than 3,000 of the most

[53] As discussed in the relevant section in chapter one, for instance, Zoltan Barany described the absence of successful military coups in post-Soviet Russia as 'a puzzling phenomenon'. Barany 'Politics and the Russian Armed Forces', p. 203. Several works by Western civil-military relations analysts were devoted entirely to the question as to why the Russian armed forces have yet failed to overthrow the civilian government.
[54] See, for instance, Marten Zisk, Civil-Military Relations in the New Russia, p. 3.
[55] See, for instance, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'.
[56] 'Kasparov Bids to Check Putin', The Sunday Times, 1 February 2004.

vocal government critics'.[57] According to the British analyst, Mark Smith, 'Putin's regime can be compared with the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973-1989)'.[58]

What these analysts disregard is the fact that this analogy is misleading about the fundamental nature of the political leadership of President Putin. As the American civil-military expert, Filipe Agüero, pointed out:

> The events in Chile in 1973 catapulted the military-as-institution into a position of absolute power…The military played the key role in the selection of the head of government and other major government officers, and in the definition of major policy orientations…[The Chilean regime under Pinochet] was a military regime; ultimate decision-making powers lay with the military…this was a military regime *tout court*.[59]

However, as discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis, the question of the military-as-institution overthrowing or replacing a popularly elected leadership was never at stake in Russia. As the analyst Andrei Zakharov pointed out:

> Russian military people – despite the terrible image ascribed to them in the West – do not have a tradition of military coups…So there is no point in exaggerating [their political role]. …There were a lot of opportunities for them to take power. For example, during the conflict between El'tsin and the parliament. But they did not do it…So why make a tragedy out of nothing?.[60]

In overstating the political influence of the Russian military, particularly with regard to the leadership of Putin, analysts pursuing such a line of argument disregard the fact that the situation could, indeed, be much worse. Although this argument should not be abused as an apology for all the policies pursued by Putin's government, the journalist Eric Kraus seems to have a point when he wrote the following: 'Foreign commentators are missing the essential point:…Following the chaos of the Yeltsin years and the trauma and humiliation of the 1998 crash, Russia was indeed ripe for dictatorship: Bonapartism at best, a return to the Soviet Union at worst.'[61]

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[57] 'Putin as Pinochet', The Baltimore Sun, 1 January 2001.
[58] Mark A. Smith, 'Putin's Regime: Administered Democracy', Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Document No. E108, June 2000.
[59] Felipe Aguëro, 'A Political Army in Chile: Historical Assessment and Prospects for the New Democracy', in Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruit (eds.), Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy, London and New York: Zed Books, 2002; p. 119.
[60] Interview with Andrei Zakharov conducted in Moscow on 13 December 2001.
[61] Kraus, 'The Wrongs of Spring and the Western Media'.

The taking into consideration of steps towards the institutionalisation of post-Soviet Russian civil-military relations can contribute to a more rounded analytical approach. In treating Russia as a 'normal' country, unrealistic expectations about the speed and degree of the country's development are replaced with the expectation of gradual change, that is, the expectation of persisting and newly arising problems as well as the possibility of constructive change. The three examples outlined above emphasise that developments in Russian civil-military relations have not been stagnant or warranted the degree of concern often expressed about them. The appointment of a civilian minister of defence, as well as the minimisation of the power of the General Staff can be evaluated as a step towards the establishment of democratic civil-military relations even if seen within the framework of commonly applied approaches to the issue. Additionally, the fact that the Russian military has never intervened in politics, despite the opportunities it had to do so particularly in the early post-Soviet years, can be interpreted as evidence for the fact that concerns over the shortcomings of civil-military relations in the country should not be overstated.

Essentialist arguments and 'neo-Kremlinology'

The last suggestion brought forward in this chapter is that in treating Russia as a 'normal' country, essentialist ideas and catch-all explanations, which disregard the complexity of any given issue, must be avoided. As the German political scientist Hans-Henning Schröder pointed out, 'Russia is not more mysterious than France, Great Britain or Germany'.[62] Instead of treating it as such, the strict adherence to empirical evidence to inform the theoretical can lead towards a fuller understanding of developments in post-Soviet Russia. An essentialist idea implicit in the work of a number of Western analysts, which has to be discussed with regard to this thesis, is the presumption of an inherently anti-democratic tendency in Russia, favouring the rule of a 'strong hand' and an authoritarian style of leadership. In recent years, this idea has been criticised as essentialist by numerous analysts. In the words of Richard Sakwa, for instance, 'the application of the authoritarian developmental model to Russia would be to concede once again that society is not ripe for democracy. This is

[62] Hans-Henning Schröder, 'Russland – fremder Nachbar im Osten?', Informationen zur politischen Bildung, No. 281, 2003. (Internet edition available at www.bpb.de)

something that is more often asserted than proved'.[63] Edwin Bacon, too, asserted that 'political culture too often serves as an explanation of last resort'.[64] In a detailed study of popular opinion in post-Soviet Russia, Timothy Colton and Michael McFaul sought to expose this idea as a myth. They concluded that 'although Russian citizens in many ways share our negative assessment of the way their national institutions work, it would be wrong to jump to the conclusion that they single-mindedly spurn democratic values and ideas per se. Even Putin's own electorate is more pro-democratic than the talk of Russia's authoritarian trend would have it'.[65]

Ideas of inherent anti-democratic sentiments in Russia are significant with respect to the subject of this thesis. Journalists in particular have often jumped to the conclusion that the presence of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia was desired and legitimised by a population with an inherently undemocratic outlook. A German journalist, for instance, in 1996 published a less than favourable profile of former General Aleksandr' Lebed and explained his relative electoral success in the presidential elections by asserting that 'the man with the brutish face and the commando voice appears to embody everything Russia is longing for'.[66] In writing about the gubernatorial elections taking place in Russia's regions in 2000, in which a number of military figures stood as candidates, the British journalist Guy Chazan wrote that 'There is some evidence that the Kremlin has its finger on the nation's pulse in supporting military candidates'.[67] (This evidence was never supplied). However, academic analysts, too, have made a link between the inclusion of military figures in political and administrative posts and the population's political sentiments. Schröder asserted, for instance, that 'it is true that the majority of the Russian population appears to react positively to 'strong men' from a military background'.[68] Kryshtanovskaia and White wrote in 2003: 'The idea of a military-security president was certainly welcome to a Russian public that was desperate for stability to be

[63] Sakwa, 'The Overall Trend is Toward Democracy'.
[64] Bacon, 'Conceptualizing Contemporary Russia', p. 293.
[65] Timothy J. Colton and Michael McFaul, 'Are Russians Undemocratic?', Carnegie Endowment Working Papers No. 20, June 2001, p. 1.
[66] K.L. Günsche, 'Der Präsident und die Generäle', Die Welt, 7 August 1996.
[67] Guy Chazan, 'Russian Military Runs for Office', The Sunday Telegraph, 29 October 2000.
[68] Schröder, 'The Russian Army in Politics', p. 62.

restored, even if it involved some curtailment of their new post-communist liberties'.[69]

The advocating of such an idea can lead to an incomplete understanding of Russian politics in the West and appears to feed both off and into the abovementioned meta-narrative proposed by some analysts of Russia as an eternally backward and authoritarian state. Whilst the study of political culture can offer valuable insights into the contexts within political processes and developments are located,[70] assertions of inherent anti-democratic sentiments in Russia that might favour politicians with a military background cannot be simply stated, but have to be verified by rigorous empirical research. It is beyond this thesis' scope to engage in a detailed analysis of public opinion poll findings in order to prove or disprove such a thesis. However, a sample of relevant opinion polls published in Russia throughout the post-Soviet era represents at least an ambiguous picture with regard to this question.[71]

In 1998, the Russian Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) conducted a poll amongst the rural and urban population on the issue of attitudes towards retired generals who had entered a political career.[72] In reply to the question 'Does it matter to you whether this or the other politician is a former general', 44 percent of the respondents answered in the negative. In the view of 36 percent of the respondents this information was important. From these 36 percent of the respondents answering in the affirmative, 56 percent were of the opinion that knowledge about a politician's military background would negatively affect their attitude towards a this figure, whereas 44 percent of the respondents claimed that this information would improve their view. In accordance with this poll, thus, only 15.8 percent of the overall number

[69] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; p. 291.
[70] See, for example, Stephen Welch, The Concept of Political Culture, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993; Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture, London: Macmillan, 1972; Lucien Pye and Sydney Verba (eds.), Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.
[71] It is acknowledged that the generation and use of public opinion poll data is a complex issue, which cannot be dealt with in detail here. The predominant aim of this section is to point out that an overview of Russian opinion poll data on issues related to 'military politicians' does clearly not support an explanation of these figures' presence in terms of the population's preference for politicians with a military background. For a discussion of the problems related to the use of public opinion polling data in academic work, see Jason Lewis, Constructing Public Opinion: How Political Elites Do What They Like and Why We Seem to Go Along With It, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
[72] This poll referred to politicians with a background in the regular armed forces only and was conducted with reference to the election of a number of retired generals to leading political posts, especially as regional governors (such as Aleksandr Lebed', Boris Gromov, Aleksandr Rutskoi).

of respondents attached a positive meaning to the military background of a politician.[73] A similar picture presented itself in an opinion poll directed at the issue of the participation of the figure of former General Aleksandr Rutskoi in the run-up to the gubernatorial elections in autumn 2000. Whilst 96 percent of respondents in the nationwide poll were familiar with Rutskoi, 57 percent of respondents had no opinion about him. According to the poll, 'many' respondents associated Rutskoi with his military past, but only one percent evaluated this information in a positive sense.[74]

The following poll findings, too, suggest that that the fact of a person's military background does not necessarily make a politician more positive or desirable in the eyes of the Russian population. In a study of popular opinion conducted in 2001 on the seven federal districts created in 2000 and the presidential plenipotentiaries heading them, FOM found that the fact of the military background of some of these individuals was evaluated both positively and negatively. Whilst some respondents evaluated the FSB background of the plenipotentiary of the Urals region, Petr Latyshev, as a positive characteristic, the KGB background of Viktor Cherkesov (North-West region) and the military background and 'inclination to military discipline' of former army General Konstantin Pulikovskii (Far East) were cited as negative attributes of these personalities.[75] As appears to be the case with civilian politicians, the ratings of 'military politicians' seem to fluctuate proportional to their success in fulfilling the tasks attached to their political posts in the eyes of the population. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, for instance, former General Shamanov, the governor of Ul'ianovsk region since 2000, in August 2003 was voted Russia's most unpopular governor, which corresponded to the perception of the poll respondents that the situation in the region had deteriorated under his leadership.[76]

[73] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), 'O generalakh-politikakh', 22 January 1998. Documents available on the foundation's website at www.fom.ru.
[74] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), '"General-gubernator Aleksandr Rutskoi', 2 November 2000.
[75] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), 'Federal'nye okruga i predstaviteli Prezidenta', 7 February 2001.
[76] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), 'Rossiiskie gubernatory – sekrety populiarnosti', 16 October 2003.

Assessing the situation not with regard to individual 'military politicians', but with regard to the issue of the participation of such figures in political and administrative posts more widely, the picture presented in opinion polls is equally ambiguous. In a poll conducted in July 2003 by the Russian National Centre for Public Opinion Research (VTsIOM), 51 percent of respondents expressed the opinion that the *siloviki* were President Putin's main support base.[77] In a poll conducted by the same agency in December 2003, 45 percent of respondents evaluated the increasing representation 'in power' of such figures as rather positive, whereas 55 percent were rather negatively inclined or found this question difficult to answer (28 percent and 27 percent respectively).[78] Whilst these findings can allow for different conclusions, an interesting poll conducted by VTsIOM-A (Levada Centre) in November 2003 found that only three percent of respondents perceived the coming to power of the *siloviki* as a major threat to contemporary Russia (the same amount of respondents perceived the restriction of personal freedoms as a threat and one percent each were afraid of the possibility of a dictatorship and repression).[79] With this assessment in mind, opinion polls appear to corroborate the interpretation of 'military politicians' under the Putin leadership provided in the previous chapter: in the eyes of the population, *siloviki* seem to form an important component of Putin's team, but their inclusion in the structures of power is seen to be due to personal loyalty (only one percent of respondents in a poll associated the term 'Putin's team' with the force structures, instead describing this 'team' as colleagues, advisers and trusted people).[80] In a poll conducted by FOM in 2002, only one percent of respondents perceived the force structures as institutions to be of influence on the decisions taken by the president.[81]

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[77] The findings of the poll are not available on the Centre's website (www.wciom.ru), but were published in Nezavisimaia gazeta (Aleksandr Maksimov, 'Grazhdane otsenili prezidenta. Glavnoi gruppoi podderzhki Vladimira Putina respondenty VTsIOMa sochli silovikov', 13 August 2003).
[78] VTsIOM, 'Press vypusk no 44: Den' chekista: Otnoshenie Rossian k FSB', 19 December 2003. The poll is available on the centre's website at www.wciom.ru.
[79] VTsIOM-A (Levada Centre), 'Chto ugrozhaet Rossii', 18 November 2003. The poll is available on the centre's website at www.vciom-a.ru (www.levada.ru). In autumn 2003, VTsIOM under the leadership of Iurii Levada was transformed into a new independent research centre, VTsIOM-A, recently renamed the Levada Centre. VTsIOM continues to exist under a different leadership.
[80] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), 'Kto okruzhaet prezidenta?', 13 March 2003.
[81] Fond 'Obshchestvennoe mnenie' (FOM), 'Kto vliiaet na prezidenta?', 21 March 2002. A research project conducted by Moscow State University under the leadership of Elena Shestopal found that in accordance with opinion polls conducted between 2000 and 2003, 19.2 percent of respondents answered that the intelligence services and *siloviki* 'can influence the president in that taking of important decisions'. The remaining 80 percent thought that different groups and institutions were more influential, such as the oligarchs (15.7 percent) and 'people close to Putin' (14.4 percent). Of all respondents, 18.1 percent were of the conviction that the president is taking all important decisions

Explaining the participation of military figures in politics by linking this phenomenon to political sentiments of the Russian population might be appealing, because it feeds into the framing of post-Soviet Russia within the concept of an authoritarian developmental model. However, in order not to risk the drawing of conclusions from analyses based on essentialist ideas, such an interpretation has to be arrived at in the course of empirical research and evidence and cannot be merely asserted. In discussing this issue with respondents interviewed for this thesis, several expressed the opinion that the electorate might perceive of 'military politicians' as less corrupted, more trustworthy, and less selfishly-motivated than their civilian counterparts, particularly in the face of the low popularity rating enjoyed by politicians as a whole.[82] A larger number of respondents, however, rejected such an explanation as doubtful.[83]

A last issue to be addressed in this section is that in treating Russia as a 'normal' country, unverifiable theories and catch-all explanations denying the complexity of events should not be used as the basis of analyses. This is true also with respect to the subject of this thesis. For instance, as discussed in detail in the previous chapter, the rising number of *siloviki* under the leadership of Putin has been portrayed by some analysts as a conscious strategy of 'militarising' the politics of post-Soviet Russia. Kryshtanovskaia and White, for instance, explicitly spoke of a '"military-president" project' – 'according to the plan, a president with a military-security background would not only regularize the work of government but also draw its staff

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independently. See Elena. B. Shestopal, Tat'iana. N. Nishcheva, Evgenii.M. Gikavyi and Vasilii.A. Zorin, 'Obraz V. V. Putina v soznanii Rossiiskikh grazhdan', Polis, No. 003, 30 August 2004, p. 12.

[82] This opinion was expressed, for example, by Nikolai Efimov (Krasnaia zvezda), Viacheslav Izmailov (Novaia gazeta).

[83] For instance, Sergei Iushenkov (Liberal Russia deputy) pointed out that if such an explanation corresponded to reality then 'only military figures would be elected to all political posts'. Andrei Lebedev (Izvestia) asserted the following in a personal interview with the author: 'it seems to me that here very strict, very clear sociological research has to be carried out, in order to determine exactly whether general Shamanov won in the elections because he has epaulets on his shoulders, because he is a field general, or because he decisively and energetically, with his powerful bass voice, performed at meetings and on TV, and promised people what he cannot institutionally give them. What exactly it was that caused his victory, this is a very big question…What concerns, lets say Putin, because there is a mildly speaking relatively careful attitude towards the FSB in our country, I would say that on the elections of Putin this feature rather made his election more difficult, then helping it. But here I would say it is relatively simple to say that Putin won because of specific personal qualities, plus there are some other circumstances, which helped him to win. But in no way did the fact that he earlier served in the KGB help in his elections'.

increasingly from the same source'.[84] The absence of empirical evidence for the existence of such a plan must, however, to some extent undermine the concept's analytical viability.

In defining Putin's leadership predominantly by his background in and reliance on the Russian force structures, and in particular on the FSB, some analysts have displayed the inclination to explain certain events by framing it *a priori* within the theory of the malevolent intent of repressive force structures legitimised by Putin without sufficient consideration of the complexity of the specific situation at stake. This tendency has been apparent, for instance, in the coverage of the aftermath of the events surrounding what appeared to be an aborted attack on an apartment block in Ryazan in September 1999, and the investigation into the Russian oil company Yukos and the arrest of some of its senior managers unfolding in autumn 2003. The issue at stake here is not whether the respective analysts' evaluations were right or wrong. However, there is a concern that some Western authors in these instances neglected the application of the same standards of evidence to their proposed theories as they would if Russia were considered a more 'normal' country.

The first event took place after the bombing of apartment blocks in the Russian cities of Moscow, Volgodonsk and Buinaksk in 1999, in which hundreds of people lost their lives. In September 1999, residents and the local police discovered what they assumed to be a bomb placed by terrorists in the basement of an apartment building in Ryazan. The federal bureau of the FSB later declared that the planting of the device, which it claimed to have been sacks of sugar disguised as explosives, had been part of a nationwide exercise testing the alertness of residents and local law-enforcement in the aftermath of the previous explosion of buildings across Russia.[85] The second chain of events started in mid-2003, when two major executives of Yukos, Platon Lebedev and Aleksei Pichugin, were arrested, respectively, on fraud charges and charges relating to the involvement in several cases of homicide. The ongoing investigations became the centre of world attention when, in October 2003, its chairman, Mikhail Khodorkovskii, was arrested, also on charges of corruption.

[84] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; pp. 290-291.
[85] For a more detailed account of this see Simon Saradzhian, 'Ryazan "Bomb" was FSB Exercise', The St. Petersburg Times, 28 September 1999.

In the first case, the FSB's explanation of the Ryazan incident as an exercise led some analysts, both in Russia and in the West, to speculate that the FSB might have organised the previous and successful apartment bombings in order to apportion blame for the attacks on Chechen terrorists, using this as an excuse for unleashing the second Chechen campaign and, ultimately, to raise Putin's popular rating as the prime minister and future president. This version of events was widely distributed in the Western media particularly at the beginning of 2002, when Boris Berezovskii, the former El'tsin ally and exiled oligarch, claimed to be in possession of evidence about the FSB's involvement in the bombings.[86] In the event, no such evidence was ever supplied.[87] When two men were sentenced for life by a Russian court for the organisation of the bombings in early 2004, Western newspapers continued to imply the FSB's and Putin's involvement in the attacks by discussing these convictions within the framework of Berezovskii's version of events.[88] A detailed account of the events in Ryazan, which clearly expressed the belief that the FSB had been behind the successful explosions, was published by the American writer, David Satter, in his 2003 book, Darkness at Dawn.[89] This book was described by a reviewer in the British periodical The Spectator as 'credible and in some way understated'. He claimed that Satter was 'not a conspiracy theorist: his research is balanced and his tone too thoughtful'.[90] In fact, however, the only sources quoted in Satter's chapter on the Ryazan incident are three articles from the newspaper Novaia Gazeta, which is known for its extremely critical stance on the Putin government, and one article of the weekly Versiia, a tabloid.

Such Western coverage of the Ryazan incident and its aftermath can be seen as confirming the impression that insufficient standards of evidence can be applied to

[86] See, for instance, 'Russian Tycoon Blames Moscow for Blasts', BBC News Online, 6 March 2002; 'Moscow behind Bombings – Tycoon', CNN, 6 March 2002; Jonathan Steele and Ian Traynor, 'Former Ally links Putin to Moscow Blasts', The Guardian, 6 March 2002; Michael Wines, 'A Film Clip, and Charges of a Kremlin Plot', The New York Times, 6 March 2002; Paul Quinn-Judge, 'Explosive Allegations', Time (Europe), 11 March 2002.
[87] 'Putin's Shadow' (editorial), The Wall Street Journal (Europe), 8 March 2002.
[88] See, for instance, Nick Paton Walsh, 'Moscow Flat Bombers get Life for Killing 246', The Guardian, 13 January 2004; Julius Strauss, 'Moscow Bombers Jailed as Doubts Rise', The Daily Telegraph, 13 January 2004.
[89] David Satter, Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, pp. 24-33.
[90] Raymond Asquith, 'The Worst Class of Elite', The Spectator, 6 September 2003.

Russia, resulting in a perhaps one-sided representation of events. Whilst Boris Berezovskii's accusations received widespread coverage in the Western media, few of the reports made the effort to balance his account with voices representing the Kremlin's point of view. Although Putin himself addressed the accusations made by Berezovskii and other critics, calling such speculation 'highly immoral',[91] alternative views on the Ryazan incident remained underrepresented. Again it has to be acknowledged that the sensationalism of media reporting, which is by no means limited only to the evaluation of events in contemporary Russia, cannot be compared to the analytical qualities of the work of academic writers. Due to the severity of the implicit accusations against the Russian government in this case, however, the unbalanced and widespread reporting of these events is significant as it might support the impression created in Russia that some 'publications…are so blatantly anti-Russian that it is clear that they are simply not interested in what is actually happening in this country'.[92]

The coverage of the investigations into the Russian oil company Yukos and the arrests of a number of its top executives in the autumn of 2003 was by many (both journalists and academics, as well as some politicians) framed from the outset within the theory of an authoritarian policy course pursued by Putin and executed by a government and administration dominated by *siloviki*. To cite but a few excerpts from the Western media, Newsweek wrote that:

> Over the past few years literally thousands of such men [*siloviki*] have followed the road to power forged in 2000 by former KGB colonel Vladimir Putin. In every region of Russia, at every level of government, former secret-police agents are grabbing power, digging in and recruiting old KGB friends. More and more, they are stepping in to "manage" Russia's fledgling democracy—most recently (but by no means exclusively) with their legal assault on the giant Yukos Oil Co. and the arrest of its biggest shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. A whiff of repression rides the air.[93]

The German magazine Der Spiegel interpreted Khodorkovskii's arrest as 'Putin's arrest of the billionaires – the secret services take over power in the Kremlin', and

[91] Quoted in Fish, 'Conclusion', p. 232.
[92] Loshak, 'Obratnaia sviaz: zapugali'.
[93] Frank Brown, 'Return of the KGB: Everyone knows the Secret Police are Back. What's new is the shocking depth and breadth of their influence', Newsweek International, 24 November 2003.

speculated about a possible 'coup of the secret service faction'.[94] The events were interpreted similarly by some Western politicians and academics. The American senator, John McCain, for instance, was cited as describing Khodorkovskii's arrest as 'a creeping coup against democracy and market capitalism in Russia'.[95] The Harvard scholar, Marshall Goldmann, portrayed the Yukos investigations with the following words: 'The *siloviki* seem to want to take back control of oil revenues so that they can build up the military industrial complex as they did in Soviet times. They're saying let's go back to the good old days'.[96]

In assessing Western coverage of the Yukos investigations, the Canadian academic Patrick Armstrong and the journalist Andrew Hurst criticised the approach taken by many analysts as 'Neo-Kremlinology', which Armstrong defined as 'the attempt to explain external events by postulating the activity of unseen, but deduced, cabals inside the Kremlin', or as 'the forming of theories in the absence of sufficient data'.[97] In effect, Armstrong expressed concern about his impression that analysts displaying this approach are treating Russia as 'less normal' than other countries by applying standards of evidence that are less than rigorous:

> Consider the difficulty of a forensic inquiry into any complex event. The point can be illustrated with the Hutton inquiry in the UK…Even assuming it is agreed that [the lengthy inquiry and long report] has produced a true and exhaustive answer, the point is that an exhaustive forensic inquiry is necessarily larger than the event. A complex and long-lived event like the Yukos affair would involve an even larger forensic inquiry.[98]

In the case of the Yukos incident many analysts were inclined to explain the events by framing them *a priori* within the model of authoritarian development pursued by Putin and a group of *siloviki* without acknowledging the complexity of the situation, for instance, in considering the history leading up to these events. In Hurst's article on the revival of Neo-Kremlinology, an unnamed British political scientist expressed the following concern about this approach: 'If you think Putin is an iron-fisted

[94] 'Putin's Angriff auf die Milliardäre – der Geheimdienst übernimmt die Macht im Kreml', Der Spiegel, 3 November 2003.
[95] Catherine Belton, 'Kremlin Reloading after Shot at Yukos', The Moscow Times, 30 December 2003.
[96] ibid.
[97] Armstrong, 'The Fallacy of Neo-Kremlinology'. See also Andrew Hurst, 'Kremlinology back in Vogue in Putin's Russia', Reuters, 4 August 2004.
[98] Armstrong, 'The Fallacy of Neo-Kremlinology'.

authoritarian trying to strengthen state control, then anything that happens can be made to fit into that particular view'.[99] In Armstrong's view, the application of unverified theories in Western analyses of Russia continues to enjoy popularity in some circles, because 'it satisfies preconceived notions'.[100] The discussion of Western coverage of the Ryazan incident and the Yukos affair respectively did not seek to question the correctness of the analysts' evaluations with regard to these issues as such. It is a concern, however, that in some instances arguably insufficient standards of evidence were applied and an incomplete picture of events was provided. In treating Russia analytically as a 'normal' country, essentialist ideas, unrealistic expectations and 'neo-Kremlinological' approaches in the generation of theories about 'military politicians' have to eschewed in favour of assessments based on meticulous empirical research.

Concluding remarks

This final thesis chapter proposed a conceptual approach to the study of 'military politicians' and of wider developments in post-Soviet Russian politics. The first section provided some conceptual considerations, which can contribute towards a fuller understanding of developments in post-Soviet Russia. It was argued that Russia should be treated as a 'normal' country. This means that, instead of contrasting developments in post-Soviet Russia to an ideal type of democracy, an assessment of developments in all their complexity can help to preclude 'monochromatic' assessments or predictions in exclusively negative or positive terms.

In identifying a number of recurrent features in Western assessments of developments in Russia, the chapter then proceeded to put forward three analytical ways in which the conceptual treatment of post-Soviet Russia as a 'normal' country without the baggage of unrealistic expectations and essentialist ideas can be implemented to contribute towards a fuller understanding of civil-military relations, and of the role of 'military politicians' in particular. The first way was the taking into account of a range of political opinion on the subject in post-Soviet Russia itself, instead of concentrating on voices mirroring the dominant discourse in the West. The

[99] Hurst, 'Kremlinology back in Vogue'.

second way was the consideration of developments of Russian civil-military relations in all their complexity. The third way concerned the avoidance of unrealistic expectations and of essentialist ideas in assessing developments in post-Soviet Russian politics, particularly with regard to the issue of 'military politicians'. In treating Russia as a 'normal' country the same rigorous standards of evidence for the generation of theories and frameworks applied to the study of other states have to be assured.

The conceptual approach proposed in this chapter is applicable to the study of broader political, societal and economic developments in post-Soviet Russia. However, it is particularly salient with regard to analyses of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia for two reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, the issue of 'military politicians' is a potentially emotive subject that, if seen within the framework of the predominant Western discourse on the issue, can be overstated as a problem from the outset. Particularly regarding this subject, thus, an approach that is able to assess the full complexity of the subject can lead to a fuller understanding of the role of 'military politicians' within the specific context of post-Soviet Russia. Secondly, as discussed in chapter one, a considerable number of respondents interviewed for this thesis expressed concerns about what they perceived as the 'exaggerated' interpretation of this subject in the work of many Western analysts. This criticism was voiced by respondents from across the political spectrum. In line with the approach proposed in this chapter, which treats Russia analytically as a 'normal' country, it is essential to include these voices in the analysis.

[100] Armstrong, 'The Fallacy of Neo-Kremlinology'.

Conclusion

The analytical conclusion of the thesis was provided in the previous chapter. This short, final chapter presents a summation of the arguments set out in the thesis.

The participation of former military personnel in post-Soviet Russian politics has often been addressed in the course of broader studies of civil-military relations, but has rarely been analysed on its own. In providing a systematic study of the role of 'military politicians', this thesis contributes to a greater understanding of an important aspect of civil-military relations in post-Soviet Russia.

The participation of ex-military personnel in politics has often been noted, particularly by civil-military relations analysts, as 'a curious aspect of Russian civil-military relations' throughout the post-Soviet era.[1] The role of 'military politicians' has been interpreted previously as an interference in politics by the military-as-institution, which was accompanied by warnings about the negative consequences of this practice on Russia's process of democratic transition.[2] The study provided in this thesis is particularly timely and important, because the issue of politicians with military/security backgrounds has received increased attention since the election of Vladimir Putin as the president of the Russian Federation. Given his own background in an element of the Russian security and defence system – the Soviet KGB and its Russian successor, the FSB – concerns have been voiced in recent years that the inclusion of former force-structure personnel in Putin's government could lead to a 'militarisation' of politics to the detriment of further democratisation in the country.[3] In providing a study of the role of 'military politicians' throughout the post-Soviet era, this thesis links the concerns expressed by civil-military relations analysts

[1] Betz, 'If they are ordered, "Die of hunger", they will die!', p. 21.
[2] See, for instance, Busza, 'Transition in Civil-Military Relations in Poland and Russia', p. 169;. Nichols, 'An Electoral Mutiny?', p. 327; Epperson, 'Russian Military Intervention in Politics', p. 102; Moran, From Garrison State to Nation State', p. 208.
[3] See, for example, Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy'; Petrov, 'Seven Faces of Putin's Russia'.

throughout the post-Soviet era with the more recent, and predominantly actor-based, evaluations of the phenomenon.

The developing hypothesis of the research conducted for this thesis was that existing Western frameworks tend to underplay key aspects of the Russian case and, by doing so, can result in an incomplete understanding and overstatement of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. In engaging in a detailed study of how such personalities are perceived in Russia itself, of their precise institutional backgrounds, and the position of such figures in the political system, the research presented in this thesis explored a number of important aspects related to the subject that can further our understanding of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. In the final chapter a normative approach to the issue was proposed.

The content of this thesis was introduced in chapter one with an assessment of traditional approaches to the study of civil-military relations and their application to post-Soviet Russia, focusing on the portrayal of politicians with a military background in particular. The chapter identified four important and previously unexplored areas of enquiry related to the subject of 'military politicians' in the particular context of post-Soviet Russia. These areas were: a) Russian perceptions of 'military politicians'; b) the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, whose diversity is difficult to accommodate within traditional concepts of civil-military relations theory; c) the benefit of increased cross-referencing between civil-military relations concepts and conceptualisations of the wider political system in post-Soviet Russia; and d) the concern that the role of 'military politicians' can be overstated not only as a result of the theoretical constraints of the concepts used to frame this issue, but also as a result of a number of recurrent features in many Western approaches to the study of politics in post-Soviet Russia. The chapters explored these areas in turn.

The first area was addressed in a study of Russian perceptions of 'military politicians' in chapter two. The study involved a review of Russian newspaper coverage dealing with 'military politicians', and an overview of the portrayal of such figures in academic assessments and perceptions of political actors. The chapter showed that the predominant evaluation of such figures as a problematic aspect of post-Soviet politics in many Western analyses is by no means the prevailing discourse

in post-Soviet Russia, but exists alongside other, less critical or outright positive attitudes. It was argued that the underlying reasons for this discursive difference is not due to the absence of sufficient knowledge in Russia about the significance of the participation of figures with a military background in politics. Instead, the chapter concluded that the generally more moderate attitudes towards 'military politicians' displayed in Russian newspapers and in the perception of academics and politicians in Russia are determined by two factors.

The first factor is the institutional make-up of the Russian military system, which is less coherent than that traditionally perceived as characterising the military in most Western countries. Due to the institutional diversity of the backgrounds of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, such personalities are less likely to be perceived as a group pursuing common goals. The second factor is a less pronounced perception of distinct civilian and military spheres. As a result, 'military politicians' in Russia itself are less likely to be seen as influencing the policy direction pursued by the civilian leadership in the interests of the military-as-institution. The presence of politicians with a military background in Russia itself appears to be evaluated as having limited relevance in terms of political developments, in either a positive or negative sense. In order to incorporate this discursive difference into the study of 'military politicians' provided in this thesis, chapters three and four engaged in a detailed exploration of these aspects.

Chapter three assessed the institutional backgrounds of 'military politicians' in an examination of the Russian military system. The aim was to assess the viability of treating these personalities, as some analysts do, as a single analytical entity united by a 'military frame of mind'.[4] This detailed study of the individual Russian force structures shows that military personnel in Russia are affiliated to a number of institutionally distinct organisations in the sphere of defence and law-enforcement. This poses questions with regard to the extent to which their personnel can be treated as a common group. The chapter concluded that due to the institutionally diverse backgrounds of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, such figures cannot be treated as an analytical entity.

[4] Isakova, 'The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Russia', p. 221.

There are several important factors standing against the perception of such figures as an analytical entity. These are firstly, the broad range of roles formerly fulfilled by 'military politicians' in active military or law-enforcement service. Such roles, which can vary widely even within individual force structures, include the tasks traditionally carried out by the regular armed forces, as well as a broad range of other tasks, such as the issuing of visas, intelligence work, the regulation of traffic, the fighting of organised crime, or the guarding of buildings. The different training of, and roles fulfilled by, 'military politicians' during their service in the force-structures undermine the viability of presenting 'common...military-style traditions'[5] as a sufficient condition for treating such personalities as an analytical entity. A second factor speaking against the analytical viability of portraying 'military politicians' as a common group is the issue of military-military relations in post-Soviet Russia, that is, the relationship between the individual force structures. This relationship is by no means smooth and is riddled with inter-organisational conflict and competition particularly over resource allocation and the division of labour. Although many force structures in contemporary Russia have a relatively short history, the institutionalisation of distinct organisational cultures is an important factor arguing against the treatment of politically active *siloviki* as a group pursuing common interests.

The study of Russian perceptions of 'military politicians' and the evaluation of the precise institutional backgrounds of these personalities in chapters two and three set the scene for a detailed assessment of these figures' political role with reference to specific individuals. Such an assessment is presented in chapter four in a micro-level analysis of the beliefs, views, and conduct of individual 'military politicians' in specific situations, framed within the context of the political system in post-Soviet Russia. The study shows that the subject of 'military politicians' is multi-faceted and cannot be treated as a single-issue question. Such personalities enter politics from a variety of force-structure organisations, in which they performed a broad range of specialist tasks. Russian 'military politicians', who previously carried out 'traditional' military jobs, such as the commanding of armies and the fighting of wars, constitute

[5] Reddaway, Lapidus, Ickes, Saivetz, and Breslauer, 'Russia in the Year 2003', p. 2.

only one type of 'military politician' in post-Soviet Russia. Many of these figures fulfilled specialist roles during service in the force structures that are compatible with their responsibilities in the civilian political or administrative posts they later held. The study also showed that many 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia gained considerable political experience since their retirement from active service in the force structures and/or have made a conscious effort at gaining the knowledge required of them in their civilian posts. In many cases, thus, the delineation of a personality as a 'military' or civilian politician is blurred.

The reasons why and ways in which 'military politicians' enter a political career are equally varied. A number of them entered politics via elections as independent candidates or in the ranks of a variety of political parties to become deputies of the Russian State Duma. Others competed in gubernatorial elections, or, in the case of Vladimir Putin, in elections to the federal presidency. The participation of Russian military figures in electoral politics is clearly regulated in the state's legislation which, not unlike the legislation in the U.S. or the United Kingdom, does not allow active military personnel to take up political posts. Approached from this viewpoint, elected 'military politicians' in Russia constitute regular participants in politics and do not denote an interference of the military-as-institution in civilian affairs.

A large proportion of Russian 'military politicians' were appointed to their posts by the civilian leadership. However, seen within the framework of the political system in post-Soviet Russia this does not represent an attempt at 'militarising' politics, but is an expression of the mechanisms of governance and elite recruitment in the country. Since the adoption of the Russian Constitution in 1993, which gives the president wide-ranging powers, the Russian system of rule has lain with the executive. Russia is ruled by a 'supraparty technocratic government of "professionals" subordinated to a strong presidency', in which the parliament and the political parties represented in it have little influence on the composition of the government.[6] Channels of elite recruitment in post-Soviet Russia are weakly institutionalised and have a strong personalistic character centred around the presidential officeholder.

[6] Sakwa, 'The Regime System in Russia'; pp. 9 and 20.

Whilst the government of Boris El'tsin contained a number of 'military politicians', his regime was dominated by the so-called 'Family', a fluid group of Kremlin-insiders focusing on a number of powerful oligarchs.

When Vladimir Putin was elected to the post of president, he composed his own government within the constraints of the political system he inherited. Being unable to draw on institutionalised channels of elite recruitment, and, due to his rapid elevation to power, lacking a ready-made 'shadow government',[7] Putin created his own 'team' based on trusted personalities. One source of recruitment for Putin was the group of people with whom he previously worked during his service in the intelligence services. The rise of the number of politicians and officials with a force-structure background under Putin was determined by the way the country is governed and is not an expression of a conscious strategy of establishing a 'well-ordered police state'.[8] Seen within this framework, appointed 'military politicians', too, are regular participants in politics.

Chapter five constituted the analytical conclusion of the thesis. Reflecting on the insights provided in the previous chapters, it proposed a conceptual approach, which can contribute to a greater understanding of the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia. The normative basis of this approach lies in the argument that Russia should be treated conceptually as a 'normal' country. In analytical terms this means that unrealistic expectations and essentialist ideas have to be eschewed in favour of assessments, which evaluate developments in all their complexity. In assessing a number of recurring features in Western assessments of post-Soviet Russia, the chapter put forward three analytical ways in which this conceptual approach can further our understanding of the role of 'military politicians'.

Firstly, Russian evaluations of the subject, which can differ considerably from the Western consensus of presenting such personalities predominantly in a critical light, have to be heard and incorporated into the analysis. The explanatory power of Russian assessments is considerable and can lead towards a fuller understanding of the subject. The consideration of 'local' perceptions is also important in order to avoid

[7] Sakwa, Putin: Russia's Choice, p. 61.
[8] Kryshtanovskaia and White, 'Putin's Militocracy', p. 303.

the impression of intentional bias in Russia itself at the perceived implication that 'the Russians simply do not understand what is good for them'.

Secondly, developments in civil-military relations have to be assessed in all their complexity. As Shleifer and Treisman pointed out, problematic aspects in many areas of Russia's development are actually 'normal'. However, in order to understand and present these developments more fully, positive trends should not be disregarded.[9] Developments in Russian civil-military relations have not been entirely stagnant. Moreover, despite repeated warnings about the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, the country continues to be ruled by a democratically elected leadership.

Thirdly, in evaluating the subject of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, essentialist ideas and 'neo-Kremlinological' approaches have to be put to one side.[10] The analytical viability of intuitive explanations for the existence and activities of 'military politicians', linking them, for example, to a presumed anti-democratic sentiment of a population or to an authoritarian policy course pursued by the president, is undermined, unless such explanations are based on meticulous empirical research and evidence. In evaluating the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia, the same rigorous standards of evidence for the generation of theories applied to the study of other states have to be assured.

As posited in the introduction, the role of 'military politicians' in post-Soviet Russia is more modest than often asserted. As Steven Fish correctly pointed out: 'many of the usual culprits of…degraded democracy are not at fault in Russia. A politically meddlesome military did not cause the problem'.[11]

[9] Shleifer and Treisman, 'A Normal Country?', p. 21-22.
[10] Armstrong, 'The Fallacy of Neo-Kremlinology'.
[11] Fish, 'Conclusion', p. 226.

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This list of references is not exhaustive but includes the major sources quoted in the thesis. Individual newspaper articles cited in the thesis are not included below unless they were of central importance to the analysis.

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All interviews were conducted in Moscow. The respondents' occupation/position is indicated as at the time of interview. Interviews marked '*' were conducted during the course of fieldwork research carried out by the author for the ESRC Project 'Securitisation of Contemporary Russian Politics' (Award number: R000239691. Project holder: Dr Edwin Bacon).

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www.grankin.ru (Archive for journalists)
www.agentura.ru (Website devoted to force structures/intelligence services)
www.nns.ru (Electronic archive of Russian-language documents)

Opinion polls:
www.fom.ru (Public Opinion Foundation FOM)
www.levada.ru (Iurii Levada Analytical Centre, successor of VTsIOM)
www.wciom.ru (VTsIOM – Centre for Public Opinion Research)

Legal documents (laws, presidential decrees and statutes)
www.kremlin.ru (Presidential website)
www.femida.info (Russian legal database)
www.rg.ru (Rossiiskaia gazeta)

Official Russian websites
(List of abbreviations at the beginning of the thesis)

TsIK	www.cikrf.ru
Federation Council	www.council.ru
Government	www.government.gov.ru
President/executive	www.kremlin.ru
Security Council	www.scrf.gov.ru
State Duma	www.duma.gov.ru
GFS	www.gsf.ru
GUIN	www.guin-uis.ru
FPS	www.fps.ru
FSB	www.fsb.ru
FSN	www.narkotiki.ru
MChS	www.mchs.ru
Miniust	www.miniust.ru
MO	www.mil.ru
MVD	www.mvdinform.ru
SVR	www.svr.government.ru

Russian newspapers

Krasnaia zvezda
Rossiiskaia gazeta
Segodnia
Sovetskaia Rossiia

(The above newspapers were used for the systematic study of Russian newspaper coverage in chapter two)

Eastview online database of Russian national newspapers