A CORPUS ASSISTED DISCOURSE STUDY OF POLITICAL AND MEDIA DISCOURSE IN THE LEAD UP TO THE BREXIT REFERENDUM

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis focuses on media and elite political discourse in the six months leading up to the Brexit referendum of 2016. The overall aim of the study was to shed light on the result of that referendum. It takes a corpus-assisted discourse study (CADS) approach to examine representation of the EU in the pro-Union *Guardian* newspaper and compares this to discourses of EU elites during the same time frame, in order to contextualise findings and assess what is absent from *Guardian* discourse. Three corpora were compiled for the study. The 4.4-million-word Guardian Pre-Referendum corpus (GPRC) contains 4269 articles published by the *Guardian* between 1 January 2016 and 23 June 2016. The Guardian Financial Crisis corpus (GuFCC) is a small sub-corpus containing 100 articles focusses on the EU and economic crisis. The EU Financial Crisis Corpus (EUFCC) is a corpus of EU press releases and speech transcripts released on that same topic during the same time period.

The study finds that pro-EU discourse present in the *Guardian* is significantly undermined by negative subtext relating to three key themes: conflict between EU member states, disparity in the experiences of EU citizens, and risk to the UK of continued membership. At the same time there was an almost total absence of elite EU voices in the *Guardian*. The EU elites, on the other hand, focussed on justification of policy and promoting the success of past policies. Nevertheless, traces of the negative themes found in the Guardian were also found in EU discourse.

This thesis argues that theories of News Values and newsworthiness have good explanatory value for the *Guardian* discourse but that the notion of the mediatisation of politics is unconvincing based on the EU data. A novel Political Values analytical framework is presented, based on the notion 'voteworthiness' and drawing Aristotle's modes of persuasion. Ultimately this thesis proposes that News Values and Political Values are somewhat incompatible and as a result, coverage of the EU is limited, and this may have affected the way people voted in the referendum.

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DEDICATION

For

Ian Walker
1944-2019

and

Nicola Taylor
1953-2022

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CADS	Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DNVA	Discursive News Values Analysis
DPVA	Discursive Political Values Analysis
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
EUFCC	European Union Financial Crisis Corpus
GPRC	*Guardian* Pre-Referendum Corpus
GuFCC	*Guardian* Financial Crisis Corpus
QDAS	Qualitative Data Analysis Software
RPA	Rhetorical Political Analysis

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and rationale for the thesis


On 23 January 2013, in a speech held at the London offices of Bloomberg, British Prime Minister David Cameron set out a vision for a reformed relationship between the UK[1] and the European Union (EU). He pledged to hold a membership referendum, which would eventually take place on 23 June 2016. The vote was always going to be close. In 2011, a *Guardian*/ICM poll suggested that 49% of voters would opt for Britain to leave the EU, with 70% of voters being in favour of a vote on membership (Clark, 2011). This represented a dramatic shift from the 1975 referendum, which saw 67% of UK voters electing to remain a part of the Common Market, as it was known at the time. It is a fact that citizens' perspectives on the EU have increasingly shifted from positive and neutral to negative across many Member States. Polling by the Pew Research Centre in May 2013 showed that EU citizens with a favourable opinion of the EU had dropped to just 45%. UK citizens, with 43% entertaining a favourable opinion, were not particularly out of step with this trend (Pew Research Centre, 2013).

Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of MPs in the British parliament would call for the UK to remain in the EU, the 2016 referendum placed the decision regarding the future

[1] While acknowledging the historical, geographical, and political complexity surrounding these terms, this thesis will use *Britain* and *United Kingdom* (*UK*) synonymously to refer to the entity that is The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and *British* to refer to citizens of that entity.

of the UK and the EU in the hands of the British public. As shown in Figure 1-1, which is derived from a BBC Poll of Polls, estimates as regards the result varied. Peter Barnes of the BBC noted on 22 June, a day before the referendum, that there was 'no clear picture' of the result (Barnes, 2016). Nevertheless, the eventual vote for what became known as Brexit, which propped 52% of Leave voters against 48% of Remainers, was a surprise to many. One of the underlying aims of the present study is to contribute to the literature that scrutinises the referendum result.

Figure 1-1: Referendum Poll of Polls 10/01/2016–19/06/2016



(compiled from BBC Poll Tracker; Barnes, 2016)

This thesis focuses on media and elite political discourse in the six months leading up to the referendum. It offers a Corpus Assisted Discourse Study (CADS), first defined by Partington (2004), who was drawing on the work of Stubbs (1996 and 2001, cited in Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 10). The data and methodology of the study are discussed in detail in Chapter Five. In this introductory chapter, I first offer a rationale for undertaking the study (1.2) before discussing the definition and analysis of discourse (1.3). In the next section (1.4), I summarise my project aims and research questions before providing an overview of the thesis (1.5).

1.2 Rationale for the study

The key underlying assumption of this thesis is that discourse constitutes an important object of study, and that media discourse is influential during the political process. A discussion of scholarship around the meaning and significance of the term "discourse" can be found in 1.3. The fact that media discourse has considerable influence on the public's understanding of politics and, specifically, on the development of public opinion regarding the EU, is well documented (see, for instance, de Vreese and Semetko, 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; de Vreese, 2007; Bartels, 2015; Eberl, Wagner and Boomgaarden, 2017). It has been shown that the majority of European citizens consider the media their most important source of information and as such, the media assume a pivotal role in the public's understanding of the EU (de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006, p. 421). The proposal that in referendum campaigns, '[t]he flow of arguments from political elites to the media and to the public [is] decisive for the campaign outcome' is also significant (Wirth *et al.*, 2010, p. 339).

Although Cary and Burton (2004) suggest that political party affiliation influenced public opinion about European integration and currency union in the 2001 British General Election, they acknowledge that the strongest influence came from a combination of aligned


messages from political parties and newspapers. It must be noted that only the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which had just one seat in parliament at the time, officially supported a Leave vote in the 2016 EU membership referendum. Cross-party groups on both sides of the referendum debate, however, ensured that disagreements within political parties were made clear. Such a situation is likely to have undermined the influence of political party affiliation on voters. Indeed, The National Centre for Research, in a study undertaken following the EU membership referendum, found that voters were more likely to vote according to the stance of the newspaper they read regularly than to that of the political party with which they align themselves (Swales, 2016).

Arguably, the advent of digital news channels, the development of independent online news content, as well as the increasing importance of social media in disseminating news, have all potentially reduced the importance of newspapers in today's world, casting doubt on the significance of printed articles as a source of information, as well as on the extent of their influence. News organisations, however, have responded to the digital shift by publishing online versions of their newspapers, which are often free to access, and have invested in mobile applications and notifications systems, which facilitate readers' engagement. Research shows that around 70% of individuals aged over 15 years 'consume quality daily news brands across print and online' (National Readership Survey, 2016). The increasing significance of the Internet and social media, such as Twitter, however, can be the object of debate. It has been shown that in the case of the 2010 UK General Election, these newer sources of information 'tended to act as a partisan echo chamber to events on television or in the newspapers' (Wring and Ward, 2010, p. 812). More recently, it has been argued that social media did not play more than a 'tangential role in overall influence and impact' on the result of the 2015 UK General Election (Byrne, 2015, p. 58).

I would further argue that the continued significance of newspaper articles should not be underestimated – despite a decline in circulation –at a time when the emergence and, in some cases, prevalence of "fake news" is of considerable concern. Disquiet as regards the reliability of online news outlets and the alleged interference by external players on social media through the use of so-called "bots" has the potential to push readers back to older and perhaps more trusted news brands. Indeed, the Reuters Institute Digital News Report for 2017 stated that '[o]nly a quarter (24%) of […] respondents think social media do a good job in separating fact from fiction, compared to 40% for the news media' (Newman *et al.*, 2017, p. 9).

For these reasons, the analysis of the news coverage of the EU in a corpus of articles published in *The Guardian* broadsheet newspaper in the six months leading up to the referendum is central to this thesis. This corpus contains articles that focus not only on the referendum debate, but also on the EU more broadly (see Chapter Five for a detailed discussion on corpus design). As shown by Swales (2016) and as demonstrated in Figure 1-2, voting patterns in the 2016 referendum broadly aligned with newspaper readership. The *Guardian*, a politically left-of-centre quality daily newspaper, was explicitly pro-EU in the lead-up to the 2016 referendum. Maintaining a long-standing pro-Union stance, the *Guardian* called on its readers to '[v]ote for a united country that reaches out to the world, and vote against a divided nation that turns inwards' (Editorial, 2016c).

Figure 1-2: Brexit vote by newspaper readership (data compiled from Statista, 2019)



In 2016, the *Guardian* had a monthly reach across its print and digital arms of over 9.6 million readers (National Readership Survey, 2016), which was the largest of all quality newspaper brands. Although the majority of the newspaper's readership voted to remain, 11.6% voted to leave the EU (Statista, 2019). In a referendum that saw a difference of just 1.27 million votes between Leave and Remain (The Electoral Commission, 2016), unconvinced *Guardian* readers, who numbered over a million, were potentially very significant to this result.

At the time of writing this thesis, no study exists that focuses specifically on the representation of the EU in British pro-EU media in the lead-up to the referendum. Although there are numerous studies on the coverage of the referendum debate in the British media more broadly, much of this scholarship concentrates on the pervasiveness of Euroscepticism in the press (see Powinski in Jackson, Thorsen and Wring, 2016) or discusses the extent to

which elements of the British media 'failed the nation' and how the 'right-wing anti-EU press […] shaped the debate' (Seaton, 2016, p. 334). Berry (2016) argues that media priming effects through 'long established themes around sovereignty and immigration' made it difficult for the Remain campaign to build effective arguments. Furthermore, coverage was deemed to be 'policy light and campaign heavy', which has also been cited as a factor in the result (Ridge-Newman, 2018, p. 342). Some go so far as to claim that anti-EU coverage in the tabloid press, and the *Express* in particular, has 'helped to undermine rational choice, economic interest or utilitarian arguments in favour of UK membership' (Startin, 2015, p. 319).

In addition to a relative lack of research on pro-EU publications and the referendum in particular, no studies to date investigate what else was being said about the EU during the period following the referendum announcement and prior to 23 June 2016. A Loughborough University study (2016) highlighted the relative prominence of Leave-leaning referendum coverage in British daily national newspapers that, when weighted for circulation, was 57% versus 33% for Remain-leaning coverage. Nevertheless, there were publications that were explicitly pro-EU. In Loughborough (2016), the *Mirro*r, the *Guardian*, the *Financial Times*, the *I*, and the *Times* all weighted positively for Remain arguments. No attempt was made in this, or other studies to date, however, to look more broadly at the coverage of these publications relating to the EU in the immediate lead-up to the referendum. I would argue that it is highly unlikely that voters formed opinions on the EU and made their referendum voting decision based on referendum coverage alone and, as such, this represents a further significant gap in the literature. This is addressed through the design of the *Guardian* Pre-Referendum Corpus (GPRC), which was compiled for the present study (see Chapter Five) and which contains over 4,000 *Guardian* articles dating from 1 January to 22 June 2016 that mention the EU.

Although pro-EU arguments may have predominated numerically in a given publication, there is no reason to assume that such coverage does not problematise the EU in some way or that the arguments presented are not negated through other coverage. Anderson and Weymouth (1999), discussing newspaper coverage of the monetary union, note that even in pro-European publications such as the *Guardian* and the *Independent*, the evaluation of the EU and, more specifically, the monetary union was qualified. Although this did not reach the level of anti-EU sentiment seen in the Eurosceptic press, I would argue that it nevertheless had the potential to undermine the publications' pro-monetary union stance, while also raising the question of whether the same happened prior to the 2016 referendum. On 20 June 2016, the *Guardian* exhorted its readers to 'keep connected and inclusive, not angry and isolated' and 'vote against a divided nation that turns inwards. Vote to remain' (Guardian Editorial Staff, 2016). As will be shown in subsequent chapters, however, a key finding of the present study is that this unequivocal stance was indeed consistently undermined through both referendum reporting and the reporting of issues beyond it. This problematised the EU in a number of important ways.

Another significant but relatively neglected topic in the literature is the identification of what is absent in media reporting on the EU. Much corpus-based discourse analysis focuses on what has been written, rather than on what could have been written. As such, relatively little consideration has been given to what might be missing from discourses studied in a corpus, with work instead focusing on those quantifiable and measurable aspects that can be analysed (Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 296; Schröter and Taylor, 2017; Duguid and Partington, 2018). This thesis seeks to address this deficit by not only considering what was written in the *Guardian*, but also gauging what more (and who else) could have been represented from the EU in the *Guardian*'s coverage. Following the principles of CADS, this is achieved through the comparison of two corpora. As Partington notes, 'it is only possible

to uncover and evaluate the particular features of a discourse type by comparing it with others' (2013, p. 12). Accordingly, two smaller corpora are compared: one is a sub-corpus of articles from the GPRC that has the key topic of the economic crisis as its focus, and the other is a corpus of EU elite discourse on the same topic during the same period (see Chapter Five for a detailed discussion of the data and study design). The findings demonstrate not only that EU elite figures are largely absent from the *Guardian* data, but also that EU initiatives and achievements, despite being emphasised in EU elite discourse, are also absent from the *Guardian*. I argue that the consequences of this absence in such a closely fought referendum are likely to have been significant.

Finally, the present study provides potential explanations for how an explicitly pro-EU media outlet may nevertheless have contributed to the outcome of the Brexit vote. I argue that theories of News Values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Bell, 1991; Harcup and O'Neill, 2001; Bednarek and Caple, 2014, 2017) have good explanatory value and that the linguistic construal of these News Values, along with the associated notion of "newsworthiness" contribute to the issue. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapters Three and Four, this study makes a major contribution to the field through the development of a novel analytical framework, in which I argue that Political Values drive elite political discourse in the same way that News Values influence media discourse. Central to this is the concept of what I term "voteworthiness".

Ultimately, I argue that there is a degree of incompatibility between News Values and Political Values that leads to an inevitable focus on negativity and conflict in news coverage, as well as to the absence of more positive framing in political discourse. Although the problematic aspects of EU membership and the EU in general are quite apparent in media coverage, their beneficial aspects and achievements are not. This, in turn, leads to a lack of

understanding among voters in relation to the function of the EU. As such, it can be said that, at best, British voters made their decision on the basis of incomplete information.

1.3 The theory and analysis of discourse

1.3.1 Defining discourse

Given that the present study offers an analysis of political and media discourse, it is important to clarify exactly what is meant by the term "discourse" and why I consider it an important object of study. The study of discourse can be viewed as an interdisciplinary field drawing on insights not only from the field of linguistics but also from political theory, sociology, anthropology, and beyond (Bhatia, Flowerdew and Jones, 2008, p. 1). It is inevitable, then, given the multitude of perspectives on discourse, its nature, and its significance, that definitions abound, ranging from a focus on individual utterances through to conceptions of discourse as texts, and discourse as 'synonymous with the entire social system, in which discourses literally constitute the social and political world' (Howarth, 2000, p. 2). To situate this study within this broad field, this section briefly outlines two concepts of discourse that are relevant to this thesis.

It has already been noted that, on one level, this is a study of discourse defined as 'language in use' (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 1) or 'language in action' according to Blommaert (2005, p. 2). These broad conceptions of discourse emphasise that language does not exist in a vacuum and that it is its use, whether spoken, written, or signed, that renders it meaningful. Another pertinent common-sense definition that extends this idea focuses on discourse in a functional sense, as 'language that is doing some job in some context' (Halliday, cited in Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 2). This definition is helpful for the present study insofar as it recognises that social situations, or contexts, matter; it implies

that we might think of "discourses" in the plural given that communicative needs and intentions can be expected to differ according to a given context.

The specific data being studied here can be described as examples of media and political discourse. For the purposes of this thesis, media discourse refers simply to that which appears in the media (in this case, the *Guardian* newspaper). Following Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), I define political discourse as that which emanates from elite political actors (either individuals or entities) in their capacity as political figures. Discourse, in this sense, can be seen as somewhat synonymous with *texts* and is related to the term "register", which is concerned with the specific linguistic features used for specific communicative purposes (Biber and Conrad, 2008). As such, studies of discourse, such as this one, can be viewed as an examination of the 'spoken or written […] product of the communicative act ' (van Dijk, 1998, p. 194). Consequently, the empirical analysis presented in this thesis, which compares the communicative acts of the media and political elites on the same issue during the same period, can be clearly defined as Discourse Analysis.

The definitions offered thus far, however, provide no insight as regards the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions about the significance of discourse/s in society or how different discourses relate to each other. The conceptualisation of Discourse with a capital "D" (following Gee, 1999) relates to such questions and underpins the second definition that is pertinent to this thesis. The work of Foucault is central here owing to his oft-cited view that discourses are 'practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak' (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). Constructivist views such as this claim that Discourse is significant not only because it reflects the society in which it operates, but also because it has the power to effect change within that society. In the words of Hyland (2013, p. 3): 'Discourse is a way of being. It is the institutions, activities, and values which we constantly

recreate though discourse as members of social groups.' The extent of the power that Discourse wields to effect change, and the nature of any potential changes, is contested by different theoretical schools. It is not the aim of this thesis to resolve such questions, and space does not permit any extended discussion of those positions; nevertheless, I consider it self-evident that electoral processes are capable of creating considerable societal change and that discourses (and thereby Discourse) influence the electorate in terms of their perception of the choices available to them. This in turn leads to incremental change in society. The aim of this study is to shed light on the potential influences and contested positions on the issue of EU membership and certainly falls within the definition of a Discourse Study.

In differentiating between the two key concepts of "discourses" and "Discourse", as utilised in the present study, we can turn to a useful explanation which argues that on the one hand Discourse Analysis 'consists of a range of techniques to analyse talk and text in context' and on the other, Discourse Theory 'corresponds to the ontological level, where the concept of [D]iscourse specifies the presuppositions of *any* enquiry into the nature of objects and social relations' (Howarth and Torfing, 2005, p. 336, emphasis added). In order to expand on the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin this thesis, I offer a more detailed discussion of constructivist theories regarding the relationship between Discourse and issues of power and the structure of society in the next subsection (1.3.2). In subsection 1.3.3, I focus on linguistic approaches to discourse, placing emphasis on critical perspectives. In the final subsection (1.3.4), I discuss Corpus Linguistics and, more specifically, CADS methodologies in order to demonstrate their utility in the study of Discourse.

1.3.2 Discourse and society

As already noted, one of the key conceptualisations that is significant for this study relates to the role of Discourse in constructing the world in which we live. In differentiating between different approaches at this level of abstraction, the question becomes one of clarifying the underlying ontological assumptions regarding the nature of reality and the extent to which a constructivist paradigm is embraced. This is important because, as Parsons (2007) notes, different stances on constructivism are related to differing epistemological viewpoints and methodological approaches.

Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory holds that 'all objects are the objects of discourse' and that discourses are always 'contingent and historical constructions' (Howarth, 2000, pp. 8–9). Consequently, meaning is only ever partially fixed owing to the way that competing discourses interact and subsequently develop (Laclau and Mouffe, 2005). That is not to say, as is sometimes claimed, that the existence of objective reality is denied. It is the *meaning* of any given reality that is always contingent. Howarth gives the example of a forest that exists in an objective sense, but that means different things in different contexts to different people: 'an intrinsic natural beauty, an obstacle to the building of a motorway or a unique ecosystem' (Howarth, 2000, p. 9). This concept of Discourse, which can more accurately be described as Post-Structuralist Discourse Theory, suggests that there are no predetermined factors that influence the structure of society and may be said to imply that anything is possible. Social structure is entirely discursive in nature and comes about through 'articulation', that is by 'combining and connecting certain words, objects, ideas and concepts in particular ways' (Jacobs, 2018, pp. 294–298).

More moderate forms of social constructivism distinguish between a natural world and a social world, with only the latter being differentiated as 'socially constructed' and

'discursively construed' (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 4–5). Approaches such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) focus on social practices and the ways in which Discourse (or discourses) are embedded within them, while also having the potential to change them in what can be described as "recontextualization" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 4). It is argued that discourse is separate from social structures but influential on them (van Dijk, 1993, 1997; Fairclough, 2003; Weiss and Wodak, 2003). Importantly, however, Fairclough (2013) argues that there is a limitation on the constructive effects of any given discursive construal of the world, stating that 'we cannot transform the world in any old way we happen to construe it; the world is such that some transformations are possible, and others are not' and citing existing power relations as one of the limiting factors (Fairclough, 2013, p. 5).

It is not my aim to resolve questions relating to the extent that Discourse can transform the world in which we live, or to suggest which transformations may or may not be possible. Rather, my position is aligned with the view that the social world, while constrained to an extent, can be influenced by discourses and that Discourse is, therefore, central to any change that might come about. In the case of the 2016 referendum, issues of power, identity, and the nature of the political structure in this country were put up for debate with competing discourses that aimed to shape the social landscape. The resultant vote has had far-reaching consequences for the UK.

1.3.3 Discourse, language, and critical approaches

As a study that looks at political and media discourses in the lead-up to a referendum, this thesis takes a critical linguistic approach insofar as it seeks to illuminate 'values, positions, and perspectives' (Paltridge, 2013, p. 89) embedded within the corpora under examination. In this subsection, I briefly discuss literature on approaches to the analysis of D/discourse that have informed my work and, in so doing, I make an argument for the utility of a linguistic

approach, with the aim of justifying the methodological choices made in the study design outlined in Chapter Five.

Discourse Studies is a broad field and it has long inspired what has been described as 'methodological plurality'; there are numerous schools drawing on distinct theoretical and methodological frameworks (Rheindorf, 2019, p. 1). Some approaches to the analysis of Discourse, particularly in the field of Political Science, focus broadly on the content rather than the linguistic form and function of texts being studied. Content Analysis is defined as 'a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the contexts of their use' (Krippendorff, 2018, p. 24). Although such work approaches texts as data, the analysis undertaken focuses on coding those texts for meaning and producing an analysis that is 'systematic and quantitative', and distinct from 'qualitative textual analysis' methods (Neuendorf, 2017, p. 9). It is argued that a 'commitment to scientific method', the application of *a priori* analytical frameworks and 'the message as the unit of data analysis' distinguishes Content Analysis from approaches such as Narrative Analysis, Rhetorical Analysis, and Discourse Analysis, among others (Neuendorf, 2017, pp. 10–13).

I would suggest that the quantitative focus of traditional Content Analysis and the well-established difficulties in operationalising coding for subtle meaning beyond explicit messages raise questions about how complexity and the interrelatedness of discourses noted in the previous section can be accounted for using such methods. In order to address some of these issues, Ahuiva (2001) makes an argument for what has been termed 'Interpretive Content Analysis'. This allows for connotative interpretation in coding design, whereby the researcher would aim to justify coding choices explicitly rather than relying on commonly used interrater reliability statistics. Nevertheless, the resultant analysis remains an essentially quantitative one and I remain convinced that giving explicit and systematic attention to how

linguistic resources are used, beyond just counting instances, along with a careful reflection on context and absence in discourses, is essential.

In considering qualitative approaches to Discourse Analysis, I turn now to Critical Linguistics, which proposes that there is 'a strong and pervasive connection between linguistic structure and social structure', (Fowler *et al.*, 1979) and can be defined as 'the application of a particular set of linguistic procedures to texts with a view to uncovering concealed cultural and ideological meanings' (O'Halloran, 2000, p. 16). Those procedures are frequently drawn from Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics, which focuses on the function of language and systematises this into three aspects of meaning or 'metafunctions': (1) 'Ideational', which construes experience in the world; (2) 'Interpersonal', which enacts social relationships; and (3) 'Textual', which relates to the internal organisation of the text (Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014, p. 83). It is important to note that these systems offer a set of paradigmatic options that enable, during analysis, a consideration not just of the way something *is said*, but also of the way that it *could have been said* in order to produce a different effect or meaning. This emphasises that choice is a key feature in the production of meaning in Discourse. It is important to note for the present study that the notion of choice does not imply that the selection made is a deliberate or even a conscious one. Nevertheless, I align myself with the view that underpins work in Systemic Functional Linguistics and Critical Linguistics more broadly, namely that choices made consistently can be revealing.

Issues regarding who has access to influential discourses and where power lies in order to generate them become particularly significant in an examination of political and media discourse. Perhaps the most influential work in Critical Linguistics has been conducted in the diverse field of CDA (see, for instance, Fowler *et al.*, 1979; van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Weiss and Wodak, 2003; Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak, 2011;

Paltridge, 2013; Forchtner and Wodak, 2018). That Discourse has the potential to produce and reproduce unequal power relations is central tenet of CDA, which seeks to illuminate the function of language in 'constituting and transmitting knowledge; in organising social institutions or in exercising power' (Wodak, cited in Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 280). Methodological approaches vary (see Weiss and Wodak, 2003; Wodak and Meyer, 2015 for a comprehensive review), but Fairclough (2013, p. 10) proposes the following three defining characteristics of CDA:

1. It is not just analysis of discourse […] it is part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of social practice.
2. It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of texts.
3. It is not just descriptive; it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them.

Criticism of Critical Linguistics in general, and CDA specifically, argues that it risks over-interpretation when just a small number of texts are closely examined (O'Halloran and Coffin, 2004) and may not therefore be representative of the discourse under study. Koller and Mautner (2004) raise concerns regarding the selection of texts for analysis, which are not necessarily typical but which interest the analysts. This is related to the suggestion that, as a consequence of their political commitment, CDA analysts 'find what they expect to find' (Stubbs, 1997, p. 2) and offer a 'careful selection and partial interpretation of whatever linguistic features suit their own ideological position' (Widdowson, 1998, p. 146). Such concerns may, of course, be raised regarding any qualitative research method, but I would suggest that methodological rigour and appropriate caution in interpreting findings go at least some way towards addressing them.

That said, I do regard as problematic Fairclough's own assertion that the 'manifesto' of CDA should shift from the 'critique of [linguistic] structures', which perpetuate neo-liberal

capitalist society, towards a critique of 'strategies' adopted in the modification of that society (Fairclough, 2013, pp. 15–17). Such an agenda shifts the aims of CDA away from an exposition of the relationship between language and power in society towards an explicit intention to effect social change according to the beliefs and priorities of the analyst. The issue here is not that the CDA analyst may have a particular political view, but that a politically homogeneous field focused on societal change has the potential to limit any understanding of the relationship between language and power and may lead to what has been described as 'premature scientific foreclosure' (Honeycutt and Jussim, 2020, p. 76).

Although the present study certainly sits within the critical tradition, insofar as it seeks to investigate the ideological underpinnings of media and political discourses in the lead-up to the referendum, I, following Partington *et al*. (2013), prefer the term Discourse Analysis rather than CDA on the basis that I do not approach the study with the aim of effecting social change. Instead, my aim is to illuminate, based on the definition stipulating that 'discourse analysis studies how language is used to (attempt to) influence the beliefs and behaviour of other people' (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 5). The 'attempt to' in brackets here neatly encapsulates a recognition of the fact that success or failure with regard to influence cannot be established in a study of Discourse (or discourses) alone.

More specifically, my thesis is defined as a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study, an approach that does not align itself with any particular school of discourse and explicitly rejects the notion of working with an overarching political agenda (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 10). Such an approach also has the benefit of combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies with contexts in a way that addresses the concerns that have been raised in this section in regard to both Content Analysis and CDA. The following section discusses this in further detail.

1.4 Project aims and research questions

The underlying aim of the present study is to contribute to the literature that fosters a deeper understanding of the Brexit referendum result. More specifically, the thesis examines the discourse around the EU in the pro-EU *Guardian* newspaper in the six months leading up to the referendum and compares this to the discourse of EU elites during the same period with the aim of establishing not just what was said, but what could have been said about the EU at the time. The rationale for this approach lies behind the fact that, as demonstrated above, the media generally, and newspapers specifically, have been shown to influence the public's perception of political issues. In such a closely fought referendum, it is important to understand the nuances of coverage in a pro-EU publication, 10% of whose readers voted to leave the EU.

Previous research has largely focused on those media outlets that are explicitly against Britain's EU membership but, as demonstrated in Chapter Two, dichotomised conceptions of Eurosceptic and Europhile publications are oversimplified. There is a need to view media representation in light of previous research into Euroscepticism that takes account of the complexity surrounding opinions on EU membership. In addition, I focus not just on discourse relating to the referendum, but to the EU more broadly because I argue that readers will have formed opinions based on that broader coverage that, in turn, fed into a referendum decision. Furthermore, in order to assess the representation of the EU in any media outlet, it is essential to gauge what could have been said about the EU. In order to do that and to facilitate comparison, it is necessary to study what the EU was disseminating at the time.

In an effort to achieve the aims outlined above, this thesis addresses the following empirical research questions:

RQ1: What are the key topics relating to the EU under discussion in the *Guardian* during the Referendum campaign, and to what extent does the nature and presentation of these topics uphold or undermine the publication's Pro-EU Stance?

RQ2: What are the similarities and differences between the *Guardian* and EU elite discourse in the lead up to the referendum, and what is the significance of the linguistic resources used on the topic of the financial crisis?

The following chapters discuss theories of both political and media discourse that endeavour to explain the nature of these discourses. An additional aim of this study is to consider the extent to which theoretical frameworks associated with these theories sufficiently account for the empirical findings of this study and indeed facilitate this work. To that end, a third research question will be addressed:

RQ3: To what extent do existing theoretical frameworks account for the empirical findings of this study and what additional frameworks are required to explain the results?

1.5 Thesis overview

This section outlines the organisation of this thesis and how it relates to the research questions detailed in section 1.4. Having presented the background to and rationale for this study, this chapter has also discussed concepts of Discourse and discourses pertinent to this thesis, including work relating to the significance of discourses in society, and their manifestation through language. To provide important context in relation to the present study, the following chapter (**Chapter Two**) outlines the background to the UK's relationship with the EU and discusses scholarship in the field. In **Chapter Three**, I continue my review of pertinent literature, and define and address the social significance of Media and Political Discourse specifically, considering theories associated with these discourse varieties along with the methodologies utilised in their study.

Chapter Four details a novel analytical framework – Discursive Political Values Analysis (DPVA) – which I present as a response to **RQ3**: to what extent do existing theoretical frameworks account for the empirical findings of this study and what additional frameworks are required to explain the results? The framework, which represents a contribution to the field of Political Discourse Analysis, was developed based on the empirical findings of the present study that address RQ1 and RQ2. Drawing on Aristotle's *Art of rhetoric* (2018) and his Modes of Persuasion, I propose that in the same way as News Values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Bednarek and Caple, 2014) can explain what finds its way into the news and how it is presented using conceptions of newsworthiness, my framework of Political Values can explain aspects of Elite Political Discourse through a concept I term "voteworthiness".

In **Chapter Five**, I describe the study design, data, and methodology used in the present study. Of particular note here is section 5.6, which provides a detailed discussion of duplication in newspaper corpora and also presents a principled method for defining and dealing with those duplicates. In so doing, it makes a methodological contribution to the field of Corpus Linguistics.

There are four empirical chapters that contribute to our understanding of the nature and significance of political and media discourse around the EU in the lead-up to the UK's membership referendum. **Chapter Six** provides a corpus analysis of the *Guardian* articles that comprise the GPRC and directly addresses **RQ1**: what are the key topics relating to the EU under discussion in the *Guardian* during the Referendum campaign, and to what extent does the nature and presentation of these topics uphold or undermine the publication's Pro-EU Stance?

Chapter Seven and **Chapter Eight** focus on the topic of the Financial Crisis, which was identified as key in Chapter Four. Together they address **RQ2**: what are the similarities and differences between the *Guardian* and EU elite discourse, and what is the significance of the linguistic resources used, on the topic of the financial crisis? Chapter Seven offers an analysis of the *Guardian* Financial Crisis Corpus (GuFCC), which is a sub-corpus of the GPRC, while Chapter Eight looks at the European Union Financial Crisis Corpus (EUFCC), which was collected to match the topic and time frame of the GuFCC.

The final chapter, **Chapter Nine**, presents the conclusion to the study. It reflects on the findings of the analysis and reiterates how they relate to the research questions. This chapter details the contributions of this study to the field and considers the strengths and limitations of the work undertaken. Potential avenues for further research are also discussed.

Chapter 2: The History and Complexity of Euroscepticism

2.1 Introduction

A key element of any Corpus Assisted Discourse Study is context (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013) and, as such, it is important at this point to contextualise historically the UK's relationship with the EU, as well as provide some background regarding the development of public opinion and the media representation of the EU. Arguments over policy, trade, and loss of national supremacy, all of which were significant during the 2016 debate, date back to the 1950s and were particularly poignant in the lead-up to the UK's accession to what was the European Economic Community in 1973. The media perspective on EU membership today has changed considerably from an initially supportive stance at the time. In the same way, public opinion has also shifted. In the following section (2.2), I discuss the background to Britain's relationship with the EU, the bumpy road to membership and the role of the media leading up to the first membership referendum of 1973. In section 2.3, I detail the development of Euroscepticism, how this has been represented in the press and its relationship to public opinion. Finally, in section 2.4, I examine the concept of Euroscepticism and the extent to which it can be considered as clear-cut and easily defined.

2.2 An awkward relationship

In 1957, The Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the Common Market, which enshrined a primary objective of 'ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'. Its aim was to achieve 'secure peace and prosperity' following two devastating world wars (J. Smith, 2016, p. 326). The six founding members of the EEC were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. In 1973, the UK

joined the EEC, along with Denmark and Ireland, expanding membership to nine nations. The Single European Act (1986) aimed to ensure the free flow of trade across members' borders with the Four Freedoms relating to the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital ultimately enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992). This saw the EEC, officially renamed the European Community (EC), incorporated into the EU as the first of three pillars. Pillar II related to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Pillar III to Political and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. The EU that we recognise today became a single legal entity on the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and can be defined as 'a supranational union of intergovernmental states directed by the institutions of the EU' (Ridge-Newman, 2018, p. 10). Prior to the withdrawal of the UK, the EU consisted of 28 Member States, with 19 of those comprising the Eurozone, after the adoption of the Euro as their national currency.

The brief chronology detailed above does not, however, capture the complexity of Britain's relationship with the EU, or the extent to which political parties in the UK have always been divided on the matter. Furthermore, it does not recognise that British media has always participated in this polarising debate. With Britain long dubbed as the Union's 'Awkward Partner' (George, 1994), having taken a view of EU membership described as 'ambivalent' (Smith, 2016, p. 326), Euroscepticism has been a significant feature of that relationship since before the accession to the EEC in 1973. Although the term 'Eurosceptic' was not coined until the 1980s (Spiering, 2005, p. 149), successive British Labour and Conservative governments declined to participate in negotiations during the 1950s that led to the formation of the EEC, with Conservative Sir Anthony Eden arguing that the intentions for the Common Market were too ambitious. This was based, at least in part, on the insistence that participants in the scheme 'must accept the principle of supranationalism' (George, 1999,

p. 521). Subsequent governments, both Labour and Conservative, have all had to reconcile differing opinions within their ranks.

During the 1960s, economic and political imperatives arguably led to Britain applying for membership of the Communities rather than an outright commitment to the principles of union. Wall (2020) states that British politicians came to recognise the economic success of the EEC, compared with British policies that centred on relationships with the Commonwealth and the USA. Britain's attempt to forge a European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) had not been as successful as it was hoped, and the relative success of the EEC was seen as a direct threat to British trade in the Commonwealth and with the USA (Mclean, 2003). In 1961, when the then Conservative Prime Minister, Harold MacMillan, announced that his government would apply for membership of the EEC, the *Guardian* newspaper, which supported application, characterised the announcement as 'so half-hearted that it must diminish the chance of success', while at the same time the *Express* accused the Prime Minister of putting 'Europe ahead of the Commonwealth' (cited in George, 1999, pp. 33–34).

Britain's application of 1963 was indeed rejected, as was a further application in 1967, both as a result of a veto by French President Charles de Gaulle, who cited concerns that British association with the Commonwealth and the United States, along with its domestic agricultural policy, would lead to divergent priorities (George, 1999, p. 35). Ultimately, following de Gaulle's departure, Edward Heath's Conservative government achieved membership of the EEC in 1973 although, as Seymour-Ure (1978) notes, this was against a background of considerable antagonism both from within the party and from some in the equally divided opposition parties. Furthermore, membership was the result of complex negotiations on the terms of British entry to the Union. The most significant of the issues in question, which can be seen as laying the ground for Euroscepticism today, were the status of

sterling as an international reserve currency, competition from Britain's Commonwealth trade relations, British objections to the Common Agricultural Policy, and the size of Britain's contribution to the EEC budget (George, 1999, p. 50). The difficulty of agreeing these terms is apparent given that the Labour Party campaign promise in the 1974 general election was to renegotiate with the EEC and put the results to the British people in a referendum.

Labour's aims for renegotiating the British relationship with Europe were based on five main objections to previously negotiated terms, which argued as follows that: the Common Agricultural Policy posed 'a threat to world trade in food products'; the British Community Budget contributions were disproportionate; proposals for economic and monetary union would increase unemployment; parliamentary power to pursue effective 'regional, industrial and fiscal policies' was at risk; and finally, harmonisation of VAT would lead to the taxation of 'necessities' (Labour Party, 1974). During the 1975 referendum campaign that followed, in a situation that would be echoed some forty years later, the main political parties were divided. The Conservative leadership (by then in opposition) were pro-membership but there were backbenchers who were staunchly against. At the same time, for Labour, 'agreement to differ' arrangements were made owing to a split in the government's Cabinet (Aqui, 2020, p. 2). Although the majority of that Cabinet and the Parliamentary Labour Party were in favour of membership, there was a 2-to-1 vote at a special party conference to oppose it.

Following the referendum in 1975, in which the British public voted Remain by 67% to 33%, Britain's relationship with Europe continued to be problematic and, arguably, 'no other Member State has had quite so difficult a relationship with the EU' (Copsey and Haughton, 2014, p. 76). The relationship can be characterised by the various exceptions sought by successive governments. Margaret Thatcher, in the 1980s, negotiated a rebate on

Britain's contribution to the Community budget. In the 1990s, John Major's government gained a permanent option to opt in or out of the Euro and the UK did not participate in the Schengen Agreement, first signed in 1985, which facilitated free movement and the removal of border controls between EU Member States. Despite these concessions, and a relationship said to be 'stable yet sceptical', Eurosceptic voices gained traction following the Conservative–Liberal–Democrat coalition government formed after the 2010 general election (Copsey and Haughton, 2014, p. 76). Ultimately, as Startin (2015) argues, while there are various historical and geographical reasons that Britain became the 'Awkward Partner' in Europe (George, 1994), it is lack of commitment to European integration and concerns over enlargement that ensured that Britain continued to play that role.

The following section will trace the development of these issues, as well as the hard Euroscepticism that has arguably led to Brexit.

2.3 Euroscepticism, the public and the press

2.3.1 Shifting public opinion

While the political division described in the previous section is familiar today, the 1975 referendum campaign differed from that to come in 2016 in terms of the stance of the British media. In 1975, the British press showed a 'pronounced and nearly unanimous Euro-enthusiasm', while 'pro-community bias' dominated coverage focusing on the 'personalities of the few leading anti-marketeers' (Wilkes and Wring, 1998, pp. 185–195). At the time, the *Guardian* asked '[d]o we want to go into the twenty-first century as a small and separate nation or as part of a greater Western Europe?', citing a split in the Labour Party, rather than a problem with EEC, as the 'real reason' the referendum was being held (Editorial, 1975). The exception was the *Daily Express*, which was opposed to the Union in what has been

described as ‘a sentimental echo of [owner] Lord Beaverbrook’s old Empire cry’ (Seymour-Ure, 1976, p. 214).

As already noted, however, this overall Euro-enthusiasm has not been maintained. Indeed, the position of the British press on the question of Europe has been described as shifting from ‘permissive consensus to destructive dissent’ (Daddow, 2012). At the same time, public awareness of Eurosceptic arguments, if not the workings of the EU itself, has increased. As such, and to contextualise the work undertaken in this study further, it is useful at this point to examine the nature and development of Euroscepticism, its relationship with public opinion, and its representation in the British press in the years between 1975 and 2016.

Starting with public opinion, the 2015 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA 33) (NatCen Social Research, 2015) found that just 30% of respondents supported leaving the EU when the question was framed as ‘continue’ with or ‘withdraw’ from EU membership. It is notable that there has never been a majority in favour of withdrawal since the question was first posed in the 1983 survey (see Figure 2-1). The Social Attitudes Survey is undertaken annually by a representative sample of the UK population and questions are repeated frequently to facilitate comparison over time. As Curtice (2016, p. 5) notes, while outright Euroscepticism appears to be a minority view, support for the Union was certainly lower in 2015 than it had been in the early 1990s. Uncertainty regarding membership also increased significantly in the late 1990s, with “don’t know” answers reaching as high as 18% in 1997. It is interesting to note that this was the time when expansion of the EU was in the news, which covered the start of the process of membership negotiations with central and eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. This, in addition to discussions around monetary union ahead of the introduction of the Euro and whether the UK would join,

are likely to have given some of those previously supportive of EU membership pause for thought.




Figure 2-1: Attitudes towards Britain's membership of the EU, 1983–2015 (NatCen Social Research, 2015)

A more complex set of attitudes, however, is revealed when looking at responses to the more nuanced questions frequently posed since 1992. Asked about Britain's long-term policy regarding the EU, respondents were given five choices: to leave the EU; to stay in the EU but reduce its powers; to leave things as they are; to stay in the EU and increase its powers; to work for a single European government. Responses to this question show that in 2015, more people than ever favoured a reduction in the EU's powers. Since 2012, the combined percentage of respondents who wanted either to leave or reduce the powers of the EU has been over 60% (see Figure 2-2).

Conversely, the combined percentage of those who wanted to remain, increase EU powers, or work towards a single European government, was just 30% in 2015 and as low as 27% in 2013. The public's apparent concerns over the extent of EU powers, combined with the fact that the "leave" option was favoured by only 22%, would appear to shed light on

David Cameron's decision to renegotiate British membership terms and offer a referendum. Such a strategy of course relied on addressing the concerns of those who wanted to see EU powers curtailed, in order to ensure that, when faced with a vote, they would not come down on the side of Leave. As such, it is important to understand the nature of their objection to the status quo.




Figure 2-2: Attitudes towards Britain's relationship with the EU, 1992–2015 (NatCen Social Research, 2015)

As noted above, concerns over joining the Euro and EU enlargement appear to have been reflected in the increase of "don't know" responses to BSA surveys in the late 1990s in both the simple continue/withdraw question (Fig. 2-1) and the more nuanced questions presented in Figure 2-2. This can also potentially explain the marked increase in those who wanted to see a reduction in EU powers. Startin (2015) argues that the Maastricht Treaty, which aimed at increasing European integration, brought to the fore discussions around the erosion of national parliamentary sovereignty. The Treaty also enshrined freedom of

movement and, along with EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, can be seen as a significant driver of Euroscepticism in the UK among both elites and citizens (Brack and Startin, 2015). Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech of 1988 argued that closer union 'does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy'. She further criticised 'utopian goals' and stated unapologetically that 'we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level' (Thatcher, 1988). The speech, which can be seen as laying the ground for Eurosceptic discourses of 'anti-federalism', 'anti-regulation' and 'the importance of sovereign nations inside the EU', was arguably a 'tipping point' in the development of Euroscepticism in Britain (Daddow, 2013, p. 217). Furthermore, as argued by Usherwood and Startin (2013), the speech marked an increase in public awareness regarding the EU and the meaning of integration. It is important to note, however, that other than at 'pivotal moments for EU decision making', the EU is not particularly visible in the news at all (de Vreese *et al.*, 2006, p. 481).

2.3.2 Changing media perspectives

If public opinion on the EU can be seen to reflect political tensions on the matter, it is likely, as already noted, that the shift in public perception was at least somewhat influenced by media coverage. Daddow (2012) identifies a clear shift in media reporting on the EU during the time of intense political debate revolving around the Maastricht treaty and EU expansion during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It has been argued that this change can be explained by the so called 'Murdoch effect', whereby somewhat cynical and business-savvy tabloid media proprietors see 'competitive advantage' in the sensationalisation of news relating to 'stories about foreigners trying to lord it over "us", or about absurd rulings imposed on the UK by alien institutions' (van Dalen et al., 2011, cited in Daddow, 2012, p. 1221).

According to Wilkes and Wring (1998), prior to 1983 what drove media alignment was support of the Conservative position that Britain was better off in the EEC. The issue, however, was not particularly high on the media agenda owing to the perception that the public were not that interested in the complexities of European integration. Arguably, this changed when the *Sun* published a front-page story on 1 November 1990 (Figure 2-3) imploring its readers to 'tell the feelthy [sic] French to FROG OFF' by facing France and "shouting" the headline 'UP YOURS DELORS' referring to Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995, argued to be 'the architect of the structure and character of today's Union' (Salm and Lehmann, 2020). In doing so, the *Sun* utilised many of the linguistic resources identified by Wodak *et al.* (2009), namely construing national identity through the use of derogatory nicknames, mimicking accents and emphasising divisions between "us" and "them" in an extraordinarily xenophobic attack.


THE Sun

Thursday, November 1, 1990 25p

FREE Turtles photos - coming tomorrow only in your Sun

UP YOURS DELORS

At midday tomorrow Sun readers are urged to tell the French fool where to stuff his ECU

Figure 2-3: *The Sun* front page (Up yours Delors), 1 November 1990

Since then, coverage in daily tabloid newspapers such as the *Sun* has been described as 'vigorously and virulently Eurosceptic, conjuring up the image of the EU as a corrupt and untrustworthy predator, driven by a Franco-German plot to damage British Economic interests, British security and British Sovereignty' (Anderson, 2004, p. 54). Such an approach is clearly exemplified in Figure 2-4 depicting the front cover of the *Sun* on 3 February 2016. Drawing on imagery from the opening titles of the popular long-running 1970s BBC sitcom, *Dad's army* (Perry and Croft, 1968), the cover invokes a war metaphor, with the EU depicted as an invading force through the use of arrows which, in the show, represented Nazi forces. Prime Minister David Cameron is lambasted as a hapless leader akin to the show's lead character, Captain Mainwaring of the Home Guard. The headline plays on the words of the show's theme tune replacing references to Hitler with Cameron's name, arguably implying that the Prime Minister, and his supposed failure to protect British interests in Europe, can be seen as a threat to the country.



Figure 2-4: *The Sun* front page (Who do EU think you are kidding Mr Cameron?), 3 February 2016

In the same vein, the *Express*, which had always taken a sceptical view of European integration, went further still. Their long-running campaign to leave the EU can be seen as an attempt to retain a 'distinctive voice' in a marketplace of increasingly Eurosceptic competitors (Daddow, 2012, p. 1225) but the impact of such a strategy has had far-reaching consequences. The English crusader logo has been deployed as 'the figurehead of the struggle to repatriate British Sovereignty from a political project that has comprehensively failed' (*Express*, 2010), and front pages have frequently been used to keep the issue at the forefront of readers' minds in what has been described as a 'billboard bombardment approach' (Startin, 2015, p. 318), which has contributed to the framing of EU membership as linked to concerns over migration, border control and a threat to national identity. This is significant given that, according to several studies, anti-EU attitudes are closely related to anti-immigration attitudes (Boomgaarden *et al.*, 2011) and that a strong sense of national identity is a predictor of Euroscepticism (Carey, 2002; Carl, Dennison and Evans, 2019).

The likes of Nigel Farage, leader of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) between 2006 and 2016, have long linked enlargement of the EU and freedom of movement to concerns over job security and unemployment, and the *Daily Express*, whose owner Richard Desmond contributed £1.3 million to UKIP in 2015, has been crucial in the mainstreaming of these ideas. Content analysis undertaken by Startin (2015) shows that 20% of the *Daily Express* front pages between July 2012 and June 2013 focused on the EU and/or migration connected to EU and enlargement. That this anti-EU agenda was a deliberate attempt to shift public opinion is undeniable given that the *Daily Express* has gone so far as to claim that it 'secured Brexit' with their '28-year EU crusade' (Nicholson, 2020). Such

relentless and negative tabloid coverage has arguably had an impact far beyond the readers of the *Daily Express* (Startin, 2015, p. 319).

Two further related factors can be said to have increased public awareness of Eurosceptic perspectives and the salience of EU membership in the minds of British voters. The first of these is the financial crisis of 2008 and the second is an increase in Eurosceptic MEPs being voted into the European Parliament as a result of the austerity measures put in place to deal with that very crisis (Brack and Startin, 2015). The 2014 European parliamentary elections saw unprecedented support for Eurosceptic parties, and in the UK, France and Denmark the majority of seats went to Eurosceptics. This was due in part, as argued by Hobolt and de Vries (2016), to a shift in blame for the financial crisis and the effects of austerity measures from national governments to the EU. Using data from the British Elections Study Continuous Monitoring Survey, Hobolt and Tilley (2014) show that, as the economic crisis hit the Eurozone, blame for it shifted from US banks to the EU. They also show that Eurosceptics were twice as likely as Europhiles to blame the EU for financial problems following the 2008 crisis but likewise suggest that poor economic outcomes result in citizens becoming Eurosceptic (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, p. 56). Arguably, a vote for a Eurosceptic MEP can be seen as a protest vote by citizens against the EU via the only process available to them, exacerbated by the fact that EU institutions and processes are not well understood by the public.

In turn, Eurosceptic MEPs cause discord and conflict, which then gets reported not just in the tabloid press, but in broadsheets including those with a pro-EU stance. There is evidence that this coverage potentially influenced support for UKIP in the UK. A recent study combining quantitative and qualitative methods suggests a ‘coverage-support dynamic’ of such an extent that media coverage appeared to drive public support for UKIP between

2004 and 2017, rather than the other way around (Murphy and Devine, 2020). What is not clear from that study is the extent to which the coverage can be seen as 'visibility bias', which refers to a disproportionate amount of coverage, or how this relates to the other two elements of media bias discussed in the literature: 'agenda bias' which refers to what gets in the news, and 'tonality bias' which measures the evaluation of political actors (see Eberl *et al.*, 2017; and Chapter Three of the present study for a more detailed discussion on the issue of media bias and media effects).

In summary, what is clear is that in the years between the referenda of 1975 and 2016, a complex interplay of economic and political factors has led to the consolidation of Eurosceptic ideas among the political elite. These ideas had always existed in the UK but at that juncture they became increasingly newsworthy. The EU's move towards closer political and economic union, along with difficult economic circumstances and increasingly hostile press coverage of political conflict, have conspired to problematise the EU in the minds of ever more British voters. Ultimately, as the saying goes, the rest is history, but there remain some unanswered questions relating to the fact that much of the research on media coverage of the EU focuses on national political elites and Eurosceptic publications.

While it has also been shown that negative coverage of the EU contributes to a 'spiral of media-driven Euroscepticism', this does not hold true for all publications or indeed for all citizens (de Vreese, 2007, p. 271). Hawkins (2012), having examined Eurosceptic discourses in the right-wing press, considers counter-discourses in left-wing publications, including the *Guardian*, the *Observer* and the *Mirror,* that go against the broadly pro-EU stance of these newspapers. It is argued that, while these publications do offer a broadly pro-EU perspective, Eurosceptic voices are still given space, and the publications are 'reactive to an agenda set by Eurosceptic discourse' (Hawkins, 2012, p. 573). That said, these counter-discourses are not

quantified and the question of the extent to which they may undermine an otherwise EU stance is not explored.

The appearance of anti-EU voices in pro-EU publications highlights the need to consider more nuanced conceptions of attitudes to the EU that include various distinctions of 'hard' or 'principled' Euroscepticism that rejects integration and seeks withdrawal from the EU, to softer or 'qualified opposition' that objects to some aspects of EU development (Bijsmans, 2020). It has been argued that a simple concept of Euroscepticism 'does not tap the diversity of EU pessimism at the mass level' (Krouwel and Abts, 2007, p. 42) and in publications like the *Guardian,* where these attitudes are studied, they tend to be dealt with only briefly and defined as pro-EU membership. An exception here is Startin (2015), who does expand conceptions of Euroscepticism using terms as 'Europositive/Euroambivalent' to describe the orientation of the *Guardian.* "Euroambivalence" is defined as:

> being generally in favour of the European Union *per se*, not being clearly partisan either with regard to further measures designed to foster closer European co-operation, and not necessarily covering EU-related issues with any great regularity and as a matter of priority (Startin, 2015, p. 321).

No analysis, however, is offered either to exemplify the category or quantify coverage in the *Guardian*. This is an issue which the present study seeks to address.

2.4 The complexity of Euroscepticism

Although much of the literature concerned with media representation of the EU tends to dichotomise attitudes towards EU membership, there is a body of work in the field of Political Science that takes a more nuanced perspective in defining Euroscepticism. The seminal study in this regard defines Euroscepticism as 'the idea of contingent or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of

European integration' (Taggart, 1998, p. 365). This was later refined to offer a two-dimensional conceptualisation of "Hard" and "Soft" Euroscepticism with the former being:

> where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived

and the latter being

> where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that "national interest" is currently at odds with the EU trajectory (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002, p. 4).

The distinction is important because it allows for a view that supports the existence of an EU in principle but objects to some aspects of it in practice.

More complex typologies have subsequently been developed. For instance, Kopecky and Mudd (cited in Flood and Underwood, 2007) differentiate among four different groups based on two dimensions. The first dimension is that of agreement or objection to the idea of an EU, and the second dimension is agreement with or objection to the way that this Union is enacted. Euro-Enthusiasts agree that there should be an EU and are optimistic as to the progress of that Union; Eurorealists are ideological europhiles but are pessimistic about the enactment of what they see as the principles of union; Eurocynics do not believe in union but nevertheless see some gain from involvement in the EU; Eurosceptics do not believe in union and see no benefit to membership.

While there is merit in differentiating between views on the concept of the EU and on its enactment, Flood and Underwood (2007) argue that the typology is still too imprecise. They advocate six categories of EU Alignments, as shown in Table 2-1, in which they reject neologisms and 'tainted terms such as Euroscepticism or pro-European', which they argue 'have been used as weapons in public controversy' (Flood and Underwood 2007, p. 6).

Table 2-1: Categories of EU alignments (reproduced from Flood and Underwood, 2007)

Maximalist	Pushing integration as far and as fast as is feasible towards the practical realisation of a chosen model
Reformist	Endorsing the advancement of integration, subject to remedying the deficiencies of what has already been achieved
Gradualist	Accepting some advancement of integration, as long as it is slow and piecemeal
Minimalist	Accepting the status quo, but wanting to limit further integration as far as possible
Revisionist	Wanting to return to an earlier state, usually before a treaty revision
Rejectionist	Outright refusal of integration, coupled with opposition to participation

Their Rejectionist category clearly aligns with the position of UKIP, but the rest of the UK political parties are more difficult to place on this scale. Flood and Underwood (2007) note that party stance can encompass more than one position on their scale and that this may change over time, but it is also the case that defining a given party's position is problematic. David Cameron's pledge to renegotiate British membership terms prior to the referendum could be seen as Reformist, assuming that further EU integration would be ultimately endorsed following reform, or it could be seen as Revisionist in terms of regaining powers in some areas of policy.

If defining party positions is complex, factions within parties complicate the picture further still. Elements of the Conservative party would be defined as Rejectionist with, for instance, backbench MP Douglas Carswell feeling sufficiently strongly about this to defect to UKIP in 2014. Furthermore, Flood and Underwood's (2007) model does not account for the

extent to which those in any given category agree with one another. Given that issues relating to the Union may extend to currency union, political union, border control, fiscal contribution, legal sovereignty, trade, and so on, there is no reason to assume that all Reformists, for instance, would seek reforms in the same areas and to the same extent or that all Gradualists would prioritise the same aspects of integration. Arguably, such complex divisions in the major parties may in part explain how voters became influenced by the media when voting in the referendum. In the absence of a coherent position on the EU in a voter's preferred political party, it is hardly surprising that media representations are appealing.

If political entities are difficult to define in terms of their stance on the EU, then it is reasonable to assume that defining media stance would be equally complex. As is demonstrated in the present study, this is most certainly the case. Partington and Zuccato (2018, p. 114) identify four viewpoints on the EU drawing on data from the *Guardian* and the *Daily Mail* in 2013: 'die hard Pro-EU idealists'; 'EU optimists'; 'EU looseners'; 'Anti-EU voices'. They note that even editorial articles, although found to be broadly in favour of Remain, demonstrated a stance that can be described as 'conflicted' (Partington and Zuccato, 2018, p. 108). In a study of attitudes towards Europe in four British national newspapers (the *Guardian*, the *Telegraph*, the *Mirror* and the *Sun*), Glaas (2016) identifies six different stances in a Corpus Assisted Discourse Study on media representation of the EU (Table 2-2) and notes that a range of these views were represented in all but the *Express*, which offers an unequivocal absolutist view against membership.

Table 2-2: Stance on the EU in the media (based on Glaas, 2016)

Position	Argument	Basis of Evaluation
Ideologically pro-EU	Absolutist – For	Discusses benefits of EU membership with no acknowledgement of issues or problems
	Optimist	Discusses benefits of EU membership, acknowledges problems but either suggests that the benefits outweigh these or is optimistic about resolutions
	Neutral	Argues for EU membership, acknowledges issues but makes no assertions regarding resolutions
	Pessimist	Believes in the concept of the EU, but is critical of issues and is pessimistic about the possibility of resolution
Ideologically anti-EU	Resigned Supporter	Assesses the EU as flawed but believes that the risks of leaving for Britain, regardless of the results on any renegotiation of terms, are too great
	Absolutist – Against	Entirely against the idea of the EU and British membership of it

What is particularly important about the categories defined in Glaas (2016) is that they raise the possibility that the Pessimist, while ideologically Pro-EU, might nevertheless decide on balance to vote Leave, while a Resigned Supporter could vote Remain despite being ideologically anti-EU. As such, while the *Guardian* can certainly be defined as ideologically pro-EU, it did not appear to maintain an Absolutist–Remain position in 2015.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the necessary context for the present study in keeping with the principles of Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies (Partington et al., 2013). I have shown that while the vote to leave the EU was seen by many as unexpected, the relationship between Britain and the EU has always been a difficult one. The 1973 membership referendum may

have reflected a broad consensus on membership of the EEC, but it did not mean that the nature of support or indeed the concerns over that membership were resolved.

Euroscepticism has many interrelated aspects, and these have been a feature of Britain's relationship with the EU from the very beginning. Political disagreements and economic issues have come into focus at different times across the intervening years. Between 1973 and 2016, the position of the British press on the EU has changed considerably. Having previously been in favour of membership, with the exception of the *Express*, British newspapers are now much more divided on the matter. At the same time, a significant proportion of the public appear to have concerns over the extent of the EU's powers. Furthermore, the economic and social cost of the 2008 financial banking crisis has potentially led to the EU being used as a scapegoat, with national governments seeking to justify their own positions. In light of all this, the referendum result is perhaps less surprising than it first appears.

Attitudes towards Europe, among political elites, the press and the public have never been more complex. I would argue that if the 1973 referendum was about the idea of a union of European countries after the Second World War, the 2016 referendum was much more about the nature of that union and how it impacts citizens' lives today. In other words, it was an inward-looking, rather than an outward-looking decision. Our understanding of the nature of Euroscepticism has certainly become more sophisticated, and I consider the idea that someone might be ideologically supportive of the ideal of an EU but felt unable to support the enactment of that ideal as an important one. For the purposes of the present study, the most significant question becomes one about those elements in an otherwise supportive *Guardian* news coverage that fostered a pessimistic view of EU membership to such an extent that they resulted in a vote to leave the EU.

Chapter 3: Political and Media Discourse: A Literature Review

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a further review of previous research relevant to this study, which compares political and media texts and asks questions about how political messages are dealt with in the media, what is lost in transmission from elite political figures and institutions to media discourse, and what, if anything, is added. Having discussed the significance and study of discourse in society in Chapter One, and the history and complexity of Britain's relationship with the EU in Chapter Two, the aim of this review chapter is to offer a more comprehensive overview of pertinent work on media and political discourse from both a methodological and an empirical perspective.

Approaches to the study of media discourse are considered in section 3.2, which is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection (3.2.1), I look at literature on Media Effects and implications for the media's impact on democratic processes. I develop this discussion further in subsection 3.2.2 by considering theories relating to the Mediatisation of politics, that is, the extent to which media influences not just what citizens understand about politics but the extent to which it may influence politics itself. In subsection 3.2.3, I consider the notion of Politicisation in relation to the media and the extent to which the latter are influenced by the political elite. What becomes clear is that while the media clearly have a significant impact on the electorate and their understanding of political processes, their relationship with the political elites is complex. To say that one is in control of the other is an oversimplification.

In section 3.3, I consider media logic, that is, what drives decisions around what gets into the news and how that is then presented. I focus on the concept of *newsworthiness* and theories of News Values and argue that a discursive approach to News Values, which focuses on the linguistic resources used to construct a news item as newsworthy, has good explanatory value in addressing the research questions of the present study.

Approaches to Political Discourse are addressed in section 3.4. I start, in subsection 3.4.1, by discussing the relationship between language and politics, and argue for the centrality of persuasion. In subsection 3.4.2, I consider work on Political Discourse that focuses on notions of representation and identity before moving on to consider the concept of political discourse as argumentation in subsection 3.4.3.

Ultimately, I argue that while there is a great deal of work across numerous disciplines, and from various theoretical and methodological standpoints, which considers different aspects of Political Discourse, there is a need for an overarching linguistic approach that focuses on persuasion as the underlying purpose of Political Discourse.

3.2 Approaches to media discourse

3.2.1 The media and politics

The fact that there is potential for the media to influence the voting public, and thereby the outcome of democratic processes, appears logical and incontestable, and this project is grounded in the notion that the study of media coverage of political issues is an important one. Lipman (1946) proposed that public perception of the world beyond their own personal experience comes primarily from the media (cited in Luo *et al.*, 2019, p. 151). More recently, McCoombs and Valenzuela (2020) argue that this remains the case despite the proliferation

of information sources that stem from technological developments and easy access to that information through personal smart devices. In this section, I extend the discussion from Chapter One on the power and the political and social significance of news media and offer a review of work from two key areas: the impact of news on voters through theories of Media Effects, and the assessment of the extent to which the media influences not just voters, but also political elites through theories of Mediatisation. I then consider work in the Politicisation of the media.

First, in subsection 2.3.2, I outline two models of Media Effects: the 'Agenda Setting' function (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), whereby media coverage influences *what* political issues we think about and prioritise, and Media Framing (Goffman, 1975), whereby the presentation of news influences *how* we think about these things. The extent to which the influence of media coverage goes beyond citizens and may influence political process itself is addressed in subsection 2.3.3, where theories of the Mediatisation of Politics (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999) are discussed. In section 2.2.4, I consider ideas that counter theories of Mediatisation and, instead, focus on the political influence of media output. As previously stated, I argue that the relationship between politics and the media is a complex one. Notions of politicisation of the media and the mediatisation of politics, when considered separately, potentially oversimplify the matter. Furthermore, the complexity of the relationship between the media and politics raises questions as to how we might study that relationship and what the limitations are of a study of political and media texts.

3.2.2 Media effects and voters

Early research into media effects on voting behaviour, conducted during the 1940s, in fact showed little evidence of effects on voters' political opinions (McCombs and Reynolds, 2014, p. 2). The failure of these studies to demonstrate that the media influence political

behaviour, however, was arguably attributable to a focus on the extent to which voters felt that they based their opinions on, or were persuaded to change their opinions owing to, media coverage. Instead, media effects can in part be seen as the extent to which coverage 'force[s] attention on certain issues […] suggesting what individuals in the mass should *think about*' (Lang and Lang, 1966, p. 468, emphasis added). In their seminal study, McCombs and Shaw (1972) termed this effect 'agenda setting' and showed that the ranking of political and social issues (the public agenda) by undecided voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina during the Presidential campaign of 1968, closely correlated with the ranking of issues by amount of coverage in newspapers, television and news magazines (media agenda). They concluded that since few voters directly access political information, and given that a time delay was apparent between representation of issues in the media and them being reflected in the public agenda, an agenda setting effect of mass media offered the most plausible explanation of the correlations they found.

Subsequent studies have supported the hypothesis of the agenda setting effect of media coverage beyond the original North American presidential election context, demonstrating that the study of media discourse on political issues remains an important area of study. With reference to public opinion on the EU specifically, Dursun-Ozkanca (2011) found a significant correlation between the amount of coverage relating to EU enlargement in the British newspapers during 2004 and whether voters, as shown in the Eurobarometer survey of the same year, had read or heard about EU enlargement. In other words, when coverage of EU enlargement increased, more people stated that they had heard of the issue shortly afterwards and, conversely, when coverage decreased, the proportion of people who stated that they were aware of the issue fell, once taking a time-lagged correlation into account (Dursun-Ozkanca, 2011, p. 146)

Influence on opinions regarding the relative salience of issues is described as a "first order" or "object" effect. In other words, this is an effect on what issues (or objects) are seen as important by voters. Studies have extended the hypothesis to 'second order' or 'attribute' effects (Luo *et al.*, 2019, p. 153), whereby news media is shown not only to influence what issues the public see as important but also the ranking of attributes associated with those issues. That is to say, the media influences not just what we think about, but also the terms by which we evaluate those things. Importantly, it is also proposed that there is a 'hierarchy of effects' and that second-order attribute effects, or how we should evaluate things, are stronger than first-order object effects (Wu and Coleman, 2009, p. 776). In addition, and particularly significant for the present study, Wu and Coleman's (2009) priming hypothesis holds that the criteria by which political leaders are evaluated by the public are influenced by media reporting.

Media agenda setting correlates with people's voting intentions, and it has been demonstrated that negative assessments of political figures potentially have a stronger effect on public opinion than positive ones (Wu and Coleman, 2009, p. 784). Given the predominance of negativity in news coverage (see section 3.3 on News Values), and the significance of political personalities in the Brexit debate (Levy, Aslan and Bironzo, 2016), the potential for significant agenda setting effects on the issue of the EU membership referendum is clear.

Whereas Agenda Setting theories account for media influence on what we think about, and the terms by which we evaluate these topics, studies in Media Framing focus on how issues, entities and individuals are presented. A seminal definition of framing holds that:

> to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem

> definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described (Entman, 1993, p. 52).

The difference between Agenda Setting and Framing is based on the "locus of effect", with Agenda Setting claiming that persuasive effects are derived from the accessibility of a topic (the amount of coverage). Framing theory suggests that the locus is derived from the description of a topic or 'how we should think about it' (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007, p. 14). Put differently, frames 'diagnose, evaluate and prescribe' a way of thinking about an issue (Entman, 1993, p. 52) and, in doing so, can be seen as extending the concept of second-order effects proposed in Agenda Setting studies.

Conceptually, frames can be said both to produce and maintain ways of thinking about issues and are, therefore, closely related to constructivist conceptions of Discourse as 'practices that systematically form the objects of which we speak' (Foucault, 1972, p. 49). More specifically, we can consider frames as 'the special configuration of discourse elements that articulate culture' (Reese, 2010, p. 20) and, as such, this is an important concept for the present study. Discourse elements, naturally, include linguistic resources, which is a key focus of this thesis, but also incorporate contextual social, historical and cultural elements, emphasising the importance of considering the wider contexts in which specific discourses exist. This is further justification for working within the Corpus Assisted Discourse Studies paradigm, as discussed in the previous chapter, which aims to draw explicitly on those wider contexts.

In their study of the relationship between public cynicism on EU integration and media framing of the issue, de Vreese (2007) sought to establish whether news frames could increase Euroscepticism. He did so by using experimental data and panel surveys along with content analysis of television news and newspaper articles. The findings of his study suggest that news coverage had the potential both to increase and decrease Euroscepticism, and that

the impact of news coverage was dependent on the framing of the issue at hand. The key here is that news stories that focused on strategic news reporting increased cynicism regarding EU integration. Strategic news reporting centres on 'winning and losing' and is characterised by metaphors of 'war and games' with an emphasis on 'performers, critics and audiences', concentrating on 'candidate style and perceptions' and opinion polls (Jamieson, 1992, cited in de Vreese, 2007, p. 42). It is, thus, clear that the very nature of a referendum is likely to encourage such reporting and, as the present study demonstrates, that even pro-EU coverage may frame the referendum in these terms.

3.2.3 Mediatisation of politics

Given that the study of Media Effects offers compelling evidence that news media influences the political opinions of voters, it is reasonable to ask whether, in this knowledge, political elites may also be influenced by the media. It has been proposed that Mediatisation, (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Strömbäck, 2008; Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby, 2015) has led to the news media not just mediating between political elites and the electorate, but also serving to 'shape and reshape politics' (Strömbäck, 2008, p. 232). This is an important concept for this thesis because it speaks to the extent to which we might expect political and media discourse on the same topic during the same time frame to align. The concept of Mediatisation is a broad one and there are debates as to the extent that it can be defined as a 'social meta-process' in the same way as other processes can be, such as globalisation (Lunt and Livingstone, 2016, p. 462). As a social meta-process, Mediatisation may be studied across social domains such as work, education, family life, law and so on. For reasons of space, however, the following discussion restricts itself to Mediatisation in relation to politics and political process.

Focusing on Western democracies, Strömbäck (2008) proposes four phases in the Mediatisation of politics, as depicted in Figure 3-1. The argument provided is that Mediatisation is a dynamic process conceptualised across four interrelated dimensions. Mediatisation can be said to be absolute when the news media, independent of political institutions and acting according to its own "logic", represents the most important source of political information for citizens, and when political actors are being governed by media logic.

Figure 3-1: Strömbäck's (2008, p. 235) Four Dimensions of the Mediatisation of Politics

Most important source of information: experiences or interpersonal communication	⟷	Most important source of information: the media
Media mainly dependent on political institutions	⟷	Media mainly independent of political institutions
Media content mainly governed by political logic	⟷	Media content mainly governed by media logic
Political actors mainly governed by political logic	⟷	Political actors mainly governed by media logic

As already demonstrated, there can be little doubt that media represents the most important source of political information for citizens, but I would argue that the extent to which political actors are governed by media logic is questionable. Media logic can be described as the judgements media outlets make regarding their content based on their own commercial imperatives, norms and values, and what they perceive as those of their audiences. More specifically, Meyer (2009) draws on Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999) to define four distinct elements to media logic. The first two are the most pertinent to the present study:

- News Values, such as personalisation and conflict, shape news selection and prioritisation
- Agenda setting and building assign relevance and meaning to issues and problems
- Production process requires predictable, cost-efficient and continuous news supply
- Partisanship and investigative journalism use critique of political actors to sharpen their profile and gain exclusivity

In the fourth dimension of Mediatisation, it is argued that political actors effectively internalise media logics to such an extent that the need to adhere to those logics, in order to influence news stories, becomes 'the prime criteri[on] to evaluate issues, policies and politics' (Cook, 2006, p. 168). This is a potent claim and one which understandably raises concerns about the democratic process. It goes beyond notions of mediation and the media as a conduit between politics and the electorate, and suggests at least the potential for media outlets to have an inappropriate level of influence in democratic societies.

In assessing the extent to which Mediatisation can be said to have taken place, Strömbäck and van Aelst (2013) propose adaptations to both political party organisation and to their communicative strategies. They suggest that the establishment of press offices, the inclusion of communications staff 'in the top of the decision-making structure', and the selection of candidates 'skilled in communicating with the media' all constitute adaptations to party organisation that can be seen as evidence of Mediatisation (Strömbäck and van Aelst, 2013, p. 344). Arguably, however, this only suggests an awareness of the mediating power of the news media and a desire to maximise positive coverage, rather than the fourth stage of Mediatisation as defined in Figure 3.1 above. I would suggest that there is no reason to assume by these actions alone that policy decisions would differ as a result.

Efforts to adapt communications strategies in order to reach 'standards of newsworthiness', as discussed by Strömbäck and van Aelst (2013, p. 345), amount to the same thing. Fostering relationships with the media, providing media packs to facilitate reporting, and organising press conferences, whether by an individual or a political entity, can certainly be seen as evidence that favourable reporting is a strategic goal. I remain unconvinced, however, that this necessarily amounts to substantial evidence of the fourth phase of Mediatisation. That is not to say that the media are without political influence. It is clear, for instance, that political reputations can rise and fall because of media coverage, and it is self-evident that politicians will respond to issues that are reported in the press, and which resonate with the public. Empirical evidence of Mediatisation, to the extent that media logic drives all political action, rather than just communications strategies, however, appears to be lacking.

Walgrave *et al.* (2008) suggest that political attentiveness to issues in parliamentary democracies does appear to be influenced by media coverage. In their longitudinal quantitative content analysis, undertaken in Belgium between 1993 and 2000, they focused on media coverage, oral questions in parliament, and weekly government press releases. These three datasets were coded for content according to 110 pre-determined issue codes derived from the EUROVOC thesaurus descriptors. These were then reduced to 25 major issues.[2] Time Series Cross Sectional Analysis demonstrates that across these issues, parliamentary data, and to a lesser extent government data, follow the media data. The extent

[2] EUROVOC is a multilingual thesaurus maintained by the Publications Office of the EU available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/web/eu-vocabularies

to which this is evidence of causation is questionable though. The authors themselves acknowledge that they only provide evidence of 'temporal precedence' and that regarding this as evidence of causation 'requires a leap of faith' (Walgrave *et al.*, 2008, p. 825). Ultimately, the study does not establish whether political institutions were responding to an event or to the media coverage of said event. Furthermore, their study only coded for the presence of the issues at hand and not for the media or political framing of any given issue, or for attitudes regarding policy options. As such, it does not connect specific policy outcomes with media sentiment.

Other studies have taken evidence of change in political communications as a proxy for evidence of Mediatisation. Using the same methodology as Walgrave *et al.* (2008), Seethaller and Melischek (2014) studied five Austrian election campaigns between 1970 and 2008 and conducted Content Analysis on parliamentary party press releases and media coverage from television and newspapers. Their findings show that, across time, the media was less likely to follow the political agenda set by press releases, thus satisfying the second dimension proposed by Strömbäck (2008) regarding media autonomy (see Figure 3.1). They also claim, however, that 'political actors are squandering their integrity by internalizing media norms and news values and, thus, becoming more vulnerable to media influences, including [the media's] selection of relevant issues' (Seethaller and Melischek, 2014, p. 262). As such, they argue that the fourth dimension of Mediatisation is fulfilled. It is my position, however, that political communications during an election campaign and political action in terms of policy development and enactment are very different things. No evidence for changes to the latter is offered in this study, and the highly emotive claims appear overstated.

Looking beyond national contexts to the EU, Meyer (2009) finds only low to moderate evidence of Mediatisation in the European Commission and suggests that the

structure of supranational entities limits the influence of the news media. Offering a theoretical paper rather than an empirical study, it is argued that there are four factors based on which the European Commission may be resistant to Mediatisation (p. 1060):

- little incentive to seek mass publicity in the EU policy process given the Commission's concern not to alienate governments and thereby endanger consensus-building in the legislative process;
- the lack of legitimacy of the Commission within national public spaces coupled with the difficulties of communicating across cultural and linguistic divides;
- the restrictions imposed on policy responsiveness by the limited scope of the competences allocated to the Commission; and, finally,
- the technocratic and drawn-out nature of the EU policy process.

Interestingly, these four factors raise questions as to the extent that some level of Mediatisation or, perhaps more accurately, the effective mediation of EU policy and action, may be beneficial to the EU, especially given claims about democratic deficit and the relative lack of public understanding of EU processes, both of which are generally argued to hamper support for EU membership and are a significant element of an anti-EU argument. Meyer (2009) cites increased Euroscepticism as an incentive for EU institutions to engage with the media in order to increase public understanding. Here, then, some degree of Mediatisation can be seen as a positive thing that would be beneficial to the democratic process.

3.2.4 Politicisation of the media

A further aspect of the relationship between the media and politics is that of political spin or 'the exploitation by governments of their dominant position as news providers for partisan

purposes' (Garland, 2017, p. 171). In the UK, the term "spin" first became associated in the late 1990s with Tony Blair's Labour government (McNair, 2004, p. 327) although the idea that politicians would present themselves and their policies in a positive light is not, of course, a new one. Referring to an increase in the importance of media communication for political elites, Gaber (2000) points to the fact that in January 1999, the British press considered the resignation of Gordon Brown's press secretary, Charlie Whelan, a more important news story than the launch of the Euro. Concern over political spin relates not to the "above the line" activities of political press offices, such as press releases, press conferences or briefings, but to the so-called "below the line" unofficial briefings and leaks, along with the professionalisation of the political PR machine, which seeks to keep politicians "on message" according to a consistent party line and to an extent that could be characterised as 'driving the news agenda' (Gaber, 2000, pp. 62–64).

There is clear evidence of what might be described as media manipulation according to political logic. In order to minimise the impact of an undesirable story, 'firebreak' stories are generated to create a 'media diversion' such as in 1997 when 'leaked' stories of an investigation into Chris Patten, former Governor of Hong Kong, and a potential reprieve for the soon to be scrapped royal yacht Britannia, kept negative stories about Foreign Secretary Robin Cook leaving his wife after an extramarital affair out of the news (Gaber, 2000, p. 65). Other strategies include 'stoking the fire' stories, which keep negative coverage about a political opponent running, 'pre-empting' negative coverage in one publication by briefing another, and 'kite-flying' stories which test public reaction to policy proposals (Gaber, 2000, pp. 65–67).

It has been argued that this is part of a 'professionalisation of campaign communications' that makes elections 'media affairs rather than party affairs' (Esser, Reinemann and Fan, 2000, p.

212), with so-called political spin-doctors and campaign advisers primarily interested in controlling media coverage (Esser *et al*., 2000, p. 217). Alistair Campbell, previously the political editor of the *Daily Mirror*, became Tony Blair's press secretary in 1994 and is even credited with winning over right-wing newspapers to the point where the *Sun*, on 18 March 1997, recommended to its readers that they vote Labour (Esser *et al.*, 2000 p. 219). Accordingly, it has been argued that such concern with media coverage amounts to the Mediatisation of politics. It has also been noted that by 2010, opinion polls showed public frustration with spin (Wodak, 2011, p. 2) but, nevertheless, it seems clear that political actors will attempt to influence the media with the purpose of gaining or maintaining political power.

More recently, and importantly for the present study, it has been suggested that media coverage of the Brexit campaign was subject to 'strategic lying', an evolution of political spin defined as 'a form of rhetorical spin in which the intention to deceive is more important than the appearance of veracity' (Gaber and Fisher, 2021, p. 5). The motivation for making demonstrably misleading claims, such as the suggestion from the Leave campaign in 2016 that the UK sent £350 million per week to the EU, can be explained at least in part by the desire to focus news coverage on the issue of budget contribution and utilise the subsequent debate and rebuttals from the Remain campaign to set the news agenda (Gaber and Fisher, 2021, p. 8). While the media is the conduit giving political actors access to the public, and media logic is exploited to achieve political aims, I would argue that it is political logic that drives this activity and, as such, it can equally be framed as politicisation of the media. Esser (2013, p. 164) distinguishes between the following three dimensions of political logic:

- Politics Aspects: Power and publicity-gaining 'self-presentational' politics
- Policy Aspects: Policy and decision-making 'production' of politics

- Polity Aspects: Institutional framework conditions of politics

The Politics aspect of political logic relates to the presentation of political figures and policies and mediatisation, or 'self-mediatisation' (Esser, 2013, p. 162), which is a consequence of the need to foster public support to gain or maintain power in a modern democracy. Importantly, not all elements of political logic are equally susceptible to mediatisation, with Policy and the 'production' aspects of politics, as well as the Polity aspects, relating to institutional frameworks much less concerned with public presentation (Esser, 2013, p. 166). Furthermore, van Aelst and Walgrave (2017) show that studies which find strong media influence on the political agenda generally relate to influence on the more symbolic or performative aspects of politics, such as parliamentary debates, but that consequences for policy are much more limited.

What becomes clear when considering both the mediatisation of politics and the politicisation of the media is that the relationship between the two is interdependent and complex, which raises important questions as to how this can be studied and what claims may be made. Arguably, the gold standard would be a multidisciplinary longitudinal study with access to political and media actors themselves, as well as the texts (broadly conceived) that they produce, across political and media institutions. Even then, the extent to which either media or political actors would accurately account for their own actions and motivations would have to be considered. Such a project is certainly beyond the remit of the present study.

While van Dijk (1990) notes difficulties in gaining access to newsrooms in order to analyse the process of news-making, we can dissect the language of the reports and interrogate the underlying values which inform them, as well as considering aspects of a story which remain unreported, and the context surrounding what these are. In the same way, we

can analyse the language of political elites through the texts made available to the media (and the public). As such, I argue that this comparative study of political and media discourse in the lead-up to the UK Brexit referendum can offer useful insights regarding the relationship between the British pro-EU press and the EU. The extent to which the political and media texts are aligned, as well as what may be absent from media reports, facilitate an assessment of the degree to which the British public were able to make an informed decision when voting in the referendum.

3.3 News Values

3.3.1 Defining newsworthiness

Having discussed the complexity of the relationship between political and media logic, I turn now to considering the element of media logic most pertinent to this thesis: News Values. Galtung and Ruge's (1965) seminal work put forward twelve 'news factors' said to influence news organisations in determining the 'newsworthiness' of events. Although they make no claims as to the completeness of their values list, they do hypothesise a three-stage process whereby an event is first subject to 'selection' based on whether it satisfies the news factor criteria. Secondly, 'distortion' takes place, whereby those news factors are emphasised and, finally, 'replication' ensures that the selection and distortion of an event is carried through to the publication of a news story (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). It is important to note here that the terminology in Galtung and Ruge's model is derived from a metaphor relating to the transmission of messages through radio waves and, as such, 'distortion' does not necessarily hold such strong negative connotations as the term might imply. To be sure, there is no suggestion of deliberate misrepresentation in the reporting of events. The twelve news factors and their definitions as proposed by Galtung and Ruge (1965, pp. 61–71) are reproduced in Table 3-1 below.

Table 3-1: Galtung and Ruge's (1965) News Factors

NEWS FACTOR	DEFINITION
F_1: Frequency	'the more similar the frequency of the event is to the frequency of the news medium, the more probable that it will be recorded as news by that news medium'
F_2: Threshold	'the bigger […] more violent the [event is] the bigger the headlines it will make' 'there is a threshold the event will have to pass before it will be recorded at all'
F_3: Unambiguity	'an event with a clear interpretation, free from ambiguities in its meaning, is preferred to the highly ambiguous event from which many and inconsistent implications can and will be made'
F_4: Meaningfulness	'some measure of ethnocentrism will be operative: there has to be cultural proximity […] will pay particular attention to the familiar, to the culturally similar, and the culturally distant will be passed by more easily and not be noticed'
F_5: Consonance	'In the sense mentioned here "news" are actually "olds", because they correspond to what one expects to happen – and if they are too far away from the expectation they will not be registered'
F_6: Unexpectedness	'[it is] the unexpected *within the meaningful and the consonant* that is brought to one's attention, and by "unexpected"' we simply mean essentially two things: unexpected or rare'
F_7: Continuity	'once something has hit the headlines and been defined as "news", then it will continue to be defined as news for some time even if the amplitude is drastically reduced'
F_8: Composition	'a desire to present a "balanced", "whole" news product leads to a "lower threshold value" (F_2) on some occasions than would otherwise have been attributed to some items'
F_9: Reference to Elite Nations	'The more the event concerns elite nations, the more probable that it will become a news item'
F_{10}: Reference to Elite People	'The more the event concerns elite people, the more probable that it will become a news item'
F_{11}: Reference to Persons	'The more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to the action of specific individuals, the more probable that it will become a news item'
F_{12}: Reference to Something Negative	'The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item'

Key to the notion of News Values is that events are not 'naturally newsworthy *in themselves*' but are effectively made into news through media processes of selection that are dependent on 'a socially constructed set of categories' relating to what news should be (Hall, 2010, p. 59). Similarly, Fowler (1991) notes that events are not 'intrinsically newsworthy' but that selection for inclusion is what makes something news, pointing out that only a very small proportion of events in the world are reported in each news outlet, and that the type of news outlet determines what gets reported (Fowler, 1991, p. 11). Importantly, as noted by van Dijk, (1990, pp. 120–121), news content is not just determined by journalistic routines and values relating to news as a business, but it also encodes and, thereby, reproduces dominant ideologies in society. As such, we can think of theories of News Values as firmly grounded in Foucauldian notions of Discourse as both a reflection and constitutive of the society in which it is situated.

3.3.2 News Values and political conflict

Among the many observations of Galtung and Ruge (1965), the most significant for this study are the concerns they raise over personification, particularly of elites, along with a focus on negativity in news items. They argue that there is a tendency to present individuals and entities as the subject of news events, rather than events as 'the outcome of social forces' (Galtung and Ruge, 1965, p. 68). In addition, a focus on negativity leads to the inevitable interpretation of events and situations in terms of conflict. The significance of this finding for political reporting and for the EU specifically is emphasised by de Vreese *et al*. (2007), who note that political conflict, based on the relative strength of Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament, led to an increase in news coverage of EU. Furthermore, it is precisely an emphasis on conflict that can be seen to have been exploited by political actors as discussed in section 3.2.4 above.

The significance of this focus on conflict for the EU referendum has been posited by Berry *et al*. (2021), who conducted a content analysis of BBC coverage of the EU from 2007–2012 and analysed semi-structured interviews of BBC journalists and editors. They cite Gavin Hughes, Europe Editor at the BBC between 2009 and 2014, who said:

> I knew that if for instance in Strasbourg if Nigel Farage got up and spoke I knew that my phone would ring "there's an interesting clip today with Nigel Farage" and I think it gives you an interesting idea of the dynamic. I think editors find it very difficult to turn away from an exciting, interesting clip in favour of some analysis (in Berry *et al.*, 2021, p. 16)

In addition to the importance of conflict and negativity in news coverage, Berry *et al.* (2021) identify a further dynamic whereby broadcast news coverage is influenced by how the press frames stories. A negatively framed news story is likely to colour coverage elsewhere, which means that Eurosceptic coverage based on conflict and disagreement in newspapers is likely to influence coverage given in even the most avowedly neutral news organisation. This suggests that News Values and, in particular, the propensity to focus on conflict and disagreement, have significance far beyond the publication in which a particular story appears. As Nick Jones, political correspondent at the BBC until 2002, states:

> This continual hostility of the press agenda does feed through to the BBC in ways which people don't understand […] If there has been some EU summit – and of course all the papers start coming out at 8, 9, 10 o'clock and have all got some line about it – that is going to have an influence. […] And the sort of the pressure you get is: "well all the papers are saying this is a complete disaster, this has gone wrong, we've got to reflect what they're all saying, we've got to reflect it […] you've got to understand this is what people are reading (in Berry *et al.*, 2021, p. 16)

Ultimately, it was found that BBC coverage of the EU during the lead-up to the referendum was 'sporadic, strongly tied to elite party conflict and indexed to the views of leading politicians'. As such, the public receive a 'highly restricted, negative and largely conflictual picture of Britain's relationship with the EU' (Berry *et al.*, 2021, p. 19). While this study did not utilise a News Values framework, instead using a combination of framing

analysis and interviews, it does suggest that attention to which News Values are foregrounded in relation to the EU in the lead-up to the referendum and an increased understanding of the nuances of this in a pro-EU publication, are likely to be informative with regard to public opinion and, ultimately, the vote.

3.3.3 A discursive approach to News Values

Various theorists since Galtung and Ruge (1965) have proposed taxonomies of News Values (see Caple and Bednarek, 2016; Harcup and O'Neill, 2017 for a comprehensive review) but most significant for this thesis is Bednarek and Caple (2014, 2017), who offer a discursive approach to News Values focusing on the linguistic resources used to construe them. Much work that refers to the idea of News Values focuses on what makes events newsworthy and relates to professional practice in journalism (e.g. Richardson, 2007). Bednarek and Caple (2014) note that both Fowler (1991) and van Dijk (1990) consider News Values to be cognitive in nature, relating to what is seen as newsworthy by journalists. Distinguishing between 'news writing objectives', 'news selection factors' and 'news values concerning the newsworthiness of events', Bednarek and Caple (2017) describe their approach as combining material, social, cognitive, and discursive aspects with the aim of focusing not on 'how an event is selected as news' but instead on 'how an event is constructed as news' (Bednarek and Caple, 2017, pp. 41–43). In other words, in a discursive approach to News Values, emphasis is placed on 'how an event is "sold" to us as new(worthy)' (Bednarek and Caple, 2014, p. 136). It is this concept of News Values I adopt in the present study and which I use in Chapter Seven to analyse a sub-corpus of articles from the GPRC (see Chapter Five for a detailed discussion on data and the methods adopted).

There are two key reasons for this choice. This first is that this discursive approach to News Values takes a constructivist stance that aligns with the theoretical foundations of this

project as outlined in Chapter One. The second is the compatibility of News Values and Corpus Linguistics methods. Bednarek and Caple (2014, pp. 142–143) propose several ways that the study of News Values can be operationalised in this way, which are reproduced in Table 3-2. The approach taken in the present study, and how this is incorporated into the overall study design, is detailed in Chapter Four.

Table 3-2: Discursive News Values Analysis and Corpus Linguistics (Bednarek and Caple, 2014)

1.	Analysis of frequent word forms, lemmas, and clusters, including dispersion analysis and qualitative analysis using concordances
2.	Analysis of parts of speech using a tagged corpus: analysing those associated with constructing a particular news value (e.g. personal pronouns → Personalisation; Proximity; comparative/superlative, number, degree, adverb → Superlativeness; proper nouns → Personalisation)
3.	Analysis of word senses using a semantically tagged corpus: analysing categories associated with constructing a particular news value (e.g. from the USAS semantic tagger: Damaging and Destroying → Negativity; Affect → Impact; Comparing → Novelty; Consonance)
4.	Analysis of keyness concerning 1–3, with the help of an appropriate reference corpus and/or comparison using ranked frequency lists (searching for big rank differences)
5.	Analysis of collocates and phrases around significant words (e.g. words associated with the topic)
6.	Manual analysis of a subset of the corpus to identify additional resources for constructing news values
7.	Quantitative and qualitative analysis of an entire corpus for additional resources

New Values, as defined by Bednarek and Caple (2017, pp. 41–43), along with a selection of linguistic devices they propose, are indicative of each value and are reproduced in Table 3.3. It is important to note that the linguistic devices proposed here are not intended to form an exhaustive list. Bednarek and Caple (2014, p. 140) state that the list has been developed using both previous literature on News Values and by taking an inductive approach based on their own empirical research. As such, there is potential for the list to expand as additional research is undertaken. I would further suggest that while some of these

linguistic devices may ultimately be determined as consistent across all media types and potentially even across languages, thereby being considered as diagnostic in relation to a given Value, other devices are likely to be more context-dependent and diagnostic of a given publication or publication type. Furthermore, the foregrounding of particular News Values, and the use of specific linguistic devices, may be particularly associated with a given topic.

Table 3-3: Bednarek and Caple's (2017) Discursive News Values Analysis

VALUE	MEANING	KEY LINGUISTIC DEVICES
Negativity	Negative aspects of an event	Construed through negative vocabulary; negative evaluative language; reference to negative emotion
Timeliness	Relevance of event in terms of time	Reference to time; verb tense and aspect
Proximity	The geographical or cultural proximity of an event	Reference to place; reference to nation and community; first person plural pronouns
Prominence	The status of the individuals or nations involved (including quoted sources)	Evaluative language indicating importance; role labels
Consonance	The extent to which aspects of a story fit in with stereotypes that people may hold	Evaluative language indicating expectedness; conventionalised metaphors; comparison; repetition
Impact	The effects or consequences of an event	Evaluative language relating to the importance or impact of an event; intensification and quantifications relating to the impact of an event; reference to emotion caused by an event or the effects/impact of an event
Novelty	The unexpected aspects of an event	Evaluative language indicating unexpectedness; comparison; reference to surprise
Superlativeness	The maximised or intensified aspects of an event	Intensification and quantification; reference to strong emotion; intensifying metaphor and simile
Personalisation	The personal or human-interest aspects of an event	Reference to emotion; quotation; reference to individuals

The present study responds to the 'invitation' from Bednarek and Caple (2014 p. 140) both to refine and add to the list of linguistic devices used in order to construe individual News Values. Additionally, it contributes to our understanding of which News Values and linguistic devices are most significant in the *Guardian* newspaper in general and on the topic of the EU specifically.

3.4 Approaches to political discourse

3.4.1 The language of politics

Having considered scholarship relating to media discourse in the previous sections of this chapter, I now extend my review of the literature that is relevant to this project to consider work on political discourse. The study of the relationship between politics and language has a long tradition dating back to Greco-Roman times (Chilton, 2003). Aristotle famously argued that human beings are political animals (cited in Martin, 2013). Notwithstanding the complexities regarding how we might define and delineate the object of study in political discourse (see van Dijk, 1997; Wodak, 2011, pp. 6–7), my focus in this thesis is on that which emanates from elite political actors (individuals or entities) in their official capacity or regarding the business of government. The object of my analysis is language.

The literature on the language of politics is vast and studies have been conducted at all levels of language, from lexis to pragmatics and discourse. Wodak and Forchtner's (2018) *Handbook of Language and Politics* is testament to the breadth and depth of work in the field, emphasising the wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches taken. Studies in this field of enquiry have focused on specific aspects of language, such as metaphor (see, for instance, Charteris-Black, 2006; Bougher, 2012; Musolff, 2017) or pronoun use (Billig, 1995). Other work focuses on different genres of political texts from press briefings (Partington, 2003) to speeches (Altikriti, 2016; Herrero, 2020) to pre-election debates (Friedenberg, 1994; Cabrejas-Peñuelas and Díez-Prados, 2014) and government communications (Hanson, 2018). There are also studies that consider the style of particular political figures or political ideologies (Halmari, 2005; Alvsåker Dridriksen and Müller

Gjesdal, 2013; Wodak, 2020), while still others concentrate on specific events (Angouri and Wodak, 2014; Bennett, 2018, 2019).

Considerations of space certainly prevent a comprehensive review of all these areas of study, but my aim in the following subsections is to outline the work that is most relevant to the present study and, in doing so, to argue for the centrality of persuasion in political discourse. Van Dijk (1997) asks: '[I]n which respect does a parliamentary speech distinguish itself from a campaign speech of a politician, except from the setting and the participants?' (van Dijk, 1997, p. 23). My view is that although they differ in their institutional context, and thereby in the certain linguistic conventions that will be in play, the more important question is related to what they have in common. I suggest that the answer to this is the underlying intention to persuade. Given that political discourse reaches the public, either directly or via the media, I take it as given that political figures always have the voter in mind and that, as Ponton (2020) notes, political rhetoric always has the potential to contribute to and influence voters' decisions in future elections. As such, the concept of persuasion and the linguistic resources associated with it, are central to political discourse.

Furthermore, I argue that there is a gap in the literature, which I propose to address by conceptualising political discourse as a claim to what I term as *voteworthiness*. This implies that the underlying aim of political elite discourse is to persuade others not just of a given argument but that the person making the argument is worthy of support and that it is important that we do support them. I further argue that conceptualising elite political discourse as a claim to *voteworthiness*, and focusing on the linguistic resources utilised, the construction of that *voteworthiness* offers the potential to provide an overarching integrated model of language use in political discourse that is currently lacking.

3.4.2 Political discourse: representation and identity

I first address work that centres on representation, or 'language oriented to the communication of conceptualisations of the world' (Chilton, 2004, p. 201). Two of the underlying ideas of the present study are that people's conceptualisation of the world is discursively represented, even when individuals are unaware of this, and that discursive representation of the world is grounded in identity and ideology. Stuart Hall's definition of ideology is helpful here:

> [ideology is] the mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, figure out and render intelligible the way society works … It has especially to do with the concepts and the languages of practical thought which stabilize a particular form of power (Hall, 1996, p. 26)

It thus follows that an analysis of political elite discourse can be revealing with regard to underlying beliefs and values. It is the centrality of language, along with a concern with systems of representation and thereby identity, that are a fundamental feature of much work in the area of political discourse analysis.

Paul Chilton (2004), for instance, makes a number of assertions about political discourse, the most relevant for the present study being his focus on political discourse and representation. He argues that 'the use of language in political discourse can be seen as a form of competition among political actors wishing to promote, to have accepted, their own particular "world"' (Chilton, 2004, p. 50). Adopting a cognitive approach, he emphasises the importance of frames in representing that world in the same way that Entman (1993) and others, as previously discussed in section 3.2.2, utilise framing analysis in the study of media discourse.

It is a particular world view, for instance, that frames military action as either defensive or aggressive. Such assertions are closely related to discursive 'strategies' of 'legitimisation' and 'justification' (Chilton, 2003, p. 152). An analysis of President Clinton's 1999 address to US citizens, announcing air strikes on Serbian forces in Kosovo, focuses on three aspects of representation, which combine to persuade Americans that action is justified. First, Clinton uses the representation of the geographically distant country of Kosovo as proximate in 'subjective geopolitical space'(Chilton, 2004, p. 153); second, he emphasises the representation of danger to the USA; and third, he highlights the representation of morally outrageous acts perpetrated by the [Serbian] enemy . These representations are achieved through the use of temporal and spatial language, including proximal and distal deictic references and metaphorical cues relating to conflict as fire. It is argued that a tendency to use such strategies may be distinctive of political discourse (Chilton, 2004, pp. 138–152). It is interesting to note, however, that the legitimisation strategies identified are closely aligned with the News Values of *proximity*, *impact* and *negativity* discussed in section 3.3 above. Furthermore, given that the overarching aim of the speech was to persuade US citizens that military action was justified, we can also argue that these linguistic devices are devices of persuasion.

In deploying linguistic devices that construct geopolitical space and danger from an enemy, it is necessary to invoke ideas of who *we* are and who *they* are. In examining discursive constructions of national identity in Austria, Wodak *et al.* (2009 [1999]) draw on their Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) to identify the linguistic resources used to construct national identities. Following Anderson (2006), they define nationalities as symbolic and discursively constructed 'imagined communities', and it is argued that national identity is always defined through the 'construction of difference/distinctiveness and uniqueness' and that nations 'build on the emphasis on a common history' (de Cillia, Reisigl

and Wodak, 1999, p. 153). Their methodological approach focuses on three 'interwoven dimensions of analysis', namely thematic contents, discursive strategies, and linguistic 'means and forms of realisation' (Wodak *et al.*, 2009, p. 30). Key discursive strategies are identified, which are realised through various linguistic means and forms.

Constructions of national identity are an important element that can go some way towards explaining the result of the 2016 EU referendum. A significant factor is the extent to which a European supranational identity exists, and how this interacts with national identity. Indeed, Carey (2002) argues that an individual's view on national identity is a significant predictor of their views on the EU. Using Eurobarometer 54.1 data from November to December 2000, he demonstrates that those who identified as English or British only had a 31% and 45% probability respectively of viewing the EU as a good thing (Carey, 2002, p. 406). More recently, Eurobarometer 81, undertaken in 2014, reported specifically on views of European citizenship and noted that more than half of respondents EU-wide defined themselves first by their nationality and then by their European citizenship (51%). Furthermore, it was also shown that in the UK, 64% of respondents defined themselves by nationality only.[3] The issue is neatly summarised by Copsey and Haughton (2014, p. 81):

> Britons – or perhaps more accurately the English – tend to see Europe as a threat to national identity. They have difficulty reconciling themselves to the idea of being both British and European… In common discourse 'Europe' refers to something different and distinct. 'Europe' is 'the Continent' over the Channel – a place to which Britons go rather than belong.

[3] Eurobarometer report available at: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2040

Ultimately, as shown by Carl *et al.* (2019), there is a relationship between a weak sense of European identity and Euroscepticism in the UK and, as such, national identity can be seen as a key factor in the Brexit vote. While the Remain campaign faced the task of building up a weak supranational identity in an apparently resistant community, the Leave campaign had the easier task of drawing on well-established tropes of what it means to be British, painting the EU as a threat to that identity. David Cameron's (2013) Bloomberg speech arguably set the tone in this regard. The UK was discursively construed as separate from Europe and the EU with significant reference to its national history and culture as an "island nation". While negative consequences for the EU were alluded to should the UK vote to leave, no such negative consequences were posited for the UK (Wodak, 2018). In addition, Wenzl (2019) notes in her Corpus Assisted study of Conservative MPs discourse from Hansard transcripts in May and June 2016, that the Remain side constructed British identity as distinct from and separate to the EU.

3.4.3 Political discourse as argumentation

Before moving on to look at work specifically related to discourse and persuasion in subsection 3.4.4, I want to address a distinct approach to political discourse from within CDA: that of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). This approach, grounded in Aristotle's notion of deliberation, is based on the idea that Political Discourse is 'primarily a form of argumentation […] for or against particular ways of acting' (2012, p. 1). If we take this to mean that political elites make arguments for why their proposed action is justified, such a view is not entirely incompatible with my assertion that political discourse is a persuasive variety of language amounting to a claim to *voteworthiness*. Rather than focusing on the linguistic resources of persuasion, however, and what Wodak (2011) describes as the performative, front-stage aspects of political discourse, the approach aims 'both [to] provide

good descriptions and analysis of practical arguments and offer a sound basis for evaluating them' (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 12). This is in line with Norman Fairclough's (2013) argument, as discussed in Chapter One, that CDA should not only critique linguistic strategies in neo-capitalist society but political ones too.

According to this approach, the purpose of political discourse is to 'underpin decision and action' and it should, therefore, be analysed using a framework of 'practical argumentation' (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p.13). Practical argumentation, based on Perlman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's *New rhetoric* (1969), focuses on reasoning about what should be done given a particular set of circumstances. It is opposed to theoretical reasoning, which is concerned with truth. Fairclough and Fairclough argue that '[t]heoretical or epistemic reasons are reasons for believing, while practical reasons are reasons for action' (2012, p. 35). As such, the focus of analysis is on the choices made by political elites in deliberating over policy rather than the effect of communicating that policy to an electorate.

An analytical focus on political deliberation is not seen as helpful by Hay (2013), who states that the approach stems from an overemphasis on dialogical and deliberative processes of the political elite in particular contexts, arguing that 'while all situations of deliberation are political, not all political situations are deliberative' (Hay, 2013, p. 325). Furthermore, there is a concern that analysis effectively 'reconstitutes' discourses as practical argumentation in a way that first presupposes the deliberative processes that have taken place (Hay, 2013, p. 326) and, second, whether it is indeed possible to reconstruct such processes accurately. Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the present study, there is the view that rather than focusing on argumentation, analysis should concentrate on 'seek[ing] to draw attention to the intended, unintended, real, anticipated and/or imagined *effects* of discourses either directly upon behaviour or indirectly' (Hay, 2013, p. 324, emphasis added).

While this thesis, following Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), defines political discourse as emanating from political elites, following Hay (2013) I take the view that reducing the concept of political discourse still further and focusing on a critique of practical argumentation prevents a broader understanding of how such arguments impact political process and, in this case, the result of the referendum. It is the extent to which political argument persuades the electorate that is central because, ultimately, it is the electorate that decides. Fairclough and Fairclough (2013) acknowledge the significance of persuasion in political discourse. They address notions of 'rational persuasiveness', which they distinguish from 'mere persuasiveness (the province of rhetoric)', and describe as an 'epistemic notion' whereby 'an argument can be rationally persuasive without being sound, and premisses can be rationally accepted without being true' (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 52). For me, this is the crux of the matter. If people can be persuaded by arguments that are not sound, then an analysis based on argumentation may help us critique a given political argument, which is of course the aim for Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) but which cannot help us understand citizens' actions.

The apparent dismissal of the importance of rhetoric in Political Discourse Analysis is troubling for additional reasons. This concern is effectively summarised by Finlayson (2013). Privileging Aristotle's notion of dialectic at the expense of his concept of rhetoric is problematic because 'a political actor is not (as in dialectic) trying to present arguments that might convince an opponent; he or she is presenting arguments to convince a third party – the audience to which, therefore, his or her argument must be directed' (Finlayson, 2013, p. 317). The audience referred to here is not, of course, one which might be present at a speech but may extend from readers of media reports as well as others, to colleagues and the electorate as a whole. The issue of multiple audiences adds considerable complexity. As discussed in some detail in the next section, Aristotle saw rhetoric as the 'counterpart to dialectic' and

believed that ‘persuasion was an essential part of civic life’ (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 5). Although decisions about what to do in policy terms may have been reached through a process of deliberation, it is the communication of those decisions and the justifications for them through rhetoric – and thereby persuasion – that ensure their enactment, at least in a modern democratic society.

3.4.4 Political discourse and persuasion

In stating that persuasion is central to political discourse, I make a claim regarding the overarching function of political discourse. Political elites, at least in democratic systems, must persuade both citizens and collegues that they are the right person to do the job, in order to gain or remain in power. Arguing that political elite discourse is always concerned with persuasion is not to say that every speech or text emanating from the political elites is always primarily intended to persuade an electorate with regard to an election or policy decision. Indeed, in a modern representative democracy, an elected government serves having won an election based on a broad manifesto and does not poll the electorate regarding each individual policy decision. I also do not claim that all political discourse is explicitly intended to persuade. I do, however, argue that elite political discourse always aims to at least imply that the speaker (or writer) is the right person (or organisation) to be in power and that they will enact (or are enacting) the right policy in any given situation.

If a focus on argumentation is an insufficient basis for a model of political discourse, and persuasion through rhetoric is central to political discourse, then it is important to consider work in the field of Persuasion Theory, and on political persuasion more specifically. In summarising theoretical approaches to political persuasion, Perloff (2012) notes three key areas of focus: (1) the source of political discourse, (2) the messages of political discourse, and (3) the receivers of those messages. These three areas are derived

from Aristotle's 'artistic proofs' or modes of persuasion: Ethos, relating to the character of the speaker; Logos, concerned with the nature of the argument, based on reason; and Pathos, an appeal to the emotions of the audience (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 8). I address each of these in turn.

Ethos is a claim to the good character and ethical credibility of a speaker encompassing 'practical wisdom, goodwill and virtue' (Charteris-Black, 2014, p. 8). According to Aristotle, 'there is no more authoritative proof than character' (Aristotle, 2018, p. 7 [1356a13]). Credibility should not be seen as an intrinsic quality of the communicator; rather, it is a quality that a message recipient only needs to perceive to be persuaded by any message given by that communicator (Perloff, 2017, p. 296) In other words, Ethos is discursively constructed. Two dimensions of credibility have emerged as particularly significant in studies of political persuasion. The first is 'expertise' and the second 'trustworthiness' (O'Keefe, 2002, pp. 182–183). Within these two dimensions, numerous specific source factors have been found to have persuasive effects, including education, occupation and experience, as well as likability. In addition, the characteristic of 'goodwill' towards an audience is seen as a third significant dimension (Perloff, 2017, p. 301).

The second mode of persuasion, Logos, is persuasion through strength or validity of argument. Aristotle considered 'the instrument of rhetorical persuasion' to be the 'enthymeme' (Aristotle 2018, p.5 [1355a8]). This is generally seen as a condensed syllogism. In formal logic or epistemic reasoning, a syllogism is a deductive schematic device that reasons from premises such that if premise X is true, and premise Y is true, then conclusion Z must be true (Corbett and Connors, 1999, p. 38). The canonical example is as follows:

All men are mortal beings (X)
Socrates is a man (Y)
Therefore, Socrates is a mortal being (Z)

In an *enthymeme*, premises and conclusions are not explicitly stated and the argument relies instead on one of three heuristics: 'commonly held views' (*endoxa*), 'signs and likelihoods', and 'general type[s] or pattern[s] of argumentation' (*topoi*) (Yunis, 2018, p. xxxvii). In other words, 'the enthymeme leads to a tentative conclusion from probable premises' and, as such, is suited to 'contingent human affairs' where absolute truth is difficult to discern (Corbett and Connors, 1999, p. 53). Other important elements related to the persuasive force of an argument have to do with its delivery. The three 'structural features' identified as significant in the research are, first, the order in which arguments are stated in a message, second, whether the conclusion of an *enthymeme* needs to be explicitly stated and, third the 'degree of specificity' describing any desired action (O'Keefe, 2002, p. 215).

The third mode of persuasion is Pathos and relates to the emotions of the audience. Studies have generally focused on two dimensions in relation to audiences. First, there are those factors described as 'enduring', which Aristotle terms 'character' (2018, 87 [1388b31]), such as gender, age, education and socioeconomic status. This describes the extent to which different categories of people may be more or less 'persuadable' in relation to message and source factors (O'Keefe 2002, p. 241). The present study, however, focuses on 'induced' characteristics, following Aristotle's argument that audiences may be persuaded 'when they are induced by what is said to feel some emotion, since we judge matters differently when we are sad and hostile from when we are happy and friendly' (2018, p. 7 [1356a14]). Emotions are defined as 'all those affections accompanied by either pain or pleasure, which cause people to undergo a change and modify their judgements' (2018, p. 61 [1378a20]).

The research discussed thus far focuses on the ways in which political discourse may be more, or less, persuasive. Also important for the present study is work which looks at political discourse in action from a rhetorical perspective. Finlayson (2018) proposes Rhetorical Political Analysis (RPA) as a means to analyse David Cameron's (2013) Bloomberg Speech. RPA seeks to 'identify and interpret how actors employ concepts in making various kinds of argument' and is particularly interested in 'how [political actors] try to adapt or rearticulate vocabularies and repertoires of commonplaces, developing new kinds of claims or subverting and redescribing old ones' (Finlayson, 2018, p. 71). Upon outlining the complexities of the audience for this speech, which includes the British public, the EU and the somewhat divided Conservative Party, the analysis portrays Cameron as developing claims to his own Ethos and to that of Britain as an actor. The concept of Britishness was deployed as 'a set of values and capacities and a way of thinking', as well as a premise leading to the conclusion that 'Europe should change and the UK should stay in the EU' (Finlayson, 2018, p. 77).

Examining speeches of Prime Minister Theresa May between July 2016 and July 2019, Marlow-Stevens and Hayton (2020) argue that since her rhetoric was focused on gaining party support, political argument yielded to Brexiteers. Ultimately, she failed to persuade them that she could get Brexit done, and she also failed to convince her party that she was a worthy leader. A number of linguistic features are noted in relation to Ethos, Pathos and Logos. May's appeals to Ethos, for instance, included claims to ordinariness, which is a common claim in political Rhetoric achieved in this case through the use of personal pronouns, reference to a grandmother who was a lady's maid, and the assertion that she herself was 'taking instruction' from the electorate (Marlow-Stevens and Hayton, 2020, p. 4). Following on from appeals to an ethos of ordinariness, May's appeals to Pathos referred frequently to ordinary people and their concerns over job security, financial

pressures and a sense of injustice emphasising ‘blue-collar conservatism’ (Marlow-Stevens and Hayton, 2020, p. 8). In terms of Logos, May emphasised “risk” through the insistence that ‘no deal for Britain is better than a bad deal’ and the tautological ‘Brexit means Brexit’. The key to the conclusions drawn in this study lie in the complexity of the situation Theresa May found herself in. In short, she could not be all things to all people.

While the Rhetorical Political Analysis carried out in these cases appears rigorous, what is less clear is the extent to which it is systematic. Both studies draw on broad categories of Ethos, Pathos and Logos and address the various ways that these are interconnected with each other and within a broader political landscape. Both studies refer to various linguistic features that are called on to achieve the speaker’s aims, but an analytical framework does not appear to exist, which specifically relates linguistic form to rhetorical function. I do not consider this a reason to abandon the rhetorical approach. Indeed, while there is a large body of work that undertakes the rhetorical analysis of political discourse, there are concerns that modern political discourse has been ‘dumbed down’ and that politicians speak in ‘soundbites and anecdotes’ resulting in citizens being denied exposure to ‘substantive discourse’ (Hogan, 2012, p. 15). In his book *The assault on reason* (2007), Al Gore, former Vice President of the United States, expressed concern at ‘superficial, emotional, and manipulative appeals’ in political discourse (cited in Hogan, 2012, p. 12). More recently, former President Trump turned to Twitter to communicate with supporters and, in doing so, entirely disrupted expectations of political communication. I suggest that what these concerns point to is a shift from the pre-eminence of Logos in political persuasion to a focus on Ethos and Pathos. On that basis, studies of persuasion in political discourse grounded in the rhetorical tradition have perhaps never been so important.

3.5 Conclusion

This review has considered a variety of scholarship relevant to the present study and, in doing so, made a number of arguments. First, I take the view that the potential of the media to influence democratic process is clearly demonstrated and, as such, it is essential to research media coverage of significant political events. Second, I argue that notions of the mediatisation of politics do not fully account for the complexities of the relationship between the media and political elites in twenty-first century democratic systems. Political elites are not without influence in the media landscape and focusing on what we find in media discourse without some consideration of what we do not find is missing half the picture.

My third point is a methodological one in support of a discursive approach to News Values analysis, which I consider as having good explanatory value for media discourse. My review of political discourse analysis suggests that there is no equivalent framework that facilitates comparison of the two discourse types, and I consider this to be a significant gap. I argue that such a framework should be grounded in the notion that the purpose of political discourse is to persuade and, on that basis, can usefully draw from work in rhetorical analysis, as well as work which focuses on identity and representation. In the following chapter, I detail my proposal for this novel analytical framework.

Chapter 4: Voteworthiness and Political Values

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present my novel analytical framework: Discursive Political Values Analysis (DPVA). As discussed in the previous chapter, Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA), as proposed by Bednarek and Caple (2017), provides a useful basis for analysing the discursive construction of News Values in the media through the various linguistic resources that their framework provides. No equivalent framework exists for Political Discourse. In attempting to compare Political and Media texts for this project, and following a review of the literature, it became clear that the development of an analytical framework would be beneficial in facilitating a comparison between the political and media corpora.

The analysis of News Values is related to the concept of *newsworthiness*: what gets into the media and how it is represented. In the same way that media organisations find it imperative to sell their products, politicians in Western democracies rely on the votes of the electorate and the support of their party. Without votes and continuous support, they cannot enact policy according to their ideological beliefs. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that politicians wish to persuade citizens and others that they are worthy of that support. It is my assertion that a concept of *voteworthiness* has similar utility for the study of Political Discourse as the newsworthiness of Media Discourse, and that a framework of Political Values is needed in order to illuminate the ways in which the discourse of the political elite construe *voteworthiness*. The term Political Values in this context refers to those qualities, both for the entity concerned and the soundness of their argument, as well as for the emotions engendered in the audience, all of which determine *voteworthiness*.

Theories relating to strategies of legitimisation and justification in political discourse (see, for instance, Ieţcu-Fairclough, 2008; Reyes, 2011; White and Ypi, 2011; Carstensen and

Hansen, 2018), go some way towards addressing the ways in which political figures present themselves and their policies as worthy. I argue, however, that a unifying concept of the discursive construction of *voteworthiness*, which gives an inventory of linguistic resources in Political Discourse, is needed in order to facilitate systematic analysis. That is not to say that linguistic form and persuasive function will necessarily align, or that it would be possible to come up with a definitive list of linguistic features that are persuasive in any context, any more than it is possible to come up with a definitive list of linguistic features that express evaluation (see Hunston, 2010, p. 13). I would nevertheless argue that a framework that exemplifies persuasive linguistic strategies offers a useful contribution to the field.

The utility of conceptualising political discourse as a claim to *voteworthiness* is particularly apparent in the context of an impending election or referendum when politicians clearly need to appeal to voters explicitly. I take the view, however, that all public communications emanating from political elites and institutions may be viewed through the concept of *voteworthiness*. This can be applied to procedural texts such as meeting minutes, agendas and diary information – the implication being that we are doing our jobs properly and are thereby worthy of your vote - as well as to more substantive texts such as speeches, party manifestos, statements and press releases, which are generally the subject of analysis. Furthermore, as clearly demonstrated by EU membership referenda, the support of a national electorate is significant even for a supranational entity, where officials may not face a public vote. At the very least, the individuals involved require the support of their peers, while a supranational entity only needs sufficient support so that national politicians do not face pressures from their electorate or their own political party over membership, as Brexit shows only too well.

The novel DPVA framework proposed here consists of eight Political Values, shown in alphabetical order in Table 4-1, and were initially derived through an iterative process of coding from my corpus of EU texts (see Chapter Five for details on corpus construction) and then refined through referencing to the literature on Political Discourse and Persuasion. Each of the Political Values described represents one way in which political elites and institutions are construed as voteworthy. It is important to note that none of the texts under examination in the present study derive from a political campaign where political figures actively sought votes. While the texts all date from the six months leading up to the EU membership referendum in the UK, none of them are 'about' the referendum. Rather, these are texts that represent EU politicians and entities going about their business.

Table 4-1: Political values and their definitions

Political Value	**Definition**
Accountability	Politicians and political entities are construed as voteworthy because they understand that they are accountable to others, which makes them trustworthy
Achievement	Politicians and political entities are construed as having been successful and/or having implemented successful policies in the past, which implies that they are voteworthy because they will continue to do so
Authority	Politicians and political entities are construed as having Authority (through the individual or entities themselves, or through consultation with other authoritative figures) which makes them voteworthy
Intention	Politicians and political entities are construed as having specific policy plans to solve problems and intend to enact them and are thereby voteworthy. This is distinct from Achievement and refers to future plans
Guilt	Politicians and political entities are construed as being voteworthy owing to their ability to assuage guilt about the suffering of others and inequalities in societies
Problem	Politicians and political entities are construed as voteworthy because there are current problems which must be solved
Fear	Politicians and political entities are construed as voteworthy because they can allay fears as to the impact of problems in the future on the message recipient
Solution	Politicians and political entities are construed as voteworthy because they know how to solve a given problem – this is distinct from Intention, as it relates to potential and broad rather than proposed and specific policy solutions

In the following section (4.2), the concept of discursive construction in relation to this analytical framework is discussed and I outline how the DPVA framework was developed. I

then present the framework. In section 4.3, I detail each of the Values and provide examples of each and then, in section 4.4, I present the preliminary inventory of linguistic resources that I propose can be used in the construal of voteworthiness. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the potential utility and limitations of the approach (section 4.5).

4.2 The Discursive Political Values Analysis Framework

4.2.1 A discursive approach

Galtung and Ruge's (1965) concept of News Values, using a metaphor of radio transmission, argues that the 'emphasis' of the 'News Factors' (Values) relating to an event leads to 'distortion' and then 'replication' of that distortion in publications of a particular news story (1965, p. 71). My position is that political elites emphasise particular *Political Values* to shape messages in such a way as to present themselves, and their perspective on issues and events, as *Voteworthy*. I use *shape* as a somewhat less value-laden term than *distort* and argue that an analysis of which Political Values are most often emphasised, or indeed missing, and the way that this is achieved in political elite discourse, is likely to be illuminating with regards to political ideology. While analysis using the Political Values framework may highlight ideological matters, however, I argue that the framework itself should aim to be politically neutral. For this reason, the DPVA framework developed here focuses on the discursive construal of the identified Values and the linguistic features used to realise them.

As discussed in Chapter One, I adhere to the view that linguistic choices in discourse – in this case, Political Elite discourse – both reflect the society in which they operate, while they have the potential to construct it. In developing the DPVA framework, however, I have taken what Bednarek and Caple describe as a 'middle ground between constructionism and realism' recognising that the nature of Values identified is 'socioculturally determined' but that there are material realities to the issues discussed (Bednarek and Caple, 2017, p. 51). The

extent to which an individual or an entity can be viewed as authoritative, for instance, may depend on the culture in which they operate or the context of an individual speech, but the job title they have is a matter of fact. Particular measures, or attributions of success in terms of policy may or may not be contested in a given context, but the changes presented (a percentage reduction in unemployment or a specific policy spending amount, for instance) are a material reality and, as such, they limit what may be conveyed. The use of the terms *construe* and *realise* when describing the relationship between language and Political Values is intended to ensure an initial focus on systematically identifying what has been done before, depending on the analyst's context, data, and research questions, turning to issues of how and why this might be.

The DPVA framework is clearly grounded in a Western democratic political system as it is derived from EU data. I argue, however, that there is potential utility for the DPVA framework beyond democratic government. Within different political systems, individual Values may be more or less significant, while the linguistic features that realise those values may vary according to systemic or local conventions. Even though government communication from authoritarian regimes may be described as propaganda, with an intention to indoctrinate rather than permit deliberation, I argue that this still amounts to a persuasive effort. As Dukalskis and Gerschewski put it, '[a]utocratic governments make claims about why they are entitled to rule. Some autocracies are more talkative than others, but all regimes say something about why they deserve power' (2017, p. 1). Whether a claim to power is explicit or implied, whether or not it is seen as justified and legitimate, claims are nevertheless being made.

4.2.2 Developing the Political Values Framework

The DPVA Framework was developed based on data from a corpus of Elite EU political discourse using methods generally associated with Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and more specifically, the Constructivist Grounded Theory developed by Charmaz (2014). Grounded Theory methods involve qualitative analysis through coding texts such that 'a studied topic starts with concrete data and ends with rendering them in an explanatory theory' (Charmaz and Belgrave, 2015). Traditionally undertaken manually, Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QDAS) now facilitates coding by allowing text searches and some automation of the coding process. For the present study, numerous rounds of coding, which I describe below, were undertaken using MAXQDA (VERBI Software GmbH, 2018). Discussion of the background and principles of Grounded Theory can be found in Chapter Five, subsection 5.3.3.

The need for a novel framework became apparent when texts were first read, and then coded, which was informed by various categories of news values found in the literature (Bednarek and Caple, 2017; Bell, 1991; Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Harcup and O'Neill, 2001). The expectation was that this would reveal similarities as implied by theories of 'mediatisation' (Esser, 2013). That is to say, if mediatisation has taken place, we would expect some alignment in media and political texts. Through this first attempt at coding, however, it became clear that viewing the data through a lens of what might be newsworthy did not account for the discourse particularly well; thus, a different approach was needed.

Grounded Theory stipulates the importance of approaching the data without preconceptions; this is done by focusing on 'possibilities suggested by the data' (Charmaz, 2014, p. 120). This approach, termed "open coding", proved fruitful and it became apparent that the discourse reflected not only assertions relating to problems that existed and actions

that were needed but, significantly, justification of actions that had been taken and a focus on achievement. Coding at this stage was undertaken through a line-by-line close reading of the data using gerunds to name codes, as it is argued that this helps to retain focus on the data in question and on implicit meaning (Charmaz 2014, p. 121). This resulted in codes, such as *claiming success*, *legitimising approach*, *describing problems*, *thanking colleagues*, *demonstrating expertise*, *presenting risk*, and *showing concern*. Through a review of these initial codes, it became apparent that what underlies all of them is a sense that the speaker is, to some degree, justifying their position and promoting their approach.

The purpose of initial or "open" coding aims to identify a "core" conceptual category (or categories) from which further coding emanates and theory can be developed (Charmaz, 2014, p. 116). In this case, the core category that emerged from the data was that of *voteworthiness*: this refers to the idea that regardless of the given context or purpose of an individual text, there was an underlying communicative purpose of conveying that the speaker, or the entity represented, is worthy of (continued) support. Having established *voteworthiness* as the core category, additional coding was then undertaken to develop this idea and ascertain the way in which the texts construed politicians or political entities as voteworthy, which linguistic resources were used, and how the codes thus far established might be refined.

The coding system was further developed though an iterative process of combining and sorting codes under broader headings and through the arrangement and assignment of Value labels. This process, referred to as 'focused coding', allows the researcher to 'sift, sort, and synthesise' the data and further develop the ideas generated through open coding (Charmaz, 2014 p. 138). One of the key goals of this part of the process is to assess the adequacy of initial codes and ascertain their 'conceptual strength' (Charmaz, 2014 p. 202).

After coding, and on establishing a final list of Political Values deriving from the EU Corpus, I turned to a consideration of how these Values related to theories of persuasion and how the utility of Aristotle's three Modes of Persuasion (Logos, Ethos, Pathos) became apparent. Each of the codes identified could be defined in terms of one of the three modes of persuasion. The result, shown in Figure 4-1, forms a framework for the systematic analysis of the discursive construal of *voteworthiness* in Political Elite discourse: DPVA.




Figure 4-1: Discursive Political Values Analysis: Framework Diagram

At this point, the linguistic resources used to manifest each value were assessed by going back to the data and fully coding the texts according to the framework established. The texts under consideration are limited to those produced by a single supranational entity on a particular topic during a relatively short six-month time frame. As such, the inventory of linguistic resources proposed should be considered as preliminary and further work on different political contexts would be fruitful in developing the inventory. In the following

section, I outline each of the values in turn and offer examples of the linguistic resources found to be associated with each.

4.3 Defining Political Value

4.3.1 Ethos: Source Factor Values

Source Factor Values are concerned with the way in which political elites and entities are construed as voteworthy on the basis of who or what they are and what they have done, reflecting a focus on the Aristotelian concept of Ethos. Aristotle argues that 'there is no more authoritative proof than character' (2018, p. 7 [1356a13]), suggesting that the persuasiveness of a source on any given issue depends in part on the extent to which it is perceived as credible. As previously noted, two dimensions of credibility have emerged as particularly significant in studies of political persuasion. The first is 'expertise' and the second 'trustworthiness'. The DPVA framework developed for this study specifies three source factor values, as detailed below, that together account for the source factor dimensions of expertise, trustworthiness and, the goodwill towards an audience: ***Authority***, ***Achievement*** and ***Accountability***. These three values combined, present the speaker (or entity) as the right one for the job. I address each in turn below.

Authority

The political value of *Authority* is related to the 'expertise dimension' in persuasion research. This quality has also been described as 'qualification' (O'Keefe, 2002, p. 182). Accordingly, the linguistic resources coded to ***Authority*** in the DPVA framework construe the politician or political entity as expert in and qualified for their roll.

The concept of ***Authority*** in the context of political discourse is also connected to the concept of status or *Eliteness* that has been found to be significant in News Values research (Galtung and Ruge, 1965; Bell, 1991; Harcup and O'Neill, 2001) insofar as elite status implies that someone has the prerequisite expertise for their role. Bednarek and Caple define *Eliteness* in Discursive News Values Analysis as 'status, expertise, [and] authority' (2017, p. 58). In addition to this, political figures may develop a claim to authority based on intrinsic personal qualities. I conceptualise the construal of ***Authority*** then, as those linguistic resources that convey status and/or expertise relating to an individual or entity, or which present their character in a favourable light, which serves to legitimise their authority.

As with *Eliteness* in News Values, ***Authority*** in Political Values is both scalar and context-dependent. It may be derived from international, supranational, national or local political roles, but a town councillor's authority for instance is likely to be considerably less significant at an EU summit than in a local council planning meeting. Status may be perceived as having an institutional role, but there may also be a hierarchy within that institution. As such, a British Secretary of State would perhaps be perceived as more authoritative on an international stage than a backbench MP, regardless of the size of the respective individual's majority in their own constituencies.

While role labels and job titles may construe ***Authority*** in some contexts, in others their use may be so conventional as to have little or no persuasive effect. The conventions of British parliamentary discourse, for instance, demand that when in the House of Commons, Members of Parliament refer to each other using epithets relating to their official position or their constituency ("the honourable member for…" or "the minister") and to members of the House of Lords as "my noble friend". Such conventions are said to 'maintain the dignity of the House and its Members and to make criticism and comment less direct' (Sandford, 2013,

p. 4) but in the context of parliamentary debate, the potential for such terms to contribute to persuasion is likely to be limited, if not absent. If an MP, however, were to refer to their own constituency title, it can be argued that in doing so they invoke expertise regarding local issues. As such, when coding for ***Authority***, it is up to the analyst to determine under which circumstances any reference to roles may be considered significant in a given context. In addition to title roles, some individuals may be sufficiently well known that their name implies authority. Again, this is context-dependent, particularly in the case of political elites, whose credibility is likely to depend in part on their audience and that audience's political allegiances.

The aspect of ***Authority*** discussed thus far can be said to relate to the extrinsic qualities of a speaker (although the fact that someone is worthy of a title, implies intrinsic personal qualities) but I also consider other intrinsic qualities that contribute to ***Authority*** and encompass aspects of a speaker's character. A political figure or entity, for instance, may be explicitly or implicitly constructed as fair or knowledgeable. Alternatively, they may be construed as having particular personal qualities, which align with some positive notion of national character.

In his 2013 Bloomberg Speech, David Cameron lays claims to ***Authority*** in a number of ways. As shown below, reference is made to historical events expressed with a certainty that suggests depth of knowledge and a clear understanding of the current geopolitical situation. Cameron explicitly draws on the authority of his role as Prime Minister and is emphatic on his assessment of the issues facing the country with the use of 'there are three major challenges' and no hedging devices. Finally, he emphasises his authority by saying that he is there to 'explain', which implies that he understands what the audience do not.

> From Caesar's legions to the Napoleonic Wars. From the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution to the defeat of Nazism. We have helped to write European history, and Europe has helped write ours.
>
> So, I speak as British Prime Minister with a positive vision for the future of the European Union. A future in which Britain wants, and should want, to play a committed and active part.
>
> But it's essential for Europe – and for Britain – that we do because there are three major challenges confronting us today.
>
> That is why I am here today: to acknowledge the nature of the challenges we face. To set out how I believe the European Union should respond to them. And to explain what I want to achieve for Britain and its place within the European Union.

Of particular interest here is the way in which David Cameron negotiates what can be described as 'competence face' and 'affective face' (Partington and Taylor, 2018, p. 45). In other words, Cameron is an authority figure to be taken seriously and at the same time he is one of the people.

Achievement

The past experience of individuals or institutions is also related to the persuasive potential of expertise. Whereas coding to ***Authority*** relates to who someone is, that is to say the roles and status an individual might hold or aspects of their character, coding to ***Achievement*** relates to what they have done. The DPVA value of ***Achievement*** focuses on past policy enactment and successes, construing political figures as voteworthy because of the implication that they will continue to be able to devise policies that will be successful. In addition, ***Achievement*** relates to the "trustworthiness" dimension of credibility insofar as a political entity or figure seen to have solved problems in the past may be trusted to do so again. In addition, achievement may be claimed in areas outside the political context if that success can be framed as relevant.

Explicit claims to the success of named policies would be coded to ***Achievement*** and may include references to dates and statistics, either in absolute terms or through comparison to denote improvement or change. ***Achievement*** may also be implied through reference to improvements without a specific claim to a particular policy having facilitated that change, at a time when the context of a specific utterance may nevertheless suggest a relationship. Differentiation of explicit versus implied achievement is likely to be of considerable interest for the analysis and demonstrates the utility of this framework, which facilitates a focus not only on the fact that a given Value is called upon, but on how that Value is constructed.

Many of the specific linguistic resources noted here, specifically those relating to the use of statistics, have been studied under the heading of 'message factors' or Logos rather than Ethos (O'Keefe 2002, p. 229). The focus of that work is to establish whether a message framed in terms of statistical improvement or one focusing on a single case study is likely to be more persuasive. The focus here, however, is the way that those statistics are used as evidence of an individual or entity achieving something good. As such, I have included this under Ethos and coded it to ***Achievement.*** In this case, it is likely that statistics reflect an improvement of some kind. Where statistics are used in a negative sense, namely as evidence of a problem (for instance, unemployment is up by 10%), then this would be coded to ***Problem***, as discussed in section 4.3.2.

Reference to previous roles may be called upon and the key to coding under ***Achievement*** would be the relevance of that previous success. A political figure with financial responsibility may call upon prior achievements in business, while someone with responsibility over matters of defence for instance may draw on a decorated military background. Again, context is key. For instance, Professor Dr Karl Lauterbach is currently the German Federal Minister for Health. He has a PhD in Medicine and a further Doctorate in

Health Policy and Management from Harvard University. His considerable academic achievements, along with a research career and his role as Director of the Institute for Health Economics and Clinical Epidemiology at the University of Cologne, render him eminently qualified for his current political position.

Accountability

The Value of ***Accountability*** is key in democratic political systems and is defined here as politicians and political entities that are construed as voteworthy because they understand and accept that they are accountable to others, which in turn makes them trustworthy. This also relates to a further dimension of credibility in the literature; goodwill, or 'intent towards the [message] receiver', is defined as the extent to which a message giver is perceived to care about the message recipient, as demonstrated through understanding, empathy, and responsiveness (McCroskey and Teven, 1999, p. 90).

The EU, for instance, can be seen as accountable insofar as all documents generated by EU institutions are made public. Coding here is based on either explicit or implicit recognition of being accountable through, for instance, any mention of collaboration or consultation in the texts under study. In addition, any reference to political process, votes or support would be coded to ***Accountability***. Once again, the coding here would be context-dependent and related to the political system in which the discourse is situated. Construal of accountability would look very different in a democracy, as opposed to other systems of governance, such as an autocracy. That being said, as noted by Burnell (2006), even autocratic leaders need to maintain their legitimacy and, as such, may construct notions of ***Accountability*** to citizens even where, from a Eurocentric view, none exists.

Returning to David Cameron's (2013) Bloomberg Speech, he is careful to repeatedly reference the power afforded to the British people; at the same time, he aligns himself as one

of those people by reference to “we”, as shown below. Interestingly, “we” here refers inclusively to all British citizens but also to political elites as a group. In addition, he refers to a “duty” to respond to concerns expressed:

> It is time for the British people to have their say. It is time to settle this European question in British politics.
>
> I say to the British people: this will be your decision.
>
> And when that choice comes, you will have an important choice to make about our country’s destiny.
>
> We should think very carefully before giving that position up.
>
> If we left the European Union, it would be a 1-way ticket, not a return.
>
> So, we will have time for a proper, reasoned debate.
>
> At the end of that debate you, the British people, will decide.
>
> Europe’s leaders have a duty to hear these concerns. Indeed, we have a duty to act on them. And not just to fix the problems in the Eurozone.

4.3.2 Logos: Message Factor Values

Message Factor Values are those that construe politicians and political entities as voteworthy because they have devised appropriate solutions to problems society faces and because they will enact those solutions. The reasoning behind the identification of problems and the appropriateness of associated solutions comes under the persuasive mode of Logos: persuasion through strength of argument. The assessment of arguments in modern political discourse, however, can be problematic owing to the fact that the reasoning behind any given solution, or indeed the identification of a problem, is often not explicitly laid out. As discussed in Chapter Three, in formal logic, a syllogism is a deductive ‘schematic device’

reasoning that if premise X is true, and premise Y is true, then conclusion Z must be true (Corbett and Connors 1999, p. 38). As previously noted, the canonical example is as follows:

> All men are mortal beings.
> Socrates is a man.
> Therefore, Socrates is a mortal being.

Rhetorical reasoning states that the equivalent of a syllogism is the *enthymeme*. This is generally seen as a condensed syllogism, whereby premises and conclusions are not explicitly stated and rely on one of three heuristics: (1) 'commonly held views' (*endoxa*), (2) 'signs and likelihoods', and (3) 'general type[s] or pattern[s] of argumentation' (*topoi*) (Yunis, 2018, p. xxxvii). Furthermore, in addition to deductive arguments, inductive arguments may be presented. These rely on a reasonable probability that something is true given the veracity of the premises and can be seen as 'empirical generalisations' (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 37). Taking account of this, the aim of the DPVA framework is not to assess the validity of arguments per se, but to establish systematically what (implied) arguments political elites rely on, and how they intend to act on them, in order to construe themselves voteworthy. As such, three values are identified: the coding of ***Problem*** and ***Solution*****,** along with that of ***Intention*** to enact policy.

Rather than prescribe the theoretical basis of analysis here, the framework offers the potential to devise additional layers of coding according to research needs and to develop a context-dependent coding system. An analysis of metaphor and 'argument by analogy' (Musolff, 2004, p. 30) or Critical Metaphor Analysis (Charteris-Black, 2013) could also lead to further coding of *Problem, Solution*, and *Intention* according to the specific metaphors employed, for instance. Those who wish to incorporate Fairclough and Fairclough's (2012) practical argumentation paradigm, as shown in figure 4-2, may sub-divide ***Problem***, which relates to their 'circumstantial premise' category, into types of fact. These may be natural

facts or social facts (i.e. institutional) relating to duty and promises. Coding to ***Solution*** and ***Intention*** aligns with their 'claim' category relating to what should be done and may be divided further into a specific or general claim that expresses explicit of implied intention (see Fairclough and Fairclough, 2021, p. 48 for more details on their framework).




Figure 4-2: Potential Fine-Grained Message Factor Values

Problem

Political elites are construed as voteworthy because there are problems to be solved. The identification of problems implies voteworthiness because, having recognised a problem, the speaker is saying that they are in a position to resolve it. Problems may be explicitly stated, or they may be implied through more vague references. It is particularly important to recognise that problems are frequently defined through an assumed shared concern. For instance, if we return to David Cameron's 2013 Bloomberg speech, there are a number of references to problems that imply shared concerns and values. As shown below, a change in 'global influence' is seen as bad and the relative success of other nations as problematic. It is assumed that there is agreement that EU rules are too complex, that they do indeed restrict labour markets, and that regulation is excessive in a way that presumably outweighs any

benefits and protections that come from regulatory practices. Coding these statements to ***Problem*** does not imply that the assessment of the issues is correct or universally agreed upon. Instead, coding facilitates interrogation of the underlying assumptions being made. These claims are coded to problem because David Cameron constructs them as such. Also, the strength of metaphor use which defines regulation as a 'plague' is noteworthy and places Cameron firmly in favour of deregulation and a free market economy.

> The map of global influence is changing before our eyes. And these changes are already being felt by the entrepreneur in the Netherlands, the worker in Germany, the family in Britain.
>
> … there is a crisis of European competitiveness, as other nations across the world soar ahead.
>
> Complex rules restricting our labour markets are not some naturally occurring phenomenon. Just as excessive regulation is not some external plague that's been visited on our businesses.

Solution

This is the identification of a ***Solution*** to a ***Problem*** that comes under the remit of a politician or political entity. ***Solution*** is related to, but distinct from, ***Intention*****,** because it is possible to propose a broad solution to a problem without committing to enact that solution in policy terms or explaining how that solution would be achieved. The extent to which solutions are explicit or can be seen as actionable, as opposed to those that are so general as to be almost meaningless, is likely to be an interesting distinction here. As shown below, once again from David Cameron's Bloomberg Speech of 2013, having identified a problem of excess bureaucracy in the EU, he goes on to say that the solution is a leaner, and less bureaucratic Union.

> And so, we urgently need to address the sclerotic, ineffective decision making that is holding us back.

> That means creating a leaner, less bureaucratic Union, relentlessly focused on helping its member countries to compete.
>
> In a global race, can we really justify the huge number of expensive peripheral European institutions? Can we justify a Commission that gets ever larger? Can we carry on with an organisation that has a multi-billion-pound budget but not enough focus on controlling spending and shutting down programmes that haven't worked?
>
> And I would ask: when the competitiveness of the Single Market is so important, why is there an environment council, a transport council, an education council but not a single market council?

But the route to a leaner EU is not specified other than through the implication that the Commission is too big and some councils unnecessary. There is no suggestion as to how the Commission budget might be cut and the mention of various councils is not accompanied by an assertion as to which one should be cut. Interestingly, having established that he feels there is too much bureaucracy, Cameron appears to suggest that there should be an additional single market council.

Cameron goes on to suggest a number of other things that 'we need', invoking the inclusive 'we' that indicates a shared value system. Some sort of, presumably improved, 'structure' is said to be needed, but there are no specific details of how this would be achieved and as such this doesn't reach the level of coding to ***intention***

> We need a structure that can accommodate the diversity of its members - North, South, East, West, large, small, old and new. Some of whom are contemplating much closer economic and political integration. And many others, including Britain, who would never embrace that goal.
>
> I accept, of course, that for the single market to function we need a common set of rules and a way of enforcing them. But we also need to be able to respond quickly to the latest developments and trends.

Intention

Whereas the ***Solution*** Value encodes explanation of why a general course of action needs to be taken and, broadly speaking, imply how it will help solve a problem, coding to ***Intention*** reflects the idea that political elites are voteworthy because they will enact policies that will solve problems. It is more specific that ***Solution*** and has a future orientation, either explicitly or by implication, via the commencement of news policies or the continuation of successful ones.

Up to this point I have illustrated Values through the use of example from David Cameron's Bloomberg speech. It is notable that no specific examples of ***Intention*** are found there relating to policy. While Cameron sets out his 'vision' for a reformed EU along with a number of principles for that reform, he does not specifically set out his intentions beyond the implication that he will seek the reform he outlines. He says that he believes that the way to achieve the reforms he seeks is through a new EU Treaty but has to recognise that there may be 'no appetite for a new treaty' (Cameron, 2013). His intention to hold a referendum, while implied by his assertion that he supports having one, is not explicitly stated. Indeed, he says that the timing is not yet right.

Ultimately, the threshold for coding to ***Intention*****,** in order to distinguish it from a proposed ***Solution*** is a high one.

4.3.3 Pathos: Audience Factor Values

Audience Factor Values are those values that construe a message giver as voteworthy because, having engendered particular emotional states in the message receiver, the politician or political entity are presented as being in a position to relieve any negative emotion or promote a positive one. As such, Audience Factor Values are related to Aristotle's notion of

Pathos. As noted in the previous chapter (see p.78), persuasion studies focus on two dimensions of audience factors. First, those described as 'enduring' and second those which are 'induced'. The latter being the idea that audiences may be persuaded 'when they are induced by what is said to feel some emotion' (Aristotle 2018, p. 7 [1356a14]).

It is not unusual in contemporary literature on persuasion to see emotional appeals discussed under the heading of "message factors", the reason being that an argument is delivered through an emotional appeal and the focus of such work is to establish the effectiveness of different types of messaging. It can be argued that all political arguments, to some degree, have emotional underpinnings, and it has been convincingly argued that a separation of emotion and reason is not feasible because '[r]eason arrives not because a neutral survey will allow facts to speak for themselves but because we are disposed (indeed, provoked) to revise our views' (Martin, 2013, p. 115). I maintain, however, that linguistic resources used to engender emotion are identifiable and since the focus of my analytical framework is to delineate the linguistic resources that construe voteworthiness, appeals to the audience's emotions are appropriately categorised here under Audience Factor Values. This allows coding to reflect, for instance, whether emotional appeals in any given case are predominantly found when defining the problems to be solved or the solutions proposed, as encoded in Message Values. It further ensures that analysis of Message Factor Values focuses on the linguistic resources used in reasoning around an argument, as opposed to the way that reasoning is presented.

A note on the nature of audience for Elite Political Discourse is warranted here. Many of the texts that make up the EU corpus used in this study are transcripts of speeches made to specific audiences who were present, while others are press releases or interviews primarily produced for the media. All of the texts are in the public domain pursuant to Article 15 of the

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which gives a right of access to EU citizens and residents. The key point here is that while all of these texts are produced for a specific audience, they all have at least one 'secondary audience' (van Dijk 1993, p. 273) raising questions as to whose emotions particular texts aim to appeal. It is, of course, impossible to be certain of the extent to which a given political figure is mindful of all potential audiences when speaking, and the degree to which a particular speech may be designed to persuade others beyond the immediate or apparent audience, although I would argue that it is reasonable to assume at least some awareness, while there can be no doubt that press releases are carefully crafted with this in mind.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of defining audiences and making assertions about political elite intentions, various 'affective rhetorical strategies' (Martin 2013, p. 120) and their impact on persuasion have been studied. Those discussed in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* include some that may be seen as closely related, and others that are binary opposites: anger vs 'gentleness', liking vs dislike, hostility, fear, shame, gratefulness, guilt, pity, envy, resentfulness and contempt (Aristotle, 2018, pp. 61–87 [1378a20–1388b30]). In defining Audience Factor Values with the aim of simplifying the model as much as possible, I take the view that the emotions described above can be conceived either as resulting from concern about something bad happening to oneself, or something bad happening to others. We might be angry or hostile in either case, but I argue that a distinction between concern for the self and concern for others is fundamental, and a useful one to make.

Two Audience Factor Values are defined in the DPVA framework, reflecting those found to have been most significant in the literature on persuasion in political discourse: *Fear* and *Guilt*. The former relates to a concern for the self and the latter, to a concern for others. As such, *voteworthiness* is construed because politicians are thought to be able either to allay

fears or assuage guilt. It should be noted that these negative emotional Factors both incorporate more positive counterparts but, as Perloff argues, it is negative emotion that motivates people to act (Perloff, 2017, p. 385). As such, the categories are named for their negative iteration.

Furthermore, notions of the self and others are taken broadly to include group membership and, as such, rely on discursive constructions of in-groups and out-groups in addition to what have been described as 'emotion codes' or cultural ways of feeling (Loseke, 2009, p. 500). Such codes act as a heuristic for emotional responses in any given society, a discursively constructed shorthand that has cultural significance. These codes are broad relating, for instance, to 'victims', 'villains' and 'heroes', and as such can be employed to appeal to large numbers of people in increasingly heterogeneous societies (Loseke, 2009, p. 517). Van Dijk's (1998) ideas on group identities and their relation to ideology are also useful here. In any analysis, careful consideration will need to be given to who is construed as *us* and who is construed as *them*.

As with Source and Message Factor Values, the development of more fine-grained categories for Audience Factors may be appropriate where, for instance, data for a given study includes both positive and negative appeals, or when arguments refer to, say, danger regarding physical well-being or risks relating to economic well-being. It may be possible to grade levels of *Fear* by coding message appeals to concern, anxiety, fear, or terror. *Guilt* may be further divided to reflect abstraction of and appeals to responsibility at the personal, organisational or societal level (see Figure 4-3).




Figure 4-3: Potential Fine-Grained Audience Factor Values

Fear

Appeals to ***Fear*** have been extensively researched and it is generally agreed that such messages are indeed persuasive, with studies focusing on message content on the one hand and audience response on the other (O'Keefe 2002, p. 224). Fear appeals in political rhetoric can be seen as a strategic effort to attract new supporters based on the idea that fear makes people receptive to new ideas (Scheller, 2019, p. 586). It is suggested that by inducing anxiety, support for 'protective measures' can be gained (Albertson and Gadarian, 2015, p. 100). The idea of a politics of fear implies that 'politicians self-consciously manipulate people's anxieties in order to realise their objectives' and it is argued that this has become a significant aspect of civic discourse in the 'post-9/11 era' (Furedi, 2005, pp. 123–124). Wodak (2015) points to the discourses of right-wing populists arguing that they inevitably 'instrumentalize some kind of ethnic/religious/linguistic/political minority as a scapegoat for most if not all current woes'. Those groups are then being construed as a danger and a threat 'to us' or to 'our' nation (Wodak, 2015, p. 2).

That is not to say that only right-wing politicians employ fear-based messages. Discussions of climate change, generally associated with centrist and left-leaning political entities, frequently refer to existential threat (Reser and Bradley, 2017). In relation to the EU referendum campaign, anti-EU campaigners derided pro-EU messages as 'project fear' since they were largely based on the idea that bad things would happen should the UK leave the EU, as exemplified by 'leap in the dark' metaphors (Daddow, 2016). Arguably, however, Anti-EU MEP Daniel Hannan's somewhat shocking metaphor of the UK being 'shackled to the corpse of Europe' (Hannan, 2012) is rather more fear-inducing. The issue here is not whether the messages are based on fact, or whether one agrees with the assertions made, but whether assertions based on threat and engendering fear are being emphasised.

Fear, then, construes political elites and their policies as necessary to avert negative consequences in the future or to ensure that opportunities are not missed. The focus of this is that something bad will or may happen to the recipient or hearer of a message, either as an individual or through membership of a particular group. That group membership relates to issues of identity and may be personal (family), local, regional, national or supranational (Risse, 2010). It is generally accepted that for fear appeals to be persuasive, they must consist of two elements: the 'threat component' and the 'coping component' (Mongeau, 2012, p. 185). In a political context, and for the purposes of the DPVA framework, it is the threat component that is captured by the ***Fear*** category, with the implication being that policies advocated by the speaker will supply the coping component (which would be coded as Message Factor Values to ***Solution***).

The potential linguistic resources that relate to ***Fear*** are numerous and, once again, context dependent. This may be particularly complex given the audience issues already noted, as well as the multifaceted aspect of identity. As such, context-based project-specific

coding is key. Appeals to ***Fear*** may be explicit or implied, specific or more abstract, and realised lexically or grammatically, as well as through the use of metaphorical expressions. It should be noted that many, if not all, of these linguistic devices can also be coded to ***Problem*** if the object of fear is presented as the reason a problem exists. The point of separately coding to ***Fear*** as well is so that the emotional aspect and impact of the representation on the audience is recognised and accounted for.

Guilt

Appeals to guilt encode the idea that something bad might happen to someone else and that the message recipient should act in order to prevent this happening. Such an appeal requires construction of an "other" in need of help, in such a way that engenders a sense of responsibility. Appeals to ***Guilt*** are effectively the same as appeals to ***Fear,*** but the fear projected on to others. As such, the same research and ideas noted above apply here and the linguistic resources that construe ***Guilt,*** with the exception of deictic references: proximal for Fear (something will happen to you) and distal for Guilt (something will happen to them).

4.3.4 Amplification of political values

The relationship of the DPVA framework to the use of superlative language is a significant issue, which has thus far only been alluded to. Each of the Values identified may be realised through a number of linguistic devices. This realisation may involve the use of superlative language or other resources to strengthen a claim to *voteworthiness*. News Value frameworks have frequently noted the use of superlative language when specifying the size, scale or scope of an event as being significant in determining newsworthiness. Galtung and Ruge referred to an event reaching a 'threshold' (1965, p. 66), others have used the term 'magnitude' (Harcup

and O'Neil, 2001). Whereas these approaches see such criteria as the quality of events, which in turn determine news selection, Bednarek and Caple's (2107) discursive approach focuses on 'how news values are communicated through discourse' (2017, p. 43). They adopt Bell's (1991) term 'Superlativeness' as the News Value, scalar in nature, which construes events 'as of high intensity or large scope/scale' in terms of 'the extent of a news event, the number of people involved, the impact of an event, the size of entities…' (Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 64).

While Discursive News Values Analysis sees 'Superlativeness' as a standalone Value relating to the size and scope of an event, being distinct from 'Impact' which relates to the significance of effects or consequences of an event (Bednarek and Caple 2017, p. 60), I take a rather broader view of Superlativeness as an ***Amplification*** of any of the values in the DPVA framework. In conducting DPVA, consideration of which Political Values attract those linguistic devices associated with superlativeness is likely to be significant, particularly in comparative studies, so while it does not figure as a Political Value in its own right, it should be seen as an element of the overall framework (see Figure 4-4).




Figure 4-4: Incorporating *Amplification* into the DPVA Framework

I use the term ***Amplification*** to reflect a conceptualisation that encompasses both intensity and scope, as well as significant potential consequences in the construal of Political Values. Furthermore, I suggest that through ***Amplification***, particular Values will be emphasised and that patterns of Value ***Amplification*** will differ among individual political elites and institutions.

Amplification in the DPVA framework relates to those linguistic devices that intensify or magnify any of the other values. Accounting for ***Amplification*** adds depth to the model which primarily facilitates the detection of different Values and how they are construed and then considers which of those are most emphatically construed and how. For instance, having established which ***Problems*** are identified, a scale may be apparent in terms of which problems are neutrally presented and which are highly amplified. In addition, appeals to Pathos through Fear or Guilt, might be similarly ranked. Table 4-10 offers an inventory of linguistic resources available for ***Amplification*** based on examples found in the EU corpus Data and informed by Bednarek and Caple's assessment of 'Superlativeness' and 'Impact' (2017, pp. 261–265), as well as literature on evaluation, stance, and emphatic language (Biber and Finegan, 1989; Hunston and Thompson, 2001; Martin and White, 2005).

4.4 Towards an inventory of linguistic resources

Having outlined the definitions of each Political Value, in this section I summarise the preliminary inventory of linguistic resources derived from this study. I do so with the same caveats given by Bednarek and Caple (2017). Political Values, like News Values, could potentially be constructed by 'an open-ended range of lexical or grammatical resources' so there can be 'no closed list of resources' and the framework presented here should not be taken as 'an automatic checklist' (Bednarek and Caple, 2017, p. 78). An analyst would need

to pay close attention to context, the time and place of production, as well as the intended audience(s), in order to be able to assess meaning potential in political discourse.

It is important to note that linguistic resources may be used for more than one Value. There is no one to one correspondence between form and function. It is frequently a combination of factors that will distinguish between the Values being construed and more than one Value may be construed within any segment of text, be that at the level of lexis, clause, sentence, paragraph or broader still. While this framework will undoubtedly facilitate automated retrieval of specific items from a corpus for further analysis and assist a subsequent qualitative analysis, it is not a replacement for critical evaluation and analysis of the data.

Table 4-2 below summarises the linguistic resources for each of the Political Values (in alphabetical order) and offers brief examples for each.

Table 4-2: Linguistic resources for establishing Political Values

Political Value	Linguistic Resources and examples
Accountability (to citizens or colleagues)	Reference to collaboration and consultation; meeting or referring to stakeholders, *constituents, supporters,* or *voters.* Reference to seeking and acting on others' opinions, e.g., s*urveys*, *consultations* Reference to electoral processes; *election*, *referendum*, *vote*. Reporting of policy intentions and *commitment* or *promise* to act, *election pledge, manifestos.*
Achievement (in relation to policy)	Reference to named policy success; *progress*, *success, improvement*; Pronoun use to claim ownership; Explicit or implied attribution of success; *comparators, percentage increase* / *decrease*, reference to *change* over time, *improvement*
Authority (Personal)	Status markers and job titles, *minister, president, prime minster;* Recognised names; References to education, *Dr, PhD.* Use of specialist and technical terms to convey expertise. Explicit claims to personal achievement or success. Reference to past roles. Authority by association with others.

Intention (To enact policy)	Distinct from Solution due to focus on how a desired outcome will be achieved. Reference to specific policy + 'by' clause; Lexis of intention to act, *propose, will, intend* + subordinate clause *by -ing* . Explicit statement intention, we*/I will* (do something) constructions. Reference to future time, *next year, in the next budget, after the election*
Guilt (Threat to others)	Same resources as **Fear,** but the threat is to others through use of distal deixis and naming of others: Negative lexis; *danger, risk, disaster* plus reference to future time. Reference to consequences Lexis of growth, contraction or restriction; *increase, decrease, shrink, slowdown.* Present continuous (to generate a sense of urgency); *are continuing to.* Modal verbs refereeing to probability; *may, could* or certainty, *will,* combined with negative outcomes. Metaphorical expressions mapping natural disaster onto social phenomenon; *floods of migrants*. Negative metaphor of war, disease, and death; *war on terror, immigrants as vermin.* Use of container metaphor; *the country is full.*
Problem	Reference to the present; *effects are still being felt.* Reference to undesirable situations; *crisis, unemployment, inequity, reduction in investment.* Reference to past as explanation; *because of X we must.* Use of numbers, percentages, or statistics; *unemployment of 30%.* Comparators, *worse, less, fewer*. Lexis relating to change (growth of a bad thing, slowdown of a good thing). Reference to a lack of desired change; *remains limited.* Expressions of urgency; *remains urgent*. Expression of need; *we must, there is work to do,*
Fear (threat to the message recipient)	Same resources as **Guilt** but focussed on the message recipient through use of proximal deixis: Negative lexis; *danger, risk, disaster* plus reference to future time. Reference to consequences Lexis of growth, contraction, or restriction; *increase, decrease, shrink, slowdown.* Present continuous (to generate a sense of urgency); *are continuing to.* Modal verbs refereeing to probability; *may, could* or certainty, *will,* combined with negative outcomes. Metaphorical expressions mapping natural disaster onto social phenomenon; *floods of migrants*. Negative metaphor of war, disease, and death; *war on terror, immigrants as vermin.* Use of container metaphor; *the country is full.*
Solution	Distinct from intention by a lack of specificity. Reference a policy without discussion of implementation; *we will reduce unemployment, cut taxes.* Present tense (for a current policy) or future reference (for a proposed policy) Mention of policy combined with infinitive to describe the effect of the policy; *we will cut taxes to ease… to modernise, …to help close, …to address*. Lexis of need for action; a particular role; dialogue (without necessarily specifying how this will be achieved) Stating that solutions can be expected (but not specified)
Amplification (All other values may be amplified)	Quantifiers; *sizeable, huge, millions*; intensifiers; Lexis of growth or contraction; *deficit,*

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has outlined in some detail the development of my novel analytical framework for the analysis of elite Political Discourse: DPVA. The framework, which represents a contribution to the field of Political Discourse Analysis, offers a unifying concept of the discursive construction of *voteworthiness*, as well as giving a (preliminary) inventory of linguistic resources used in Political Discourse to achieve this. Having established this framework of Political Values, it is important to clarify a number of points.

The first is that I have aimed to specify as few categories as possible while accounting for all claims to *voteworthiness* found in the data and suggested by the literature on persuasion and political discourse. Each of the Values presented here may be further sub-divided according to an analyst's research questions, theoretical orientation and data.

Second, neither the Values nor linguistic devices are mutually exclusive. Any given segment of text may, and is indeed likely to, be coded to more than one Political Value, and there is no one-to-one correlation of linguistic resources to Political Values. Personal pronouns, for instance, may be used to construct any of the Political Values, but the choice of pronoun and combination with other linguistic features in any given text will be of interest.

Third, I do not specify a unit of analysis when using the framework, since the Values identified may be realised lexically, in phrases, across paragraphs or even as whole texts. Analysis for the present study, offered in Chapter Nine, takes the paragraph as the unit of analysis in order to strike a balance between the nature and amount of data studied and on account of practical considerations relating to the scale and time frame of this project. In addition, a focus on the (quasi) paragraph facilitates comparison with media texts analysed through News Values, which also codes at the paragraph level.

Finally, it should be noted that, for the purposes of the present study, consideration of physical attractiveness, speaking rate and fluency, which have also been found to impact on the persuasiveness of a speaker (O'Keefe, 2002), are not incorporated into the framework as I focus on textual representations of spoken language and linguistic devices. In the same way that Bednarek and Caple (2017) incorporate multimodal resources into Discursive News Values Analysis, however, the impact of paralinguistic and multimodal resources on the discursive construal of voteworthiness would be a useful avenue for future exploration.

Chapter 5: Methodology and Data

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I detail the study design, methodology and data utilised in the present study. In section 5.2, I discuss the rationale for the study design and then in section 5.3 examine the methodology which, as previously noted, falls within the definition of a Corpus Assisted Discourse Study (CADS). I suggest, however, that the present study offers a more in-depth qualitative approach than is generally the case with CADS work by drawing on coding methods associated with Grounded Theory. I argue that through a triangulation of methods, the present study achieves what has been described as a 'virtuous cycle' of research (Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 295). In sections 5.4–5.5, I discuss the data collection and corpus building undertaken for the project. Of particular significance here is the discussion regarding duplicated text in newspaper corpora, in which I offer a novel procedure for identifying and evaluating duplication along with the resultant typology of online newspaper text re-use, which represents a further contribution of the present study (5.4.2–5.4.3).

5.2 Study design

As a Corpus Assisted Discourse Study, this work relies on what Partington describes as an 'eclectic' approach (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 10) using multiple data sets . I use corpora and corpus-external data to account for the discourse(s) under study through corpus linguistics, methodologies and drawing on qualitative data analysis methods in Grounded Theory, as discussed above. In addition, observations made from the initial data analysis led to an evidence-driven approach, where the focus of the study evolved based on what was found to be significant in the initial stages. Owing to the sheer volume of potential data available for the present study, and given the restrictions of time and resources, it was necessary to adopt a fairly narrow focus.

The methodological challenge that arises when approaching a project in this way is to ensure that decisions made during the study are principled, that the resultant work is rigorous, and that the conclusions drawn are not under- or overstated. In the first instance, I made the decision to begin with the media corpus since, as discussed in the preliminary chapters, media representation of political messages is potentially key in influencing voter decisions. Furthermore, I made the decision to focus on the *Guardian* newspaper, based on findings from previous work that suggested that the pro-EU stance of the *Guardian* may be undermined by their representation of the EU. Details regarding the creation of the GPRC are given in section 5.4.

Initial keyness analysis of the GPRC was undertaken (this is presented in Chapter Six) and on the basis of the results, a sub-corpus of articles focused on the economic crisis was created for further analysis (see section 5.5.1). This analysis was completed using Qualitative Data Analysis Software MaxQDA (VERBI Software GmbH, 2018), to facilitate a detailed analysis of the discourse (see Chapter Seven). An additional corpus was then built using EU texts taken from their web repositories of press communications (see 5.5.2 for a detailed discussion).

As shown in Figure 5-2, which summarises data gathering and analysis for the study, at all stages, corpus-external data was consulted to explain and contextualise the findings further.




Figure 5-1: Study Design

There are clear benefits to selecting data and structuring the research design in this way. First, the focus of the project, beyond the initial decision to study the *Guardian*, was led by the data. The decision to focus on the economic crisis stems from the results of the initial corpus analysis so that whilst researcher bias can never be eradicated, decisions on the focus of the study have been made in a principled way. Although the number of texts ultimately studied in detail is a relatively small proportion of the original *Guardian* corpus – albeit more than many CDA studies have undertaken in the past – I can be sure that the discourse is likely to have been influential. Furthermore, the two small corpora, focusing on the financial crisis in the *Guardian* and the EU, are highly comparable having been built on the same broad topic

during the same time period. As such, it is possible to conduct rigorous analysis of both differences and similarities between the corpora to arrive at clear conclusions. In sections 5.4–5.5, I discuss the corpora used in this study in detail.

5.3 A Corpus Assisted Discourse Study: methodology

5.3.1 Triangulation of methods

It has been previously noted that this thesis falls within the definition of a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study (CADS) as defined by Partington, (2004, 2006), who was in turn drawing on the work of Stubbs (1996, 2001, cited in Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 10). CADS combines Discourse Analysis with Corpus Linguistics methods and is characterised by engaging with the corpora in a number of different ways, including close reading, and with reference to corpus external contextual data, which may then direct further corpus work. In this section, I shall discuss the benefits, along with some of the potential pitfalls, of that approach.

Corpus Linguistics (hereafter CL) can be defined as 'the study of language based on examples of real-life language use' (McEnery and Wilson, 2001, p. 1). More specifically, this is achieved using computational methods and electronically encoded textual data (the corpus) that represents a specific type of language (Baker, 2006, p. 1). This study makes use of a corpus derived from collections of newspaper texts and texts collected from the EU online repositories. Traditionally, a binary distinction has been made between 'corpus-based' approaches and 'corpus-driven' approaches (Tognini-Bonelli, 2004). The former sees CL as a method and a means to 'explore a theory or a hypothesis […] in order to validate it, refute it or refine it' and the latter 'rejects the characterisation of Corpus Linguistics as a method and

claims instead that the corpus itself should be the sole source of our hypotheses about language' (McEnery and Hardie, 2011, p. 6).

The distinction between corpus-based and corpus-driven work, however, has come to be seen as problematic. The present study, for instance, applies an existing analytical framework to media texts but also develops a novel framework for the study of political texts. The former can be seen as corpus-based and the latter as corpus-driven. CADS offers a helpful alternative notion regarding the utility of Corpus Linguistics in Discourse Studies in the phrase 'corpus-assisted'. It has been suggested that this implies that the corpus takes a 'subservient' role in the analysis (Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 274) although this is a characterisation that I do not accept. Instead, I would argue that 'assisted' simply emphasises that this is a study of Discourse that utilises CL methodologies in order to facilitate understanding of the corpus data and direct further study. As such, I would argue that the corpus work is central to the development of the study.

The combination of methodologies associated with (Critical) Discourse Analysis and CL is not new and they have been described as 'the twin pillars of language research (Sinclair, 2004, p. 11). Indeed, Hardt-Mautner's (1995) study of European Community Discourse in the British press supplemented CDA's qualitative analysis with CL methods such as concordancing, in part because 'CDA proved ill-suited to handing the sizeable corpus that formed that basis of the study' (Hardt-Mautner, 1995, p. 1). By facilitating the analysis of more texts than would otherwise have been possible, in order to drive the focus of further qualitative study, the combination of CL and (C)DA methodologies allow the researcher to address, in part at least, one of the criticisms levelled at CDA, that of researcher bias.

It has been argued that absolute objectivity in social research is not possible (O'Halloran and Coffin, 2004, p. 276). The use of CL in Discourse Analysis, however,

ensures that items selected for in-depth qualitative study can be justified based on frequency and salience in a representative corpus. That is not to say that using CL and (C)DA together by definition avoids issues of bias. It remains essential that the researcher is aware of the risks of 'reinforc[ing] existing beliefs by selecting confirmatory evidence, while disregarding alternatives, supported by converging findings' (Taylor and Marchi, 2018, p. 7).

The benefit of incorporating CL methodologies with (C)DA then is that quantification of a given phenomenon supports claims of its significance. As noted by Hunston (2002, p. 142), intuition is insufficient evidence for the cumulative effects of 'semantic prosody' (Louw, 1993), which relates to the notion of incremental 'adjustments to meaning and structure in language' (Sinclair, 1991, p. 65). Similarly, the 'incremental effect of discourse' (Baker, 2006, p. 13), whereby a particular representation becomes dominant or normalised through repetition, can also be evidenced though corpus study. An example of this is the RASIM project (Baker *et al.*, 2008), which demonstrates the utility of combining CL and CDA in identifying the development of frequent negative constructions of refugees and asylum seekers in the British press across a ten-year time frame. Of particular note for the present study is their finding that the *Guardian,* while explicitly sympathetic to the plight of migrants, nevertheless 'discursively represents immigrants and asylum seekers in a way which echoes the representations by the right-wing press and the Conservative Party […] represents immigrants and asylum seekers as an 'issue' […] objectified and backgrounded' (Baker *et al.*, 2008, p. 293).

Baker *et al.* (2008) further note that (C)DA, in their case through the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) advocated by Wodak (2001), brings a depth of analysis that CL alone cannot achieve. As Egbert and Schnur (2018) caution, the use of large corpora can lead to fragmentation of the texts, which make up the corpus, and cause the researcher to lose

sight of those texts as a unit of analysis. El-Haj *et al.*, (2019) note, with regard to the use of Computational Linguistics methodologies in financial discourse, that highly automated analytical processes can struggle with context-specific, jargon-heavy specialised discourses in areas such as corpus annotation for parts-of-speech. In general, pure corpus approaches to Discourse are likely to miss significant contextual influences in attempting to explain their findings (Taylor and Marchi, 2018). It is the combination of the quantitative tools from CL and qualitative methodologies in (C)DA that counters Widdowson's criticism that CL studies privilege analysis that computers do well (such as counting things) rather than conducting more complex analysis (cited in Baker, 2006, p. 7).

The incorporation of data from outside the corpus in order to contextualise findings, a feature of the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) advocated by Wodak (2011, p. 39), is also key in CADS (Partington, Duguid and Taylor, 2013, p. 12). The process of initial analysis driving the development of research questions and further study, and the triangulation of both the qualitative and quantitative techniques of CL, (C)DA and DHA, is described by Baker *et al.* (2008, p. 295) as a 'virtuous research cycle', which is summarised in Figure 5-2:




Figure 5-2: Virtuous Cycle of Research (adapted from Baker *et al.* 2008, p. 295)

While Baker *et al.* (2008) specifically look at the methodological synergy of CDA and Corpus Linguistics, the approach outlined above neatly encompasses the processes of Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies and the importance placed on both corpus-external data and the use of initial corpus analysis. These result in the development of hypotheses and new research questions. In short, it seems clear that combining CL and DA methodologies is a worthwhile undertaking. This is eloquently expressed by Partington (2003, p. 12) who argues:

> At the simplest level, corpus technology helps find other examples of a phenomenon one has already noted. At the other extreme, it reveals patterns of use previously unthought of. In between, it can reinforce, refute, or revise a researcher's intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded.

5.3.2 Corpus Methods: keyness

In the first stage of this study, presented in Chapter Six, I make use of what can be described as the core tools of Corpus Linguistics; keyness, collocations, and concordance analysis. These methods will be discussed in that chapter, but a note regarding keyness analysis is appropriate here. The concept of keyness, as noted by Gabrielatos (2018), was first introduced in the 1990s and keywords were defined as 'a word which occurs with unusual frequency in a given text (Scott, 1997, p. 236). A keyness analysis can be seen as a comparison of frequency between two corpora and may be carried out on particular wordforms, lemmas, or parts of speech tags. As such, the term "keyword" can be misleading. The analysis presented in Chapter Six is a key lemma analysis and, for the avoidance of doubt, this is the term I shall use in that chapter. A lemma is the base form of a word, generally the dictionary form, and stands for all forms of that word. As such, a search for the verb form BE would return *am*, *are*, *is* and *be*.[4]

It is important that any keyness analysis is completed in a principled and transparent way since this forms the basis for further study. The statistical methods used to compare corpora and establish keyness are the subject of some debate in the literature (see Brezina,

[4] The typographical convention used here and throughout is the use of SMALL CAPS to denote the lemma and *italics* to denote specific forms of the lemma in question.

2018, p. 85; Gabrielatos, 2018). Keyword lists can vary considerably depending on the metric used to calculate them and concerns have been expressed over the use of statistical significance measures of frequency difference in keyness analysis, which can be considered 'unreliable and misleading' (Gabrielatos, 2018, p. 233). The basis of this concern is that measures frequently used for keyword analysis, such as Mutual Information (MI) and Log Likelihood (LL), are based on probabilities and on proving a null hypothesis (H_0), which assumes that word choice is random, when we know that it is not (Kilgarriff, 2005).

I follow Kilgarriff (2009) who advocates using a simple ratio also known as the Simple Maths Parameter (Brezina, 2018, p. 85), whereby keyness is calculated by dividing the standardised frequency of a word in the study corpus by the standardised frequency in the reference corpus. When using the Simple Maths Parameter, it is necessary to make an adjustment, by adding a constant (k) to each normalised frequency, which allows the calculation to take place where there are zero occurrences of an item in either corpus.

$$\frac{(Normalised\ Freq\ GPRC)+k}{(Normalised\ Freq\ GSibol)+k} = \text{keyness score}$$

This measure is not unproblematic, most significantly because adding a fixed number to normalised frequency increases counts of individual items unevenly; 1 added to an item with frequency 100 represents a 1% increase and 1 added to an item with a frequency of 10 represents a 10% increase (Gabrielatos, 2018, p. 237; Kilgarriff, 2009). Where the focus corpus and the reference corpus have different sizes, the impact of that addition will also be different between the corpora. Given that the purpose of my analysis is to identify key lemmas and group them semantically in order to direct further study, rather than to rank them according to keyness, the ratio measure was deemed appropriate and the recommended default setting of k = 100 (with a per million normalising frequency) was used. The effect of

this choice is that lemmas with a mid-range frequency are emphasised in the resultant list, followed by the most common and, finally, by the rarer ones.

5.3.3 Qualitative Data Analysis Methods

In this section I discuss the Qualitative Data Analysis undertaken which underpins the analysis presented in Chapters Seven and Eight. I approach two corpora (see section 5.5 below) using two different coding strategies. The first of these is an approach not generally associated with CADS drawing on coding principles associated with Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2014). I have already addressed the coding procedures that led to the development of the novel DPVA framework in Chapter Four, and the specific coding strategies used in Chapters Seven and Eight will be discussed there. Here, however, I shall briefly outline some of the background to the development of Grounded Theory.

In 1967, Glaser and Strauss developed Grounded Theory using 'systematic methodological strategies' (Charmaz, 2014, p. 5) as a way to build theory from qualitative data. The components of Grounded Theory at that time, according to Charmaz (2014, p.7) were:

- Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis
- Constructing analytic codes and categories from data, not from pre-conceived logically deduced hypotheses
- Using a constant comparison method, which involves making comparisons during each stage of the analysis
- Advancing theory development during each stage of data collection and analysis
- Memo-writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties, define relationships between categories and identify gaps
- Sampling aimed towards theory construction (theoretical sampling), not for population representativeness
- Conducting the literature review after developing an independent analysis.

Their work was intended to systematise, and thereby legitimise qualitative research and the Constructivist Grounded Theory advocated by Charmaz (2014; Charmaz and Belgrave, 2015) developed from those foundations but emphasises 'flexible guidelines' rather than 'methodological rules, recipes and requirements' (Charmaz, 2014, p.16). For the purposes of the present study, it is the guidelines for coding practices which are most pertinent.

Charmaz (2014) advocates at least two stages of coding; initial coding and focussed coding. The initial stage involves 'naming each word, line or segment of data' and the second focussed stage takes the most frequent initial codes and develops them to 'sort, synthesis, integrate and organise' the data (Charmaz, 2014, p. 113). The important thing about these codes is that they do not come from a predetermined analytical framework. While I would argue that Glaser and Straus's suggestion that a literature review is only completed after coding is unrealistic, given that an experienced researcher cannot aim to forget previous knowledge, I do consider it beneficial to approach coding as openly as possible and without fixed ideas of what to look for.

In addition to the "bottom up" coding inspired by grounded theory, I also approach the data "top down" using the Bednarek and Caple's (2017) DNVA framework (Chapter Seven) and my own DPVA framework (Chapter Eight). In doing so I argue that I can more fully account for the Discourses of the media and political elites.

5.4 Data: The *Guardian* Pre-Referendum Corpus (GPRC)

5.4.1 Initial data selection

The data for the initial stage of this study are a corpus of news articles from the *Guardian* newspaper collected from the LexisNexis repository. The GPRC is a sample corpus, which

aims to be balanced and representative of *Guardian* coverage relating to the EU (Biber, 1993; McEnery and Hardie, 2011). When building the GPRC, I considered it important to select *all* articles that discussed the EU, rather than just those that discuss the referendum, and had originally hoped to collect data from January 2013 which was the date of David Cameron's Bloomberg speech announcing his intention to hold a referendum. Exploratory searches, however, showed that the number of articles was very large and so it became necessary to limit the time frame selected. On 20 February 2016, David Cameron officially announced that the referendum would take place on 23 June, although this had been leaked and reported as likely on 3 February (Mason, 2016). Ultimately, it was decided to collect articles from 1 January to 23 June 2016 (the date of the referendum), which contained the terms "European Union" or "EU". On that basis, the GPRC can be said to be entirely representative of coverage relating to the EU from just before the time when the referendum date was set.

After an initial review of the results, those articles containing the word "football" were excluded as it was found that articles relating to European Cup competitions were appearing. The review also revealed that although a total of 10,582 articles were found, this included a large number of duplicate articles and reused text and that a process of deduplication would be necessary. LexisNexis offers a "similarity analysis" option to remove duplicate articles from search results. The options available are limited to "high similarity", whereby 'news articles must be nearly identical' to be grouped together, and "moderate similarity", which groups articles with 'relatively less similarity' (LexisNexis, no date). The basis for this similarity analysis, however, is not detailed and therefore all articles, including apparently duplicated texts, were retrieved with a view to looking more closely at the nature of duplication in the corpus and devising a process to deal with them. The deduplication process is discussed in detail in subsections 5.4.2–5.4.3. Following that process, the GPRC

comprises 4,269 articles, which amounts to over 4.3 million tokens as shown in Table 5-1 below.

Table 5-1: *Guardian* Pre-Referendum Corpus

Date	All Articles	Net Articles	Tokens
Jan 2016	923	364	415,659
Feb 2016	1,709	622	640,443
Mar 2016	1,930	692	719,937
Apr 2016	1,840	777	788,328
May 2016	2,591	936	947,253
Jun 2016 (to 23rd)	1,589	878	863,564
Total	10,582	4,269	4,375,184

5.4.2 Dealing with duplicates in newspaper corpora

The *Guardian* newspaper considers itself a 'digital first' organisation (GNM-Archive, 2015) so we can be confident that all articles that appear in the physical copy of the newspaper are available online and through the LexisNexis database. Being a digital publication, however, also raises questions regarding duplicated articles and developing news stories when studying media discourse. Print media have clear submission deadlines by which time an article must be complete and will not change. It would appear from the timestamps in the metadata of articles collected for the GPRC that items can be posted and updated at any time rather than by a hard evening deadline for the following day's issue. The possibility of updating an article at any time has the potential to lead to considerable issues with duplicate data when collecting articles using LexisNexis. Indeed, over 60% of the articles initially collected for the GPRC appeared to have some degree of duplication.

The existence of such a large number of duplicates has implications for our understanding of media text production and the priorities given to finalising and fact-checking articles. It is not clear, for instance, whether pressure to get a story out first leads to

compromises being made in checking facts with the understanding that details can be corrected later. Duplication also raises questions as to the consumption of these articles by readers and the extent to which duplication increases exposure to particular ideas and adds to the incremental effects of the representations found.

Scholarship relating to text reuse frequently focuses on challenges associated with plagiarism detection, including through paraphrasing, via computational methods using algorithms for automated processing and, as such, have limited utility in studying the discourse significance of such reuse in newspaper corpora. Text reuse in newspapers is not new. Salmi et al. (2021) looked at a corpus of Finnish newspaper texts dating from 1771–1920 and show that diverse kinds of text reuse were a significant aspect of media production. Using a novel approach based on identifying strings of characters, it is argued that 'virality' through reuse of text, often seen as a new phenomenon related to technological advances and social media, can in fact be traced back to the nineteenth century (Salmi *et al.*, 2021, p. 22).

While computational approaches can of course help to identify matching strings of characters or tokens in large corpora, the extent to which automated methods alone should guide decisions regarding inclusion or deletion in a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study is questionable. This is clearly demonstrated by Beals (2018), who argues for a combination of distant and close reading when comparing text reuse in three nineteenth-century periodicals. In her study, 'textual reappearance' was assessed by comparing a corpus of specific periodicals with a reference corpus of the *British Library 19th century newspapers* for 'a match of at least 100 words per page, in clusters of at least 20 words' (Beals, 2018, p. 620). The results of this analysis were followed up by a close reading, which determined that while automated comparison suggested that around 3–4% of the *Caledonian Mercury* periodical

was duplicate material, in fact the figure was closer to 20% on average across the issues studied.

An initial manual review of GPRC corpus files for the present study showed that not only were there duplicated articles, but that shorter sections of text were also duplicated. In order to evaluate duplication in the corpus in a principled way, the n-gram tool in AntConc (Anthony, 2014) was used to identify extended stretches of duplicated text, followed by a manual review of the findings. Through trial and error, a large n-gram of n=90 tokens was selected for the initial review. Using this size of n-gram retrieved a manageable number of results allowing for a relatively quick review of articles, via the concordance and then file view functions within AntConc (Anthony, 2014). Simple duplicates were identified first and then those that were not so clear-cut. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 demonstrate the need for manual review given that two articles, published less than two hours apart, appear to represent an emerging story, whereby the first draft, by a single author, is developed by a second. In this case, the first article discusses the reaction from Alan Johnson, leader of Labour's pro-EU campaign, to '[m]igrant benefit limits' negotiated by Prime Minister David Cameron (Watt, 2016) while the second, having gathered more reactions, discusses Downing Street facing 'criticism from both sides of the EU referendum debate' (Mason and Watt, 2016).

Figure 5-3: Duplicated Text Concordance





Figure 5-4: Duplicated Text File View



After this initial round of deduplication, subsequent rounds were completed using smaller n-grams each time (70-grams, 50-grams, 30-grams, 10-grams). While the procedure took considerable time, this computer-assisted approach ensured that a comprehensive review could be performed, and principled decisions could be made regarding which articles, if any, should be deleted from the corpus. The GPRC remains representative and at the same time suitable for this Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study.

In addition, the deduplication process identified four distinct types of text re-use, as discussed in some detail below. This typology of text-reuse constitutes a further contribution of this thesis. The four types of duplicate found in the GPRC were as follows:

I. Simple duplicates: an exact match or with a few words changed.
II. Re-worked/developing articles: significant chunks of reused text.
III. Rolling coverage: “live” coverage of significant events or news stories.
IV. “Related” links: where titles are used to hyperlink to earlier articles on a similar topic.

The following subsection deals with each of these in turn and discusses decisions made regarding deletion.

5.4.3 Duplicate types identified

Simple duplicates

These are articles that are clear duplicates with the same author but, for reasons that are unclear, appear again at a later date. Articles such as these are likely to have been picked up through an automated deduplication process if date metadata was excluded from the search. In some cases, small corrections appear, such as a name or job title correction, but otherwise the piece is identical. All articles produced by the *Guardian* appear to remain available on their website via the search facility even once more prominent and timely content is added. In the case of these duplicates, however, the amended or reposted articles appear to replace the original. By way of example, an article on Swedish border controls (Crouch, 2016) was corrected on 7 January 2016 to give a spokesperson for Welcome to Denmark her correct designation, and only the corrected version has been retained under the original publication date of 4 January with the correction acknowledged at the end of the article.

One specific issue arose with what appeared to be a considerable reorganisation of content on the *Guardian* webpage that took place on 31 May 2016 at 9:24am when over 800 articles were (re)posted, and the majority were simple duplicates. The reasons for this are unclear although we might surmise that articles relating to the Brexit debate were grouped in a Referendum section at that time so that browsing readers might easily find all the related content. A search on the *Guardian* site for one particular article discussing the possibility of 'migrant camps in Kent' (Travis, 2016) demonstrates that while the article was reloaded on 31 May, it is the original publication date of 8 February that is retained.

Even if articles were reposted owing to reorganisation under a Brexit heading, it is not possible to establish with any certainty what increased prominence was given to the reposted articles. It is also not possible to ascertain the extent to which readers (re)engaged with this content. According to Husin *et al.* (2021), who used web logs to compare reader behaviour in 2012 and 2017 for Malaysian publication *Berita Harian Online*, page navigation by readers of online news changed considerably during this time period, and they note the need for further research regarding navigation flow in online media.

Owing to this uncertainty surrounding the potential impact of reposted news stories, and thereby the discursive effects of this practice, I decided on a cautious approach and retained only the first instance of these duplicates since it is the earlier date that is maintained on the website. This approach effectively avoids double-counting articles and although it may lead to an underestimation of the effect of what is written in the *Guardian,* I argue that claims to readership effects based on a Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study alone should always be cautiously made.

Developing articles

In addition to simple duplicates, some repeated material appeared in articles that were updated and re-worked. In a study of online news updating patterns, Saltzis (2012) found that the majority of news story updates were done within one day. Where stories continued to develop beyond this time, this was covered through further articles being posted with links connecting to the original story. The *Guardian* newspaper news stories studied were updated on average 4.2 times and the nature of those updates, in 84% of cases, was to add information rather than edit or make corrections (Saltzis, 2012, p. 707). As shown in Figure 5-5, the type of information added included clarifications relating to a breaking news story followed by the

addition of background information, reactions by main actors, figures, analysis and finally confirmation of facts.




Figure 5-5: Types of information added in updates (from Saltzis, 2012, p. 708)

An example from the GPRC is found in reports derived from the Davos summit in January 2016, with eight versions published between 18:56 on Thursday 21 January and 13:41 on Friday 22 January. The headline of the first, written by reporters in Davos, focuses on the threat to the Schengen agreement because of the refugee crisis and cited the Dutch Prime Minister.

> Dutch PM says refugee crisis could shut down Europe's open borders for good; EU leaders use Davos economic summit to voice concern at numbers of migrants and warn of threat to Schengen agreement over continent-wide travel. (Elliott and Treanor, 2016)

The article is developed and the focus changes after the second version, with contributions by a third author in France, concerning the fact that the refugee crisis is 'destabilising Europe' and is a threat to the 'concept of Europe', citing the French Prime Minister.

> French PM Manuel Valls says refugee crisis is "destabilising" Europe. Speaking at the Economic Forum in Davos, Valls fears the flow of those fleeing war zones is placing the concept of Europe in grave danger.

By the fourth iteration, evaluative language from the reporters is added along with an analysis of refugees' views on France over other EU Member States (there is no attribution for these assertions):

> Valls has in recent days been hammering home his message that Europe cannot welcome all refugees […] Refugees themselves have often chosen to avoid France in favour of other northern countries […] This reluctance is for several reasons: France has over 10% high unemployment – double that of Germany – but it also previously had a record of very slow processing of asylum claims […] Some refugees were also put off by stories of tough policing in places like Calais. The current political debate on national identity and Islam, often inspired by far-right themes, created an atmosphere where accepting newcomers is seen as a problem (Chrisafis, Elliott and Treanor, 2016)

Additional text is added by the final iteration, which also remains on the website, that describes the most recent example of refugee drownings overnight off Greece. Furthermore, text is added quoting the German finance minister and focusing on divisions among EU Member States, suggesting that Germany is isolated and noting lack of support for Schäuble's suggested EU-wide petrol tax, an issue unrelated to migration.

The article started off as a summary of what was said regarding the refugee crisis and a specific threat to the Schengen open border in the EU, by the Dutch, French and Swedish Prime Ministers, and leaders from Austria and Germany. Concerns expressed by Jim Yong Kim (World Bank President) plus comments from Gordon Brown and Justine Greening from the UK were also noted. The article becomes one which focuses on the refugee crisis as a risk to the very concept of the EU, emphasising the French and German positions, as well as divisions among EU Member States regarding migration and other issues. I suggest that this shift can be seen as the "Guardianisation" of a breaking news story and, as such, it is the later version which is most useful when analysing *Guardian* discourse on the EU. Based on this

and on the fact that, in keeping with Saltzis' (2012) findings, versions were largely completed within a 24-hour period, it was decided to remove all except the final version of these articles from the GPRC.

It should be noted that this solution is a compromise. Instances of text reuse was not consistent across articles and, as was the case with the article discussed above, more than one version may be retained on the *Guardian* web site. In this particular case, a single version of Elliot and Trainer's (2016) article can be accessed, as well as a single version of Christofis *et al.* (2016). It could be argued that it would be appropriate to keep each of the articles on the *Guardian* website in the corpus, but this would have required extensive manual searching and checking of every duplicate found, which was not a practical solution within the scope of this study.

Rolling coverage

Rolling coverage of significant news events is a relatively recent phenomenon and represents one of the affordances of online media coverage in that news stories may be frequently updated during a 24-hour news cycle. Whereas developing articles are updated to include additional information, rolling coverage is characterised by the brevity of individual updates and the large number of links to additional reporting that give context, or to social media posts such as tweets. This presents a number of challenges. First, the brevity of the text snippets is out of keeping with the average article length of around 900 words in the *Guardian* and includes considerable repetition of terms. Arguably, this would skew any statistical analyses of normalised frequency as undertaken in Chapter Six given that the GSiBol reference corpus used dates up to 2013 and is likely to contain fewer, if any, of this kinds of text. Secondly, links and comments related to each other are not easily understood in

the texts, as they are downloaded from LexisNexis. It is only by following up links to longer articles that conclusions may be drawn about the discursive effects of the data.


In addition, there is little research regarding the reading and reception of these texts. Van Driel (2018) compared reader response to online news blogs and traditional news stories, and found that readers evaluated live blogs in similar ways but considered the news events as more personal than traditional articles. This suggests that rolling news articles during the Brexit referendum campaign may have influenced voters differently to traditional news articles, but an assessment of this is beyond the scope of the present study. On that basis, I made the decision to exclude all examples of rolling coverage from the GPRC.

The files were relatively easily identified in a few steps owing to the presence of the term "block-time", which was present on rolling coverage articles (this likely represents the time an updated page was uploaded to the repository).

Related links

The final type of text reuse identified was that which arises through the use of "related" links. Headlines of previously published articles are often inserted as hyperlinks into later articles as shown by the screen capture in Figure 5-6. This shows concordances of the n-Gram 'dream of Europe without borders', which was identified through an n-gram search. In this case, the original article from 5 January 2016 is referred to in 12 later texts. While some of these may potentially be duplicated articles and require further investigation (2 and 3 below or 6 and 7 for instance), in general, where the term "related" falls to the left of the node, this is not an example of a duplicated or developing article.

Figure 5-6: Related links in the GPRC



Where such articles are duplicates, they will be picked up through the process described above. On that basis, no articles were removed. Again, it should be noted that this has an effect on corpus analysis. The repeated use of headlines in other articles will impact on the normalised counts for the words of those headlines. It can also be argued, however, that repeatedly drawing attention to these articles through the "related" links will make them more likely to be read and, thereby, increase their significance in the discourse. Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to discount the large number of articles with related links.

To recap, for each of the four kinds of duplicate text found in the corpus, the following actions were taken:

I. Simple duplicates: removal of all but the first iteration of the article
II. Re-worked/developing articles: removal of all but the final iteration of the article
III. Rolling coverage: removal of all identified
IV. "Related" links: None removed

5.5 Data: Financial Crisis Corpora

5.5.1 *Guardian* Financial Crisis Corpus

Following analysis of the GPRC and the decision to focus on the use of the financial crisis for this study, a sub-corpus of articles was selected from the entire GPRC, based on the articles including the lemma CRISIS and at least one of the key lemmas identified in the Finance and Economy lexical set that was compiled through analysis of the GPRC corpus (see Chapter Six). Having identified a total of 403 articles fitting these criteria, representing around 10% of the full corpus, every fourth article was selected for inclusion in the *Guardian* Financial Crisis Corpus (GuFCC) giving a total of 100 articles or around 0.25% of the total corpus (see Table 5.2).

Table 5-2: *Guardian* Financial Crisis Corpus

Month	**No. of Articles**	**Tokens**
Jan	12	14,110
Feb	13	10,959
March	18	15,931
April	19	18,469
May	23	25,286
June	15	17,753
	Total	**102,508**

The number 100 was chosen to enable sufficiently close reading of articles given the time and word length constraints of this study, whilst at the same time ensuring that any claims arising from the data would be sufficiently robust. As expected, the number of articles increases by month until June, when their number drops owing to the fact that articles were collected only until the date of the EU referendum vote (23 June 2016).

5.5.2 EU Financial Crisis Corpus

As previously noted, if news media is influential in elections and referenda, then it follows that an understanding of news sources is also important. Numerous studies address the potential impact of the ideological stance of the media or the importance of their gatekeeping and agenda-setting roles (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007; van Dalen and van Aelst, 2014). Few, however, address the extent to which that news coverage reflects the messages conveyed to the media by political entities and elites, through press releases and the like. An exception to this is Wirth *et al.*, (2010) who emphasise that '[t]he higher the correlation between the arguments of one [referendum] camp and the corresponding arguments in the media coverage, the higher the […] agenda-building function of that camp' (Wirth *et al.*, 2010, p. 331). In other words, the side of the argument best represented in the media sets the terms of the debate. In order to evaluate the way in which the EU is presented to the media, by the political sources on whom the media reports, and in order to assess the correspondence between media and political elite discourse, a corpus of EU texts was compiled.

The EU Economic Crisis Corpus (hereafter EUFCC) consists of 99 documents, obtained from EU web repositories, published from 1 January to 23 June 2016. Press office documents were selected because these are produced for the media and arguably form the basis of information that the EU would like the media to convey to their readers. The research questions of the present study pertain to the role of the press in mediating between political institutions and the public; therefore, press releases that provided purely procedural information were excluded (e.g. agendas, advanced information about meeting dates, announcement of appointments.). Such texts are produced to facilitate the distribution of information to the press rather than with the intention of informing the wider public.

Texts were included in EUFCC on the same basis as GuFCC in that they had to contain the lemma CRISIS and at least one of the key lemmas identified in the Finance and Economy lexical set derived from the corpus analysis presented in Chapter Six. Furthermore, the texts had to have been published during the same time period as GPRC – January 1, 2016 to June 23, 2016. While GuFCC can be described as a sub-corpus of GPRC, this corpus was designed in such a way as to allow analysis of EU elite discourse that could have been reported on during the time period in question. The search resulted in 99 texts being returned and all were used, resulting in a corpus of 205,699 tokens as shown in table 5-3 below.

Table 5-3: EU Financial Crisis Corpus

EU Entity	**Document type**	**Documents**	**Tokens**
EU Commission	Speech	31	56,902
EU Council	Speech	2	3,198
EU Parliament	Article	6	3,221
EU Parliament	Press Release	11	4,643
ECB	Interview	10	17,952
ECB	Press Conference	3	18,768
ECB	Speech	36	100,985
	Total	**99**	**205,669**

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have detailed the study design and methodology adopted in this study and outline how the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods will be used in order to address the research questions. I have also described the data sets to be examined and discussed various issues arising in data preparation.

I have also proposed a novel approach to address the challenges of duplicate data in newspaper corpora. I caution against a fully automated approach to deduplication of

newspaper data in CADS and instead suggest a semi-automated method for dealing with duplicates that balances the need to address the issue as easily as possible but at the same time ensure that appropriate decisions are made with regard to deletion of duplicate data in order not to influence the results of analysis in unacceptable ways.

Chapter 6: Keyness in the *Guardian* Corpus

6.1 Introduction

The primary objective of this chapter is to address my first research question (RQ1) as detailed in Chapter One: what are the key topics relating to the EU under discussion in the *Guardian* during the Referendum campaign, and to what extent does the nature and presentation of these topics uphold or undermine the publication's Pro-EU Stance? I approach the analysis through a corpus linguistic investigation of key items in the GPRC, which contains all articles from the *Guardian* that mention the EU from 1 January 2016 to 22 June 2016. The second objective of this chapter is to establish what can be learned from corpus linguistics methods and the extent to which they facilitate drawing conclusions regarding the *Guardian* newspaper's position on the EU. As such, the chapter contributes in part to the methodology aspect of RQ3, which asks about the extent to which existing methods and theoretical frameworks facilitate and account for the empirical findings of this study.

The analysis was undertaken through the semantic grouping of key lemmas in the corpus and by examination of concordance lines and collocations based on those findings. What emerges is a focus on the EU membership referendum with reference to both sides of the debate but with strikingly little reference to EU political figures or institutions. Two specific issues are emphasised, namely the economy and migration. That said, migration is presented to a large extent as an economic issue and it can be argued, therefore, that the central topic of concern is an economic one. I show that these key topics are frequently presented in terms of the evaluative abstract noun lemma CRISIS and that this term belongs to a further set of key lemmas relating to problematic situations. Ultimately, I argue that the

presentation of these situations in negative terms, along with the relative absence of reporting on the work of EU entities, suggests that any explicit pro-EU membership message proffered by the *Guardian* is likely to have been undermined.

That said, certain limitations of only using corpus tools for Discourse Analysis become apparent. It is possible to identify significant aspects of the discourse represented by the corpus, but the impact of the items identified is not so readily inferred without the more detailed analysis of individual texts that I offer in subsequent chapters. Furthermore, as noted by Taylor (2013), it is clear that a corpus can only ever provide an incomplete picture of what is significant in a given context, as it gives access only to what is contained within the corpus and not to that which has been excluded. We can see, for instance, that EU officials and institutions appear to be under-represented in the corpus, but it is only possible to understand the significance of that absence, and what could have been reported, with reference to corpus-external data from the EU itself, as I show in Chapters Eight and Nine.

Following discussion of the methods utilised in determining key terms in section 6.2, the findings of the analysis are presented in sections 6.3–6.6. Finally, the significance of these findings are discussed in the concluding section (6.7).

6.2 Methods: frequency, keyness and distribution

As noted in Chapter Five, keyness analysis must be performed in an 'accurate and principled way in order that strong foundations are laid for subsequent analysis' (Gabrielatos, 2018, p. 228). The significance of terms in the GPRC was established based on three criteria: keyness score, absolute frequency, and distribution. I used lemma, rather than word, to generate the list. First, a lemma was considered significant if it was also key, which is defined as 'a word

[or lemma] which occurs with unusual frequency in a given text' (Scott, 1997, p. 236). The reason for undertaking keyness analysis is its utility in establishing the aboutness of a corpus (Scott, 1997; Bondi and Scott, 2010). Second, those key lemmas had to be frequent in absolute terms and, thereby, have the potential to influence discursive constructions of the EU and semantic prosodies, taken here to refer to 'a consistent aura of meaning with which a form is imbued by its collocates' (Louw, 1993, p. 157). Finally, in order to discount any 'burstiness' of key items (Kilgarriff, 2001), which appear frequently in only a small number of articles or only for a short period of time, distribution of terms in the resultant key lemma list across the GPRC was checked.

While absolute or raw frequency is easily established using corpus software, the issue of keyness, which must be calculated with reference to another corpus, is less straightforward. As noted in Chapter Five, I follow Kilgarriff (2009) and use simple ratio, also known as the Simple Maths Parameter (Brezina, 2018, p. 85), whereby keyness is calculated by dividing the standardised frequency of a word in the study corpus by the standardised frequency in the reference corpus.

Various decisions must be made regarding the reference corpus used. These decisions have the potential to affect the resultant list of candidate lemmas significantly and, thereby, the conclusions which may be drawn from the analysis. Both the nature of the corpus under study (or focus corpus) and the research questions being asked are important considerations. Any reference corpus should minimise variables so that the results of the analysis may be attributed to the issue under study and not to other factors. In this case, the focus corpus (GPRC) comprises news articles from a single publication (*The Guardian*) over a relatively short span of six months in 2016. Articles were selected for inclusion based on whether they contain the terms *EU* or *European Union*, while the research aims are concerned with

establishing what is notable about discourse around the EU during the time period in question. News articles, like any other register, have specific linguistic traits (Biber *et al.*, 1998, 1999; Biber and Conrad, 2008). As such, a general corpus of English, comprising many text types, would make it difficult to attribute distinctive lexis in the GPRC to anything other than register variation.

Arguably, an ideal reference corpus in this case would comprise *all* news articles from the *Guardian* during the first six months of 2016. Compilation of such a corpus was not possible owing to the constraints of this study, but the SiBol Corpus (see Partington, 2010), available through the Sketch Engine interface (Kilgarriff et al., 2014), offers a good alternative. The iteration of the SiBol Corpus used comprises English language broadsheet newspaper articles from 1993, 2005, 2010 and 2013 and offers a sub-corpus of articles from the *Guardian* in those years of over 147 million tokens. The selection of the SiBol *Guardian* sub-corpus as a reference corpus (hereafter, GSiBol), offers the additional benefit that the Parts of Speech (POS) tag set used in the compilation of GSiBol and GPRC within Sketch Engine are the same. As such, any anomalies in tagging will be consistent across corpora and are unlikely to skew the analysis.

A candidate list of key lemmas in the GPRC was generated in Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff *et al.*, 2014) with a minimum frequency cut-off of 500 occurrences. By using the "Lempos" definition to create the list, the Part of Speech Tag distinguishes between, for instance, the noun and verb forms of VOTE. It has been noted that setting frequency thresholds for keyness analysis is potentially problematic, as it excludes items that are infrequent but nevertheless key in statistical terms (Gabrielatos, 2018, p. 238). My aim, however, is to ascertain which aspects of discourse around the EU are likely to have been influential, and I argue that frequency of exposure to particular ways of talking about things is related to

potential influence. As such, a frequency cut-off is justified in this case. The 500-occurrence limit was selected because this would represent an average presence in just over 10% of the 4,269 articles in the corpus.

For the purposes of this analysis, a minimum keyness score cut-off of 1.4 was set, meaning that a lemma appears 1.4 times per million words in the GPRC more frequently than in GSiBol. This cut-off, while arbitrary, was selected to ensure that a manageable, within the constraints of this project, list would be created. Disregarding some metadata terms absent from SiBol, the result was a list of 218 key lemmas, representing those which are both frequent and, therefore, have the potential to influence readers' perceptions, while also being clearly specific to discourse on the EU in the *Guardian* during the first six months of 2016.

As a final step, the distribution of each of the 218 key lemmas was checked in order to ensure that occurrences were not focused on just a few texts. The distribution function in Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff *et al.*, 2014) splits the corpus into a number of equal parts and checks for occurrences of the noun in question in each segment. The researcher may define granularity between 10 and 1000 segments. The corpus is segmented by token count and, as such, splits may occur within documents (in this case articles), but each document is counted in turn. Thus, owing to the way the GPRC was compiled with documents ordered by date, each segment represents a similar number of articles over time. As can be seen in the screenshot in Figure 6.1, where each bar represents a 1% segment of the corpus (about 43 articles), 514 occurrences of the lemma TREATY are widely distributed, with particular emphasis in those segments representing articles in January and February 2016 when discussion of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty as the mechanism for leaving the EU was particularly frequent.




Figure 6-1: Distribution of TREATY in the GPRC Corpus

Conversely, TATA, relating to the company Tata Steel, appears in fewer segments of the corpus, first in relation to quarterly losses reported in February 2016, then UK job losses in April 2016 and, finally, the reporting of Trade Union commentary and discussion of a potential rescue package for the company in May. Nevertheless, as the screenshot in Figure 6-2 shows, TATA appears in 36% of corpus segments. Indeed, all nouns identified through frequency and keyness analysis satisfy a cut-off of occurrences in at least 33% of segments and in at least three of the six months covered by the corpus. On that basis, none was removed.




Figure 6-2: Distribution of TATA in the GPRC Corpus

As noted earlier, the purpose of this analysis was not to establish a ranking of key lemmas but rather sets of semantically related significant lemmas to ascertain which topics were particular to the dataset so as to direct further study. By grouping key lemmas into thematic sets, and then looking more closely at those terms through concordances and collocations, it is possible to gain some insights into fundamental aspects of discourse around the EU in the GPRC.

I propose that five major sets account for the key lemmas in the corpus. The first, relating to **Politics and the Referendum**, and the second, to **Named Individuals and Entities**, are both relatively predictable given that the GPRC is a corpus of news articles pertaining to the EU leading up to the British membership referendum of 2016. Two further sets denote significant topics in the referendum debate: **Economy and Business** and **Refugees and Migrants**. The fifth and final set, which is connected to both of the significant topics, is that of **Situations** including abstract noun lemmas such as CRISIS or ISSUE, which can be said to evaluate the seriousness or importance of situations highlighted in the discourse. This final set is of interest owing to the significance of CRISIS in particular, which

occurs 4.1 more times per million words in the GPRC than in GSiBol. This is also interesting owing to the relative absence of key terms expressing positive evaluation of situations.

While limitations of space prevent an in-depth examination of all items in each set, the following sections (6.3–6.6) examine those items that are particularly notable, as well as those which provide directions for further study. In each case, concordance lines were generated, and collocations were examined in order to understand better the function of the key lemmas concerned. This is followed by a discussion of the findings in the concluding section (6.7).

6.3 The Politics and Referendum set

6.3.1 The prevalence of referendum talk

Given the time period and selection criteria for the corpus, it is no surprise that 67 out of the 232 key lemmas found (29%) belong to the largest lexical set pertaining to POLITICS and the REFERENDUM with reference, for instance, to the CAMPAIGN, the VOTER, and to DEBATE (see Table 6-1). The now familiar term BREXIT, a portmanteau word derived from "British", and "exit", was first coined in 2012 and is attributed to Peter Wilding's BlogActive.EU post.[5] It received the highest keyness score in this set. Such a high figure, however, is a function of the fact that GSiBol only contains texts up to 2013, and BREXIT appears just seven times,

[5] For the first use of Brexit, see BlogActive post at: http://blogactiv.eu/blog/2012/05/15/stumbling-towards-the-brexit/

demonstrating that the nature of the corpora being compared must be considered when interpreting keyness results.

There are two aspects of this list that warrant discussion. I shall first examine the use of the most frequent noun lemma in this set, PEOPLE, and the way in which the *Guardian* claims to represent the views of voters in section 6.3.2. I shall then look at LEAVE (section 6.3.3), which in its verb form is much more frequent than the verb form of remain, and which is of particular interest owing to the fact that the noun form of REMAIN was not found to be key.

Table 6-1: Sample of key lemmas – Politics and Referendum Lexical Set

	Freq GPRC	Relative Freq GPRC	Relative Freq GSIBOL	Keyness Score
BREXIT-N	4655	1064	0.05	11.634
REFERENDUM-N	5852	1338	39.61	10.297
JUNE-N	3446	788	121.52	4.007
CAMPAIGN-N	4780	1093	206.07	3.896
VOTE-V	2791	638	100.48	3.681
MEMBERSHIP-N	1491	341	30.65	3.374
VOTER-N	2117	484	76.32	3.311
LEAVE-N	1503	344	36.92	3.239
REMAIN-V	4811	1100	332.58	2.773
DEBATE-N	2140	490	126.63	2.600
LEAVE-V	7341	1678	605.26	2.521
DEAL-N	3100	709	242.62	2.367
POLL-N	1324	303	77	2.273
CITIZEN-N	1030	235	58	2.121
STAY-V	1826	417	172	1.896
PEOPLE - N	9015	2061	1402	1.44

6.3.2 What do the people think?

The most frequent keyword in this set is the noun lemma PEOPLE, which occurs 9,051 times. Other terms to appear in the set include VOTER (2,117 occurrences) and CITIZEN (1,030). While the presence of these nouns in the list is perhaps unsurprising, owing to the nature of a referendum that puts the issue of EU membership in citizens' hands, modification of the PEOPLE is revealing and shows how various actors lay claim to an understanding of the

opinions of different segments of society to back up their own position. PEOPLE is most frequently modified by *young* (503 times or in 4.9% of all instances), followed by *British* (319 occurrences or 3.5%). The next most frequent modifiers are all quantifiers: *many*, *more*, and *most* (201, 146 and 156 occurrences respectively), which together account for 6.1% of all occurrences of PEOPLE. Samples of concordance lines for each of these modifiers were randomly selected though Sketch Engine and examined in order to understand their use.

Based on a random sample of 100 concordance lines for *young* PEOPLE, the overall impression given is one of a broadly pro-EU stance with references to the future of young people, who are already struggling in various ways. This emphasises the view of a potentially negative and long-standing impact of a vote to leave, which would be in keeping with the *Guardian*'s stance on EU membership. It does, however, focus on the negative aspects of leaving rather than the positive ones of remaining. Forty-one percent of the selected concordance lines mention the EU referendum and a further 14% refer to the referendum, but this can only be determined by looking beyond the concordance lines. This gives a total of 56%. As such, in a manner similar to all concordance line searches downloaded for this study, the lines include 100 characters either side of the keyword.

Eleven percent of the concordance lines appear to identify young people as potential Remain voters (see lines 1–3 in Concordance 6-1), although there is concern over young people's (lack of) engagement with the EU referendum debate. Thirty-seven percent of concordances deal with problems faced by young people including housing costs, debt, health care and job scarcity (6-9 in Concordance 6-1), although these issues are not necessarily connected to the referendum debate. Labour's Ed Miliband is quoted as expressing concern that a failure of the young to engage and vote would result in a vote to leave the EU. He also conveyed his apprehension that, with Conservative David Cameron leading the campaign to

remain, young people could be put off voting in agreement with him (see lines 4–5). The potential impact of a leave vote on the young is referenced in 5% of the concordance lines, while a further 5% address the potential for the religious radicalisation of disenfranchised young people (see 10–11). The significance of the EU referendum for these issues is not clear even by expanding the concordance lines to show more context.

Concordance 6-1: Selected Concordances from the GPRC of young people

1.	agreed that it was vital for	young people	to take part and welcomed Cameron's
2.	only just over half (52%) of	young people	said they were certain to […] vote
3.	general trend that the majority of	young people	want Britain to remain in the EU
4.	warns Britain could leave EU if	young people	don't vote; Former Labour leader warns
5.	Cameron leading […] will this put	young people	off voting to stay?
6.	excessive alcohol consumption among	young people	and its connection to heart disease
7.	unemployed, and nearly half of its	young people	are without work. Hundreds of thousands
8.	higher than they would otherwise be.	Young people	struggling with ludicrous rents
9.	a comeback as the drug of choice for	young people	in the UK and across Europe
10.	The head of the CBI said	young people	would be hardest hit by a leave vote
11.	terrorist groups use to radicalise	young people	and racists use to spread violence

It is only by consulting the full article for the concordance line shown in example 11 above that relevance to the EU becomes clear and also demonstrates that the pro-EU stance in the *Guardian* may not be as consistent as the concordance lines suggest. Vera Jourova, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality, cites the importance of 'European laws and values' in protecting young people from radicalisation on the internet in an article of 31 May 2016 which reports the launch by the European Union of an 'online code of conduct' aimed at 'fighting racism and xenophobia across Europe'(Hern 2016). What is missing, however, is any explicit connection between this and the benefits to EU membership. In fact, further reading highlights tensions between a 'narrow' definition of hate speech and 'the right to freedom of expression' in the 'slim document', which 'isn't legally binding' and was necessary because efforts to address these issues are 'hampered by varying

enforcement in different [EU] countries'. The article ends by noting the launch in Britain of a campaign to tackle online misogyny, which is not covered by the 'limited scope' of the EU code of conduct (Hern, 2016). It can certainly be argued that unbiased reporting should avoid encoding the stated pro-EU stance of the *Guardian,* but the underlying position of this article is by no means neutral. The emphasis on what is lacking in the code of conduct, along with reference to British plans to address associated issues, including a link to related content about those plans, implies that the EU is unable to resolve these particular problems satisfactorily and that Britain must tackle them independently. I would argue that this undermines a key aspect of the Pro-EU argument and indeed the remain campaign name: Britain Stronger in Europe.

Where PEOPLE is modified by *British*, 27% of concordances from a random sample of 100 emphasise that the referendum puts the decision on the issue of EU membership in the hands of the electorate. It also includes references to the importance of the decision and that the result should be respected (see 12–14 in Concordance 6.2). Fourteen percent of concordances present reflections on what the British people are being told during the referendum campaign, in most cases with considerable concern, although it is not possible to discern from the concordance lines alone whether criticism is being levelled at the Leave or the Remain campaigns broadly or to specific individuals. It is also not possible to discern the extent to which such criticisms are evenly reported (see 15–17 in Concordance 6.2).

A notable aspect of the sample concordances of *British* PEOPLE is that 46% of them include direct quotations, which are indicated by speech marks. Reporting verbs such as "suggested" and "said", along with use of the first-person singular pronoun outside quotation marks in phrases such as "I expect the British people", account for a further nine instances. This means that in at least 54% of cases, assertions are being made as regards the needs,

views, and expectations of the British population. What is less clear is the extent to which these assertions, which appear to come from others, are refuted. It is also not always well defined whether unquoted assertions come from reporters and columnists (although line 18 below represents a clear case). Brookes *et al.*, (2004) note that in television news prior to the 2001 general election, public opinion was frequently invoked through unsubstantiated claims, and that these inferences were made by political figures being interviewed, by reporters commenting on what politicians had said, and by the reporters and commentators themselves.

Concordance 6-2: Selected concordances from the GPRC of *British* PEOPLE

12.	gravity of the decision facing the	British people	when he ruled out a second
13.	decision lay ultimately with the	British people	- that's fair, right? The rules are
14.	that whatever the decision the	British people	take, it should be respected.
15.	hiding inconvenient facts from the	British people	", she said, "this has become
16.	if everything he is telling the	British people	is in line with reality, "I don't
17.	is beneath Lord Owen and the	British People	Deserve better." Owen's
18.	begin the process of exit. And the	British people	would rightly expect that that

Claims regarding opinions and attitudes of the population are also found when the modifiers *many, more* and *most* are used. In a random sample of fifty concordances from each of the three, 54% of the occurrences of *many* PEOPLE*,* 74% occurrences of *most* PEOPLE and 22% of the occurrences of *more* PEOPLE assert an understanding of the views and motivations of others (see lines 19–24 in Concordance 6-3). In the case of *many* and *most*, such assertions are generally made to strengthen arguments, and imply that the speaker's views are representative, with *most* asserting that a majority of people hold such a view. Of course, the issue with *many* is that it is entirely unquantified but that does not mean that it is insignificant in that, along with other terms, it contributes to conveying an 'impressionistic, journalistic "common sense" about public opinion' (Brookes *et al.*, 2004, p. 72). It is also

apparent, however, that these claims can be contradictory. Looking at expanded concordances shows that line 20 asserts that most people are engaged in and passionate about the political debate, while line 21 suggests that the EU is 'so boring that most people switch off'. It is also claimed that people lack understanding of financial tools such as Quantitative Easing (25) or are generally 'apathetic' (24).

Although the modifiers *many* and *most* are used in similar ways, mainly quantifying the level of support for a given issue, the modifier *more* is used somewhat differently. Twenty-eight percent of 50 randomly generated concordances of *more* PEOPLE relate to the issue of migration, with half of those expressing negative sentiment regarding the effect of migration on local services and questioning the potential contribution of migrants (see 26–28). Within this sample of 50 concordances, from a total of 156 in GPRC as a whole, there appear to be no examples of positive feelings with regard to migrants coming to Britain, and just three that reference migrants as victims of traffickers or focus on migration as a humanitarian issue. That said, expanding concordance line 26 below for instance, shows that what is being cited is the view of the 'Brexit campaign', while the article of 15 June 2016 goes on to say that 'academic research' does not back up the assertion that migrants arriving has contributed to a 'housing crisis' (Foster and Dudman, 2016). It may also be that migrants and refugees are relatively infrequently referred to as people and, as such, no inference can be made based on this analysis alone as to sentiment or indeed the extent to which this is presented specifically as a referendum issue rather than as something affecting Europe as a whole. Further discussion on the discourse surrounding migration can be found in section 6.5.

Concordance 6-3: Selected concordances from the GPRC of *many, more*, and *most* PEOPLE

19.	rights was one of the reasons	many people	would vote to stay in, but
20.	thing, that is not where	most people	are at all. Hardly anybody talks about
21.	and being so boring that	most people	just switch off. What we are left with
22.	this is one reason why so	many people	will vote Brexit. People here do
23.	shows what we know: that	most people	vote with their wallets. Political argu

24.	apathetic to the issue.	Many people	don’t understand it, feel like it
25.	He spots, at a time when	most people	were struggling to comprehend quantita
26.	through Britain’s borders,	more people	take homes, fewer homes are available
27.	we can take	more people	but we have to think very hard
28.	what we don’t want is	more people	coming in who won’t bring anything posi

6.3.3 Leave or Remain

The noun *leave* is key in the Politics and Referendum lexical set, referring to the campaign to leave the EU. This is particularly notable owing to the absence of *remain* as a noun, which does not appear at all in the GPRC. The verb forms of both, however, are key. A closer look at this, suggests a POS tagging anomaly, which requires some investigation. For instance, in the following, *leave* is tagged as a noun and *remain* is tagged as a verb:

`Despite the fact that the respective “leave” and “remain” campaigns…`

Of 5,916 occurrences of *leave/Leave,* 4,438 are tagged as verbs and 1,478 are tagged as nouns (c. 33%). All 3,369 occurrences of *remain/Remain* are tagged as verbs. A manual check of 100 randomly selected concordances of each suggests two things: first, that some of the occurrences of *remain/Remain* could reasonably be tagged as nouns; and, second, that the tagging of leave/Leave is occasionally inconsistent:

`Leave want to take the county backwards` [leave is tagged as verb]
`At the beginning of April, leave had a four-point lead` [leave is tagged as a noun]

Given these inconsistencies, it is perhaps best to consider both noun and verb forms together. The frequency for REMAIN in GPRC, including both noun and verb tags, is 3,369 (770 per million), while LEAVE is 5,916 (1,352 per million). In order to contextualise these counts, REMAIN occurs 107 times per million in GSiBol and LEAVE occurs 166 times per million. Keyness can then be manually calculated, with the result, as shown below,

demonstrating that although both terms are key in the GPRC, LEAVE does indeed have a higher keyness score than REMAIN.

$$\text{remain} = \frac{770+100}{107+100} = keyness\ score\ 4.20$$

$$\text{leave} = \frac{1352+100}{166+100} = keyness\ score\ 5.46$$

These two terms, in their verb forms, reflect the wording of the referendum question and the two options offered to voters: to remain a member of the EU or to leave the EU. That LEAVE has a higher keyness score than REMAIN may be explained to an extent by the names of official campaign groups. The official cross-party campaign group for remaining in the EU was named "Britain Stronger in Europe". It was launched in October 2015 and was designated as the official campaign group by the Electoral Commission in April 2016. The leave campaign group selected by the Electoral Commission was "Vote Leave", a cross-party group also launched in October 2015. There was also a number of other groups, such as Labour Leave and Liberal Leave, which were set up by politicians wishing to campaign against their Party's official pro-European line.

In addition to their contribution to the increased frequency of the term *leave* in the corpus, the Leave campaign group names can all be read as a strong call to action – vote to leave the EU – which is precisely what the campaigners were asking the electorate to do. The Remain campaign name, conversely, emphasises the assertion that Britain would be stronger inside the Union, but this is at best an indirect reference to a vote. The phrase *vote leave* appears 972 times in the GPRC compared to just 98 occurrences of *vote remain*. Arguably, this disparity, generated by the more consistent language of the Leave campaign, has the potential to strengthen semantic and discourse prosodies in favour of a leave vote, even when that is not the intention of the publication.

Given that the Remain campaign group name did not contain the word *remain*, a more informative comparison can perhaps be made by looking at the phrase *Britain Stronger in Europe*. However, this is found only 183 times in the GPRC corpus, while the shortened *stronger in* returns only an additional 77 occurrences, totalling 260 and falling far short of the 1,124 occurrences of *vote leave.* At first glance, the disparity in the number of mentions between the two campaign groups would appear to raise significant questions regarding balanced coverage. It is important to recognise, however, that the phrase *vote leave* need not have been specifically referencing the campaign name. Furthermore, a vote to remain represented the status quo and demonstrated that all leading political parties had declared themselves to be pro-EU. As such, media coverage of their position need not have referred to the remain campaign group specifically and may simply have framed their position as being against a vote to leave.

It cannot be concluded from these corpus counts alone that either the Remain or the Leave positions are over- or under-represented in the corpus. Furthermore, since reference to leaving the EU or to the leave campaign may well have been intended to offer arguments against leaving, to counter an argument given for leaving, or to discuss the negative consequences of leaving the EU in more general terms, a much more detailed analysis would be needed to quantify the use of the lemmas LEAVE and REMAIN in relation to the balance and nature of coverage for each side of the debate. Such an analysis, however, lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

6.4 The Named Individuals and Entities Set

6.4.1 Predicable and notable inclusions

A second predictable lexical set is the one reflecting individual politicians and entities pertaining to the EU membership referendum, such as BRUSSELS, EUROPE and BRITAIN (see Table 6.2). The highest keyness score goes to EU (23.75). As one of the search terms for the creation of the corpus, this is unsurprising. David CAMERON was Prime Minister prior to the referendum and advocated a remain vote. JOHNSON refers most often to Boris Johnson, who was Mayor of London at the time and, to the surprise of many commentators, announced in February 2016 that he supported a vote to leave the EU. It also comes as no surprise to see other British political figures included, such as Theresa May (Home Secretary), Jeremy Corbyn (Labour leader of the opposition) and George Osborne (Chancellor of the Exchequer). In addition, there are ample mentions of the political party UKIP and Nigel Farage, who had long campaigned for the UK to leave the EU.

Table 6-2: Sample of key lemmas – Named Individuals and Entities Lexical Set

LEMPOS	Freq GPRC	Relative Freq GPRC	Relative Freq GSiBol	Keyness Score
EU-N	21,467	4,906.54	110.77	23.75
CAMERON-N	5,701	1,303.03	144.46	5.74
EUROPE-N	7,153	1,634.90	221.11	5.40
CORBYN-N	1,813	414.38	0.62	5.11
TURKEY-N	2,291	523.64	41.12	4.42
BRUSSELS-N	1,749	399.75	27.68	3.91
UK-N	11,583	2,647.43	631.26	3.76
BORIS-N	1,340	306.27	21.28	3.35
GREECE-N	1,499	342.61	35.14	3.28
OSBORNE-N	1,629	372.33	53.18	3.08
MAY-N	2,892	661.00	155.80	2.98
SYRIA-N	1,347	307.87	37.48	2.97
GOVE-N	1,026	234.50	21.91	2.74
FARAGE-N	814	186.05	5.61	2.71
TRUMP-N	805	183.99	5.50	2.69
UKIP-N	909	207.76	19.45	2.58
ISIS-N	610	139.42	1.03	2.37

MERKEL-N	670	153.14	16.08	2.18
COMMISSION-N	1,677	383.30	135.86	2.05
OBAMA-N	923	210.96	63.79	1.90
GERMANY-N	1,376	314.50	127.61	1.82
POLAND-N	565	129.14	26.21	1.82
PARIS-N	913	208.68	81.42	1.70
SCOTLAND-N	1,076	245.93	120.28	1.57
RUSSIA-N	800	182.85	84.71	1.53

Other than the expected salience of the names of some EU Member States, the appearance of TURKEY, SYRIA, and RUSSIA in the list of key terms here warrants further investigation. That Turkey should appear in the list of keywords as the most frequently mentioned country other than the UK, with a keyness score of 4.42, is perhaps surprising. Equally surprising is the fact that GERMANY and FRANCE appear less frequently, with GERMANY alone appearing on the keyword list as a result of FRANCE falling below the cut-off point with a keyness score of 1.37. Research has shown that the EU is generally construed by the British press as a Franco-German project (Glaas, 2016; Hawkins, 2012). As such, the significance of non-EU countries such as Turkey, Syria and Russia is striking, as is that of EU members states Greece and Poland.

Turkey is a country that has been actively negotiating its accession to the EU since 2005 and is one of seven recognised potential candidate countries seeking membership.[6] Concerns over its democratic processes and judicial independence, however, as well as

[6] For information about EU membership candidates see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/check-current-status_en

Turkey's refusal to recognise EU Member State Cyprus, has delayed negotiations. Consultation of concordance lines for TURKEY (see Concordance 6.4) confirms that anxieties over Turkey joining the EU are reflected in the discourse, with David Cameron offering reassurances that this would not happen 'for decades' (line 29). Such a message suggests that Cameron was trying to allay fears about immigration long used as an argument by Leave campaigners. At the same time, however, this sentiment put the UK at odds with the EU, emphasising division rather than unity.

A review of concordance lines also offers further explanation for the significance of Turkey in the GPRC. Turkey is frequently mentioned, along with Greece and Syria, in relation to the issue of migration. The main point of contention was that refugees were claimed to be seeking a route to Europe via Turkey (30–31). These refugees were leaving Syria as a result of the civil war, which also explains the prevalence of Russia following their intervention in 2015, purportedly to fight Islamic State terrorists in a move that caused mixed reactions around the world. European leaders had condemned air strikes that harmed civilians and the US suggested that President Vladimir Putin was seeking to 'weaponise the refugee crisis' and undermine the relationship between the USA and the EU (Quinn, 2016). Complications in international relations are clearly stressed and, once again, it is lack of unity rather than shared values that appear to be emphasised. Some Europeans were potentially shifting in their tough stance on Russia, while at the same time Russia was being effectively 'blacklisted' (32–33 below).

Concordance 6-4: Selected Concordances from the GPRC for Turkey, Russia, and Syria

29.	"There is no prospect of	Turkey	joining the EU for decades," Cameron
30.	will be returned and the Syrians in	Turkey	will then be allowed to enter Europe
31.	Turks travelling to Europe, means	Turkey	now has more incentives to police
32.	toughest voices in Europe on	Russia	, could suddenly become more amenable
33.	European policies towards the east an	Russia	, has in effect been blacklisted.

34.		fears the US has moved too far towards	Russia's	position. France's outgoing foreign
35.		European leaders urge	Russia	to maintain Syria ceasefire; Cameron,
36.	has failed…to put an end to the war in		Syria	; and the EU is widely criticised

The fact that the EU was 'widely criticised' in 36 above was even more damaging; it goes on to mention the EU's 'inability to address a variety of crises – its very functioning as an institution is questioned as never before' (Nougayrède, 2016). Although it is not immediately discernible from the concordance line alone, the opinion piece by *Guardian* columnist Natalie Nougayrède, published on 21 May 2016, roundly criticises international institutions such as the EU and the United Nations for having lost credibility. Meetings and conferences in London and elsewhere in Europe, where the legitimacy of international institutions was discussed, are cited. Particularly problematic is the emphasis on EU leaders acting according to their own national imperatives, potentially to the detriment of the EU or other Member States. The overall tone of the article is one of frustration with the EU and, as such, it may represent a position closest to the EU Pessimist (Glaas, 2016), who is ideologically pro-EU but may, nevertheless, support a vote to leave based on a belief that flaws cannot be resolved. Such a view would clearly be at odds with the *Guardian*'s stated position.

6.4.2 Notable absence: EU officials

In the same way that we find striking inclusions in the key lemma list that serve to foreground tensions and challenges, there are also striking absences, particularly with regard to EU political figures. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany in 2016, is the only non-British EU political figure on the list, appearing 670 times with a keyness score of 2.18, but

no other EU officials are present. European Council President, Donald Tusk appears 302 times in the corpus, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the EU Commission in 2016, appears just 191 times and the President of the European Parliament at the time, Martin Schulz, appears just 49 times.

The absence of EU officials in the key lemma list cannot be explained by a focus in the British media on British political figures alone. For comparison, US president (Barack) OBAMA appears 923 times with a keyness score of 3.00 and (Donald) TRUMP, the soon-to-be Republican presidential candidate at the time, appears 794 times with a keyness score of 55.47. It is to be expected that campaigning for the US election would be reported in the British press, but it is less clear as to why American politicians should be mentioned more frequently than their European counterparts in a corpus comprising articles specifically pertaining to Europe.

The examination of 50 randomly selected concordance lines for TRUMP offers some explanation regarding his connection to Europe, and reveals reports on various controversies, including a comment he made on 'a complete and total ban on Muslims entering the US' (see line 37 in Concordance 6-5). There is reference to a claim by Donald Trump that some parts of Britain are 'no-go areas' for the police, and it is asserted that Trump's 'anti-immigration mood' would be vindicated should Britain vote to leave the EU (line 38). Upon examination of the extended concordance (line 39), a suggestion can also be made that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin seek to 'weaken the European Union'. While such assertions do not reflect badly on the EU directly, nevertheless I argue that they in fact represent the EU as an institution at risk and, as such, they have the potential to undermine support.

Concordance 6-5: Selected Concordances from the GPRC for Trump and Obama

37.	Turks travelling to Europe, means	Trump	now has more incentives to police

38.	The anti-immigration mood driving	Trump	would receive a major vindication if
39.	weaken the European Union, a goal shared by Vladimir Putin and Donald	Trump	. This week their fellow Brexiteer,
40.	pro-EU camp was still buoyed by	Obama's	insistence that it would take up to 10
41.	There are many reasons why the	Obama	era has been perceived as one of American indifference to Europe
42.	Clegg advised Susman to persuade	Obama	to tell Cameron directly he was making a mistake…

President Obama was said to have boosted the pro-EU camp when he discussed that Britain's negotiations of a trade deal outside the EU may in fact be quite prolonged (line 40 above). A closer look at the article, however, shows that it actually focuses on Leave campaign messaging. The headline refers to Brexit as 'the only way to control immigration' and despite the qualifying 'campaigners claim' (Khomami, 2016), the article focuses entirely on claims from the Leave campaign regarding immigration, which to all intents and purposes go unchallenged. The suggestion that 'Angela Merkel's asylum amnesty' in Germany is 'out of control' (Iain Duncan Smith, quoted in Khomami, 2016) and would result in uncontrolled immigration to the UK, not only serves to present EU membership as a risk to the UK, but also emphasises the impact of national choices on other EU Member States. Although those *Guardian* readers who support EU membership would be likely to dismiss the claims as either inaccurate or unimportant, those wavering in their support of Remain would not be able to read counter-claims, or anything about any positive impacts of either EU membership or immigration. By allowing the argument to stand, even when qualified as 'claims', I suggest that a pro-EU stance is once again potentially undermined. Issues of voices in the media, namely who gets mentioned, who gets to speak, as well as attribution of opinion, have all received considerable attention in the literature (see, for instance, Bednarek, 2016; Bednarek and Caple, 2014; Bell, 2002; Fowler, 1991). A much closer reading of individual texts, however, would be needed in order to establish the extent to which these findings are repeated.

6.5 The economy and migration

6.5.1 Risks to the British economy

Two dominant topics of interest are suggested, based on key lemma sets; **Business and Economy**, and **Migration**. A notable aspect that is presented when considering these sets more closely is the extent to which they are interrelated and how far both can in fact be seen as economic concerns. The lexical set relates directly to financial issues, including TRADE, BUSINESS, MARKET and INDUSTRY (see Table 6-3). The keyness scores for these nouns are somewhat lower than for the **Refugee and Migrant** set, suggesting that the economy is a relatively common topic in the *Guardian* regardless of reference to the EU. The lemmas themselves are nevertheless frequent and, thereby, likely to influence opinion on the EU.


Table 6-3: Sample of key lemmas – Economic and Business Lexical Set

LEMPOS	Freq # GRPC	Freq/mil GPRC	Freq/mil GSiBol	Keyness Score
BUSINESS-N	3379	824.4	407.2	2.1
MARKET-N	3238	738.4	376.4	1.8
DEAL-N	3088	704.2	241.6	2.4
TAX-N	2895	660.2	213.7	2.7
ECONOMY-N	2731	622.8	161.1	2.8
TRADE-N	2112	481.6	147.6	2.6
INDUSTRY	1920	437.9	220.0	1.7
EURO	1225	280.0	58.7	2.4
FINANCIAL-J	1712	391.3	183.9	1.7

Collocates of ECONOMY in the GPRC (see Figure 6-3) reveal a concern with the *British* or the *UK* economy, also designated as *our* economy, but with frequent reference to the *global* economy and those of *China* and the *US*. A focus on the relative success of world economies

is evident in the significance of *biggest, slowing*, *damage*, *growing*, and *growth*. What is not apparent from this list of collocates, however, is any reference to the EU or EU membership.

Figure 6-3: Collocates of Economy



Economy Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

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		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	global	227	1,672	10.718
P | N	UK	330	10,411	9.683
P | N	our	171	6,123	9.303
P | N	world's	52	466	9.052
P | N	jobs	66	1,422	9.020
P | N	world	85	2,775	8.979
P | N	slowing	44	124	8.974
P | N	British	103	4,180	8.929
P | N	damage	46	432	8.891
P | N	growth	60	1,753	8.772
P | N	largest	42	497	8.730
P | N	growing	43	667	8.691
P | N	wider	38	392	8.634
P | N	China	40	634	8.600
P | N	Britain's	52	1,783	8.556
P | N	market	58	2,360	8.541
P | N	grow	33	227	8.508
P | N	biggest	41	948	8.508
P | N	slowdown	33	262	8.491
P | N	circular	31	84	8.489
P | N	advanced	31	93	8.485
P | N	impact	43	1,231	8.470
P | N	would	187	14,904	8.439
P | N	emerging	29	156	8.357
P | N	US	54	2,987	8.270

Concordances of the UK ECONOMY (Concordance 6-6), however, show a clear concern regarding instability owing to uncertainty created by the referendum and with the potential implications of a vote to leave the EU. It would appear that although both positive and negative evaluations of such a vote are presented, it is concerns for the risk to the UK economy that predominate, with quotations appearing from diverse sources, including the credit ratings agency Moody's and fund managers, as well as references to 'experts'. A notable exception is line 48, which refers to the benefits of the free movement of labour in the EU. In direct contradiction to the article discussed in the previous subsection, this article dating to 26 April 2016 focuses on a speech from the then Conservative Minister for Small

Business, Anna Soubry, and her support for Remain. Soubry is cited as saying '[t]hat freedom and liquidity of workers is critical to so many small businesses. We need to wake up to the reality of what migration is about. They come here to work. The idea that they take British jobs is not true, they add huge value to our economy' (Featherstone, 2016).

Concordance 6-6: Selected Concordances from GPRC of UK economy

43.	referendum will cap growth in the	UK economy	at 2% this year. It's only
44.	EU would be disastrous for the	UK economy	until after the referendum
45.	exit would send shockwaves through	UK economy	- business live It said: "Markets
46.	risk collapse of confidence in	UK economy	; Former chancellor is latest Labo
47.	credit negative for the	UK economy	," said Kathrin Muehlbronner at
48.	labour is a positive for the	UK economy	, "That freedom and liquidity
49.	"The biggest risk to the	UK economy	, a risk that even the Bank of
50.	trade deals could hit the	UK economy	and, in turn, impact on public
51.	Norwegian-style EEA model, the	UK economy	is forecast to be 3.8% smaller
52.	Brexit could benefit	UK economy	, says £8bn fund manager;

This does show, however, that counter-arguments to the Leave campaign appear, even if they are still placed within the context of an argument about the negative consequences of leaving rather than the positive benefits of membership. Earlier in the article, Soubry is quoted as saying, '[i]f we have Brexit, we don't know what we will get', adding that '[w]hat we do know is that it will take at least two years to untangle ourselves […] there will be a serious impact on our economy, it will undoubtedly go into decline' (cited in Featherstone, 2016).

6.5.2 Migration – whose crisis is it?

The term *refugee* appears alongside *migrant* (25.8 times), *migration* (28.9 times) and *immigration* (9.2 times) in the corpus. This frequency clearly denotes a topic of significance in the GPRC (see Table 6-4). The terms *migrant* and *refugee* have gained considerable

attention in both sociological and linguistic studies. Issues over the discursive representation of immigrants and refugees, and particularly the conflation of the two terms, have been studied extensively. Concerns over the categorisation of such people as a process of legitimisation (or otherwise) have been found to be significant in both political and media discourse. Notions of 'worthiness' and, subsequently, entitlement to admittance in the country or the provision of financial support are also related to this (see, for example, Long, 2013; Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018). It is beyond the scope of this study to reflect further on these particular issues, but what is significant here is the extent to which these lemmas reflect economic concerns and, thereby, how they are connected to the referendum debate.


Table 6-4: Sample of key lemmas – Refugee and Migrant Lexical Set

Lempos	Freq # GRPC	Freq/mil GPRC	Freq/mil GSiBol	Keyness Score
refugee	4409	1005.5	35.8	27.3
number	2557	583.1	400.5	1.5
immigration	1706	389.0	41.4	9.2
migrant	1631	371.9	13.5	25.8
migration	1377	314.0	9.9	28.9

The difference in the use of the two terms in the GPRC is apparent when looking at the collocates for each based on a span of 5 either side of the node word. Migrants are associated with concerns over *access* to *benefit*s, *claims* and *payments* made, and the extent to which they might be *skilled workers* (see Figure 6-4). This reflects reporting around migrants from EU Member States who have a right to work and claim benefits in the UK as a result of EU membership. Far from emphasising what migrants offer to the country, this type of reporting instead focuses on the Leave campaign argument, according to which they take more than they give. David Cameron sought to limit the right of EU migrants prior to the referendum with an aim to ensure, for instance, that benefits paid to EU citizens in Britain

should reflect what is available in their country of origin. Migration, then, is presented as very much of an economic issue.

Collocates of *refugee* (Figure 6-5) focus on those persons originating from countries such as *Syria* and on entry points into the EU, such as *Turkey* or *Greece*, as well as on the presence of a *camp* in *Calais*, France. There is particular concern over *unaccompanied* and child refugees. Both *migrant* and *refugee* collocate with terms relating to their *number,* itself a significant noun in the corpus, and the words *million* and *thousands* appear in both lists. In addition, in both lists, the collocate *flow* is found, which invokes the often used water metaphor relating to migration and which likened the country to a container that could, therefore, become full (see Gabrielatos and Baker, 2008).




migrant Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

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		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	benefits	187	1,234	10.830
P | N	refugees	209	2,838	10.428
P | N	workers	107	1,261	10.013
P | N	in-work	65	185	9.845
P | N	flow	61	308	9.679
P | N	Greece	66	1,332	9.287
P | N	number	67	1,753	9.143
P | N	EU	384	20,573	9.114
P | N	crisis	64	2,198	8.920
P | N	numbers	41	788	8.846
P | N	arriving	33	246	8.830
P | N	brake	33	282	8.808
P | N	Turkey	49	1,991	8.605
P | N	coming	36	931	8.590
P | N	Europe	97	6,361	8.548
P | N	irregular	25	65	8.543
P | N	economic	51	2,374	8.535
P | N	from	214	16,879	8.527
P | N	arrived	28	390	8.508
P | N	stop	33	849	8.503
P | N	claiming	27	346	8.481
P | N	Britain	84	5,682	8.460
P | N	million	35	1,241	8.410
P | N	limit	25	322	8.384
P | N	Italy	27	540	8.372
P | N	who	117	9,764	8.332
P | N	skilled	22	139	8.311
P | N	access	29	874	8.305
P | N	camps	24	362	8.301
P | N	thousands	27	695	8.290
P | N	influx	21	142	8.242
P | N	benefit	25	677	8.189
P | N	working	32	1,524	8.164

Figure 6-4: Collocates of migrant



refugee Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

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		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	crisis	544	2,198	11.382
P | N	Syrian	442	1,158	11.327
P | N	Turkey	247	1,991	10.288
P | N	child	197	716	10.279
P | N	migrants	209	1,504	10.160
P | N	Greece	165	1,332	9.861
P | N	Europe	300	6,361	9.824
P | N	million	146	1,241	9.708
P | N	children	157	1,804	9.677
P | N	camps	115	362	9.604
P | N	take	144	2,855	9.329
P | N	help	110	1,642	9.201
P | N	from	381	16,879	9.191
P | N	thousands	92	695	9.186
P | N	flow	81	308	9.114
P | N	unaccompanied	80	260	9.111
P | N	camp	88	902	9.065
P | N	Related	124	3,982	8.907
P | N	more	216	10,327	8.900
P | N	UN	74	706	8.869
P | N	Syria	77	1,260	8.780
P | N	in	1,030	72,644	8.773
P | N	numbers	70	788	8.766
P | N	;	155	7,212	8.763
P | N	deal	98	2,966	8.752
P | N	to	1,533	112,508	8.746
P | N	into	122	4,875	8.739
P | N	for	521	35,532	8.737
P | N	asylum	72	1,062	8.733
P | N	are	305	19,889	8.679
P | N	Calais	60	319	8.678
P | N	who	174	9,764	8.644
P | N	number	75	1,753	8.623

Figure 6-5: Collocates of refugee


Concordance lines of this collocation show concern with the numbers of refugees and migrants and a need to 'stem the flow'. Although there is also an apparent concern for the plight of migrants and refugees facing a 'mental health toll' and 'extreme poverty' (line 53 in Concordance 6-7), I would argue that the conflation of migrants and refugees here has the potential to bolster the Leave position on migration and construct the EU as a source of immigration that is primarily problematic. This, in turn, would somewhat undermine the *Guardian*'s stance on the EU.

Concordance 6-7: Selected Concordances from the GPRC of *Refugee and Migrant* collocations

53.	health toll borne by migrants and	refugees	"Extreme poverty is a major motivator
54.	more than a million migrants and	refugees	- had been unusually challenging.
55.	shantytown, which houses up to 3,500	refugees	and migrants trying to reach the UK
56.	there were 52,451 migrants and	refugees	stranded in Greece after Macedonia
57.	huge pressure to stem the flow of	refugees	and migrants from Turkey, amid
58.	manage the arrival of boats carrying	refugees	and migrants from north Africa. But

One further key lemma, which is a significant collocate of both *migrants* and *refugees*, is CRISIS. Examination of collocates for *Migrant* CRISIS and *Refugee* CRISIS show that, in both cases, the crisis is presented as *Europe's* or the *EU's* (see Figures 6-6 and 6-7). Concordance lines suggest that the focus lies on the extent to which movement of refugees and migrants is problematic for the EU, rather than on the issues faced by the refugees and migrants themselves. Whereas additional collocates for *migrant* CRISIS are not particularly useful in determining the precise nature of this discourse, the collocates for *refugee* CRISIS suggest an emphasis on the *handling* of and *response* to the crisis. Furthermore, the extent to which the crisis is *destabilising* also appears to be a matter of concern. What is not clear from this analysis, however, is the extent to which articles are critical or supportive of EU efforts.

Either way, the crisis is presented as a European one and, thereby, it is susceptible to anti-EU arguments stipulating that leaving the EU makes this less of an issue for the UK.




migrant crisis Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	Europe's	3	790	6.858
P | N	refugee	5	1,446	6.768
P | N	first	3	3,409	4.825
P | N	Europe	5	6,361	4.674
P | N	there	3	6,331	3.943
P | N	European	3	6,783	3.845
P | N	with	8	21,469	3.606
P | N	by	7	19,381	3.560
P | N	about	3	9,354	3.384
P | N	been	3	9,534	3.357
P | N	the	55	213,590	3.076
P | N	The	8	33,613	2.960
P | N	from	4	16,879	2.952
P | N	at	3	14,683	2.737
P | N	in	13	72,644	2.550
P | N	.	26	148,772	2.517
P | N	and	14	80,713	2.505
P | N	said	3	17,575	2.479
P | N	is	7	42,297	2.437
P | N	to	18	112,508	2.389
P | N	have	3	19,066	2.361
P | N	"	11	72,227	2.318
P | N	was	3	20,471	2.259
P | N	EU	3	20,573	2.252
P | N	for	5	35,532	2.202
P | N	of	12	108,105	1.862
P | N	,	20	189,496	1.789

Figure 6-6: Migrant Crisis collocates



refugee crisis Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

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		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	Europe's	36	790	9.814
P | N	response	30	701	9.653
P | N	handling	10	112	9.018
P | N	tackle	13	349	8.937
P | N	EU's	20	878	8.872
P | N	Syrian	20	1,158	8.609
P | N	cope	8	166	8.577
P | N	dealing	8	179	8.550
P | N	continent's	6	58	8.410
P | N	Related	43	3,982	8.289
P | N	respond	7	259	8.201
P | N	What	18	1,591	8.126
P | N	ongoing	6	186	8.121
P | N	Syria	15	1,260	8.109
P | N	war	17	1,504	8.104
P | N	Instead	7	319	8.094
P | N	summit	10	710	8.057
P | N	destabilising	4	30	7.896
P | N	chaos	5	168	7.895
P | N	experiencing	4	40	7.870
P | N	solved	4	50	7.845
P | N	second	12	1,229	7.812
P | N	fallout	4	63	7.812
P | N	plunge	4	65	7.807
P | N	biggest	10	948	7.802

Figure 6-7: Refugee Crisis collocates

6.6 The Situation Set

6.6.1 An issue or a crisis?

As noted, analysis of both **refugee & migrant** and **economy & business** key lemma sets reveals CRISIS to be a significant collocate for both sets, while it is also a key lemma in its own right within the corpus. It is used 4.1 times as often as in GSiBol. CRISIS is an abstract noun, which negatively evaluates a situation. It is also one of a number of key lemmas that evaluate situations and issues (see Table 6-5). It is fair to say that any political debate is likely to be centred on 'issues' and it is, therefore, not surprising that this should be the case with the GPRC. It might be expected that situation nouns such as this are near synonyms

expressing an evaluative scale. The arguably more neutral term ISSUE has about the same frequency as CRISIS in GPRC and is also used more than in GSibol, but only by a multiple of two. A comparison of collocates and concordance lines for ISSUE and CRISIS shows, however, that the two nouns are used very differently.


Table 6-5: Sample of key lemmas – Situation Lexical Set

lempos	Freq GPRC	Freq GPRC / mill	Freq SiBol / mill	Keyness Score
issue	2399	547.1	270.1	2.0
crisis	2326	530.4	129.2	4.1
concern	1273	290.3	147.0	2.0
emergency	562	128.2	50.0	2.5

Although CRISIS, as already noted, collocates with terms relating to migration and the economy, collocates of ISSUE are much less informative. Rather than collocating with modifiers to specify a particular problem, ISSUE collocates with specifiers such as *this* and *such*, thereby suggesting that it is used as a cohesive device in the articles. The difficulty here is that concordance lines, even if they have been expanded, do not necessarily show to which ISSUE reference is being made (see Tables 6.8 and 6.9). Both CRISIS and ISSUE collocate with terms relating to migration, but *immigration* (to the UK) only occurs with ISSUE. Interestingly, in 22 out of the 100 randomly selected concordance lines that were examined, ISSUE appears to address concerns which are deemed significant to voters and signifies discussion of what should or will be considered by them. What is not apparent in this limited context is who decides on which issues are significant, and how they come to that conclusion.

Conversely, CRISIS is used to describe or report on situations that concern Europe, the UK, or global economies. As already noted, the crises to which it refers have generally to do

with refugees, migrants, or economic problems. Of the 100 randomly selected concordance lines for CRISIS, 30% reference the former and 28% the latter. CRISIS is also a term used to describe the potential crisis that would result should the referendum yield a leave vote, with three references being made specifically to an *existential* or *constitutional crisis* for the UK. Again, this presents a negative argument for the Remain camp. In addition, there is commentary on how to *resolve* the 'political fallout' or how to *handle* the crises (see Figures 6-8 and 6-9).




issue Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

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		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	immigration	85	1,651	9.291
P | N	on	627	32,227	9.196
P | N	such	105	3,402	9.117
P | N	key	62	1,002	9.063
P | N	this	222	11,186	9.023
P | N	statement	53	608	8.995
P | N	an	207	12,522	8.790
P | N	warning	42	588	8.668
P | N	important	50	1,296	8.645
P | N	big	48	1,415	8.545
P | N	these	59	2,485	8.516
P | N	over	94	5,715	8.499
P | N	about	128	9,354	8.431
P | N	raise	33	386	8.409
P | N	raised	32	430	8.345
P | N	security	40	1,484	8.259
P | N	with	226	21,469	8.253
P | N	become	39	1,417	8.245
P | N	address	30	451	8.242
P | N	most	60	3,723	8.236
P | N	is	415	42,297	8.236
P | N	referendum	77	5,656	8.222
P | N	has	186	18,611	8.153
P | N	been	106	9,534	8.138
P | N	other	64	4,737	8.121
P | N	migration	34	1,348	8.071
P | N	environmental	26	421	8.049

Figure 6-8: Collocates of Issue in the GPRC



crisis Guardian Pre Ref

Collocation candidates

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		Cooccurrence count	Candidate count	logDice
P | N	refugee	493	1,446	12.062
P | N	financial	223	1,684	10.829
P | N	migration	180	1,348	10.646
P | N	humanitarian	83	495	9.909
P | N	steel	102	1,171	9.898
P | N	response	80	701	9.755
P | N	Europe's	76	790	9.639
P | N	migrant	58	533	9.373
P | N	eurozone	55	428	9.350
P | N	2008	51	345	9.286
P | N	housing	51	648	9.131
P | N	Refugee	41	116	9.100
P | N	since	80	2,476	9.090
P | N	tackle	44	349	9.070
P | N	during	55	1,213	8.989
P | N	Greek	39	578	8.778
P | N	Syria	48	1,260	8.774
P | N	Related	80	3,982	8.697
P | N	debt	33	360	8.649
P | N	facing	32	438	8.564
P | N	handling	28	112	8.552
P | N	economic	53	2,374	8.527
P | N	Syrian	39	1,158	8.516
P | N	industry	43	1,635	8.472
P | N	global	41	1,672	8.390
P | N	Greece	36	1,332	8.330
P | N	biggest	29	948	8.178

Figure 6-9: Collocates of Crisis in the GPRC

In this case, it becomes clear that there is no scale of seriousness when using abstract nouns to denote problems. An issue does not appear to become a concern and subsequently a problem before finally turning into a crisis. Based on the concordance lines examined thus far, it appears that a state of crisis is a given for a particular situation, and that the significance of a given issue seems to refer to the 'real' issue (64 in Concordance 6-8). There is no evidence, for instance, of a counter-discourse suggesting that the movement of large numbers of people into and across Europe does not actually represent a crisis. That being said, the nature of the crisis appears to be somewhat disputed. Are these people migrants or refugees? Is this a humanitarian crisis affecting the displaced or is it a political crisis that concerns Europe? Reference to economic and financial crisis again appears to be uncontested insofar as a crisis exists – or did exist in 2008. What is much less clear from the concordance lines is the extent to which the causes and effects of these problems impact on the EU referendum debate.

Concordance 6-8: Selected Concordances from the GPRC of ISSUE

59.	be the topic. It has to be on an	issue	which everybody can understand,
60.	government. "It was a very big	issue	at the last election, it is a big
61.	and work together on key health	issues	such as obesity. The EU working time
62.	showing a massive spike. The	issue	of cyber security for small
63.	are really interested in local	issues	. If we can solve the problem of dog
64.	in many markets. The real	issues	that started the euro crisis have
65.	patience and goodwill" of EU "The	issue	of access to social benefits
66.	on to it. There again, one obvious	issue	is directly linked to the EU, and

Concordance 6-9: Selected Concordances from the GPRC of *Crisis*

67.	the crisis? Or is it a European	crisis	? Or hands up who has not muddied the
68.	could cause a "constitutional	crisis	within these islands". Crispin Blunt
69.	I didn't see the financial	crisis	coming. I had hired some wrong
70.	of a political and humanitarian	crisis	. Our fear on the ground is that as

71.	Labouring under its worst economic	crisis	in decades, with poverty and
72.	political fallout of the refugee	crisis	. It's not that US action in itself
73.	convention can't cope with this	crisis	. Time for a rethink) and the super-
74.	falling ever since the financial	crisis	of 2008. The march from 1% to zero
75.	in to help others in times of	crisis	and today's ruling will ensure those
76.	Downing Street's handling of the	crisis	, which included a series of

6.6.2 A Eurozone crisis

Beyond the UK economy, talk of the *Eurozone* is also highly significant in the GPRC. Concordance lines (Concordance 6-10) suggest considerable concern over the 'long running' 'Eurozone crisis' and its potential effect on the British economy. There is also discussion on the extent to which the departure of the UK from the EU would have negative consequences on the Eurozone. The latter is described as 'ailing', 'dying', and facing an existential threat as the economic problems in Greece pose a significant destabilising factor. Furthermore, there is criticism of how the EU has handled the crisis and a suggestion of both discord among Eurozone countries and a divide between Eurozone members and non-members. I argue that an emphasis on risks , whether to the UK or the EU, has the potential to undermine any pro-EU argument presented.

Concordance 6-10: Selected Concordances from the GPRC of *Eurozone*

77.	ions on how to deal with the	Eurozone	crisis , how to best support refugees
78.	Brexit may spill over to the	Eurozone	and threaten the future of the Euro
79.	attributed to the long-running	Eurozone	crisis, which has meant there have been
80.	published essay is that the	Eurozone	countries should not be allowed to
81.	remained very critical of the	Eurozone's	policy towards Greece. Indeed I
82.	the best answer to a dying	Eurozone	paints a grim picture of the

A British leave vote also entails risks to the global economy but that is not the only factor apparent from the concordance lines of *global economy*. General issues relating to a

global ‘slowdown’ and a ‘sluggish’ US economy are found alongside discussions of its potential impact on the UK economy. The discourse here appears to be resoundingly negative but any likely effects are not readily discerned from the concordance lines (Concordance 6-11).

Concordance 6-11: Selected Concordances from the GPRC of *Global Economy*

83.	cocktail of risks from the	global economy	". Economists expect that desp
84.	concerns about the state of the	global economy	. Testimony later from US
85.	financial crime. The UK and	global economy	The UK economy is crucial for
86.	have profound consequences for the	global economy	. He said that despite a large
87.	case threats to the fragile	global economy	materialise. "The good news is
88.	represents a critical threat to the	global economy	. Plenty of home-grown econom
89.	with grave risks for the	global economy	. Christine Lagarde said
90.	by worries surrounding the	global economy	, a weakening pound and delays

As in the case of the topic of *migrants and refugees*, there is an apparent emphasis on various crises, whether in relation to the UK economy, the Eurozone, the EU, or farther afield.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter used core corpus linguistics methodology to analyse the GPRC in order to make note of the frequency of lemmas, and their concordances and collocates. The main aim of this investigation was to address RQ1 and establish key topics in the news coverage of the *Guardian* that are relevant to the EU in the lead-up to the membership referendum. As was expected, the analysis has shown that the referendum is a significant topic that crops up frequently, while there are also claims that coverage reflects popular opinions. In terms of the two referendum options: leave or remain, articles pertaining to the former appear to

predominate over discussions regarding the latter. The extent to which this discrepancy emphasises leave arguments or challenges, however, is unclear. Nevertheless, it would appear that the leave campaign is more adept at setting the terms of the debate. While the views of UK political figures are widely represented, in relative terms, there is a striking absence of EU actors in the corpus. In most cases, any references are made within the context of their national status as political figures in their own country. Furthermore, in those rare instances, they are mostly associated with division rather than union.

This chapter has underlined two key topics: migration and economic concerns. I have demonstrated the ways in which much of the emphasis in refugee and migrant discourse is permeated by economic concerns. It has also been shown how both these topics are also largely presented through CRISIS terminology, which is a key lemma in the corpus. Research conducted on the referendum post hoc suggests that it was concerns about the economy and incoming migrants that mostly influenced voter opinion (Swales, 2016). Discussion as to the extent to which *Guardian* coverage reflects or generates such concerns notwithstanding, the fact that these topics should be so significant and were presented as crises connected to the EU suggests their potential to influence voters against EU membership. As such, they have potential to affect the outcome of the referendum, despite the *Guardian*'s explicit pro-EU stance.

An additional aim of the analysis, addressing RQ3 in part, was to establish the extent to which corpus methods, used by themselves, can enable the drawing of conclusions regarding discourse around the EU in the lead-up to the British membership referendum. It has become clear through the discussion that corpus tools are capable of identifying significant topics and offering insights, which would not have been possible based on

intuition alone. Examples are the different uses of situation nouns and the economic focus of migration discourse. There are, however, limitations. While it is possible to identify that the discourse makes certain evaluations of the EU, it is not always clear whether those evaluations would be sustained throughout an article or whether they are, on balance, refuted. The extent to which evaluations are attributed or averred, and who is consulted and quoted, is also difficult to determine.

In order to address these issues and gain a better understanding of the discourse significance of this chapter's findings, further investigation will be undertaken in Chapter Seven. Representation of migrants in the media, and the potential impact that this has on social cohesion, racism and public opinion, is an area that has gained considerable attention in the literature (see, for example, Baker, McEnery and Gabrielatos, 2007; Morley and Taylor, 2012; Esses, Medianu and Lawson, 2013; Bleich *et al.*, 2015). Given that the economy can be seen as an overarching key topic in the GPRC corpus, and that this includes references to migration, the focus of the qualitative investigation in the next chapter is on a sub-corpus of articles from the GPRC dealing with the topic of Economics and Business.

Chapter 7: Discourses of Financial Crisis in the *Guardian*

7.1 Introduction

It was established in the previous chapter that the lemma CRISIS occurs in the GPRC at a significantly higher frequency than in the SiBol sub-corpus of *Guardian* articles that was used as a reference. The prevalence of two key topics, namely **Economics and Business**, and **Migration**, seems to account for this fact. In what follows, I shall focus on discourses relating to the economic crisis. It is not immediately clear why references to economic crisis, especially in relation to 2008, should be so frequent in the GPRC. Nevertheless, the collocation analysis of ECONOMY presented in Chapter Six indicates a concern with the stability of the UK's economy and certain negative discourses around the Eurozone. A significant number of scholars maintain that economic arguments, alongside those relating to identity, had an important influence on the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum (see, for instance, Jackson, Thorsen and Wring, 2016; Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley, 2017; Zappettini, 2019). The present study is particularly concerned with how, and to what extent, discourse around the EU might have undermined the pro-EU stance of the *Guardian* (see Research Question 1, discussed in Chapter One). To facilitate further understanding, this chapter examines a sub-corpus of the GPRC, namely the *Guardian* Financial Crisis Corpus (GuFCC – see Chapter Five for a discussion on the criteria used for its creation).

The analysis presented here demonstrates that there is clear evidence of pro-EU discourse in the GuFCC, including unequivocal appeals to vote for remaining in the EU. However, I argue that this stance is undermined by negative portrayals of political figures and

referendum campaign strategy, as well as negatively focused representations of the referendum itself and, in particular, of the Remain argument.

Discourse relating to economic crisis further undermines the *Guardian*'s explicit pro-EU stance by emphasising three interconnected themes: (1) **conflict**, both between the UK and the EU and between individual EU Member States; (2) **disparity** in the experiences of EU citizens; and (3) **risk**, both to the existence of the EU itself, and to the UK though its continued membership of the bloc. Finally, the nature of the frequent references to a migrant crisis found in this economically focused sub-corpus suggests that, in terms of their relationship to the issue of EU membership, the topics of economy and migration may not be as clearly delineated as one might expect.

That the *Guardian's* coverage of the EU has the potential to undermine their support for EU membership raises questions as to why that might be the case. I will argue that theories of News Values (Galtung and Ruge, 1965) and more specifically the discursive construction of News Values (Bednarek and Caple, 2014, 2017; Caple and Bednarek, 2016) has good explanatory value. Analysis of News Values in GuFCC shows that the discursive construal of *negativity* combined with *superlativeness* and *consonance* serves to problematise the EU. Furthermore, *proximity* and *consonance* combine to distance the EU from the UK and contribute to othering the EU. Finally, voters are alienated from the EU through constructions of *eliteness* and *personalisation.* Ultimately, constructing stories as newsworthy overrides explicit calls to vote to remain in the EU.

In the following section (7.2), I shall discuss the methodology used here and detail the coding strategy adopted for this part of the study. I then present the results of the analysis in sections 7.3 – 7.5 before concluding this chapter in section 7.6.

7.2 Methods

To understand the references to the financial crisis in the *Guardian*, a sub-corpus (GuFCC) was created by selecting articles that contained both the lemma CRISIS and at least one of the key lemmas identified in the Finance and Economy lexical set discussed in Chapter Six (see Chapter Five for a detailed description of the GuFCC sub-corpus). This sub-corpus was analysed to clarify how discourse on financial crisis may have had an impact on the representation of the EU and the referendum. As discussed in Chapter Five, two methods were used to analyse the data. The first is informed by the principles of Constructivist Grounded Theory (after Charmaz, 2014) and the second involved coding with a pre-existing News Values framework.

Qualitative coding of the sub-corpus (GuFCC) was undertaken, facilitated through the use of QDA software, MAXQDA (VERBI Software GmbH, 2018). In this part of the study, coding procedures associated with Grounded Theory were used to ensure a principled and rigorous analysis of a larger number of texts than would be possible with Discourse Analysis. This approach also allowed more detail than may be generally found in CADS, which tends to focus on concordance lines, frequency, and keyness, along with a close reading of a more limited number of texts.

A process of trial and error led to the paragraph – rather than document, sentence, or line – being selected as the coding unit. This choice was made because the paragraph generally provided sufficient context to meaningfully assess the use of the lexical item in question, whereas sentences or lines invariably required expansion. It should be noted, however, that newspaper paragraphs are generally short: they frequently consist of only one

or two sentences. Where necessary, text outside the selected paragraphs was consulted to clarify the use of a given term. As has been noted, the coding of paragraphs was undertaken in accordance with the principles of Grounded Theory analysis. By this, I mean that coding was undertaken inductively, with no pre-determined categorical framework being imposed on the text. However, my approach differs from the one generally adopted in Grounded Theory studies in that rather than coding every paragraph in all 100 articles, I selected certain lexical items for examination and coded paragraphs that contained these items. The selection of lexical items for examination (as discussed in more detail in sections 7.3.1 and 7.4.1) was informed by the keyness analysis presented in Chapter Six. It focused first on REFERENDUM-related lexis and then on the lemma CRISIS. From a purely Grounded Theory perspective, it could be argued that I have imposed this focus on the data. In response, I would counter that the focus is informed by the data by means of the corpus study undertaken previously and presented in Chapter Six.

Charmaz argues that coding without a predetermined categorical framework allows the researcher to 'define what is happening in the data' (2014, p. 113). In this project, this was achieved by following Charmaz's recommendation that coding should be completed in numerous phases. During the first phase of coding, each paragraph was assessed in isolation. Next, a second phase of focused coding was undertaken to 'synthesise, analyse and conceptualise' the data (Charmaz, 2014, p. 138). This process, which was followed by a review of the resultant codes, led to the development of major thematic category codes. At that point, additional work was undertaken to establish subcategories where required and revise categories and coding where appropriate. This was carried out by means of an iterative process that Corbin and Strauss (2015) have described as axial coding. A final step involved the further contextualisation of the thematic categories through the reading of a number of

sub-corpus articles in full and referring back to the GPRC to check frequency counts the main *Guardian* Pre-referendum corpus and to the GSiBol reference corpus where necessary. I decided against including a statistical test of inter-coder reliability due to the scale and nature of the project. However, after a break of some weeks, I checked the stability of the coding frameworks that had been developed and ensured the consistency of coding through a review and re-evaluation of all the codes. The two resultant code frameworks, one for REFERENDUM and one for CRISIS, are presented and discussed below in sections 7.3 and 7.4, respectively.

Following analysis of REFERENDUM and CRISIS paragraphs, I then turned to a consideration of News Values. More specifically, I adopted the definitions of News Values found in Bednarek and Caple's (2017) Discursive News Values Analysis (DNVA). The headlines (including sub-heads) and first paragraph of each article in GuFCC was coded according for construal of each News Value (a discussion of News Value definitions and the effect of context on those definitions can be found in subsection 7.5.1). The code *yes* was applied for each News Value where the definition was met. *no* was applied where it was not met and *maybe* was applied where the News value was partially or potentially met, so as to account for borderline cases. As with the qualitative analysis discussed above, the paragraph following the first one was consulted where necessary for comprehension. The analysis is presented in section 7.5.

7.3 Referendum talk: a qualified stance

7.3.1 The Guardian referendum code framework

To assess the extent to which crisis discourse may have undermined *The Guardian*'s pro-EU stance during the referendum campaign, an assessment of referendum talk in the sub-corpus was first undertaken. Paragraphs containing any of the four lemmas with the highest keyness score from the 'Politics and Referendum' lexical set identified in Chapter Six – BREXIT, REFERENDUM, VOTE, and LEAVE – were coded to capture discourse relating to the referendum vote. In addition, paragraphs containing the lemma REMAIN were coded to ensure that both sides of the referendum debate were captured. After the removal of any unrelated uses of the lemmas selected, the number of paragraphs coded for each lemma was as follows:

Brexit	135 paragraphs from 35 articles
Referendum	98 paragraphs from 42 articles
Vote	102 paragraphs from 32 articles
Leave	87 paragraphs from 33 articles
Remain	48 articles from 23 Articles.

Because any given paragraph may have contained more than one of the lexical items coded, a total of 314 paragraphs were coded across 54 out of 100 articles of the GuFCC. This small majority of articles is nevertheless notable, particularly given that the GPRC, and thereby the GuFCC sub-corpus, were not built using any search terms that relate specifically to the referendum. I would argue that, as readers considered their vote, *The Guardian*'s representation of the EU connected to the negativity arising from its coverage of crises is likely to have been connected to the membership referendum in their minds, even where no such link was explicitly made. Furthermore, connecting crisis frames and referendum frames to the EU potentially undermined *The Guardian's* pro-EU stance.

The coding framework derived from my analysis of the 314 referendum paragraphs in the GuFCC contains eight main thematic categories. These, along with a number of subcategories, are presented in Table 7-1, as are the number of paragraphs and the number of articles coded to each. It should be noted that the codes are not mutually exclusive: paragraphs may be coded to multiple thematic categories. The analysis, which will be discussed in detail in sections 7.3.2–7.3.4, reveals a considerable emphasis on covering the negative consequences of holding a referendum and the effects of the political campaigns prompted by it, as opposed to engaging with the Leave and Remain arguments per se. There is relatively little evidence of the referendum being defended (see Thematic Code 1: Problematising the Referendum and Code 2: Defending the Referendum). The focus is on uncertainty, disruption, and the divisiveness of the campaign itself. Furthermore, although a pro-EU stance is apparent in the reporting, Codes 3 and 4 below indicate an interesting duality in pieces explicitly designated as opinion. There, Remain arguments tend be presented negatively, suggesting, in broad terms, that leaving the EU will be bad for the UK. On the other hand, the Leave argument, which is less frequently presented overall, tends to be presented more positively, suggesting that leaving will be a good thing and that it is not a risk.

Table 7-1: Referendum code framework

CODE	NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS CODED	NUMBER OF ARTICLES CODED
1. PROBLEMATISING THE REFERENDUM		
1.1. CREATING UNCERTAINTY	66	23
1.2. PROBLEMATIC TACTICS	14	13
1.3. CREATING /REFLECTING DIVISION IN SOCIETY	8	3
1.4. POLITICIANS / PARTIES DIVIDED	5	2

	1.5. IMPACTING ON POLITICS	3	2
2.	**DEFENDING THE REFERENDUM**		
	2.1. REFERENDUM AS IMPORTANT	3	3
	2.2. REFERENDUM NOT DESCRIPTIVE OR SIGNIFICANT	7	2
3.	**EXPLICIT REMAIN ARGUMENT**		
	3.1. BENEFIT OF STAYING	11	8
	3.2. RISK OF LEAVING FOR EU	11	6
	3.3. RISK OF LEAVING FOR UK	76	26
4.	**EXPLICIT LEAVE ARGUMENT**		
	4.1. BENEFIT OF LEAVING	9	7
	4.2. RISK OF STAYING	5	3
	4.3. LEAVING NOT A RISK	6	3
5.	**REPRESENTING OTHERS' VIEWS**		
	5.1. ON INDIVIDUAL ELITES' VIEWS	10	8
	5.2. ON OTHERS' VIEWS	24	11
	5.3. ON UK VOTERS' CONCERNS	8	5
6.	**COMMENT ON THE EU**		
	6.1. ON EU RESPONSE	3	2
	6.2. CRITICAL OF THE EU AS AN ENTITY	8	3
	6.3. POSITIVE ON THE EU AS AN ENTITY	8	2
7.	**PREDICTING RESULT**	**9**	
	7.1. PREDICTING BREXIT	5	3
	7.2. CONFIDENT OF REMAIN	2	1
	7.3. PREDICTING REMAIN	1	1
8.	**COMMENTING ON PREPARATIONS**	**14**	**6**

Thematic Codes 1–4 above account for all 54 articles identified as referring to the referendum. As such, the analysis presented below is divided into two parts. The first, subsection 7.3.2, focuses on thematic codes 1 and 2. The second, subsections 7.3.3–7.3.4, discusses the Remain and Leave thematic codes (3 and 4, respectively). Ultimately it will be

argued that this coverage significantly undermines the explicit pro-EU stance professed by the *Guardian*.

7.3.2 The referendum, disruption, and uncertainty

Of the 54 articles that refer in some way to the 2016 EU membership referendum, the largest number of articles are coded to thematic categories that do not necessarily discuss an argument for leaving or remaining explicitly, but instead discuss the effect of having a referendum (see codes 1 and 2 in Table 7-1). Most frequently, such articles discuss the extent to which the referendum itself is disruptive or generates uncertainty. Problematisation of the referendum (Code 1) is found in 82 paragraphs across 33 of the 54 articles. Defending the referendum (Code 2) is found in just 10 paragraphs across eight articles. From February 2016, shortly after David Cameron's announcement that there would be a June referendum, caution on the part of financial analysts' forecasts is emphasised (see example 1 below) owing to the uncertainty created by the referendum. However, as the weeks progress, there are increasing references to 'jitters among businesses' in response to the possibility of negative interest rates (example 2). It is reasonable to assume that a referendum vote that maintained the status quo would be of little concern, and, arguably, such references therefore imply an argument in favour of remaining in the EU (but see Chapter Two for a discussion of the complexity surrounding views on EU membership). A downturn in consumer confidence in the economy is attributed to, among other things, 'uncertainty ahead of the EU referendum' (example 3). By June, economic recovery is presented, at least in part, as being dependent on a vote to remain in the EU (example 4). Again, this implies a stance in favour of remaining.

1. However, the analysts added that their forecasts are based on a view that the UK will remain in the EU and that, as a result, the underlying

dynamics will remain solid in the UK economy. They continue to forecast the pound at $1.40 and the euro at 68p in 12 months' time.

2. But with economic growth showing signs of slowing amid a global trade downturn and jitters among businesses ahead of the EU referendum, there has been some speculation that borrowing costs could be cut further.

3. Numbers of shoppers visiting retail centres fell in April, in the latest evidence that cautious consumers are cutting back or going online to hunt for better deals. Consumers have been the main drivers of the UK's economic recovery but recent business surveys suggest confidence is flagging, affected by a range of factors from economic uncertainty ahead of the EU referendum to a darker global outlook.

4. But there are signs that the downturn has bottomed out, with firms growing more confident about the coming months. That could lead to a recovery in the second half of this year, the EEF believes, if the UK chooses to remain in the EU and 'other factors holding back growth continue to wane.

A further significant aspect of discussion about the referendum relates to the campaign's divisiveness, both for the country as a whole and within political parties (code 1.3 in Table 7-1). Concerns were expressed before the announcement of the referendum date (see example 5 below) and continued throughout the campaign (example 6). This has been shown to be a feature of editorials in all major newspapers prior to the referendum: according to some, the referendum was presented 'mostly in terms of a civil war within the conservative party' (Jackson, Thorsen and Wring, 2016, p. 48), as demonstrated in examples 6 and 7 below. The issue here is the framing of the referendum in terms of the concerns of the political elites, rather in terms of the voters' concerns. As such, explicit arguments to remain are neglected. Indeed, although many of the articles refer to things that would affect voters, such as job losses and economic uncertainty, only four articles that refer to the referendum explicitly invoke voters' concerns (example 8). Even then, voters are mentioned in terms of their importance to the campaign. Arguments about how either side addresses their concerns are absent.

5. The Brexit debate will be highly charged and hugely divisive for the UK and, like the rest of the nation, business remains split on the issue. The CBI's own polling shows that a majority of members in favour of remaining within a reformed EU, but there is a small and vocal minority that believes the UK would be better off outside.

6. Three years ago, Cameron put the future of the UK […] at stake by setting off towards an in-out referendum on the EU as a way of managing his own party. It is obvious he has failed to put internal Tory dissent to rest. That Boris Johnson has sided with leave brings to mind how in 2005 Laurent Fabius […] opted for no against his own party's leadership in the referendum campaign on the EU constitution. That led to disastrous results.
7. By polling day, 23 June, some good may yet come of this ramshackle and unimpressive pair of campaigns, as Michael Gove is saying. Brexit would trigger a major EU reform and may save it from current folly, Gove argues.
8. This, though, ignores the obvious point: many voters are worried about immigration not because they are xenophobes but because, for them, it is an economic issue. They are less bothered about living standards, as narrowly defined by GDP per head, and more concerned about quality of life. This is particularly true of Labour voters living in less prosperous parts of Britain. They will decide the referendum's outcome.

7.3.3 The Negative Remain Argument

Although voters' concerns are perhaps neglected in terms of explicit references (see code 5 in Table 7-1), with only eight paragraphs found across four documents, the Remain argument is nevertheless made and the potential impact of leaving on voters is noted, albeit indirectly. However, in the 98 paragraphs across 31 articles in which an explicit remain argument is propounded (code 3), 24 articles (74% of the total) do so by referencing the risks to the UK of a leave vote rather than by elucidating the benefits of remaining in the EU. Nine articles extrapolate existential risks to the EU and risks to the world in the event of Brexit. Examples 9 and 10 below demonstrate the emphasis on increases in mortgage interest rates and job losses in the UK. Donald Tusk, President of the European Council 2014–2019, goes so far as to suggest that a vote to leave the EU presents an existential risk to 'western political civilisation' (example 10), part of a discourse termed 'project fear' by Brexit campaigners. As has been argued, such a negative emphasis served to pitch threats of dire consequences from political elites against the concerns of ordinary voters who, according to the Leave campaign, wanted to 'take back control' (Clarke and Newman, 2017, p. 110). It would appear that,

despite *The Guardian's* stated support for EU membership, the newspaper's reporting of the Remain campaign led to their inadvertent amplification of such messaging.

9. The Bank of England has given David Cameron a significant boost ahead of the EU referendum by warning that a vote to leave risks causing a run on sterling, a credit crunch and higher interest rates for mortgage payers and businesses.
10. The trade union federation, which is campaigning to persuade voters to remain part of the EU, said Brexit would hit wages, jobs and workers' rights and warned of a 'devastating' blow to Britain's manufacturing sector, where highly skilled jobs would be lost.
11. Donald Tusk, president of the European Council, said on Monday that if Britain votes to leave it could be the 'beginning of the destruction of not only the EU but also of western political civilisation in its entirety'.

On the one hand, negative framing of the risk of leaving the EU is found in 24 articles. On the other, a positive message was presented in just 11 paragraphs across eight articles. Notably, this messaging is conveyed in somewhat general terms rather than in concrete benefits. In example 12 below, the Labour Party refers to 'national interest' and 'the interests of working people', but neither the specific interest nor the ways in which EU membership is beneficial are mentioned. The same is true in example 13 below. There, 'dialogue among nations' is presented as desirable and the UK is framed as a positive influence on an imperfect EU. Notably, this article presents 'letters' from EU citizens, arguing for and against the UK's remaining part of the EU. The comments in example 13 come from staff at the International School of Geneva who argue for remaining, but their comment sits among others in favour of leaving. Overall, the comments both criticise and praise the EU, and similarly criticise and praise the UK. As such, it is the complexity of the argument, rather than the strength of one side or the other, that is emphasised.

12. A Labour spokesperson said: 'The Labour party's position is clear – it's in Britain's national interest and in the interests of working people to remain in Europe and we will be campaigning accordingly.'

13. We believe in the power of democracy and self-determination, but we also believe in the enormous value of dialogue within and among nations. For that reason, and despite the imperfections of the EU, we would greatly prefer to see the UK remain a strong member and use its influence positively in order to construct a better future for Europe and for the world.

7.3.4 A Positive Leave Argument

In contrast to the presentation of the Remain argument in the paragraphs analysed, the Leave argument is presented positively: if we leave, good things will happen. However, such arguments explicitly presenting the benefits of leaving the EU were found in only 11 articles. These articles focus on an economic argument of continued growth (examples 15–16) or on the freedom to spend money on 'priorities that matter to us' (example 14). Further details of the article of 21 March 2016 from which example 16 below is taken reveal that reporter Julia Kollewe is evidently seeking to offer a balanced view, presenting arguments from both sides of the debate. However, the headline places the article firmly in the realm of the negative: 'Brexit could cost 100bn and nearly 1m jobs, CBI warns; Report conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers for the CBI says economy faces irreparable damage if UK leaves European Union'(Kollewe, 2016). Thus, even where a positive argument for leaving is presented, the negative campaign messaging of the Remain camp is emphasised.

14. 'This is more scare tactics from the remain side. If we vote to leave and take control of our money we will have more to spend on the priorities that matter to us like the NHS.'

15. Even pro-EU campaigners have admitted that after we vote leave on 23 June, we will secure a deal where the economy will grow and jobs will be created. The safest thing for our economic security is to spend our money on our priorities.' (Gdn March 00062, Pos. 20)

16. Matthew Elliott, chief executive of Vote Leave, said: 'Even in the CBI's skewed choice of scenarios for exit, they are forced to admit that employment and the economy will continue to grow after we Vote Leave. (03 Gdn March 00236, Pos. 13)

Hobolt (2016) has argued convincingly that both the Leave and Remain campaigns were based on fear: Remain invoked the fear of economic consequences and risk to jobs, Leave focused on the fear of migration (Hobolt, 2016, p. 1262). However, the present analysis shows that, whereas the Remain argument achieves this through explicitly negative messaging, the Leave campaign's messaging is presented in a much more positive light. According to a meta-analysis of political messaging research, contrary to conventional wisdom, negative campaigns are not effective at winning votes and such campaigns may serve to lower trust in government and political efficacy (Lau, Sigelman and Rovner, 2007). In a campaign that set the priorities of political elites against the concerns of ordinary voters (Clarke and Newman, 2017), exemplified in Michael Gove's assertion that 'people in this country have had enough of experts' (Deacon, 2016, p. NP), any undermining of trust and even a small reduction of turnout is likely to have been significant for the final outcome of the referendum.

7.4 Crisis Talk: Undermining a Pro-EU Position

7.4.1 The Guardian Crisis Code Framework

Having established the nature of the discourse on the referendum in the *Guardian* sub-corpus, the next sections analyse the themes that emerge through the coding of paragraphs containing CRISIS, according to the principles outlined in subsection 7.2 above. In total, 236 occurrences of the lemma CRISIS were found across the 100 articles. In general, these references simply use CRISIS, variously conceived, as a reference to the 2008 financial crisis. Table 7-2 shows the five broad thematic code categories identified, along with subcodes. As with the above

referendum analysis, codes are not mutually exclusive: paragraphs may be coded to multiple categories and to multiple codes within those categories.

Table 7-2: Crisis Codes Framework

CODE	NUMBER OF ARTICLES CODED /100	NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS CODED /236
1. TEMPORAL		
1.1. PAST CRISIS	*82*	*126*
1.2. CURRENT CRISIS	*29*	*85*
1.3. POTENTIAL CRISIS	*15*	*23*
2. ONGOING CONSEQUENCES	**46**	**60**
3. RECOVERY	**21**	**27**
4. PROBLEMATISING SUBTEXT		
4.1. CONFLICT	42	91
4.1.1. WITHIN EU	*35*	*78*
4.1.2. BETWEEN UK AND EU	*10*	*13*
4.2. DISPARITY	27	63
4.2.1. OF MEMBERSHIP BENEFITS	*7*	*7*
4.2.2. SUFFERING / MIGRATION	*12*	*26*
4.2.3. SUFFERING / FINANCIAL	*17*	*30*
4.3. RISK	28	48
4.3.1. EUROZONE / EU EXISTENTIAL	*17*	*30*
4.3.2. TO THE WORLD	*8*	*11*
4.3.3. TO THE UK	*7*	*7*
5. POSITIVE SUBTEXT	**8**	**9**

This analysis demonstrates that references to crises in the majority of articles problematise the EU, thereby having the potential to undermine *The Guardian*'s pro-EU

stance. In addition to the temporal references reflected in Thematic Code 1 above, frequent reference is made to the ongoing consequences of a crisis – the implication being that this is a failure on the part of the EU (Thematic Code 2). A pro-EU argument is further undermined by the considerable prevalence of a problematising subtext (Code 4) that encompasses three related themes: **Conflict**, **Disparity**, and **Risk**. Of the 100 sub-corpus articles, 56 were coded to one or more of these three negative subtext themes. As with references to the Brexit referendum, this represents only a slight majority of the sub-corpus. Indeed, there is some infrequent positive discourse, relating to recovery from crisis (code 3) and certain benefits of EU membership (code 5). However, I am not arguing that the negativity is relevant owing to any measure of statistical significance. Rather, I am arguing that this conflation of crisis framing with the EU and the referendum has the clear potential to influence voters in a fiercely contested referendum.

As shown in in Figure 7-1 below, the focus on numerous negative issues relating to austerity and the Eurozone gives rise to the negative subtext. I shall argue that this serves to problematise the EU and, once again, to undermine the stated pro-EU position of the *Guardian*.




Figure 7-1: Summary of negative subtext themes in the GUFCC sub-corpus

After first considering the definition of crisis in the GuFCC in subsection 7.4.2, I shall consider the positive representations that were found in subsection 7.4.3. I shall look, in turn, at Conflict, Disparity, and Risk coding (subsections 7.4.4–7.4.6) before moving on to consider the influence of News Values in section 7.5.

7.4.2 Crisis: What, When, Where, and Whose

Given that this sub-corpus was compiled on the basis of the presence of terms relating to economics, finance, and banking, it is unsurprising that 100 of the 239 instances of CRISIS are

preceded by *financial* across 84 of the 100 articles. In addition, Table 7-3 shows that there are 21 references to *economic* CRISIS and 11 occurrences of *banking* CRISIS along with references to a *Eurozone* CRISIS, *2008* CRISIS, and *debt* CRISIS. However, the naming of a crisis is not a politically neutral act. Describing the crisis as a banking crisis arguably focuses responsibility on banks rather than on political entities. Here, however, the crisis is more frequently characterised as financial or economic (and therefore, arguably, a political issue). I argue that this draws political entities, and the EU in particular, into focus: the EU is saddled both with the original culpability for the crisis and with the responsibility for resolving its concomitant issues. Once again, this messaging has the potential to undermine a pro-EU position.

Table 7-3: Left collocates of crisis used more than once

Collocate	**Number of Occurrences**	**In Number of Articles**
Financial Crisis	100	81
Migra* / Refugee Crisis	29	14
Economic Crisis	21	18
The Crisis	20	15
Greek Crisis	12	6
Banking Crisis	11	11
Pre-Crisis	5	4
Euro/Eurozone Crisis	5	3
2008 Crisis	4	2
Steel Crisis	3	3
Humanitarian Crisis	3	1
Debt Crisis	3	2
Funding	2	1
Existential	2	2
Quiet	2	1

In general, any mention of the 2008 global financial crisis acts as a reference point for comparison (see example 17 below). Indeed, 126 out of the 224 paragraphs that contain one or more instances of crisis refer to a crisis that happened in the past (see the Temporal coding category in Table 7-2). References to past crises may express a neutral, positive, or negative

assessment: a situation has improved since 2008, it has remained the same, or it has become worse. Where such judgements of the EU occur, the evaluation is generally neutral or favourable. However, there are instances in which a negative evaluation is presented owing to the crisis being unresolved. There are 85 references in 33 articles to a current crisis, and a further 23 references in 18 articles to a potential future crisis. EU Member States Greece and Italy are both reported to be currently facing financial or economic crises, and other reports characterise Italy as facing a potential crisis in the future (examples 18–20 below). That two EU Member States should be facing crises implies differential experiences and economic fortunes for individual Member States. The significance of this is discussed in further detail in sections 7.4.4. and 7.4.5. It is important to note that the combination of negative references relating to past crises, together with negativity associated with current or potential future crises again conspire to undermine any positive evaluation of the EU.

17. And going back to the height of the financial crisis, the worst-hit economies – the US and Britain – expended vast resources driving down the value of their currencies.
18. Greece's economic crisis goes on, like an odyssey without end; Last year was deeply tumultuous for the troubled country but with growing fears of social unrest, 2016 could be even more unpredictable
19. But some commentators believe an altogether quieter crisis should also be at the top of the worry list: Italy's battle to prop up its debt-laden banks.
20. Italy's ability to deal with any potential financial crisis down the road was called into question late last year following what was seen as a botched bailout of four regional banks, in which a number of pensioners lost their savings.

If discourse relating to the financial crisis is to be expected as a result of the economically oriented make-up of the *Guardian* Crisis sub-corpus, the prevalence of discourse relating to migration and the refugee crisis is rather less predictable. As noted in the previous chapter, both MIGRANT and REFUGEE are key in the main GPRC corpus and CRISIS is a significant collocate of both. Nevertheless, collocation analysis did not clarify the extent to which these

references reflect a discourse that problematises the EU. Closer scrutiny reveals that the majority of references are to migrants from Afghanistan and Syria entering Greece via Turkey; such references appear in this sub-corpus owing to the fact that this increased migration places additional pressure on a country already suffering from a financial crisis. When combined with references to *humanitarian crisis*, in all but 9 of the 32 cases, paragraphs are additionally coded to one of the three problematising subtext codes. As detailed in sections 7.4.4–7.4.6, this crisis talk highlights the notions of **conflict** between EU nations, **disparity** in the experience of citizens, or **risk** to either the EU itself, the UK, or the broader world (see examples 21 and 22 below). Although positive references to Greece can be found, these are clearly concerned with the generosity of the Greek people and their attitudes towards refugees arriving there (example 23). The implication remains: not all EU Member States face the same burdens when faced with the arrival of large numbers of refugees.

21. Observers such as Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands and the EU have been filling the funding void, but the refugee crisis has prompted many European countries to focus funding closer to home.
22. Austria has a proud history of helping refugees – but for how much longer?; The nation that functions as a bridge between east and west could help to stabilise the migration crisis facing the EU
23. Greeks will always be willing to help regardless of their own situations. 'When you spend your last euro to buy vegetables to make your neighbour some soup because she is ill, what do you think changes when the refugee crisis knocks on your door? Nothing.'

7.4.3 Crisis Talk Highlighting the Positives

It is noteworthy that, although some evidence of positive discourse in relation to the crisis was found, it was extremely limited and featured in opinion pieces by writers from EU Member States such as Estonia and Portugal in an EU Voices series. Just nine paragraphs containing the lemma CRISIS were coded as positive. Significantly, all of these relate to benefits to countries other than the UK. In example 24 below, the EU is presented positively as a place

that applies a ‘merit-based approach’, although there is also a negative evaluation of decisions made based on ‘political expediency’. The article written immediately before the referendum by Kadri Liik, an Estonian Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, emphasises the benefits of EU membership for small countries rather than larger ones such as the UK, and, even then, it is not entirely positive. Similarly, an article by Carlos Gaspar, a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations, also focuses on how EU membership benefits smaller Member States (example 25 below).

24. Interestingly, and contrary to many stereotypes, the merit-based approach that so benefited Estonia as a candidate country still works inside the EU. The EU may fill its important posts on the basis of political expediency and impersonal quotas, but if life presents it with questions, it looks for answers where these can be found – which may well be in a small country. Estonia is now the EU's leader on digital and cyber issues – because it has built up the relevant expertise and learned how to offer it. Its efficient handling of the economic crisis has earned it credibility on economic issues
25. The European project helps small states think big; Belonging to a club of big states gave us democratic stability and economic growth. Not even the eurozone crisis can shake Portuguese faith in the EU.

The EU Voices series published in the *Guardian* was undoubtedly intended to broaden the publication’s positive representation of the EU. However, I would argue that the focus on benefits to other nations, references to the Eurozone crisis, and implied criticisms of the political process in some nations are unlikely to have persuaded a wavering voter of the benefits of EU membership for the UK and its citizens. Those who reacted positively to such stories were likely to have been those who would have voted to remain anyway.

7.4.4 Crisis Talk Highlighting Conflict

Whether they refer to past, present, or potential future crises, 91 paragraphs across 42 of the 100 articles in the sub-corpus emphasise conflict between EU Member States. Some of this discourse relates to the renegotiation of British membership terms as instigated by David Cameron in his 2013 Bloomberg speech. One might argue that the EU is reasonable in wanting to protect its ability to 'act fast in a debt crisis' (see example 24 below). Nevertheless, some level of disagreement – between the UK and the EU, but also between Member States – is implied by references to the Eurozone and to the fact that 'several countries', but not all of them, are concerned by the possibility of conflict.

Indeed, of the 91 paragraphs coded to conflict, only 13 refer to conflict between the EU and the UK; 78 refer to conflict between other EU Member States. A particularly antagonistic relationship between Germany and Greece is repeatedly emphasised, with Greece portrayed as having been 'forced' to accept the conditions of a financial bailout (example 26). In addition, Ireland and Portugal are described as having had to '[pay] the price for [their] mistakes' and had 'austerity regimes imposed'. This language is indicative of punishment rather than mutual cooperation (example 27). Furthermore, the reference to 'escalating tensions' between unspecified EU Member States and Italy implies that such inter-Member State conflict is an ongoing issue, rather than a problem that relates to the 2008 financial crisis (28–29).

26. The UK wants a get-out-clause on economic policy […]. But an economic emergency brake would require treaty change and several eurozone countries, including Germany, are loath to introduce this mechanism when the currency union may need to act fast in a debt crisis.

27. Turmoil in the Middle East and in the markets has pushed the eurozone debt problems down the agenda […] But it still provides hope of a verbal punch-up, when the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, and the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schuble, discuss the future of Europe. Memories of last summer's crisis, where Tsipras was forced into a painful third bailout deal, are still fresh.)

28. After Greece and Ireland, Portugal paid the price of both its own mistakes and of the failings of the European institutions. In the frontline of the euro crisis, these three countries were granted bailouts and subjected to austerity regimes imposed by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the Central European Bank. In 2014, Portugal was able to guarantee a 'clean exit' from its bailout.

29. The Italian banking index closed up 6.9%, ending a rout which had seen it lose nearly a quarter of its value this year. […] But volatility in the sector, coupled with escalating tensions between Italy and the EU on a broad range of topics, have generated fear that the country could be inching towards a financial crisis.

It is interesting to note that any imposition of austerity measures on an EU Member State would have been a condition for receiving support from the European Stability Mechanism, the mission of which is 'to provide financial assistance to Euro Area countries' (ESM, no date). Decisions regarding support packages and conditions are made by the Board of Directors, which comprises representatives from each of the Eurozone countries as appointed by the Governor for that country. These directors are the Ministers of Finance in their respective home nations. As such, the members of the Eurozone are clearly jointly culpable for any consequences suffered by the likes of Greece and Italy. This nuance is missed by the reporting: it is the EU as a whole, and frequently Germany in particular, that is presented as imposing draconian measures.

7.4.5 Crisis Talk Highlighting Disparity

Issues relating to the financial crisis, the imposition of austerity measures, and the migration crisis all demonstrate a disparity in the experiences of EU citizens. These differences are emphasised in 63 paragraphs across 27 of 100 articles, reflecting concerns over the loss of pensioners' savings in Italy (example 30 below) and issues created by large numbers of

refugees arriving on relatively small Greek islands (example 31). It is particularly notable that 12 of the 100 sub-corpus articles refer to the suffering of citizens as a result of migration.

The cynicism expressed by certain EU citizens is exemplified in the *Guardian* letters page from two days before the referendum. There, we read a powerful statement from a Greek citizen who sees the EU as benefiting 'French and German banks' rather than 'struggling Greek people' (example 32 below). The EU's frequent representation as a Franco-German entity, and the problems associated with it, is well documented (see, for instance Glaas, 2016; Michailidou, 2017). Of the eight letters presented in the aforementioned issue, two are vehemently angry at the EU. While the *Guardian* should perhaps be applauded for presenting both sides of the referendum debate, these assertions undeniably reinforce a problematising discourse already found in the publication. They potentially undermine a pro-EU position.

30. Italy's ability to deal with any potential financial crisis down the road was called into question late last year following what was seen as a botched bailout of four regional banks, in which a number of pensioners lost their savings.
31. The movement of so many people displaced by civil war and persecution saw nearly half a million refugees land on the shores of Lesbos in 2015. Since then the island's 90,000 residents have found themselves under the glare of the world's media.
32. The EU is a union for the big banks, not for people. The bailouts have not been to help the struggling Greek people, but for the French and German banks.

7.4.6 Crisis Talk Highlighting Risk

The final observed element of negative subtext relates to the EU and potential future risk. It is to be expected that, during a referendum campaign, arguments would describe how remaining in the EU poses a risk to the UK. Although such references are found, they are invariably marked as quotations and countered by other views (see example 33 below). Furthermore, this accounts for only 7 of the 48 paragraphs coded to risk. A further 11

references to broader, global risk are clearly presented as mere potential arguments or the opinions of only a few. Perhaps most interesting are references to a risk to the EU itself: 30 such paragraphs across 17 articles were found. These references range from concerns over the future of the Eurozone, to more broadly questioning the notion of EU integration (examples 34–35). It has been shown that risk framing had an impact on support for EU enlargement (Schuck and de Vreese, 2006). As such, it is reasonable to assume that the same would also be true of the EU membership referendum.

33. 'The real risk to the UK economy is remaining in a failing EU club that will tax our financial services, depress wages via mass migration and continue to impose burdensome red tape on our small and medium-sized businesses.' (04 Gdn April 00439 2, Pos. 36)
34. One left-of-centre argument against Brexit is that it would result in the breakup of the euro and by doing so set off a chain reaction that would lead to the next global crisis: a perfectly fair point. (05 Gdn May 00364, Pos. 24)
35. The eurozone recovery remains disappointingly weak after Greece fell back into recession and Italy slowed to near stagnation. The single currency area grew by just 0.3% in the final quarter of 2015, statistics body Eurostat reported on Friday. On an annual basis, the eurozone expanded by 1.5%, down from 1.6% three months earlier, suggesting growth remains weak despite the European Central Bank's stimulus measures and the positive impact of cheap oil.

7.5 News Values driving media discourse

7.5.1 News Values and context

As noted in 7.2 above, headlines and first paragraphs in GuFCC were coded *yes, no* or *maybe* for each of the News Values. Table 7-4 below shows the definition of each value according to Bednarek and Caple (2017, p. 55) and, for a number of the News Values, I provide a more specific definition given the context of the analysis. Consonance, for example, relates to expectation and as such, the historical context of Britain's relationship with the EU and particular member states is relevant. Of particular note is the News Value **Proximity**. We

might consider that as the UK is part of the EU then reference to the EU should be considered proximate at all times, however, as previously noted, part of the issue in representation of the EU is that it is presented as other. I made the decision here to code reference to the EU as *maybe* proximate in order to review each paragraph and the broader context more carefully within the article as a whole, in order to judge whether the EU is represented in the Guardian as proximate or not (see subsection 7.3.3 below).

Table 7-4: News Values: Definitions and Context

Value	Definition from Bednarek and Caple (2017, p. 55)	Specific context for this study and coding
Consonance	Expectedness of events. The event is discursively constructed as (stereo)typical: Limited here to news actors, social groups, organisations and countries.	Consonance will have been historically established – e.g., UK as awkward partner / French as anti-British; EU as anti UK.
Eliteness	Actors and events discursively constructed as of high status or fame	EU entities and actors assumed to be elite
Impact	Event is discursively constructed as having significant effects or consequences (not restricted to impact on the target audience)	Coded as *Yes* for impact specified for UK and maybe for impact implied for UK or impact specified / implied elsewhere
Negativity	Event is discursively construed as negative	-
Personalisation	Event is discursively constructed as having a personal or human face (non-elite actors, including eyewitnesses)	-
Proximity	The event is discursively constructed as geographically or culturally near	Coded *yes* for UK; *maybe* for EU / US & other western democracies – because in this context, proximity and 'belonging' is what is challenged by the referendum
Superlativeness	The event is discursively construed as of high intensity or large scope / scale	Based on a scale of intensity – inevitably subjective and context dependent. Coded *yes* for clear superlative lexis
Timeliness	The event is discursively construed as timely in relation to publication date	-
Unexpectedness	The event is discursively construed as unexpected / unusual / strange or rare	-

7.5.2 Negativity, Superlativeness and Consonance: problematising the EU

Negativity has been described as the key News Value and this is supported by the findings here with 83 out of 100 articles being coded as explicitly negative (either in the headline, or the opening paragraph, or both). This focus on negativity is perhaps unsurprising given that the criteria for this sub-corpus of articles included presence of the lemma CRISIS. Nevertheless, I would argue that the extent of the negativity leads to an overwhelmingly negative context around the topic of the European Union that serves to undermine a pro-EU position. Of the 83 articles in GuFCC, 21 contained headlines or initial paragraphs which explicitly problematise the EU in some way. While a minority, I would suggest that this is nevertheless significant when considered in conjunction with the other issues outlined in this chapter.

Negative construal of the EU ranges from reference to conflict around David Cameron's EU negotiations which are described as 'fraught', to financial problems in EU member states like Italy which is 'inching towards financial crisis', and to a eurozone recovery which is framed as faltering (see examples 36 - 38 below). The News Value **superlativeness** is also clearly apparent in these examples. Italian shares have been in 'freefall' and, in a particularly negative article, the Eurozone is 'dying' (Example 39 below)

36. The fraught negotiations are focused on Cameron's insistence on curbing welfare payments for non-British EU citizens working in the UK as a means of reducing EU immigration to Britain.
37. Italian prime minister tries to buoy shares in Italy's banks; Shares start to recover after weeks in freefall but there are fears Italy is inching towards financial crisis.
38. Eurozone recovery falters as Greece slips back into recession; Italy slows to near stagnation as eurozone GDP expands just 0.3% in final quarter despite ECB stimulus and cheap oil
39. Brexit may be the best answer to a dying eurozone; Staying in the EU means hitching ourselves to an undemocratic project run by and for a remote elite

The example cited in 39 above comes from an opinion piece by *Guardian* economics editor, Larry Elliot. He is scathing in his superlative ridden criticism of the Eurozone describing it as 'economically moribund, persists with policies that have demonstrably failed, is indifferent to democracy, is run by and for a small, self-perpetuating elite, and is slowing dying' (Elliott, 2016). At the same time, he describes Brexit 'as act of creative destruction' making the article not so much calling for Brexit but vehemently anti currency union. This underlines, once again the complexity of opinion on EU membership. Of the 100 articles in GuFCC, Elliot has by-lines in 11 in the Business or Economy sections along with this one opinion piece. It is not clear when reviewing his other articles whether he himself might vote Remain or Leave, but it is certainly true to say that his perspective on the Eurozone has the potential to undermine the *Guardian* stance on remaining in the EU.

In addition to that which relates directly to the EU, negativity is significant in relation to having a referendum and political process, as discussed in 7.3.2 above. While this need not necessarily reflect badly on the EU itself, the association with political turmoil and conflict does undermine confidence in political process and had the potential to depress turnout in the referendum. Of particular interest here is another opinion piece, this time listed as editorial rather than an individual by-line. The article lists 'six big things about Britain and Europe that were true last week, are still true today, and are likely to remain true in the future (Guardian Editorial, 2016b). Frustration with the referendum comes from a concern that there are other issues that should be addressed. It is suggested that EU membership is not the most important issue facing the UK and that UK membership is not the most important issue facing the EU. Despite a pro-EU stance indicated through the statement that Europeans are 'likely to be safer, stronger and more prosperous because of the common EU project', the article refers to 'policy distortions caused by Germany's eurozone austerity mantra', and 'the growing divide

between the EU's rich west and north and its poor south and east' (Guardian Editorial, 2016b). What this shows very clearly is that dichotomising views on EU membership is not particularly helpful. The Guardian may come down on the side of Remain, but that does not mean that there is support for all that the EU does or the way that it does it. A consideration of the arguments presented in this article might just as easily result in a reader coming down on the Leave side.

7.5.3 Proximity and Consonance: Distancing the UK from the EU

Of particular interest in this data set is the News Value of **Proximity**. This is defined as events being constructed as 'geographically or culturally near' and it operates on a cline (Bednarek and Caple, 2017, pp. 63–64). Conceptualisation of Europe (and thereby of what it is to be European) is complex and contested (see, for example, Bayley and Williams, 2012). The word *Europe* has been shown to be highly polysemous and, as shown in Glaas (2016), the EU and the UK are frequently constructed in opposition with the EU represented as 'other'. This calls into question the extent to which the EU can be described as proximate to the UK. The lemma EUROPE appears 436 times across 70 of the 100 GuFCC articles. Reference to the European Union should include the UK but The IMF is cited as estimating economic growth of Europe and the UK as separate entities (see example 40 below).

Furthermore, just one of the 70 articles clearly constructs the UK as part of the EU through a reference to 'non-British EU workers' (see 41 below), but even here the reference is a negative one emphasising conflict over immigration. In general, 'EU workers' in this corpus is used as shorthand for *non-British EU workers*, and the shorter phrasing may be seen as satisfying a need for brevity, but as demonstrated in 42 below in an article by Helena Smith (2016), this is frequently followed by other statements about those on 'the European side', in

opposition to the UK, further distancing the UK from the EU. EU citizens is similarly used to refer to those who are not British as in 43 below. I would argue that the cumulative effect of repeated references to the EU as other can only serve to distance the UK from the EU in the minds of *Guardian* readers and had the potential to impact the referendum vote.

40. The IMF also shaved 0.2 points off its growth estimates for the US in 2016 and 2017 … European growth is expected to be 1.7% in 2016, an upward revision of 0.1 percentage points on October, with no change to the 1.7% pencilled in for 2017. The IMF has left its forecasts for the UK - of 2.2% in 2016 and 2017 - unchanged.
41. The fraught negotiations are focused on Cameron's insistence on curbing welfare payments for non-British EU citizens working in the UK as a means of reducing EU immigration to Britain.
42. Britain wants to stop paying child benefit for EU workers in Britain whose dependents are living back home. Many on the European side acknowledge that the UK has a case.
43. The British are arguing that EU citizens coming to the UK to work should be "self-sufficient" - have enough means to support themselves without drawing on social security or benefits.

Also significant is that **consonance** is realised in this corpus in such a way that draws on established stereotypical representations of some EU Member States and again serves to distance the UK form the EU, although this is not done with the same strength of negativity and superlativeness as has been found in anti-EU publications (see, for example, Glaas, 2016). The significance of the representation of the EU as a Franco-German alliance in opposition to the UK is well established and indeed the two countries describe themselves as the 'engine of EU integration' (European Union, 2015), which is certainly at odds with Britain's historical reluctance regarding closer Union.

Germany is the most frequently mentioned country in the GuFCC with 130 occurrences in 34 articles and it is notable that both Germany and France are mentioned even when there appears to be no particular reason to single them out. The implication in example 44 below is that Germany's objections to treaty change are more important than others. Or perhaps their agreement is being presented as uncommon, and thereby satisfying the News

Value of **Unexpectedness**. Even where there is agreement between the UK and other member states, it is Germany and France who are singled out (example 45). While focusing on Germany and France may not be problematic in and of itself, I suggest that this does become an issue when those countries are also construed as being in conflict with other member states and as acting according to stereotypical notions of national identity. While the construal of national identities as problematic is perhaps less blunt in the *Guardian* than in anti-EU publications, there is nevertheless a clear divide with southern European countries represented as fiscally feckless and Germany as domineering in response as is arguably implied in 46 and 47 below.

44. But an economic emergency brake would require treaty change and several eurozone countries, including Germany, are loath to introduce this mechanism when the currency union may need to act fast in a debt crisis.
45. This agenda also has the support of a majority of EU member states: 18 countries, including France and Germany, signed a letter drafted by the British government calling for targets on cutting "burdensome" red tape.
46. This may partly explain why Greece in 2016 will remain the eurozone's weak link and why, in contrast to other bailed-out EU member states, there is no guarantee that its latest rescue programme will succeed without another bout of debt relief. This will doubtless become a further source of potential conflict with Germany, the biggest contributor of bailout funds to dat.
47. But it still provides hope of a verbal punch-up, when the Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, and the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schuble, discuss the future of Europe. Memories of last summer's crisis, where Tsipras was forced into a painful third bailout deal, are still fresh.

7.5.4 Eliteness and Personalisation: Alienating the Voter from Europe

Research has shown that the media tends to present the EU as "elite business" (Nicolas Hubé, Susana Salgado and Puustinen, 2015, p. 85) and the *Guardian* is no exception. In Chapter six, I discussed the lemma PEOPLE and how the term is used to represent various groups rather than individual citizens and as such there is relatively little **personalisation**. There is considerable focus in the both the GPRC and GuFCC, however, on political actors. 97 of 100

articles in GuFCC mention various elites from politicians to banking executives, anonymous analysts and think tank members. British political figures mentioned include David Cameron, Theresa May, Boris Johnson and George Osborne and Nigel Farage with one or more of these mentioned in 39 articles in GuFCC. There is an absence of EU political figures, however except for one article that references Italy's leader, Matteo Renzi and ECB president Mario Draghi. This is unsurprising given that, as established in section 6.4 that EU figures are relatively absent in the larger GPRC, but the article does not present the EU in a good light.

Italy is presented as having considerable financial difficulties and a 'troubled banking sector' (Kirchgaessner, 2016) (see 48 below). While the article does suggest that Mario Draghi is sympathetic and unlikely to impose 'tougher provisions' on the debt, this does emphasise past issues with the imposition of austerity measure, which again highlights both conflict between EU countries and disparity of the experience of EU citizens. The Italian economy is sluggish and being impacted by those measures (49) and negotiations are ongoing (50).

48. Italy's beleaguered banking sector has been boosted after the European Central Bank and the Italian prime minister sent soothing messages to anxious investors. Shares in Italy's troubled banking sector recovered on Thursday following weeks of freefall, after the ECB president Mario Draghi said there were no plans to demand tougher provisions to cover the country's bad debt pile.

49. Italy's banks have some (EURO)201bn (154bn) in non-performing loans (NPLs) which are unlikely ever to be paid back and which are restraining the country's sluggish economic recovery by putting a brake on the release of new credits.

50. Italian officials have been in protracted talks with the EU over the plan, details of which are still being hammered out, for hundreds of billions of euros in bad loans to be unloaded from the banks in order to alleviate pressure on the financial services sector.

7.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have demonstrated a significant negative subtext relating to the EU in a sub-corpus of articles referring to both the EU and the economic crisis. Of course, it was inevitable that a sub-corpus built using the lemma CRISIS would reflect negativity. But this analysis demonstrates how references to crisis are extremely frequent and significant in the GPRC corpus: it represents a key discourse that is connected to the representation of the EU. As shown in section 7.3, crisis frames had an undeniable impact on the referendum coverage, explicitly linking the EU and economic crisis with the referendum. As shown in section 7.4, crisis talk emphasises conflict between EU Member States, disparity in the experience of EU citizens, and risks to both the UK and the EU itself. Although each of the issues outlined here occurs only in a small majority or a significant minority of articles examined, it is not my intention here to present an argument about the statistical significance of any of the identified themes. What is important, rather, is that these themes combine to effectively chip away at *The Guardian*'s explicit pro- remain position and, together, to undermine a pro-EU stance. If this reflects how the EU is represented in pro-EU media, I suggest that, in such a closely contested referendum, the potential impact on the vote is considerable.

The analysis presented in 7.5 demonstrated that the construction of News Values contributed to the negative presentation in a number of ways. I argue that the key News Value of **negativity**, combined with **superlativeness** and **consonance** effectively problematised the EU and the UK was distanced from the EU based on constructions of **proximity** and **consonance**. Finally, **eliteness** and **personalisation**, or rather the relative lack of personalisation as a result

of a focus on elites, served to alienate voters from the EU. In all, construction of News Values can be said to result in the focus on **conflict**, **disparity** and **risk** noted in section 7.4.

As has been noted, it is important to consider not just what we find in *Guardian* articles, but also what could have been reported. Given the apparent absence of any positive coverage of EU policy, and the relative absence of EU political figures, as discussed in Chapter Six, the next chapter will look more closely at what the EU had to say about the economic crisis during the six months leading up to the EU referendum.

Chapter 8: Discourses of Financial Crisis in the EU

8.1 Introduction

Having established in Chapters Six and Seven, that the pro-EU stance of the *Guardian* newspaper appears to have been undermined in the lead up to Britain's EU referendum, I now turn to Research Question 2, as presented in Chapter One: what are the similarities and differences between the *Guardian* and EU elite discourse? In keeping with the principles of CADS, and continuing the focus on economic crisis, the aim of this chapter is to investigate EU political elite discourse around that topic and compare that to the *Guardian* coverage in order to contextualise the findings of Chapters Six and Seven. This is achieved through analysis of the EU Financial Crisis Corpus (EUFCC) and through comparison with both the larger GPRC and the GuFCC sub-corpus.

Given the theories of mediatisation of politics and the politicisation of media discussed in Chapter Three, (see, for instance, Esser and Strömbäck, 2014), we might expect there to be parallels between discourses found in GuFCC and EUFCC, and to an extent this is the case. My analysis shows that there are similarities but that these are driven by events; there are economic issues in some EU countries and there are migrants arriving in the EU. Whereas in the GuFCC this results in a negative subtext around **conflict**, **disparity**, and **risk** (as discussed in subsections 7.4.4– 7.4.5 of the previous chapter) financial crisis, at least, is framed very differently in EUFCC, with an emphasis instead on the achievements of the EU and on justification for policy decisions in a way that simply isn't present in either GuFCC or the larger Guardian Corpus (GPRC). Furthermore, The EU voices represented in EUFCC are almost entirely absent from absent from *Guardian* reporting.

That is not to say that crisis talk in the EUFCC presents an entirely positive representation of the EU. Two of the categories of negative subtext from the GuFCC are present in EUFCC – that of **disparity** and that of **risk**. I argue that despite apparent attempts to mitigate the negativity apparent in the two interconnected themes of disparity and risk, there remains a subtext that is problematic for the EU. I suggest that it is this negative subtext that drives negative coverage in the *Guardian.* Effectively, we can say that EU discourse serves to work against the EU since while there is justification for policy, this is presented in such a way as to reinforce the sense of the EU as elite business.

In Chapter Seven, News Values analysis showed that construction of news stories as newsworthy served to undermine the Guardian's pro-EU position. Here, Political Values analysis shows that while the EU elites focus on voteworthiness, this is done in such a way as to promote and defend policy decisions rather than promote membership. Support for membership is simply not addressed. Indeed, there is no reference to the Brexit referendum at all found in EUFCC. Construction of Political Values by the EU assumes agreement with membership and focusses on support for specific policy rather than support for the Union as a whole.

8.2 Methods

As with Chapter Seven, two coding methods were adopted to examine the EUFCC (see Chapter Five, subsection 5.5.2 for details of the corpus). The first informed by the principles of Constructivist Grounded Theory (after Charmaz, 2014) and the second involved coding with the novel Political Values framework presented in Chapter Four. Again, qualitative coding was facilitated through the use of QDA software, MAXQDA (VERBI Software

GmbH, 2018). The coding procedures for the initial part of the analysis were the same as those for Chapter Seven. Specifically, the paragraph was selected as the unit of coding. This was not entirely straightforward as importing the texts into MAXQDA resulted in individual lines being designated as paragraphs for some texts. All 99 texts were manually checked, and paragraphs reinstated. Inevitably, it was necessary to use some judgement as to what construes a paragraph in texts that were delivered as speeches.

As with the previous chapter, initial coding for was completed on all paragraphs containing CRISIS with each paragraph assessed in isolation. The second phase of focused coding followed, and the resultant codes were reviewed leading to the development of major thematic category codes. Subcategories were established where required and revised as needed through axial coding (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). The final step involved the further contextualisation of the thematic categories by consulting a number of sub-corpus articles in full and referring back to the GPRC to check frequency counts and context. The analysis is presented below in section 8.4.

Whereas coding for News Values is only done on the headline and first paragraph, the nature of the data in EUFCC meant that this would not have been sufficient for the Political Values analysis. News articles traditionally contain *who, what, when,* and *where,* within that first paragraph, but although press releases may follow that pattern, speeches do not. As a consequence, and since I was able to review the structure of each text, all paragraphs were coded when conducting the DPVA.

Before moving on to present the results of coding, in the following section (8.3) I shall consider the extent to which EU voices found in the EUFCC are represented in the *Guardian.*

8.3 The (In)visibility of EU Speakers

8.3.1 The Need for EU Voices

The problem of visibility in relation to the workings of the European Union and limited media coverage of the EU beyond specific events is well established (Oberhuber *et al.*, 2005; Marchi and Taylor, 2009; Boomgaarden *et al.*, 2010, 2013; Dugales and Tucker, 2012). While the Brexit Referendum generated a great deal of coverage in the British press, with over 4,000 articles covering the EU being produced between January and June 2016 the *Guardian* alone, we cannot make assumptions regarding the extent to which these articles offered any clarity to readers about what the EU does and how it does it. With voters being asked to make a judgement on the value of European Union membership, the extent to which EU voices have the potential to be heard is important, and the corpora built for this project provide an opportunity to examine this. Before moving on an analysis of *crisis* discourse in EUFCC corpus, I shall first turn to who is speaking and to whom and then look at the extent to which these voices are present in the GuFCC Corpus and the Guardian Pre-Referendum Corpus more widely.

8.3.2 Who is speaking, and to whom?

A total of 23 different speakers are represented in EUFCC, with the highest number of speeches (16) given by Mario Draghi, President of the European Central Bank (ECB) and various members of the Executive board of the ECB. EU Commissioner Jonathan Hill gives 12 speeches, perhaps unsurprisingly given his title ‘Commissioner for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union Regulatory responses to the global financial

crisis in the EU and US'. As shown in table 8-1 below, a number of the text are issued not from a named individual, but from an EU entity, including the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. As such all arms of the European Union are represented here.

Table 8-1: EU sources in EUFCC

EU Speaker	**EUFCC Texts**
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB	16
Commissioner Jonathan Hill	12
Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB	11
Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB	8
MEPs (unspecified)	8
Vítor Constâncio, Vice-President of the ECB,	7
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker	6
Vice President Valdis Dombrovskis	6
Sabine Lautenschläger, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB	5
Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB	4
Council of the EU	3
European Parliament (unspecified)	2
Vice-President Jyrki Katainen	2

While the question of who is speaking in these texts is fairly easily answered, defining the audience is more complex. Of the 99 texts in EUFCC, 44 are press releases, or the texts of speeches provided through a press release, and the remaining 55 are plenaries or conference speeches in various contexts. Press releases are, or course, specifically produced for and distributed to the press but the audience for conferences are quite specialist in some cases. That said, all speeches are released to the press in written form and as such I suggest that we can assume that a wider audience is considered. Notwithstanding the complexities surrounding the notion of audience, it is also important to note that all of these texts are available not only to the media but to the general public themselves. Article 15 of the Treaty

on the Functioning of the European Union enshrines a public right to access documents applicable to the European Parliament, Council and Commission.[7]

8.3.3 The absence of EU speakers in the Guardian

Turning now to which speakers from the EUFCC corpus are found in the Guardian Pre-Referendum Corpus (GPRC), it is striking just how infrequently these elite political actors are represented. As shown in 8-2 below, Mario Draghi appears 56 times and Jonathan Hill just eight times. Other than two mentions for Benoît Cœuré and one each for Yves Mersch and Jyrki Katainen, none of the other individual speakers in the EUFCC corpus are found in the GPRC. The relative absence of EU officials in *Guardian* coverage has already been noted in Chapter Six (6.4.2) but what this analysis adds is evidence that even when EU officials are speaking about policy in relation to economic crisis, this is not communicated to the British public. In general, citation of EU officials in the GPRC is incidental to a larger news story that doesn't pertain to the EU specifically.

Table 8-2: EU speakers found in GPRC

EU Speaker	**GPRC Mentions**
Mario Draghi, President of the ECB	56
Commissioner Jonathan Hill	8
Benoît Cœuré, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB	2
Yves Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB	1
Vice President Yrki Katainen	1

[7] Details of public access to EU documents is available here: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegistreWeb/home/welcome.htm?language=EN

Taking Mario Draghi as a case study, of the 16 documents in the EUFCC attributed to or citing words by him, only two are directly referenced in the *Guardian*. The first is an interview with Guardian columnist Shiv Malik published verbatim (Malik, 2016b) with the same interview cited in a further article on the same day (Malik, 2016a). EUFCC texts include three occasions that Draghi gave introductory statements at the European Central Bank press conference, which occurs every six weeks. Reference to only one of these is found in GPRC, on 21st April, 2016, saying that Draghi 'used his latest press conference' to 'defend' the ECB's interest rate policies from criticism by Germany's finance minister (Allen, 2016). The article, far from just explaining a policy decision to keep interest rates at 0%, is focussed instead on disagreements between the ECB and Germany, quoting Germany's finance Minister, Wolfgang Schaüble, and Chancellor Angela Merkle, as well as noting negative impact on German savers. As such, this serves as a further example of the emphasis on conflict and disparity noted in the previous chapter.

In other GPRC references to Draghi, he is presented as having 'failed' in early efforts to increase economic growth and subsequent success is framed as 'the weak Euro boosting Italian, Spanish and French exports' (Inman, 2016). He is also said to be 'the powerful head' of the ECB and 'known to share the aversion to making too many concessions to the British' in negotiations over Britain's relationship with the European Union ahead of the Brexit referendum (Traynor and Rankin, 2016). In a reader letter, there is an implication of a connection between Draghi, 'a former high-profile Goldman Sachs employee,' and Italy's Prime Minister Mario Monti, a 'former Goldman Sachs advisor', along with reference to 'continuous banking scandals' (Jachym, 2016). Again, these references do nothing to improve understanding of EU policy and instead imply that this EU official is at best ineffectual and at

worst, potentially corrupt. Of the 32 articles referencing Draghi in the GPRC, only eight can be read as representing him neutrally and the rest present a negative evaluation.

Even when the EU figure concerned is British, coverage is limited. Jonathan Hill, the EU Commissioner, who later resigned following the Referendum result, is described as 'Britain's man in Brussels' (Editorial, 2016a), but none of his 12 speeches in EUFCC are reported in *The Guardian*. This is despite the fact that, in the EUFCC texts, he discusses issues such as financial stability, investment funds for businesses and social enterprise, as well as Capital Markets Union proposals, private pensions and other issues important to the understanding of what the EU does and how it goes about this through consultation and the publication of proposals. Where he is cited in the GPRC, the focus is on the taxation of multinational companies and high net worth individuals. This became an issue in April 2016 due to the so-called Panama Papers scandal whereby tax information of elites was made public following a leak of 11.5 million files from international law firm Mossack Fonseca (Harding, 2016). In response to EU policies aimed at tackling tax avoidance 'defended' by Jonathan Hill, the *Guardian* suggests that they 'continue to fall short of the comprehensive approach that is required' (Editorial, 2016a). Once again, European initiatives are negatively represented.

8.4 Crisis talk: Undermining positive representation

8.4.1 The EU Crisis Code Framework

Having considered the extent to which speakers and texts represented in the EUFCC corpus are found in the GPRC, the following sections offer an analysis of how CRISIS is used. The relative frequency of the lemma CRISIS in EUFCC is slightly less than in GuFCC. There are 406 occurrences of the CRISIS across the 99 texts in EUFCC compared to 236 occurrences in

the 100 texts of the GuFCC corpus, but normalised frequencies are 2.4 per 1000 words in GUFCC and 1.9 per 1000 words in EUFCC. As with the GuFCC, crisis most frequently refers to the 2008 financial crisis and the consequences thereof, as will be discussed below, and this is variously represented as either a past crisis or one still ongoing. Table 8-3 below shows the five thematic codes identified along with subcodes. Like the analysis presented in Chapter Seven, the codes are not mutually exclusive, and paragraphs may be coded to multiple categories and to multiple codes within those categories.

Table 8-3: Crisis Coding in EUFCC

CODE	NUMBER OF TEXTS CODED / 99	NUMBER OF PARAGRAPHS CODED / 406
1. TEMPORAL		
1.1. PAST CRISIS	81	236
1.2. CURRENT CRISIS	16	30
1.3. POTENTIAL CRISIS	7	7
2. JUSTIFICATION FOR POLICY	**54**	**100**
3. ONGOING CONSEQUENCES	**50**	**104**
4. RECOVERY AND SUCESSES		
4.1. CRISIS AS BENCHMARK	32	51
4.2. CRISIS TEACHING LESSONS	30	39
4.3. CRISIS AS OVERCOME	4	4
5. PROBLEMATISING SUBTEXT		
5.1. CRISIS AND DISPARITY	46	100
5.2. CRISIS AND RISK	16	25

Where the EUFCC code framework differs from the GuFCC sub-corpus is in the emphasis on **justification** for ongoing policy (thematic code 2 in 8-3 above) and the closely related (code 3), **ongoing consequences** in an emphasis on **recovery and success** (code 4)**.** Nevertheless, a **problematising subtext** (code 5) exists relating to themes of **disparity,** and

risk, just as it did in GuFCC, potentially undermining a positive representation of the European Union. While the negative subtext found in EUFCC is not as frequent as in GuFCC, I am not making claims as to the statistical significance in this qualitative analysis. What I do suggest however is that the presence of EU elite discourse around **disparity**, and **risk** acts as the foundation for what is emphasised in the *Guardian*. What I argue is that these are the issues that are picked up by the media, including the *Guardian*, as a result of the News Value of negativity and then a local (national) focus is adopted. Since EU discourses of justification for policy along with recovery and success (codes 3 and 4 respectively) are effectively deemphasised, this leads to an incomplete picture for readers of media publications.

In the following subsections, I shall first look at the ways crisis is defined in the EUFCC (8.4.2) and then look at how the EU used crisis talk to justify policy and convey policy success in subsection 8.4.3.and 8.4.4 respectively. In section 8.4.5 I turn to how conflict, disparity and risk codes are realised. I will then focus on the influence of Political Values in section 8.5.

8.4.2 Naming and defining the crisis

Before looking at the code framework discussed above, I shall briefly address naming and defining of crisis. In the previous chapter (subsection 7.4.2) I noted that naming of crises is not a neutral act. I demonstrated there that references to financial and economic crisis, while potentially avoiding blame, in fact implies political responsibility. In EUFCC CRISIS is most frequently broadly referred to as a *financial* CRISIS (50 times across 31 texts) or as *economic* CRISIS (21 times across 19 texts) and *global* CRISIS (2 times in 1 text). Arguably, blame is directly implied with the more specific *banking* CRISIS (6 times across 6 texts) but this can also

be seen as reflecting complexity of the crisis. This complexity is further reflected in the various ways that more fine-grained representations of the crisis are given; *debt crisis* (8 times in 5 texts) and *sub-prime crisis* (1 time) both of which relate to credit being provided to consumers that they are unable to then repay.

Given that half of the texts that comprise the EUFCC come from the European Central Bank, I argue that *financial crisis* and *economic crisis* along with other terms that implicate the banking sector more directly can be seen as undermining the credibility of that institution. Furthermore, the Eurocentric nature of the discourse is emphasised by reference to Greek crisis or Eurozone crisis with the former reflecting issues around national culpability and a lack of unity among EU members which was discussed in Chapter Seven (subsection 7.4.4) and will be addressed further in 8.4.5 below.

Turning now to temporal references to crisis (Thematic Code1) The most frequent reference to crisis, however it is named, is to a past crisis. This is the case in 81 of the 99 texts and this is similar to the results from GuFCC. Where the two differ is in reference to current crisis (Thematic code 1.2 in both cases) and potential crisis (code 1.3) which are both more frequent in the Guardian. This, I suggest, reflects the News Value of timeliness, whereby news is constructed as new, recent, or ongoing (Bednarek and Caple, 2017, p.55). Furthermore, the EU focus on recovery and success leads to a characterisation of the crisis as in the past (see subsection 8.4.4 for a discussion on this).

8.4.3 Crisis as justification for policy due to ongoing consequences

The main reason for reference to crisis in EUFCC is to justify policy (thematic code 2) and this is closely related to code 3 which captures reference to the ongoing consequences of crisis. This is unsurprising given that in order to justify action, there must be a reason for that

action. The past crisis and ongoing consequences of that crisis serve as a good reason to act. This is exemplified in example 1 below that comes from a speech by Jean-Claude Junker on 6 April 2016. References earlier in the speech suggest that the crisis referred to here relates to the Eurozone debt crisis rather than the broader economic crisis of 2008 (although this is not specified elsewhere). He goes on to define the crisis as not over due to unemployment. This leads up to his final assertion that the EU Commission's Investment Plan must continue 'with greater ambition' as a result. Similarly, Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, constructs his argument for a 'more complete and consistent international framework' by citing the success of policies enacted as a result of crisis (2 below).

1. As long as 22 million Europeans are without work, we cannot rest, and we cannot say that the crisis is over. This is why the first results of our Investment Plan are encouraging – but also why we need to push ahead with greater ambition
2. The severity and nature of the financial crisis resulted in an extraordinary response by central banks; one which was very much in the spirit of Thornton and Bagehot. In a complex and incomplete institutional environment, the Eurosystem has been able to adapt its set of interventions by using all the flexibility allowed by our instruments in a principled way to address both systemic and idiosyncratic liquidity problems. We will continue to do so. And we will be supported to a greater extent than in the past by a more complete and consistent institutional framework.

The examples above, which are typical of what is found in EUFCC, are interesting for two reasons. The first is that there is a lack of detail regarding the plans. On that basis, there is perhaps relatively little for the media to report. Secondly, both are actually dealing with complex financial instruments developed or extended as a result of crisis. This may explain in part why the policy successes as conveyed here don't make it into the mainstream media. If the policies are more complex and technical than a mainstream newspaper article would generally deal with, they are unlikely to be covered and neither are the successes. In addition, it can be argued that qualified or partial successes referred to in the two speeches covered here are not particularly newsworthy.

Arguably, the most newsworthy element of the examples cited above is the fact that 22 million Europeans remained unemployed. Interestingly, the phrase '22 million' only appears in GuFCC in reference to Syria's population. As to unemployment, there are just nine instances of EU and unemployment collocation within a span of +/- 5 in the GuFCC. Four of these relate to a reduction of youth unemployment in Poland since joining the EU, one cites reduced levels of unemployment in Italy. On the other hand, two others cite British unemployment levels as one of the lowest in Europe. Jean-Claude Junkers plans to enact policies to get unemployment down further are simply not mentioned.

8.4.4 Crisis recovery and successes

Related to the **justification of policy** and **ongoing consequences** coding, as shown by the examples above, is thematic code 4 that encodes the discursive construal of **recovery and success**. This code is comprised of three elements. First, and most frequently, crisis is presented as a benchmark (code 4.1) and secondly it is constructed as having taught the EU a lesson. Both of these codes are used to construct an argument that says *we have recovered well and learned lessons.* This is then followed by reference to ongoing consequences and the need to continue with or develop policy. Example 3 below is typical of this. Less frequently crisis is constructed as having been overcome (code 4.3).

3. The 2008 financial crisis showed how dangerous liquidity problems can be – not just for individual banks, but for the financial system as a whole. Some banks are failing to meet our expectations in terms of the management of liquidity risk. We will therefore be paying particular attention to banks' internal liquidity management – The level of total real investment in the euro area remains more than 10% below pre-crisis levels. Therefore, further action is needed, including at EU level.

8.4.5 Crisis Emphasising Disparity and Risk

Disparity is emphasised through the description of economic crisis relating to individual countries (most often Greece or Portugal) or through reference to 'sovereign debt crisis' and also when CRISIS is specified as 'Euro-Area'. Arguably, many of these references might also have been coded to **conflict,** as in the GuFCC analysis in Chapter Seven. However, I have chosen not to code them this way because in this corpus, it is **disparity** which is emphasised in the spirit of cooperation and unity. In example 4 below, a European Commission presentation emphasises widening disparities. The difference between this and articles in the *Guardian* is that in the next paragraph, as shown in 5 below, the disparities are explicitly stated to be unacceptable. This is then followed by a specific policy proposal designed to remedy the situation (6)

4. … the effects of the crisis are still being felt. Even more worrying, our review reveals that the crisis has widened the disparities across and within EU countries. Employment rates vary tremendously, from just 55% in Greece to 81% in Sweden. Although unemployment has decreased in the countries hit hardest by the crisis, unemployment rates are still over 20% in Spain and Greece. By contrast, for Germany it is as low as 5%.
5. In short, divergence between EU Member States has further increased. These disparities are unacceptable because they hamper growth and erode the confidence of people in a truly 'social' Europe.
6. To address these changes in the world of work, the European Commission is proposing to bring forward a European Pillar of Social Rights. This will be a reference framework based on the values and principles that mark the essence of the 21st century social market economy. It should make our labour markets and the European social market economy more resilient and ensure that we can achieve both flexibility and security in a fast-changing world. In this context we are working on a wider review of our occupational health and safety legislation as well as ways to improve people's work-life balance and women's participation in the labour market.

Risk, while present in EUFCC and coded is construed very differently to that found in GuFCC. Rather than risk to the EU, the risk here is in not taking policy action. A press release from the Council of the EU about a speech from Eurogroup president Jeroen Dijddelbloem on 15 March 2017 is shown in example 7 below. The speech expresses concern that not enough

has been done to prepare for the next crisis and suggests that resilience should be a priority. Reference to this press release was not found in the GPRC. It would be possible to frame a lack of resilience as a threat to the EU, and this is certainly seen in media reporting, but here the concerns are expressed in order to discuss proposed policy (8) about which Dijddelbloem goes on to elaborate.

7. Let me make a few final remarks. After the economic crisis the groundwork was laid for a stronger economy. At the same time, we are still not resilient enough for the next crisis. If it may come, and when it may come. We need to continue making our economies stronger to maintain our high level of social welfare and equality.
8. This means rethinking all the instruments in our policy toolkit: 1. First, expansionary monetary policy. It is much debated. It supports our economy in the short run, but the limitations are imminent and negative side effects are becoming stronger. 2. Second, fiscal policy needs to be geared towards a long-term strategy to improve the quality of public expenditures 3. Third, we need to re-accelerate the engine of convergence, the convergence machine that Europa has been needs to be restored. And innovation by structurally reforming our economies


8.5 Political Values: defending policy not membership.

Having examined the construction of crisis talk in the EUFCC, in this section I shall briefly outline my thoughts regarding Political Values there, although I do so with some caution. As discussed in Chapter Four, the DPVA framework was developed from the EUFCC which is almost certainly means that the framework is incomplete and would benefit considerably from further development using a larger and broader dataset which could be said to be more representative of political discourse. As such, I can only draw tentative conclusions from my analysis. In addition, there is the danger of circularity of argument. Any claim that a given Political Value is apparent in the data set from which the Values were derived would of course be problematic. I will avoid, therefore, drawing any conclusions as to the relative absence or presence of Political Values, or quantifying the results, and instead confine my

discussion to the notable ways in which the Values are construed and how this relates to the construction. of News Values in the GuFCC.

I will argue that the evidence suggests discourse of EU Elites, driven by Political Values and focusing on voteworthiness, ultimately serves to defend policy rather than membership of the EU. I propose that in some ways, political and media values are incompatible and that, inevitably, there is a disconnect between what the media wants to report and what politicians want to convey.

The DPVA framework, depicted in Chapter Four (Figure 4-4), and reproduced below for convenience, is comprised of eight Political Values plus the overarching Value of **Amplification**.



Source Factor Values that are of note in the EUFCC are **Achievement** and **Accountability.** Constructing **Achievement** appears to be central to EU discourse and this is particularly significant since, as I have shown, reference to achievements of the EU are, on the whole,

absent from the *Guardian* data. In a speech by Commission Vice-President Katainen in April of 2016, a long list of policy successes was given in explicit terms (see 9 below). The pronoun 'we' clearly refers to the Commission and claims ownership of the successes which include reference to having taken 'decisive action' 'provided clarity', 'guidance'. Even more concrete evidence of achievement is provided by Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem at the Peterson Institute, Washington, D.C. on 14 April 2016 with reference to 'boosting productivity and competitiveness', 'strong growth' with Greece 'propelled' up in business rankings (10). Also notable in this example is the amplification of Achievement through intensifiers

9. The Commission has taken decisive action to address barriers at the EU level this year. To name but a few examples: With Commissioner Hill, we provided clarity for insurance companies to invest in infrastructure projects under Solvency II and the new rules have just entered into force at the end of last month. With Commissioner Cretu we have provided guidance and legal certainty on how to combine optimally the opportunities presented by EFSI and other EU funds, like structural funds (that represent a big chunk of the total investment in certain Member States)
10. In recent years we've made progress. In the European Union we've established a banking union and started working on a capital markets union. In various countries reforms have boosted productivity and competitiveness. For example, the labour market in Spain was rigorously reformed in 2012, resulting in quite a strong growth in jobs the following years. Product markets in Portugal and Italy have been reformed, opening up various sectors and stimulating economic growth in both countries. And actually Greece , too, has implemented some important product market reforms, such as measures that make it easier to start a new business. These reform efforts propelled Greece from the 109th spot in the World Bank Doing Business Index in 2010 to 60th place in 2015. This has laid the foundations for further economic growth.

At the same time, the EU is constructed as accountable through collaboration and consultation with others. There is explicit reference to 'working side by side with social partners' in a European Commission social review (11) and similarly, Vice President Katainen announces a public consultation. (12). **Accountability** is also constructed through more subtle means. The presentation of reviews which guide policy, such as that given by the European Commission on 21 January 2016 (13) ensures transparency in the same way that

publication of all EU documentation does. This is a far cry from the opaque and undemocratic institution that some publications claim the EU to be.

11. Following recent initiatives on the integration of the long-term unemployed, the Youth Guarantee and the Youth Employment Initiative, this year we will take forward work on proposals for a European Pillar of Social Rights, on labour mobility and on skills. We will continue working side by side with the social partners to achieve an inclusive recovery
12. We have also just launched a public consultation on insolvency frameworks in the EU.
13. I am happy to present today the latest review of Employment and Social Developments in Europe. Let me share with you the key findings… This year's analysis serves as a compass to create the quality jobs and inclusive growth that people in Europe so much need.

It is, of course, quite understandable that the EU would construct themselves as a transparent and accountable entity that has achieved success. But highly significant for the present study, and potentially for the referendum result, is that this does not reach the *Guardian's* pages.

The Message Factor Values, **Problem**, **Solution**, and **Intention** are, as I have already alluded to in section 8.4.3 above, frequently presented together. Policy intentions tend to be preceded by a statement of the problem and associated solution. In 14 below, from a press release published by the Council of the EU on 14 April 2016, low interest rates as a means to control inflation is said to be unsuitable to sustain economic recovery. This clear statement of a problem is then followed with a solution – 'a strategy to phase out the [interest rate] policy'. On other occasions, intention is explicit and the problems which led to a given policy are implied. In 15, the intention to 'table a package of measures' is constructed as necessary due to the implied problem of limited investment in a narrow range of financial products. Finally, in example 16 we can see the construction of multiple Values. Commission Vice-President Katainen indicates **Accountability** in the **Intention** to continue to work with banks and small businesses to address the **Problems** of a lack of communication and barriers to investment

14. Over the past few years, monetary policy has been highly accommodative in order to bring inflation towards its target level. The current low-

interest-rate environment acts as a tailwind for our economy. It supports the economic recovery in the short run. But this effect is short-lived. It simply cannot foster a sustained recovery if underlying structural problems are not addressed. It only creates the conditions and allows time for governments to implement difficult structural measures. In due course a sensible strategy to phase out this policy has to be designed.

15. In the near future, the Commission will table a package of measures to stimulate venture capital investment in the EU. We want venture capital and social entrepreneurship fund managers to be able to invest more money, in a wider range of financial products.

16. In addition, we will continue to work with banking and small business representatives to improve communication between business and banks in the case of declined loan applications; identify and then tackle the key barriers to cross border distribution of investment funds; and start work to evaluate the case for EU policy support for a market for European personal pensions.

The Audience Factor Values of **Guilt** and **Fear** are both apparent in EUFCC although **Guilt** is much more frequent. All reference to **risk**, as discussed in 8.4.5 constructs either fear or guilt depending on whether those suffering include the hearer or others. Reference to inequality in 17 below constructs **Guilt** as does so in order to justify policy. Similarly in 18 those on low income are said to have suffered. Once again, this is connected to a desire to develop policy to rectify the situation.

17. The measures we took to ensure financial and fiscal sustainability have been painful and affected the most vulnerable in our society. Ordinary families have not always shared equally in the benefits of economic growth. And it is this inequality that causes a sense of insecurity and disaffection in society. But adjustments are unavoidable to maintain our high level of social welfare and reduce inequality. So it's time to look forward and redirect our gaze to policies that will make the economy more robust in the long run

18. People have not profited equally from economic growth in the past. Disposable income increased, but less than GDP growth per capita. This is true for all income categories but mostly for the lowest incomes. Some measures taken during the crisis only served to heighten this effect. This was necessary to save our economies in the short term, but did not correct problematic incentives in the sector. In the long-term policy we've devised, we've succeeded in turning this situation around.

8.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have analysed EU elite discourse in the EFCC. I have demonstrated that by far the majority of the EU voices represented here simply are not represented in the Guardian and that focus of EU crisis talk is on justification of policy. There is no engagement with the referendum debate and no attempt to justify membership. The construction of Political Values demonstrates the way in which the EU is represented as worthy of support through policy successes but that these are expressed in such a way as to show issues of **disparity** and **risk** which then get reproduced and emphasised in *Guardian* coverage.

In the following chapter I conclude the present study and discuss my findings in response to the research questions set out in Chapter One as well as the contributions of this thesis.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This final chapter concludes the present study. At its root, this study seeks to contribute to our understanding of the result of the June 2016 EU membership referendum. In Chapter One of this thesis, I discussed the rationale for the project: media discourse has a considerable influence on democratic processes and, specifically, on citizens' understanding of the EU. The lack of scholarship on the representation of the EU in pro-EU media provided further motivation for my focus on *The Guardian*. As argued in Chapter Two, it is likely to be an oversimplification to designate individual publications as wholly Europhile or Eurosceptic. Therefore, an in-depth examination of a publication that explicitly declares itself to be pro-EU is worthwhile. This thesis improves our understanding of media coverage relating to the EU in a sympathetic media publication and in so doing makes an original contribution to scholarship.

In undertaking this CADS, I have approached my research questions (detailed in Chapter One and below) using various methods. The study design ensures a comprehensive analysis that captures not only the *Guardian*'s representation of the EU, but also what is absent from that discourse. Furthermore, the conclusions that I have drawn from my analysis have taken account of the UK's complex historical relationship with the EU and the intricacy of the arguments for and against membership of the EU (as detailed in Chapter Two). I have argued that theories of News Values and the concept of newsworthiness are valuable for explaining my findings regarding the *Guardian*'s coverage. Furthermore, I have proposed and developed a novel theory of Political Values and voteworthiness. This approach, using the

Discursive Political Values Analysis framework, I argue, is necessary to explain the nature of EU elite discourse under study. It represents a further original contribution to scholarship.

In section 9.2, I shall outline my study's empirical contribution and my major findings in relation to the research questions set out in Chapter One. I summarise the methodological and theoretical contributions of my work in section 9.3, discussing what they add to existing knowledge and how they address gaps identified in the literature review detailed in Chapter Three. In section 9.4, I shall address this study's limitations before discussing various avenues for future work. Finally, I offer concluding remarks in section 9.5.

9.2 Major findings

9.2.1 Guardian coverage

This study's first research question (RQ1) asked: *what are the key topics relating to the EU under discussion in The Guardian during the Referendum campaign, and to what extent does the nature and presentation of these topics uphold or undermine the publication's Pro-EU Stance?* The question alludes to the project's first key contribution, based on the focus on coverage in the pro-EU *Guardian.* As noted in Chapter Three, scholarship published to date tends to focus on anti-EU sentiment in media publications that oppose the UK's membership. Given how close the referendum result was, the importance of assessing pro-EU publications should not be underestimated. As previously noted, 1.1 million *Guardian* readers voted to leave the EU in a referendum that was decided by a difference of only 1.27 million votes.

RQ1 was addressed primarily in Chapters Six and Seven. These chapters analyse a corpus of *Guardian* articles that mention the EU in the six months prior to the referendum

(GPRC) and a sub-corpus of articles (GuFCC) that specifically reference the financial crisis. There are two major findings arising from this. The first, based on the key lemma analysis presented in Chapter Six, is the particular significance of two topics, namely migration and the economic crisis. A further examination of economic crisis discourse in Chapter Seven reveals a connection between these two topics. The second key finding in relation to RQ1 is that *The Guardian*'s explicitly stated pro-EU stance is significantly undermined by the general presentation of the referendum and the emphasis on three interconnected themes: conflict, disparity, and risk.

As discussed in Chapter Seven, the referendum itself is presented as problematic, which precipitates an emphasis on the UK's political process and conflict within it rather than on the issues that were relevant to the membership debate. Furthermore, in discussions of the referendum debate, the Remain argument is largely presented in negative terms through what Brexit campaigners dubbed 'project fear'. This contrasts with the more positive framing of the argument in favour of leaving the EU. As discussed in subsection 7.3.4, the prevalence of negative messaging has been shown to deplete trust in politics and has the potential to suppress voter turnout. Given that the referendum was decided by such a narrow margin, any reduction in the number of votes cast had the potential to influence the result.

In addition, the *Guardian*'s pro-EU stance is undermined by the emphasis of three interconnected themes: **conflict**, **disparity**, and **risk**. As shown in Chapter Seven (section 7.4), discourses of **conflict** – both between the UK and the EU and between other EU Member States – largely focus on issues relating to the European Stability Mechanism. That mechanism saw the imposition of austerity measures on some Member States following the Euro crisis, which led to discord among EU Member States. The theme of **disparity**, which

refers to the differing experiences of EU citizens, highlights the disproportionate suffering of citizens of countries such as Greece, relative to those of other Member States, owing to the pressures enforced by austerity measures. It is possible to argue that this emphasis represents the EU as being incapable of ensuring equity among citizens or to reach an agreement on how it might be achieved. I suggest that this discourse significantly undermined any argument in favour of the benefits of EU membership, especially given that, as noted below, policy successes are not highlighted. The third theme, **risk**, relates specifically to how continued EU membership poses a risk to the UK. Here, the emphasis is on concerns relating to EU integration and an existential risk to the EU posed by issues afflicting the Eurozone.

9.2.2 Elite EU voices

The study's second research question (RQ2) asked: *what are the similarities and differences between The Guardian and EU elite discourse, and what is the significance of the linguistic resources used on the topic of the financial crisis?* This question was addressed primarily in Chapter Eight. In keeping with the principles of CADS, the analysis of EU discourse revealed what could have been reported in the *Guardian* and, thereby, indicates what is absent from their coverage. In addition, an analysis shows a further amplified significance of negative media representations of the EU as a result of the relative absence of positive messaging from and about the EU in *Guardian* coverage. This analysis emphasised three key issues. First, EU voices were markedly absent. Second, EU policy success were not discussed. Third, the *Guardian* contained similar negative themes of conflict and disparity as were found in EU discourse.

The first significant finding from the EU data was the absence of discourse on the referendum. The stated aim of EU leaders not to contribute to the debate in the UK arguably contributed to the minimisation of coverage of their position. Furthermore, this strategy did nothing to counter the public's well-documented lack of understanding of EU governance and policy. It can be argued that the EU's lack of input was a lost opportunity to support those in the UK who were arguing for continued membership. The comparison of the GuFCC and EUFCC presented in Chapter Eight shows that EU voices were significantly absent in the *Guardian*'s EU coverage. Given that, following their comments on the referendum, Barak Obama and Donald Trump were both cited more frequently than EU leaders, it is reasonable to assume that comment on the issue from EU leaders would have been seen as newsworthy and would have been reported.

The second significant finding in relation to RQ2 was that, in the EU, crisis talk was characterised by justifications of policy, with the 2008 financial crisis serving as a benchmark for measuring improvement or arguing for further required action. Again, this element of EU discourse was absent from *Guardian* coverage. Where EU policy is reported in the *Guardian*, reporting tends to be related to issues of conflict and disagreement. As such, it is clear that voters, who we know to be influenced by the newspaper they read, were deciding on their position on EU membership based on limited information.

Finally, the analysis has shown there to be similarities between *Guardian* and EU discourse on economic crisis; it has also demonstrated that these similarities emphasised the issues of **conflict** and **disparity** discussed above. Arguably, it is the discourse relating to conflict and disparity, apparent in the discourse of the EU elite, that serves as the foundation for the *Guardian's* reporting. Ultimately, discourses of **conflict** and **disparity**, combined with

the relative paucity of EU voices and limited coverage of EU policy successes, clearly contributed to further undermining the *Guardian*'s pro-EU stance.

9.2.3 Incompatible values

The key empirical findings discussed above provide insight into the *Guardian*'s reporting on the EU in the run-up to the referendum. I have demonstrated the significance of what was absent from that reporting. In order to elucidate these results, the third research question (RQ3) asked: *to what extent do existing theoretical frameworks account for the empirical findings of this study and what additional frameworks are required to explain the results?* As discussed in Chapter Three, theories of News Values effectively explain what appears in the media through what is considered newsworthy and how this is construed. But the same does not account for the findings regarding the discourse of the EU elite. Instead, I propose that a theory of Political Values is needed. As I have argued, the discursive construal of Political Values implies voteworthiness.

The discursive construction of the News Values of **Negativity**, **Timeliness,** and **Superlativeness** in the *Guardian* problematise the EU as an entity. **Negativity**, intensified by superlative language and constructions of **timeliness**, add a sense of urgency to EU-related negative issues. At the same time, constructions of **proximity** are used to effectively distance the UK from the EU and to construct the EU as 'other'. This leads to constructions of **impactfulness** that establish tensions between the EU and the UK and resonate with the claims made by Leave campaigners. The News Value of **personalisation** further problematises the EU. In the reporting, British people are referred to only as workers or citizens, whereas the discursive construal of **eliteness**, focused on the named British political

elites, arguably suggests that questions of EU membership concern elites only. There are references to individual citizens of other EU Member States, but these frequently illustrate the issues of **disparity** discussed in Chapter Seven, even when that individual supports EU membership. Ultimately, the discursive construction of News Values in *The Guardian* undermines any pro-EU argument.

At the same time, as argued in Chapter Eight, the discursive construction of Political Values in the EU elite's discourse on economic crisis emphasises the EU's **Accountability** and **Achievement** as well as recognition of **Problems** and the **Solutions** needed to solve them along with the **Intention** to enact specific policy to address the issues. The EU is not concerned with justifying EU membership. Instead, it's primary concern seems to be justification of policy.

Although additional engagement with the referendum by EU leaders may well have been helpful to ensure that the UK remained in the bloc, the issue is not that EU discourse was explicitly unsupportive of such arguments. Rather, the problem for the Remain campaign was that discourses from the EU that reflect policy successes and the benefits of membership – and, thereby, embodying the virtue of voteworthiness – were not reproduced in the *Guardian*. The newspaper was, instead, concerned solely with newsworthiness. This therefore raises the issue of incompatible values. Only those elements of EU elite discourse that satisfied, or could be presented as satisfying, conceptualisations of newsworthiness made it into the *Guardian*. Figure 9-1 below, neatly depicts the issue. It is my position that this clash of values, combined with voters' existing ignorance of the EU's work, an historical ambivalence to the idea of closer union, and division among and between British political elites, all conspired to diminish support for Remain.




Figure 9-1: Incompatible values and public perception of the EU

9.3 Contributions of this thesis

This thesis makes a number of novel contributions to scholarship. First among these is the empirical contribution described above. Second, the methodological approach is novel insofar as adhering to the principles of CADS allows one to consider both the context of the data and absences from them through a triangulation of methods and comparison of data sources. I have combined quantitative and qualitative methods, including core tools of corpus linguistics such as keyness and collocation analysis; I have also reviewed concordance lines. However, in further analysis of those data, I have qualitatively coded both with pre-existing frameworks (News Values and, following its development, Political Values). I have also used coding procedures that are generally associated with Grounded Theory and that do not apply existing frameworks. This approach extends the general CADS methodology.

There are numerous benefits to this study design. First, the qualitative coding procedures associated with Grounded Theory have facilitated the rigorous qualitative analysis of a greater number of texts than is generally possible in CADS. Furthermore, allowing the data to speak for themselves facilitated the identification of themes that might not have been made apparent through coding to a pre-existing framework. For instance, the novel Political Values framework was only able to be devised owing to this approach. Conversely, coding to the existing News Framework – and the Political Values framework once it was developed – along with reference to contextual information, enabled a novel comparison between political and media discourses that explained the results from earlier coding.

A further methodological contribution to Corpus Linguistics comes from the procedure I developed, outlined in section 5.4 of Chapter Five, for assessing and dealing with duplicate data in newspaper corpora. I identify four distinct types of duplicate: simple duplicates, developing articles, rolling coverage and related links. I propose a semi-automated procedure for identifying and classifying duplicates and caution against fully automated approaches.

My Political Values analytical framework (DPVA) presents a novel contribution to the field of Political Discourse Analysis. Some have argued for the need to 'develop an analytical approach [to political discourse] which seeks to address what is distinctive about politics' (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 34). I suggest that we may answer that call with an approach that is focused on the discursive construal of **voteworthiness**. It is certainly true that politics, for political elites, involves deliberation and argumentation with the aim of deciding which course of action should be taken. However, I argue that the key to understanding the political process lies in assessing how the results of that deliberation are expressed, and the

extent to which such expression persuades others to permit politicians to enact the policies arising from those deliberations. Political figures who are not considered *voteworthy* are not permitted to (continue to) enact their policies. In democratic systems, this relates directly to the electoral processes. In other systems, it may involve the suppression of opposition or even revolution. But each case involves either explicit or implied persuasion.

Beyond the field of Political Discourse Analysis, persuasion has, since antiquity, been the central concern of the study of rhetoric. As discussed in Chapter Three, there is a great deal of work that has been undertaken in the field of Persuasion Studies. Much of this work analyses which modes of persuasion are used, and with what results, by particular political figures. The classical distinction divides rhetoric into persuasion by the logic of argument (Logos), the personal qualities of the speaker (Ethos), or playing on the emotions of the audience (Pathos). This thesis has taken an interdisciplinary approach and therein lies another of its contributions. It focuses on the linguistic resources exploited in the realisation of each of these modes. Of course, the inventory of linguistic resources produced here is partial and context dependent. As discussed below, more work must be done to further develop the framework. But this contribution is significant in that it allows for a much more fine-grained analysis and, in particular, that it enables comparison. This systematic and rigorous linguistic approach can be adapted to diverse languages and political contexts. By deploying it, we may, for instance, go beyond saying that a politician relies on appeals to Ethos: we may instead gain an understanding of precisely how Ethos may be discursively construed by different actors in different contexts. In addition, as this thesis has demonstrated, the framework allows for direct comparison with media discourse, enabling the researcher to contextualise reporting on a given topic or in specific publications.

9.4 Limitations, Opportunities and Potential Impact

Having outlined the key finding of the present study in relation to my research questions and the original contributions made by this research, I now turn to the limitations of the study and discuss opportunities for future work. As ever, limitations of time and space necessitated numerous decisions regarding the scope of the work. The study's limited six-month timeframe means that it cannot justify any claims about whether the *Guardian*'s coverage leading up to the referendum differed from their usual coverage. Furthermore, a focus on the issue of economic crisis, while supported throughout by objective data, has the potential to emphasise negativity as other topics may not. A further limitation of this work is my focus on texts to the exclusion of an analysis of multimodal resources. It is well established that the representation in news stories is influenced by article placement and visual materials. Audiences also judge speakers based on various factors from their looks to their fluency. As such, my findings would be better supported had a consideration of multimodal resources been possible.

A further interesting avenue for the development of this study would be the addition of the perspectives of news editors. Given that the *Guardian* explicitly called for a vote to remain in the EU, I would welcome the opportunity to speak to the newspaper's editors. This would allow me to gain a better understanding of their perspective on their own reporting and to ascertain their level of awareness of the incremental effects of their publication's negativity and exclusion of EU voices. I would argue that this research has the potential to significantly support the media in producing more balanced coverage. Similarly, this study identifies a number of features of the EU's representation in the media. As such, it would be beneficial to

study reader response to gauge the extent to which readers are indeed influenced, or aware of being influenced, by what they read.

The most significant limitation of the study also presents perhaps the most exciting opportunity. This is related to the development of the Political Values framework. The framework is inevitably limited in this thesis: it is based on a relatively small number of texts, from one entity within a particular political system, on a specific topic. I very much hope that, in the future, I shall be able to remedy this situation. I would approach this work from a number of directions. First, the model could be developed and refined by working with a much larger and more varied data set. This would ensure a more complete inventory of linguistic resources. Data sets from different political systems may well produce different inventories or see the same linguistic resources being used for different purposes. As noted, the addition of a multimodal element would also be useful, as it would account more fully for speech delivery and picture use in political contexts. The inclusion of paralinguistic features in political speeches and multimodal analysis for sources such as web sites would undoubtedly enrich the framework. Ultimately, I would hope to establish whether certain core linguistic resources hold for all political systems.

A more complete development of the Political Values framework would open up numerous possibilities for future study and impact. It would be possible to develop profiles for particular political regimes and individual figures. This may be potentially applied in political and election studies. Or, for instance, we could probably have traced changes to President Putin's representation of himself as voteworthy prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. As such, the model has a potential impact in contexts of defence and security. In addition to the potential for profiling specific leaders, or potential leaders, it

offers a method for identifying potential allies whose use of language and other persuasive resources indicates an alignment with our own political values.

Combining this work with Forensic Linguistics studies of extremist discourse affords the possibility to address specific threats. Having established which organisations produce potentially problematic extremist discourse or call for terrorist activity, using DPVA to evaluate their persuasiveness would usefully assist in identifying the most dangerous groups. The benefit of an inventory of linguistic resources lies in the possibility of using corpus methods to search for particular features, thereby automating an element of the work. The framework also enables the development of an analytical protocol for qualitative checking of data by non-specialists.

9.5 Concluding remarks

At the beginning of this thesis, I claimed that the result of the Brexit referendum was a surprise to many. Having completed my study, the outcome seems less surprising. Just over one million *Guardian* readers voted for the UK to leave the EU. Had they followed their newspaper's recommendation, the outcome of the referendum might well have been different. In the literature, much is made of the bias exhibited by the British media in reporting on the EU. This is certainly true in the case of the *Express* tabloid newspaper, for instance, which adopted an explicit and, at times, vitriolic stance against EU membership. However, I would suggest that the *Guardian*'s effective undermining of its own pro-EU stance was not intended by the editors. Rather, this result was precipitated by the imperatives of news production and the adherence to News Values. Combined with what can be described as an historical British ambivalence towards the EU, a lack of reporting around EU matters in general, and voters'

consequent lack of understanding of the EU's role, this ultimately led to a referendum result that will have wide ranging effects for generations to come.

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