# *Imaginings of Identity:* The Construction of National Identity in German Integration Discourses in Print News Media, 2010-2015

by

ANJA CHRISTINA BENEDIKT

A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham
for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS)
School of Government and Society
College of Social Sciences
University of Birmingham
March 2020

UNIVERSITY OF
BIRMINGHAM

## University of Birmingham Research Archive

### e-theses repository

This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation.

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.

# ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the discursive constructions of national identity in (migrant) integration discourses in the German print news media between 2010-2015 and examines whether these constructions are inclusionary or exclusionary to migrants/ethnic minorities. Drawing on the interdisciplinary, multi-theoretical and multi-methodological framework of critical discourse analysis, I approach discourse as social practice and as a 'discursive battlefield', in which powerful actors construct national identity based on dominant ideologies and unequal power structures. Through an extensive analysis of the German media, I examine constructions of national identity and test two theories as to whether they can explain the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of identified boundary drawings. The key argument is that recent constructions of German national identity are rather exclusionary and show remarkable (historical) continuity despite different situational contexts. The findings further illustrate that constructions of national identity are inherently based on the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other', and that a more inclusionary approach cannot solely focus on improving the representation of 'Others' but needs to break from existing dialectics. Moreover, while the explanatory value of the two theories is confirmed, I argue that a further mechanism for theorising the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of German reactions towards diversity is required.

# ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to first and foremost thank my supervisors, Professor Stefan Wolff and Professor Nando Sigona, for their valuable feedback and intellectual advice, for their patience and understanding. I am indebted to Professor Stefan Wolff for taking me on as a student in the third year of my PhD studies. I must also thank Dr Isabelle Hertner for her feedback and continuous encouragement during the first two years of my studies, and Professor Sara Jones for encouraging me to undertake this research project in the first place and for supporting me throughout the PhD and funding application process as well as the Master in Social Research.

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [grant number 1368243]. This thesis would not have been possible without the funding from the ESRC. I was fortunate to receive the 1+3 funding, additional training and conference funding as well as the opportunity to conduct a placement with the Home Office in London.

I would also like to thank the Institute for German Studies (IGS) and its members, above all Dr Nicholas Martin, for giving me the opportunity to actively take part in the institute's activities and to take advantage of its partnership with the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) allowing me to participate in two international summer schools.

I would further like to thank the POLSIS PhD community and above all Dr Ahmad Barakat (and family) for being a wonderful friend with unfailing support and hospitality, who also made the submission of this thesis in the midst of Covid-19 possible.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my partner, friends and family for their support.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**CHAPTER 1**

**INTRODUCTION** ..... 1

1.1. National Identity and the Integration Discourse ..... 1

1.2. Research Approach ..... 4

1.3. Contribution ..... 7

1.4. Overview of Chapters ..... 9

**CHAPTER 2**

**THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY** ..... 14

2.1. Philosophical Underpinning ..... 15

2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis ..... 19

2.3. The Discursive Construction of National Identity ..... 24

2.3.1. The Construction of Identity ..... 24

2.3.1.1. Narrative Identity ..... 24

2.3.1.2. Discursive Identity ..... 27

2.3.2. The Construction of National Identity ..... 30

2.3.2.1. The Nation ..... 31

2.3.2.2. Theories on Nationalism ..... 33

2.3.2.3. Content of National Identity ..... 38

2.4. The ‘Self’/‘Other’ in Integration Discourses ..... 41

2.4.1. The ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ ..... 42

2.4.2. Integration ..... 45

2.4.3. Typology of Nations ..... 48

2.4.4. New Theoretical Frameworks for Determining Inclusion/Exclusion ..... 52

**CHAPTER 3**

**GERMAN IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION DISCOURSES** ..... 59

3.1. Immigration Discourses ..... 60

3.2. Integration Discourses ..... 70

3.3. The Construction of the ‘Other’ ..... 74

3.3.1. ‘Foreigners, Criminals and the Migration Background’ ..... 74

3.3.2. The Muslim ‘Other’ ..... 78

3.4. The Construction of the ‘Self’ ..... 85

**CHAPTER 4**

**METHODOLOGY** ..... 95
4.1. Research Design ..... 95
4.1.1. Research Questions and Operationalisation ..... 95
4.1.2. Case Study ..... 101
4.1.3. Media Discourse ..... 105
4.1.4. Time Frame ..... 107
4.2. Data Collection ..... 110
4.2.1. German Print Media and Maximum Variation Sample ..... 112
4.2.1.1. Print Media ..... 112
4.2.1.2. Maximum Variation Sample ..... 113
4.2.2. Collection of Media Articles and Criterion-i Sampling ..... 118
4.2.2.1. *Spiegel* and *Bild* ..... 119
4.2.2.2. *FAZ* and *Süddeutsche* ..... 120
4.3. Content Analysis and Third-Stage Sample ..... 122
4.3.1. Qualitative Content Analysis ..... 122
4.3.2. Corpus/Sample for In-Depth Analysis ..... 130
4.4. Critical Discourse Analysis as Method ..... 132
4.4.1. Discourse Historical Approach ..... 133
4.4.2. Contents ..... 136
4.4.3. Strategies and Topoi ..... 138
4.4.3.1. Strategies ..... 138
4.4.3.2. Topoi ..... 140
4.4.4. Means of Realisation ..... 143
4.4.4.1. Lexical Analysis ..... 143
4.4.4.2. Referential Strategies ..... 144
4.4.4.3. Deictic ‘we’ ..... 146
4.4.4.4. Intertextuality ..... 146
4.4.4.5. Visual Analysis ..... 147
4.5. Trustworthiness and Limitations ..... 148
4.5.1. Credibility ..... 149
4.5.2. Transferability ..... 151
4.5.3. Dependability ..... 152
4.5.4. Confirmability ..... 153

**CHAPTER 5**

**THE CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN *LEITKULTUR*** ..... 155

5.1. The 'Self' – Germans ..... 157

5.1.1. As Constitutional Patriotism ..... 158

5.1.2. German Values, Norms and Customs ..... 162

5.1.3. German language ..... 164

5.1.4. Judeo-Christian Culture ..... 168

5.1.4.1. History Topos ..... 169

5.1.4.2. Culture Topos ..... 170

5.1.4.3. Reality Topos ..... 173

5.1.4.4. Criticism ..... 174

5.2. The 'Deviant Other' – 'Muslims' ..... 176

5.2.1. German Language and Integration Courses ..... 177

5.2.2. Other Cultural Values ..... 179

5.2.3. Criminality ..... 184

5.2.3.1. Culture and Criminality topoi ..... 184

5.2.3.2. Linguistic Means ..... 186

5.2.3.3. Criticism ..... 188

5.2.4. Integration Unwillingness ..... 188

5.2.5. Criticism and Alternative Constructions ..... 190

5.3. Discussion ..... 192

**CHAPTER 6**

**THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN *WIRTSCHAFTSNATION*** ..... 198

6.1. The 'Self' – The German leading economy ..... 201

6.2. 'Others' – Between Successful and Failed Labour Market Integration ..... 207

6.2.1. The Muslim and Turkish 'Other' ..... 207

6.2.1.1. Education ..... 208

6.2.1.2. German Language ..... 210

6.2.1.3. Labour Market Integration ..... 212

6.2.2. Southern and Eastern Europeans as High-Skilled Migrants ..... 213

6.2.2.1. Education ..... 213

6.2.2.2. German Language ..... 214

6.2.2.3. Labour Market Integration ..... 215

6.2.3. Romanians and Bulgarians as 'Poverty Migrants' or Roma ..... 216

6.2.3.1. Education ..... 217
6.2.3.2. German Language ..... 219
6.2.3.3. Labour Market Integration ..... 220
6.2.4. Refugees ..... 223
6.2.4.1. Education ..... 223
6.2.4.2. German Language ..... 226
6.2.4.3. Labour Market Integration ..... 227
6.3. Discussion ..... 231
**CHAPTER 7**
**THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE *HOMO GERMANICUS*** ..... 237
7.1. 'Mainstream Germans' ..... 239
7.1.1. As Helping and Volunteering ..... 239
7.1.1.1. Volunteering Examples ..... 239
7.1.1.2. Majority ..... 243
7.1.1.3. Moral Leadership ..... 244
7.1.2. Argumentation Schemes ..... 247
7.1.2.1. Humanitarian Topos ..... 247
7.1.2.2. Image topos ..... 248
7.1.3. As Open-minded and Tolerant ..... 252
7.1.3.1. Transformative Strategy ..... 253
7.1.3.2. Criticism ..... 254
7.2. 'Deviant Germans' ..... 255
7.2.2. The 'Right-Wing Extremist Other' ..... 255
7.2.2.1. Intolerance of Violence ..... 256
7.2.2.2. Anonymity ..... 258
7.2.2.3. 'Assigning' Criminal Behaviour ..... 260
7.2.2.4. Negative Representation ..... 264
7.2.2.5. Relativization ..... 266
7.2.3. The 'East German Other' ..... 270
7.2.3.1. Xenophobia ..... 270
7.2.3.2. Relativization ..... 271
7.2.3.3. Criticism ..... 272
7.3. The 'Worried Citizen' ..... 273
7.3.1. Fear of Refugees ..... 273

7.3.2. Culture, Crime and Danger Topoi ..... 276
7.3.3. Liability and Xenophobia Topoi ..... 277
7.3.4. Boundary Drawing and Denial of Racism ..... 279
7.4. Hatred and Racism in German Society ..... 282
7.4.1. Criticism of 'Worried Citizens' ..... 282
7.4.2. Hatred and Exclusion in Society ..... 285
7.4.3. Boundary Drawing ..... 286
7.5. Discussion ..... 287
**CHAPTER 8**
**CONCLUSION** ..... 295
8.1. Empirical Findings and Contribution ..... 299
8.2. Theoretical Findings and Contribution ..... 307
8.3. Methodological Contribution ..... 313
8.4. Wider Implications ..... 314
8.5. Limitations and Further Research ..... 316
**APPENDIX** ..... 321
A. Qualitative Content Analysis ..... 321
1. 'Cultural Integration' ..... 321
a) Coverage over Time and Events ..... 321
b) Themes ..... 324
2. 'Structural Integration' ..... 333
a) Coverage over Time and Events ..... 333
b) Themes ..... 337
3. 'Perceptions' ..... 352
a) Coverage Over Time and Events ..... 352
b) Themes ..... 356
B. Critical Discourse Analysis - 'Structural Integration' ..... 368
1. Welfare Benefits ..... 368
a) Muslim and Turkish 'Other' ..... 368
b) Romanians and Bulgarians / Roma ..... 370
c) Refugees ..... 374
2. Crime ..... 377
a) Romanians and Bulgarians / Roma ..... 377
b) Muslim and Turkish 'Other' ..... 378

c) Refugees ..... 379
**LIST OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES CITED** ..... 385
*Der Spiegel* ..... 385
*Die Bild* ..... 388
*Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)* ..... 394
*Die Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)* ..... 400
**BIBLIOGRAPHY** ..... 407

# LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Overall Research Strategies and Theoretical Background ..... 20
Figure 2.2: Typologies of Nations ..... 48
Figure 2.3: Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources ..... 53
Figure 2.4: Conceptual Space for Discursive Constructions of National Identity Formed by the two Dimensions of Logic of Boundary Drawing ..... 54
Figure 3.1: Frames ..... 68
Figure 4.1: A Typology of Case Study ..... 102
Figure 4.2: Case Study Research Designs ..... 105
Figure 4.3: Sampling Forms and Process ..... 111
Figure 4.4: Circulation of Newspapers 2010 (3) to 2015 (4) ..... 117
Figure 4.5: Monthly Publications on 'Integration' July 2010 to December 2015 ..... 123
Figure 4.6: Steps of Inductive Category Development ..... 126
Figure 4.7: Categories of Newspaper Articles ..... 129
Figure 4.8: Linguistic Depth of Field and Level Aggregation ..... 135
Figure 4.9: Hypothetical Rule ..... 140
Figure 4.10: Strategies for Improving Trustworthiness ..... 149
Figure 5.1: *Bild*, 5.10.2015, p. 2 ..... 160
Figure 5.2: *Bild*, 4.10.2010, title page ..... 169
Figure 5.3: *Bild*, 6.10.2010, p. 2 ..... 171
Figure 5.4: *Bild*, 5.10.2010, title page ..... 172
Figure 5.5: *Spiegel*, issue 39, 2012, p. 60 ..... 181
Figure 6.1: *Bild*, 16.10.2010, p. 2 ..... 205
Figure 6.2: *Bild*, 17.2.2011, p. 8 ..... 209
Figure 6.3: *Spiegel*, issue 36, 2015, p. 25 ..... 224
Figure 7.1: *Bild*, 31.8.2015a, p. 3 ..... 241
Figure 7.2: *Bild*, 29.8.2015a, p. 3 ..... 242
Figure 7.3: *Spiegel*, issue 34, 2015, p. 40 ..... 246
Figure 7.4: *Bild*, 8.9.2015, p. 2 ..... 250
Figure 7.5: *Bild*, 31.8.2015b, p. 3 ..... 260
Figure 7.6: *Bild*, 23.10.2015, p. 2 ..... 261

Figure 7.7: *Bild*, 23.10.2015, p. 2 ..... 262
Figure 7.8: *Spiegel*, issue 16, 2015, p. 31 ..... 262
Figure 7.9: *Spiegel*, issue 16, 2015, p. 30 ..... 267
Figure 7.10: *Spiegel*, issue 31, 2015, p. 20 ..... 268
Figure 7.11: *Bild*, 15.10.2015, p. 3 ..... 274
Figure 7.12: *Bild*, 9.10.2015c, p. 3 ..... 279
Figure 7.13: *Bild*, 8.4.2015a, p. 3 ..... 281
Figure 7.14: *Süddeutsche*, 24.8.2015b, p. 5 ..... 283
Figure 7.15: *Süddeutsche*, 24.8.2015b, p. 5 ..... 284
Figure A.1: 'Cultural Integration' Totals July 2010 to December 2015 ..... 321
Figure A.2: 'Cultural Integration' by Newspaper over Time ..... 322
Figure A.3: Themes of 'Cultural Integration' by Newspaper ..... 324
Figure A.4: Articles on 'German Language' by Newspaper over Time ..... 326
Figure A.5: Articles on 'German Values' by Newspapers over Time ..... 327
Figure A.6: Articles on 'Islam' by Newspaper over Time ..... 328
Figure A.7: Articles on 'Male Circumcision' by Newspaper in 2012 ..... 329
Figure A.8: Articles on 'Crime' by Newspaper over Time ..... 328
Figure A.9: Articles on 'Xenophobia' by Newspaper over Time ..... 332
Figure A.10: 'Structural Integration' Totals July 2010 to December 2015 ..... 333
Figure A.11: Articles for *Die FAZ* and *Die Süddeutsche* over Time ..... 334
Figure A.12: Articles for *Der Spiegel* and *Die Bild* over Time ..... 334
Figure A.13: Themes of 'Structural Integration' by Newspaper ..... 337
Figure A.14: Articles on 'Labour Market' by Newspaper over Time ..... 339
Figure A.15: Articles on 'Education' by Newspaper over Time ..... 340
Figure A.16: Articles on 'German Language' by Newspaper over Time ..... 341
Figure A.17: Articles on 'Integration Measures' by Newspaper over Time ..... 342
Figure A.18: Articles on 'Costs' by Newspaper over Time ..... 343
Figure A.19: Articles on 'Finance' by Newspaper over Time ..... 344
Figure A.20: Articles on 'Welfare Benefits' by Newspaper over Time ..... 345
Figure A.21: Articles on 'Poverty' by Newspaper over Time ..... 346
Figure A.22: Articles on 'Crime' by Newspaper over Time ..... 347
Figure A.23: Articles on 'Ethnic Segregation' by Newspaper over Time ..... 348

Figure A.24: Articles on ‘Citizenship’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 350
Figure A.25: Articles on ‘Political’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 351
Figure A.26: ‘Perceptions’ Totals July 2010 to December 2015 ..... 353
Figure A.27: ‘Perceptions’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 354
Figure A.28: Themes of ‘Perceptions’ by Newspaper ..... 357
Figure A.29: Sub-Themes of ‘Welcoming’ by Newspaper ..... 358
Figure A.30: Articles on ‘Openness’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 359
Figure A.31: Articles on ‘Volunteering’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 360
Figure A.32: Sub-Themes of ‘Xenophobia’ by Newspaper ..... 361
Figure A.33: Articles on ‘Attack’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 363
Figure A.34: Articles on ‘Prejudice’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 364
Figure A.35: Articles on ‘Discrimination’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 365
Figure A.36: Articles on ‘Exclusion’ by Newspaper over Time ..... 366
Figure B.1: *Spiegel*, issue 14, 2012, p. 44 ..... 371
Figure B.2: *FAZ*, 10.10.2015, p. 19 ..... 376
Figure B.3: *Bild*, 2.10.2015, p. 10 ..... 380
Figure B.4: *Bild*, 2.10.2015, title page ..... 381

# LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: Characteristics of Chosen Newspapers ..... 117
Table 4.2: Systematic Sample of Collected Newspaper Articles ..... 131
Table A.1: Events related to 'Cultural Integration' ..... 323
Table A.2: Events related to 'Structural Integration' ..... 335
Table A.3: Events related to 'Perceptions' ..... 355

# ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| AfD | Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) |
| BKA | Bundeskriminalamt (Federal Criminal Police Office) |
| CDA | Critical Discourse Analysis |
| CDU | Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) |
| CSU | Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria) |
| FAZ | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung |
| FDP | Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party) |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| PEGIDA | Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) |
| NPD | Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) |
| NRW | Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalia) |
| SPD | Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) |
| SZ | Süddeutsche Zeitung |

# CHAPTER 1

# INTRODUCTION

*What is German – and how German do you have to be to belong to Germany?*
- *New York Times*, 26.5.2016[1]

*Germany is an immigration country but not yet a real immigration society.*
- Aydan Özoguz, German Integration Minister (SPD) in the *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 3.11.2014[2]

## 1.1. National Identity and the Integration Discourse

In August 2010, first excerpts of the book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* ('Germany does away with itself') were published by the then politician and executive member of the Federal Bank of Germany Thilo Sarrazin (2010). In the book, Sarrazin (2010) propounds biological theses on the inferiority of Muslims, which sold over 1.5 million times becoming Germany's biggest bestseller post-WWII (Krieger 2012). Piwoni (2015: 96) argues that while the biological theses themselves were generally rejected by people and the political elite, it was the claim of Muslims failing to integrate into society that caused widespread resonance with the public and led to month-long political debates. Further spin-offs following this debate included Chancellor Angela Merkel proclaiming that the approach to multiculturalism has failed, and the controversy and resistance that erupted after the then Federal President Christian Wulff declared that Islam now also forms part of Germany (Wulff 2010).

Political and public debates in Germany about (migrant) integration are far from new nor

[1] Sauerbrey (2016: n.p.).
[2] Unger (2014: n.p.). Unless otherwise stated, all translations from German are my own.

can be considered a recent phenomenon. Indeed, immigration and integration have arguably been one of the most consistent, contentious and emotionally laden topics in German politics (Thränhardt 2002: 353, 346; Nouripour 2011: 13). Yet, Bade (2013: 363) and Foroutan (2012a: 323) argue that the whole discussion on (migrant) integration conceals the underlying issue and 'real debate' on German identity and what German identity entails in light of the country's increasingly heterogeneous composition.

Indeed, national identity is theorised to be based on the mutually constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' (Aydin 2009: 176; Rash 2012: 24; Rommelsbacher 2002: 10; Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 80; Hall 2004: 51), and the concept of 'integration' inherently presupposes the notion of the host society ('Self') and single or multiple 'Others' (Aydin 2009: 216). This locates discursive constructions of national identity and the 'Other' at the core of integration debates. Stipulating questions such as 'Who belongs to Germany?', 'What does it mean to be German?', and 'When is an immigrant truly integrated and becomes German?' further illustrate how the presence of migrants is linked to ideas about national identity (Kotowski 2013: 295). Subsequently, it can be deduced that increasing levels of diversity in society trigger a constant re-negotiation and re-definition of the boundaries of the national community in relation to these (new) 'Others within' (Triandafyllidou 2000: 375; Antonsich 2016: 1791; Faist and Ulbricht 2013: 3).

While the literature on immigration and integration discourses in Germany has been widely researched, studies on immigration discourses have mainly focused on the post-WWII period all the way to the political discussions of the new immigration law in 2005 (Bauder 2008a, 2008b; Wengeler 2003; Schönwälder 2001; Lubawinski 2008; Kotowski 2013). Also, methodical investigations on the constructions of 'Others' have looked at the representation of Poles, Turks and expellees in the 1990s (Eder et al. eds. 2004), while

systematic analyses of the construction of 'Muslims' have mainly used the same data of the political negotiations and media debates leading up to immigration law in 2005 (Klug 2010, Halm 2013). Further research on the portrayal of 'Muslims' has focused on specific single aspects such as the headscarf (Rostock and Berghahn 2008), honour killings (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009, 2010), forced marriages (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2013), or the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in textbooks (Jonker 2013).

In addition, while previous research has also looked at constructions of the 'Self' in relation to immigration (Bauder 2009, 2011, 2014, Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009), the headscarf (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014), the Leitkultur debate in 2001 (Klusmeyer 2001; Manz 2004; Pautz 2005a, 2005b), or the 'refugee crisis' (Schmidtke 2017; Matthay 2017), these analyses have not taken the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' into account and have either focused on the 'Self' *or* the 'Other', which is arguably required for the investigation of boundary drawings in the context of this thesis.

As a result, this thesis systematically investigates recent discursive constructions of national identity in German (migrant) integration discourses, in the sense of shedding light on (new) competing ideas of who forms part of the imagined German national community; and whether these constructions are inclusionary or exclusionary to those considered 'Others'. Consequently, the two main research questions of this thesis are:

*How is national identity constructed in discourses on (migrant) integration in Germany?*

*And are these identified constructions inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others' for becoming part of German society?*

The aim of this thesis is to reveal whether and how discursive constructions of national identity (continue to) marginalise particular groups of people. As a result, this thesis seeks

to expose hegemonic discourses and unequal power structures that may not only exclude individuals from the national 'we', but which may also provide the basis of xenophobic and racist ideas that are increasingly employed in racist attacks against those considered as 'Others'.

## 1.2. Research Approach

To answer these questions, the thesis draws on the overarching framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA) that allows for a multi-theoretical, multi-methodological and interdisciplinary approach to analysing the construction of national identity in discourse. Hence, by means of multiple theoretical concepts and constructivist theories of nationalism, national identity is understood to be constructed in discourse, to be multiple and dynamic, and to be constructed by means of mass communication on behalf of the elite. In this sense, the nation is constructed through imagination rather than being a product of primordial occurrence. Furthermore, national identity is conceptualised to inherently be based on the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. In other words, the creation of national identity can only occur with the construction of an 'Other' that essentially forms a contrasting entity (e.g. Rash 2012: 24; Rommelsbacher 2002: 10; Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 80).

Nations have traditionally been topologized by dualisms such as the civic vs. the ethnic nation, whereby the former was argued to lead to inclusion and the latter to exclusion of those considered 'Others'. Nevertheless, this framework has been criticised for neglecting that civic and ethnic aspects cannot necessarily be separated and that civic aspects can also be exclusionary (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 197-198; Smith 1995: 99; Aydin 2009: 178; Antonsich 2016: 1792). As a result, to further answer the second research

question in theoretical terms, the thesis draws on Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) extension of determinism and voluntarism, and Karner's (2011) extension of 'grammars of identities' in order to classify national identity constructions and to test their inclusionary or exclusionary nature. For the purpose of obtaining an in-depth understanding of discursive constructions of national identity in integration discourses, the method adopted is Wodak et al.'s (1999) discourse-historical approach (DHA) and the three-level model of 'contents', argumentation/discursive constructions (strategies and topoi), and linguistic means.

Germany is selected as a key case for a single case study because of its intrinsic and instrumental value. It represents a particularly interesting country for the study of the construction of national identity and the creation of 'Others' due to its historical homogeneous understanding of the nation, yet continuous immigration and commitment to pluralist values. This creates an essential paradox that has been manifesting itself in continuous political and public debates about immigration and integration. Moreover, Germany is arguably a unique case for the investigation of national identity due to its historical experience of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* ('Coming to terms with the past') of its Nazi past as well as state division and re-unification.

Germany has traditionally been described as an 'ethnic nation', which implies that it is based on ethnicity rather than the demos and civic understandings of the nation (Bauder 2011: 4). The German community in the early 1800's and particularly after the Napoleonic wars was based on the idea of the *Volk* ('people') with a common German culture and language (Rash 2012: 44-46). Under Prussian hegemony, the German nation-state was formed in 1871 based on notions of 'Others' including Jews, Catholics, and

Poles (Kurthen 1995: 916; Kotowski 2013: 302; Manz 2004: 482). This means that a culturally homogenous identity of Germany was constructed based on common blood ties, culture and language. These ideas about the common 'race', culture and language were conceived throughout the 19th century and propagated by intellectuals such as Ernst Moritz Arndt and Johann Gottfried Herder (Bauder 2009: 265). They were moreover enshrined in Germany's 1913 citizenship law, which was based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* and the "principle that citizenship can only be conferred by descent" with parents needing to possess German citizenship (Ingram and Triadafilopoulos 2010: 356; Marshall 2001: 139; Hogwood 2000: 127).

While Germany did not alter its 1913 citizenship policy in the second half of the 20th century and officially claimed to be 'a country of non-immigration' (Gerdes 2010: 4), it simultaneously received the largest number of immigrants in Europe (Green 2000: 105; Geddes 2003: 79), with its constitution also representing a clear break from its Nazi history by ensuring pluralism as well as individual freedoms (Schmitt 2007: 148-150). This created a paradox between the desire for ethnic belonging on the one hand and the commitment to pluralism and a diverse reality on the other hand. The consequences were that displaced persons and expellees with German descent received equal treatment to German citizens[3], while those of non-German descent, such as Turkish migrants, were incorporated into the guest worker scheme, which emphasised the temporality of their stay (Green 2000: 106).

With a change in government in 1998 to a red-green coalition, a new citizenship law (2000) and a new immigration law (2005) were created (Klusmeyer 2001: 519-520; Kruse

[3] Jewish migrants from the Soviet Union also received "preferential treatment" after 1990 (Kahn 2004: 51).

et al. 2003; Baringhorst 2013: 48-49), and Germany was officially recognised as 'a country of immigration' (Winter 2010: 171; Baringhorst 2013: 48). Yet, the proclaimed paradigm change has been questioned. In fact, the new immigration law cannot be characterised as a modern immigration law fostering immigration (Kruse et al. 2003; Schmid-Drüner 2006), and the citizenship law continues to avoid dual citizenship[4] and in consequence the existence of hybrid or transnational identities of people (Green 2000: 116). Most importantly, however, the self-understanding as an immigration country is argued to be far from self-evident (Kotowski 2013: 305).

Consequently, this leaves Germany with an unresolved debate about its national identity between a culturally homogeneous and a pluralist self-understanding. Hence, I argue that the findings of an analysis into the construction of German national identity are of interest in itself, but also have instrumental value for illuminating the patterns and processes in the construction of national identity more generally.

## 1.3. Contribution

The thesis aims to make an empirical contribution by adding to existing data on German integration discourses and national identity, and by adding to the theoretical scholarship on typologies, boundary drawings and the co-constitutive nature of national identity constructions. Firstly, the thesis aims to make an empirical contribution by conducting a systematic analysis of recent integration discourses from 2010-2015 that are not tied to specific events or pre-defined 'Others', and by employing CDA as the method of analysis.

[4] The new citizenship law originally envisioned dual citizenship, but its general acceptance was dismissed by the CDU/CSU campaign arguing that "dual citizenship is logically incompatible with the precondition of cultural integration for naturalisation", and hence dual citizenship became an exception rather than the rule (Green 2000: 116). Legal exceptions, for instance, include dual citizenship with another EU country.

With this, I seek to find out whether the constructions of German identity have indeed become more open-minded and inclusionary as often proclaimed in the media, or whether Germany is still largely exclusionary to those considered 'Others'.

Secondly, the thesis intends to make an empirical and theoretical contribution by analysing the discursive constructions of the 'Self' *and* of the 'Other' thereby incorporating this co-constitutive nature of boundary drawings into the analysis of national identity, which in this combination has thus far been neglected by the literature on German immigration or integration discourses. Thirdly, the thesis aims to make a theoretical contribution to knowledge on national identity typologies and their inclusionary or exclusionary impact. The existing literature predominantly still applies the civic/ethnic model of the nation for determining the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others'. As a result, I draw on two new theoretical frameworks involving boundary drawings with the purpose of testing their explanatory value in determining inclusion/exclusion.

The thesis furthermore addresses a significant and time-relevant subject in Germany. Identifying discursive practices that include or exclude particular groups of people from the national community is particularly important in the context of Germany. Germany has become the country with the second-largest inflow of migrants (net immigration) in 2013 worldwide (OECD 2014; Astheimer 2014). Additionally, Germany has received the largest number of asylum seekers in EU in 2015 (Eurostat 2016). These developments continuously add diversity to an already existing multicultural society. German cities become more and more diverse and host a number of different migrants who increasingly come from further away (see Vertovec 2007 on superdiversity). There were 20.8 million people with a so-called migrant background in Germany in 2018 comprising 25% of the German population (Groll 2019).

At the same time, a rise in nationalism and expressed racism and/or xenophobia can be observed. Towards the end of 2014, the social movement of the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident (PEGIDA) was formed and led weekly demonstrations with xenophobic tones. However, actions against refugees were not confined to demonstrations and apart from nationalist slogans (e.g. Roßmann 2018), there has also been an increase in right-wing extremism (BKA 2015). The year 2015 noted a fivefold increase in attacks against asylum seeker/refugee accommodations (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg 2017). Moreover, for 2016, an estimate of over 3500 attacks against refugees has been reported (*Spiegel Online* 2017).

As a result, it is the aim of this thesis to reveal whether and how discursive constructions of national identity marginalise particular groups of people and potentially legitimise xenophobic and racist ideas in mainstream discourses of the German media. In summary, I intend to make an important timely contribution to our understanding of national identity constructions and their inclusionary or exclusionary impact at a theoretical as well as at an empirical level in relation to recent integration discourses.

## 1.4. Overview of Chapters

The thesis is divided into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical foundations for investigating constructions of national identity in integration discourses and the aspect of inclusion/exclusion. It locates the thesis in the research paradigm of social constructivism and identifies CDA as the most appropriate overarching theoretical and methodological framework for this study. It then discusses the underlying theoretical concepts and constructivist theories of nationalism for understanding national identity to be constructed

in discourse, to be multiple and dynamic, and to be constructed by means of mass communication on behalf of the elite. The chapter explains that national identity is inherently based on the boundary drawing of the 'Self' and 'Other' and that the integration discourse as the subject of analysis is particularly relevant because integration implies and discusses the existence of the host society ('Self') vs. one or multiple internal 'Others'. The last section turns to the literature on typologies of national identity criticising the limitations of the ethnic vs. civic nation for determining the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of identity constructions, and instead proposes the application of two new theories.

Chapter 3 reviews the existing literature on German immigration and integration discourses, including the construction of the German 'Self' and the (migrant) 'Other'. It finds that German immigration discourses have been extensively researched in the post-WWII era up to the new immigration law in 2005, while research on integration discourses has focused on the constructions of Turks, Poles and expellees in the 1990s or above all on different issues relevant to Islam and the Muslim 'Other'. The review further shows that German identity has been discussed in relation to the *Leitkultur* debate in 2002 and more recently with regards to the 'refugee crisis', but that research looking at constructions of the 'Self' and of the 'Other' simultaneously, is still missing. Furthermore, I point out that these studies have predominantly employed the theoretical framework of the ethnic/civic nation for classifying constructions of identity in spite of this framework's limitations.

Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology by explaining the single case study design, the chosen time period, and the focus on the media. It operationalises the research questions and the two theoretical frameworks on boundary drawings by outlining

expected assumptions about inclusionary or exclusionary boundary drawings as well as how they relate to each other. It continues with an explanation of the chosen material – its collection and sampling – before outlining the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) as the chosen method of analysis within the framework of CDA. The chapter concludes by discussing the trustworthiness and limitations of the thesis.

Chapters 5-7 present the empirical findings of the study. These three empirical chapters are based on the three categories of 'cultural integration', 'structural integration' and 'perceptions' identified in the German integration discourse by means of a qualitative content analysis. Chapter 5 asks how national identity is constructed in discourses on the first category of 'cultural integration', whereby 'cultural integration' entails aspects of culture such as language, religion, customs and norms. It finds that the German 'Self' is by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation and the history and culture topos constructed in opposition to the Muslim 'Other'. While the German 'Self' is characterised by the German constitution, German values, the German language as well as the Judeo-Christian tradition, the Muslim 'Other' is negatively represented by gender inequality, patriarchy, hostility, violence and crime, and partially a lack of German language. This, I argue, reflects a highly exclusionary relationship for the Muslim 'Other' and confirms the theoretical assumptions about the exclusionary nature of deterministic constructions of identity and the 'orientalist discourse'.

Chapter 6 discusses the discursive construction of national identity with regards to the second category of 'structural integration'. 'Structural integration' is defined as "migrants and their descendants' aiming at the acquisition and the 'quality' of participation in the key institutions of the host society", which are among others the education and social security system, and the labour market (Heckmann 2015: 72). The findings show that the

German ‘Self’ is constructed as a leading economy, while ‘Others’ are evaluated by their ability to contribute to the economy. By means of the economic utility topos, ‘Others’ are judged by their level of employment, level of education and German language skills. The chapter identifies four overarching groups of ‘Others’: 1) Muslims and Turks, 2) Southern Europeans, 3) Romanians and Bulgarians including Roma, and 4) refugees. While Southern Europeans are positively represented as educated and employed, the representations of the remaining three groups is mixed with particularly the Roma being constructed as a burden to German society. I argue that this represents a rather exclusionary boundary drawing because it is based on conditional acceptance depending on the ‘Other’s’ labour market performance. This finding not only represents remarkable continuity in German constructions of the ‘Self’ but also confirms the theoretical assumption of (semi-)exclusion with regards to the deterministic construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘instrumentalist discourse’.

Chapter 7 asks how national identity is constructed in the context of the attitudes and behaviour of the German host society towards refugees (‘perceptions’). It finds several constructions of the German ‘Self’. Firstly, by means of a transformative strategy and the humanitarian and image topos, the German ‘Self’ is in the form of ‘mainstream Germans’ constructed to be open-minded and volunteering. This construction stands in opposition to the one of two deviant German ‘Others’: the ‘right-wing extremist’ and the ‘East German’. All three constructions of the ‘Self’ are accompanied by the representation of refugees as ‘victims’, either due to their persecution or as victims of racist attacks. Lastly, the German ‘Self’ is constructed as ‘worried citizens’ whose xenophobia and racism are legitimised as fears of a different and dangerous refugee ‘Other’. I argue that these latter aspects of legitimising racism through ‘fears’ or constructing it as a ‘right-wing extremist’

minority, denies racism in society and hence is rather exclusionary for refugees. I further claim that the two applied theoretical frameworks are limited in their explanatory value of inclusion/exclusion in the context of 'perceptions' and that an additional mechanism would be beneficial.

Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarising the research project and its empirical findings on constructions of national identity in Germany and by discussing the theoretical and methodological contributions of the thesis. Finally, it reflects on the limitations of the study and on possible avenues for further research.

# CHAPTER 2

# THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

This chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks relevant to the discursive construction of national identity within the context of migrant integration. In order to answer the two research questions of how national identity is constructed in (migrant) integration discourses and whether these constructions are inclusionary or exclusionary for certain groups of 'Others' to become part of German society, the theoretical basis for understanding identity and more specifically national identity to be constructed in discourse firstly needs to be provided. Secondly, it needs to be discussed what national identity as a concept entails meaning the content of national identity, but also with regards to the specific context of (migrant) integration. As a result, also the concept of integration for the purpose of this thesis has to be defined. Furthermore, theoretical guidelines for determining and categorizing inclusion or exclusion and with it the boundary drawings of different discursive constructions, will be required. Lastly, due to the nature of these multiple theoretical requirements and the incorporation of different concepts, also a framework allowing for a multi-theoretical and interdisciplinary approach within the interpretive paradigm integrating the mentioned aspects is needed.

I will argue that critical discourse analysis (CDA) is the appropriate and most suitable overarching theoretical and methodological framework for addressing the research questions. As part of CDA, national identity will be understood as socially constructed in discourse, while the integration discourse will be seen as a discursive battlefield in which different actors engage with different notions of national belonging that have been

"internalised in the course of socialisation" (Wodak et al. 1999: 28). I will furthermore show that national identities are fluid and multi-layered, and that the 'Self' and the 'Other' are mutually constitutive, which is particularly relevant in the context of migrants and integration. Last of all, I will propose two theoretical frameworks to be tested on their ability to frame and assess the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of discursive constructions of national identity.

The structure of the chapter is as following: The first section will outline the philosophical framework including the relevant epistemology and ontology, on which the research project is based (2.1). The second section (2.2) will introduce CDA as the overarching theoretical and methodological framework of this thesis. The third section (2.3) will provide an overview of theoretical ideas and concepts supporting the discursive construction of identity (2.3.1) and of national identity (2.3.2). This corresponds to the first research question and the investigation of how national identity is constructed in (migrant) integration discourse. The fourth section (2.4) will then introduce the co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations as part of the construction of national identity and discuss how this relates to integration discourses. Furthermore, typologies of nations will be outlined and two theoretical frameworks for assessing the inclusionary or exclusionary impact of identity constructions will be proposed. This final section hence also serves to answer the second research question with regards to whether identified constructions of national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary of (migrant) 'Others'.

## 2.1. Philosophical Underpinning

With regards to the philosophical framework, I argue that the ontological and epistemological position of this thesis needs to be interpretive. More specifically, I

contend that the research design and analysis rest on social constructivism that is part of the interpretive paradigm. Ontology essentially is the basis of all research and entails assumptions about the nature of reality (Blaikie 2007: 3; Grix 2010: 59). In the interpretive paradigm, social actors attach meaning to social phenomena due to which the reality of social phenomena is continually created and interpreted by social actors (Bryman 2008: 19; Saunders et al. 2012: 131; May 2011: 13). To put it differently, knowledge is constructed and retained through social interactions (Berger and Luckmann 1966). This is also referred to as an internal reality, which stands in contrast to the positivist paradigm, in which social phenomena are thought to exist as facts constituting an external social reality (Saunders et al. 2012: 131; Bryman 2008: 18).

Ontology is inextricably linked with epistemology (Mason 1996: 16; Grix 2010: 60, 65-67). Epistemology can be understood as the theory of knowledge; the process of accepting what constitutes knowledge and of acquiring recognised knowledge about social reality (Blaikie 2007: 18; Grix 2010: 63; Saunders et al. 2012: 132). With a constructivist epistemology, interpretations are seen as acceptable knowledge. Moreover, the content of documents or discourse are not treated as factual evidence and cannot be understood at face-value (May 2001: 185) but are approached as 'topics' (Gidley 2004: 254). Constructivist thought pays attention to how phenomena are socially constructed by the means of the social organisation of documentary sources (Green and Thorogood 2009: 190; Gidley 2004: 254).

This thesis rests on the interpretive/constructivist paradigm in both ontological and epistemological terms because national identity and representations of the 'Other' are socially constructed in discourse, as will be shown in the discussion of theoretical assumptions in the following sections. Different actors in society attach meaning to the

discourse on migrants and therefore construct and reproduce discourse. They continuously interpret and reinvent different aspects of the discourse thereby creating their own internal realities. In fact, following Wodak et al. (1999: 28), I see the (migrant) integration discourse as a 'discursive battlefield', with different social actors engaging and battling over interpretative dominance. This has also been described as different social actors or groups in society competing for "the one and only narrative which should be hegemonic" (Wodak and de Cillia 2007: 338). Moreover, knowledge of the discourse cannot be 'discovered' without interpreting the linguistic aspects and narratives of the discourse. As a result, the information and issues identified in (migrant) integration discourses cannot be treated as facts but rather as 'topics' (see Gidley 2004: 254).

While constructivism dominates the field on nationalism and national identity, Helbling (2007: 10) shows that constructivists do not so much have to defend themselves against essentialists but against the criticism of the increasingly slippery slope of constructivism itself. The criticism that now everything can be conceptualised as constructed has also been put forward by Ian Hacking (1999: 2). In his publication *The Social Construction of What?*, Hacking (1999) outlines a range of odd items that he found based on the search term "the social construction of X". In the context of nations and national identity, Helbling (2007: 10) agrees that it will be difficult to explain what we mean by 'imagined communities', if we do not know what constructivism represents.

As a result, Helbling (2007: 10) argues that social or modern constructivism must be delimited from radical or postmodern constructivism. While postmodern constructivists contemplate that no 'true' claims can be made "about a 'real' world" (Parsons 2002: 90), modern constructivists think that the "claim that action depends on meaning does not necessarily imply that there can be no 'real' analysis of why certain people do certain

things" (Parsons 2002: 81). Indeed, by drawing on Berger and Luckmann (1966), Helbling (2007: 10) points out that "knowledge about the social world is possible by revealing the ways in which actors contribute to the creation of their perceived reality". Hence, while national identities are seen as a mental construct of 'invented tradition' or as an 'imagined community', the identified constructions are however thought to form part of an objective reality (Wodak et al. 1999: 22). In the context of this research project, I will hence treat national identity as a discursively constructed phenomenon involving hegemonic ideas that do not represent reality, but I argue that the findings of these discursively constructed ideas represent real existing constructions of the discourse.

Helbling (2007: 11) continues that as a result of this, research into the field of national identity construction must show how cultural difference is socially constructed and how these constructions are the product of social interaction. Furthermore, by drawing on Barth (1969), Helbling (2007: 12) points out that it is not the aspect such as culture or language itself that is relevant, but how this specific aspect is applied to induce boundary drawing between people. From this, he (2007: 12-13) proceeds that boundary drawing as much as any process of understanding the social world requires the creation and application of categorizations. Such categorizations are a part of cognition also referred to as stereotypes involving the labelling of persons based on generalisations and simplifications (Helbling 2007: 13). These stereotypes can, for instance, be acquired through education (see Gellner 1994), or following the continuous exposure of specific reproductions by the political elite (see Lepsius 1982/1990: 246). Moreover, Estel (1994: 32; 2002: 107) points out that key historical events can influence and constrain future constructions of national identity. Consequently, there are limitations to the constructions of national identity. As a result, while I aim to analyse constructions of the 'Self' and the

'Other' and how these boundary drawings are socially constructed by different authors and media outlets, I thereby recognise that the media is also limited by stereotypes and categorizations, by the discourse of the political elite, the historical events and the situational context in Germany.

## 2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis


Having discussed the philosophical underpinning of this thesis, in this section, I will introduce critical discourse analysis (CDA) and argue that it is the appropriate and most suitable overarching theoretical and methodological framework for addressing the research questions. CDA has its origins in Critical Linguistics that was developed by Roger Fowler, Gunter Kress, Robert Hodge and Tony Trew at the University of East Anglia in the 1970s (Machin and Mayr 2012: 2). They built on Halliday's (1973) claim that language can be used to represent society but went further by arguing that language also constitutes society (Machin and Mayr 2012: 18). As a result, their principal aim was a social critique with the purpose of demonstrating how "language and grammar can be used as ideological instruments" (Machin and Mayr 2012: 2).

CDA can be understood as a paradigm or research programme because it does not draw on a single theory or adopt a specific methodological approach, but instead draws on multiple theoretical frameworks, methodologies and data (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 3, 5). Different approaches within CDA are associated with different scholars in the field of CDA (Tonkiss 2004: 376). While CDA has its theoretical origin in Critical Theory (van Leeuwen 2009: 277) and 'Western Marxism'[5] associated with important scholars such as

[5] 'Western Marxism' in the sense of the "cultural dimensions of society" and not economic arguments (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 260).

Louis Althusser, Jürgen Habermas and Antonio Gramsci (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 260), it is also strongly influenced by the theorists Foucault, Bhaktin and Giddens (van Leeuwen 2009: 278; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 261-262). The following figure provides an overview of the different research agendas and the theories that they are predominantly based on:

*Figure 2.1: Overall Research Strategies and Theoretical Background*




**Source: Wodak and Meyer (2009: 20)**

While Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2) list a number of aspects, which CDA shares with other forms of discourse analysis such as an interest in language use and its contexts, a focus on analysis beyond sentence grammar or words and on interaction, and "an extension to

*non-verbal (semiotic, multimodal, visual) aspects* of interaction" [original emphasis], there are a few characteristics that distinguish CDA from other forms of discourse analysis. Hence, despite of CDA's inherent variety of research agendas and approaches, CDA constitutes a paradigm based on important aspects that all approaches share:

Firstly, CDA sees discourse as social practice (Wodak 2002: 7; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Understanding discourse as social practice thereby implies a dialectical relationship between the two, in which discourse shapes social structures and social structures shape discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Paltridge 2013: 90). As a result, discourse is seen as "socially constitutive", constituting objects of knowledges such as social relationships and identities (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Wodak 2002: 8). Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) explain that

> discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned – it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258)

Secondly, CDA is not solely concerned with the mere linguistic analysis or use of language but with "the partially linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures" (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271). For the investigation of linguistic features in political contexts and complex social phenomena, a "*multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach*" [original emphasis] is required (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 2). This interdisciplinary approach is fundamental to CDA (Wodak 2002: 10; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 272; Paltridge 2013: 89).

Thirdly, CDA focuses on political discourse and power relations (Fairclough 2001), which is argued to be a defining feature of CDA (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 10). Issues of power are raised based on the constitutive nature of discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Wodak 2002: 8). Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) point out that

> Since discourse is so socially consequential, it gives rise to important issues of power. Discursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258)

As a result, it is the aim of CDA to show how powerful agencies employ discourse to construct social issues (van Leeuwen 2009: 279), and to maintain or reproduce specific power structures (van Dijk 1987a: 18). In this context, ideology understood as a coherent set of beliefs (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 8) and as the representation of aspects contributing "to establishing and maintaining relations of power" (Fairclough 2003: 218), becomes important. Ideology essentially serves to sustain "unequal power structures" (Wodak 2002: 9). Wodak and Meyer (2009: 8, 10) add that the concern rests with analysing "competing discourses in various public spaces" rather than power per se and that it is usually "the more hidden and latent type of everyday beliefs" that CDA analysts are concerned with.

Fourthly, based on critical theory, CDA seeks to employ a 'critical' inquiry, meaning that it does not only want to understand and explain social phenomena but intends to critique it by producing and conveying "critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms of domination" (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 6-7). As a result, CDA has an overtly political agenda of 'changing the world' (Wodak and Meyer

2009: 3; van Leeuwen 2009: 279; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 259), and more specifically in highlighting how particular groups are oppressed by discourses of the elite (van Dijk 1987a: 18; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 259; Wodak 2002: 10). Hence, CDA openly attempts to criticise dominant discourses that constitute and legitimise social injustices and inequalities (van Leeuwen 2009: 277; Wodak and Meyer 2009: 10).

CDA was chosen as the appropriate theoretical and methodological framework for this thesis because it provides the basis for analysing national identity as constructed and constituted in discourse. Furthermore, CDA incorporates the investigation of linguistic features in relation to social and cultural structures and processes, which I argue is the basis for answering the first research question of *how* national identity is constructed in discourse. Moreover, I propound that CDA is the appropriate framework for this thesis due to its quest for uncovering dominant ideologies and unequal power structures, which corresponds with the second research question of identifying different (and dominant) constructions of national identity and how they are potentially exclusionary to different people in German society.

In the words of van Dijk et al. (1997: 144), "discourse is a prominent way in which ethnic prejudices and racism are reproduced in society", particularly when a dominant group employs the idea of difference such as religion, educational status, language or skin colour etc. as a rightful means to dominate or to exclude another other group. As a result, I argue that CDA precisely not only allows for the research of this thesis into inequality and how weaker groups in society considered as 'Others' are excluded by the dominant group (host society), but also links with my research aim of highlighting potential exclusion and racism in the German (migrant) integration discourse. The specific approach chosen within CDA and the methodological tools applied in this thesis will further be discussed

in the methodology chapter in section 4.4. The next section will provide the theoretical background on how identity and national identity are constructed in discourse.

## 2.3. The Discursive Construction of National Identity

### *2.3.1. The Construction of Identity*

Identity is a heavily theorised concept with a mass of literature constituting a controversially debated topic (Wodak et al. 1999: 10; Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 17). In this section, a few theoretical concepts will be discussed, which will provide the basis for identity as a narrative identity that is multiple and dynamic and for identity to be constructed in discourse as postulated in CDA. I will conclude that this provides the underlying frame for analysing the first research question with regards to *how identity is constructed in discourse* and that it allows for the analysis of different and potentially changing constructions of identity by and within different newspapers.

#### *2.3.1.1. Narrative Identity*

The first known chronicle of 'identity' involved the word "identie" in 1570, which in this context referred to the meaning of 'sameness' (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 18). Yet, 'identity' has long been understood as a "project of the self", whereby "the individual is a 'self-interpreting subject' (Taylor 1989 cited in Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 18). In relation to selfhood, Martin (1995: 6) suggests that this can be explained by concepts of 'singularity' or 'uniqueness'. However, Wodak et al. (1999: 13) criticise that in English, this would not be the exact meaning and that selfhood is rather similar to the concept of 'ego identity'. Goffman (1990: 129) explains that ego identity is an individual's "subjective feeling about one's own situation and one's own continuity and uniqueness".

The idea of identity being both sameness (*idem*) and selfhood (*ipse*) was also conceptualised by Paul Ricœur (1992). Ricœur (1992: 116-117) identifies identity as sameness to be based on three aspects: numerical identity, qualitative identity and temporal distance or uninterrupted continuity. With regards to numerical identity, Ricœur (1992: 116) explains that

> identity denotes oneness: the contrary is plurality (not one but two or several). To this first component of the notion of identity corresponds the process of identification, understood in the sense of reidentification of the same, which makes cognition recognition: the same thing twice, *n* times. (Ricœur 1992: 116)

Qualitative identity, on the other hand, is argued to contain extreme resemblance. "We say that *x* and *y* are wearing the same suit – that is, clothes that are so similar that they are interchangeable with no noticeable difference" (Ricœur 1992: 116). Yet, both numerical and qualitative identity considering change and time (temporal distance) often result to be weak, and rather represent dissemblance, difference or diversity (Ricœur 1992: 117). In order to maintain the idea of similarity, Ricœur (1992: 117) hence suggests a further element of identity which is uninterrupted continuity. Change is argued not be relevant if there is temporal constancy of similarity such as in the form of structure (Ricœur 1992: 117). This continuous structure could be the genetic code of an individual or in relation to nations, their social institutions (Ricœur 1992: 117; Wodak et al. 1999: 12).

Sameness and selfhood are furthermore argued to have a dialectical relationship, meaning that selfhood interprets and negotiates aspects of sameness (Ricœur 1992: 17-18). Ricœur (1992: 17-18) terms the intermediary process between selfhood and sameness narrative identity and claims that it is tied to issues of time and the ordering of temporality. He (1992: 140) argues that narrative identity intends to integrate various and different

characteristics into coherent plots that inform the overall narrative. As a result, continuity can be established through the integrating function of narrative identity "with permanence in time what seems to be its contrary in the domain of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, discontinuity and instability" (Ricœur 1992: 140). Wodak et al. (1999: 14) explain that the purpose of narrative identity is to synthesise and combine heterogeneous aspects "into a coherent temporal structure, thus making it possible to sketch a person's identity against the background of a dynamic constancy model which does justice to the coherence of human life". Yet, at the same time, this also means that identity cannot be understood without difference and change (Wodak et al. 1999: 14).

Following the notion of 'selfhood' and the idea of it being a "subjective feeling about one's own situation" (Goffman 1990: 129), I understand identity to be rooted in subjectivity and open to change rather than as a natural given. Moreover, Ricœur's discussion of identity as 'sameness' demonstrates that also in this context, identity implies change and diversity, that can only be mediated by 'temporal constancy'. Based on the concept of narrative identity, I deduce that the formation of identity is a dynamic process that develops dialectically by selfhood interpreting aspects of sameness. In the context of the research project, I then understand identities as subjectively narrated ideas about the 'Self' by newspaper authors and editors (narrative identity) that can change over time depending on altering and shifting elements, experiences and events. Different sources of data can hence yield different interpretations of identity or show changing interpretations over time.

Furthermore, the process of the narrative 'Self' integrating various aspects into a coherent plot is argued to include the internalisation of expectations, behavioural dispositions and values, which are deduced from role models in the social world around us (Wodak et al. 1999: 15). Consequently, narrative identity also involves the concept of internalisation that is inherent to social or collective identities. Ricœur (1992: 247) argues that narrative identity cannot only be applied to individuals but also to collective groups including groups of people or institutions. In *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, Hegel (1807/1977) addresses the intersubjective nature of identity by describing that 'the Self' is not completely free from the surrounding social world. This idea of identity being tied to a "*social location*", has led to the 'Self' being "defined primarily by virtue of its membership of, or identification with a particular group or groups" (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 24). Group or collective identities could be along socio-economic lines such as ethnic, religious, class-based, professional etc. (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 24).

As a result, narrated identities do not only have to be tied to an individual but also collective identities can be voiced. In the context of this research project, the subject of inquiry is the construction of the collective identity of the nation. Furthermore, I understand this collective identity of the nation as conditioned by the social world and more specifically by subjectively and selectively chosen group membership. Individuals are part of a variety of social groups, and hence their identities can take multiple forms depending on which characteristics and social memberships are emphasised.

#### *2.3.1.2. Discursive Identity*

Furthermore, the theoretical and methodological framework of CDA entails that objects of knowledge and hence identities are "socially constitutive" and are constructed in

discourse (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258; Wodak 2002: 8). These theoretical ideas of CDA have their origin among other scholars with Althusser and Foucault (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 260-262; van Leeuwen 2009: 278). More specifically, the origin of discursive identities can be traced back to Althusser's (1970/1971) *interpellation* concept, in which he describes how the 'Self' is constituted in discourse.

In his work *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, Althusser (1970/1971) influenced by Marxist thought seeks to explain how the reproduction of the relations of production is secured. Althusser (1970/1971) distinguishes between the public domain of the repressive state apparatus that mainly "functions 'by violence'" and the private ideological state apparatuses such as churches, schools or families that function "by ideology". He (1970/1971) argues that it is the prevailing ideology, a "system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group" that secures the power of the state by linking and enabling "'harmony' between the repressive State apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses" (sic). Further seeking to explore why an imaginary ideology is required, Althusser (1970/1971) notes its dialectical relationship with social practice: Ideology is recognised to exist in actions that are "inserted into *practices*", while "these practices are governed by the *rituals*", "*which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject*" [original emphases].

As a result, Althusser (1970/1971) postulates that ideology is only possible through "the notion of the subject" and that "ideology hails or interpellates individuals as subjects". Interpellation is defined as the process, in which ideology leads to or "transforms" individuals into subjects. As an example of interpellation, Althusser (1970/1971) describes the policeman hailing a person who automatically turns around and has the

"ideological *recognition*" of the one being hailed [original emphasis]. In this context, Butler (1997: 5) notes "the subordination of the subject" through language as a result of the authoritative voice of the policeman. Hence, Butler (1997: 5) describes the process of recognition and interpellation as "the discursive production of the social subject". This understanding of social subjects being produced in discourse represents the theoretical basis of CDA as well as the underlying frame for analysing the first research question of this thesis with regards to how identity is constructed in discourse.

Moreover, Foucault (1972/2002) advances this notion by regarding identity to be produced in dominant discourses that result from specific social practices. In his work *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault (1972/2002: 23, 32-33), driven by the theoretical problem of discontinuity and rupture inherent to historical analysis, seeks to identify when different statements and relations between statements as well as under which 'rules of formation' (objects and themes of discourse), these statements can form a discursive unity. With regards to the formation of discourse and using the discourse of psychopathology as an example, Foucault (1972/2002: 49-53) argues that continuity or the emergence of a discourse is not achieved in its objects and form, but by a particular group of relations (institutional and discursive) characterising discursive practice. Indeed, the discipline of psychopathology is thought to be "in a constant state of renewal, subject to constant discoveries" and hence to involve change in its objects and content, while its discursive unity is achieved through the relevant "system of formation" of specific relations and discursive practice (Foucault 1972/2002: 51-52). As a result, Foucault (1972/2002: 54) points out that discourses should not only be treated as a number of signs "but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak". He

(1972/2002: 59) furthermore notes that this system of relations does not exist a priori but instead achieves discursive unity by constantly making "use of this group of relations".

This account hence also argues for a constructive, and hence fragmentary, anti-essentialist conception of the 'Self'. The idea of identity as an imaginary rather than an invariable, pre-social trait of characteristics has become widely accepted in the literature (Hülse 1999: 2). It is the Foucauldian lack of agency given to the subject, however, that has attracted criticism and attempts for modification (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 31). Butler (1997: 3-4) doubts that the construction of identity can be explained if discursive practices are performed without the agency of the subject. Also Hall (2000), in relation to Althusser's concept of interpellation, critiques that the subject needs to exist prior to discursive practices. As a result, Hall (2000: 23) advocates that the subject can recognise discursive positions and can actively engage with specific positions within discourse. Nevertheless, Althusser and Foucault provide the theoretical basis for social phenomena to be seen as constituted in discourse (CDA) and in the context of this research project, for analysing the discursive construction of identity.

### *2.3.2. The Construction of National Identity*

In order to further answer the research question of how *national* identity is constructed in discourse, this section will review the literature on nationalism. While a few definitions of the nation will be provided, I will show that nations are historical context-specific productions, that they are 'invented' or 'imagined' by means of mass communication on behalf of the elite. Based on constructivist theories of nationalism, I will argue that national identity is constructed and narrated in discourse. Furthermore, I will outline ideas about the content of national identity. This will provide the theoretical basis for analysing

the content of national identity, which will further be operationalized in the methodology chapter in section 4.4.2.

#### *2.3.2.1. The Nation*

While the original connotation of the nation was blood ties, such as race or breed, by the early 1600s, it became a substitute for citizens or people despite of their ethnonational background (Connor 1978/1994a: 38). Up until today, there is no consensus on the definition and concept of the nation (Wodak et al. 1999: 18; Piwoni 2012: 29; Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 15; Connor 1978/1994a: 36; Helbling 2007: 22). Piwoni (2012: 29-30) argues that there are three reasons that the nation is difficult to define: Firstly, there are various terms such as state, people (*Volk*), ethnicity and the nation that attempt to describe similar or comparable self-organising structures and political units; secondly, the term nation is very abstract, since it is used for constructing 'Self' as well as 'Other' perceptions; lastly, the concept of the nation was used to define different examples and organisational structures, which has led to different definitions. For instance, while for the UK, the nation was primarily thought of in the form of the state (Estel 1994: 21), the German nation, on the other hand, was seen as a *Sprachvolk* meaning a language community (Fichte 1808/1997: 595-612).

Three classic definitions of the nation are provided by Renan, Stalin and Weber (Anbarani 2013: 61). Ernest Renan described the nation as a *Willensnation*, "a nation by an act of will" (Wodak et al. 1999: 18). In his essay *Que'est-ce qu'une nation?*, Renan (1882/1994: 17) illustrates this by explaining that the nation is constituted by two aspects: a "rich legacy of remembrances" and "the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common" (Renan 1882/1994: 17).

Following this reasoning, the nation is also described as "an everyday plebiscite" (Renan 1882/1994: 17).

Joseph Stalin (1973/1994: 18) starts with the idea of the nation as a "historically constituted community of people". Yet, he argues that this community requires several characteristics in order to constitute a nation. According to him (1973/1994: 20), these criteria include a "*stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture*" [original emphasis]. Max Weber (1948/1994: 21), on the other hand, views the nation based "upon sentiments of prestige". The advocates of prestige convince the people of a cultural mission, which involves "the very cultivation of the peculiarity of the group set off as a nation" (Weber 1948/1994: 25). As a result, the nation would be "anchored in the superiority, or at least irreplaceability of the culture values that are to be preserved" (Weber 1948/1994: 25). Yet, Weber (1948/1994: 25) argues that this national sentiment is varied and does not have just one criterion due to which heterogeneous people can be united "through common destinies".[6]

These definitions do not only show the complexity in defining the nation that Piwoni has described, but also point towards different typologies of the nation, which will be

[6] Further classical definitions of the nation can be found by Geertz and Giddens (Anbarani 2013: 62). In relation to post-colonial states, Clifford Geertz postulates that people have two distinct yet complementary aims. The former involves a search for a publicly acknowledged identity (Geertz 1963/1994: 30). This constitutes the ethnic dimension of the two competing components and is based on primordial attachments (Geertz 1963/1994: 31). The other component represents the civic dimension that has the aim of achieving progress in society such as higher living standards and better social justice and unites people by citizenship (1963/1994: 30). Lastly, Anthony Giddens views the nation as a 'power container' (1985/1994: 34). The existence of the nation is thereby tied to the state exercising sovereign power over a specific territory with demarcated borders (Giddens 1985/1994: 34-35).

described in section 2.4.3. with the aim of assessing their inclusionary or exclusionary impact towards migrants. The next section will discuss different theoretical ideas illustrating that nations or national identity are constructed in discourse.

#### *2.3.2.2. Theories on Nationalism*

The literature on the study of nationalism has mostly been divided over whether nations are seen as natural entities or whether they are historical context-specific productions (Helbling 2007: 6-7). The former approach is known as primordialism or also referred to as essentialism. The latter approach is modernism or also known as constructivism. Constructivist approaches today "clearly dominate the field" (Helbling 2007: 7) and as I have pointed out, form the basis for understanding national identity in this research project. In consequence, the primordialist approach will only be pointed out briefly, while several key constructivist scholars belonging to classical theories on nationalism will be introduced and their accounts will be used to build up to the claim of national identity being constructed in discourse.

Primordialism is the term used to describe the idea that the nation consists of an organic and natural community, in which its members form their identity based on the overwhelming emotional attachment to the community (Brown 2000: 6). The argument is that humanity has at some point in time developed into different natural communities with distinct cultures and languages (Brown 2000: 6). As a result, the primordialist approach only recognises ethnic nationalism as an authentic form of nationalism and

claims that "ethnic consciousness is indeed a central component of individual identity" (Brown 2000: 6).[7]

Modernists, on the other hand, view the nation and nationalism as a historically recent and modern occurrence (Anbarani 2013: 64). Key scholars of classical theories on nationalism are Deutsch, Gellner, Breuilly, Hobsbawn, Anderson and Smith (Piwoni 2012: 34; Hutchinson and Smith 1994; Spencer and Wollman eds. 2005b). For instance, Karl Deutsch (1966/1994: 27) provides a functional definition of the nation. In his view (Deutsch: 1966/1994: 27), membership of a nation

> consists in wide complementarity of social communication. It consists in the ability to communicate more effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders. (Deutsch: 1966/1994: 27)

People are thought to be brought together by facilities of communication, and once collective groups obtain the power to persuade its members of national norms and symbols, then the group becomes a nation (Deutsch 1966/1994: 29).

Ernest Gellner, on the other hand, believes that nationalism is a modern phenomenon because in agrarian societies, the feudal system prevented rational arguments between the elite and peasants, due to which ideologies such as nationalism could not develop (Anbarani 2013: 65). On the other hand, in modern societies, the process of

[7] For instance, Connor (1994b: 202) reaffirms that a nation is comprised by people who consciously "feel that they are ancestrally related". Yet, primordialism has been criticised for failing to explain how common ancestry exactly exerts this bond between the people and their community (Brown 2000: 7). Therefore, instead of genetics, cultural knowledge and behaviour acquired through "primary socialisation processes", have been drawn upon to explain the bond between community members (Brown 2000: 7). In this specific variant of primordialism, the nation is not seen as natural anymore, but that throughout time there are large-scale similarities and continuities in the different ideas of the nation (Anbarani 2013: 64).

industrialization eroded traditional culture and instead demanded the cultural integration of a homogenized workforce (Karner 2011: 23). As a result, Gellner (1964/1994: 63) understands nationalism as "the consequence of a new form of social organization based on a deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each promoted by its own state".

Also John Breuilly (1982/1994: 103-104) identifies the source of nationalism in the growing cleavage between the state and society in the 17th century. Yet, nationalism in this sense is understood as a political force used by elites to mobilise people rather than, as for Gellner, an education-dependent high culture (Piwoni 2012: 34). Important in this regard is that Breuilly (1982/1994: 112) sees nationalism as a means of the elite to exacerbate the ambiguity around cultural and political elements of national identity by selectively attaching different values to political action and as a result mobilising mass support. As such, national identity can be understood as socially constructed, and discourse as a field for political actors to engage with specific ideological motivations.

Yet, it was Hobsbawn (1983: 13) who claimed that the creation of these modern nations was aided by the 'invention of tradition' and that national identity was manipulated by political elites trying to legitimise their power:

> Invented traditions are highly relevant to that comparatively recent historical innovation, the nation […] All this rests on exercises in social engineering which are deliberate and always innovative. (Hobsbawn 1983: 13)

Similarly to Hobsbawn, Benedict Anderson[8] views the nation as a modern artefact that evolved out of the disintegration of religious states from the 17th century onward; out of

[8] Yet, Hobsbawn was a Western centric historian, while Anderson was an anthropologist investigating South East Asia.

the demise of the Latin language as the written language and means to 'truth'; the simultaneous emergence of local written languages; and out of the advances in capitalist production particular with reference to print as a form of mass media production (Anderson 1983: 20-40). He (1983: 122) believes that it was the written language that invented nationalism and connected people through print. As a result, Anderson (2006: 6) proposes that the nation is an

> imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. [original emphasis] (Anderson 2006: 6)

His argument is that most members of a community will never get to know each other and hence cannot have a natural feeling of solidarity, other than a constructed one (Anderson 1983: 49). Anderson's idea of the 'imagined community' as well Hobsbawn 'invention of tradition' have become guiding concepts in the literature and have opened the door for social-constructivist scholarship on the nation (Piwoni 2012: 35-36).

A third approach to the origin of the nation and nationalism rejects both primordialist and modernist thought yet incorporates elements of both approaches into what has been called ethno-symbolism (Anbarani 2013: 66). Anthony Smith, who conceived of the original ethno-symbolist synthesis on the one hand recognises the recent transformations of nations in modern times and the ability of an "upper class *ethnie*" (original emphasis) to provide cultural identity through administration and mobilisation, as is stipulated by modernist thought (Smith 1994: 147-149). On the other hand, Smith (1989/1994: 151) argues that modern nation-states have only been able to emerge and that their upper class *ethnie* have only been able to mobilise and to create cultural identity "because of a

relatively homogeneous ethnic core". This idea of nation-states only being able to emerge due to their ability of tapping into pre-existing myths, traditions, symbols, and practices that pre-dated the modern nation-state reflects the primordialist component (Karner 2011: 23).

Therefore, ethno-symbolism essentially assumes that nations have ethnic roots and that national sentiment antedates modern nationalism, but that nations and national identities can change due to different historical contexts, although the *ethnie* is never obliterated (Karner 2011: 24; Anbarani 2013: 66). While this thesis rejects the stipulated essentialist/primordialist claim of nations and national identity[9], the modernist component of Smith's claim "on the 'flexible character' of nations, the 'centrality of social processes', and ongoing symbolic 'reproduction *and reinterpretation*' as defining features of national identities" (original emphasis) (Karner 2011: 24) can be seen as an additional theoretical guidance for understanding the social and linguistic construction of national identities.

More importantly, however, Anderson's (1991: 204-205) last chapter "Memory and Forgetting" discusses the concept of identity in the form of a 'narration of the nation'. National identity is thereby thought to be formed through narration, which essentially allows researchers to investigate national identity through the analysis of text and talk. The idea that national identity is produced through stories in discourse is also echoed by Uri Ram (1994: 153), who argues that "[n]ationality is a narration, a story which people tell about themselves in order to lend meaning to their social world". Moreover, it is noted

[9] The previous section on the construction of identity has shown that any form of identity is thought to be constructed through discourse and social interaction rather than to have an essentialist character.

that national narrations are produced within specific contexts (Wodak et al. 1999: 23). As such, they are not static and depend on a specific "positioning" (Räthzel 1994: 226). Hall (1990: 222) writes that identity is "a 'production', which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within". With regards to context, Hall (1990: 222) notes that "[w]e all write and speak from a particular place and time, from a history and a culture which is specific. What we say is always 'in context', *positioned* " [original emphasis].

Hence, this shows that rather than conceptualizing the nation as a primordial occurrence, it can be understood as 'invented' (Howbsbawn) or 'imagined' (Anderson) on behalf of the elites by means of communication (Deutsch, Breuilly, Howbsbawn), and essentially as a context-specific historical production that is 'positioned', yet dynamic. Like individual identity or other forms of collective identities, national identity is seen as 'narrated' (Anderson) and "conveyed and constructed in discourse […] [it] is thus the product of discourse" (Wodak et al. 1999: 22). This understanding of national identity consequently ties into the previously outlined theoretical aspects of social constructivism, CDA and the discursive construction of identity and allows for the investigation of how national identity is constructed in specific discourses. The next section will furthermore discuss which aspects are commonly thought to constitute national identity. This will inform the analysis of national identity in this research project because in order to answer *how* national identity is constructed, it is also necessary to contemplate *what* aspects national identity can entail.

#### *2.3.2.3. Content of National Identity*

Hall (1996: 613-615) identifies five main aspects that are thought to constitute the narration of national culture. These include the 1) 'narrative of the nation' as it is

presented in everyday culture including the media and the literature. It connects territory, stories and events and therefore ties the common destiny to people's everyday lives. 2) The stories thereby emphasise 'origins, continuity, and tradition'. They attempt to present national culture as continuous, unchanging, and uniform. 3) Tradition is then emphasised by borrowing from Hobsbawn and Ranger's 'invention of tradition'. This has the purpose of transforming historical and cultural confusion into order and unity. 4) Also origin is highlighted as its own point. The 'myth of origin' is attributed great importance in the national story. 5) Lastly, a constructed image of the 'folk' is also used to reinforce feelings of national identity (Hall 1996: 615).

While these aspects provide details on which elements national identity can be created in discourse, Wodak et al. (1999: 24) point out that it is difficult to separate Hall's named aspects and to hence apply them in this format to the analysis of data. They (1999: 25) also mention that as part of their data on the discourse in Austria, there was no indication of Hall's last point of a 'pure people'; instead Wodak et al. (1999: 25) find forms of essentialist representations, which they term "*homo Austriacus*".

As a result, Wodak et al. (1999: 30-31) present the following five contents on national identity by in addition drawing on Leszek Kolakowski's framework (1995) as well as the findings of their own data. They (1999: 30-31) list the linguistic construction of 1) the *homo Austriacus*, 2) a common political past, 3) a common culture, 4) a common political present and future, and 5) a 'national body'. These elements of national identity are also referred to as contents. The first content of the *homo Austriacus* entails aspects such as national mentality and behavioural dispositions. This content was further developed from Hall's (1996: 615) aspect on the image of the 'folk' and in relation to Kolakowski's (1995) idea of the *Volksgeist* (national spirit). The second content of a common political

past includes the myth of origin, political crises, or successes. While several of Hall's (1996: 613-615) aspects may be merged into this content, Wodak et al. (1999: 30-31) also draw on Kolakowski's (1995) 'historical memory' and on Maurice Halbwach's (1992) idea of 'collective memory'.

The third content of a common culture incorporates religion, language, habits and art. This can be seen as a development from Hall's point on the 'narrative of the nation', which was thought to entail the narration of everyday culture. The fourth content of a common political present and future involves issues of political objectives, achievements, dangers, problems, and citizenship. This is based on Kolakowski's (1995) aspect of "*Anticipation and further orientation*" (Wodak et al. 1999: 26). Wodak et al. (1999: 26) take a note that this future orientation ultimately means that "national identity cannot be reduced to narrative identity", since narrative identity draws on the past rather than the present and the future. However, they (1999: 26) regard present and future dimensions as important in the construction of national identity, and subsequently incorporate it as a content into their framework. The last content of the 'national body' is borrowed from Kolakowski (1995) and is extended to include landscape, artefacts and symbols beyond territory (Wodak et al. 1999: 26).

In summary, the mentioned approaches attempt to capture elements that are drawn upon in the narrative construction of national identity. National identity mainly involves stories about national culture, memory and origin. Yet, it has been shown that national identity can also be subject to different aspects of the present and future. By speaking about current political objectives, problems or dangers, it becomes clear that these could entail a variety of things that go beyond culture and historical memory. The contents applied in this research project will be discussed in section 4.2.2 in the methodology chapter. Lastly,

it needs to be noted that the co-constitutive relationship between the 'Self' and the 'Other' has so far been neglected and indeed it is argued that the role of the 'Other' has often been neglected in shaping and constructing national identity (Triadafyllidou 2001: 14). Triadafyllidou (2001: 13) criticises Anderson's work for seeing the nation as sovereign and for not further exploring how national identity is also limited through the 'Other's' role of "consolidating the national self-awareness". Hence, the identified contents of national identity above also need to be seen as limited or conditioned by available constructions of the 'Other'. It is this issue of the (migrant) 'Other' and the context of integration discourses that the next section will turn to.

## 2.4. The 'Self'/'Other' in Integration Discourses

As has been mentioned, this section will first discuss the underlying theoretical ideas of 'Self' and 'Other' constructions and how this specifically relates to integration discourses. I will argue that boundary drawings of the 'Self' and 'Other' are not only important to consider as an essential theoretical component in the construction of national identity per se, but also because they constitute the basis for answering the second research question of whether identified constructions of national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others'. In order to examine whether 'Others' are included or excluded from the national 'we', the analysis needs to make a distinction between the 'Self' and the 'Other' in the first place. Furthermore, this section will discuss the concept of integration and how this is understood for the purpose of analysing data in this research project. Lastly, I will review the literature on theoretical frameworks determining the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of constructions of national identity and/or boundary drawing. More specifically in this regard, I will propose two theories that will be tested on the data and

the findings of this thesis to see whether they can explain the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of boundary drawings.

### *2.4.1. The 'Self' and the 'Other'*

Ricœur (1992: 3) argues that identity does not only entail a dialectical relationship between selfhood and sameness, but that the dialectic between the 'Self' and the 'Other is even more important. To mark this necessity of the 'Other' and to highlight its significance in the construction of the 'Self', Ricœur (1992) named his book on the hermeneutics of the 'Self' *Oneself as Another*. He (1992: 3) clarifies that this title

> suggests from the outset that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes into the other, as we might say in Hegelian terms. (Ricœur 1992: 3)

Ricœur (1992: 3) points out that 'other' is simultaneously an antonym for 'same' and 'distinct', 'contrary' or 'diverse', and that when used within the realm of sameness, that it does not offer anything original. It is, however, the otherness in combination with selfhood rather than sameness that leads to the essential dialectical relationship described above (Ricœur 1992: 3).

Social identity theory also highlights the significance of the 'Other' for the construction of the 'Self' (Hülse 1999: 2). This theory, on the other hand, postulates that identities are constructed through difference, and that hence in- and outgroups are formed (Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 25). It acknowledges that the creation of national identity or the 'Self' can only occur with the construction of an 'Other' that essentially forms a contrasting entity (Aydin 2009: 176; Rash 2012: 24; Rommelsbacher 2002: 10; Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 80; Hall 2004: 51). This is based on the idea that "any kind of social

identity is constituted in social interaction. The outside (the Other) is constitutive of the inside (ingroup)" (Triadafyllidou 2001: 10). It essentially means that the (national) 'Self' cannot exist independently or without the 'Other'. The 'Other' serves to draw a boundary and hence contrasts the national 'Self', but at the same time the 'Other' is required for creating the national 'Self'. As such, Smith (1992: 75) explains that "[i]dentities are forged out of shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those of other collective identities".

On the one hand, it is argued that in this process, the 'Other' is depicted unfavourably in comparison to the 'Self' (Rash 2012: 24; Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 25) The 'Other' can thereby even become the enemy (Rash 2012: 26). Smith (1992: 75) notes that collective identities are "often forged through the opposition to the identities of significant others, as the history of paired conflict so often demonstrates". Yet, Triadafyllidou (2001: 15) argues that the relationship between the 'Self' and the 'Other' does not need to be hostile. As mentioned before, this is not a static process and as much as ideas about the 'Self' change over time, so do ideas about the 'Other' (Rash 2012: 25). Nor does the 'Other' need to be limited to one group but rather there can be multiple 'Others'. Considering that identities are thought to be multiple in nature, it is suggested that overlapping identities can tone down differences and hence counteract conflict, while cultural over-identification can exacerbate practices of differentiation and exclusion and can hence escalate conflicts (Wodak et al. 1999: 17).

Based on these theoretical ideas, I argue that the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' is important for any analysis into the construction of national identity. Moreover, I claim that it is particularly relevant in the context of investigating immigration or (migrant) integration discourses. Due to processes of globalization,

telecommunications and easier global movement, 'the Self' is argued to have become dislocated and fragmented. Immigration is thought to challenge ideas of national identity since it requires the

> "dealing with these 'Others within' whose presence challenges the political and cultural order of the nation […] It requires a constant re-definition of the We that must be distinguished from a They that is geographically close". (Triandafyllidou 2000: 375)

Triandafyllidou (2000: 375) notes that migrants with different cultural attributes may pose a threat to the national community, although the level of the threat varies depending on the "perceived cultural distance" of newcomers.

The idea of internal 'Others' challenging a pre-existing order from within is also voiced by Bauman (1990) who conceptualizes this internal 'Other' as the stranger. Bauman (1990: 143) reiterates the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' by theorising it in the form of that "There are friends and enemies […] [who] stand in opposition to each other", and who constantly reinforce the cultural and social boundaries between them. Yet, Bauman (1990: 143, 145) postulates that "there are *strangers*" [original emphasis], who are a greater threat to society than the enemy because the stranger is neither friend nor enemy and hence questions and threatens the whole dichotomy (the 'Self' and the 'Other') in itself and the social interaction on which it is based. Migrants or ethnic minorities may indeed challenge constructions of national identity by questioning pre-existing social and cultural boundaries and it is precisely the aim of this thesis to identify constructions of national identity (the 'Self' and the 'Other') and to examine whether they lead to the exclusion of these internal 'Others'.

Following this, I argue that the integration discourse as the subject of analysis in this thesis is particularly relevant for the investigating of 'Self' and 'Other' constructions because integration implies and discusses the existence of the host society vs. one or multiple internal 'Others'. Regardless of how integration is defined and which aspects it involves, integration implies that someone or some group (e.g. the stranger) is thought to be integrated into the host community. As a result, the idea of integration inherently entails the mutually constitutive relationship of the 'Self' and the 'Other', the dichotomy between 'us' and 'them' (Aydin 2009: 216).

Before discussing the theoretical ideas with regards to when the boundary drawings between the 'Self' and the 'Other' are expected to be inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others', the aim of the next part is to provide a definition on integration. Integration can be understood in different ways and for the purpose of investigating constructions of national identity in (migrant) integration discourses, it is necessary define how 'integration' is understood in this thesis and based on which understanding data is collected.

### *2.4.2. Integration*

There is no specific definition of integration and different actors rather attach different meanings to the concept (Schunk 2014: 10; Sardinha 2009: 32; Hargreaves 1995: 33). It is problematic because 'integration' may simultaneously be used for assimilative or pluralistic demands or act as an umbrella term or co-term for all sorts of concepts such as accommodation, inclusion, cohesion-building, incorporation, adaptation or participation (Favell 2003: 14; Sardinha 2009: 32, 36). It usually relates to the question of the "consequences of immigrant insertion into host societies" (Sardinha 2009: 32). As such

‘integration’ can generally be distinguished from ‘immigration’ and can be understood as the process that migrants and society go through in the longer term after migrants have entered the host country. Favell (2003: 14) explains this by pointing out that

> ‘Integration’ conceptualizes what happens after, conceiving practical steps in a longer process which invariably includes the projection of *both* deep social change for the country concerned, *and* of fundamental continuity between the past and some idealized social endpoint. [original emphasis] (Favell 2003: 14)

A broad definition may see integration as creating social cohesion through socialisation based on standards of expectations (Brochmann 2003: 4).

Integration is furthermore thought to have evolved from assimilation, which focuses on the one-way street adaptation of migrants to the host society. The traditional assimilationist model was first developed by Robert E. Park (1914) in the Chicago School of Sociology, who postulated that assimilation, involving newcomers adapting to the values, attitudes and lifestyles of the host society, would be the end result of an immigration cycle (Sardinha 2009: 34-35). The assimilationist approach assumes that the nation-state requires its members to possess a uniform national culture in order to be stable (Sardinha 2009: 35), which can also be interpreted as a quest for cultural homogenization. Hence, assimilation is thought to be successful, when the former group identity is rendered, and the culture of different members becomes indistinguishable (Sardinha 2009: 35; Barry 2001: 72-73). Park’s model has been refined and specified by Esser (1980) and Kecskes (2000) and usually contains the four categories of 1) cognitive assimilation (norms, behaviour, language), 2) structural assimilation (de-segregation, reducing inequality), 3) social assimilation (social relationships, participation), and 4) the assimilation of identity (feeling of belonging) (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001: 278-279).

The idea and practice of assimilation has however come under criticism since the 1970s (Glazer 1993). At this time, support for multiculturalism rose instead (Kymlicka 2012: 3), although the concept of multiculturalism has also experienced an at least rhetoric backlash since the 1990s (Kymlicka 2012: 3; Joppke 2004). While the UK, for example, now refers to social cohesion (Demireva 2017), 'integration' has become the buzzword in Germany for describing the coexistence of migrants and the host society (Davy 2005: 123). Even though the term 'integration' remains contested, it can be argued that 'integration' in the academic sense represents a move away from assimilation towards a two-way process in which both migrants and the receiving society are thought to adapt to each other. Indeed, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM 2016) describes 'integration' to be "generally defined as **process of mutual adaptation between host society and migrant**" [original emphasis]. For the purpose of this thesis, I will adopt this definition and understand integration as this mutual adaptation process. Furthermore, I draw on Heckmann's (2015) framework to guide my understanding of integration.

Heckmann (2003) mostly retained the different aspects by Esser (1980), yet referring to them as 'integration': Structural integration (labour market and economy, political integration and citizenship, education), cultural integration (values, norms, points of view and behavioural aspects), social integration (social relationships between migrants and host society), and identification (identifying as member of the host society). While he also mentions the requirement for the 'openness' of society (Heckmann 2003: 47), it is his 2015 publication that incorporated the mutual adaptation process on behalf of the host society by including aspects of prejudices and discrimination as barriers to integration (with openness of the host community being a central requirement) (Heckmann 2015).

The next section will now return to the discussion of when constructions of national identity are expected to be inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others' with the aim of providing a theoretical basis for answering the second research question of whether particular constructions of national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others' in society. In this context, the literature on the typology of nations and citizenship regimes will be reviewed, as well as their implications for the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others'.

### *2.4.3. Typology of Nations*

The discussion on whether different types of nations or national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others' indicates a typology of nations. Indeed, Piwoni (2012: 30) notes that the abstractness and different (geographical) contexts used to define the nation have led to the formation of different typologies of nations. Spencer and Wollman (2005a: 199) identify several dualisms that have been used in the literature for classifying nations, whereby particularly the first four dualisms shown are argued to be of a similar nature.

*Figure 2.2: Typologies of Nations*

| | |
|---|---|
| Western | Eastern |
| Political | Cultural |
| *Staatsnation* | *Kulturnation* |
| Civic | Ethnic |
| Liberal | Illiberal |
| Individualistic | Collectivist |
| Voluntarist | Organic |
| Rational | Mystical/emotional |
| Universalistic | Particularistic |
| Patriotism | (Chauvinist) Nationalism |
| Constitutional | Authoritarian |
| Historic nations | Non-historic nations |
| Nationalism of the oppressed | Nationalism of the oppressor |
| Women-Emancipation nationalism | Patriarchal nationalism |

**Source: Spencer and Wollman (2005a: 199)**

The most commonly named dualism thereby is the one of the *Staatsnation* and the *Kulturnation* (Piwoni 2012: 30-31; Wodak et al. 1999: 19; Aydin 2009: 178). The *Staatsnation*, similar to Renan's *Willensnation*, refers to a political nation constituted by the will of the people (Wodak et al. 1999: 18-19; Piwoni 2012: 31). The term *Staatsnation* has also been taken up by Jürgen Habermas (1991: 9) who associates this type of the nation with constitutional patriotism. Constitutional patriotism thereby is thought to have replaced ethnic sources of national identification with political or civic ones (Habermas 1991: 9-16). The *Kulturnation*, on the other hand, was first introduced by Friedrich Meinecke and is based on a common language, religion, and further cultural values (Meinecke 1907/1927: 3; Wodak et al. 1999: 18-19; Piwoni 2012: 30-31). The two types are in this sense understood as an antithesis (Brubaker 1992: 1).

Despite the criticism of these two ideal types of the nation (Wodak et al. 1999: 19; Gellner 2006: 42-43; Francis 1965: 115), the literature has generally drawn on Meinecke's approach in order to develop and compare (further) typologies (Piwoni 2012: 31). The distinction between political and cultural nationalism hence follows from the already named dualisms. Political nationalism refers to Western nationalism or the *Staatsnation*, which is characterised by a "liberal and social outlook" and "individual liberty" (Kohn 1965: 30). Cultural nationalism then goes hand in hand with Eastern nationalism and the idea of the *Kulturnation* constituting a cultural movement based on history and tradition (Kohn 1965: 32; Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 202).

In a similar way, this distinction is extended to the civic and ethnic dualism. Civic nationalism is described as envisaging "the nation as a community of equal, rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values" (Ignatieff 1994: 3-4). Membership is described as open, since it may be comprised of all

people within a specific territory who are then considered citizens (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 203). This principle can also be referred to as *ius soli*, the law of the territory (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 203). Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, sees the nation as "first and foremost a community of common descent" (Smith 1991: 11) and a "historically determined entit[y] based on ancestry" (Jenkins and Sofos 1996: 15). Membership in the ethnic nation is acquired through blood by birth, which is also named *ius sanguinis*, the law of the blood (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 204).

With regards to the inclusionary or exclusionary impact in the context of immigration or (migrant) integration, Aydin (2009: 7) argues that it is the ethnically homogenous construction that threatens the nation. In this sense, if the nation is imagined to be rather essentialist based on specific cultural elements, then this implies a static image of the 'Self' that raises barriers for the inclusion of 'Others' with 'other' cultures (Aydin 2009: 178). This is specifically the case, if the constructed national identity involves ideas of superiority and past cultural achievements that often lead to the discrimination and devaluation of 'Others' (Aydin 2009: 187). On the other hand, if national identity rests on civic ideas of the nation, it is argued that a more inclusionary image of the 'Self' can be constructed, accommodating equal rights (Aydin 2009: 178). Particularly a positive evaluation of the democratic principles of the nation can help to counteract exclusionary xenophobic attempts (Aydin 2009: 187).

Further to the context of immigration and integration, this dualism has further been developed into so-called citizenship regimes or also referred to as 'integration models'. In his influential work, Brubaker (1992) compares the concept and policy of citizenship in France and Germany and develops these citizenship regimes. By analysing the two countries' historical context and understanding of nationhood, he postulates that on the

one hand, France with its rather civic understanding of the nation employs citizenship based on *ius soli*, while Germany with its rather ethno-cultural understanding of the nation based its citizenship law for a long time on *ius sanguinis*. In this context, also Brubaker (1999: 56) points out that the civic nation is associated with being inclusionary and the ethnic nation with being exclusionary.

While the citizenship models have been widely applied, mostly in comparative studies on immigration policy, integration policy and discourse, and public opinion (see Hochman et al. 2016; Helbling 2014; Saharso 2007; Phillips 2010; Dolezal et al. 2010; Joppke 2007), they as well as the dualist typology of nations have also been criticised (Brubaker 1999). The first criticism is that they reflect ideal type distinctions that undermine practical complexity and the fact that most nations draw on both civic and ethnic elements at the same time (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 197-198; Smith 1995: 99; Aydin 2009: 178; Wodak et al. 1999: 19; Piwoni 2012: 33). This is reinforced by Silverman (1994: 34) who claims that the typology cannot be applied to "the difference between individual countries" but to "differences in the countries themselves".


Furthermore, it is criticised that ethnic and civic aspects "are intertwined in almost all existing nationalisms" and that any civic presentation cannot be "purified by all these 'thick' features of cultural practices" (Antonsich 2016: 1792). Moreover, the inclusionary nature of the acclaimed "civic integrationist turn" leading to the dominance of constitutional patriotism, has been questioned (Antonsich 2016: 1792). More specifically, the theoretical idea of civic nationhood leading to inclusion and ethnic nationhood leading to exclusion, has become questioned altogether. Indeed, it is argued that civic aspects have increasingly been employed in an exclusionary manner (Antonsich 2016: 1792; Faist and Ulbricht 2013: 4). Based on these criticisms, I will hence introduce two new

theoretical frameworks in the next section and argue that they are better suited for determining the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of constructions of national identity.

### *2.4.4. New Theoretical Frameworks for Determining Inclusion/Exclusion*

The shortcoming of the civic/ethnic dimension for determining belonging has also been recognised by Oliver Zimmer (2003). While Zimmer (2003: 177) acknowledges the advantage of the civic/ethnic divide for its theoretical basis for comparative institutional analysis, he argues that this dualism is particularly "inadequate when it comes to analysing national identity as public discourse". As a result, Zimmer (2003: 178-179) suggests distinguishing between mechanisms of boundary drawing, namely the voluntarist/inclusionary and organic/exclusionary dimension, and symbolic resources incorporating the four aspects of political values/institutions, culture, history and geography. Voluntarism thereby emphasises the constructed nature and opportunity for change, while organic mechanisms imply rootedness and inability for change (Zimmer 2003: 179). This model allows for the investigation of inclusion/exclusion independent of particular contents, here referred to as symbolic resources, and hence goes beyond the drawback of the civic/ethnic model.


*Figure 2.3: Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources*




**Source: Zimmer (2003: 180)**

Nevertheless, this chapter has already pointed out that negotiations of national identity "must pay attention to the different kinds of *self-other category relations*" [original emphasis] (Karner 2011: 176). Nations cannot exist without outsiders (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 198), and as a result, any form of national identity construction requires the construction of 'Otherness' (Aydin 2009: 175). Consequently, Kriegbaum Jensen (2014: 564) builds on Zimmer's framework (2003) by adding the dimension of the individual (migrant) to the one of the collective (host society) and argues that this boundary drawing logic is necessary for substantiating "national identity's explanatory leverage" particularly in the context of integration discourses and policies. His model leads to four ideal types:

*Figure 2.4: Conceptual Space for Discursive Constructions of National Identity Formed by the two Dimensions of Logic of Boundary Drawing*




**Source: Kriegbaum Jensen (2014: 569)**

The top-left corner comprising a deterministic collective and individual represents exclusion since both dimensions are thought to be fixed and membership is hence not available (Kriegbaum Jensen 2014: 569). The bottom-left entailing a deterministic collective and voluntaristic individual allows the individual to choose to adapt to a fixed collective and can be associated with assimilation, while the top-right corner entailing a voluntaristic collective and deterministic individual can be associated with social cohesion and the idea of an open collective that attempts to integrate different forms of individual identities (Kriegbaum Jensen 2014: 569-570). Lastly, the bottom-right corner showing a voluntaristic collective and individual, is open for the possibility of mutual adaptation (Kriegbaum Jensen 2014: 570). While Kriegbaum Jensen has tested this

framework on the Danish and Norwegian migrant integration discourse, my aim is to further apply and to test this framework for assessing the inclusionary/exclusionary boundary drawings of national identity in this thesis. I argue that this theoretical model is better suited because it goes beyond the content of ethnic and civic ideas and because it integrates boundary drawing.

Another theoretical framework to be applied and tested in this thesis, is provided by Karner (2011). Karner (2011: 176) draws on Baumann's and Gingrich's (eds. 2004) framework of "grammars of identity" and modifies this framework based on his findings in the Austrian (migrant) integration discourse. Baumann and Gingrich (eds. 2004: x) outline three modalities or what they call "grammars of identity" that are each loosely based on "classical works in the anthropological canon" – Edward Said's *Orientalism*, Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer*, and Louis Dumont's *Homo Hierarchicus*. Baumann and Gingrich (eds. 2004: v) use these three classical works as anthropological alternatives for understanding *Othering* and the construction of alterity, or put differently, as guides with regards to "how different discourses order the relationships between self and other" (Baumann 2004: 19).

Firstly, Baumann (2004: 19) outlines the 'orientalising' grammar that is derived and adapted from Edward Said's (1979) *Orientalism*. Baumann (2004: 20-21) explains that the 'orientalising' grammar is not only a binary grammar with the "simplest of oppositions" (good and bad), but that it includes "an operation of reverse mirror imaging" that can simultaneously entail self-criticism and the superiority of the 'Self' and can hence be a "double-edge play between exclusion and exoticized appreciation" (Baumann 2004: 25). While Said's *Orientalism* refers to the binary opposition between the 'West' and the

‘Orient’, the orientalising grammar describes the relationship ordering the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ independent of any specific ethnic, national or religious group.

Secondly, Baumann (2004: 21) discusses the grammar of segmentation that is based on Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) “model of the segmentary lineage system” of the Nuer people in southern Sudan. Identities and alterities are thought to be segmented and influenced by context in the sense that a neighbourly/local ‘Other’ can become part of the ingroup against a regional ‘Other’, and a regional ‘Other’ can join the national ingroup against a non-national outside ‘Other’ and so on (Baumann 2004: 21-23). The third grammar, the grammar of encompassment, is based on Dumont’s *Homo Hierarchicus* (1980) and the analysis of the Indian caste system. Alterity in the grammar of encompassment is not contextual and rather involves a two-level hierarchical segmentation in which a subordinate ‘Other’ is subsumed into the identity of the superior group doing the encompassing (Baumann 2004: 25-27).

Karner (2011: 180) finds common support in his data for the orientalising discourse mostly in relation to Islam and negative images of patriarchal violence and forced marriage, but also in relation to common opposition to multiculturalism and the argument that integration has failed. However, Karner (2011:176) did not find support for the grammar of segmentation or the one of encompassment in his data of the Austrian integration discourse and instead suggests that there are other grammars at work, which he then outlines as three further discourses. He (2011: 182-184) identifies ‘integrationist discourses’ that entail arguments about assimilation and community cohesion. Furthermore, he (2011: 186) lists ‘instrumentalist discourses’ that entail discussions as part of a cost-benefit prism. And lastly, he (2011: 188-189) identifies ‘conviviality and syncretism’, which are thought to negotiate boundaries by showing “positive evaluations

of cultural mixture" and "appreciation of diversity". Karner (2011: 191) however echoes the ambivalences and inconsistencies often found in the data, which have also been pointed out by Wodak et al. (1999).

I chose to apply Karner's (2011) theoretical framework in this thesis instead of only drawing on Said's *Orientalism* because it provides more options of differentiated boundary drawings between the 'Self' and the 'Other' apart from the exclusionary orientalising discourse, and because the application of the orientalising discourse is not restricted to the orient/Islam, but rather describes the specific boundary drawing of reverse mirror imaging in relation to any group constructed as 'Other'. In comparison to Kriegbaum Jensen's framework, Karner's (2011) framework also entails boundary mechanisms and goes beyond the ethnic/civic divide, but it further attributes characteristics to these boundary drawings and hence makes specific assumptions about the (migrant) integration discourse. While both Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) and Karner's (2011) framework each list four different possibilities of boundary drawings, they imply a different logic. As a result, I see these two theoretical frameworks as complementary and argue that they are, based on the discussed literature, better suited for determining the inclusionary or exclusionary outcome and shall hence be applied and tested on the data of this thesis.

In conclusion, the following assumptions have been made in this chapter. I have introduced CDA as the most appropriate and overarching theoretical and methodological framework for investigating discursive constructions of national identity. CDA as well as a literature review on the underlying theoretical concepts and ideas about identity, the

nation and national identity, have shown that national identity needs to be understood as dynamic, multiple and constructed in discourse. Furthermore, I have pointed out that national identity should be understood as constructed by the elites by means of mass communication and often around key historical events. Moreover, I have highlighted how national identity is based on the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other', and that this not only limits the content on which national identity can be based, but also makes it particularly relevant for (migrant) integration discourses.

Based on these assumptions and for the purpose of answering the first research question of how national identity is constructed in (migrant) integration discourses, I deduce that the required data needs to comprise communicated elite discourses surrounding key events and that the required method needs to be part of the CDA framework that particularly allows for the analysis of boundary drawing - the linguistic and discursive construction of the 'Self' and the 'Other' - as well as its implied reasoning and justification. Moreover, data selection of and within 'integration' discourses needs to be based on the selected definition of seeing 'integration' as a mutual adaptation process between the host society and migrants.

Lastly, for the purpose of answering the second research question of whether identified constructions of national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others', I discussed the typologies of nations and their implications for inclusion or exclusion. I proposed two theoretical frameworks going beyond this typology and including boundary drawings to be applied and tested in this thesis. As a result, these two theories will need to be operationalised methodologically. Before outlining the methodology however, in the next chapter, I will discuss the literature on immigration and integration discourses, including the construction of the German 'Self' and the (migrant) 'Other'.

# CHAPTER 3

# GERMAN IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION DISCOURSES

With rising levels of immigration in Germany in the past few years adding to an already diverse society, there is arguably agreement amongst political parties that integration is a key goal and that social cohesion should be fostered. Yet, both the political elite and academic research have mainly focused on the policies directed at migrants and how migrants and minorities adapt to the host society. At the same time, however, immigration and increasing diversity in society essentially question the host society's characteristics and construction of national identity that in turn determine the criteria for integration and influence whether integration is determined successful or whether particular groups of people are excluded. Antonsich (2016: 1791) illustrates this scenario by explaining that the focus

> is not on policies aimed at making immigrants 'attuned' to the national mainstream, but on how immigration triggers a rethinking of the national mainstream. (Antonsich 2016: 1791)

In other words, the emphasis is on "the transformative power international immigration exercises on perceptions of a national 'we' rather than on measures nation-states adopt to make 'them' national" (Antonsich 2016: 1791). As a result, an investigation into the constructions of the national 'we' and the implications these hold for the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others', becomes important.

This chapter will review the literature on German immigration and integration discourses, thereby a particular focus will be placed on research looking at national identity. The first

section will focus on immigration discourses ranging from the post-WWII era to the implementation of the new immigration law in 2005. The second section will outline essays, commentaries and studies on integration discourses criticising recent debates. The third section will look at research dealing with boundary drawing and the construction of the (Muslim) 'Other'. The fourth and final section will discuss research in relation to the construction of the German 'Self' in the context of migration and diversity.

The key argument is that the existing literature has neglected to research national identity constructions in light of the co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations and has hence despite the criticism continued to apply the civic/ethnic model for classifying different types of national identity and their inclusionary or exclusionary nature. Moreover, the existing literature falls short of a (recent) systematic analysis of integration discourses that could provide an insight into whether Germany has indeed become more open(-minded) as is often proclaimed[10]. This thesis will address this research gap by conducting a critical discourse analysis on a large dataset to systematically investigate recent integration discourses in relation to national identity, and by drawing on two theories of boundary drawing arguably better suited for classifying constructions of national identity and their inclusionary/exclusionary nature.

## 3.1. Immigration Discourses

With the recruitment of the guest workers post-WWII, immigration started to form a political and public issue in Germany again. Schönwälder (2001) provides an in-depth and detailed analysis of the political debates and arguments of the post-war immigration

[10] See chapter 7 for relevant media articles; Schmidtke (2017); Faist and Ulbricht (2013: 22); and the literature on German citizenship law from 2000.

discourses of the 1950s to the 1970s by comparing parliamentary and media debates of West Germany and the United Kingdom. Her findings are interesting and a contribution to the literature because they contradict some widely prevailing beliefs about the post-war immigration discourse. Indeed, Schönwälder (2001: 364, 632, 648) shows that in the mid-1960s, the political elite in Germany was in fact informed about the potential long-term consequences of the guest worker system and did not see the guest worker system as a temporary and rotary immigration system, as commonly believed. Instead, Schönwälder (2001: 632) highlights that politicians were long aware of Germany having become an immigration country.

She (2001: 365, 637-638) shows that apart from the economic aim of recruiting foreign labour, the guest worker treaties were also used as a tool in German foreign policy and that only a combination of these political goals made the recruitment of such a large number possible. The guest worker scheme could be advocated to people, since the idea of helping and teaching foreigners was thought to assist the 'Self' image of superiority and because European integration was supported by the population as a political goal (Schönwälder 2001: 643). Consequently, the discourse on the guest workers in the 1960s was generally positive, as they were "identified with economic recovery and an essentially wanted European integration", yet also paternalistic attitudes about superiority and clearly critical voices could be identified (Schönwälder 2001: 364).

Furthermore, Schönwälder's (2001: 154) study shows how national contexts influence political debates and the discourse on migrants. While in the UK racism towards black and Asian citizens was openly displayed, this was more of a taboo in the German discourse. Schönwälder (2001: 364) argues that while a liberal open-minded German state was proclaimed, it was quietly discussed how African and Asian migrants could be kept

away. However, in the UK, the freedom of individuals was also highly valued showing a liberal tradition, whereas foreigners were distrusted in Germany and thought of as a potential danger that needed to be monitored and controlled (Schönwälder 2001: 154; 365-366). The aspects of this study can be judged to provide valuable empirical insights into the argumentations and constructions employed by the political elites in the early post-war period.

Mualem Sultan (2011) provides a chapter with an overview of the immigration discourses in West Germany post WWII, while Thränhart (2002) also discusses German immigration discourses within that time frame with reference to inclusion and exclusion in the form of a journal article. Starting out with the first recruitment treaties, Mualem Sultan (2011: 28) agrees with Schönwälder that discourse towards migrant workers was at first neutral or positive, but that it turned negative with the economic crises of 1966/67 and in the early 1970s. Migrant workers as well as asylum seekers were then described as a burden to Germany society, while asylum seekers were pictured as a threat to the prosperity of German citizens (Mualem Sultan, 2011: 28-30). Mualem Sultan (2011: 35) concludes that the Islamist terrorist attacks such as 9/11 have added to fear being expressed in discourse with regards to the establishment of 'parallel societies' and the failure of a multicultural society in Germany.

Thränhardt (2002: 347-456), on the other hand, identifies four broad themes in the post-WWII discourse on immigration: Firstly, he (2002: 348) describes how Italian and Greek guest workers became more accepted, as part of the establishment of freedom of movement within the EU, whereas Turkish migrants starting with the oil crisis in 1973/1974 faced criticism and rejection. Secondly, he (2002: 350) draws on the issue of work and welfare. Similarly, to Mualem Sultan, Thränhardt (Thränhardt 2002: 351)

argues that guest workers were acknowledged for their work, but that from the 1970s onward migrants were seen as an economic burden. Thirdly, Thränhardt (2002: 352-353) identifies a humanitarian discourse that was before 1989 characterised by a welcoming and friendly approach to asylum seekers, but that turned controversial in the late 1980s. With rising numbers of asylum seekers, the discourse was then said to be influenced by xenophobic tendencies and anti-asylum campaigns (Thränhardt 2002: 354).

Lastly, Thränhardt (2002: 358-360) describes the issues of multiculturalism and inclusion including the idea of a culturally homogenous society as well as the debates surrounding the changes in citizenship and immigration law in 1999 and 2005. While Thränhart and Mualem Sultan provide good summaries of the discourses on immigration and migrants in the post-war period and make convincing arguments, as for instance showing that the discourse of migrants became negative once migration was associated with economic loss, their studies are not based on empirical data and rather comprise a literature review as well as rely on their own understanding and knowledge.

These mentioned arguments also form part of Wengeler's (2003) analysis of the post-war immigration discourse from 1960-1985. Wengeler as a linguistics scholar uses the German immigration discourse to develop and showcase the linguistic tool of the topos. In relation to the immigration discourse of the 1960s, he (2002: 380) confirms Schönwälder's empirical analysis and Mualem Sultan's and Thränhardt's arguments by showing that German discourse was initially predominantly positive towards migrants, since migrants were being seen as an economic gain (utility argument). A shift to this pattern was found in the years 1972 and 1973 from positive towards negative reporting on migrants (Wengeler 2003: 442). While immigration-approving utilitarian topoi of positive economic gain, and the idea of fair and human treatment of guest workers

persisted (Wengeler 2003: 440), on the growing disapproval side, arguments increasingly drew on the topoi of welfare burden and danger in the form of cultural minority conflicts and 'ghettos' (Wengeler 2003: 441). The discourse of the 1980s additionally saw asylum as a major issue (Wengeler 2003: 509), and Wengeler (2003: 511) finds the humanitarian topos be employed in defence of immigration and migrants.

Wengeler confirms many of the findings described by the previous authors. Moreover, with his analysis of topoi and hence the introduction of discourse analytical tools, he makes a methodological contribution to the investigation of German immigration discourses. The use of topoi not only allows better understanding the nature of arguments but also for a categorization of argumentation schemes, which in turn allows for a comparison between different discourses or time frames. As a result, Wengeler's identified topoi were used in further investigations.

Bauder (2008a, 2008b, 2011) employs Wengeler's topoi in his extensive analysis of the German immigration discourses surrounding the discussion of a new immigration law from 2000-2005. He identifies both quantitatively and qualitatively four dominant topoi (Bauder 2008a). These include the culture, economic utility, danger and the humanitarian topos, which can all be used to argue in favour or against immigration (Bauder 2008a: 102). Bauder shows how these topoi fluctuated in their appearances over the time of the negotiations, with the danger topoi, for instance, becoming more dominant after a terrorist attack such as the Madrid bombings in 2004 (2008a: 107).

Focusing on the economic utility topos, Bauder (2008b) argues that immigration to Germany was in the media both employed as an economic necessity for skills shortages, but also as a burden due to rising unemployment and increased spending on public

welfare. Although the former argument was dominant, Bauder (2008b) explains that the enacted immigration law comes short of more liberal immigration laws. Moreover, in another article, Bauder (2009: 264) concentrates on the humanitarian topos in relation to national identity and finds that "the media does not reflect attitudes towards humanitarian immigration and associated policy that would be expected from an immigration country". While the German state is imagined as safeguarding human rights for the refugees from "deficient" countries, refugees are still 'Othered' and are not incorporated into the national 'Self' (Bauder 2009: 264).

Bauder (2011) brings these aspects together in his book "Immigration Dialectic", in which he compares this media discourse in Germany to the one in Canada and argues for understanding the construction of national identity through Hegelian dialectics. Apart from the humanitarian and economic utility topoi, he (2011: 180) combines the danger and culture topoi and finds how national identity in Germany was negotiated between being an immigration country and not being an immigration country into becoming an integration country. Danger and culture thereby become connected, since migrants are seen as a threat until they put aside their own culture and take on the 'German' culture (Bauder 2011: 167-168). His arguments (2014: 23) comparing Canada and Germany in this regard are furthermore outlined in a journal article, in which he comes to the conclusion that the dialectic of migration and belonging "will not be accomplished by continuing to embrace national models of settler society [Canada] and ethnic nation [Germany]".

With regards to the imagination of national identity in the parliamentary debates of the same time frame (2000-2004), Bauder and Semmelroggen (2009) find an economic liability narrative and a Muslim narrative involving ideas about the compatibility of Islam

and democracy, terrorism, and gender equality. Thereby, Islam was constructed as undemocratic and as the opposite to Christianity (Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009: 11). Furthermore, the customs and cultural practices of Muslim migrants were seen as contradictory and incompatible with the German constitution and the principle of gender equality and democracy (Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009: 14). On the other hand, the economic liability narrative was found to identify "immigration as a threat to Germany's economic and social well-being" (Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009: 14).

In summary, Bauder displays interesting findings on more recent immigration discourses at the turn of the century that are also very relevant to current discourses. The analysis of topoi allow him to make quantitative comparison apart from the qualitative analysis, which strengthens his argument on the dominance of prevailing argumentations. Furthermore, Bauder also relates the immigration discourse to matters of national identity and identifies a dialectical relationship by drawing on Hegelian theory. Nevertheless, caution needs to be taken when talking about different narratives, since topoi, as the analytical method, allow for the identification of argumentation schemes, but not narratives. The investigation of national identity arguably requires further methodological tools apart from topoi. Lastly, while the distinction between a settler society and an ethnic nation serves the comparison between Canada and France, the theory chapter has shown the pitfalls of relying on ethnic vs. civic or in the case of Canada plural ideas of the nation for determining inclusion/exclusion of national belonging.

Another method was applied by Helbling (2014) who investigates immigration discourses in relation to how actors frame such discourses in six West European countries including Germany from 1999 to 2006. His (2014: 24-28) analysis is thereby guided by a number of theoretical frameworks, including Habermas's framework of identity-related, moral-

universal and utilitarian frames, and the national citizenship models. By taking political statements from one quality news-media source per country and carrying out framing and logistic regression analysis, Helbling (2014: 30-32) finds that immigration revolves around economic frames, while integration is instead mostly associated with cultural considerations. Furthermore, the moral-universal frame – general moral principles and universal human rights – occurred by far most frequently, which is interpreted as an indicator for transnationalism (Helbling 2014: 32). The theory of citizenship models could not be confirmed, since Germany shows the largest number of moral-universal frames although a nationalistic discourse was expected (Helbling 2014: 33).

Moreover, by drawing on Habermas, Helbling (2014: 25) introduces a framework for categorising the frames in relation to national identity. While this allows Helbling to integrate identified frames into a typology and to make cross-national comparisons, his research aim predominantly rests with actors' motivation of using different frames rather than with different constructions of national identity and their impact on inclusion/exclusion. In the figure below, we can see that Helbling does not classify moral universal or utilitarian frames - the types used from Habermas - under national identity, and that identity is rather theorised on the basis of the citizenship regimes between the dualist nationalistic vs. multicultural framing. The dualist identity framing provides answers with regards to how the state responds or deals with migrants but does not necessarily provide indications of boundary drawings regarding inclusion/exclusion.

*Figure 3.1: Frames*

| Types by Habermas Frame Categories | Identity | | Moral-universal | Utilitarian | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Nationalistic | Multicultural | Moral-universal | Economic | Labour and social security | Security | Pragmatic |
| Examples | Foreign infiltration<br>National identity<br>Loss of traditions<br>Avoid Islamisation<br>Avoid flows of refugees<br>National sovereignty | Integration through tolerance<br>Advantages of cultural diversity<br>Tolerance between religious groups<br>European identity | Fairness<br>Equality<br>Discrimination of groups<br>Human rights<br>Freedom of opinion<br>Geneva convention<br>Rule of law<br>Democracy | Attract high-skilled immigrants<br>Productivity<br>International competition | Unemployment rates<br>Salary dumping<br>Poverty<br>Welfare state<br>Congestion social security system | Terrorism<br>Youth criminality<br>Internal security<br>Political stability<br>Organised crime | In our interest<br>Capacity to act<br>Legal security<br>Response to globalisation<br>Reputation<br>Legality |

**Source: Helbling (2014: 25)**

Two further studies have investigated whether a paradigm change in the immigration discourse has occurred and whether Germany's self-understanding has changed in relation to not seeing itself as an immigration country. Lubawinski (2008) analyses whether a paradigm change occurred in Germany's migration discourse and policy in 1998 with the change to the red-green coalition government[11]. By drawing on a range of primary and secondary data, he employs a quantitative text-based analysis in relation to parliamentary debates (Lubawinski 2008: 8). The guiding framework used for his analysis is the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory by Baumgartner and Jones, since it allows for the investigation of stability and change of policy fields over time (Lubawinski 2008: 9). The findings reject the idea of a paradigm change in the parliamentary discourse and show continuity despite the shift from humanitarian aspects to economic and integration aspects (Lubawinski 2008: 50-53). Interestingly, in this quantitative analysis, most frames are continuously positive and no change from a negative ('no immigration country') to a

[11] The Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party formed a coalition in 1998 following the national election.

positive understanding ('immigration country') can be identified (Lubawinski 2008: 53). Despite these influences and correlation, it is noted that no greater liberalization of migration laws has occurred (Lubawinski 2008: 71).

Kotowski (2013), on the other hand, analyses by means of discourse analysis the immigration narratives in German and US social study textbooks. In relation to Germany, Kotowski (2013: 305) identifies the narrative that sees an identity shift in the late 1990s that transformed Germany into an accepting immigration country. Yet, she also criticises that this supposed new image and immigration status is attached with question marks and qualifying attributes in textbooks, which show the uneasiness and strangeness of coming to terms with seeing Germany as an immigration country (Kotowski 2013: 305). While Kotowski points out how German textbooks attempt to "deconstruct notions of ethno-national homogeneity" (2013: 307), she also notes that the term 'foreigner' is still significantly used and that textbooks employ visual markers (race and ethnicity) for illustrating 'otherness' of migrants (2013: 309). Kotowski (2013: 310) concludes that "Germany is still far away from a full embrace of the idea of itself as an *Einwanderungsland*". Thus, both studies show in different ways how the discourse on immigration has, despite political developments, not led to greater changes or a paradigm change in discourse.

To conclude, previous studies on immigration discourses in Germany provide significant insights into the topics and issues thematised as well as the argumentations used. Despite the methodological variety (methods, sources, time frames and research design), all studies share to varying degrees a certain concern for identifying the nature and arguments employed in immigration discourses, how migrants are portrayed, how arguments can be categorised and how this compares either to other countries or over time. Empirically,

these studies on immigration discourse provide in-depth knowledge of economic, cultural and humanitarian argumentation schemes that also touch on issues of inclusion and exclusion. Methodologically, particularly Wengeler and Bauder provide examples of topoi relevant to German immigration discourses, while Helbling introduces a theoretical framework of classifying different frames that goes towards a model of classifying different forms of national identity constructions. Arguably, these studies are more concerned with the content and changes in immigration discourses than with different constructions of national identity, although the relationship to national identity is pointed out in various instances most prominently in Bauder's book on the immigration dialectic and Helbling's typology of frames.

## 3.2. Integration Discourses

Since the negotiations of the new citizenship (2000) and immigration law (2005), when Germany was officially recognised as 'an immigration country' (Winter 2010: 171; Baringhorst 2013: 48), more emphasis has been placed on *Integration* (the 'integration of migrants') (Mualem Sultan 2011: 33). Integration was made a national priority by Chancellor Merkel and has since become a "buzzword" in Germany in relation to the coexistence of migrants and the host society (Davy 2005: 123). It is "one of the top issues of political and public agenda in Germany" (Gerdes 2010: 4).

Firstly, integration discourses have been criticised by several scholars, politicians, think tanks or activists in working papers, book chapters, essays or commentaries. These point out some issues and make some valid criticism, although they are not based on empirical data or involve theoretical or methodological aspects. For instance, Bukow (2002: 6-7) in his working paper in 2002 criticises that the permanent feature of integration discourses

is the exclusion of 'Others' based on religious and linguistic differences, which neglects participation and incorporation of the migrant population. On the other hand, Beer (2013) provides a general critique of the integration discourse and integration practices. She (2013: 42) argues that the discourse is shaped by ideas of threat and demise, which is exemplified by, for instance, Sarrazin's publication of *Germany does away with itself*. Beer's (2013: 43) critique further includes the discursive distinction between 'Us' and 'Them', the insistence on assimilation and the non-recognition of hybrid identities (2013: 43-44), the discursive construction of homogeneous groups (2013: 44), and the neglect of a transnational reality (2014: 44-45).

Furthermore, Green Party politician Nouripour (2011: 15) judges Germany's obsession with integration to be a loyalty paranoia based on not giving people with a migrant background the necessary trust for being loyal to Germany as a country. As a result, he (2011: 22) proposes several aspects, which he thinks are required for the successful participation of migrants. Inclusion and participation of migrants is also requested by Goel (2009) in her article for the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation. Goel (2009: 99-100) criticises that the present discourse constructs migrants as 'Others', since they are often constructed as criminal, uneducated, homophobe and sexist. Hence, Goel (2009: 102, 109) argues that the integration discourse can be characterised as a mixture of post-colonialism and racism.

Similarly, also Breitenbach and Schubert (2010) criticise the continuously occurring integration debates in their position paper for the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation. They critique the concept of a German *Leitkultur*, as initiated by the CDU/CSU, which assumes that Germany is a homogeneous entity and excludes anyone else from this German society, as well as portrays Muslims as a threat (Breitenbach and Schubert 2010: 1, 2).

The image of migrants that is often reproduced is described as unemployed, little education, Muslim and fundamental (Breitenbach and Schubert 2010: 2). On the other hand, Butterwegge (2013: 87) criticises the statements of Sarrazin and his rejection of Muslims based on their belonging to a socially constructed group. In addition, also historical migration researcher Bade (2013) discusses the case of Sarrazin and Islam critic Kelek, and their media engagement and stipulation of populist fears in Sarrazin's book.

Furthermore, Peeck (2014) analyses the specific aspect of the supposed 'failing of integration' and integration policy in political discourse. By investigating statements by the political figures Ralph Giordano, Nekla Kelek and Thilo Sarrazin, it is shown how the responsibility of failed integration is attributed to multiculturalism (Peeck 2004: 64-65). Furthermore, Islam is found to be directly associated with questions of security and is constructed as a homogenous entity characterised by backwardness (Peeck 2004: 66-67). Religiousness of teenagers is seen as a problem, while violence against women is used to construct differences between Islam and the West (Peeck 2014: 68-69). Peeck (2014: 73) argues that belonging to German society can only be achieved with the simultaneous delimitation from Turkey or Islam.

Lastly, Arnold (2007) compares the integration debate of Muslims in Germany to the one of Jews in France under Napoleon. Arnold (2007: 17-19) identifies several parallels between the two cases leading up to two established conferences: "Le Grand Sanhédrin" in 1807 and the *Islamkonferenz* in Germany in 2007. In both cases, the goal was to achieve an assimilation of the religious minority group in the sense that civil and constitutional laws trump religious rules and ideas (Arnold 2007: 17-19). Furthermore, in both instances the national government sought to establish a dialogue on these issues with religious

representatives who were supposed to deliver answers on the compatibility of religion and the state (Arnold 2007: 17-19).

In summary, these short commentaries or small-scale studies can be argued to raise important points but are based on less rigorous and systematic data analysis. One exception is provided by Rauer and Schmidtke (2001). Research shows that the idea and use of 'integration' is far from being clearly defined or commonly agreed on and is even differently interpreted by distinct migrant groups (Ehrkamp 2006: 1679; Rauer and Schmidtke 2001). As a result, Rauer and Schmidtke (2001: 277) analyse these different interpretations of integration. By means of a framing analysis, they look at framing structures in the media and then relate the results to the framings used in interviews and group discussions with migrants (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001: 277-280). Three groups of migrants are thereby distinguished, which are Poles, Turks and migrants from the former Soviet Union (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001: 278). Firstly, the results show that the word 'integration' is 50% of the time used in relation to Turks (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001: 281). With regards to the context in which integration is used, Rauer and Schmidtke (2001: 283) find the labour market to be by far the most prevailing category followed by citizenship, language and culture. The categories discrimination, racism and identity are found as well, although they occur far fewer (Rauer and Schmidtke, 2001: 284).

In relation to the media analysis and the different migrant groups, cultural integration is most often associated with Turks, while Poles are associated with some problems in the labour market and criminality, but otherwise find no mentioning (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001: 285-186). Rauer and Schmidtke (2001: 290) conclude that assimilation in identity is requested by the media but seen as a conflict by migrants. As a result, the content and use of integration itself produces conflicts in society (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001: 291).

Hence, Rauer and Schmidtke (2001) provide important empirical insights in relation to integration discourses and who is considered an 'Other' (Turks) and based on which aspects. Indeed, the findings also relate to previous claims made about exclusion, host country privileges and dominance and the negative representation of 'Others' that were however based on small-scale data of integration discourses. The construction of 'Others' undeniably takes up great space in the context of (migrant) integration discourses and as a result, the next section will introduce academic studies on the construction of 'Others' in Germany.

## 3.3. The Construction of the 'Other'

### *3.3.1. 'Foreigners, Criminals and the Migration Background'*

Firstly, migrants have been constructed as *Ausländer* (foreigners) (Faist 1994), Turks (Ehrkamp 2006), or as persons 'with a migrant background' (Mannitz and Schneider 2014), but have also been negatively represented as violent, criminal or culturally different. Firstly, however a study drawing on historic constructions of national identity is worth pointing out. In her book *German Images of the Self and the Other*, Rash (2012) analyses the intellectual discourse of prominent writers such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Wilhelm Marr, Heinrich Claß and Eugen Dühring between 1871-1918, using the discourse historical approach. She finds that anti-Semitic, anti-Slavic, colonial and racist discourse were prevalent. Thereby, the German 'race' was described as superior due to the aim of being developed and 'protected' from different minorities.

Such openly biological and scientific racist discourse as illustrated by the discussion on "*Rassenkampf*", "*Kreuzung*" (cross-breeding) and the idea of the "*Lebensraum*" for the Germany 'race' by the mentioned intellectuals (Rash 2012: 50-61), has been rejected in

mainstream discourses after the Second World War. However, racism in the form of cultural racism based on essentialised cultural difference that is yet often still influenced by phenotypical and physical criteria (hence biological racism) (see Taguieff 1990: 117; Balibar 1991), has continued to exist in discourses on foreigners and migrants.

Indeed, in (critical) discourse analysis, the concept of 'race' is understood as a social construction and is hence not only tied to biological appearances but can also include cultural aspects (Rash 2012: 50, also see Miles 1993). As a result, racist discourse, from a discourse analytical point of view, involves strategies of constructing a positive self-image in contrast to a negative essentialised 'Other' that is employed to achieve a hierarchical power dynamic in society and to produce or legitimise discrimination, unequal access to resources and exclusion based on a variety of biological, cultural or other types of prejudices and criteria (van Dijk 1993a: 23; van Dijk et. al. 1997: 167-175; Rash 2012: 61). The following will now outline various academic contributions discussing the construction of migrants/ethnic minorities as 'Others'.

Eder et al. (eds. 2004) demonstrate such constructions of migrants in their edited book *Die Einhegung des Anderen* ('The construction of the 'Other''). As part of this volume, Pichler and Schmidtke (2004) analyse the German media discourse between 1996-1999 in relation to three migrant groups: Poles, Turks and expellees. They find that the topic mostly discussed in relation to migrants was cultural identity, followed by social order involving aspects of criminality and violence (Pichler and Schmidtke 2004: 59-60). In relation to Poles, the topic of social order is very frequent, whereby Polish migrants are often associated with crime (Pichler and Schmidtke 2004: 60). Expellees, on the other hand, are found to be mostly discussed in relation to cultural identity and as a social burden to the welfare state, both of which contradict the assumption that expellees would

share German culture and would hence be easily integrated (Pichler and Schmidtke 2004: 61). Finally, the Turkish group is mostly mentioned in relation to ethno-cultural differences and their supposed unwillingness to integrate (Pichler and Schmidtke 2004: 61).

In a separate chapter of the edited volume, Rauer (2004) analyses the media reporting of the year 1996 on criminal acts by foreigners in comparison to crimes committed by right-wing German extremists, in which migrants were the victims. He finds that in terms of migrants as offenders about 80% of the reporting is dramatized while about 20% of the articles employ neutral jurisdictional language (Rauer 2004: 95). Right-wing extremists in comparison are often only dramatized in about 40% of the reporting and they rather tend to be labelled as 'extremists' instead of as 'criminal gangs or hordes' as in the case of migrants (Rauer 2004: 96). Rauer (2004: 96) argues that this shows a level of stigmatization along ethnic lines.

Geissler (2011: 150) also criticises the negative portrayal of migrants as violent and criminal in the media and argues that this goes back to stigmatizing political discourse that had the restriction of immigration as its goal. He (2011: 145, 152) argues that there was a change in political discourse and an improved representation of migrants due to the goal of recruiting high-skilled labour migration, but that Muslim migrants were still negatively portrayed. Further in relation to the media reporting on migrants, Vassiliou-Enz (2014) criticises the media's lack of professionalism. This includes the false use of terms, the manipulation or non-critical use of immigration numbers as well as the uncritical naming of origin in crimes whether with regards to offenders or victims (Vassiliou-Enz 2014: 392-404). Moreover, Vassiliou-Enz (2014: 407) demonstrates how the media excludes young migrants by classifying general societal problems as

integration problem, criticising that these problems exist independently from migrants' origin or culture.

Lastly, Mannitz and Schneider (2014), show how a paradigm change in German migration politics has created new forms of speaking about 'the Other'. More specifically until 2005, Germany used the criterion of citizenship in population statistics and hence categorised migrants as 'foreigners' (Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 84). With the changes in citizenship law, this distinction as well as the term 'foreigner' itself lost significance (Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 82-85). As a result, the statistical office created the term 'person with a migrant background' (Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 85). Yet, Mannitz and Schneider (2014: 85) criticise that in public and media discourses the term 'with migration background' substitutes the previous description of 'foreigner' and hence continues to create a demarcation in German society between migrants and the native population.

In summary, this section shows that different migrant groups are constructed as 'Others' based on different lines of reasoning (economic burden vs. cultural differences vs. criminality) that can however be overlapping. Furthermore, there is a culturalization or ethnicising of socio-economic issues or of migrants per se that assists the construction of the migrant/foreign 'Other'. The literature identifies the media to play a great role in this process of upholding demarcations that represent continuous racism, yet in a more subtle form compared to the historically racist discourse as outlined by Rash (2012). Moreover, one dominant construction of migrants as 'Others' has increasingly been that of the Muslim 'Other' (Mannitz and Schneider 2014: 84), which will hence be the subject of discussion in the next section.

### *3.3.2. The Muslim 'Other'*

The change in the citizenship law and the subsequent 'disappearance' of foreigners in statistics is also the reason named for the (new) construction of the Muslim 'Other' (Foroutan 2012b: 25; Spielhaus 2006, 2010, Hierl 2012; Halm 2013). This is argued to have further been enhanced by terrorist attacks such as 9/11 (Foroutan 2012b: 55; Spielhaus 2006, 2010, Hierl 2012; Halm 2013). Kallis (2012: 403) argues that ideas about the immigrant 'Other' articulated since the 1980s have received new legitimacy as a result of the 'securitisation' of the debate, and this new form of divisive 'Othering' is argued to potentially carry "explosive implications for the future of an open, plural, and proudly inter-cultural society". As a result, it is claimed that the merge of the immigrant 'Other' with the Muslim 'Other' has re-contextualised contemporary islamophobia and "appeals to latent but long-standing fears and fixations in Germany" (Kallis 2012: 399).

Also Yilmaz (2012: 368) argues that this shift in the debate towards Islam and Muslim migrants "goes back to the mid-1980s when the populist far-right intervened in the immigration debate in Europe" and created fear by presenting "immigration as a cultural threat". He (2012: 373) further contends that previous economic and social identities have been replaced by cultural identities. Indeed, the 'culturalization' of discourse and the idea of social conflicts arising due to different cultures have been pointed out by a few scholars (Pautz 2005a, 2005b; Hierl 2012). Furthermore, the shift in the discourse towards Muslim migrants has been accompanied by increased research on Muslim migrants as part of the integration discourse or on particular aspects of the integration discourse that are associated with Muslim migrants:

Hierl (2012) provides an overarching contribution of the discourse on Muslims by claiming that this discourse has become 'Islamised'. Her book (2012) *The Islamisation of*

*the German Integration Debate* brings together different aspects of study and disciplines including discourse theory, post-colonialism, Islam studies and integration policy. More specifically, Hierl (2012: 47-48) draws on Verena Stolcke's framework of cultural fundamentalism that entails the separation of different groups based on cultural characteristics. She (2012: 50-68) argues for its extension to religious aspects by providing an overview of guest worker immigration to Germany and negative portrayals of Muslim migrants in Germany. While Hierl shows a great trajectory of how 'Others' have come to be portrayed as Muslims, her analysis is based on a literature review and secondary analysis, and no empirical data.

Rauer (2009) analyses the discourse of two Turkish organisations in Germany and how this minority discourse is affected and influenced by the discourse of the majority group. He (2009: 84) thereby draws on German print media articles from 1999 to 2004 and identifies four categories in 811 articles mentioning the Turkish organisations. The two biggest and most relevant categories are "political demands" (which include the demand for the financing of language courses) and "political commentaries" [own translations] (Rauer 2009: 84). Based on an analysis of Grounded Theory, five codes were identified (Rauer 2009: 84-85), whereby citizenship was the most occurring code, followed by Islam and integration (Rauer 2009: 86). These three codes were then argued to show a "reflection of cultural boundary drawing" [own translation] (Rauer 2009: 86), although it is not clear how categories and codes can create and signify boundary drawings only if to quantitatively confirm other qualitative findings.

Jonker (2013) analyses the perceptions of Muslims, Jews and Atheists in history textbooks used in German schools from 1700 to 2010 and finds the continuous negative portrayal of Islam by associating it with violence and backwardness. More specifically,

she (2013: 155-165) traces the narrative on Islam through the centuries and shows how the continuous persistence of this narrative has been possible. Jonker (2013: 153-154) argues that the previous (including peaceful) existence of Islam in Europe is denied and rejected and that collective memory is reduced to seeing Islam as the most dangerous and continuous enemy of Europe by associating it with expansion and crusades. This 'Other' creation and boundary drawing has enabled Europe to identify itself with Christianity and with the protection against Islam, both of which have become to form the basis of schoolbook narratives up to this day. Most recently, the narrative of Islam has been attached in school textbooks with the immigration of Turkish guest workers and the crises in the Middle East leading to a continuous image of threat (Jonker 2013: 163).

Halm (2013) investigates the parliamentary debates and the media from 2000–2004 by quantifying themes and categories from his content analysis. He finds that the importance of Islam has increased significantly in both parliamentary discourse and the media, particularly post 9/11, and that this has led to increased diversification of aspects discussed in relation to Islam (Halm 2013: 463). Halm (2013: 463) also identifies Islam to be seen as a threat and that issues of terrorism have greatly increased from 2000/2001 to 2003/2004 in parliamentary minutes. For the media, he shows that Muslims have been more negatively portrayed post-9/11 (Halm 2013: 464). In his book *Islam as a discursive field: Images of Islam in Germany*, Halm (2008: 107) finds a distinction between a secularized Islam and Islamism, whereby the former is accepted.

Klug (2010) also analyses the parliamentary debates of the same period questioning whether Islam has become the new concept of the enemy. Based on a quantitative analysis, Klug (2010: 83) agrees with Halm that since 9/2011 Islam was mentioned three times more in parliamentary debates. Based on the frequent combination of integration

and Islam, Klug (2010: 89-90) argues that the two discourses are linked. This is further confirmed in her discourse analysis, whereby Muslims are almost always identified as migrants (Klug 2010: 157). Klug (2010: 162) furthermore finds that the negative image of Islam is invoked through its link to the immigration/integration discourse, whereby people are thought to fear the religious and cultural implications of immigration as a threat to identity that leads to further calls for the integration of migrants and a reduction of immigration.

Jäger and Halm (eds. 2007) published an edited volume with contributions on how Islam and Muslims are represented in the media. Generally, the book identifies racism in the media or negative portrayals of Muslims to hinder inclusion (Jäger and Halm eds. 2007). One chapter is provided by Schiffer (2007) who looks at representations of Islam among others in the German media. She (2007: 169-180) finds that Islam is associated with threat and terrorism and that this representation is assisted by images and textual markers. Schiffer (2007: 185-189) furthermore highlights how personal stories in the local news section, TV programmes at late hours, stereotypes or missing translations of foreign words can either assist the 'Othering' of Islam or prevent a normalisation of Muslims in the discourse.

Jäger (2007), on the other hand, analyses how the debate around the Mohammed cartoons was constructed in the German news media in 2006. He (2007: 98) finds that the reporting has partially been racist and that a clear demarcation is drawn between the Muslim world abroad and the propagated need for the 'integration' of Muslims at home. Also Miera and Sala Pala (2009), comparing France and Germany, investigate the construction of Islam by means of the Mohammed cartoons. They (2009: 401-402) find that in both countries Islam and Muslim culture was constructed as a threat and in opposition to 'Western'

democratic values, although national differences confirming the citizenship regimes or 'philosophies of integration' could be confirmed.

Müller (2018) examines the representations of Muslim refugees in the British and German media in the week 31st August to 6th September 2015 and the same week in 2016. He (2018: 273-274) finds that the connection between refugees and Islam is much more often made in the German media than in the British press and that the culture and religion of refugees is also more "*directly problematized in German media*" [original emphasis], which assists the reconstruction of German identity as Judeo-Christian.

Another issue[12] that has attracted public and scholarly attention is the headscarf debate. In Germany, the headscarf debate revolved around schoolteacher, Fereshta Ludin, who fought over the duration of five years for being allowed to wear the headscarf in class (Saharso 2007: 523). Saharso (2007) investigates this policy issue of the headscarf in Germany and the public debate surrounding it and compares it to the one in the Netherlands. He (2007: 513) claims that at the bottom of this debate, there is a tension between the principle of "public neutrality and the right to religious freedom". Saharso (2007: 527) argues that while Germany and the Netherlands may have converged in general immigration policies, the approach to the headscarf differed and corresponded with the relevant citizenship models. As a result, for Germany, Saharso (2007: 526-527) identifies the unequal treatment of religions by the Christian Democrats thereby representing a continuation of ethno-culturalism.

[12] Further issues subject to the analysis of the representation of Islam in the German media included the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands (Ködel 2007), and the German Islam Conference (Bayat 2016).

Also Korteweg and Yurdakul (2014) research the construction of identity through the headscarf debates in the German media, but compare this with France, the Netherlands and Turkey. On the one hand, they (2014) identify transnational influences of issues such as multiculturalism, gender equality, and secularism, but on the other hand, they show that due to different national contexts, these concepts are given distinct meanings and are interpreted in different ways. In the German context, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2014: 157) find that opponents of the headscarf used the arguments of state neutrality and gender equality to uphold an idea of national homogeneity, whereas defenders of the headscarf tried to re-define national belonging by recognising diversity.

Korteweg and Yurdakul have further investigated other aspects regarding Muslims by looking at the portrayal of so-called honour killings (2009, 2010) and forced marriages (2013) in the media. The findings include that more than half of the published articles clearly mark a religious boundary in terms of 'Us' and 'Them' (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009), and that in comparison to other countries such as the Netherlands, the UK or Canada, in Germany, the idea of honour killings are solely used to inform policies on immigration restrictions rather than policies on domestic violence (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2010: iii). In addition, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2013) argue that ideas of gender equality are used as a tool for the stigmatization of Muslims and again restrictive immigration laws in Germany rather than leading to migrant inclusion such as in the Netherlands.

In fact, Magarete Jäger (1996) has researched gendered stereotypes in the German debate and has already found a discursive interlock of the immigration discourse with the one on gender relations and women in Germany in the 1990s. This shows that gender and the argument for equality have been used mainly against Muslim migrants and for

stigmatization. By analysing the headscarf debate of 2003 and the case of the Islam critic Nekla Kerek, Rostock and Berghahn (2008) confirm that gender has come to play an important role in re-defining the German nation through the migrant integration discourse. Also Sauter (2009: 50) concludes there to be a link between the discourses of integration and gender, and the resulting boundary drawing on behalf of the majority population. Influenced by Foucault and Siegfried Jäger, and investigating a petition of 69 migration researchers against the work of Necla Kelek in 2006, Sauter (2009: 41-42) focuses on the aspect of speaking about integration and difference as well as the three topoi of integration, difference and Islam.

In summary, it can be concluded that there exists an array of research on the discursive representation of Muslims and Islam. Depending on the source and data in question, the portrayal of both is rather negative and involves several stigmatizations such as the association with violence, backwardness, gender inequality and terrorism. Muslims have become the dominant 'Other' in discourse (Brubaker 2013: 2), which is not least demonstrated by the number of publications in this regard. The host community as well as the Muslim group are thereby imagined as homogeneous entities that stand in opposition to each other mostly with regards to their values. Although the mentioned studies partially focus on different aspects, there is agreement in their findings of the characteristics and portrayals of the Muslim 'Other'.

Most of the mentioned studies were concerned with the representations of Muslims and of Islam per se or the thematic issues of how Muslims are represented, but not necessarily how this relates to the context of German identity. As a result, several studies employed quantitative analysis or qualitative content analysis, which are arguably suited for identifying themes, frequencies, topics and categorizations, while a few studies used

discourse analysis to examine the construction of Muslims. Furthermore, as already mentioned, Hierl (2012) bases her analysis on a literature review, also Saharso (2007) and Rostock and Berghahn (2008) do not define primary data and refer to 'current events' or 'debates'.

Two studies, Korteweg and Yurdakul (2014) and Rostock and Berghahn (2008), make claims about German national identity, yet both solely focus the analysis on the Muslim 'Other' and consequently make assumptions about the German 'Self' following this analysis. Moreover, in another publication Korteweg and Yurdakul (2010: 5) refer to content analysis or simply qualitative analysis as their method and hence it is not clear how conclusions about *constructions* of 'Others' can be reached. It is the purpose of this thesis to add to this body of research by investigating the construction of national identity based on the co-constitutive relationship between the 'Self' and the 'Other', and by employing two theoretical frameworks of boundary drawing in relation to national identity that go beyond the established citizenship regimes (see Saharso 2007) or other theories of boundary drawing (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2013).

## 3.4. The Construction of the 'Self'

On the other hand, research has also focused on the construction of the German 'Self' in relation to immigration and (migrant) integration[13]. Firstly, this was in relation to the so-

[13] In addition, research into German national identity has focused on the relationship with the Aussiedler (Räthzel 2006); or compared national identity in relation to the Turkish population in France (Paris) and Germany (Berlin) in the early 1980s (Kastoryano 2002); or German national identity has been researched in the context of transnationality, whereby the 'Self' represents the 'national' and the 'Other' the 'transnational' (Faist and Ulbricht 2013).
On the other hand, research on German national identity has focused on other non-migration related aspects such as on historic constructions of German identity in the 19th century (Mollenhauer 2002; Pleitner 2002); German identity in relation to the Holocaust (memory) (Piwoni 2013; Fulbrook 1999; Rothberg and Yildiz 2011; Götz 2011); German identity in relation

called *Leitkultur* debate that had its peaks in the year 2000 following statements made by CDU politician Friedrich Merz. In this debate, the conservative opposition party CDU propagated that migrants would have to adapt to the German 'guiding culture' (Pautz 2005b: 44-45). Manz (2004) analyses 350 newspaper articles and interviews in the context of the *Leitkultur* debate and provides an overview of the main arguments. He shows the different interpretations of the term itself and the different positions of the political parties (Manz 2004: 484- 494). Moreover, he identifies the arguments about whether culture is homogeneous or plural, what degree of adaptation is required by migrants and whether they are willing to do so, as well as the negative reception of the debate by minority groups in Germany (Manz 2004: 484- 494).

Klusmeyer (2001) examines one such position paper of the Christian Democrats and analyses the concept of the proposed 'guiding culture' and its underlying assumptions in relation to integration. He (2001: 521-522) argues that the term 'Leitkultur' expresses "Romantic German nationalism" and essentially shows an ethno-cultural understanding of a supposed homogeneous German society. He, however, criticises that the idea of a common culture undermines historical facts of cultural, ideological and religious diversity in Germany (Klusmeyer 2001: 522). For instance, Judaism and the Christian 'Abendland' are included in the value community, which obscures the past experiences of anti-Semitism in Germany (Klusmeyer 2001: 524). Furthermore, by drawing on the historical examples of the expellees and refugees from the East, Klusmeyer (2001: 526-528) shows how the integration of different minorities forms part of German history and culture. The concept of the *Leitkultur* then is argued to lead to boundary drawing of

to East and West Germany and German unification (Le Gloannec 1996; Fulbrook 1996; Kühnhardt 1996; Staab 1998; Silver 2010; Götz 2011); German identity in relation to conservatism (Czitrich 1989), and German identity in relation to national pride and sports events (Gehring 2016; Götz 2011).

insiders and outsiders, and to safeguard the dominance of the German culture, but to neglect engaging with 'real aspects' of integration and inclusion (Klusmeyer 2001: 525-526).

Pautz (2005a) investigates the *Leitkultur* debate more systematically by analysing different phases of the debate in his book on the German 'guiding culture' and national identity. He (2005a) agrees with Klusmeyer that aspects of the debate are used to mask German history and to 'normalise' German national identity. His main argument (2005a) entails that the specific discourse surrounding the 'guiding culture' is part of a neo-racist discourse of the new right and with an origin in Huntington's Clash of Civilization. Indeed, I would also classify the *Leitkultur* debate as racist discourse since it goes beyond the aspect of the German constitution as German national identity and instead draws on cultural and religious elements to discursively homogenise people into different groups and to then not only demarcate the outgroup from the ingroup but to establish a hierarchical level of belonging/of *Germanness* with the purpose of essentially excluding those considered 'Others' from the national community.

In an article, Pautz (2005b) exemplifies this by describing the discourse of the Christian Democrats during the workings of the commission. He (2005b) argues that the CDU/CSU produced a shift from the focus on ethnicity to the focus on culture, which was subsequently equally discriminating to foreigners or persons with a migrant background. Pautz (2005b: 47) confirms that the *Leitkultur* debate represents continuity in German identity politics, whereby a so-called *ius cultus* replaces the understanding of *ius sanguinis* in citizenship law. Within this context of the *Leitkultur* debate though, again the tensions between civic and ethnic understandings of national belonging can be found, due to the German 'guiding culture' never being explicitly defined, yet evoking ideas that

go beyond abiding to the constitution (Klusmeyer 2001: 524; Pautz 2005b: 46). This also shows that a clear-cut distinction between civic and cultural elements is flawed, since to some extent both characteristics are argued to be part of the German 'guiding culture'.

The *Leitkultur* debate also forms part of Piwoni's (2012) analysis of change in German national identity. Piwoni (2012: 88-91) investigates German national identity over a period of 20 years in five different events including the *Historikerstreit* and the *Patriotismusdebatte*. Her method (2012: 79-88) involves a discourse analysis based on Schwab-Trapp, which focuses on discursive strategies and discursive events. With the aim of identifying different constructions of national identity based on the ideal types of the *Staatsnation* and the *Kulturnation*, Piwoni (2012: 263) finds that both ideas were represented in the *Leitkultur* debate as well as a mixture of both, which she calls a "civic-national understanding" involving a "plea for patriotism".

Apart from research into the debate surrounding the *Leitkultur*, a few studies investigate how German citizens construct national identity. Miller-Idriss (2006) analyses in 60 interviews in 2000-2001 how young German people understand citizenship and belonging. She finds (2006) that citizenship was mainly defined inclusionary through cultural ideas, geography and economic criteria and therefore did not reflect the exclusionary pre-2000 official state version of citizenship based on blood and ethnicity.

By means of telephone interviewing, Foroutan et al. (2014) investigate the narratives and self-image of German citizens. The study generally finds that narratives are exclusionary of Muslims (Foroutan et al. 2014). Yet, the quantitative survey methods that Foroutan et al. (2014: 12) draw on, make conclusions on 'narratives' difficult, since research questions on narratives cannot be adequately addressed with closed survey questions.

Hjerm (1998) also provides an analysis of attitudes on national identity in the context of immigration and citizenship. By comparing the countries of Australia, Germany and Sweden and using the citizenship models of multicultural vs. semi-multicultural and ethnic country as a theoretical background, he (1998: 461) finds based on survey data from 1995 that national identity is constructed similar in the countries under investigation despite of their distinct policies on immigration. Furthermore, he (1998: 461) shows that the distinction between ethnic and civic aspects of identity is not necessarily straight forward, since people draw on both to different degrees (Hjerm 1998: 461). As a result, he introduces the classifications of multiple national identity and plurality into his analysis, which either combine ethnic and civic aspects or which do not show signs of national identity in the first place (Hjerm 1998: 460).

Lastly, German identity constituted also the subject of analysis with regards to the so-called 'refugee crisis'. Matthay (2017: 769-774) recognises this 'refugee crisis' to constitute an 'identity crisis' and examined the intellectual debate mainly between philosopher Peter Sloterdijk and political scientist Herfried Münkler in early 2016 by drawing on the concept of *Gemeinschaft* as exclusionary ethnic nationalism and *Gesellschaft* as inclusionary civic nationalism. Matthay (2017: 774-775) argues that Sloterdijk's narrative represents an exclusionary construction of a homogeneous German nation that is pitched against a migrant 'Other', while Münkler's idea of Germany being embedded in the supranational European level allows for heterogeneity and hence change and inclusion. While the latter aspect of whether a European identity is necessarily inclusionary of a migrant 'Other' is questionable, Matthay (2017: 775-776) demonstrates how national identity is debated particularly in times of crisis and specifically in the event of the 'refugee crisis', when the nation's external and internal borders are questioned.

Schmidtke (2017) investigates German parliamentary and political party discourses with regards to the construction of national identity by comparing framing strategies between 1990-1995 and 2010-2015. He (2017: 502) uses three different frames for classifying constructions of national identity as well as for determining inclusion and exclusion: Ethno-cultural type, civic-territorial type, and a European-cosmopolitan type. While the former two types correspond to the ethnic/civic dualism, the third one of a European-cosmopolitan type is based on transnational cultural diversity, although Schmidtke (2017: 503) comments on the possibility of this European identity also potentially being exclusionary of 'Non-European Others'. Schmidtke (2017: 503-506) finds that while the period 1990-1995 was predominantly characterised by ethno-cultural frames, that there was a remarkable shift towards civic-political frames and to some extent also to European-cosmopolitan frames for the period 2010-2015.

Consequently, he (2017: 507-510) argues that growing societal diversity, Europeanisation, political party competition, and the important pragmatism of the subnational level have led to this increase in inclusionary frames, and that generally German unification in 1990 has started a process of negotiating German identity and coming to terms with its heterogeneous character. Schmidtke makes a significant contribution by empirically confirming the so-called 'civic turn' for Germany and the growing influence of constructing national identity based on civic ideas. Nevertheless, as has been argued in the theory chapter, it is questionable whether civic constructions are indeed inclusionary of 'Others' or rather that they have increasingly been employed for exclusionary purposes.

Mattissek and Schopper (2019: 254) conduct a corpus linguistic analysis of the German print media (*Die FAZ* and *Die Süddeutsche*) from May 2015 to April 2016 comparing

speech patterns in order to examine "how the term *culture* is used to create the illusion of a homogeneous German identity that is fundamentally different from the identity" of refugees. Firstly, they (2019: 255-257) find that culture is associated with adjectives of 'Otherness' such as 'different', 'distinct' or 'alien', and with concepts such as religion, language and tradition. Secondly, by means of concordance analysis, they (2019: 259) show that refugees are represented as a challenge to Germany, as victims and as incompatible with German culture. Furthermore, Mattissek and Schopper (2019: 259-261) argue that the antagonistic construction groups all non-German cultural 'Others' together against a homogenised German culture associated with language and values. As a result, they (2019: 262) conclude that "essentialist understandings of national identity and an ethnopluralist use of the term 'culture' are not limited to right-wing movements". With its reach into mainstream discourses, they (2019: 262) call for further research to explore the antagonist nature of cultural identities and "what kinds of discursive strategies constitute the hegemonic construction of distinctions between self and other".

Miller-Idriss (2006), Foroutan et al. (2014) and Hjerm (1998) with their studies directly relevant to German national identity and the German 'Self' provide a good overview on the criteria that may influence the construction of national identity and how these may have been evaluated including cross-nationally. Furthermore, Matthay (2017) and Schmidtke (2017) show with their studies how German national identity is central in relation to the more recent event of the 'refugee crisis'. On the other hand, Klusmeyer's (2001) and Pautz's (2005a, 2005b) work on the *Leitkultur* debate thematise the issues of exclusion and racism that such discussions can raise, while Mattissek and Schopper (2019) with their corpus linguistic analysis of the discourse on refugees in 2015 show how the concept of culture can be used as an exclusionary ethnopluralist tool.

Yet, since Hjerm (1998) and Foroutan et al. (2014) study large-scale attitudes both in Germany and abroad, they draw on quantitative data. Also Mattissek and Schopper (2019) used corpus linguistics to identify speech patterns in a large dataset. While these methods are suited for the purposes of these research projects, the aim of this thesis is to conduct an in-depth analysis of the discursive construction of German national identity, for which a qualitative method of discourse analysis is required.

Secondly and more importantly, most theoretical frameworks used draw on the ethnic/civic dualism, which has been criticised for its limitations. Matthay (2017) and Schmidtke (2017) both draw on variants of the ethnic/civic dualism and make claims about inclusionary and exclusionary discourse. This however neglects the fact that also civic constructions can be exclusionary. Particularly Piwoni's (2012) and Hjerm's (1998) study show the limitations of applying the dualism of an ethnic/civic nation either in its form of the *Staatsnation* versus the *Kulturnation* as in Piwoni's case, or by drawing on citizenship models in Hjerm's case. Both encounter the issue of identifying constructions that essentially entail more than one element and attempt to create mediating types or types mixing both elements. While both do not specifically seek to identify whether the identity types found in the data are inclusionary or exclusionary, assumptions are made about these typologies.

Klusmeyer (2001) only identifies the ethnic variant in the position paper of the Christian democrats and so do Mattissek and Schopper (2019) in their study on the concept of culture, while Pautz (2005a, 2005b) approaches this theoretical issue by drawing on theories of racism and cultural relativism. While in the context of the *Leitkultur* debate this leads to civic aspects also being identified as exclusionary and indeed racist, these theoretical bases would not necessarily allow for inclusionary constructions and

argumentations to be found. Hence, it is the aim of this thesis to examine by means of two new theories whether constructions of German identity are inclusionary or exclusionary.

In summary, this chapter has shown that immigration and integration discourses including constructions of the German 'Self' and the (migrant) 'Other' have been widely researched and that there is an abundant empirical knowledge on the issues involved. This thesis aims to add to this knowledge by firstly conducting a systematic analysis of the recent integration discourse that is not tied to a specific event or a pre-determined 'Other', and by drawing on CDA for the analysis of the *construction* of German national identity in (migrant) integration discourses. With this, it will be interesting to see whether Germany has indeed become more open(-minded) as is sometimes proclaimed, or whether Germany is still largely exclusionary as argued by others. Secondly, this thesis aims to focus on the mutually constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' and by hence attempting to bring these two streams of research together. As stipulated in the theory chapter, national identity is based on the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other', and existing literature could benefit from studying the two sides of the same coin in conjunction rather than by separately focusing on one side only.

Thirdly, the existing literature predominantly still applies the civic/ethnic model and the citizenship regimes for determining types of national identity and their impact on inclusion/exclusion. This thesis hence aims to contribute to existing knowledge by drawing on two different theoretical frameworks for classifying the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of identified constructions. As a result, this thesis

attempts to conduct a critical discourse analysis on a larger data set (non-singular issue) of the discursive construction of national identity in integration discourses of recent years by analysing the relationship of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ constructions and by drawing on two different theoretical frameworks for classifying the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of identified constructions.

# CHAPTER 4

# METHODOLOGY

This chapter will outline and discuss the research methodology for this research project with the aim of showing how the identified research questions were operationalised; how 'relevant' and suitable data was collected and how the chosen method within CDA enabled an analysis leading to appropriate research findings. In the first section of this chapter, I will revisit the research questions, and will discuss their operationalisation and expectations. Furthermore, the case study design, the focus on the media discourse and the relevant time frame will be explained and justified. In the second section, I will outline the process of data collection for the media discourse by providing more information on selected newspapers. In the third section, I will discuss the rationale and first findings of a qualitative content analysis on the collected data as well as the final sampling of newspaper articles to be investigated by CDA. Subsequently, in the fourth section, the Discourse Historical Analysis (DHA) as a form of CDA will be introduced and its methodological framework for analysing contents, and discursive and linguistic means of realisation, will be laid out. In the fifth and final section, I will reflect on trustworthiness and limitations of the research project in relation to the outlined methodology.

## 4.1. Research Design

### *4.1.1. Research Questions and Operationalisation*

Germany was the county with the second largest net migration in 2014 (OECD 2014) and received the highest number of asylum seekers in the EU in 2015 (Eurostat 2016). While political parties as well as academic research predominantly focus on the integration of

these newcomers, it is argued that immigration and increasing levels of diversity in society also challenge constructions of national identity, since they trigger a constant re-negotiation and re-definition of the boundaries of the national community in relation to these (new) 'Others within' (Triandafyllidou 2000: 375; Antonsich 2016: 1791; Faist and Ulbricht 2013: 3).

Political and public debates on immigration and integration in Germany have arguably been one of the most consistent, contentious and emotionally laden topics in German politics (Thränhardt 2002: 353, 346; Nouripour 2011: 13), yet notable German scholars Bade (2013: 363) and Foroutan (2012a: 323) have also argued that the whole discussion on (migrant) integration conceals the underlying issue and 'real debate' on German identity and what German identity entails in light of the country's increasingly heterogeneous make up. National identity is theorised to essentially be based on the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other', while the concept of 'integration' inherently presupposes the notion of the host society and single or multiple 'Others' (Aydin 2009: 216), making it thereby central to an investigation of constructions of national identity.

The review of the literature has shown that discourses on immigration and integration in Germany have been widely researched. Systematic, non-issue specific analyses on immigration discourses, however, have not been carried out since the implementation of the immigration law in 2005 (Bauder 2008a, 2008b). Also, methodical investigations on the constructions of 'Others' and of 'Muslims' have mainly used the same data, that is, the political negotiations and media debates leading up to this immigration law (Klug 2010, Halm 2013). More recent research on this latter aspect of 'Othering' and the portrayal of Muslims has instead focused on specific single aspects such as the headscarf

(Rostock and Berghahn 2008), honour killings (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2009, 2010), forced marriages (Korteweg and Yurdakul 2013), or the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in textbooks (Jonker 2013). In addition, while previous research has also looked at constructions of German national identity in relation to immigration (Bauder 2009, 2011, 2014, Bauder and Semmelroggen 2009), the headscarf (Korteweg & Yurdakul 2014), the Leitkultur debate in 2001 (Klusmeyer 2001; Manz 2001; Pautz 2005a, 2005b), or the 'refugee crisis' (Schmidtke 2017; Matthay 2017), these analyses have not taken the mutually constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' into account and have focused either on the 'Self' *or* the 'Other'; or have not applied the methodology of CDA, which is arguably required for the investigation of discursive constructions of identity. Moreover, previous research has predominantly employed the civic/ethnic framework for classifying constructions of identity and for determining inclusion or exclusion.

As a result, it is the purpose of this thesis to add to research on the discursive construction of national identity, in the sense of shedding light on (new) competing ideas of who forms part of the imagined German national community based on how the national 'Self' versus the 'Other' are constructed in and through discourses on integration; and whether these constructions are inclusionary or exclusionary to those considered 'Others'. Therefore, the thesis seeks to expose hegemonic discourses based on unequal power structures that potentially marginalize different groups of people in German society. The two overarching research questions therefore are:

***How is national identity constructed in discourses on (migrant) integration in Germany?***

***And are these identified constructions inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others' for becoming part of German society?***

‘Migrant’ is written in brackets because integration discourses also refer to third generation migrants or other ethnic minorities such as the Roma that arguably have no own migration experience and can at best be described as descendants of migrants or as ethnic minorities.

The two research questions were furthermore operationalised into the following two clusters of more detailed questions that in turn informed each of the empirical chapters.

1. The first research question examining the construction of national identity in (migrant) integration discourses was operationalised into two sets of sub-questions.

   1.1. Contents:

   - On which aspects is the ‘Self’ constructed? Who are ‘Others’ and based on which aspects?

   1.2. Discursive/Linguistic Construction:

   - How is the construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ discursively and linguistically realised? How are the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ represented?

The first set of sub-questions has an empirical rationale with the purpose of identifying the content of national identity constructions as well as allowing for a first identification of boundary drawing in the analysis of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ constructions, on which the concept of national identity is based. The answers to the latter set of sub-questions have a theoretical and above all methodological rationale. With regards to the theoretical aspect, it was previously established in the theory chapter that national identity is constructed in discourse and hence that constructions also need to be investigated discursively in order to gain an empirical understanding. This leads to the methodological rationale that an investigation of the discursive constructions of national identity needs to

be based on examining discursive and linguistic realisations within the framework of CDA. This theoretical and methodological rationale then however also inform the empirical findings of both the first set of sub-questions as well as the first research question overall. Subsequently, all sub-questions are needed in order to answer the first research question of how national identity is constructed in (migrant) integration discourses.

2. Moreover, answers to the first research question are required in order to analyse and proceed to the second research question of whether identified constructions of national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary for 'Others'. This was again operationalised in two sets of sub-questions:

   2.1. Empirical:

   - Are the different constructions of national identity and/or 'Others' inclusionary or exclusionary for migrants/ethnic minorities?

   2.2. Theoretical:

   - Are the constructions of the 'Self' and of 'Others' voluntarist or deterministic?
   - In relation to Karner's framework, which types of boundary drawing between the 'Self' and the 'Other' can be identified?
   - Is there a mechanism of how the different boundary drawings map together?

The first sub-question represents the second research question itself and aims to provide an empirical answer following the findings of the first research question. The second set of sub-questions has a theoretical rationale of testing whether the two mentioned theoretical frameworks in section 2.4.4. in the theory chapter can determine and explain when different constructions of national identity are inclusionary or exclusionary.

For the theoretical investigation of the second research question, the two mentioned theoretical frameworks shall further be operationalised. While the general assumption is that different constructions of national identity imply different forms of inclusion or exclusion for those considered 'Others', the following expectations can be operationalised based on the first framework by Kriegbaum Jensen (2014):

1. Voluntarist constructions of both host society and migrants are inclusionary.
2. Voluntarist constructions of the host society and deterministic constructions of migrants are semi- inclusionary.
3. Deterministic constructions of the host society and voluntarist constructions of migrants are semi- exclusionary and most likely pose a barrier to inclusion.
4. Deterministic constructions of both host society and migrants are exclusionary.

With regards to the second framework by Karner (2011), it can be expected that

5. Discourses of conviviality and syncretism are inclusionary.
6. Integrationist discourses focusing on assimilation are semi-exclusionary and most likely pose a barrier to inclusion, while integrationist discourse on social cohesion are semi-inclusionary and are less likely to impose a barrier to inclusion.
7. Instrumentalist discourses can both be inclusionary or exclusionary depending on the utility and value attached to migrants/minorities.
8. Orientalising discourses are exclusionary.

While the two theoretical frameworks have different points of departure for their boundary drawings, it can further be expected that the combinations (1. and 5.), (4. and 8.) as well as (2. and 6.), and (3. and 6.) correspond with each other, and that any other

combinations are contradictory or would be logically impossible. The exception is 7., since this boundary drawing can theoretically correspond with any of those from the first framework.

### *4.1.2. Case Study*

The research design of this thesis chosen involves a qualitative single case study approach. The case study has the advantage of exploring a social phenomenon in-depth by using different sources and/or methods (Stake 2005: 444; De Vaus 2001: 231; Stark and Torrance 2005: 33). At the same time, "the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events" can be retained (Yin 2009: 4). Migrant integration discourses and national identity are both highly complex phenomena that involve several issues that can be approached from various angles. Hence, I argued that the case study design provides a good opportunity to explore these issues at length. Gerring (2007: 29) argues that the distinguishing feature of the case study method is

> its reliance on evidence drawn from a single case and its attempt, at the same time, to illuminate features of a broader set of cases. (Gerring 2007: 29)

In addition, the case study is thought to be useful for explaining *how* independent variables are linked to the dependent variable (Collier et al. 2005: 22). As a result, the case study design is also helpful for differentiating "among several competing mechanisms" (Collier et al. 2005: 23), which is relevant in this thesis with regards to identifying how different types of national identity affect inclusion/exclusion.

Since the case study has been criticised for its various definitions, different authors have attempted to outline different typologies (Gerring 2007: 17). Thomas (2011) lays out the following process with regards to the typology involving a qualitative inquiry:

*Figure 4.1: A Typology of Case Study*





**Figure 1.** A typology of case study

**Source: Thomas (2011: 518)**

This typology first involves making a distinction between "(1) the subject of the study, which is the case itself, and (2) the object, which is the analytical frame or theory through which the subject is viewed and which the subject explicates" (Thomas 2011: 511). For this thesis, the subject of the case or case itself was German (migrant) integration discourses in the German media. On the other hand, the object of the case then was the construction of national identity and its influence on inclusion/exclusion, meaning its consequences on the inclusion or exclusion of particular groups in society.

The rationale of selecting the case of the German integration discourse or the German media integration discourse was based on the two factors of 'local' and 'key'. 'Local' refers to local knowledge and the familiarity of the researcher with the relevant case

(Thomas 2011: 514). Since the researcher is native German and familiar with the historical context of Germany, the subject of Germany seemed appropriate.

On the other hand, and more importantly, 'key' refers to key case and the idea that a subject comes "into focus because of the inherent interest of the case" (Thomas 2011: 514). Moreover, for the purpose of gaining "exemplary knowledge", Thomas argues that the ""key-ness" […] of the case is manifested in its capacity to exemplify the analytical object of the inquiry" (2011: 514). Hence, it is the interaction and dynamic of the subject and the object that drive the case selection (Thomas 2011: 514). While Germany is not singular in having originally constructed its identity on an ethno-cultural basis, it offers some unique combinations of its ethno-cultural heritage on the one hand, and its dedication to pluralism following WWII on the other hand. Furthermore, Germany has experienced the national division between East and West and arguably constitutes the country with the highest number of immigrants in Europe - currently and over time. This specific socio-historical context of Germany makes Germany an interesting or key case for the investigation of national identity constructions and their implications for inclusion/exclusion.

The purpose of the case study then is intrinsic, since the findings on the case of Germany are of interest in itself; but the purpose is also instrumental because the case facilitates understanding and provides insight on how different constructions of national identity influence the exclusion or inclusion of migrants/ethnic minorities per se. Indeed, Gerring (2007: 30) argues that a case study only classifies as such if it can also "shed light on a larger class of cases" and be put in a larger context without necessarily making a claim of being representative. A further distinction of the object is made between a theoretical and an illustrative case, whereby the former is generally divided between theory-testing

and theory-building (Thomas 2011: 516). This case study involves theory-testing, as two different theoretical frameworks will be employed in order to investigate the object of how different types of national identity influence inclusion/exclusion. In the context of Yin's typology (2009: 47-48), this relates to the *critical case* and the aim of testing a theory, as one of the five outlined rationales of a single case study.

In relation to methodological choices, the unit of analysis is the German media, and hence the sources comprise documentary sources and more specifically newspaper articles (see 4.1.3). In order to gain a detailed picture, methods can be triangulated (Thomas 2013: 145-146). In this case, qualitative content analysis was used to investigate all collected articles in relation to integration (see 4.3.1), while CDA was employed to analyse the discursive constructions of national identity and 'Others' in selected articles and how this determines the inclusion/exclusion of migrants in society (see 4.4).

Furthermore, Gerring (2007: 19-20) points out that the case consists of "a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit) observed at a single point in time or over some period of time", while temporal boundaries are often difficult to determine. The case study of this thesis can be classified as spatially synchronic because it comprises comparisons within the case by comparing different newspapers, and as temporally diachronic because observations were made over a period of 5.5 years (see 4.1.4). This then corresponds with type 4 shown in Merriam's table (1998: 7) that is partially based on Gerring's case study typology (2007: 28):

*Figure 4.2: Case Study Research Designs*

| Cases | Spatial Variation | Temporal Variation: No | Temporal Variation: Yes |
|---|---|---|---|
| One | None | 1 | 2 Single case study – diachronic |
| | Within case | 3 Single case study – synchronic | 4 Single case study – synchronic & diachronic |
| Several | Cross-case & within-case | 5 Comparative Method | 6 Comparative Historical |
| Many | Cross-case | 7 Cross sectional | 8 Time-series cross-sectional |
| | Cross-case & within-case | 9 Hierarchical | 10 Hierarchical time-series |

**Shaded cells are case study research designs**
From Gerring, John (2007) *Case Study Research.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 28.

7

**Source: Merriam (1998: 7)**

### *4.1.3. Media Discourse*

For the analysis of national identity constructions in integration discourses, the media discourse was firstly selected for its key role as an elite discourse. CDA has traditionally focused on elite discourses such as the political elite or the media because it recognises that the elite has greater access to power and has hence greater ability to form and shape public discourses (van Dijk 1993b: 255-256). More specifically, CDA assigns the media a "manifestly pivotal role as discourse-bearing institutions" (Garrett and Bell 1998: 6). Moreover, the media represents an important link between the government and the people, by selecting, scrutinizing, summarizing and conveying information. It has been argued that the national media and in particular newspapers constitute "important sites in which and through which the national agenda is articulated and disseminated" (Perdigão Ribeiro 2010: 33). On the other hand, the media is an important actor for setting the

agenda, for framing and emphasising issues, and for hence constructing reality (Adam 2009: 3-7). While both politicians and the media influence each other, the media is argued to be enjoying "margins of independence" and "far from being a passive recipient" (Archetti 2010: 586). Hence, the media possess great means of access to discourse (van Dijk 1993b: 255-256).

Secondly, the media discourse was chosen due to its key role in the construction of national identity. Constructivist scholars of nationalism view national identity to be formed by the elite through their knowledge and ability to communicate ideas for the purpose of mobilizing mass support or the legitimation of power (Breuilly 1982/1994: 112; Deutsch 1966/1994: 29; Hobsbawn 1983; Lepsius 1982/1990: 245; Giesen 1993: 68-73; Piwoni 2012: 39). Hence, while constructivist theories of nationalism have also assigned the role of constructing national identity to governments and political actors (Gellner 1964; Deutsch 1966/1994; Anderson 1983), this is argued to only be possible by means of mass communication. For instance, Anderson (1983: 122) argues that nationalism was created through written language and the invention of print media. Also Deutsch (1966/1994: 27-29) maintains that the nation is created through social communication, meaning that facilities of communication allow groups in power/ the elite to persuade people of national norms and symbols. Lastly, Lepsius (1982/1990: 246) adds that the acceptance of a particular construction of national identity ultimately depends on the consistency of its communication but also on the plausibility of its content.

Hence, the requirement of consistent communication en masse assigns specific importance to the media. The media represents "a powerful force in the creation and/or dissemination […] of public images of the 'imagined community' that is the nation" (Hargreaves 2001: 23). Newspapers as a form of mass communication can through the

communication of their ideas create a feeling of community because of the experiences that their readers share (Anderson 1991 cited in Li 2009: 86). The media hence enables people to think as a community while participating in national discourse (Anderson 1991 in Li 2009: 86). Furthermore, newspapers establish conceptions of national identity and national thinking by setting national frames of reference (Billig 1995 cited in Li 2009: 86). National thinking is thought to be enhanced by the various stereotypes and messages that newspapers (re)produce, when they 'remind' their readership of the nation and cause them to reflect on the meaning of the national community (Billig 1995 in Li 2009: 86).

As a result, the media is also argued to be key in the "discursive expression and reproduction of racism in society" (Van Dijk 1987a: 20). In this sense, not only does the media set the agenda on ethnic groups, it also predetermines a certain consensus (Van Dijk 1987b: 94), that in turn greatly affects the "attitudes among the majority population towards minority groups" (Hargreaves 2001: 23). Wood and King (2001: 2) write

> [H]ost-country media constructions of migrants will be critical in influencing the type of reception they are accorded, and hence will condition migrants' eventual experience of inclusion or exclusion. Often acting as the mouthpiece of political parties or other powerful groups, media discourses have been shown to be immensely influential in constructing migrants as 'others', and often too as 'criminals' or 'undesirables'. (Wood and King 2001: 2)

### *4.1.4. Time Frame*

The time frame for the selection of data comprised July 2010 to December 2015. This time frame was firstly chosen in order to provide empirical findings of *recent* constructions of national identity in integration discourses, since most more systematic and non-singular issue-specific analyses with primary data involved sources from 2000

to 2005. The selection of recent data was also necessary in order to analyse and provide findings on more current constructions of national identity in integration discourses.

Secondly, key historical events have been argued to be important for the construction of national identity (Estel 1994: 32). By naming Germany's experience with the Holocaust, Estel argues that future constructions of identity are limited in their development, as they are shaped and constrained by an earlier important construction of identity of a key historical event (Estel 1994: 32; Estel 2002: 107). Hence, with the importance of key historical events, the two most significant events in recent time influencing discourses on integration were chosen to frame the selected time frame.

As the start date, 1 July 2010 was chosen because it represented the month before the start of the so-called 'Sarrazin debate' in Germany. The 'Sarrazin debate' refers to the controversy and public debate following the book publication *Germany does away with itself* by Thilo Sarrazin (2010), former board member of the German Federal Bank, which entailed biological theses on the inability of Muslim (migrants) to integrate in German society. Sarrazin's book was "the number one bestseller for twenty-one weeks" in Germany (Buchreport n.d. cited in Diel and Steinmann 2012a: 142). Yet, Bade explained how the resulting 'Sarrazin debate' illustrated societal and socio-political divisions in German society and went far beyond an "escalating book discussion" (2018: 317). Hence, the 'Sarrazin debate' was also argued to be "the most heated German controversy since the 'Historikerstreit' between Ernst Nolte and Jürgen Habermas in the mid-1980s" (Stefanidis 2011 cited in Diel and Steinmann 2012b).

The key event to frame the end of the time frame was the so-called 'refugee crisis' arguably receiving specific public attention between August to November 2015, when

Chancellor Angela Merkel declared to suspend the Dublin regulation[14] for a short period of time in order to take asylum seekers from other EU countries (Harding 2015). The event of the 'refugee crisis' as such represents a significant historical event because it recorded the highest German net migration numbers since 1994 and sparked significant public debate on diversity and German national identity. While the discussion on the integration of refugees arguably continues up to today, the number of asylum seekers was significantly reduced by restoring the Dublin regulation at the end of September 2015, and by other measures such as the Balkan blockade, Hungarian fence, EU-Turkey deal, etc. in October and November 2015 (Harding 2015; Traynor 2015; Amnesty International 2015). The end date of the 31 December 2015 was hence chosen for the time frame to conclude the peak of the 'refugee crisis' in the German context and the year 2015, as well as to start the collection of data for this thesis (in November/December 2015). Indeed, the collected data and the content analysis showed two significant peaks in the number of articles published by newspaper surrounding the mentioned two events of the 'Sarrazin debate' and the 'refugee crisis'. In addition, the named start and end dates of the time frame also roughly coincided with the 20th and 25th anniversary of German unification.

[14] Angela Merkel may have declared to have suspended the Dublin regulation and to have 'opened' the borders; and this has been widely reported in the media and has become accepted in public discussions. Nevertheless, as part of the Schengen area, there are no internal EU borders and hence Germany could not simply 'open' the borders, since they were open to begin with (European Commission n.d.). Moreover, although asylum applications should be recorded and carried out in the first country of entry, Article 17 of the Regulation of (EU) No 604/2013 states that "each Member State may decide to examine an application for international protection" (EUR-Lex 2013 cited in Pries 2019: 4). Indeed, long before 2015, other EU member states assessed asylum applications, especially if the country of first entry was Greece, since the European Court of Justice had ruled that asylum seekers cannot be sent back to Greece "due to the deficits of the Greek asylum system" (Pries 2019: 4). As a result, Chancellor Merkel also did not suspend the Dublin regulation. This however did not change the fact that it was reported as such and that the arrival of refugees gained a momentum in the media and became known as the 'refugee crisis'.

These anniversaries offered an additional frame around two key dates of historic importance, and with it an opportunity for introspection and reflection in relation to German national identity and on what it means to be German.


Despite the significance of key events for the construction of national identity and their necessity for being integrated into the selected data, the purpose of this thesis was to find out about the construction and the role of national identity in integration discourses in Germany per se and not to focus on singular events only. As a result, the entire time frame of five and a half years between July 2010 and December 2015 was chosen. Immigration and integration have been one of the most controversially debated topics in German politics (Thränhardt 2002: 353, 346). Hence, there are continuous events and continuous reporting in the media such as publications of opinion polls, studies and reports, commentary or interviews from politicians, conferences and summits on integration etc. By selecting the 5.5 years instead of further events, the imposition of a preconception as to which other events could be considered most important or relevant was avoided, while more general assumptions about German national identity not tied to specific events could be made. Moreover, the data selection for further events would have proven difficult in practical terms, since start and end dates of other 'crisis points' than the two mentioned key historical events are not necessarily identifiable or are more arbitrary. Instead the integration discourse should be seen as situated in an ever-evolving context.

## 4.2. Data Collection

In the previous section, it has been shown why the analysis of the media discourse on migrant integration is important and why a specific time frame was selected. In this section, the specific data selected for analysis and their collection process will be

described. The process of collecting data required an active selection of the data as well as justifications for these specific selections (Stake 2005: 450; Stark and Torrance 2005: 35; Descombe 1998: 33), which essentially led to imposing preconceptions of which data was considered 'relevant' and information rich. Thereby, the sampling of the relevant sources involved a three-step process including two forms of purposive sampling (maximum variation and criterion-i) and systematic sampling (see graph below).

*Figure 4.3: Sampling Forms and Process*




The underlying logic of purposive sampling is to select "information-rich cases" that yield "insights and in-depth understanding rather than empirical generalizations" (Patton 2002: 230). While purposive sampling generally entails the subjective selection of data with the researcher relying on his or her own judgment (Bryman 2008: 177), there are different types of purposive sampling (Palinkas et al. 2015). Systematic sampling, on the other

hand, is described as a "variation on the simple random sample" that selects "units directly from the sampling frame – that is, without resorting to a table of random numbers" (Bryman and Bell 2011: 180). The different sampling stages will be discussed in the following parts, when outlining the data sources and the collection of data.

### *4.2.1. German Print Media and Maximum Variation Sample*

#### *4.2.1.1. Print Media*

While the importance of the media discourse has been established, the specific data selected as part of the media discourse, involved print media including two newspapers, one tabloid and one news magazine. The print media was preferred over alternative forms of the media such as television news, political talk shows, social media or other forms of news providers on the internet due to newspaper reporting remaining to be "powerful media actors and agenda setters" (Mawby and Gisby 2009: 40), that play an active role in shaping and reacting to popular public debate (Light and Young 2009: 286). Despite the increase of e-news, newspapers have been acknowledged to retain influence (Marr 2004; Castells 2001: 198), and to also shape public opinion (Martins et al. 2013: 2), with at least an obvious link between attitudes and readership in the context of immigration and 'race' (Duffy and Rowden 2005: 1).

In addition, print news media have not been found to produce less mobilizing information than online news (Hoffman 2006: 66-67). Putting it differently, they equally provide information that influence readers to act on pre-existing opinions (Hoffman 2006: 66-67), and the print media has historically reported on issues surrounding immigration (Mawby and Gisby 2009: 40). Moreover, print media are due to matters of access and available archives argued to represent a "reliable resource for studying an issue over a period of

time" (Mawby and Gisby 2009: 40). Indeed, during the process of collecting relevant material from selected newspapers, it became clear that online publications of the same newspapers were not necessarily reliable, since they were edited or changed later on.

#### *4.2.1.2. Maximum Variation Sample*

The specific outlets of the print media then were selected based on maximum variation. This first sampling strategy implies that a heterogeneous sample is sought for "capturing and describing the central themes that cut across a great deal of variation" (Patton 2002: 234-235). More specifically, diverse samples allow (Patton 2002: 235):

> (1) high-quality, detailed descriptions of each case, which are useful for documenting uniqueness, and (2) important shared patterns that cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of heterogeneity. Both are important findings in qualitative inquiry. (Patton 2002: 235)

Mawby and Gisby (2009: 40) maintain that a nuanced insight into controversial issues can in fact be obtained by analysing different newspapers over a period of time. This sample of maximum variation was achieved by selecting two German broadsheets, *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (*FAZ*) and *Die Süddeutsche*, as well as the tabloid, *Die Bild*, and the news magazine, *Der Spiegel*. All four news outlets were selected due to their national reach (*influence*) in Germany, yet representing different types/styles of news media, different *authors*, different political orientations (*interests*) as well as *audiences*[15]. In the following, the influence of the newspapers as well as the characteristics of maximum variation will further be described.

[15] For a discussion on using documentary sources and aspects to consider (e.g. authors, influence, interests and audience) for judging authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of documents see Scott (1990); Prior (2003); Gidley (2004); Macdonald (2008).

Firstly, *Die Bild* was selected not only as Germany's leading tabloid but also as the news outlet with the highest average circulation of 1,997,84 copies in the last quarter of 2015 in Germany overall (IVW n.d.). As part of the Axel Springer group, *Die Bild*'s political orientation can be classified as centre-right conservative. The tabloid format furthermore fulfils the functions of "*facts*, *fun* and *fulmination*" (Marlow 2002). This implies that tabloids do not only bind their audiences by providing a will to facticity (Marlow 2002: 336), but that informative texts also need to entertain (infotainment) (2002: 338). The third element of tabloids entails the attempt "to persuade and to command a certain authority" by showing empathy and an understanding of the perceptions of the reader, while simultaneously using condemnatory language "with an aspiration for moral 'leadership' (Marlow 2002: 340).

*Die Bild* showed all of these traits by frequently claiming to provide 'the truth', by offering entertainment based on its layout, register and selection of topics; and by frequently adopting denunciatory and condemnatory positions, while showing empathy, for example, for rising fuel prices or cuts in unemployment benefits. As a result, the distinguishing feature of *Die Bild's* audience is lower levels of education. Only 13% of *Die Bild's* readers have the high school leaving certificate Abitur and readers are rather male above the age of 40 (Schröder 2013).

Secondly, *Der Spiegel* was selected as Germany's leading weekly news magazine. The average circulation of *Der Spiegel* ranked second after the one of *Die Bild* with 807,839 copies in 2015 (4) (IVW n.d.). *Der Spiegel* is generally seen as left-liberal concerned with investigative journalism (ef 2016), but its political orientation is debatable. The typical reader of *Der Spiegel* has been found more than twice as likely to be male, to be older

than 50 years and to have a more than 3.000 Euros monthly net income (*Der Spiegel* 2017). Also at least 54% of the readers of *Der Spiegel* have the Abitur.


Thirdly, *Die Süddeutsche* was selected as a centre-left broadsheet with an average circulation of 378,131 copies in 2015 (4) (IVW n.d.) and thereby ranking in 4th place. *Die Süddeutsche* also places more emphasis on investigative journalism (ef 2016; NDR 2016) and has the mission of promoting a liberal and tolerant tenor as well as excellent journalistic quality (Süddeutscher Verlag n.d.). The typical reader of *die Süddeutsche* tends to be younger on average, a student or first higher-wage earner, rather female, interested in politics and in the region of Munich and Bavaria, and not interested in tabloid news (Schröder 2012). About 47.8% of the readers of the *Süddeutsche* possess the German school leaving certificate Abitur (Schröder 2012).

Fourthly, *Die FAZ* as a liberal-conservative or centre-right broadsheet (ef 2016) was selected with a daily edition and an average circulation of 278,292 copies in 2015 (4) (IVW n.d.), thereby ranking in 5th place. *Die FAZ* prides itself for having several editors-in-chief and for creating space for guest authors, both of which is thought to provide readers with a range of opinions on any given topic (*FAZ* Media n.d.). Furthermore, this broadsheet aims for high quality journalism and for influencing the elite (*FAZ* Media n.d.). The market analysis of the Sunday version *FAS* of *Die FAZ* showed that the *FAS* reader is highly educated with a good socio-economic position and an opinion leader, more likely to be male and from Western Germany (*FAZ* 2012).

Further important newspapers in Germany that were not selected for analysis are *Die Zeit, Die Welt* and *Die Tageszeitung*. Even though the *Die Zeit* is a newspaper with a centre-liberal orientation reaching 507,791 copies in 2015 (4) and therefore has a higher daily

average circulation number than *Die Süddeutsche* (IVW n.d.), it can be argued that the political orientation of this broadsheet lies somewhere between the already included *FAZ* and *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. Also *Die Welt* as a centre-right newspaper reaching an average daily circulation of 190,393 copies in 2015 (4) (IVW n.d.) was not included in the data collection because its political orientation is similar to the one of the already included *FAZ* and because *Die Welt* is owned by the same publishing company as *Die Bild* that is also already included in the analysis. Lastly, *Die Tageszeitung* despite its clear left-leaning political orientation was not selected for data collection because it only reached an average circulation of 53,424 copies in 2015 (4) (IVW n.d.). In addition, *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* were also selected over *Die Welt*, *Die Zeit* and *Die Tageszeitung* due to reasons of access, since they are the only two newspapers prepared electronically in German state archives. The following tables show the circulation numbers and summarise the characteristics of selected newspapers.

*Figure 4.4: Circulation of Newspapers 2010 (3) to 2015 (4)*




**Source: Created with data from IVW (n.d.)**

*Table 4.1: Characteristics of Chosen Newspapers*

| | ***Spiegel*** | ***Bild*** | ***Süddeutsche*** | ***FAZ*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Influence | Weekly edition 807,839 copies | Daily edition 1,997,84 copies | Daily edition 378,131 copies | Daily edition 278,292 copies |
| Authors/ Ownership | Partly owned by *Spiegel Verlag* | Owned by *Axel Springer* | Attached to its publishing company *Süddeutscher Verlag* | Independent ownership and owned by not-for-profit foundation *FAZIT* |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interests | Centre-left news magazine focused on investigative journalism | Centre-right tabloid aiming to provide 'facts, fun and fulmination' through infotainment | Centre-left news broadsheet also involving investigative journalism | Centre-right broadsheet aiming at high quality journalism and at influencing the elite |
| Audience | Higher-wage earner, older than 50 years, male | Lower levels of education, older than 40 years, male | Higher-wage earner, young, political interest, from Bavaria, and female. | Highly educated, good socio-economic position, male and from Western Germany |

### *4.2.2. Collection of Media Articles and Criterion-i Sampling*

With the selection of the respective media outlets and the relevant time frame of July 2010 to December 2015, the documentary sources had to be filtered for their relevance to 'integration' in order to draw any conclusions about national identity constructions and potential exclusion in German (migrant) *integration discourses*. As a result, this second sampling step was based on the purposive sampling strategy of criterion-i sampling. This sampling implies that "all cases that meet some predetermined criterion of importance" are identified and selected (Palinkas et al. 2015). As discussed in the theory chapter, for the purpose of this thesis, 'integration' is understood as the two-way adaptation process between migrants/ethnic minorities and the host society, entailing aspects of 'structural', 'cultural', 'social', and 'identificative' integration, as well as 'prejudice and discrimination' in the form of German reactions and public opinion towards migrants/ethnic minorities (Heckmann 2015). However, although not outlined by Heckmann, also articles discussing crimes committed by migrants or persons with

'migrant background' were included in the criterion-i sample, while issues relating to the immediate asylum process (handling of asylum claims, deportations, availability of short-term accommodation) were not included in the criterion-i sample.

#### *4.2.2.1. Spiegel and Bild*

For *Der Spiegel*, print media articles were available online because this news magazine hosts all printed versions of the magazine apart on its website *Spiegel Online*. Each weekly publication has an online edition offering a contents page with links to the single articles. There are no options for a keyword search and as a result, the editions were searched in their entirety. The articles published in 2015 were in the first instance collected by means of photocopying from the print editions available in the German state archive in Munich in November 2015 but were from 2016 onward then also available online. All types of articles were included except full interviews and letters to the editor. This search resulted in the collection of **161 articles** relevant to 'integration'.

With regards to *Die Bild*, only a very limited number of electronic articles of *Bild Online* can be accessed each month against a fee, while the printed versions of *Die Bild* are retrospectively not accessible on their website at all. Hence, the printed articles of *Die Bild* were collected in the German state archive in Munich. *Die Bild* is only available in print version in the archive as well and hence packs with 3 months-worth of daily publications were searched entirely. It also needs to be noted that *Die Bild* has regional editions rather than a national edition, and that since the articles were collected in the German state archive in Munich, the Bavarian edition was used. However, the differences between the regional editions are rather minor, for instance entailing different advertisements or election messages. Articles relevant to 'integration' for *Die Bild* were

collected the same way as described above for *Der Spiegel*. As a result, as part of two separate visits at the German state archive in Munich in November-December 2015 and August 2016, **292 articles** were collected for *Die Bild*.

#### *4.2.2.2. FAZ and Süddeutsche*

The online search for print versions of *Die FAZ* on its website faz.net carried a fee and was still limited to the collection of a specific number of articles. The online search for print articles of *Die Süddeutsche* on its respective website despite being free of charge and unlimited in number, seemed to be inconsistent, mixed online and printed articles together and at times led to different search results despite the same key word search and time frame. Therefore, the articles for both newspapers were also collected via the German state archive, which has an electronic database for the printed versions of both newspapers. Since both broadsheets are daily publications with a large quantity of articles and since they were available electronically through the database of the state archive, keyword searches had to be used. However, several keywords were applied, since the assumption was that articles with insightful data to the research topic may not always entail, for instance, the keyword 'integration' but may still deal with migrant integration related topics.

Hence, the keywords used were 'Einwanderung' and 'Zuwanderung' (immigration), 'Integration' (integration), 'Asyl' (asylum), and 'Flüchtlinge' (refugees). While 'integration' is the obvious choice for a keyword, 'asylum' and 'refugees' were used in order to also capture articles on refugees that may not name the term integration but that may still entail integration-related data. Furthermore, two different keywords for 'immigration' were applied, since immigration and integration are often discussed

together and because using migrants as keywords on the other hand is problematic. Migrants are referred to in various ways: 'Zuwanderer' or 'Einwanderer' (Migrant), 'Gastarbeiter' (guest worker'), 'mit Migrationshintergrund' (with migrant background), Muslim, Turkish, Arab, Romanian, Bulgarian, Roma etc. The various descriptions of migrants make it difficult to use 'migrants' as a search term and it was not feasible to conduct a search for all available descriptions and references of migrants. Consequently, the two keywords for immigration were preferred.

After comparing the collected articles from *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* with those of *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* by means of qualitative content analysis to be described in 4.3, it became clear that there were two topics or events within the selected time frame that were underrepresented in relative terms for *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ*. More specifically, it appeared that not enough articles on the integration of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants as well as on the male circumcision debate in 2012 were picked up with the existing keyword search terms for these two newspapers. As a result, the search term 'Freizügigkeit' (freedom of movement) was added in order to ensure that enough articles on EU migrants were included, since it appeared that this was the preferred term by the media for this topic rather than 'Einwanderung'/'Zuwanderung' (immigration). In addition, the search term 'Beschneidung' (circumcision) was used in order to also gather articles on the male circumcision debate in 2012, since this issue was also deemed relevant with regards to integration in the sense of boundary drawing and a discussion on how to mediate differences in society.

With regards to *Die FAZ*, the selection only concentrated on the main print edition of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and excluded regional and local editions and extras such as the *Rhein-Main Zeitung* as well as interviews and letters to the editor. Data was


collected in two separate visits at the archive. Most articles were collected in November/December 2015. During the second visit in August 2016 the keyword search term 'Freizügigkeit' (freedom of movement) and 'Beschneidung' (circumcision) were added. This led to a collection of **704 articles**. The collection of articles for *Die Süddeutsche*, on the other hand, was only conducted in August/September 2016 and was carried out externally via the archive link. The same keyword searches were used as for *Die FAZ*, and the search was also limited to the main edition of *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* excluding any regional or local pages as well as interviews and letters to the editor. This resulted in the collection of **1018 articles**.

## 4.3. Content Analysis and Third-Stage Sample

### *4.3.1. Qualitative Content Analysis*

Following the collection of data, a total of 2175 'integration-relevant' articles were gathered. The graph below shows the number of integration-relevant articles on a monthly basis over the selected time frame. It demonstrates that newspapers continuously reported on integration-related matters. Also, two large peaks from August to November 2010 and July to December 2015 can be identified, in which all four newspapers showed a similar pattern. These two peaks confirm the rationale of the applied time frame of using two key events as a frame for the discourses on integration in Germany: the 'Sarrazin debate' and the 'refugee crisis'.

*Figure 4.5: Monthly Publications on 'Integration' July 2010 to December 2015*



While this amount of articles could not be investigated in depth by means of CDA, the aim was still to identify the content of these articles, firstly in order to understand the context in which the discourses were embedded (since CDA requires the analysis to take the macro-structure meaning the wider political development and discussions into account); and secondly, in order to be able to evaluate the further sampling process for in-depth analysis. A qualitative content analysis was judged to be most appropriate because it assigns categories to different issues based on the thematic and latent content of the issue at hand (Bryman and Bell 2011: 297) rather than based on the occurrence of specific terms (quantitative content analysis). A quantitative content analysis would have been difficult to perform, since 'integration' and 'migrants' are referred to in different ways. As a result, an inductive qualitative content analysis based on Mayring that can be characterised as "a bundle of techniques for systematic text analysis" that includes an interpretative analysis of the author, the socio-cultural context of the text and the text's message (2000, 2014: 39), was chosen to be most appropriate.


Qualitative content analysis is argued to entail a systematic or methodologically controlled analysis of a standardized process with predetermined and evolving rules that distinguishes the analysis from other forms of qualitative analysis such as coding (Mayring 2014: 39). In this sense, a dissection in the content is achieved by "content-analytical units" such as context units or coding units (Mayring 2014: 39), which are a central instrument in the analysis of content and allow for comparability (Mayring 2014: 40). By employing categories and assigning them to different topics in integration discourses, it was then possible to compare both the frequencies of different categories, of different newspapers as well as over time. This helped to establish the context of the debate and to identify the main categories, on which CDA could then be carried out.

Qualitative content analysis is generally divided into an inductive and a deductive model (Mayring 2000). In spite of being influenced by Heckmann's (2015) classifications of integration (structural, cultural, social, 'identificative', prejudice and discrimination), an inductive approach allowing further categories as well as themes within categories to emerge from the data was preferred, since articles had ultimately been selected based on the general assumption of integration being the long-term adaptation between migrants and the host society. The following image then presents the step-by-step guide for the inductive category development in qualitative content analysis[16].

[16] In practice, articles from *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* were analysed first, and categories and themes were assigned. These were then revised and reformulated several times in the process. The content of the articles from *Die FAZ* and *Die Süddeutsche* was then analysed, although smaller revisions still took place until after finishing with all articles. The smallest component of material, the coding unit, comprises specific words that are usually employed as part of a complete sentence, while the context unit as the largest text component comprises the article (see Mayring 2014: 51). This means that one article was enough to reach a coding decision and that also the recording unit comprises the article, since all integration-relevant text portions would be subject to category formation. However, one category or theme would only be counted once per article even if the discussion mentioned it several times.

It also needs to be noted that during the analysis, two obstacles were encountered. Firstly, newspaper articles sometimes draw on several themes within one category or even on two to three categories at the same time. In order to mitigate this, generally the primary or dominant category and theme were assigned. However, if further themes were equally significant, then these themes and if applicable further categories were coded as well. Secondly, some themes could not be associated with just one category and were hence split and placed into two categories. For instance, the theme of 'crime' was reported to be a consequence of different cultural values on the one hand or based on structural factors such as unemployment and poverty on the other. Hence, 'crime' was coded as part of two different categories: 'cultural' and 'structural'. Similarly, the theme of 'German language' was assigned a 'cultural' function for being part of German culture as well as a 'structural' function for access to the labour market.

*Figure 4.6: Steps of Inductive Category Development*




**Source: Mayring (2014: 80)**

While qualitative content analysis is an excellent method for establishing comparable frequencies of data or for organizing and reducing data to a manageable set, the method cannot and does not intend to offer information on single arguments, argumentation structures, and descriptions within themes nor does it provide a means of analysing discursive constructions. The purpose of using content analysis in this thesis was precisely to identify, summarise and organize content and to compare both themes and

frequencies between newspapers. For obtaining further information on the arguments and constructions made in identified themes, is the object of critical discourse analysis.


The findings of the qualitative content analysis show that a total of 8 categories ('cultural', 'structural', 'social', 'identity', 'perceptions', historic', 'statistic', 'Other') were identified, whereby all 8 categories were found in the data of *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ*, 7 in *Die Bild* and 6 in *Der Spiegel*. The first four categories thereby roughly correspond to Heckmann's (2015) contents on 'cultural integration', 'structural integration' and 'social integration', while 'identity' refers to Heckmann's classification of 'identificative integration'. Hence, the category of 'cultural' was assigned to articles that discuss aspects of culture such as language, religion, customs, norms etc, while 'structural' referred to the 'structural integration' of migrants/ethnic minorities into labour market, to levels of poverty and welfare benefits or to citizenship. The category 'social' furthermore describes social integration in the sense of migrants' social relationships and activities, while 'identity' refers to 'identificative integration' and migrants' sense or feeling of belonging.

The category 'perceptions' was created in relation to Heckmann's (2015) ideas on 'discrimination' and 'prejudice', yet it only focused on discrimination and prejudice in relation attitudes regarding diversity and newcomers more generally, while, for instance, prejudicial aspects on the labour market were coded as part of the 'structural' category. Moreover, the category 'perceptions' was formed as such because it entails the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of the German host society in the face of diversity, which do not only have to be discriminatory, but can range between welcoming attitudes and violent racism. The category 'historic', on the other hand, was also inductively created for articles discussing historical migrations and past policies, or for elaborating

on the history of integration in Germany. Furthermore, the category ‘statistic’ was formed for articles discussing the numbers or statistics of foreigners or persons ‘with migrant background’ in Germany. Finally, the category ‘Other’ simply grouped articles not falling into any of the above-mentioned categories and involved topics such as migrants’ consumer behaviour, arts, music or sport.

As can be seen in the graph below, the findings show that the three categories of ‘cultural’, ‘structural’ and ‘perceptions’ predominated in all four newspapers, while the other categories only recorded a very low number of articles. Indeed, none of the other categories amounted to more than 2%, while the mentioned three main categories made up over 95% of all identified categories in the publications. Of these, in total, 978 articles were coded as ‘structural’, followed by 696 identifications of the category ‘perceptions’ and 569 results for ‘cultural’. As a result, the three categories of ‘cultural’ and ‘structural integration’ as well as ‘perceptions’ were chosen to each represent an empirical chapter for further analysis.

*Figure 4.7: Categories of Newspaper Articles*




While all four newspapers shared the same trend of being confined to these three categories, the distributions within these three categories appeared to differ between the newspapers. In *Die Süddeutsche*, the largest number of articles were found for the category 'perceptions' closely followed by the category 'structural'. In comparison, *Die FAZ* led in the category 'structural' and its second largest category was 'cultural', with 'perceptions' in third place. Both, for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* the 'cultural' category was identified as the most frequent. *Die Bild* almost had as many results for 'structural', whereas *Der Spiegel* had 'perceptions' in second place. This shows that all four newspapers had different distributions and emphases within these three main categories. Further information on the context and the identified themes within these three main categories will be presented at the beginning of the three empirical chapters and in appendix A.

### *4.3.2. Corpus/Sample for In-Depth Analysis*

As already mentioned, after the collection of data from the different media outlets and selecting newspaper articles by their relevance to 'integration', the data sample of the four newspapers was too large for an in-depth analysis of national identity constructions by means of critical discourse analysis. CDA scholars often draw on typical case sampling as the sampling strategy of choice. This is exemplified by Jäger's (2001) guide for the processing of material. The material sampled for fine analysis is advised to be "as typical as possible of the discourse position of the newspaper" (Jäger 2001: 55). Articles are then selected based on their discursive findings following an iterative process. Researchers of CDA studies are however criticised for choosing data that "support[s] their analytical claims without first establishing a representative sample of texts" and hence for being subjective (Lin 2012). As a result, some studies have used corpus linguistics in combination with CDA in order to analyse a larger sample and to identify patterns in linguistic constructions in texts (Cheng 2012).

Since the total number of articles collected involved **2175 articles**, a *typical case sample* was not only open to the criticism of subjectivity but was in practical terms also unrealistic to establish. On the other hand, also corpus linguistics appeared to be limited because again 'integration' is referred to in different ways and it was unlikely to identify common word patterns in the data that allowed for drawing overall conclusions about the content of the data. With the aim of obtaining a more objective and representative sample of both the time frame and of identified themes (qualitative content analysis), firstly a systematic sample by date was chosen for each newspaper in order to adequately cover the time frame. Due to the great differences in the number of collected articles between newspapers (161 for *Der Spiegel* and 1018 for *Die Süddeutsche*), the systematic sample

for each newspaper was based on a different percentage. For *Der Spiegel* with its 161 articles, every 2nd article was selected by date, leading to 81 articles. For *Die Bild*, every 3rd article was selected by date leading to 98 articles. 204 articles were selected for *Die Süddeutsche* and 141 articles for *Die FAZ* after sampling every 5th article by date:

*Table 4.2: Systematic Sample of Collected Newspaper Articles*

| **Newspaper** | **Total Collection** | **Systematic Sampling** | **Percentage** | **Systematic Sample** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Der Spiegel* | 161 | Every 2nd article | 50% | 81 |
| *Die Bild* | 292 | Every 3rd article | 33.5% | 98 |
| *Die Süddeutsche* | 1018 | Every 5th article | 20% | 204 |
| *Die FAZ* | 704 | Every 5th article | 20% | 142 |
| **Total** | 2175 | | | 525 |

In addition, in order to also have identified themes (qualitative content analysis) represented adequately in the systematic sample, a small purposive sample was added in the process of analysing the data in order to ensure comparability between the newspapers and in order to cover relevant data. For instance, further articles on the same page were added to the sample in order to facilitate the interpretation of the original article from the systematic sample. This was frequently the case for *Die Bild Zeitung* that operates on a limited number of pages and has several interwoven articles naturally by its format. On the other hand, further articles were added if the systematic sample did not cover the identified themes from the qualitative content analysis. This was more the case for the two broad sheets with larger publications, in which only every 5th article was sampled, and which did not necessarily result in small themes to be represented (sufficiently).

Lastly, further articles were added if the systematic sample was not enough to determine the discursive position of the newspaper clearly. This latter aspect mostly related to the newspapers inclined to offering different opinions on an issue and hence offering different positions, which made it more difficult in small samples to detect the overall narrative.

## 4.4. Critical Discourse Analysis as Method

The theory chapter discussed CDA to be the overarching framework for this thesis by allowing for the incorporation of multiple theories and methods. With regards to method, firstly, a qualitative research methodology was required because this is not only in line with the interpretive/constructivist paradigm (Oakley 2000: 26-27; Bryman 2008: 22), but because qualitative research generates non-numerical in-depth data using interpretation in its analysis (Bryman and Bell 2011: 403; Grix 2010: 119-120), which is necessary for answering the research questions.

Secondly, and more specifically, CDA was apart from the theoretical reasons, chosen as the appropriate qualitative research method because it represents a specific form of discourse analysis that aims to investigate linguistic features in relation to social and cultural structures and processes (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271), which is required for the analysis of discursive constructions of national identity. It seeks to identify the meaning and the underlying messages of texts as well as "unequal power structures" (Wodak 2002: 9) and the "reproduction of dominant ideologies" (Van Dijk 1987a: 16), which are important aspects for uncovering the discursive constructions of national identity or put differently the 'reproduction of dominant ideas about national identity' that may be employed by the more powerful group such as the host society in order to dictate the behaviour and place of migrants and ethnic minorities in society. Therefore, the aim

is not only to identify ideas and ideologies, but also to discover their impact, which in this case is whether migrants are included or excluded from society. Since the purpose of CDA is to discover these structures and hidden agendas (Paltridge 2013: 89), to identify underlying power structures and how these are maintained or transformed by discourse (van Dijk 1987a: 18), it represents a relevant and beneficial research method for this thesis.


### *4.4.1. Discourse Historical Approach*

There is no single method of conducting CDA (Tonkiss 2004: 376; Paltridge 2013: 90; Wodak 2002: 7). Rather, different approaches are associated with different scholars in the field of CDA and these different approaches are still adapted to distinct research projects (Tonkiss 2004: 376). Hence, the process is highly data driven (Paltridge 2013: 90). This thesis draws on the discourse-historical approach, which has been developed by Wodak and colleagues of the Vienna school and has been applied in several of the school's research projects (Wodak et al. 1990; Wodak et al. 1994; Matuschek and Kühnel 1995; Van Leeuven and Wodak 1999). The DHA is described as interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, incorporating fieldwork and studying multiple genres and public spaces, as well as analysing the historical context etc. (Wodak 2001: 69-70).

The distinguishing feature of the DHA is the quest for triangulation both with regards to employing multiple methods and by analysing different kinds of sources (Wodak 2001: 65). Furthermore, triangulation is also theoretical based on the idea of context that rests on four levels including the immediate internal co-text, the "intertextual and interdiscursive relationship", extralinguistic social variables and frames as in the context of the situation, and the "broader socio-political and historical contexts" (Wodak 2001:

67). Subsequently, the DHA requires the consideration and analysis of background information such as the historical context and "the political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded" (Wodak 2001: 65). DHA furthermore represents a more "inductively oriented approach" analysing research problems at the "meso level" and by conducting a more detailed linguistic analysis as well as by employing "in-depth case studies and ample data collection" (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 19). The following image further illustrates how DHA is situated within other approaches of CDA:

*Figure 4.8: Linguistic Depth of Field and Level of Aggregation*




**Source: Wodak and Meyer (2009: 22)**

More specifically, the DHA has three analytical dimensions: contents, discursive strategies (and topoi) and means of realisation (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 91; Wodak et al. 1999: 30). These will be described in the following sections. The DHA was mainly selected as a guiding framework within CDA because it has been applied to the investigation of discursive constructions of national identity (see Wodak et al. 1999), and it has originally been created to analyse anti-Semitic stereotyping in Austria (Wodak and

Meyer 2009: 18). For this thesis and the research questions, it is essential to analyse the thematic content, the linguistic construction as well as wider socio-political context in order to arrive at an in-depth understanding of how discourse is employed to produce different forms of national belonging. The named contents and macro-strategies from Wodak et al. (1999: 30-35) offer guidance and relevant means for the study of the linguistic construction of national identity.

### *4.4.2. Contents*

The theory chapter discussed different definitions and ideas of what constitutes the nation. Ultimately, based on the modernist approach, it was argued that the nation and hence national identity is constructed in discourse. Furthermore, theoretical ideas about the narrative aspects of national identity were outlined (see Hall 1996: 613-615; Kolakowski, 1995; Wodak et al. 1999: 30-31). These aspects of national identity are also referred to as 'contents' as part of Wodak et al.'s (1999: 30) discourse historical approach. Contents aim to provide answers to 'what'-questions in the sense of *what* aspects of national identity can be identified or on *what* national identity is based. In order to respond to the first set of sub-questions of the first research question on which aspects the 'Self' and the 'Other' are based, the contents of national identity or what is constructed as national identity, needs to be identified.

Three of Wodak et al.'s (1999: 30-31) contents were found in the critical discourse analysis in this thesis. These were however slightly modified based on both qualitative and discursive content of the collected data: Firstly, the contents were adapted to the integration specific content of this research project and were linked with the findings and more specifically the three emerging categories ('cultural' and 'structural integration',

and ‘perceptions’) of the qualitative content analysis. Secondly, the contents were adapted based on the content of the discursive constructions identified in the data. As a result, the three contents identified and applied in this thesis were therefore the following:

- **The linguistic construction of a common culture**: Wodak et al.’s (1999: 30-31) third content comprises aspects of religion, language, habits and art. In this thesis, the discursive construction of a common culture was tied to the first empirical chapter on ‘cultural integration’ and entailed the aspects of religion, above all Islam, the German language, and German values including the idea of the ‘Leitkultur’, German laws, customs and traditions. This also included the construction of constitutional patriotism, which relates more to a civic ideal rather than to culture, but since constitutional patriotism was discussed with reference to German values, it was hence handled as part of ‘cultural integration’.

- **The linguistic construction of a common political present and future:** Wodak et al. (1999: 30-31) identify “citizenship, political achievements, current and future political problems, crises and dangers, future political objectives and political virtues” as part of a common political present and future. In this research project, this is mostly linked to the second empirical chapter of ‘structural integration”, which discusses the achievements, objectives and potential problems surrounding migrants and labour market integration.

- **The linguistic construction of the *homo Germanicus***: Wodak et al. (1999: 30-31) describe their first content with biographical aspects such as place of birth,

origin, ethnicity, supposed behavioural dispositions and national mentality. In this thesis, this identity content negotiated the national mentality and behavioural dispositions of 'Germans' towards diversity in society (whether people are xenophobic or open-minded) and was hence relevant for the third empirical chapter of 'perceptions'.

### *4.4.3. Strategies and Topoi*

#### *4.4.3.1. Strategies*

Strategies and topoi, on the other hand, show on a macro-analytical level *how* the contents are discursively constructed and *how* arguments are constructed and rationalised and thereby also assist in answering the second set of sub-questions of the first research question with regards to how the 'Self' and the 'Other' are discursively constructed and how they are represented. As a result, they answer 'how'-questions and in this context how national identity is discursively constructed and/or how particular constructions of identity are achieved and justified, thereby also providing evidence for content and certain interpretations.

A strategy generally implies a form of a plan that details action on how to achieve objectives (Wodak et al. 1999: 31). Yet, strategies can be employed automatically, and the conscious use of strategies is argued to be greater in political discourse of the elite rather than in day to day discussions (Wodak et al. 1999: 32). Furthermore, linguistic discursive constructions are not strategies in themselves but are the "realisations of strategies" (Wodak et al. 1999: 32).

Four main macro-strategies are distinguished as part of the Discourse Historical Approach (Wodak et al. 1999: 33; van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999: 92): Constructive

strategies, strategies of justification, strategies of transformation and destructive strategies. The former is used to promote "unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation" thereby seeking to *construct* a particular national identity, while the opposite of the destructive strategy attempts to *destruct* or dismantle a current (or parts of a) construct of a national identity (Wodak et al. 1999: 33). Strategies of justification intend to *justify* and to preserve a particular construct of national identity that aims to maintain the status quo that has come under threat (Wodak et al. 1999:33). Lastly, strategies of transformation seek to *transform* a construct or part of a construct of current national identity, but often lack the vision of a new idea of national identity (Wodak et al. 1999: 33). Macro-strategies predominantly relate to the construction of the 'Self' and assist in identifying and explaining the construction of the 'Self' yet based on the co-constitutive nature of national identity, also make assumptions about the 'Other'.

Wodak et al. (1999: 33) have further developed several sub-strategies, two of which may be particularly important for this research project. Strategies of assimilation attempt to construct homogeneity, whereas strategies of dissimilation aim to linguistically create heterogeneity. In the context of this research project, a strategy of assimilation (sub-strategy) may, for instance, hide inner-German divisions with the objective of constructing (macro) a particular homogenous Germany that may or may not be pitched against 'Others'. On the other hand, a strategy of dissimilation (sub-strategy) may be used with a transformative macro strategy and the purpose of creating the image of a new Germany that is more diverse as opposed to a previous more homogeneously one.


Macro as well as supporting strategies can be combined in different ways and are not limited to the given examples. In addition, they may not only be used with sole reference to the 'Self' but may equally be applied in the 'Self'/'Other' context. In summary, the

mentioned strategies serve as a tool for identifying *how* national identity is constructed, which not only provides evidence on the particular construction of national identity per se, but particularly taking the assimilation and dissimilation strategies into account, already gives an indication of whether constructions are inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others'.

#### *4.4.3.2. Topoi*

In comparison to strategies and purposefully planned actions, topoi comprise argumentation schemes or structures that are essential for argumentation (Wodak et al. 1999: 34), since they help to identify, categorise and to justify arguments (Boukala 2016: 251, 258). Van Eemeren et al. (1996: 5) define argumentation as "a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint". The topos then is described as the warrant marking the transition from an argument to the conclusion (Kienpointner 1997: 226). Wengeler (2003: 180) explains that the topos is the hypothetical rule that allows in combination with a non-controversial argument to become this arguable conclusion/claim. The triple step can be visualized as the following[17]:

*Figure 4.9: Hypothetical Rule*




[17] Translated from Wengeler (2003: 180).

As a result, topoi are "the formal or content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument with the conclusion" (Reisigl and Wodak 2009: 110).

For instance, Wengeler (2003: 180) provides the example that the argument is that 'the asylum law is abused by some'. If the inference rule then purports that 'when a law is abused, the legal basis should be changed', the inference rule serves as a justification for the arguable/disputed conclusion suggesting that 'the asylum law needs to be changed'. Together, the argumentation scheme can then be said to form the 'abuse topos'. The topos is hence an intermediary, linking argument and conclusion by means of a hypothetical rule.

While the relationship between the classical context of the Aristotelian topoi and its usage in CDA as well as the typology of topoi remains to some extent contested (see Boukala 2016: 250-159), it is argued that topoi are "not limited to unique classifications" and that ultimately the researcher has to label one's own topoi for the context of a specific analysis (Boukala 2016: 259). Wengeler (n.d.) explains that the number of arguments and conclusions is infinite, but that inference rules and hence topoi can be reconstructed depending on how abstract or context specific they are formulated. Wengeler (2003: 302-331) identifies 39 different topoi in his analysis of the German immigration discourse from the 1960s to 1980s. He (n.d.) argues that these topoi can be understood to keep the balance between abstractness and being context specific. The topoi are thought to be formulated for the specific immigration context yet allow for argumentation schemes of similar discourses to be integrated as well as for argumentation schemes to refer to past, present or future actions (Wengeler n.d.). Lastly, Wengeler (2003: 302-331) distinguishes three different types of topoi: the first group of topoi includes central content specific arguments; the second group of topoi is more abstract and used in support of topoi in the

first group; and the third group of topoi for which he did not find much support in his empirical analysis.

In this thesis, I will draw on Wengeler's topoi for analysis. Although these topoi were developed for the German immigration context, they are abstract enough or can be slightly modified in order to be applied to the German (migrant) integration context as well.[18] The following topoi were identified in the data of this thesis:

- History Topos
- Culture Topos
- Reality Topos
- Danger Topos
- Criminality Topos
- Image Topos
- Abuse Topos
- Xenophobia Topos
- Liability Topos
- Humanitarian Topos
- Legal Topos
- Economic Utility Topos
- Example Topos

Topoi are argued to be an essential component of the DHA providing "a systematic analysis of the discursive dichotomy between 'us' and 'them'" (Boukala 2016: 265). My aim is to identify topoi in order to showcase how particular content and constructions on

[18] For instance, Wengeler's criminality topos in the immigration context reads that 'because people commit criminal acts, measures should be taken for these crimes to be prevented or for the right to residence for those groups of people committing crimes to be made impossible'. In the integration context, the first part of the conclusion rests the same, since applying measures to prevent crimes essentially involves integration measures. The second part of the conclusion about a potential removal of foreign criminals can in the integration context be understood as 'because people commit criminal acts, these groups of people committing crimes need to be subjected to integration measures or do not belong to the German national community'.

German national identity are justified discursively. As such, I understand topoi to assist in responding to the second set of sub-questions of the first research question with regards to *how* the 'Self' and the 'Other' are discursively constructed and *how* they are represented in discourse. Moreover, I use topoi in order to gain insight into *why* the 'Self' and the 'Other' are constructed in particular ways and hence provide justifications for boundary drawings and their inclusion or exclusion, which is relevant for empirically answering the second research question.

### *4.4.4. Means of Realisation*

The tools through which content, arguments and strategies can linguistically be realised is among others by means of lexical choices, referential strategies, the deictic 'we', intertextuality and visual features. Means of realisation therefore involve a micro-level analysis of text that inform *how* both contents and strategies/topoi are discursively constructed. As a result, means of realisation are applied in this thesis for the purpose of further show-casing *how* national identity is constructed - for showing which constructions and characteristics of the 'Self' and the 'Other' there are and how they are linguistically realised – with the aim of answering the second set of sub-questions of the first research question. Moreover, linguistic realisations are used for highlighting how they ultimately construct and legitimise exclusion or inclusion of different groups in society and thereby assist in answering the empirical part of the second research question.

#### *4.4.4.1. Lexical Analysis*

Lexical analysis involves the most basic form of linguistic analysis by looking at single words and how they are used to highlight and to shadow particular meanings (Machin and Mayr 2012: 30). It is argued that the choice of a specific type of word signifies a

particular ‘lexical field’ that is foregrounding or suppressing specific features depending on the interests and preoccupations of the author or speaker (Machin and Mayr 2012: 30-31). Firstly, word connotations imply that the choice of word can evoke or stipulate meanings that go beyond the literal meaning of the word (Machin and Mayr 2012: 32). Secondly, overlexicalization occurs when a second almost synonymous word is used in a repetitive way for purposes of persuasion or other ideological aims (Machin and Mayr 2012: 37). In contrast, the absence of a particular word also referred to as suppression is used for purposes of simplification, omitting information or for changing the context (Machin and Mayr 2012: 38-39).

Fourthly, a combination of words can be employed as opposing concepts also called structural opposites (Machin and Mayr 2012: 39). Thereby the opposites do not have to be spelled out as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, but evaluations are automatically attached through the structuring of opposing concepts (Machin and Mayr 2012: 40). Fifthly, lexical choices can determine the genre of communication. The author employs specific words in order to indicate membership or sameness with the audience or to exercise influence by means of claiming power over the audience (Machin and Mayr 2012: 42). For instance, *Die Bild* employs informal language with colloquial expressions that indicates sameness with the audience. Lastly, abstractions or generalisations that are used as substitutes for facts are argued to be an indicator of ideological influence (Machin and Mayr 2012: 48).

#### *4.4.4.2. Referential Strategies*

Single persons or groups of people can be named and referred to in different ways – also known as referential strategies - depending on which aspects the speaker wants to highlight or conceal (Machin and Mayr 2012: 77). By doing so, values or ideas can be

attached to persons or groups without explicitly expressing them (Machin and Mayr 2012: 77). Hart (2010: 49) argues that referential strategies "can be used to exploit the human capacity for categorising coalitional groups in terms of a dichotomous in-group and out-group". As a result, referential choices used are particularly important in this research project with regards to determining membership and providing insights into 'Self' and 'Other' constructions.

Van Leeuwen (2008: 52) provides a grand actor network with regards to how actors can be portrayed. Firstly, there is the distinction between whether actors are included or excluded and as part of the latter, there are the two options of backgrounding and suppression (van Leeuwen 2008: 52). While backgrounding is a referential choice that names the actor, although at the end or elsewhere in the clause (context) rather than in conjunction with the action performed, suppression means that the actor is not named in the text at all (van Leeuwen 2008: 29-30).

In the case of the actor being represented and included with reference to the performed action, there are several options provided by van Leeuwen (2008) that have been summarized by Machin and Mayr (2012): Firstly, persons or groups can be named or can be impersonalised (personalisation vs. impersonalisation) by referring to them for instance as staff (Machin and Mayr 2012: 79). Impersonalisation is used to either conceal responsibility or to emphasise a particular statement by implying that it affects more people (Machin and Mayr 2012: 79-80). On the other hand, persons can be described as specific individuals versus "as part of a collectivity" (individualisation vs. collectivisation), or actors can also be referred to with regards to "who they are" (nomination) versus their function of "what they do" (functionalisation) (Machin and Mayr 2012: 80-81). Functionalisation can serve to dehumanise the actor or to insinuate

legitimacy (Machin and Mayr 2012: 81). Finally, persons or groups can be anonymised (anonymisation) or quantified (aggregation) (Machin and Mayr 2012: 82-84).

#### *4.4.4.3. Deictic 'we'*

A deictic word is vague in nature and implies that the interpretation of the word depends on the extralinguistic context of the word (Segal 1995: 10). For the purpose of investigating the first research question and the discursive/linguistic constructions of national identity, the deictic pronouns have been argued to be of central importance (de Cillia et. al. 1999: 163) because they "serve to codify certain feelings of identification and belonging to the same group" (Blas Arroyo 2000: 4). Particularly, the deictic 'we' "may fulfil a powerful persuasive function since they have the potential to encode group membership and identifications" (Zupnik 1994: 340). Also Volmert (1989: 123) explains that 'we' can be used with the attempt of uniting people from different social divisions into one community and that the linguistic construction of a community can serve the interests of the speaker/author. This furthermore can provide indications of inclusion and exclusion in group membership, which relates to the empirical rationale of the second research question.

#### *4.4.4.4. Intertextuality*

Intertextuality involves the incorporation of other texts, statements or voices into the primary text that is analysed (Fairclough 2003: 47; Bloor and Bloor 2007: 51-52). Intertextuality is argued to play "an important role in revealing speakers' and writers' strategies in reinforcing or re-formulating ideas and beliefs" (Bloor and Bloor 2007: 54). By referring to different sources, omitting sources, including or excluding voices, arguments can be supported, and events or persons can be represented in specific ways.

Denials, for instance, hint that what is being denied has been asserted elsewhere (Fairclough 2003: 47). In this case, intertextuality is not attributed, and no reference is made to another text or voice. Intertextuality can further be analysed in terms of whether other texts are directly cited or whether persons are quoted as opposed to indirect reporting (Fairclough 2003: 192). The directly or indirectly reported text can be framed in a specific way that can influence the interpretation of the text under analysis (Fairclough 2003: 53).

Moreover, voices or statements can be framed in a particular order that also helps the author to construct his or her argument (Fairclough 2003: 53; Bloor and Bloor 2007: 57). Lastly, the lexical choice for the reporting or quoting verb that introduces a voice enhance or alter interpretation (Machin and Mayr 2012: 57; Fairclough 2003: 53). Intertextuality can provide 'evidence' or justification for strategies and topoi as well as for referential strategies, and as such aid the discursive/linguistic construction of national identity.

#### *4.4.4.5. Visual Analysis*

Arguments, representations and messages are often not only communicated through words, but also involve images (Machin and Mayr 2012: 49). Kress and van Leeuven (1998: 186) argue that "[a]ll texts are multimodal" meaning that language communicates through various semiotic modes including images. Indeed, images have been argued to represent powerful means to convey messages by acting as "rhetorical devices in an effort to 'control' interpretations" (Kostoudis 2006: 235). When analysing an image, the following questions can be explored: Who or what is shown in the picture? (iconography); What values and ideas are attached to them? (attributes); what stands out or attracts specific attention? (salience) (Machin and Mayr 2012: 49-56).

Images are further used in conjunction with captions, which can be understood as a form of intertextuality. Image-caption relations can be anchoring, in which "the immediate context [is] expressed both verbally and visually" and can be expanding, which refers to captions going beyond the context of the image (Caple and Knox 2015: 300). Images can assist the discursive/linguistic construction of national identity in different ways: For instance, a text may not specifically name the type of migrant 'Other', but an accompanying image may display women wearing the headscarf.

## 4.5. Trustworthiness and Limitations

Since this thesis involves qualitative data, judging its quality by quantitative criteria such as validity is rather unsuited (see Thomas 2013: 134). Instead, Lincoln and Guba (1986: 18) provide a model for assessing qualitative research. This includes the criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 1986: 18). In order to improve trustworthiness, the literature outlines additional strategies of enhancing each of the four criteria developed by Lincoln and Guba, which are detailed in the graph below.

*Figure 4.10: Strategies for Improving Trustworthiness*

Provisions that may be Made by a Qualitative Researcher Wishing to Address Guba's Four Criteria for Trustworthiness

| *Quality criterion* | *Possible provision made by researcher* |
|---|---|
| Credibility | Adoption of appropriate, well recognised research methods |
| | Development of early familiarity with culture of participating organisations |
| | Random sampling of individuals serving as informants |
| | Triangulation via use of different methods, different types of informants and different sites |
| | Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants |
| | Iterative questioning in data collection dialogues |
| | Negative case analysis |
| | Debriefing sessions between researcher and superiors |
| | Peer scrutiny of project |
| | Use of "reflective commentary" |
| | Description of background, qualifications and experience of the researcher |
| | Member checks of data collected and interpretations/theories formed |
| | Thick description of phenomenon under scrutiny |
| | Examination of previous research to frame findings |
| Transferability | Provision of background data to establish context of study and detailed description of phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made |
| Dependability | Employment of "overlapping methods" |
| | In-depth methodological description to allow study to be repeated |
| Confirmability | Triangulation to reduce effect of investigator bias |
| | Admission of researcher's beliefs and assumptions |
| | Recognition of shortcomings in study's methods and their potential effects |
| | In-depth methodological description to allow integrity of research results to be scrutinised |
| | Use of diagrams to demonstrate "audit trail" |

**Source: Shenton (2004: 73)**

In the following, the different criteria on trustworthiness, the limitations encountered in the methodology and the research process as well as the measures and strategies undertaken to mediate these limitations will be discussed.

### *4.5.1. Credibility*

Credibility as the equivalent to internal validity in quantitative research can be seen as the most important criteria. It refers to the 'truth' in findings and looks at the congruence between the findings and reality (Lincoln and Guba 1986: 19; Shenton 2004: 64). In this thesis, credibility was improved by employing two different yet recognised research methods: qualitative content analysis and critical discourse analysis. Even though these

two methods were employed for two different purposes – comparing frequencies on integration categories and themes and for identifying constructions of the 'Self' and 'Other in (migrant) integration discourses – they not only assisted each other in managing such a large dataset, but also, for instance, confirmed Islam to be the dominant theme in 'cultural integration' and labour market to be the dominant theme in 'structural integration', and could hence also be understood as a triangulation of methods.

Furthermore, it can be argued that a theoretical triangulation was achieved in this thesis by juxtaposing and integrating multiple theories and a linguistic analysis in the analysis of the data. This is based on Wodak and Meyer (2009: 32), who point out that the DHA involves a theoretical triangulation by simultaneously drawing on different levels of context including the linguistic aspects, intertextual relationships, the extralinguistic context "explained by middle-range theories" as well as "the broader socio-political and historical contexts".

A limitation, on the other hand, can be seen with regards to the triangulation of sources. Since the data collection of the media articles led to a sample of 2175 articles, it was practically difficult to include further and moreover comparable data of other non-media related sources. As a result, the emphasis was on getting a well-represented sample from the news media by using a strategy of maximum variation with regards to sampling the newspapers, and a larger sample of articles for in-depth analysis. Therefore, the findings on national identity can arguably not provide conclusions for national identity constructions in Germany per se but provide a good picture of this phenomenon in the German news media, since a saturation of the findings was identified in the investigated articles. As has been outlined, the media furthermore is a powerful actor that not only engages in political discussions but also takes their different audiences into account.

Hence, it can be expected that these findings are also to some extent of relevance to Germany as a whole.

A further limitation can be seen in the lack of random sampling. However, a random sample was avoided because the aim was to have a representative number of articles across the entire time frame. At the same time, the criticism particularly of CDA, its small sample size and its iterative content-related sampling, also criticised as 'cherry picking', was acknowledged. Consequently, a systematic sample by date was chosen. While this may not be a random sample, the content of the articles can still not be influenced. The systematic sample further allowed for the opportunity of negative case analysis. While these may not have been actively sought, due to the large sample, articles countering the dominant discourse were identified and were described in the empirical chapters as part of 'criticism' or opposing identity constructions. Moreover, it needs to be noted that opposing articles simultaneously reinforce dominant constructions in discourse and thereby confirmed the research findings on identity constructions.

### *4.5.2. Transferability*

Transferability is concerned with the findings also being applicable to other contexts and therefore requires a 'thick' description of the findings and their context (Lincoln and Guba 1986: 19). In relation to transferability, context and frequencies of the data were provided by the qualitative content analysis. Moreover, the empirical chapters provide a thick description of the findings with many examples and direct quotations from the newspapers. This not only enhances transferability but also credibility.

### *4.5.3. Dependability*

On the other hand, dependability refers to the finding's consistency, which can be ensured by providing a detailed description of the methodology and operational processes so that the study can be repeated (Shenton 2004: 71; Lincoln and Guba 1986: 19). The collection of data has been described in this chapter in detail and this also increases both credibility and dependability. With regards to a reconstruction of this study, the same keyword searches can be used for *Die FAZ* and *Die Süddeutsche* for the collection of articles. Also the systematic sampling allows for the sampling to be repeated with the same results.

Limitations in relation to reliability can only be noted with regards to the data collection of *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel*, since this was conducted without a keyword search, which was because these two newspapers are not available electronically. Arguably, the data collected for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* is more complete, since complete editions were checked for relevancy, whereas in the case of *Die FAZ* and *Die Süddeutsche*, articles relevant to 'integration' may not necessarily have been picked up with the keyword search. Yet, a keyword search had to be applied for *Die FAZ* and *Die Süddeutsche* due to their large number of articles and the electronic archive.

On the one hand, the criterion-i sample and what has been described to constitute 'integration' can be applied to recreate the sample for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel*. On the other hand, in order to ensure consistency between all four newspapers, the collected data was compared, and keyword searches were amended in order to match the collected articles for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel*. Furthermore, the qualitative content analysis showed that overall trends in the data were similar for all newspapers involved and that difference in themes can rather be associated with the different focuses or layout of the

newspapers. As a result, there were no indications that relevant data was missed or that the collected data was not comparable.

### *4.5.4. Confirmability*

Lastly, confirmability is concerned with researcher neutrality and the potential of bias (Lincoln and Guba 1986: 19). Strategies for enhancing confirmability include apart from the already mentioned in-depth description of methodology and process and of triangulation, reflexivity in the form of the researcher's potential bias and the recognition of the study's limitations (Shenton 2004: 71; Lincoln and Guba 1986: 19). Researcher bias constitutes one of the main criticisms of CDA, with critics arguing that CDA researchers do not analyse the data sufficiently but rather interpret the findings based on their pre-existing beliefs and political stances (Machin and Mayr 2012: 213). For instance, Widdowson (1995: 159) claims that in CDA "interpretation in support of belief takes precedence over analysis in support of theory" (Widdowson 1995: 159).

Apart from the idea that no research is purely objective, CDA analysts openly acknowledge the political motives underlying their research and do not attempt to obscure their biases (van Leeuwen 2009: 279; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 259). CDA is carried out to highlight how particular groups are potentially oppressed by the discourse of the elite, and it shows the problems of the weaker groups in society (van Dijk 1987a: 18; Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 259; Wodak 2002: 10). Yet, at the same time, CDA adheres through systematic and rigorous analysis just as any other approach to the principles of academic objectivity required in scientific inquiries (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258-259). I have acknowledged bias in this sense, by highlighting the research aim of identifying hegemonic discourses and showing their potentially exclusionary impact

towards weaker groups in society with the purpose of making exclusionary and racist practices visible. At the same time, adhering to the principles of scientific inquiries, I have offered a detailed description of the methodology, and will provide a 'thick' description of the research findings in the following empirical chapters.

# CHAPTER 5

# THE CONSTRUCTION OF GERMAN *LEITKULTUR*

After setting out the methodology and the context of the data, this first empirical chapter will discuss the findings of the critical discourse analysis on sampled articles of 'cultural integration'. In the content analysis, 'cultural integration' was found to be one of the three main categories identified in the relevant newspapers. The category 'cultural integration' entailed aspects of culture such as language, religion, customs, norms etc. whether this was in relation to the host society or the culture of migrants/ethnic minorities. More specifically, identified themes of 'cultural integration' found in the data were: 'German language', 'German values', 'Islam', 'other culture', 'male circumcision', 'crime', 'xenophobia', and 'religion'.

The content analysis in appendix A.1 further explains these different themes and their occurrences over the time frame. Here it can be noted that articles on 'cultural integration' were more spread over the years and did not follow the u-shaped pattern with great peaks in 2010 and 2015, as it was the case for the other two categories. This suggests that 'cultural integration' was a more continuous issue pertaining to continuous events[19]. With regards to the themes identified as part of 'cultural integration', the theme 'Islam' was for all newspapers by far the most frequent one. This was followed by the themes 'German language' and 'German values'. Islam and hence Muslims were however not only

[19] See table A.1 in appendix A.1.

dominant quantitatively, but the CDA also showed that Islam and Muslims were by far the most relevant and indeed only 'Other' against which the 'Self' was constructed.

The aim of this chapter is to identify these 'Self' and 'Other' constructions with regards to culture, what these constructions entail and how they are linguistically/discursively realised as well as how these identity constructions are potentially exclusionary to newcomers or ethnic minorities in German society. It will be argued that German national culture was mainly constructed by negation and in opposition to Muslim culture. This reinforced the co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' constructions and showed that this Muslim 'Other' was required in order to construct the 'Self' in that particular way. In other words, while there were articles exercising criticism and contesting the dominant construction of the Muslim 'Other', the idea of the Muslim 'Other' was needed in order to uphold and maintain commonly agreed aspects of German culture to begin with.

As a result, negotiations about the 'Other', on the other hand, almost entirely revolved around Muslims. While 'Others' were named to be Turks, Arabs, refugees, Kurds, Lebanese etc., the uniting aspect was that they were all Muslims. These 'Others' were predominantly portrayed as different and in opposition to German culture. Arguments for difference included the lack of knowledge of German language, not abiding by the laws, having incompatible customs and traditions, and simply being of Muslim faith. I interpret this construction of Muslims in opposition to German culture and hence their discursive exclusion from the national 'Self' as representing cultural racism (see Taguieff 1990), since a cultural element – religion – is employed to homogenise Muslims as inferior 'Others' and to exclude them from the national community.

In the following, the different aspects and constructions of German identity will be described, but it needs to be noted that they are obviously interlinked in the 'Self/Other' prism that cannot as such be separated from one another. As part of the discussion, it will then be argued that the identified cultural constructions are mostly exclusionary of Muslims.

## 5.1. The 'Self' – Germans

The construction of the 'Self' in relation to 'cultural integration' was sometimes vague or it was not clear how these characteristics make German identity essentially German rather than European or 'Western'. Nevertheless, four interlinking contents of German identity could be identified in sampled articles. These included: 1) German laws and the constitution, entailing German values, which were often referred to as the German 'guiding culture' (*Leitkultur*); 2) further German values, norms, and traditions; 3) German language; and 4) the (Judeo)-Christian tradition.

These four overarching contents were created by means of different strategies and topoi. However, the linguistic feature of the deictic 'we' was employed across all contents and was used in its different forms in order to create the 'Self' and to separate it from the 'Other'. Examples of the deictic 'we' included "the basic principles of *our* legal system"[20] (*Spiegel*, issue 46, 2015, p. 22); "The German language binds *our* country together" (*FAZ*, 21.4.2015, p. 8); "Respect for *our* German language is respect for *our* culture and *our* country" (*Bild*, 10.9.2010, p. 1); "But *we* are not a Muslim country" (*Bild*, 4.10.2010, p.

[20] All quotations from newspaper articles are my own translations from German to English.

2) [own emphases]. In the following, the four characteristics of German cultural identity will be described and discussed.

### *5.1.1. As Constitutional Patriotism*

Firstly, German identity was by means of a constructive strategy argued to be based on the German constitution, and thereby on German laws and their embedded values. The constitution was thought to set out the "culture of coexistence" in Germany, which was characterised by "freedom and responsibility, by rights and duties" (*Bild*, 30.9.2015, p. 2). The German constitution as constituting German national identity was firstly justified with the history topos and the idea that the constitution and its values are a product of German history and hence cultural heritage that inherently determines the rules and duties of coexistence in present German society. For instance, *Die FAZ* saw the German constitution and its principles "not as a product of chance, but born out of the debris of our painful history" (12.11.2015, p. 10). Similarly, *Die Süddeutsche* published excerpts from the federal president's[21] speech on German unity arguing that what binds Germany together despite of all its differences, is "the memory of our common history" (4.10.2010, p. 6). This history was further thought to have led to the "values that have made our country strong" (*Süddeutsche*, 4.10.2010, p. 6).

German identity was furthermore argued to be based on the constitution because of the laws and values of the constitution themselves. These laws were positively represented and associated with past achievements and desired societal coexistence in the future. *Die Bild* described that "this most important German law has turned Germany into a peaceful

[21] Christian Wulff (CDU) was the federal president of Germany from 3 June 2010 to 7 February 2012.

and prosperous country, in which people feel comfortable" (*Bild*, 5.10.2015, p. 2). The law that was most frequently pointed out from the constitution was "the equality between men and women" under article 3 of the constitution (*Spiegel*, issue 46, 2015, p. 22; *Spiegel* issue 49, 2015, p. 30; *Bild*, 5.10.2015, p. 2; *Süddeutsche*, 18.12.2015, p. 36; *FAZ*, 1.10.2015, p. 1). *Die FAZ* moreover specifically pointed out that "the guiding culture also has a lot to do with rights for women" (1.10.2015, p. 1). Further laws that were also mentioned from the constitution were "tolerance", "freedom of opinion and religion" (*Spiegel*, issue 46, 2015, p. 22; *Bild*, 5.10.2015, p. 2; *FAZ*, 14.11.2015, p. 26), and the separation between religion and state (*Süddeutsche*, 18.12.2015, p. 36). *Der Spiegel* reminded its readers that "the discrimination of women, homosexuals and people with different beliefs, cannot be accepted as an expression of religious pluralism" (issue, 49, 2015, p. 30).

Due to the importance being placed on the constitution, this set of German laws was also often referred to as the 'guiding culture' (*Leitkultur*) of Germany. Former Vice-Chancellor Gabriel (SPD) was quoted saying that "the first 20 articles of our constitution are this guiding culture" (*Bild*, 30.9.2015, p. 2). *Die Bild* titled as the main headline "The constitution – Bild prints our guiding culture" and listed the first 19 articles of the constitution by discussing what they mean (5.10.2015, p. 2):

*Figure 5.1: Bild, 5.10.2015, p. 2*




Due to its importance, the German constitution was considered valuable and non-negotiable. For instance, *Die FAZ* titled "No compromises on our values" (12.11.2015, p. 10). In consequence, it was argued that migrants who come to Germany need to learn and live by "the rules of the game" (*Bild*, 30.9.2015, p. 2), while the minister of the interior[22] was reported to urge refugees to abide by the "German legal order and order of values" (*Bild*, 2.10.2015, p. 10). Furthermore, *Der Spiegel* pointed out that the Christian Democrats (CDU) argued that if immigrants do not comply with the German constitution that welfare benefits could be cut and their right to stay could be changed (issue, 49, 2015, p. 30). As a result, it was reported that different tools such as an "explanatory film" have

[22] From 17 December 2013 to 14 March 2018, the minister of the interior was Thomas de Maizière (CDU) for his second term in office.

been created to teach refugees about German laws (*Spiegel*, issue 46, 2015, p. 22). *Die Süddeutsche* reported on the initiative of having TV or radio programmes for refugees teaching them on what is "normal" in Germany such as "the equality between men and women" (2.11.2015, p. 27). *Die FAZ*, on the other hand, pointed to the constitutional classes for refugees in the state of Hesse (12.11.2015, p. 10).

The construction of the German constitution or 'guiding culture' to constitute German identity at first sight seems plausible since any national legislation reflects national cultural values and determines national (legal) practices. Nevertheless, employing the constitution as the basis of the 'Self' also raises three issues. Firstly, it is not clear how the mentioned laws are essentially *German* laws, since they could equally be French, Italian or Canadian etc. Secondly, the emphasis on gender equality as German identity is hypocritical considering that, for instance, in a European comparison, Germany has a 5% higher gender pay gap than the European average and ranks 3rd from the bottom (Eurostat 2019). Thirdly, and most importantly, as the example of the refugees demonstrated, the German 'Self' was constructed in dependence of a non-complying 'Other'. If there was no non-complying 'Other', then the mentioned aspects could not be used to construct the German 'Self'. This oppositional construction implies an exclusionary boundary drawing towards 'Others'.

Criticism by the newspapers in this regard was scarce. One example was published by *Der Spiegel*, which criticised that the idea of "the woman belongs at the stove and in the children's room", still has a lobby in Germany today and that this does not sit well with equality between men and women (issue 35, 2015, p. 120). Moreover, *Der Spiegel* lamented that the Christian Democrats did not approve same-sex gender marriage and that homosexuals were still treated as 'Others' (issue 35, 2015, p. 120). As a result, by

means of a transformative strategy, *Der Spiegel* argued that "Germany needs a new national concept" (issue 35, 2015, pp. 120-121) namely the "rainbow nation" that stands for "openness, tolerance, diversity, generosity", whereby "The Other becomes part of the Self" (issue 35, 2015, pp. 120-121). Yet, it was not clear how the concept of the rainbow nation is different from constitutional patriotism and the enshrined insurance of religious diversity. The idea of the rainbow nation however additionally addressed discrimination and the exclusion of non-white, non-ethnic German individuals and can hence be considered a counter-narrative to the dominant discourse.

### *5.1.2. German Values, Norms and Customs*

While there was widespread agreement amongst the newspapers that Germany is characterised by a commitment to the German constitution and its laws, the constitution on its own was however judged to not be enough for constituting *Germanness*. On the one hand, it was argued that the laws are not sufficient if their inherent values are not stressed more. *Die FAZ* questioned "Are the limits of our criminal law sufficient?" and answered that "these people [refugees] have to be won for our values" (12.11.2015, p. 10). Perhaps more clearly, *Die FAZ* criticised that "Already then, there were parallel societies in Germany, already then it was obvious that pure constitutional patriotism would not be sufficient for framing a diverse, "multicultural" society" (1.10.2015, p. 1). Also *Die Süddeutsche* claimed that "simply calling for the *respect* of the constitution, is too vague […] Immigrants also need to bring these basic values to life" [original emphasis] (5.10.2010, p. 4). With this, it was envisioned that immigrants need to take freedom of opinion more seriously even if this involves Mohamed-caricatures (*Süddeutsche*, 5.10.2010, p. 4).

On the other hand, it was argued that *Germanness* entails further values outside of the German constitution. *Die FAZ* thought of German values to include knowing about the school and health system, and knowing "what Christmas means, what the most important events in German history are" (1.10.2015, p. 1). *Der Spiegel* named, as proposed by the Christian Democrats, "Israel's right to exist" as a German value (issue, 49, 2015, p. 30). *Die Süddeutsche* identified 'keeping order' as a German value and by describing a refugee family, it argued that they have become 'more German', since every family member now owns a folder with their documents and these folders stand "in line" (15.10.2015, p. 3). Other mentioned aspects of German customs entailed recycling, painting Easter eggs and having chocolate Santa in shops at the end of August (*Die Süddeutsche*, 15.10.2015, p. 3), as well as "punctuality" and "discipline" (*Spiegel*, issue 35, 2015, p. 120).

Another example of the German 'Self' comprising further norms apart from the constitution was the reporting on a mayor issuing rules of politeness to refugees. Apart from aspects relating to the constitution, refugees were reminded that products can only be opened once they have been paid for, that the peace has to be kept after 10 pm at night and that young girls should not be harassed by being asked about their phone number and that they are not interested in getting married (*Bild*, 8.10.2015, p. 3). Moreover, it was argued that "Germany is a clean country and should also stay that way" (*Bild*, 8.10.2015, p. 3).

Although *Die Bild* questioned whether such rules or ideas about behaviour in Germany necessarily have to be communicated to refugees (8.10.2015, p. 3), it published a defence of the mayor the following day explaining that there have been instances of inappropriate behaviour by refugees that have led to tensions with citizens (9.10.2015a, p. 3). Also, *Die FAZ* discussed these rules of behaviour mentioning respect for property and the issue of

keeping toilets clean, and concluded that these rules help people live together (9.10.2015, p. 5). Similarly, *Der Spiegel* criticised that the named aspects of using a public toilet and bins "all smells strongly like animosity and prejudices", but acknowledged that "the difficulty with foreigners is that they are so foreign" and pointed out that even the left-leaning political spectrum discussed "how one can make the foreigners a bit more German" (issue 45, 2015, p. 12).

Overall, it can be said that the four newspapers agreed that German identity goes beyond constitutional patriotism. While the newspapers agreed on aspects like order, discipline, cleanliness and environmental awareness, the specific details and emphases varied among the newspapers. Moreover, while there was no clear agreement with regards to which values and norms exactly constitute German identity, it was only clear that 'Others' do not possess them and at best can learn them. Similar to the criticism of the previous section, it can be questioned whether, for example, cleanliness is indeed a uniquely German value and whether Germany indeed fares well in this regard in international comparison. Lastly, the construction of norms and customs shows again that a negative 'Other', someone who is not clean, who is not environmentally aware and who disrupts the order, was needed for this co-constitutive construction to work and that this essentially has an exclusionary impact for 'Others'.

### *5.1.3. German language*

Thirdly, German language was argued to constitute German identity. With a constructive strategy of assimilation, all four newspapers imagined Germans as a homogeneous entity due to the fact of all speaking German. This construction was mostly advanced by *Die FAZ* and *Die Bild*, although German as the language for Germany was not disputed by

*Der Spiegel* and *Die Süddeutsche* either. For instance, *Die FAZ* (22.9.2015, p. 11) differentiated Germany from other German-speaking countries arguing that

> Germany is most notably the country of the German language. Without this [the language] we have very little of what connects us, and at first also almost nothing that could connect us to immigrants. (*Die FAZ*, 22.9.2015, p. 11)

*Die FAZ* further explained that "The German language keeps our country together. Global networking and immigration make it more needful to use the German language in all areas of life" (21.4.2015, p. 8). Similarly, *Die Bild* wrote that "because in a country with people from innumerable nations, it does not work without a common basis. This above all consists of the German language and the constitution" (18.10.2010a, p. 2). *Die Süddeutsche* published excerpts from the federal president's speech on German unity in 2010 including that "It is a consensus that one has to learn German, when one lives here" (4.10.2010, p. 6), while *Der Spiegel* used the title "The German-maker" when describing a teacher of a German language class (issue 44, 2010, p. 69).

With the aim of further protecting and enforcing German language use, again mostly *Die Bild* and *Die FAZ* reported on the initiative of inscribing German language into Germany's constitution. *Die Bild* reinforced that "German language must be in the constitution!" and cited a politician from the SPD arguing that "We have to write down culture in the constitution and that includes German language" (18.11.2010, p. 2). Elsewhere, *Die Bild* cited CSU politician Dobrindt in relation to demanding German to be written in the constitution: "Respect for our German language is respect for our culture and our country" (10.9.2010, p. 1). Also, *Die FAZ* noted German language to be the "greatest and most important cultural asset" and ran the subtitle "German has to be in the constitution – that helps refugees" (22.9.2015, p. 11).

Moreover, due to German language being considered important for Germany's cultural identity, several articles were devoted to demanding the learning and speaking of German to be compulsory. This was, for example, achieved by means of referential strategies (the process of constructing group membership) that have the purpose of mobilising support for a specific goal or outcome which in this case was knowing and speaking German. For instance, *Die Bild* reported that "The great majority of Germans make a case for speaking German to be compulsory in schoolyards" (18.10.2010, p. 1). *Die FAZ* pointed out that the Federation of Turkish Entrepreneurs and Industrialists in Europe "asks for more governmental pressure on immigrants whose children do not learn German" (8.9.2010, p. 4).

This obligation to speak German was further reiterated with the keynote motion of the CSU in 2014, which sparked a debate about whether German should also be used in the private sphere. *Die FAZ* cited from the keynote motion that "who wants to live here permanently, should be asked to speak German in the public sphere and in the family" (8.12.2014, p. 1). While *Die FAZ* acknowledged the criticism that it should be the people's choice of what to speak in private, it published the CSU's defence that German at home was thought as an ""appeal" to learn German" in order to "motivate [migrants and ethnic minorities] to speak German in daily life" (9.12.2014, p. 1). On the other hand, *Die Süddeutsche*, titling "A cold welcome", saw the keynote motion by the CSU more critical (6.12.2014, p. 9). *Die Süddeutsche* described how language politics can be used for the "subjection of 'Others" and as a form of domination (9.12.2014, p. 4).

*Die Süddeutsche* was generally more critical with regards to obligation and expectations. It mentioned some reservations when discussing the issue of German in the constitution, by lending its voice to the opposition party, the SPD, arguing that the constitution with

its laws and values is sufficient as it is and that the government first has to provide sufficient language classes for newcomers (10.3.2011, p. 1). Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* argued that expecting migrants to learn German in one year unnecessarily increases the barriers for integration and that the problem rather is the decade-long neglect of integration policy and the lacking recognition of multiculturalism in Germany (12.11.2010, p. 34). In summary, it can be said that constructing German language as an obligation is exclusionary to migrants/ethnic minorities, while the approach of *Die Süddeutsche* is semi-inclusionary, since it promotes German language for practical purposes rather than as a means of belonging.

Nevertheless, the strong focus on German language as part of German national identity can be explained by three arguments. Firstly, Germany's historical background still influences constructions of its national identity. Germany was compared to France or England after a failed democratic revolution in 1848/49, founded in 1871 on values of blood, ethnic descent and the German language (Rash 2012: 44-46). Therefore, descent and language were the determining factors for bringing different territories and people together for the purpose of creating one country and one identity. This idea of German identity has served throughout the 20th century and can hence explain the continued importance of German language for German identity.

Secondly, in the previous two sections, it has been questioned how the German constitution and associated values and/or norms are indeed a unique indicator for *Germanness* rather than for Europeanness or 'Western culture' per se. In this context, the German language is much better suited to solely indicate *Germanness*. While German is also the language spoken in Austria and Switzerland, *Die FAZ* already proactively differentiated Germany from other German-speaking countries by arguing that "Germany

is most notably the country of the German language" (22.9.2015, p. 11). Thirdly, a reason for the importance of German language for the construction of German identity may also be due to its dual function of also constituting German identity with regards to 'structural integration'. Chapter 6 will show how migrants are expected to learn and speak German for the purpose of successful labour market integration.

### *5.1.4. Judeo-Christian Culture*

Lastly, German identity was by means of a constructive strategy argued to be based on the Judeo-Christian culture. Nevertheless, as with previous aspects of German identity, this national Judeo-Christian culture was constructed by means of negation/of dissimilation, meaning by means of what it is not. The identified 'Other' was argued to be Islam and this was justified with the history and the culture topos. Yet, it needs to be noted that these boundaries were not altogether clear, since different standpoints of the newspapers could be detected, including the argument of Islam belonging to Germany (reality topos). As a result, there was a discussion of how Germany is religiously defined and whether Islam can belong to Germany, which helped to reinforce the cultural and above all religious boundaries of German identity.

The discussion about the issue of whether Islam belongs to Germany originally started with Federal President Wulff's speech on German unity on 3 October 2010, in which he said that apart from Germany's Judeo-Christian tradition that Islam now also forms part of Germany. All three daily newspapers reported on the federal president's speech and the aspect of Islam belonging to Germany (*Bild*, 4.10.2010, p. 1, 2; *Süddeutsche*, 4.10.2010, p. 1, 6; *FAZ*, 4.10.2010, p. 8, 10). *Die Bild* published Wulff's statement that

Islam belongs to Germany on its title page. The statement was followed by an exclamation mark, which indicates or suggests the explosive nature of this message (4.10.2010, p. 1):

*Figure 5.2: Bild, 4.10.2010, title page*




*Die Süddeutsche* titled "Islam belongs to Germany" and published excerpts from Wulff's speech on its first page (4.10.2010, p. 1), while *Die FAZ* titled "Valuing diversity – encouraging societal cohesion" (4.10.2010, p. 8).

### *5.1.4.1. History Topos*

*Die Bild* and *Die Süddeutsche* argued for Islam not to belong to Germany firstly by drawing on the history topos and the idea that history does not confirm Islam to be influential in Germany. Both newspapers applied the history topos in this context by quoting several politicians from the Christian Democrats. For instance, *Die Bild* cited the leader of the parliamentary group of the CDU that "Islam is not part of our tradition and identity in Germany and hence does not belong to Germany" (20.4.2012, p. 2), and CSU politician Stoiber that "Islam is not of central existence for German culture and also does

not shape our intellectual history and tradition" (*Bild*, 21.9.2015, p. 2). Similarly, *Die Süddeutsche* quoted Minister of the Interior Friedrich (CSU)[23] that history does not prove Islam's belonging to Germany, and Chairman Kauder (CDU) that Islam has not historically shaped German society and hence does not belong to Germany (7.3.2011, p. 6).

#### *5.1.4.2. Culture Topos*

Moreover, the culture topos was used by all four newspapers in combination with a constructive strategy of dissimilation to argue that German values (gender equality, liberalism) discussed above belong to a Judeo-Christian Germany, whereas Islam incorporates other non-compatible cultural values. In a commentary in *Die Bild*, the idea of a Judeo-Christian-Islamic country was judged as "irritating" and by using the culture topos, it was argued that only the Christian-Judeo tradition provides the basis for values and society in Germany (4.10.2010, p. 2). *Die Bild* lent its position even more validity by means of having this construction corroborated by two Muslim interviewees who stated that "Muslim culture does not fit to Germany at all" and that "up to now Germans and Muslims often live alongside rather than with each other" (*Bild*, 5.10.2010a, p. 2).

Also *Die Süddeutsche* quoted a bishop in Hamburg confirming that Germany is characterised by the Christian culture (5.10.2010, p. 6). Moreover, *Die FAZ* argued that the 'guiding culture' of Germany incorporates Judeo-Christian cultural history but not the basic values of Islam (7.10.2010, p. 10) and hence quoted former Minister of the Interior Friedrich (CSU) that one cannot recognise Islam's belonging (15.1.2015, p. 3). In addition, in order to justify the cultural difference of Islam, *Die Bild*, *Die FAZ* and *Der*

[23] Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU) was minister of the interior from 3 March 2011 to 17 December 2013.

*Spiegel* reported on the rejection of Islam by the German population. *Die Bild* published a representative survey of people's opinion showing that 66% do not think that Islam belongs to Germany, while only 24% think that it does (6.10.2010, p. 2):

*Figure 5.3: Bild, 6.10.2010, p. 2*




*Die FAZ* confirmed this by drawing on a study by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation suggesting that 60% of Germans think that Muslims' practice of religion should be "significantly restricted" (16.10.2010, p. 1). Moreover, *Der Spiegel* confirmed that Islam's belonging to Germany "is rejected by 2/3rds of Germans" (issue 41, 2010, p. 146). As a result, *Die Bild* asked on its title page "How much Islam can Germany bear?" (5.10.2010, p. 1):

*Figure 5.4: Bild, 5.10.2010, title page*




The same question was also asked in *Die FAZ* (16.10.2010, p. 1). This statement reminds of the 'the boat is full'-metaphor and as such not only argues that Islam does not belong but that there is a danger of too many Muslims. Hence, this represents a powerful means of exclusion of Muslim 'Others'. Interestingly, in an attempt to reject criticism of racism and exclusion in this context, *Die Bild* had three Muslim interviewees praise the situation in Germany as open and tolerant (5.10.2010b, p. 2). *Die FAZ*, on the other hand, tried to negotiate this aspect by arguing that it depends on the kind of Islam and that there could be a version of Islam that is compatible with Germany (5.3.2011, p. 1).

Since the Judeo-Christian culture was deemed to comprise German identity, hence also belonging to German society was made dependent on having adopted this Judeo-Christian culture. As a result, *Die FAZ* argued for integration to be achieved by accepting the values of the "Judeo-Christian tradition" (*FAZ*, 24.12.2015, p. 7), and that "integration specifically means to integrate oneself into the guiding culture of our country" (7.10.2010, p. 10). Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* cited Minister of the Interior Friedrich (CSU) that

integration requires "a clear awareness for the Christian-occidental origin of our culture" and that this represents the 'guiding culture' "into which everyone has to integrate if they want to live in Germany" (7.3.2011, p. 6). Both examples can be understood as demands for assimilation. Yet it is not clear with this however, whether Muslims must 'only' be aware and accept the Judeo-Christian culture, and whether they must demonstrate this awareness or whether they are required to renounce their religion to be considered integrated/German.

#### *5.1.4.3. Reality Topos*

On the other hand, articles arguing in favour of Islam belonging to Germany drew on the reality topos, which entails the idea that reality shows Islam's presence in Germany. For instance, by means of a destructive strategy, *Der Spiegel* affirmed that Islam's belonging to Germany is "self-evident" because "Around four million Muslims live in Germany" (issue 4, 2015, p. 12). Also *Die Süddeutsche* mentioned the four million Muslims living in Germany and that hence Islam is part of Germany (10.5.2012, p. 4). *Die FAZ* confirmed Islam as a reality in Germany by arguing that one must only look onto German streets (5.3.2011, p. 1).

Yet, even though the presence of Muslims in Germany was acknowledged, an argument for a Judeo-Christian culture was still made by means of a strategy of justification. For example, *Die Süddeutsche* cited General Secretary of Bavaria Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) saying that "surely there are Muslims in Germany, but Islam does not form part of the German guiding culture" (7.3.2011, p. 6). *Die Süddeutsche* furthermore quoted Minister of the Interior Friedrich (CSU) arguing that while Islam represents a societal reality in Germany, that this is not a contradiction for "Germany and the German culture to be

religiously characterised above all by Christianity and to not also be characterised by it in the future" (5.3.2011, p. 5). *Die FAZ* added that the idea of Islam belonging to Germany is not helpful, since Muslims may belong to Germany as individuals, but not as a "religious collective, which requires concessions beyond the constitution" (14.11.2015, p. 26). This shows that despite acknowledging the presence of Muslims in Germany, that Islam was as part of an exclusionary relationship considered as not belonging.

#### *5.1.4.4. Criticism*

This construction of the Judeo-Christian culture of Germany and of Islam not belonging did however not remain uncontested. By means of a destructive strategy, it was argued that Islam indeed belongs to Germany (*Süddeutsche*, 5.3.2011, p. 5; *Süddeutsche*, 20.10.2010, p. 4; *Süddeutsche*, 27.6.2011, p. 4; *Die FAZ*, 15.1.2015, p. 3). One argumentation for Islam belonging to Germany was based on the republican and secular character, and the German constitution. This construction was mostly advanced by *Die Süddeutsche*. *Die Süddeutsche* defended that the 'guiding culture' in Germany refers to democracy, rule of law and basic rights, which entail respect and tolerance for other religions and ways of life (10.5.2012, p. 4). As a result, *Die Süddeutsche* argued that one must defend a "colourful Germany" (20.10.2010, p. 4), that the majority must accept a visible Islam (5.10.2010, p. 4) and that Germany needs to "understands itself as a free and plural democracy, in which different cultures and religions have their space" (29.9.2015, p. 4).

Also *Der Spiegel* agreed with this by arguing that "We Germans know from our own, painful past that intolerance, hatred, insularity and ideologies lead to perdition" (issue 41, 2010, p. 147). More directly, *Der Spiegel* subtitled "Islam belongs to Germany" and

discussed possible scenarios of the relationship between the state and religion that would allow Islam equality to Christianity (issue 4, 2015, p. 10). In addition, *Die FAZ* published a guest commentary by Christian Linder (leader of the FDP), in which he argued that "Christianity is not the German state religion" and that "pluralism is a win for liberty" (18.10.2010, p. 10). On the other hand, *Die FAZ* also drew on Christian values to criticise the exclusion of Islam from national identity. *Die FAZ* argued that the church does not know foreigners (14.10.2010, p. 10), and that the Christian faith can only be credible if it respects a minority position and does not impose religious belief as a societal requirement for belonging (18.4.2011, p. 28). As a result, apart from the dominant exclusionary construction of Germany as a Judeo-Christian country, there was also criticism to include Islam in the national 'Self'.

In summary, German identity was constructed based on four overarching characteristics. The German constitution and its embedded values were argued to be non-negotiable and to represent the 'guiding culture' for Germany. While all newspapers argued for German values to go beyond the constitution, they did not necessarily agree on which values and customs this comprises. Also the German language was maintained to be indispensable for German identity. Moreover, the Judeo-Christian culture was argued to represent German identity, although there were different standpoints within and between the newspapers with regards to whether Islam is or can be part of German culture as well. These four overarching characteristics of German identity were predominantly realised by means of a constructive strategy of assimilation for the German 'Self' and by a constructive strategy of dissimilation with regards to the Muslim 'Other'. Common references were made to Arabs, Turks, refugees, or migrants per se, but the common element among them was that they were all considered Muslims, and indeed Islam was

predominantly mentioned as the opposing aspect against which the 'Self' was constructed. Hence, in the following, the findings on this Muslim 'Other' from the articles on 'cultural integration' will be presented.

## 5.2. The 'Deviant Other' – 'Muslims'

Before presenting the findings of the CDA and the construction of 'Others' as 'Muslims' in discourses on 'cultural integration' however, two aspects need to be noted. Firstly, the construction of 'Others' as 'Muslims' was part of the analysis because integration discourses also involve individuals of ethnic minorities or third generation migrants that have no migration experience of their own. Secondly, Brubaker (2013: 2) points out that 'Muslim' can represent "both a category of analysis and a category of social, political and religious practice" and that we may risk adopting the latter as a category of our own analysis. In this way, by researching the characteristics of Muslims, scholars have contributed to the 'Othering' of Muslims and for them to be seen as different (Brubaker 2013: 5). Brubaker (2013: 5) suggests that categorising people as 'Muslim' "risks foregrounding religion […] as a frame" as well as seeing them as a homogeneous entity, whereby explanations may rather be socio-economic than cultural.

Indeed, it is important to note the diverse nature of Islam. Apart from the different ethnic backgrounds, geographical spread, and religious groupings within the 1.6 billion Muslims worldwide, there is also diversity with regards to self-proclaimed religiosity, views about their faith and religious practices (Pew Research Center 2012). In relation to Germany, the German government published a representative study of Muslims in Germany in 2008 that showed that among the up to 4.3 million Muslims in Germany, 49 nationalities or countries of origin were represented, and that 75% were Sunnis, 13% were Alevites and

7% were Shiites as well as of some smaller Islamic denominations such as the Ibadites and the group of the Ahmadiyya (Haug et al. 2008: 11-14). The study also showed that daily religious practices significantly varied between the region or country of origin and Islamic denomination with, for instance, Sunnis and Shiites praying much more frequently than Alevites (Haug et al. 2008: 147-148).

In this thesis, it is not the purpose or intent to overlook this diverse nature of Islam nor to employ 'Muslims' as an analytic category that risks foregrounding religion as the determining difference among people and to hence reinforce constructions of the Muslim 'Other'. Nevertheless, it is the aim to showcase the discursive constructions of the 'Self' and the 'Other' in the news media discourse and this indispensably requires keeping and displaying named categories of the media discourse including the Muslim 'Other'.

### *5.2.1. German Language and Integration Courses*

Firstly, since German language was identified to be one of the four criteria of whether one was considered German and/or integrated, the newspapers evaluated 'Others'' knowledge of German. While this in many cases confirmed predominantly Muslims to be seen as 'Others', the reporting on this aspect showed a mixed picture of a constructive strategy of dissimilation of the 'Other' not knowing German, but also a transformative strategy of the 'Other' making progress towards or actually knowing German well.

Examples of 'Others' not speaking German entailed *Die Süddeutsche* informing that "1.1. million people with a migrant background do not currently speak sufficient German" (9.9.2010, p. 1), and by quoting Sarrazin that Turkish mothers do not speak German (7.9.2010, p. 5), although in both cases it was not clear where this number came from. While *Die Bild* argued that too many Turks do not know German sufficiently "in order to

participate in German life" (18.10.2010b, p. 2), *Die FAZ* was more specific in reporting that "in 15 per cent of families" German is not predominantly spoken (21.4.2015, p. 8). *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, used the example topos by titling "Mrs K. does not learn German" (issue 39, 2013, p. 50) and "Safiye, 53, lives for 33 years in Germany, but hardly speaks a word of German" (issue 10, 2011, p. 31). With regards to integration and German language courses, *Die Bild* criticised that only 16% of Muslim migrants participate in integration courses and that "Only one third of Muslim participants finish it with the certificate in German" (5.10.2010b, p. 2),

Contrary to this, *Die Bild* talked about "two Turks, who speak German flawlessly", even though it was not clear whether they were migrants or were born in Germany (25.10.2011, p. 8). And *Die Süddeutsche* referred to pupils as speaking "fantastic German, also those not born here" (10.12.2010, p. 3). Furthermore, in 2012, *Die Süddeutsche* with the title "One speaks better German" argued that the integration courses show that migrants can speak better German and that only 7,9% did not receive a certificate (27.11.2012, p. 6). *Der Spiegel* also opined that the problem of 'integration deniers' is very small in the sense of only 3.8 % of foreseen participants not attending their courses (issue 42, 2010, p. 15), and argued that those taking a long time to finish have good reasons such as childcare (issue 44, 2010, p. 69).

As a result, while critics claimed that 'Others' simply do not learn German or deny doing so, supportive statements focused on explanations of why these 'Others' have difficulty in acquiring language skills. Hence, the 'Other' was at least theoretically judged as being able to acquire German language skills. Yet, the construction of 'Others' not speaking German implied that they are not integrated and above all not German, since they do not meet the criteria of German national identity, which led to their exclusion of from the

national ‘we’. However, also the construction of ‘Others’ speaking German ‘flawlessly’ represented ‘Others’ precisely as ‘Others’ by for example linguistically referring to them as ‘Turks’. The construction of the ‘Other’ as different and more precisely as Muslim will be more obvious in the following section on cultural values.

### *5.2.2. Other Cultural Values*

Muslims were represented to have a different culture and different values than Germans. The construction of Muslims as ‘Others’ was achieved by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation and the culture topos. The negative version of the culture topos implies that ‘Others’ are different because their culture is different and that they are hence non-desirable. In this context, Islam played a major role, as it was seen as the source of the different cultural values of gender inequality, female oppression and patriarchal structures, which characterised the Muslim ‘Other’ as predominantly negative, non-modern and backward. As a result of this different culture, Muslims were further seen as not integrated and above all as not German.

Firstly, gender inequality and patriarchal structures were constructed by, for instance, *Die Bild* criticising that Muslim women are not allowed to choose their husbands and that only female members of the family can bring shame (1.10.2014, p. 6). *Die Bild* further lamented “Pressure and violence in families”, that women should not be forced to submit to the regressive “honour or moral codes of their parents” (18.10.2010b, p. 2), and to be prohibited to go out and to wear skirts (22.7.2010, p. 2). *Die FAZ* questioned whether women are allowed by their husbands to participate in German classes (12.11.2015, p. 10), and by citing Islam critic Nekla Kelek criticised that daughters are hidden and guarded (31.8.2011, p. 29). *Der Spiegel* further criticised that many Muslim girls and

women are not allowed to do sports (issue 24, 2011, pp. 104-107), and that women generally suffer under traditional moral values that lead to "domestic violence, late-term abortion, and an increased danger of suicide" (issue 1, 2011, p. 34). This was seen as a confirmation of patriarchal structures that these 'migrants' brought with them or maintain in Germany.

Furthermore, the veil as an aspect of Islam played a prominent role in the construction of Muslims as 'Others' and as incompatible with German values. *Der Spiegel* informed its readers that many women wore headscarves at an event, which it judged as a sign that they "never arrived in this new world [in Germany]" (issue 10, 2011, p. 30). Below the headline "Allah is the best", *Der Spiegel* portrayed two Muslim wives of detained Salafists who wear full religious attire and who excuse and endorse violence and female oppression (issue 39, 2012, pp. 60-64). This served to illustrate how avowed Muslims proven by the religious attire have different cultural values; with the implication that the more women cover their body, the more radical and oppositional they are with their views.

*Figure 5.5: Spiegel, issue 39, 2012, p. 60*



**Konsumentinnen Reyhana, Saliha in Königswinter:** *In der Hölle ist das Trinkwasser eitrig*

With the sub-headline "7 cases that show how bad integration in Germany works", *Die Bild* criticised that at a doctor's appointment, women did not want to remove their headscarves for examination (8.9.2010, p. 2). *Die Bild* also reacted relieved clarifying that SPD politician Gabriel does not promote a news moderator with the veil (6.7.2013, p. 2). Furthermore, *Die Bild* ridiculed the religious attire by testing the Burkini after the court ruled that girls must participate in school swimming classes (13.9.2013, p. 2), and

judged the federal court ruling of teachers being allowed to wear the veil as a "Surprising ruling" (14.3.2015, p. 1).

On the other hand, *Die FAZ* evaluated a Muslim teacher, who does *not* wear the veil, as someone "who sets an example" and who fights for "modernity", integration and an "enlightened" society (1.9.2010, p. 33). Also, *Die Bild* saw women not wearing a headscarf or not predominantly covering themselves as a sign for successful integration (25.10.2011, p. 8; 11.10.2011, p. 3). By showing the winner of the 'Miss Turkuaz Germany' modelling competition, *Die Bild* claimed that successful integration means that Turkish women "are also allowed to be sexy" (11.10.2011, p. 3). Interestingly in both cases, *Die Bild* still referred to the women as 'Turks' rather than as Germans, (15.4.2011, p. 8; 11.10.2011, p. 3).

The argument of being different due to a different culture was moreover combined with the danger topos. *Die Bild* cited Sarrazin writing in his book that "The transition to violence and terrorism is in no other religion as fluent [as it is in Islam]" (26.8.2010, p. 9) and asked, "How do you want to protect Europe from Islamization, Ms Chancellor?" (9.9.2015, p. 2). Meanwhile, *Der Spiegel* reported about author Houellecbecq's vision of "an Islamic takeover in Europe" (issue 3, 2015, p. 26), and about Islam critic Ayaan Hirsi Ali who envisions Islam to become a totalitarian system against which the West should guard itself more confidently (issue 13, 2015, pp. 128-133). *Der Spiegel* further insinuated that Muslims are trying to change the daily life of people in Germany (issue 11, 2011, p. 153).

Moreover, *Der Spiegel* reported about extremist or Salafist organisations and sermons in Germany (issue 41, 2010, p. 17; issue 42, 2010, p. 56; issue 28, 2010, p. 57; issue 8, 2012,

pp. 48-50), and argued that it is not sufficient for moderate Muslims to distance themselves from Islamic extremists, since they created the "basis for ideologies such as the ISIS one" (issue 37, 2014, p. 110). Also *Die Bild* talked about Salafism and terror (30.9.2014, p. 5) and of "religious fundamentalism" (*Bild*, 7.10.2010, p. 3), while *Die FAZ* mentioned the minister of the interior's plan for security against Islamism (30.3.2011, p. 5). With Islam and Muslims being associated with danger and violence, the negativity of Islam was further achieved with lexical choices and by representing this "parallel world […] in which Islam determines thought" as one "full of brutality" (*Bild*, 22.7.2010, p. 2). *Die Bild* repeated the idea of some Muslims being "Particularly radical" and connected this with the argument that multiculturalism is not desirable or has failed (3.3.2012, p. 2). Both *Die Bild* (3.3.2012, p. 2) and *Die FAZ* (6.9.2010, p. 29) also explained authoritarian backgrounds of migrants to be the reason for the failure of integration, and that some religious ideas are simply not compatible with "our values" (*Bild*, 3.3.2012, p. 2).

In summary, Islam and Muslims were represented to belong to a culture of gender inequality, patriarchy and violence/danger. This culture was negatively connotated and generally seen as non-compatible and the opposite of German culture. Due to this non-belonging other culture, Muslims were hence also reinforced as non-belonging 'Others'. There was only little criticism in relation to this construction. For instance, *Der Spiegel* reported about a sewing project for women with the aim of learning German (issue 40, 2013, p. 54). It acknowledged that female migrants are sometimes isolated from society, but that the reasons for this are not female oppression but childcare (*Spiegel*, issue 40, 2013, p. 54).

### *5.2.3. Criminality*

The culture topos and more specifically the arguments of different gender roles, patriarchal family structures and extremist violence were not only used to construct 'Others' as non-integrated and non-German per se, but also for explaining criminal behaviour. The supposed criminal behaviour in turn however allowed Muslims to be represented as non-integrated and non-belonging again. Discursively this was achieved with the criminality topos, which argues that 'Others' are not belonging because they carry out criminal activities. Hence, the interlinking of culture and criminality reinforced each other in the construction of Muslims as 'Others' and together the two topoi functioned as a constructive strategy of dissimilation to explain 'forced marriages', 'honour crimes' and 'vigilante/parallel justice'. The argument was moreover often bolstered by the example topos that justified this particular representation by means of single examples. The most obvious examples in this context were published by *Der Spiegel*.

#### *5.2.3.1. Culture and Criminality topoi*

Examples of this 'other culture' leading to criminal behaviour included *Der Spiegel* describing how "the community became the central focus in the life of the Khans, everything revolved around the faith" and that as a result of the community's tradition, "the parents had feared to lose their honour due to Lareeb's [their daughter's] change of life" (issue 42, 2015, pp. 47-48). *Die Bild* described that the crime happened "apparently because of the family honour!" but explained that the daughter seemed to have been promised to a man in Lebanon, which is why the parents objected to her current relationship (14.7.2010, p. 8). *Die Süddeutsche* informed its readers that the ethnic group of the Yazidi do not allow relationships with persons of different faith and that the girl

was supposed to be married to a man from Turkey (2.5.2012, p. 10). Lastly, *Die FAZ* argued that the different culture entails clan-like family structures with "tribal relations", that "the cousin marrying his cousin is not an exception but the rule" or that "Islamic law demands to exercise revenge" (*FAZ*, 23.4.2014, p. 3).

The reporting of criminal behaviour then involved, for instance, *Der Spiegel* describing that a Yazidi murdered his wife and her female friend because of her emancipation, desire to leave him and to change her faith (issue 33, 2015, pp. 48-49). *Der Spiegel* further described how "the father kills" his daughter over her change in way of life (issue 42, 2015, p. 46). *Die Bild* reported that a "married couple allegedly held daughter Jomana (26) in captivity, hit her and even forced her to have an abortion" in order to restore the family honour (14.7.2010, p. 8), while *Die Süddeutsche* explained that "The ethnic Kurdish Arzu had to die because she loved a person of a different faith" (2.5.2012, p. 10).

*Die FAZ* furthermore reported that Kurdish family clans generally carry out "organised crime" including "drug trafficking, extortion, theft and robberies" or that the brother of a victim shot the perpetrator in the leg for revenge, while "girls are pressured and are often also hit" (23.4.2014, p. 3). *Die Süddeutsche* added to this that an arbitrator ("Friedensrichter") advised a family wrongly and ultimately the brother of the murderer was also killed (31.7.2010, p. 14), while *Die Bild* reported on "physical fights" between ethnic groups and the police (4.9.2013, p. 2). Lastly, *Die FAZ* informed its readers that "3443 cases of forced marriage were registered with counselling centres in Germany in 2008" (8.11.2011, p. 10; also see 11.7.2014, p. 1).

#### *5.2.3.2. Linguistic Means*

The 'Otherness' of Muslims and the constructive strategy of dissimilation were further achieved linguistically by referential strategies and by referring to 'Others' as different ethnic or religious groups but not as German: "Kurdish" (*Spiegel*, issue 30, 2010, p. 48; *Süddeutsche*, 2.5.2012, p. 10), "from Pakistan" (*Spiegel*, issue 42, 2015, p. 46), "Yazidi" (*Spiegel*, issue 33, 2015, p. 48; *Süddeutsche*, 2.5.2012, p. 10); "Lebanese" (*Bild*, 3.12.2010, p. 7; 14.7.2010, p. 8); "Mhallamiye-Kurds" (*FAZ*, 23.4.2014, p. 3); "Turkish criminals" (*Bild*, 4.9.2013, p. 2). *Die Süddeutsche*, on the other hand, summarised this to be "Everywhere, where Muslims are in the majority" when reporting on 'parallel justice' systems (31.7.2010, p. 14), while *Die FAZ* reporting on forced marriages noted that "83.4 percent of parents are Muslims, 9.5 percent belong to the specific Kurdish Yazidi group" (8.11.2011, p. 10).

Secondly, Muslims were linguistically constructed as 'Others' by referring again to 'failed' integration, to 'parallel worlds', 'parallel lives' or 'parallel justice' that run alongside but are separate from German society. *Der Spiegel* wrote "And it is a story of failed integration looking at the parents […] they never arrived here. They never adapted to this new world, they created their own one" (issue 42, 2015, p. 46). Furthermore, *Der Spiegel* referred to the conflict of the families with the two teenagers in love as a "textbook case for failed integration" (issue 30, 2010, p. 48). *Die FAZ* described that "Mhallamiye-Kurds in Germany are thought to be particularly difficult to integrate" (23.4.2014, p. 3). Although more than half possess German nationality, *Die FAZ* argued that "Yet the Mhallamiye stayed "where they were and transformed their ghettos into a parallel society"" (23.4.2014, p. 3).

With regards to 'parallel justice', *Die Süddeutsche* argued that "In the immigration quarters of German cities so-called arbitrators construct a parallel justice system, in which German law is not valid" and this was judged as "failed integration" (31.7.2010, p. 14). Also *Die FAZ* warned about "parallel justice as well as disadvantages for the integration of Muslims and the position of women" in the context of these arbitrators (7.2.2012, p. 4). *Der Spiegel* with the title "Allahs judges" further criticised "Islamic parallel justice" to be a danger for the constitutional state (issue 35, 2011, p. 57), and argued that the arbitrators protect people who do not want to integrate in Germany and their culture of patriarchal structures (issue, 25, 2012, p. 37). Lastly, *Die Bild* pointed out that this Islamic 'parallel justice' has nothing to do "with our laws" and that arbitrators do not have a legal qualification (19.3.2013, p. 5). The above examples were furthermore generalised. *Der Spiegel* noted this to be "The everyday of integration" (issue 30, 2010, p. 48), while *Die Süddeutsche* reported that a 'parallel justice' system "is being applied in *many* German cities" [own emphasis] (31.7.2010, p. 14).

Thirdly, the construction of Muslim 'Others' was enhanced by evoking outrage and disbelief in relation to their victims, who in turn were constructed as integrated or as German. Consequently, the victims were positively described as "able girls, good in school" (*Spiegel*, issue 42, 2015, p. 46), or as a "good, quiet girl" (*Spiegel*, issue 33, 2015, p. 49), and moreover as integrated and German at least until conflict arose. Two other daughters were pictured as "the story of a successful integration" (*Spiegel*, issue 42, 2015, p. 46).

#### *5.2.3.3. Criticism*

Criticism, on the other hand, was voiced by *Die Süddeutsche* that questioned the argument of refugees not understanding German law and equality between men and women (18.12.2015, p. 36). On the practical side, *Die Süddeutsche* criticised that there is no evidence of religiously motivated crimes in refugee accommodation centres (25.8.2014, p. 36). In addition, *Die Süddeutsche* reviewed the proposal of extending the minimum time for married partners to get a residence permit from 2 to 3 years of marriage in order to combat forced marriages, as not useful, and argued that this only forces women to stay with abusive husbands longer (28.10.2010, p. 8). Despite the criticism of *Die Süddeutsche*, it can be noted that the previously homogeneous construction of Muslim culture can be criticised for not only misrepresenting Islam, but also for ignoring diversity within Islam, between various Muslim ethnic minorities, and between individuals. Linguistic representations of these 'Others' moreover entailed mistakes, since, for instance, "Kurdish Yazidi" is a contradiction and one is either a Kurd or a Yazidi. In addition, the practice of using an arbitrator was condemned, although arbitrators are often used also by non-Muslims.

### *5.2.4. Integration Unwillingness*

Moreover, Muslim 'Others' were further argued to choose to be culturally different – backward, patriarchal, criminal, and violent. In this sense, they were thought of as not willing to integrate. For instance, in *Die Süddeutsche*, an Islam researcher criticised the Arab population in a quarter of Berlin "for lacking activity and willingness to integrate oneself" (31.7.2010, p. 14). In addition, *Die Süddeutsche* reported that a high-ranking CSU politician claimed that "We have one million integration deniers" ("Integrationsverweigerer") (15.10.2010, p. 6). Similarly, *Die FAZ* quoted the CDU

minister of the interior [24] that there is a "concentration of migrants with moderate willingness to integrate" (27.10.2010, p. 4), and wrote that there are migrants "that may work in Germany, but have no desire to integrate, and sometimes even trample on the basic values and laws of living together" (15.1.2015, p. 1). *Die FAZ* further argued that it seemingly depends on the culture of the migrants "if he is integration-willing or not" (11.10.2010, p. 12), and that particularly the migrants of Turkish origin have to face the question of why "they are threatened to become the losers of the German migration culture" (4.6.2014, p. 8).

In 2012, the *Die Bild* and *Die FAZ* reported the results of a study on Muslim integration in Germany. *Die Bild* titled "Study confirms - Every fifth Muslim in Germany does not want to integrate" (1.3.2012, p. 2). *Die Bild* further talked about "radical" "young Muslims" who are strictly religious and object to "the West" and its values and have a tendency towards violence (1.3.2012, p. 2). *Die FAZ* informed its readers that 22 percent of young Muslims prefer their culture of origin over integration and cited a CSU politician arguing that there is still "strong resistance of many Muslims to respect the liberal-democratic central order of Germany" (2.3.2012, p. 4).

On the other hand, *Der Spiegel* (issue 10, 2012, p. 18) and *Die Süddeutsche* (3.3.2012, p. 6) pointed out that the same study incorporated 700 pages and showed many positive developments. *Der Spiegel* criticised that the researchers of the study were shocked about the "complete distortion of the results" by the CSU (issue 10, 2012, p. 18). However, with the dominant discourse of Muslims not wanting to integrate, *Die Bild* made it clear that "we do not accept the import of authoritarian anti-democratic and religiously fanatic

[24] From 28 October 2009 to 3 March 2011, the minister of the interior was Thomas de Maizière (CDU) on his first term in office.

views" (1.3.2012, p. 2). In addition, *Die Süddeutsche* named the CDU bill as "stricter punishment for integration-unwilling people" (28.10.2010, p. 8), and that migrants rejecting German values must expect resistance (4.10.2010, p. 1).

Moreover, it was often agreed that as part of the integration process between the 'Self' and the 'Other' that 'Others' have to do considerably more for successful integration. While *Die Süddeutsche* acknowledged that Muslims cannot be generalised as unable to integrate, it nevertheless postulated that success depends on 'Others' by arguing that "who comes to Germany, will need to adapt clearly more to the local society than the established society to the immigrants" (5.10.2010, p. 4). Also *Die Bild* confirmed that "now it is up to you that you do not stay foreign in our country" (8.10.2015, p. 3). Moreover, in relation to forced marriages, *Die FAZ* argued that "Some traditional roots have to be cut, if one takes arriving in Germany seriously" (8.11.2011, p. 10). These examples demonstrate that considerably more emphasis was placed on migrants in the integration process and that they were expected to renounce their identity and culture of origin.

### *5.2.5. Criticism and Alternative Constructions*

There were a few articles that criticised the whole idea of Muslims as different and as 'Others'. Apart from *Die Süddeutsche* criticising that the circumstances of failed integration described for Neukölln in Berlin are not comparable and are not everywhere (24.9.2012, p. 7), other articles were mostly written in satirical language and partially by persons referred to as 'Others' themselves as a form of subversion strategy. *Der Spiegel* writing in the first person lamented the descriptions of "us migrants" as "lazy, greedy, hostile towards Germans and unwilling to integrate", as "less-gifted and being in love

with terror" (issue 41, 2010, pp. 146-147). Also in *Der Spiegel* a woman of Turkish background regretted being confronted with the prejudice of the majority society and explained how she told stories rejecting common stereotypes that would make her family "Modern Turks. Nice Turks. Almost Germans" (issue 45, 2013, pp. 74-75). Yet, she also concluded that one can only be a "show case migrant" – only almost German (*Spiegel*, issue 45, 2013, pp. 74-75).

Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* tried to highlight that integration has been successful by describing how "foreigners" have adopted questionable German habits such as smoking in front of people, drinking and contributing to nonsense during carnival (23.7.2011, p. 42) as well as by showing Turkish contributions to German society including Mesut Özil, unlimited parsley, doner kebab, hammam and barber shops (22.10.2011, pp. 8-9). *Die Süddeutsche* further urged not to view Muslims as not able to integrate due to their faith or culture (5.10.2010, p. 4). As a result, while there was criticism on the construction of Muslims as 'Others', this criticism mostly focused on the exclusion, prejudice and racism against Muslims and rejected the idea of failed integration but did not actively attempt to construct an alternative, positive representation of Islam and Muslims.

One identified alternative construction arguing for a different representation of Islam, was the reporting on the book publication by Mouhanad Khorchide. The Islam scholar and theologist argued in his book of the same title that "Islam is mercy" (*FAZ*, 13.10.2012, p. 10) and that, as *Der Spiegel* titled, "God is not a tyrant" (issue 41, 2013, p. 46). His effort for a modern interpretation of Islam as such did not completely reject the construction of Islam being interpreted as regressive, authoritarian and backward, and can hence not be seen as a destructive strategy of the dominant discourse. It can however be understood as a transformative strategy towards viewing and understanding Islam differently – peaceful,

merciful and compatible with human dignity, and hence with German values (see *Spiegel*, issue 41, 2013, p. 46).

## 5.3. Discussion

This chapter outlined and discussed German identity constructions – 'Self' and 'Other' constructions - in relation to discourses on 'cultural integration'. Four overarching characteristics of the German 'Self' were identified in the data. Firstly, German identity was constructed to be based on the German constitution and its values, which was also referred to as the German *Leitkultur*. Since the criteria of the constitution can also be interpreted to represent political membership, this discursive construction can be seen as a civic identity or more specifically as constitutional patriotism. In the theory chapter, it was outlined that belonging has previously been theorised along the civic/ethnic dualism, in which the former is thought to be inclusionary of outsiders such as migrants. In this chapter, however, the construction of German identity as constitutional patriotism in relation to the 'Muslim Other' was argued to be exclusionary.

This exclusionary construction was achieved by selecting specific values of the German constitution such as gender equality and by constructing the 'Other' as culturally different and opposite to that value (patriarchal hierarchy, gender inequality). In this sense, liberal values were employed for the purpose of exclusion. This finding supports the criticism described in the theory chapter that the 'civic turn' does not necessarily bring about more inclusion, and it confirms the pitfall of the civic/ethnic criteria for assessing belonging. Yet, the German constitution could have been used as constitutional patriotism to construct an inclusionary boundary drawing. For instance, freedom of religion could have been highlighted as an inherent German value with different religious practices including

Islam to belong. While the value of freedom of religion was mentioned, this value was not employed for incorporating Muslims into the national 'we' but was rather used to point out Muslims' intolerance towards other religions and hence their non-belonging.

Secondly, further German values and norms were named such as order, recycling and cleanliness. While all newspapers agreed that migrants or ethnic minorities had to adopt or internalise further values or norms that go beyond the constitution, they did not necessarily agree on what these values are. Thirdly, from a cultural angle, German language and the Judeo-Christian culture vis-à-vis Islam were argued to represent German identity, although the presence of Islam and hence its belonging was also acknowledged by the left-leaning newspapers. On the other hand, the Muslim 'Other' was predominantly constructed negatively by arguing to possess a different culture and different values that involve female oppression, crime and violence, and a lack of German language.

Drawing on Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) theoretical framework, the German 'Self' can be argued to be deterministic. This is based on the construction of the German constitution to be non-negotiable and by clearly stating that migrants will have to adhere by and adopt the values of the constitution if they want to have a future in Germany. Also, further German values were constructed as indispensable, while the German language was naturally and inherently seen as the language of Germany. Lastly, the Judeo-Christian culture was represented as historically enshrined in Germany and it was argued that this was not going to change. Hence, the German 'Self' can in all four criteria be seen as deterministic.

Also, the construction of the Muslim 'Other' can be seen as deterministic because Muslim culture was described as inherently characterised by gender inequality, patriarchy, different cultural values and violence. The deterministic nature of the Muslim 'Other' was on the one hand achieved by arguing for cultural roots needing to be cut for the purpose of 'arriving' in German society. On the other hand, the Muslim 'Other' was constructed as deterministic by representing the 'Other' as 'unwilling to integrate'. Milačić and Vuković (2018: 452) point out that theoretically culture should be seen as a static concept and should signify an inclusive concept in liberal democracies. Culture should be "a choice and not a destiny" and migrants should be able to adapt to it (Conversi 2004: 818). Yet, culture more often is constructed as an inflexible entity inherent to someone's presence (Milačić and Vuković 2018: 452), which is also the case in this context. Consequently, the deterministic 'Self' in combination with a deterministic 'Other' leads to an exclusionary relationship, which can hence be confirmed here.

With regards to Karner's (2011) framework, the boundary drawing between the German 'Self' and the Muslim 'Other' can be identified as the orientalising discourse because the two were constructed in opposition to each other. The German 'Self' was represented based on gender equality, tolerance, and other freedoms, as well as security and order, Christianity and Christian holidays, and the German language. Meanwhile, the Muslim 'Other' was characterised by gender inequality, patriarchy, intolerance and hostility, violence and crime, and a lack of German language. This not only confirms the exclusionary nature of the orientalising discourse, but also that a deterministic-deterministic relationship corresponds with an orientalising discourse. Furthermore, I classify this exclusionary construction of Muslims as the opposing 'Other' as racist discourse or as cultural racism (see Taguieff 1990), since Muslims are discursively

constructed as an inferior homogeneous entity based on the aspect of religion (also ignoring diversity within Islam) with the purpose of maintaining and legitimizing a hierarchical relationship leading to the exclusion of Muslims from the national 'we'.

Moreover, it needs to be noted that the orientalising discourse shows how German identity was constructed by negation – meaning by what it is not. All aspects of German identity needed a non-complying 'Other'. While this also confirms the mutually constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations, it is not clear whether the construction of the Muslim 'Other' was limited in its content based on the construction of the German 'Self' or whether the German 'Self' was conditioned by the prevailing construction of the Muslim 'Other'. Most likely, based on the internationally relevant negative construction of Islam as an 'Other'[25], it can be expected that the German 'Self' was selectively constructed (such as the choice of gender equality) in order to contrast it to the Muslim 'Other', although such a causal relationship cannot be proven with the present analysis in this thesis.

Arguably there was no alternative presented to the deterministic 'Self'. In relation to the German language, it can be said that *Die Süddeutsche* opposed some of the arguments by defending that migrants could take more time in learning German and that they could speak their native language in private. Yet, this did not deter from the idea that German is seen as the language of the country and that migrants eventually need to learn and speak it. Also with regards to the Judeo-Christian culture, while *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* argued that the presence of Islam and of Muslims is a reality in Germany, they did not go further with this argument to construct German identity as religiously diverse

[25] See *Orientalism* by Edward Said (1979).

and open for legal and social changes that would include Islam or indeed celebrate it as an enrichment. One article by *Der Spiegel* of the rainbow nation, a colourful, more open-minded and diverse Germany, could be argued to represent a voluntaristic construction. Yet, this article was apart from being singular not further connected to the discourse and no conclusion or changes in the representation of the Muslim 'Other' followed. Hence, in spite of the criticism of the left-leaning newspapers, voluntarist constructions of the collective 'Self' were rather absent.

On the other hand, while the Muslim 'Other' was predominantly constructed as deterministic, there were also some voluntaristic constructions. For example, some Muslims were represented as having made significant progress in learning and speaking German. Moreover, the Muslim 'Other' was to some extent thought of as being able to change culturally, if, as mentioned, the roots were cut. A deterministic 'Self' and a voluntaristic 'Other' were expected to be semi-exclusionary. This can be confirmed here to the extent that a significant burden is placed on the 'Other' to adapt or indeed to assimilate to the German 'Self'. Hence, this combination can indeed also be identified as the assimilationist discourse with regards to Karner's (2011) framework and hence confirm the expectations of both theories as well as their combination.

Generally, it can be concluded that the findings in this chapter empirically confirmed the construction of the Muslim 'Other' identified in previous research. It also confirmed the expectations of an exclusionary relationship in both theoretical frameworks as well as how these frameworks map onto each other. It furthermore showed the co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations and that it is important to consider both in related investigations. In practice, particularly the orientalist discourse is exclusionary of Muslims and their belonging. News media trying to counter this discursive construction

by representing the Muslim 'Other' as being able to assimilate, however does not necessarily support a more inclusionary construction of belonging, since this form of reporting only plays into dominant discourse constructions of the outlined criteria and hence reinforces the deterministic nature of the 'Self'. Arguably a more inclusionary discourse would have to deconstruct the orientalist discourse from both sides, the 'Self' and the 'Other', and build on new criteria and priorities.

# CHAPTER 6

# THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN *WIRTSCHAFTSNATION*

This chapter will present the findings of the critical discourse analysis on the constructions of national identity that was carried out on sampled articles of the category 'structural integration'. 'Structural integration' based on Heckmann's (2015: 72) conceptualisation, was understood as

> migrants and their descendants' aiming at the acquisition and the 'quality' of participation in the key institutions of the host society. Key institutions thereby are the education and training system, the economy and the labour market, the social security systems, the housing market as well as the political community, whose membership can be acquired through naturalisation. (Heckmann 2015: 72)

The content analysis in appendix A.2 shows that articles on 'structural integration' constituted a variety of different themes including 'education', 'German language', 'labour market', 'welfare benefits', 'poverty', 'ethnic segregation', 'crime', 'integration measures', 'finance', 'costs', 'citizenship' and 'political integration'. Of these, the dominant focus in both quantitative and qualitative terms was found to be labour market integration. More specifically, 'structural integration' was not only found to be the category comprising the largest number of articles overall, but the theme 'labour market' also entailed the largest number of articles within 'structural integration'. Following the CDA, it became clear that the news media outlets considered labour market integration to be the most important goal for the integration of newcomers.

Indeed, other themes were identified to be assisting the main aspect of labour market integration or were a consequence of the failed labour market integration. For instance,

the themes ‘education’ and ‘German language’ were discussed with relative importance considering that they were seen to be the conditions or determinants for successful labour market integration. ‘Integration measures’ was discussed in relation to advancing ‘education’ and the knowledge of ‘German language’, while the themes ‘finance’ and ‘costs’ reported on the financial issues of ‘education’ and ‘integration measures’ with the difference being whether the argument was made in favour of spending (‘finance’) or whether it was about communicating involved ‘costs’.

Further themes appeared to be the consequences of failed labour market integration. The newspapers discussed immigrants or ethnic minorities to receive ‘welfare benefits’, to live in ‘poverty’ and in separate areas (‘ethnic segregation’), or to become criminals (‘crime’). On the other hand, the themes ‘citizenship’ and ‘political integration’ also pertaining to ‘structural integration’ were discussed more separately, yet not completely independent from issues of education and labour market integration. The discussion on citizenship mainly revolved around the issue of dual citizenship, which was thought to be dependent on having received a German education. Also ‘political integration’ was argued to be dependent on educational and career-related aspects. Since the number of articles published on these two more separate themes was rather small, they will not be discussed as part of the findings of CDA.

The content analysis in appendix A.2 further shows that articles on ‘structural integration’ were despite the peaks in 2010 and 2015 published across all five years. Compared to the chapter on ‘cultural integration’, the CDA on ‘structural integration’ identified various constructions of ‘Others’. These different ‘Others’ were however associated with different years, although this was of course not clear cut. For instance, the Muslim ‘Other’ was predominantly referred to in the years 2010-2012 following the publication of

Sarrazin's book on the inability of Muslims to integrate in German society. 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' were constructed as 'Others' mostly in 2012 and 2013 because of increased immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe following the financial crisis and increased unemployment in these countries. Romanians and Bulgarians as 'poverty migrants' were subject to 'structural integration' in 2013 and 2014 because of the lifting of restrictions to freedom of movement for Romania and Bulgaria in January 2014. Lastly, the end of 2014 and the year of 2015 were characterised by the strong focus on refugees as 'Others'. As a result, the presentation of the findings will show different yearly emphases of published articles depending on which group of 'Others' is discussed.

Notably, and in contrast to the chapter on 'cultural integration', the discussion on 'structural integration' showed a more indirect relationship rather than direct connotations to national identity. In other words, 'structural integration' does not openly negotiate what it means to be German, but instead refers to *successful* or *failed* integration. One can indirectly imply that the state of successful integration is associated with becoming German, while failed integration is associated with remaining foreign. Nevertheless, the lack of clear discursive constructions and outlined conditions on what it means to be German, by judging the level of integration rather than of belonging per se, raises the question of whether one can be successfully (structurally) integrated but still remain an 'Other' and vice versa.

Another marked difference compared to 'cultural integration' was the focus on what in theoretical terms is the cost-benefit prism. In contrast to negotiations on whether someone is similar or different, as we could observe in aspects of 'cultural integration', the question for 'structural integration' more often revolved around whether someone is in economical or financial terms a useful or beneficial contributor to society or whether someone is a

financial burden or cost to society. This idea of someone being a cost or benefit will be elaborated at the end of this chapter. It however needs to be noted that ideas and discursive constructions of 'cultural' and 'structural integration' can of course also reinforce each other, since someone who is considered as structurally integrated may as well also have better chances of being considered 'German' culturally or vice versa.

In the following, first, constructions of 'the Self' will briefly be described and discussed. Then the second part will outline and demonstrate, how aspects of 'structural integration' were discussed with regards to 'Others' and how 'Others' were represented in relation to desired characteristics and goals of successful integration. The third and last part will elaborate on theoretical considerations and the implications these findings have for the inclusion or exclusion of migrants and ethnic minorities.

## 6.1. The 'Self' – The German leading economy

Articles on 'structural integration' compared to articles on 'cultural integration' show little reference to the 'Self' and strongly focus on the 'Other'. Nevertheless, as with the chapter on 'cultural integration', constructions of the 'Other' always imply constructions of the 'Self', and the entanglement of the two becomes visible again in this chapter. Based on Wodak et al.'s (1999: 30-31) framework, the content of national identity comprises the discursive construction of a common present and future, which entails the country's assumptions about national goals and threats. This discursive content was found in relation to 'structural integration', whereby Germany was primarily constructed as a "leading economy" (*Spiegel*, issue 9, 2013, p. 32; *FAZ*, 31.1.2012, p. 12), with the goal of remaining that leading economy. *Die Bild* further described Germany to have "pride in the diligence and efficiency of its citizens, in the continuously rising living standards

and the continuously expanding welfare state", while warning that losing the focus from these values due to already achieved successes, will endanger society (23.8.2010, p. 7).

An identified threat for securing continuous wealth and prosperity (*Spiegel*, issue 9, 2013, p. 32) and for maintaining Germany's economic power (*FAZ*, 31.1.2012, p. 12) was argued to be the demographic development of a decreasing German workforce (*FAZ*, 3.2.2014, p. 2). As a result, for labour market purposes, the national goal was denominated to be the immigration of "foreign skilled workers" (*Spiegel*, issue 32, 2013, p. 42). This national goal was constructed with the economic utility topos, entailing that migrants/ethnic minorities are desired based on their economic utility for Germany. For instance, it was pointed out that without foreign doctors, hospitals could already close (*Spiegel*, issue 2, 2015, pp. 52-53). Consequently, preferred characteristics of immigrants were argued to be "motivated, cultivated, well-educated, multi-lingual" with the willingness and ability to learn German (*Süddeutsche*, 17.11.2012, p. 13). Indeed, such immigrants were seen as the ones "that we really wish for" (*Süddeutsche*, 17.11.2012, p. 13), and as the ones required for successful integration (*FAZ*, 31.1.2012, p. 12).

As previously mentioned, national identity constructions in 'structural integration' did not often discuss whether someone was considered German but rather whether someone was successfully integrated. While *Die FAZ* emphasised that "The integration of foreigners in Germany above all succeeds through the labour market" (8.7.2010, p. 4), *Die Süddeutsche* noted that "the faster adults are absorbed into the labour market, the more successful integration will be" (23.9.2015a, p. 6). Therefore, it can be said that the overarching goal of supplying skilled migrants to the labour market set the parameter of whether integration was judged to be successful or not.

In order to find a job, it was argued that it is indispensable to know the German language. As a result, *Die Süddeutsche* maintained that "A requirement for successful integration is to learn the German language", since "knowledge of German language is essential for the integration into the labour market" (12.4.2014, p. 28, also see *Süddeutsche*, 17.11.2012, p. 13 and 24.10.2015, p. 34). Also *Die Bild* stated that "The path to integration is the language" (16.10.2010, p. 2), and that the language "is the key to professional success and societal recognition and hence to successful inclusion" (29.10.2011, p. 8). *Die FAZ* confirmed that "Language acquisition is the most important" (31.12.2013, p. 14), and continued that "The one who is to become integrated, also needs to have a secure income", thereby not only providing another reason for the importance of labour market integration but also pointing out the parameter of financial independency for determining successful or failed integration (8.11.2013, p. 4).

On the other hand, *Die Bild* constructed these national goals and ideals in the form of concrete examples and by already engaging in 'Other' constructions. For instance, *Die Bild* wrote:

> Here at Daimler, I can feel the atmosphere of successful integration. Employees of Turkish origin do not only produce cars, but also high spirits. They make German discipline even more attractive and nicer. (28.10.2011, p. 8)

Furthermore, below the headline "BILD shows 50 examples of successful integration" (19.10.2011, p. 3), *Die Bild* described various persons of Turkish heritage and how they made an effort at learning German, at advancing their education and at pursuing a successful career (19.10.2011, p. 3; 29.9.2011, p. 10). Similarly, *Die Süddeutsche* evaluated that an Eastern European woman "has finally arrived" in Germany, after having found her first employment (28.9.2015, p. 17). With the headline "Too well integrated",

*Die Süddeutsche* reported about refugees Modou and Oumar who both actively take German classes and have part-time jobs in order to finance their education and training (15.10.2015, p. 36).

The more complicated relationship between the judged level of integration and whether an 'Other' was considered German, was exemplified by *Die Bild*. For instance, referring to successful integration, *Die Bild* titled "At Daimler I met the most German Turk" (28.10.2011, p. 8). This shows that possessing particular characteristics such as having a job and working in a disciplined manner were not only considered as successfully integrated but also as having acquired a level of *Germanness* despite being called a 'Turk'. *Die Bild* further exemplified this with the following article titled "When Turks become Germans" (16.10.2010, p. 2):

*Figure 6.1: Bild, 16.10.2010, p. 2*



Wenn aus Türken Deutsche werden...

TOP

FLOP

Erol Kirilmaz (38) machte Abitur als einziger Ausländer seines Jahrgangs

Özcan Tasin (36) lebt seit 36 Jahren in Deutschland, bekommt Hartz IV

„Mein Vater stand bei Ford am Band"

„Ich hätte viel mehr Druck gebraucht"

Von C. MARTENS

**Erol Kirilmaz (38) ist bei der Siemens-Tochter Osram in München für Lateinamerika, den Mittleren Osten und Afrika zuständig. Verheiratet mit einer Deutschen, ein Sohn.**

„Meine Eltern kamen Ende der 60er aus Ostanatolien nach Köln. Mein Vater war Gastarbeiter bei Ford am Band. Als er 1977 verstarb, war ich 5, meine Schwester erst 40 Tage alt. Meine Mutter war am Boden zerstört und musste zur Kur.

Die Caritas brachte mich vorübergehend bei einer wohlhabenden deutschen Familie unter. Dort gefiel es mir – ich wollte auch gut Deutsch sprechen, gut leben! Schon in der Grundschule war klar: Wenn ich schon hier sitze, will ich auch was lernen! Erst habe ich mich gedrückt, dass meine Freunde in die Lehre gingen und ich keinen mehr zum Fußballspielen hatte. Dann büffelte ich fürs Abitur, schaffte es als einziger Ausländer meines Jahrgangs.

Die klammheimliche Bewunderung meiner Verwandten spornte mich weiter an – ich machte eine kombinierte Ausbildung aus Lehre und Studium zum Diplom-Betriebswirt bei Siemens.

Mit 22 erhielt ich eine feste Stelle im Vertrieb. Seitdem ging es bergauf. Mittlerweile bin ich für Lateinamerika, den Mittleren Osten und Afrika verantwortlich.

Wenn ich beruflich in der Türkei bin, halte ich gelegentlich Vorträge zur Integration. Ich finde es schade, dass so viele meiner Landsleute keine Lust auf Sprachkenntnisse und Bildung haben und zu wenig aus sich machen. **Ich hoffe, dass mein Werdegang viele junge Türken motiviert. Ich glaube: Der Weg in die Integration ist die Sprache."**

Von V. REICHARDT u. K. HENSE

**Özcan Tasin (36) kommt aus Kars/Südosttürkei, lebt mit Frau und Tochter in Berlin-Neukölln.** Er bekommt seit einem Jahr Hartz IV, hat einen 1-Euro-Job:

„Mein Vater kam 1979 nach Deutschland, fing 1980 bei Siemens in Berlin an und holte die Familie nach. Mutter ging putzen. Bei mir ist von Beginn an einiges schief gelaufen. Obwohl ich gut Deutsch konnte, haben die Deutschen mich nicht richtig anerkannt. Ich war dann nur mit Türken und Arabern unterwegs, war faul und schaffte den Hauptschulabschluss gerade so.

Ich hatte keine Lust auf Ausbildung, habe es nur für meine Eltern gemacht. Die Lehre zum Maler und Lackierer habe ich kurz vor Ende geschmissen. Ich hing mit türkischen Gangs rum, besprühte Wände und Züge, machte Lagerdiebstähle, baute Scheiße. Mein Glück ist, dass ich nicht richtig kriminell geworden bin. Zwar hatte ich viele Anzeigen bei der Polizei, aber es ist nie etwas passiert. Heute frage ich mich, warum nicht?

Ich hielt mich dann mit Aushilfsjobs über Wasser, war auch mal selbstständig. Deutschland hat mich immer irgendwie gewähren lassen. Hätte ich mehr Druck gekriegt, wer weiß. Viele Leute in meinem alten Freundeskreis sind langzeitarbeitslos, ohne Schulabschluss oder kriminell. Hätte der Staat früher reagiert, wären viele nicht gescheitert.

**Ich würde mir gründlich überlegen, ob ich mein Kind in Neukölln auf die Schule schicke. Wenn die Klassen fast nur aus Ausländern bestehen, wie soll da Integration gelingen?"**

In this article, *Die Bild* described two 'Turks' yet assigning one to be "TOP" and the other to be "FLOP" (16.10.2010, p. 2). While the Turk being referred to as "TOP" was said to have learned German and to have made an effort at school finishing "as the only foreigner in his year", the individual of the "FLOP" was characterised as unemployed and receiving welfare benefits for a year, due to not having finished his training and due to having committed crimes (*Bild*, 16.10.2010, p. 2). The 'TOP' example thereby reinforced the idea and criteria of successful integration, while the 'FLOP' example demonstrated failed

integration. Based on the headline "When Turks become Germans", both examples also negotiated *Germanness*, yet did not assign more *Germanness* to one or the other (*Bild*, 16.10.2010, p. 2). Instead, the article simultaneously continued to draw a boundary by linguistically referring to these individuals as "Turk" and as "foreigner" (*Bild*, 16.10.2010, p. 2). As a result, while the criteria and idea of whether someone is successfully integrated or not, was expressed quite clearly and represented a consensus among newspapers, it was not clear whether and when an 'Other' can be considered German. Instead, there appeared to be avoidance or at least some lack of clarity as to whether the level of 'structural integration' determines whether one is considered German.

In conclusion, the German 'Self' was by all four newspapers seen as a leading economy based on virtues of diligence and order. Yet, it was argued that a decreasing workforce poses a threat to this successful economy. Hence, immigration was seen as an opportunity to counteract the issue of a decreased workforce, yet emphasis was placed on the type of immigrant. Immigrants were expected to benefit the labour market (economic utility topos) and hence Germany as a whole. As has been mentioned, only few references regarding the 'Self' were identified in sampled articles on 'structural integration'. However, since 'Self' and 'Other' constructions are co-constitutive, the great emphasis on labour market integration of 'Others' also provided evidence of how important the issue of labour market integration and economic progress were for German national identity. In the following, in order to determine the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others', it will be discussed how migrants/ethnic minorities were represented in terms of 'structural integration', their belonging and potential *Germanness*.

## 6.2. ‘Others’ – Between Successful and Failed Labour Market Integration

Four groups of ‘Others’ could be identified in the sampled articles, while at times the discussion simply revolved around ‘migrants’ per se. The four groups of ‘Others’ will be described in the following and their representations in relation to education, knowledge of German language and labour market integration will be outlined.

### *6.2.1. The Muslim and Turkish ‘Other’*

The first group of ‘Others’ represented the guest workers and their descendants and with this particularly the Turkish ethnic minority, but also Arabs who came to Germany decades ago either as refugees or as migrants (e.g. Palestinian or Lebanese refugees) or generally individuals referred to as ‘Muslims’. Discursive boundaries were blurred and hence it was not always clear whether the term ‘Muslims’ referred to the Turkish community or to another community and in which instance. What distinguished this group however was that they were thought to have either lived in Germany for a relatively long time, to have been born in Germany and/or to possibly hold German citizenship.

The integration of the (Turkish) guest workers and their descendants was often seen as a “story of failure”, a case of failed integration (*FAZ*, 10.11.2012, p. 12). Indeed, *Der Spiegel* argued that many Turks “have still not arrived in the country” (issue 44, 2011, p. 38). *Die Bild*, on the other hand, while generally being critical of the integration of Muslims, ran a campaign in 2011 in light of the 50$^{th}$ anniversary of the guest worker treaty with Turkey arguing that “The influx of Turks is a German story of success” and that “Fellow Turkish citizens and of Turkish origin have contributed a great part to the German economic miracle, and also support the safeguarding of our prosperity today” (29.10.2011, p. 8). As a result, a mixture of positive and negative constructions of this

'Other' in relation to the outlined criteria of 'structural integration' and hence their economic utility could be identified.

#### *6.2.1.1. Education*

In its "Turkish Germany Tour", *Die Bild* pointed out examples of successful 'structural integration' (28.10.2011, p. 8). Former guest workers or second and third generations were constructed as having acquired good levels of education (*Bild*, 1.10.2011, p. 3; *Bild*, 22.10.2011, p. 3; *Bild*, 12.10.2011, p. 3; *Bild*, 24.10.2011, p. 3; *Bild*, 28.10.2011, p. 8). Also *Der Spiegel* reported about Selcuk (22) who completed school with excellent grades and who studies dentistry (issue 44, 2011, p. 44), while *Die Süddeutsche* talked about a cook who came to Berlin and studied business successfully (4.9.2010, p. V2/5). *Die FAZ* confirmed that subsequent generations have caught up in terms of (vocational) education with every second achieving a higher educational level than their parents (10.11.2012, p. 12).

*Die Bild* however understood educational success to be based on diligence (1.10.2011, p. 3) and hence saw the responsibility for success to rest with the 'Other'. In an article titled "A future due to education", *Die Bild* compared two adolescents of Turkish origin, and questioned why one has good school grades and why the other one has become criminal (17.2.2011, p. 8). The young woman with good school grades was said to diligently do her homework and with her statement helped *Die Bild's* argument and image topos by praising Germany and its education system that was said to make it easy for Turks (17.2.2011, p. 8):

*Figure 6.2: Bild, 17.2.2011, p. 8*


„Zukunft durch Bildung"

Warum hat diese Türkin* so gute Noten?

*Vor drei Jahren nach Deutschland gezogen

DIE GROSSE BILDUNGSUMFRAGE

SAGEN SIE UNS IHRE MEINUNG!

STIMMEN SIE AB:

DB BAHN

...und warum wurde dieser Deutsch-Türke* schon 2x straffällig

*In Deutschland geboren, türkische Eltern

The young male, on the other hand, was described as having bad grades and was consequently seen as a case of failed integration (*Bild*, 17.2.2011, p. 8). Even though he was born in Berlin, *Die Bild* remarked "But one hardly notices that on him" (17.2.2011, p. 8), thereby 'Othering' him due to his lack of academic achievement. Indeed, in relation to the previous comment of the Turkish girl, successful integration was seen as a matter of one's ability rather than of the German system.

On the other hand, the Muslim 'Other' and above all the second and third generation of ethnic Turks were constructed as less educated (*Spiegel*, issue 44, 2011, p. 38; *FAZ*, 10.11.2012, p. 12; *Bild*, 1.10.2014, p. 6), and particularly the problematic educational

situation of Turkish women was highlighted (*FAZ*, 10.11.2012, p. 12; *Spiegel*, issue 39, 2013, p. 52). *Der Spiegel* saw the reason for this lower level of education in the Islamic religion and more specifically in its family tradition, in which upbringing and education is the mother's task and which is more likely to bind women to the household and have them spent less time in full-time education (issue 18, 2011, p. 23).

In this argumentation, *Der Spiegel* neglected the fact that the issue of mothers raising their children is widespread and not dependent on Islam. Yet again, this also showed that the responsibility for education was placed on parents rather than on schools. Indeed, *Die FAZ* noticed that teachers often find that migrants from lower social classes think that education is the task of the state (16.9.2010, p. 6). One could argue that this indirectly confirms that the educational success of children in Germany still very much depends on the socio-economic standing of their parents, which has been criticised by the OECD (2018: 2). In addition, *Die FAZ* saw educational success based on the combination of genetics and the social environment (9.9.2010, p. 32). Also *Die Bild* identified lower levels of education to be the result of lacking willingness to learn and the lacking pressure of the government to force them to learn (16.10.2010, p. 2). Only *Die Süddeutsche* pointed out that German politicians should have provided more support for migrants and their families (4.9.2010, p. V2/5).

#### *6.2.1.2. German Language*

Secondly, in relation to German language, the representation of Muslims/Turks was mixed. Generally, it was highlighted that German language skills are important for social mobility and labour market integration and that the lack thereof may lead to unemployment, violence and criminality (*Bild*, 4.9.2010, p. 2; *Bild*, 14.9.2012, p. 11; *Spiegel*, issue 39, 2013, pp. 51-52; *Spiegel*, issue 41, 2011, p. 16; *FAZ*, 2.3.2011, p. 5).

On the one hand, *Die Bild* reported as part of its series on the guest worker jubilee that a number of persons with Turkish origin speak German well (28.10.2011, p. 8; 29.10.2011, p. 8; 22.10.2011, p. 3; 19.10.2011, p. 3). All of them and one in particular were due to speaking German, described as "a perfect example for successful integration" (*Bild*, 28.10.2011, p. 8). *Die FAZ* also reported that the German language skills of Turks have significantly increased from 43,6% in the first generation and 86,3% in the second generation to 98,9% in the third generation (10.11.2012, p. 12).

On the other hand, in spite of this tiny percentage of persons in the third generation of Turkish origin not speaking German, *Die Bild* insinuated there to be "these difficulties" with this migrant group with regards to their language skills (23.8.2010, p. 7). Indeed, Muslim 'Others' were by means of the example topos, constructed as not speaking German (*Bild*, 17.2.2011, p. 8; *Spiegel*, issue 14, 2012, p. 44; *Spiegel*, issue 39, 2013, p. 50). The reason for not being able to speak German was argued to be due to speaking mostly Turkish at home (*Bild*, 17.2.2011, p. 8; *Spiegel*, issue 39, 2013, p. 51) and due to not having enough German friends (*FAZ*, 1.9.2010, p. 33).

*Die FAZ* also lamented that 70% of 'marriage migrants' ("Heiratsmigranten") do not speak German (10.11.2012, p. 12), and that victims of forced marriages often do not have good knowledge of German (8.11.2011, p. 10). *Die FAZ* further claimed that demanding knowledge of German language impedes forced marriages (11.7.2014, p. 8), thereby suggesting that they would not have become victims if they knew German better. While general education of women may help, it is unclear how a specific level of German language would save women or girls who do not want to disappoint their parents or who may not have someone to turn to, from forced marriages. Hence, this suggestion by *Die FAZ* appears to only blame the victim.

#### *6.2.1.3. Labour Market Integration*

There was little discussion on labour market integration regarding this group of 'Others' and the focus was on the previously discussed aspects of education and German language. Again, a mixed picture of positive and negative representations of Muslims/Turks was painted. From its 'Turkish Germany Tour', *Die Bild* showed several examples of successful Turkish businessmen and women (1.10.2011, p. 3; 12.10.2011, p. 3; 24.10.2011, p. 3; 28.10.2011, p. 8; 22.10.2011, p. 3). *Die Bild* even described the otherwise criticised area Marxloh in Duisburg as one that has due to its wedding dress industry no problem with integration (25.10.2011, p. 8). *Die Süddeutsche* reported on someone who successfully founded his own restaurant (4.9.2010, p. V2/5), while *Die FAZ* acknowledged advancements of Turks in politics and in the media (31.10.2011, p. 7).

On the other hand, in relation to the area Neukölln in Berlin, *Die Bild* quoted former mayor of that area Buschkowsky saying that "We live here in a different culture. No one works, and if, then at best illicitly" (1.10.2014, p. 6). Particularly the Arab parents were said to have never regularly worked (*Bild*, 1.10.2014, p. 6). *Die FAZ* pointed out that Turks in the first and second generation are "the worst integrated into the labour market", and blamed the supposed lack of inter-ethnic contact and the lack of parental engagement in "local groups such as sports clubs or the voluntary fire department" for the difficulties in the transition from training to employment (31.10.2011, p. 7). While the construction of the responsibility for education resting with the family has already been pointed out, the latter argument by *Die FAZ* that transition into work is aided by inter-ethnic contact and social involvement can also be criticised. Surely networking is always useful, but in the end, one might argue that it should be about meritocracy and not nepotism.

In conclusion, the mixed and changing representations of this 'Other' particularly by *Die Bild* appeared curious at first. However, it seems that during the 'Sarrazin debate' in 2010, when Sarrazin's book outlining the biological theses on Muslims became a bestseller, the representation of this group of Muslim/Turkish 'Others' was rather negative. On the other hand, a year later during the celebrative event of commemorating the 50th anniversary of signing the guest worker treaty with Turkey, particularly *Die Bild* employed a positive construction of Turks in order to advance its image topos. As a result, it can be argued that the representation of this group depended on the current situation or relevant context, but that their level of inclusion or exclusion was either way determined by their economic utility.

Furthermore, the responsibility for meeting the criteria of economic utility and hence for successful integration was identified to rest with the Muslim/Turkish 'Other' and not with German society or government. Moreover, it needs to be pointed out that Muslims/Turks were in both representations – successful or failed integration – constructed as 'Others' by means of the referential strategy of being referred to as 'Turk', 'Muslim' or as 'Arab'. Descent or religion were thereby foregrounded, while geographies and socio-economic aspects as well as the construction of them as German were neglected.

### *6.2.2. Southern and Eastern Europeans as High-Skilled Migrants*

#### *6.2.2.1. Education*

The second group of 'Others' that was identified in articles on 'structural integration' were 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' who have migrated to Germany due to economic and financial problems in their home countries. Firstly, this 'Other' was positively represented and described to have high levels of education. *Der Spiegel* with the subtitle

"Highly qualified persons from Southern and Eastern Europe" reported that the newcomers are "academics", that they are well educated and speak several languages as well as that they are "better educated and more confident than previous migrant generations" (issue 9, 2013, pp. 31-32). Using examples, *Der Spiegel* named Thalia, a graphic designer from Athens (issue 16, 2012, p. 41). *Die Süddeutsche* confirmed that these migrants are "computer specialists, fashion designers or nurses" and that hence "they are very different from their grandfathers who once came to Germany as 'guest workers'" (17.11.2012, p. 13).

#### *6.2.2.2. German Language*

Secondly, this group was thought to know that German language is necessary and that they either learn or have learned to speak German. *Die Süddeutsche* pointed out that most companies require some level of German and that many speak foreign languages such as English (17.11.2012, p. 13). Yet, educated 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' were argued "to try to learn German quickly" (*Spiegel*, issue 9, 2013, p. 34). They were described to register with classes at the Goethe institute back in their home country or right when they arrive (*Süddeutsche*, 17.11.2012, p. 13). One person was said to have classes at the adult education centre every evening and another to have six hours of class every Saturday (*Spiegel*, issue 9, 2013, pp. 34-35).

*Die Bild* furthermore used the example topos for showing that one had already learned German as a child; the other had taken German classes in Madrid, and another had studied German for two years in Vienna (14.4.2012, p. 2). Moreover, Southern Europeans were argued to know that language skills are needed for work and daily life and that speaking the German language is necessary in order to find a job (*Spiegel*, issue 16, 2012, p. 41).

Furthermore, according to *Die Süddeutsche* "they also know as educated young people that German is a language that is culturally interesting […] not only useful for practical daily life, but also as a cultural profit" (17.11.2012, p. 13). The idea of German as a cultural gain thereby assists to positively construct the German 'Self' as interesting and of cultural value.

#### *6.2.2.3. Labour Market Integration*

Thirdly, this 'Other' was hence constructed to have integrated well into the labour market. *Die Süddeutsche* reported that Romanians make up the largest nationality among migrated doctors (16.3.2013, p. 6). *Der Spiegel* noted that the "new guest workers do not stand at the assembly line, but in the university lab. [They] become senior physicians, develop products" (issue 9, 2013, p. 31). *Die Bild* legitimised its argument of successful labour market integration of 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' by means of the example topos: "Christos Kotanidis (33) from Greece has worked since 2011 as a civil engineer at Siemens", "Laura Liarte (27) from Spain is working since January in Eschborn for the IT provider GFT" (*Bild*, 14.4.2012, p. 2). *Die Bild* further assisted the positive construction of the German 'Self' by quoting a Southern European saying "Here [in Germany], I have always wanted to work" (14.4.2012, p. 2).

This group of 'Southern and Eastern European Others' was by means of the economic utility topos and due to meeting the criteria of education, language and labour market integration positively represented and welcomed. As *Der Spiegel* put it, they "do not threaten prosperity in Germany, but preserve it" (issue 9, 2013, p. 32). Moreover, it can be noted from the discussion that they were thought to have achieved their education and their language skills elsewhere or on their own, but not via the support of the German

government. *Die Süddeutsche* furthermore highlighted the provisional acceptance of these 'Others' dependent on their continuous economic utility by saying that

> "we need qualified migrants, we should be very happy about these migrants […] Since they are highly motivated, they should be a great profit to our country, as long as it works to make their different professional skills, their energy, their creativity useful for the economic cycle of our country". (17.11.2012, p. 13)

The construction of these migrants as workers benefitting the economy indeed shows remarkable similarity and continuity to the idea and discourses on guest workers. As a result, while 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' may have been welcomed, their inclusion in the German national community was constructed as conditional upon benefitting the German economy. By meeting the criteria of successful 'structural integration', consequently, a constructive strategy of assimilation was employed towards 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' implying *Germanness*. *Der Spiegel* argued that "Carolina López cannot be distinguished from other young people from Berlin" (issue 9, 2013, p. 31).

### *6.2.3. Romanians and Bulgarians as 'Poverty Migrants' or Roma*

The third group of 'Others' that was identified in the newspaper articles were Romanians and Bulgarians. Compared to the educated 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' who indeed also were Romanians or Bulgarians, this group was thought to be poor and to have minimal education. They also comprised Roma and were hence referred to as 'poverty migrants'. Since German official statistics capture nationality and not ethnicity (*FAZ*, 15.2.2013, p. 1), it was unknown how many of the Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants were indeed Roma. Consequently, discursive constructions were again often blurred talking about 'Romanians and Bulgarians', about 'poverty migrants' or about 'Roma' and

often mixing these terms within in the same article. In the analysis, it was therefore not always clear whether statements were indeed about Roma or not.

With increased immigration from these two countries (*FAZ*, 15.2.2013, p. 1), Romanians and Bulgarians were seen as a problem (*FAZ*, 24.12.2012, p. 3) or as a threat (*FAZ*, 31.12.2013, p. 14). This is because Romanians and Bulgarians were by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation represented as 'poverty migrants'. *Die Bild* argued that with the EU enlargement of Romania and Bulgaria the "poorhouses of Europe" came into the EU (29.9.2014, p. 9), while *Die Süddeutsche* pointed out that there is "great poverty migration" from there to big German cities (31.12.2013, p. 5). *Die FAZ* noted that "It is the poorest of the poor" who come with "the hope for a better life" (14.10.2014, p. 3). Only EU Social Commissioner László Andor was quoted to view the new migrants as prosperity for Germany due to reducing labour force shortages (*FAZ*, 31.12.2013, p. 14).

#### *6.2.3.1. Education*

Firstly, these 'poverty migrants' were by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation represented as non-educated. *Der Spiegel* argued that many Romanian and Bulgarian children are not literate, are not developed sufficiently for their age and have few or no experience of schooling (issue 19, 2012, p. 37; issue 21, 2011, p. 44). Although *Die Süddeutsche* quoted a labour market institute saying that the education structure of immigrants from Romania and Bulgaria shows that Sinti and Roma do not represent the majority of the immigrants (4.1.2014, p. 21), more articles indeed explicitly focused on the Roma.

To begin with, Roma were described as illiterate, as not being able to read or write, and as not having completed school (*Spiegel*, issue 29, p. 44; *FAZ*, 14.10.2014, p. 3; *Bild*, 6.3.2013, p. 2; *Bild*, 5.3.2013, p. 6). *Die FAZ* argued that "Every second Roma in Germany does not finish school" (22.2.2013, p. 1), while *Die Bild* noted that "According to EU statistics, only 42% of Roma children finish primary school" (6.3.2013, p. 2). The latter thereby did not make it clear whether this is for the EU or Germany, which would have quite different implications. It was however agreed that getting parents to send their children to school was already a challenge (*Spiegel*, issue 29, 2013, p. 44; *FAZ*, 14.10.2014, p. 3; *FAZ*, 22.2.2013, p. 1; *Bild*, 5.3.2013, p. 6).

*Der Spiegel* further noted that "many do not send their children to school, but to the next intersection to clean windscreens" (issue 16, 2011, p. 34). By means of the example topos, *Die Bild* talked about a German Roma family arguing that education has never played a role and that women should be at home and cook and clean (5.3.2013, p. 6). The woman described however, still received education and was represented to have managed to get out of the "misery" (*Bild*, 5.3.2013, p. 6). *Die Bild* appeared to suggest that it was the Roma child's responsibility to break the cycle, yet it also remained unclear from the article how exactly the quoted woman did that. In addition, Roma were represented to have a general lack of knowledge. *Der Spiegel* noted that "It is frightening, how little knowledge the people who come to us have" (issue 29, 2013, p. 45), while *Die FAZ* maintained that "Many of the newcomers do not even know what the toothbrush is used for" (14.10.2014, p. 3). Therefore, it can be said that Romanians and Bulgarians and particularly Roma were negatively constructed as backward.

#### *6.2.3.2. German Language*

Secondly, Romanians and Bulgarians in the form of 'poverty migrants' or Roma were generally represented as not knowing or speaking the German language (*Süddeutsche*, 14.10.2011, p. 6; *Spiegel*, issue 21, 2011, p. 44; *Spiegel*, issue 16, 2011, p. 34; *Spiegel*, issue 48, 2014, p. 78), while working in construction (*Spiegel*, issue 21, 2011, p. 45) or while at school (*FAZ*, 22.2.2013, p. 1; *Spiegel*, issue 21, 2011, p. 45; *FAZ*, 8.11.2013, p. 4; *FAZ*, 14.10.2014, p. 3). *Der Spiegel* implied that one 'poverty migrant' did not want to learn German and did not want to have anything to do with Germany (issue 16, 2011, p. 37). On the one hand, *Die Süddeutsche* lamented that "bathing" Roma children in the language around German native speakers in Berlin does not work anymore due to areas with high-level immigration (16.3.2013, p. 6). On the other hand, *Die Süddeutsche* provided an example of a Romanian speaking German explaining that she went to a German school in Romania and hence concluded that "one hardly recognises her as a Romanian with her almost accent free German" (16.3.2013, p. 6). Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* defended Romanians and Bulgarians arguing that it is normal not to focus on German language when being busy with one's survival of getting by (14.10.2011, p. 6).

This once again showed that learning German was mostly seen as the responsibility of the newcomers and preferably before they even arrive in Germany. When Romanian and Bulgarian children arrived in Germany not knowing German, instead of looking at schools for the responsibility of teaching and learning German, the problem identified was that many migrants live in the same area and have it hence harder to learn German. Indeed, it needs to be questioned here what the purpose of the school then really is and whether schools cannot adapt to also teach German to speakers of other languages.

Moreover, the findings on Romanians and Bulgarians and German language further illustrate that knowing German implies successful integration and belonging.

#### *6.2.3.3. Labour Market Integration*

Thirdly, Romanians and Bulgarians were due to "lacking knowledge of the language and inadequate school and vocational education" said to also lack "opportunity on the labour market" (*FAZ*, 31.12.2013, p. 14; also see *FAZ*, 15.2.2013, p. 1; *Spiegel*, issue 29, 2013, p. 44; *Spiegel*, issue 6, 2013, p. 17). Newspapers therefore used the example topos to illustrate this. *Der Spiegel* noted in relation to a Roma village that "Most recently, most were unemployed" (issue 14, 2012, p. 42). Yet, *Die Bild* had to acknowledge that "According to statistics 80% of migrants from Bulgaria and Romania found a regular job (since 2007)" (6.3.2013, p. 2), and also *Der Spiegel* had to admit that "most migrants from Bulgaria and Romania find their way well on the German labour market" (issue 32, 2013, p. 43). Indeed, a smaller part of poorer migrants from Eastern Europe were thought to encounter these problems (*Spiegel*, issue 32, 2013, p. 43).

For this smaller group of 'poverty migrants', poverty was further described by type and conditions of employment and by the conditions of the accommodation. In this regard, 'poverty migrants' were seen as victims. Firstly, they were argued to be brought to Germany by smugglers or "non-serious agents" and to later be economically exploited or to end up homeless (*Spiegel*, issue 9, 2013, p. 33; *Spiegel*, issue 21, 2011, p. 44; *FAZ*, 15.2.2013, p. 1). They would be hired as day labourers (*FAZ*, 14.10.2014, p. 3; *SÜD*, 14.10.2011, p. 6; *Spiegel*, issue 16, 2011, pp. 34, 36), "for three Euros per hour" (*Spiegel*, issue 19, 2012, p. 36; *Spiegel*, issue 21, 2011, p. 44), and without health and national insurance (*SÜD*, 14.10.2011, 4; p. 6; *Spiegel*, issue 19, 2012, p. 36; *SÜD*, 24.8.2015a, p.

5). It was argued that they work as garbage collectors or prostitutes (*SÜD*, 14.10.2011, 4).

*Der Spiegel* explained that 'these migrants' "live without tenancy agreements in circumstances not worthy of human dignity (issue 19, 2012, p. 36), while *Die Süddeutsche* argued that they live in small rooms and "under partially inhuman conditions" (4.1.2014, p. 21). *Die FAZ* talked about overcrowded dormitories or buildings, which are rented for much more than they are worth (8.11.2013, p. 4; 24.12.2012, p. 3; 31.12.2013, p. 14). Poverty of Romanians and Bulgarians was however also seen as a form of competition for poor German people. *Der Spiegel* described how shelters are overcrowded due to Eastern Europeans and that there is a competitive fight for spaces "at the margin of society" (issue 9, 2013, p. 36). Also *Die Süddeutsche* argued that only "ten per cent of the homeless in winter emergency shelters have a German passport", and that others mainly come from Eastern Europe and Africa (16.3.2013, p. 6).

While these Romanian and Bulgarian 'Others' were represented as victims, there was not much discussion about the exploiters. One can argue that indirectly the suggestion was made that if poor migrants from Romania and Bulgaria were not migrating to Germany, then this problem of exploitation would not exist. Moreover, in relation to the exploiters, *Der Spiegel* mentioned that "Germans pay more decently, here do not live so many Turks" thereby implying that it is Turkish employers who exploit Romanians and Bulgarians (issue 16, 2011, p. 37). However, *Die Süddeutsche* quoting the EU Social Commissioner criticised that the problem with 'poverty migrants' is based on missing minimum wages and exploitative work contracts (14.1.2014, p. 4).

In order to further emphasise the dissimilation of the described 'Others', *Der Spiegel* argued that "worlds collide, since Bulgarians and Romanians flood to Germany" and that it was obvious "How deep the divide between new migrants and native population often still is" (issue 19, 2012, pp. 36-37). The strategy of dissimilation was moreover achieved by linguistic means of realisation and in this case mostly lexical choices. *Der Spiegel* described Romanian and Bulgarian migrants as "impoverished EU migrants", "penurious EU citizens" as part of a "poverty migration" into a "poverty camp" and "precarious circumstances" (issue 19, 2012, pp. 36-37). Other frequent lexical choices included "poverty refugees" (*Bild*, 6.3.2013, p. 2; *FAZ*, 14.10.2014, p. 3), "poverty migrants" (*FAZ*, 22.6.2013, p. 4; *FAZ*, 15.2.2013, p. 1) and "poverty migration" (*Spiegel*, issue 14, 2012, p. 42; *FAZ*, 22.6.2013, p. 4; *FAZ*, 10.1.2014, p. 13).

In conclusion, 'poverty migrants' were predominantly represented as poor, as lacking education, skills and career. As a result, they were constructed as not well integrated and as excluded from the national 'we'. The discussion not only reinforced the structural criteria of language, education and employment for successful integration, but also confirmed the idea that 'Others' are supposed to obtain and achieve the structural criteria on their own. Indeed, migrants were desired to be a profit and economic utility to the German economy, and barriers such as poverty requiring support and training were hence seen as a burden to the German community.

### *6.2.4. Refugees*

#### *6.2.4.1. Education*

The last group of 'Others' that was identified in the newspaper articles were more recently arrived refugees[26]. With regards to their level of education, the newspapers painted a mixed pictured. On the one hand, both refugee children and adults were represented positively. *Die FAZ* titled "Refugees are particularly diligent pupils" (15.12.2015, p. 17) and described them as highly motivated and that in one school, refugee children were already doing well (15.12.2015, p. 17). *Der Spiegel* pointed out that refugee children view education as a luxury and hence appreciate it (issue 52, 2014, p. 46), while *Die Süddeutsche* further reported that 87% of refugee children received a school education (8.1.2015, p. 19).

Also, in relation to adults, refugees were considered as motivated and willing to learn (*Spiegel*, issue 52, 2014, p. 46; *Süddeutsche* 8.1.2015, p. 19; *FAZ*, 13.8.2015, p. 4). Particularly Syrians were seen as educated (*FAZ*, 24.8.2015, p. 4), with 60% having achieved university entrance qualification and only 3% being without a school education (*FAZ*, 10.10.2015, p. 11). *Die Süddeutsche* talked about a refugee who gained a school leaving certificate and is now training to become an electrician (1.9.2015a, p. 18), while *Der Spiegel* captioned an image of a Syrian woman as "educated, cultivated, longing for promotion" (issue 36, 2015, p. 25), and explained that also the middle and upper class of society is fleeing to us from countries like Syria (issue 36, 2015, p. 26):

[26] The newspapers commonly referred to refugees independent of their legal status and whether they are officially recognised as a refugee or not. Since the actual status of the persons referred to could not be determined, the language and terms used in the articles was adopted in the analysis.

*Figure 6.3: Spiegel, issue 36, 2015, p. 25*



FOTO: MARTIN STORZ / DER SPIEGEL

**Syrerin Darwish:** Gebildet, kultiviert, aufstiegshungrig

On the other hand, the newspapers also constructed refugees as non-educated or as lacking education. Refugee children were said to not have received appropriate levels of education for their age or any education at all and hence show educational deficits (*Spiegel*, issue 52, 2014, p. 45; *FAZ*, 15.12.2015, p. 17; *Bild*, 8.12.2015, p. 2; *Süddeutsche*, 10.6.2014, p. 15). Reports noted that children simply ran away from school (*Spiegel*, issue 52, 2014, p. 45), that children are traumatised (*FAZ*, 11.4.2012, p. 6), or that they cannot concentrate on school and learning because they are afraid of being deported (*Süddeutsche*, 10.6.2014, p. 15). *Die FAZ* further mentioned that children of Yazidi and Iraqi background have been brought up with little education, as their parents are illiterate and are generally described as backward (11.4.2012, p. 6).

Also adult refugees were described with limited qualifications (*Süddeutsche*, 9.12.2015, p. 1), and 50 to 60 per cent were thought not to have any vocational qualification (*Spiegel*,

issue 35, 2015, p. 63). Yet again, it needs to be kept in mind that most countries of origin of refugees do not have vocational and dual education schemes. Hence, refugees as such cannot have the same vocational qualifications that the newspapers refer to. However, *Der Spiegel* also argued that "It is not only the brightest minds that are coming to us […] whether they are doctors or illiterates" (issue 36, 2015, p. 21). Lastly, in relation to asylum seekers from the Balkan, *Die FAZ* questioned that one does not know "what they want here", and advised that they should "learn the language and a profession and to come back [to Germany] with that" (24.8.2015, p. 4).

In the context of refugees, newspapers were more critical with the German system. Schools were argued to not be prepared for refugees (*Süddeutsche*, 7.12.2015, p. 1), requiring additional teachers and psychologists (*Spiegel*, issue 52, 2014, p. 46). *Die Süddeutsche* further concluded that without language and social competence

> every advancement in the knowledge society is obstructed. Who does not want that his children one day will have to feed an army of insufficiently educated immigrants, already has to care based on his self-interest that children of all cultures will be integrated more successfully into the German school and value system than so far. (26.9.2015, p. 25)

This quotation however shows that the concern was not about educating refugee children with the purpose and entitlement to education but was motivated by the idea of refugee children being a future threat or burden to the German welfare state or economy. Moreover, neglected in the discussion surrounding the German education system was the fact that educational success still heavily depends on the level of education of the parents rather than on the schools.

A final aspect discussed by newspapers in this regard was how refugees could get into higher education. *Die FAZ* reported that "greater economic hopes" are placed into "the young people, who bring a university entrance qualification with them" (24.10.2015, p. 20). The universities were also evaluated as opening-up to refugees but not without barriers (*FAZ*, 10.10.2015, p. 11; *Süddeutsche*, 17.8.2015, p. 14). On the other hand, barriers for refugees' access to university education were identified: Refugees were argued to require quite a high level of German in order to enter a German university (*FAZ*, 24.10.2015, p. 20). In addition, refugees often could not bring their qualifications with them or their qualifications were not equally recognised (*Süddeutsche*, 17.8.2015, p. 14; *FAZ*, 24.10.2015, p. 20).

#### *6.2.4.2. German Language*

Secondly, refugees were generally represented as not knowing or speaking the German language. However, compared to the Romanian and Bulgarian 'Other' and the Muslim/Turkish 'Other', they were as recent arrivals not expected to already know German prior to their arrival, nor to have learned it without classes living in asylum seeker accommodation centres. Hence, the discussion focused on organisational matters for refugees to learn German. For instance, *Der Spiegel* criticised that there are no specific classes for 20.000 refugee children without knowledge of German language in Bavaria (issue 52, 2014, p. 44). *Die Süddeutsche*, on the other hand, focused on the shortages of teachers of German as a foreign language and argued that low recognition and payment for these teachers is a problem (3.12.2015, p. 27). Refugee children, who have already had the chance to learn German, were however positively constructed. For instance, *Die FAZ* reported about an Iraqi girl who arrived with her family without any knowledge of German and who frequently studied whole nights and by now speaks German fluently

(6.7.2011, p. N6). Another refugee who had been taken in by a German family was said to have learned German in six months (*Süddeutsche*, 1.9.2015a, p. 18).

Furthermore, instead of criticising refugees' ability to speak German, appeals for learning German were made: *Die Bild* titled "Learn German fast!" (14.10.2015, p. 3). Also *Die FAZ* confirmed that learning German is the most important goal (15.12.2015, p. 17), since, as *Der Spiegel* pointed out, German is the greatest barrier on the labour market (issue 35, 2015, p. 61), and as *Die Süddeutsche* noted, German is also a barrier for refugees to get a place to study (17.8.2015, p. 14). As a result, it was argued that German language courses should be greatly offered (*FAZ*, 2.9.2015, p. 15).

#### *6.2.4.3. Labour Market Integration*

Thirdly, with regards to labour market integration, the need for skilled labour as well as the existing labour gap were reiterated. *Der Spiegel* wrote in this regard: "We and the Others: The German population is declining; skilled labour becomes scarce. A faster integration of refugees into the labour market could provide a remedy" (issue 35, 2015, p. 59). This was followed by *Der Spiegel's* argument: "We only survive with immigration" and that refugees "would be useful as manpower" (issue 36, 2015, p. 27). *Die FAZ* explained that "Skilled workers are wanted – refugees are coming" yet that "This is not a contradiction, but a challenge" (24.6.2015, p. 15). With the demographic change and the lack of skilled labour, *Die FAZ* argued that it is correct to display a "welcoming culture" to refugees (24.6.2015, p. 15).

Also *Die Süddeutsche* proclaimed that "the refugees of today are the families and skilled labour of tomorrow" (8.1.2015, p. 19), which apart from recognising them as 'families' has very similar connotations to the idea of the guest workers. Indeed, *Die Süddeutsche*

further explained that "In the best case, this can become the basis for the next German economic miracle – just as the millions of guest workers in the 50s and 60s significantly contributed to the upswing of the Federal Republic" (24.9.2015, p. 17). As a result, "Allowed to come are those who help the country" (*Süddeutsche*, 24.9.2015, p. 17). Similarly, *Die Bild* stated that "Work willing refugees from Syria are welcome on our end" (8.12.2014, p. 1). Nevertheless, *Die Süddeutsche* also criticised that it is not "about immigration policy, but humanity" and that these people are "persons seeking help and are not (yet) manpower" (20.11.2015, p. 17).

Refugees were represented both positively and negatively in terms of labour market integration, but the discussion placed most emphasis on removing any barriers to labour market integration. The newspapers reported about training provided to refugees such as by the German train company (*Spiegel*, issue 46, 2015, p. 74); about the Chamber of Craft's initiative to employ refugees (*Bild*, 8.12.2014, p. 1), or about available jobs for refugees with the Federal Voluntary Service (*Süddeutsche*, 24.12.2015, p. 8). *Die Bild* cautiously drew on the statement by the Federal Labour Office saying that "many refugees in Germany could get a job" (4.9.2015, p. 2), while *Die Süddeutsche* reported on the example of a 23-year-old refugee training on weekends in a bakery (24.10.2015, p. 34).

Negative representations, on the other hand, comprised *Die Bild* informing that "Only every fiftieth (2%/month) indeed finds a job!" (14.12.2015, p. 1), and that the number of unemployed persons from asylum seeker countries rose to 161399 in November 2015 (8.12.2015, p. 2). While *Die Süddeutsche* stated that not even "every tenth can get directly into work or training" (9.12.2015, p. 1), *Die FAZ* pointed out that many refugees cannot find a job in the short term (17.9.2015, p. 1). *Der Spiegel* further pitched refugees against high-skilled migrants by arguing that these two groups of foreigners are not alike:

"refugees appear powerless", while "The others, the doctors are the saviours on site" (issue 2, 2015, p. 54).

With regards to barriers for refugees, *Der Spiegel* argued that "The German economy sees the influx of refugees as a chance for growth and prosperity", but bureaucratic barriers need to be removed (issue 35, 2015, p. 58). The obvious barriers of language acquisition, education, training and qualifications were mentioned (*FAZ,* 19.9.2015, p. 18; *Süddeutsche,* 13.10.2015, p. 17; *FAZ,* 2.9.2015, p. 15). More importantly, however, the newspapers discussed the barrier of asylum seekers having to wait a long time until they receive a decision on their asylum status and until they are able to start language courses or work (*Süddeutsche,* 24.10.2015, p. 34; *Spiegel*, issue 35, 2015, p. 61; *Süddeutsche*, 16.6.2015, p. 19; *Süddeutsche,* 27.5.2015, p. 6). Only *Die Süddeutsche* voiced the barrier of discrimination arguing that "Müller" is still rather employed than "Üzgür" (31.1.2015, p. 24).

In conclusion, the representation of refugees was both positive and negative depending on their judged level of education and skills and hence the possibility of them entering the labour market. Due to their recent arrival, and with the construction of Germany as a welcoming country (which will be discussed in the following chapter), refugees were predominantly constructed as an 'opportunity' for the labour market. This also shows that their inclusion was conditional resting on their future economic utility. While this conditional inclusion or acceptance was reiterated in relation to all identified 'Others' and indeed any migrants per se, only 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' were constructed as consistently meeting the criteria for being considered successfully integrated. The further

three identified ‘Others’ were however also constructed as not having the desired level of education, language skills, and hence levels of employment.

As a result, these ‘Others’ were by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation also represented as welfare benefit recipients or indeed as welfare benefit abusers as opposed to the German ‘Self’ that was characterised as being self-sufficient and employed. This construction did not only represent ‘Others’ as not useful to the economy and as an example of failed integration, but also excluded them from the national community. Exclusion was most obvious in argumentation schemes of the abuse topos that implied that these ‘Others’ purposefully want to receive benefits. All four newspapers discussed welfare benefits, although *Die Bild*, in relative terms, published the largest number of articles on this topic.

Another consequence of failed labour market integration was argued to be the criminality of migrants/ethnic minorities. As mentioned in the content analysis, sources of criminality in ‘structural integration’ as opposed to ‘cultural integration’ entailed unemployment, poverty, lack of opportunity and in the case of refugees, desperation, lack of appropriate accommodation, trauma etc., although a clear-cut separation from implied cultural reasons could not always be made. Similar to the issue of welfare benefits, the three mentioned ‘Others’ were negatively represented as criminals and were hence excluded from the national ‘we’. The arguments and the level of ‘othering’ however varied depending on the context of the different ‘Others’. Examples and further analysis of these two themes – welfare benefits and criminality – can be found in appendix B.

## 6.3. Discussion

This chapter started by outlining the 'Self' and by showing that German identity is based on the idea of being a leading economy, a *Wirtschaftsnation*. Indeed, the requirement for migrants and ethnic minorities to be economically successful and financially independent (the economic utility topos) has been voiced throughout this chapter. While the newspapers may have disagreed with regards to how this is achieved, or which policies are needed, they all agreed on the goal and desired outcome itself: migrants must be educated, to know German and to have a decent job, preferably high-skilled. The idea of the worthy or deserving migrant is surely not uncommon or restricted to Germany, nor can the goal of education be argued to be a bad goal for any society. Nevertheless, one needs to question why this particular construction of the 'Self' featured so prominently in the discussion on 'structural integration' of newcomers and ethnic minorities and why that much emphasis and importance was attached to it.

Decker (2018: 45) explains that the 'Self'-image of Germany based on an "economic miracle" is the only 'Self'-construction that predates National Socialism and was more precisely already used in 1936. Hence, he argues that the idea and concept of the 'economic miracle' was so readily applied post-WWII because it not only offered continuity and re-assurance but above all filled the gap of lost German pride (Decker 2018: 45). Moreover, Decker (2018: 44) refers to the role of the German economy as "secondary authoritarianism". Secondary authoritarianism does not need a personal authority like a leader, but instead requires an "idealised object", which in post-war Germany was represented by the "prosperous economy" that allowed to bind diverse people together, to provide national confidence and legitimation of the political system (Decker 2018: 45). This can hence explain the continued importance of the German

*Wirtschaftsnation* for German national identity and the dominant aim of securing a profitable economy.

Translated to the context of this chapter, it can be argued that the newspapers engaged in particularly negative constructions of 'Others', when they felt that these 'Others' threaten the national ideal of the German *Wirtschaftsnation*. Moreover, since their assumption about the state of the economy is subject to change, also the constructions and focus on 'Others' are subject to change, which explains change over time. Simultaneously, the continuity of the German economic 'Self' may also explain why economic aspects were seen as that important to begin with. Indeed, the previous chapter on 'cultural integration' showed that the Muslim 'Other' was required in order to construct the German 'Self'. A cultural construction of being an either Christian country or one based on constitutional patriotism with equal rights for women, only works when the 'Other' is thought to be non-Christian and not committed to gender equality. Hence, if the Muslim 'Other' did not exist, then German cultural identity would not be what it was. This is different with the 'Self' on 'structural integration'.

The idea of the *Wirtschaftsnation*, is not based on this internal reverse mirror imaging such as the Christian 'Self' vs. the non-Christian 'Other' in 'cultural integration' and can exist independently of migrant 'Others' by focusing on German brands, export numbers, general prosperity vs. the ones of other countries. The discourse on 'structural integration' does not draw on an internal 'Other' in order to construct the 'Self' as an economically successful nation and rather the discussion shows that Germany is already thought to be economically successful before engaging with the aspect of migrants and immigration, and the desire to fill labour market shortages. Due to this discursive construction of the *Wirtschaftsnation*, independent of internal 'Others', it can in theoretical terms be seen as

a highly deterministic construction of national identity. This means that it is unlikely to change. A deterministic 'Self' obviously leaves less room for the inclusion of diverse people and is hence more likely to lead to the exclusion of those not living up to the required standard.

Since 'Others' were represented as both meeting and not meeting the criteria of being educated and having a job, in theoretical terms the picture was also mixed with both voluntaristic and deterministic constructions. For instance, the representation of refugees was mostly voluntaristic because refugees were thought to not have the skills at present, but with adequate training and courses, to theoretically be able to acquire them. This possibility for 'Others' to change and to become like the desired standard can be seen as voluntaristic construction and also as a possibility for inclusion. A combination of a deterministic 'Self' and a voluntaristic 'Other' however implies a semi-exclusionary relationship, since the 'Other' is thought to be forced to assimilate and to comply with the requirements of the 'Self'. In this context of 'structural integration', 'Others' can indeed acquire the skills in order to meet the requirements of the 'Self'. In practice, however, this can be very difficult because refugees, Romanians and Bulgarians/Roma, or generally poorer migrants may not have the financial means 'to change' by themselves, while barriers and structural discrimination may also hinder them. As a result, the construction of 'Others' with the possibility of upward social mobility may be more of a theoretical thought than a practical reality, and hence a semi-exclusionary relationship may in this context become an exclusionary one if no support mechanisms are put in place.

On the other hand, 'Others' were also constructed as deterministic and, in that sense, as unable to acquire the required skills of high-level education and professional career. This at the most deterministic level comprised the sentences involving genetics and the family

environment, which implied that one is basically born that way. The combination of a deterministic 'Self' and a deterministic 'Other' implies an exclusionary boundary drawing, which can also be confirmed here particularly with reference to 'Others' as welfare abusers or criminals.

With regards to Karner's (2011) theoretical framework, the most fitting discourse in this chapter is the instrumentalist discourse involving the cost/benefit prism. While 'Others' were at times constructed in opposition to the 'Self' as in the case of the Roma (orientalist discourse), the dominant discourse revolved around whether 'Others' are beneficial to the labour market, or whether they represent a burden. Hence, the cost/benefit prism was best suited to explain this discourse. This has further implications for 'Others'. More specifically, the cost/benefit prism entails a conditional acceptance in society and not a general acceptance per se. For instance, the group of the 'Southern and Eastern Europeans' may currently be judged as a benefit to the economy but if labour market conditions change, their acceptance may change along with it. This can also be argued to have been the case with the guest workers, since in the beginning their lower skill set was needed for the economy, but as the conditions of the labour market changed, they were increasingly seen as a burden, as non-placeable workers. This may have been different, if they had been unconditionally accepted as fellow citizens. Surely, national discourses are non-static and a previously inclusionary construction of an 'Other' can theoretically become an exclusionary one. However, the cost/benefit prism places additional conditionality to the mix that arguably makes change more likely.

Moreover, this instrumentalist discourse of the cost/benefit prism implies that 'Others' can be included in the national 'Self' as contributing workers, as successfully integrated migrants, but simultaneously it prevents 'Others' from being included as fellow citizens,

as co-nationals, or indeed as Germans. Some references in the articles were made to either *Germanness* or to 'Others' hardly being distinguishable due to their successful integration (although in both instances this was in relation to white EU migrants), but the overwhelming majority of linguistic constructions still talked about 'Turks', 'migrants', 'refugees' etc. This was particularly visible in relation to people of Turkish origin in the second and third generation who were still predominantly referred to as Turks or with Turkish migrant background rather than as Germans. As a result, it can be argued that the instrumentalist discourse does not only pose a level of conditionality on the acceptance of 'Others' but in the long-term upholds the level of *Otherness* rather than fostering inclusion.

This furthermore can provide some explanation of why the discussion revolved around successful and failed integration rather than about national belonging. Successful 'structural integration' may lead to becoming German but can also simply lead to being considered nothing more than a successfully integrated 'Other'. As a result of the attached conditionality and limited belonging, it can be argued that the expectations for the instrumentalist discourse need to be refined and that an inclusionary boundary drawing in the form of viewing 'Others' as a benefit without conditions is not possible. Instrumentalist discourses can at best be semi-exclusionary but not inclusionary.

A few further points in relation to this chapter can be made. Constructions of the 'Other' were not entirely static and were identified to depend on the situational context. This means that 'Others' and their level of acceptance was affected by current developments. For instance, the book publication by Sarrazin had a negative impact on the construction of 'Turks', while the volunteering efforts of the German population may have had a positive impact on how also uneducated refugees were still seen as a labour market

opportunity, compared to for example the Roma. Secondly, and typical for constructions of identity, a lot of ambiguity could be identified. For example, it was not clear how the national 'Self' can be proud of its ever-expanding welfare state, while everyone relying on the welfare state was criticised at the same time.

Lastly, it can be argued that the findings on 'cultural integration' and 'structural integration' can overlap and can hence enhance *Otherness*. Being Muslim/Roma and being unemployed or relying on welfare benefits created more *Otherness* than being Muslim and having a professional career, or than being Spanish and being unemployed. Indeed, the most orientalist constructions are those that lump all cultural prejudices and all non-meeting structural criteria into one article and argumentation. In the next and final empirical chapter, constructions of German national identity in the context of attitudes and behaviour of the German host society towards these 'Others', which will be referred to as 'perceptions', will be discussed.

# CHAPTER 7

# THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE *HOMO GERMANICUS*

This chapter analyses the findings of national identity constructions of the critical discourse analysis that was carried out on sampled articles of the category 'perceptions'. 'Perceptions' was applied to articles that discuss the reactions, behaviour or opinions of the German host society in relation to migrants and/or ethnic minorities. Articles coming under this category were selected based on the understanding of integration being a two-way flow between migrants and the host community, since the ability of migrants/ethnic minorities to become part of the host society and to be included also depends on the reactions and behaviour of the host society.

The content analysis, which can be found in appendix A.3, shows that most articles on the category 'perceptions' were published in relation to the arrival of refugees[27] in 2014 and 2015. Indeed, only 5.5% of articles of *Die Bild*, 12% of *Die Süddeutsche*, 19% of *Die FAZ*, and 25% of articles of *Der Spiegel* were not published in relation to refugees. As a result, this chapter will focus on articles relating to the reactions of the German host society towards refugees. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that newspapers did not seem to find it that relevant or necessary to discuss German reactions and opinions of 'Others' prior to the arrival of a larger number of refugees. With regards to identified themes, the content analysis showed that articles could be divided into two themes:

[27] The newspapers talk about the arrival of refugees in Germany, but legally speaking most persons at that stage were asylum seekers who had not yet made a claim for asylum. Since their actual status cannot be determined, the language and terms used in the newspapers will be used in the analysis of the data.

'Welcoming' and 'xenophobia'. While the theme 'welcoming' discussed open-minded behaviour of the German society towards refugees, 'xenophobia' deliberated on all sorts of hostile or opposing reactions of the German host society.

This opposing dualism between 'welcoming' and 'xenophobic' Germans, between good and bad Germans, or in the words of Federal President Gauck[28], the 'light' and the 'dark' Germany, was also applied in the discursive constructions of the newspapers (e.g. *Spiegel*, issue 37, 2015, p. 8), Nevertheless, as will be outlined in this chapter, five different discursive constructions of Germans were identified in the data. Subsequently, this chapter will discuss these five identity constructions and will show the complexity and contradictions involved. Similar to the analysis in the two previous empirical chapters, the aim was to identify 'Self'/'Other' constructions (in this case also inner German constructions), what these constructions entail and how they are linguistically/discursively constructed, as well as whether they are inclusionary or exclusionary of refugees.

Compared to the previous two empirical chapters however, this chapter focuses more on inner-German identity constructions rather than on German vs. migrant/ethnic minority constructions. The different German identities were constructed in opposition to each other and hence the interaction and relationship between these inner-German identities will be discussed. While different representations of refugees were still found, they essentially assisted the construction of different German identities.

[28] Joachim Gauck was the federal president of Germany from 18 March 2012 to 18 March 2017.

## 7.1. ‘Mainstream Germans’

The first construction of German behaviour and opinions towards refugees identified in the data was that of ‘mainstream Germans’. While the term itself was not used by the newspapers, the four newspapers agreed on the characteristics of these Germans, the idea that the majority of Germans was represented by it and hence that this group of Germans represents Germany. ‘Mainstream Germans’ were constructed in opposition to ‘deviant Germans’ and were described as helping and assisting refugees, and therefore as open-minded and tolerant. The discursive strategies employed were the constructive and the transformative strategy, which assisted in portraying change and the idea that Germany has become more open-minded and welcoming.

### *7.1.1. As Helping and Volunteering*

#### *7.1.1.1. Volunteering Examples*

‘Mainstream Germans’ were referred to as “good Germans” and were represented as helping and volunteering for refugees (*Spiegel*, issue 34, 2015, p. 40). While it was acknowledged that this overwhelming support was new for Germany, the engagement and volunteering precisely also constituted expected and desired behaviour. Examples of volunteering in Germany included donations, welcome events, German classes, networks and refugee cafés (*Die Süddeutsche*, 31.12.2015, p. 11). *Die Süddeutsche* among other examples reported that books are being donated at refugee accommodation centres based on the initiative “Books say welcome” (8.9.2015, p. 10), and had the volunteering activities were confirmed by a refugee mother who was quoted saying “many people help us” (23.10.2014, p. 5). Also *Der Spiegel* was keen to inform its readers about volunteering activities by Germans such as languages courses and interpretations services from students at university (issue 34, 2015, p. 41).

*Die FAZ* mentioned the commitment and engagement of Germans helping refugees but provided fewer specific examples of how Germans help. For instance, it wrote that "Gauck recognises the commitment of volunteers in Germany" (*FAZ*, 24.12.2013, p. 1). In contrast, *Die Bild* ran a whole series called "We help", in which it printed everyday examples of people volunteering for refugees. *Die Bild* first published an article titled "That is what I can do now!", which provided information on volunteering examples and made the call to readers to send stories of their volunteering to an email address that roughly translated to to-this-is-how-I-help@bild.de (25.8.2015a, p. 3). It then started the publication of the 'We help' series and displayed a new email called we-help@bild.de (*Bild*, 29.8.2015a, p. 3). Notable is the deictic change from 'I' to 'we' and the constructive strategy that Germans per se volunteer and support people in need. The campaign itself entailed volunteering examples of readers (Figure 7.1), but also the call for volunteering and open-mindedness by politicians and celebrities, which was shown by them posing with the 'we help' sign (Figure 7.2):

*Figure 7.1: Bild, 31.8.2015a, p. 3*



*Figure 7.2: Bild, 29.8.2015a, p. 3*



gsdrama – WIR HELFEN

Seite 3

# So funktioniert die große Hilfs-Aktion von BILD

**Hunderttausende auf der Flucht. Männer, Frauen, Kinder in Not!**

**Mit der Aktion WIR HELFEN will BILD ein Zeichen der Menschlichkeit setzen. Wir wollen zeigen, dass Schreihälse und Fremdenhasser NICHT in unserem Namen grölen! Dass Deutschland ein Herz hat für Menschen, die Hilfe brauchen!**

**DESHALB die große BILD-Aktion WIR HELFEN.**

**Das bedeutet:**

- **BILD berichtet täglich über Hilfsaktionen, über Menschen, die sich einsetzen für Flüchtlinge.**
- **BILD sammelt über „Ein Herz für Kinder" Spenden (siehe S. 2, unten).**
- **BILD lädt zum Mitmachen ein: Schneiden Sie das Aktions-Logo aus und zeigen Sie, dass auch Sie mitmachen. Teilen Sie das Logo (auf www.bild.de) über soziale Netzwerke (Facebook, Instgram, Twitter) – immer mit dem Hashtag #refugeeswelcome („Flüchtlinge willkommen!"). Bei Politikern, Managern, Prominenten findet die BILD-Aktion schon jetzt ein Riesenecho:**

#refugeeswelcome WIR HELFEN

**Sigmar Gabriel (55),** Vize-Kanzler und SPD-Chef: „Die Hilfsbereitschaft für die Flüchtlinge ist überwältigend: Tausende Freiwillige engagieren sich ehrenamtlich. Die Beschäftigten in den Unterkünften, bei Verwaltungen und Polizei machen einen großartigen Job. Wir haben allen Grund, DANKE zu sagen."

**Johannes Teyssen (55),** E.on-Chef: „In Not geratene Flüchtlinge haben Anspruch auf menschliche Solidarität. Deshalb haben wir dem Landkreis Passau ein leer stehendes Verwaltungsgebäude für 5 Jahre mietfrei als Flüchtlingsunterkunft angeboten."

**Klaus Engel (59),** Evonik-Chef, stiftet mit seiner Firma u.a. 5 Stipendien am Chemie-Lehrstuhl (Uni Bochum): „Wir stehen vor der größten moralischen Herausforderung seit einem halben Jahrhundert. Die Flüchtlinge sind auch für die deutsche Wirtschaft eine große Bewährungsprobe."

**Ursula von der Leyen** (56, CDU), Verteidigungsministerin: „WIR HELFEN ist eine großartige Initiative. Jeder kann beitragen, dass sich diese Menschen in Not bei uns würdig aufgenommen fühlen. Die Bundeswehr unterstützt mit Schlafplätzen in Kasernen und vielen weiteren Diensten. Zehntausende Bürgerinnen und Bürger spenden und bieten Hilfe an. Ich bin stolz auf die Welle der Solidarität, die durch unser Land geht."

**Janina Kugel (45),** Siemens-Vorstand: „In München haben wir ein leer stehendes Bürogebäude vorübergehend der Stadt zur Unterbringung zur Verfügung gestellt. In Erlangen öffnen wir unser Sportgelände und bieten Praktikumsplätze für Flüchtlinge an. Das wollen wir auch in anderen Städten machen."

**Julia Klöckner (42),** CDU-Vize: „Wir müssen Menschen helfen, die um Leib und Leben fürchten und die verfolgt werden."

**Thorsten Rolfes (53),** Sprecher von C&A: „Menschen in humanitären Notlagen steht C&A zur Seite und besonders Kinder und Mütter brauchen unsere Unterstützung." **Die C&A Foundation spendet 100 000 Euro an „Ein Herz für Kinder".**

**Frank-Walter Steinmeier (59, SPD),** Außenminister: „Die Welle der Hilfsbereitschaft ist großartig! Mitmenschlichkeit, Toleranz und Solidarität mit Menschen in Not – das sind die Botschaften, die wir alle gemeinsam in die Welt senden."

**Werner Michael Bahlsen (66),** Chef der Firma Bahlsen, spendet u.a. 20 000 Packungen Leibniz Butter-Keks für Auffanglager auf dem Balkan: „Wir begegnen Menschen in Not, direkt vor unserer Haustür. Und wir können etwas tun, jeder nach seinen Möglichkeiten."

**Hans-Peter Kröger (65),** Präsident Deutscher Feuerwehrverband: „Wir unterstützen die BILD-Aktion #refugeeswelcome – Wir helfen. Sie passt genau zu unserem Leitbild: Die Feuerwehr steht für eine Gemeinschaft, die Menschen Hilfe leistet unabhängig von Herkunft, Religion, Geschlecht und Ansehen der Person."

Adresse geschaltet und Unterdaktion über ihrichten wollen.

wir-helfen@bild.de

#### *7.1.1.2. Majority*

Secondly, the newspapers constructed 'mainstream Germans' by arguing that they are in the majority. The idea of the majority was realised by the number and the example topoi. With the 'we help' series, *Die Bild* employed the two topoi by showing a great number of examples of different individuals who help and who are engaged in volunteering activities. On the other hand, it reinforced the idea of the majority of Germans by referring to the quantity of examples. While the number was not specified, *Die Bild* generalised in headlines that "More and more participate" (31.8.2015a, p. 3), and that "All want to help" (1.9.2015a, p. 5). By means of the deictic 'we', *Die Bild* furthermore constructed this majority of Germans to represent Germany, which was illustrated by the following quote:

> The overwhelming majority of Germans has nothing to do with the mob in front of refugee accommodation centres! The majority is helping! We help! (29.8.2015b, p. 3)

Also *Der Spiegel* attempted to show that the majority of Germans is volunteering by writing "From Munich to Berlin, Dresden to Hanau, ten thousand people support refugees. Pupils, students, workers, pensioners." (issue 34, 2015, p. 41). *Der Spiegel* further argued that volunteers are "less visible, less loud", but that they are "efficient – and they are many" (issue 34, 2015, p. 41). *Die Süddeutsche*, on the other hand, tried to prove this construction by statistical means arguing that "Almost 11 per cent of these Germans are currently specifically engaged in volunteering for refugees", which was said to constitute more engagement than for sports clubs (30.12.2015, p. 4).

While praising Germans for their volunteering efforts cannot be deplored, the construction of the majority of Germans helping refugees simultaneously limits other identity constructions to the contrary. If Germans are mostly helping, then automatically only a minority of Germans cannot be helping. Hence, the focus and emphasis of this

national identity construction of 'helping and volunteering Germans' restricts the ability or at best makes it more difficult to conceptualise and explore hostile attitudes and behaviour towards refugees in larger parts of the German society. At the same time however, it needs to be noted that hostile actions to the contrary are required in order to construct this positive image of the helping and volunteering Germans as something extraordinary. This shows the depending nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations, but interestingly also shows that German identity needs hostile behaviour in order to construct its positive 'Self'-image as extraordinary.

#### *7.1.1.3. Moral Leadership*

Germans were not only constructed as helping and volunteering in the form of a majority, but the relevant newspapers also argued that people *should* be helping and welcoming refugees. The newspapers, except to some extent *Die FAZ*, voiced moral judgements and evaluations and asked people to participate and to do more. *Die FAZ* quoted Federal President Gauck calling volunteering actions "a clear sign for humanity within our society" (24.12.2014, p. 1), whereby the variant 'our' of the deictic 'we' again showed a constructive strategy for creating a German identity. *Die Süddeutsche* described people who are helping as those "who are good-willed" (5.3.2015, p. 7), and reported about Federal President Gauck asking citizens to help refugees (*Süddeutsche*, 24.12.2013, p. 1), and "to set an obvious example for humanity" (*Süddeutsche*, 24.12.2014, p. 1). Also, Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted saying that Germany is "a good country" and that the volunteers make her "proud and grateful" (*Süddeutsche*, 1.9.2015, p. 3).

These moral judgments were further emphasised by *Die Bild* that reinforced the positive self-representation of the helping German by praising volunteering activities, not least by appropriating moral leadership, which is typical for a tabloid paper (see Marlow 2002:

340). Actions of volunteers were described as "exemplary" (*Bild*, 2.9.2015, p. 7; 5.9.2015, p. 7) and those who do not want to help were constructed as if there was something wrong with them: "We have to help. And who doesn't understand that, cannot be helped anymore" (*Bild*, 1.9.2015b, p. 5). Similarly, in an article, with the title "Helping instead of complaining" (issue 43, 2014, p. 30), *Der Spiegel* evaluated commitment to refugees as "exemplary" (p. 32). *Der Spiegel* also demonstrated this moral evaluation and leadership by titling "The good Germans" in relation to German volunteers in the image below (issue 34, 2015, p. 40):

*Figure 7.3: Spiegel, issue 34, 2015, p. 40*




Apart from the implicated moral judgment of desired behaviour towards refugees, this image of three white women helping a black male refugee is also problematic and can be interpreted as white saviourism. While there are certainly black African refugees arriving in Germany, it is interesting that this example and image was picked as the title image of the story because the whole discussion of welcoming refugees in 2015 otherwise

predominantly revolved around Syrian refugees. Instead, the image of the black male refugee here can assist to construct refugees as needy or in need to be saved, while the white women self-servingly achieve the status of "good Germans" and a higher moral standing. White saviourism is not only patronising but also reflects racism in the sense of constructing (black) refugees as inferior while simultaneously legitimising the privileged/hierarchical position of the 'saviours'. Moreover, the image as well as these moral judgements more generally assisted to construct a positive 'Self'-representation of the 'mainstream Germans' in itself and against a negative 'Other' of 'deviant Germans'. If the 'Self' is described as 'the good Germans' than other Germans can only be bad Germans.

Lastly, it needs to be noted that *Die FAZ* did not promote a more welcoming attitude of Germans as actively as the other newspapers. While the newspapers so far coincided in their construction of the 'mainstream Germans', *Die FAZ* appeared to be more reluctant to promote further open-mindedness and tolerance. For instance, *Die FAZ* described calls for open-mindedness as "arrogant" and by quoting former Chancellor Schröder argued that "Germany does not need anything more urgently than "immigration into the benefits systems"" (31.8.2015, p. 1). Furthermore, with the aim of justifying deportations, *Die FAZ* claimed that "not everything shines, in what calls itself bright Germany" (31.8.2015, p. 1).

## *7.1.2. Argumentation Schemes*

### *7.1.2.1. Humanitarian Topos*

The moral judgement and positive evaluation of Germans to be helping refugees was justified by two argumentation schemes: the humanitarian and the image topos. The humanitarian topos purports that since an action is needed or required for reasons of

human rights, this action should be supported. Hence, it was contended that volunteering and helping refugees is an obligation due to humanitarian reasons. For instance, *Der Spiegel* argued that "it is our obligation and duty to help people who are suffering under such conflicts" (issue 51, 2015, p. 32). *Der Spiegel* further claimed that flight and persecution are "still part of the collective memory" in Germany, and that hence particularly pensioners know why there is a right to asylum (issue 43, 2014, p. 31).

Similarly, also *Die Süddeutsche* drew on the humanitarian topos by quoting Prime Minister of Brandenburg Dietmar Woidke saying: "It is our duty, not only based on our history, but due to our basic essence of humanity, to act in solidarity and sympathy and to show tolerance" (20.4.2015, p. 5). *Die Süddeutsche* further highlighted that not helping people and leaving them potentially to their death "disregards our European values" (24.12.2013, p. 1).

#### *7.1.2.2. Image topos*

On the other hand, the image topos was used to justify open-mindedness and commitment to refugees. The action of welcoming and assisting refugees was thought to give Germany a positive image in the world and was hence promoted and encouraged. Quoting Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich (CSU), *Die FAZ* reported that "Germany is one of the most popular countries in the world" and that hence "[w]e cannot allow that this positive image is ruined. Neo-Nazis damage our fatherland" (23.8.2013, p. 4). Also *Die Süddeutsche* argued that in the year 2015, "there is good reason, to be proud of this country" (30.12.2015, p. 4), while *Der Spiegel* referred to the event of many Germans helping refugees as "this wonderful German history" (issue 53, 2015, p. 10).

The image topos was however most strongly asserted in *Die Bild*. A grand headline, as shown below, titled “THE WHOLE WORD IS CELEBRATING US GERMANS” (8.9.2015, p. 2):

*Figure 7.4: Bild, 8.9.2015, p. 2*



Bild KOMMENTAR

Netz für Asoziale?

Von HANS-JÖRG VEHLEWALD

„Dreckjude", „Kanacke", „Abschaum" – an stumpfsinnigen Hassparolen im angeblich „sozialen Netz" ist kein Mangel. Vieles ist von der Meinungsfreiheit geschützt.

Denn: Ausländerhass ist keine Straftat. Aufrufe zu Hass und Gewalt dagegen sind strafbar – egal ob sie sich gegen Flüchtlinge richten oder gegen jene, die Flüchtlingen helfen wollen.

Deshalb ist es unerträglich, wenn Unternehmen wie Twitter oder Facebook sich außerstande sehen, wirksam gegen rassistische Hetze im Netz vorzugehen.

Wenn, wie jetzt bei Twitter, jemand dazu aufruft, Autos niederzubrennen, auf denen ein „Wir helfen"-Sticker klebt, ist das eine Straftat. Sie gehört verfolgt und der Schuldige verurteilt.

Wer dazu nicht beiträgt, macht sich mitschuldig. Die sozialen Netze werben mit freier Meinung. Sie verdienen Geld, wenn Menschen sich austauschen.

Aber sie dürfen – schon im eigenen Interesse – nicht wegschauen, wenn „Hass-Sprache" Teil ihres Geschäftsmodells wird. Und aus sozialen Netzen ein Netz für Asoziale macht.

# DIE GANZE WELT FEIERT UNS DEUTSCHE

## Wie der Umgang mit Flüchtlingen ein neues Deutschland-Bild prägt

Was passiert mit Flüchtlingen nach ihrer Ankunft?

Nach Hass-Kommentar JUSTIZMINISTER MAAS KRITISIERT TWITTER-LÖSCH-REGELN SCHARF

GROKO-PLÄNE NICHT WEIT GEN

Muss d Bunde wehr m Soldat schicke

BILD-Aktion „Wir helfen" Auch Gysi macht mit

foreign newspapers that described Germany as "with good example", with the "spirit of solidarity" and "the conscience of Europe" (*Bild*, 8.9.2015, p. 2).

The humanitarian topos and the idea to carry out an action because of human rights and humanitarian values is understandable and desirable because if people flee a humanitarian crisis, they should also be welcomed for humanitarian reasons. Argumentations based on sympathy and collective memory that support the welcoming of refugees, are equally desirable, since they can foster the acceptance of refugees in society and their integration. The humanitarian topos can however also be problematic if it is employed in the form of white saviourism. When the argument for humanitarian actions is used to construct refugees as inferior (needy) on the one hand, and to re-construct or maintain the privileged position of volunteering Germans on the other hand, it serves to legitimise an hierarchical relationship between the German 'Self' and the refugee 'Other'. Moreover, the combination of the humanitarian topos with the image topos can reinforce white saviourism, since humanitarian actions and volunteering become self-serving to the 'saviours' for looking 'good' in society or the world. Indeed, Smith Cooney-Petro (2019: n.p.) explains that rather than the humanitarian act itself, it is the "framing, photographing, and publicly posting that act on social media, which drives today's white saviour". While the image topos is to some extent understandable, as it is natural wanting to be seen positively, it is problematic if it serves white saviourism and to maintain an unequal power relationship between host society and refugees. Moreover, if the underlying reason for treating refugees positively is one's image rather than their inclusion, there is danger that the act of helping refugees is not long lived and can easily change at any point depending on which image of Germany is sought.

Interestingly also a legal topos that justifies the welcoming of refugees based on the country's international legal obligation to shelter asylum seekers and to grant them a process, was absent in the discussion. Only, *Die FAZ* once quoted Martin Dulig (SPD Saxony) saying that "[t]he right to asylum is a basic right in Germany" (24.08.2015, p. 1). This argumentation may have been neglected however because of the discussion surrounding the Dublin regulation and the distribution of refugees between other EU countries.

### *7.1.3. As Open-minded and Tolerant*

The representation of 'mainstream Germans' as helping and volunteering was then further employed to construct 'mainstream Germans' as open-minded and tolerant. Armin Laschet (CDU) was quoted naming *Die Bild* campaign for helping refugees "a strong sign for the openness to the world and solidarity in our country" (31.8.2015, p. 2). *Die Bild* attained the construction of an open-minded and welcoming Germany by having this German identity reaffirmed by a refugee himself. Feras from Aleppo was quoted narrating that once he reached Germany "policemen treated him friendly and politely, that he has a very, very positive impression of Germany" (*Bild,* 3.9.2015, p. 5). While *Die FAZ* affirmed tolerance by quoting Phillip Rösler (FDP) saying that "[h]atred of foreigners has no business in Germany" (26.08.2013, p. 2), *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* interpreted people demonstrating in favour of diversity and the welcoming of refugees, as evidence for the open-mindedness of Germans and Germany as whole (*Süddeutsche,* 22.12.2014, p. 4; *Spiegel,* issue 51, 2014, p. 23).

#### *7.1.3.1. Transformative Strategy*

This construction of 'mainstream Germans' being open-minded due to their volunteering was further reinforced by means of a transformative strategy, which argued that Germany and Germans have become more open-minded and tolerant than in the past. For instance, *Die Bild* applied a transformative strategy with the sub-headline "How the handling of the refugees shapes a *new* image of Germany" [own emphasis] (*Bild*, 8.9.2015, p. 2). *Der Spiegel* with the title "The new Germany" argued that "times have changed" and that "Germans have become more open to the world", which was shown by their empathy towards refugees (issue 36, 2015, pp. 23-24). While *Der Spiegel* acknowledged that people have also helped like "heroes" in the past decades (issue 45, 2015, p. 26), it claimed that civic engagement and volunteering has not existed to this extent, nor has it been that far reaching before (issue 36, 2015, p. 22). Furthermore, *Der Spiegel* argued that Germany was long not used "to see people of different skin colour or religion walk through the streets" (issue 53, 2015, p. 10), but that "The refugee crisis has brought about a new species – the brave, helping citizen" (issue 53, 2015, p. 10), and that this willingness to help "will change Germany permanently" (issue 36, 2015, p. 22). Also *Die Süddeutsche* with its title "In another country" argued that Germany would change for the better (1.9.2015, p. 3), and that it has become "more humane, social, flexible and relaxed" (30.12.2015, p. 4).

The construction of a more open-minded Germany was furthermore achieved with the transformative strategy by comparing the current situation explicitly to past situations. *Die FAZ* compared public opinion polls from the 1990s to 2015 (first half) and argued that today there are now less "resentments" against asylum seekers (21.05.2015, p. 10). It further argued that there are now no "ambiguous reactions of politicians towards burning accommodations" as there have been in the 1990s (*FAZ*, 24.6.2015, p. 15). Also

*Die Bild* already noted a shift in public opinion towards more open-mindedness in 2012, when it stated that 71% compared to 52% in 2004 see the relationship between Germans and foreigners positive (9.8.2012, p. 1).

Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* confirmed that one cannot encourage xenophobia as easily as 20 or 30 years ago: "people have become more open" (23.10.2014, p. 5), and that "the mood in Germany is not comparable to the one at the beginning of the nineties" (20.7.2015, p. 2). Lastly, *Der Spiegel* noted that "it has been much worse in the seventies and eighties" and that "Germans have become friendlier, less xenophobic" (issue 37, 2015, p. 58). Considering the daily attacks against refugees in Germany, *Der Spiegel* claimed that Germany is far from falling back to the xenophobia of the 1990s (issue 36, 2015, p. 28), and that at least today people do not dare to attack foreigners (issue 2, 2015, p. 54).

#### *7.1.3.2. Criticism*

Lastly, it also needs to be noted that the idea of Germans as open-minded and tolerant mostly contradicts the findings in the previous chapters on 'cultural' and 'structural integration'. While some criticism was also voiced in the newspapers, this was however minor compared to the number of articles in favour of 'mainstream Germans'. For example, *Die FAZ* described Germany's transformation with its title "Timid steps towards a "Welcoming culture"" (21.05.2015, p. 10). A public opinion poll found that people show "significant worries", when they were asked in more detail about refugees (*FAZ*, 21.05.2015, p. 10). Furthermore, a student volunteering project for the accommodation of refugees, showed that in practice the participation of the students was "reserved" with only two signing up (*FAZ*, 26.11.2014, p. 2). Also *Die Süddeutsche* reinforced that in

light of the attacks against refugees "one can long not be proud about everything that happens in Germany" (30.12.2015, p. 4).

The desire and idea of Germany as open-minded and tolerant should be welcomed, and open-mindedness and tolerance would indeed foster the inclusion of newcomers in society. Questions however need to be raised as to whether Germans committed to volunteering are indeed open-minded and support cultural pluralism or whether they may either be influenced by messages of moral leadership or may seek a positive self-image for themselves. Surely, there are many committed volunteers, but the question remains whether handing out pretzels will indeed cure decades of being socialised with prejudices and racism, and whether a person donating clothes now thinks that Muslim women wearing the veil should be able to teach in school. Hence, while criticism is not directed at the commitment of volunteers, it is questionable whether volunteering activities truly require one to be open-minded and tolerant. Furthermore, if the construction of Germans as open-minded and tolerant neglects wide-spread xenophobia and racism in society, then this construction also makes it difficult to seriously engage with and to combat xenophobia and racism.

## 7.2. 'Deviant Germans'

### *7.2.2. The 'Right-Wing Extremist Other'*

Contrary to and in opposition to 'mainstream Germans', two different types of 'deviant Germans' were constructed. Firstly, Germans who commit crimes against refugees were discursively generalised as 'right-wing extremists' and portrayed as the negative deviant 'Other'. This was accomplished by a constructive strategy of dissimilation, in which an 'Other', namely the 'right-wing extremist German', was constructed to be different from

'mainstream Germans'. All four newspapers reported on the various attacks against asylum seeker accommodation centres or refugees themselves. Thereby, four overarching arguments and linguistic realisations in the reporting were identified that assisted in negatively constructing these Germans as 'deviant' and as 'right-wing extremists':

1) all four newspapers clearly rejected violence against refugees arguing that this has no part in Germany; 2) perpetrators were mostly kept anonymous, which allowed to collectivise them as the specific group of 'right-wing extremists'; 3) perpetrators were assumed to possess a right-wing extremist or criminal background; 4) perpetrators were negatively represented and partially demonised. All four newspapers constructed and applied these four linguistic realisations to various degrees, which will be shown in the following.

#### *7.2.2.1. Intolerance of Violence*

Violence and physical abuse against refugees were generally denounced and strongly condemned as not acceptable in Germany. For instance, *Die FAZ* cited the minister of the interior of Brandenburg (SPD) saying that "such an act is in no way tolerable" (26.08.2015, p. 4) and the Justice Secretary Heiko Maas (SPD) that "the perpetrators have to be thoroughly investigated and to be held accountable" and that such attacks are ""shameful" for Germany" (*FAZ*, 16.12.2015, p. 4). *Die Bild* reinforced the idea of the 'right-wing extremist Other' by, for instance, citing Vice-Chancellor Gabriel (SPD) saying that "They [right-wing extremists] are lowlifes. They have nothing to do with Germany" (25.8.2015a, p. 2). *Die Bild* further denounced violence and pointed out the gravity of arson attacks by emphasising that "Arson is attempted murder" (12.10.2015, p. 2).

Also *Die Süddeutsche* cited Chancellor Angela Merkel that the government will use the full extent of the "constitutional state against people who molest other people, and who attack other people" (1.9.2015, p. 3), thereby arguing that violence against refugees is not tolerated. In light of a mayor stepping down from his post due to threats from right-wing extremists, *Die Süddeutsche* explained that politicians were in dismay and as a result, pictured perpetrators of criminal acts against refugees as "enemies of democracy" arguing that "clear limits need to be shown to the enemies of democracy" (11.3.2015, p. 5). *Die Süddeutsche* further described attacks against refugees as a "shame" or "disgrace" (13.4.2015, p. 7). Lastly, drawing on the image topos, *Die Süddeutsche* quoted Foreign Secretary Steinmeier (SPD) fearing that arson attacks could harm the image of Germany in the world (*Süddeutsche*, 13.4.2015, p. 7).

In summary, it can be said that violence and attacks against refugees were rejected by all four newspapers whether this was due to humanitarian, historical, democratic or image reasons. For the inclusion of refugees in society, it is of course essential and hence positive that the newspapers provide a clear denouncement of violence against refugees. It is however interesting to see that this first section already shows the co-constitutive construction of the 'right-wing extremist German' vs. 'mainstream Germans'. 'Pride' and 'exemplary behaviour' of 'mainstream Germans' are mirrored by 'shame' and 'in no way tolerable behaviour' of 'right-wing extremist Germans'. Furthermore, the former was argued to constitute the 'new Germany', while the latter was argued to have 'nothing to do with Germany' and to hence be the deviant 'Other'.

#### *7.2.2.2. Anonymity*

Linguistically, this generalisation of 'right-wing extremists' was on the one hand achieved by the anonymity of the perpetrators and on the other, through the referential strategy of collectivisation as 'right-wing extremists'. No one was named and descriptions entailed "The attacker" (*FAZ*, 16.12.2015, p. 4; *Süddeutsche*, 20.7.2015, p. 2), "criminal(s)" (*FAZ*, 01.10.2014a, p. 4), "thugs" (*Bild*, 2.11.2015, p. 2), "right-wing extremist(s)" (*FAZ*, 26.08.2015, p. 4; *Süddeutsche*, 26.8.2015, p. 1; *Spiegel*, issue 31, 2015, p. 23; *Süddeutsche*, 28.7.2015, p. 5; *Süddeutsche*, 25.8.2015, p. 5; *Süddeutsche*, 28.3.2015, p. 45), and "unknown persons" (*FAZ*, 12.09.2015, p. 2; *Bild*, 2.11.2015, p. 2; *Süddeutsche*, 17.7.2015, p. 1; *Süddeutsche*, 3.7.2015, p. 6; *Süddeutsche*, 25.8.2015, p. 5) as well as a "man" (*Bild*, 2.11.2015, p. 2), "right-wing persons" (*Spiegel*, issue 31, 2015, p. 21) or "right-wing radicals" (*Süddeutsche*, 20.10.2014, p. 6; *Süddeutsche*, 20.7.2015, p. 2; *Süddeutsche*, 25.8.2015, p. 5; *Bild*, 23.10.2015, p. 2; *Bild*, 8.4.2015a, p. 3) and "neo-Nazi" (*Spiegel*, issue 43, 2014, p. 32).

It can be argued that this was out of necessity if the perpetrator was indeed unknown. However, if the perpetrator was unknown, then it would also be unclear whether that person was indeed part of the right-wing extremist scene. Furthermore, in the case of an arrest, anonymity was still preserved by referring to suspects as "a 42 year-old man" (*FAZ*, 21.10.2015, p. 2), "a 45 year-old" and "the alleged attacker" (*Bild*, 9.10.2015b, p. 3), "a 15 year-old adolescent" and "three suspects" (*Süddeutsche*, 25.8.2015, p. 5), "a 39 year-old" (*Süddeutsche*, 20.5.2015, p. 6) "a 39 year-old financial advisor" (*Süddeutsche*, 12.5.2015, p. 6) or "both arrested persons (32 and 37 years old)" (*Bild*, 25.8.2015b, p. 3). Keeping the anonymity thereby served to construct the perpetrators as a homogeneous group of the right-wing spectrum whether this was indeed the case or not.

Furthermore, all newspapers also kept the identity of 11 identified perpetrators who abused refugees in an asylum seeker accommodation centre, anonymous. In this case, by means of functionalisation, they were frequently referred to as "watchmen"/"guards" ("Wachmänner", *FAZ*, 1.10.2014a, p. 4; *Bild*, 29.9.2014, p. 3; and "Wachleute" *FAZ*, 1.10.2014b, p. 4; *Bild*, 29.9.2014, p. 3; *Spiegel*, issue 41, 2014, p. 32; *Spiegel*, issue 22, 2015, p. 46; *Süddeutsche*, 7.10.2014, p. 6; *Süddeutsche*, 21.8.2015, p. 6).

*Die Bild*, on the other hand, slightly stood out by sometimes mentioning individuals. This however cannot be seen as a strategy of individualisation and the shedding of light on different perpetrators and contexts. Instead it served *Die Bild* to name and shame the perpetrators, to acclaim moral superiority and as a result to further widen the gap between this 'deviant Other' and 'mainstream Germans'. For instance, in relation to the assault of peeing on refugee children, *Die Bild* published a random image of the *supposed* perpetrator referring to him as "Christoph Sch." and calling him "creep", while pointing out that "For this act, *we* feel ashamed!" [own emphasis] (31.8.2015b, p. 3):

*Figure 7.5: Bild, 31.8.2015b, p. 3*




### *7.2.2.3. 'Assigning' Criminal Behaviour*

The perpetrators were often further demarcated as deviant by assigning a right-wing extremist background, even when this was not proven or when the motives were not clear yet. For instance, *Die FAZ* described a perpetrator as "a potentially avowed right-wing extremist" (21.10.2015, p. 2) or explained that "the police assumes a xenophobic background there to be very likely" (26.08.2015, p. 4). Also *Die Süddeutsche* argued in relation to two arson attacks that "A xenophobic background cannot be excluded" (17.7.2015, p. 1). With regards to an explosive attack against a politician from the Left party, *Die Süddeutsche* mentioned that "his party assumes the attack to be committed by right-wing extremists" and that "We are dealing with Nazis and terrorists here" (28.7.2015, p. 5). In relation to the attack on the Cologne mayor, *Der Spiegel* informed its readers that the 44-year-old unemployed male has "already early on sympathised with Nazi ideology" (issue 44, 2015, p. 29). Lastly, *Die Bild* described the case of arson in Tröglitz to have been committed "probably by right-wing radicals" (8.4.2015a, p. 3).

In a different instance, when the perpetrators were indeed known to be "right-wing radicals" with affiliated party membership, *Die Bild* provided visual evidence containing flags with the Nazi cross, weapons and bombs in order to reinforce the perpetrators' right-wing extremist background (*Bild*, 23.10.2015, p. 2):

*Figure 7.6: Bild, 23.10.2015, p. 2*



*Figure 7.7: Bild, 23.10.2015, p. 2*




Moreover, *Der Spiegel* displayed the following image showing a Nazi cross in relation to an attack on an asylum seeker accommodation centre in Vorra, thereby emphasising the right-wing extremist background (issue 16, 2015, p. 31):

*Figure 7.8: Spiegel, issue 16, 2015, p. 31*



It appears that the criminal act alone determined the representation of the perpetrator as a 'right-wing extremist'. Yet, the idea that all perpetrators of criminal acts against refugees belong to a specific neo-Nazi scene, own symbolic equipment or leave symbols relating to Nazism, is misleading and again does not acknowledge wider racism in society. Indeed, if it is automatically assumed that criminal acts were perpetrated by an existing right-wing group, the focus on potentially further and wide-ranging problems of racism in society is not possible, and racist acts are outsourced to a deviant, non-desirable, 'right-wing extremist Other'.

On the other hand, deviance was further shown by linking to other forms of criminal behaviour. With the 'watchmen' who abused refugees, it was explained that "some of them had previously been convicted" (*FAZ*, 01.10.2014, p. 4a), which was intended to show that these persons were criminals anyway. Also *Die Süddeutsche* reported on this aspect that some of the 'watchmen' were previously convicted for assault (2.10.2014, p. 6). Furthermore, *Der Spiegel* pointed out that one of the abusers had the "tattoo "glory and honour" on his arm"" that reminded of the "SS-squad" (issue 41, 2014, p. 33). Also *Die Süddeutsche* mentioned this as well as the "„hatred" tattoo on the throat" of another abuser (2.10.2014, p. 6).

As a result, *Die Süddeutsche* argued that "It was obvious, what kind of watchmen hung about in the refugee accommodation centre of Burbach" (2.10.2014, p. 6). In addition, *Der Spiegel* critically noted that activists of PEGIDA are "known to the police" (issue 51, 2014, p. 25). In a similar way, *Die Bild* highlighted that one of the thirteen persons of 'the Right' came from "the hooligan scene" (23.10.2015, p. 2), as if this explained the criminal activity against refugees.

*Die FAZ* most notably quoted the Minister of the Interior of Brandenburg Karl-Heinz Schröter (SPD) in relation to an arson attack on a local sports hall saying that the perpetrator is "not an asylum critic, but a criminal" (*FAZ*, 26.08.2015, p. 4). *Die FAZ*, however, went further and generalised this quote to by using the plural forms. The title "Not asylum critics, but criminals" was then applied to caption an image of firefighters in front of a burned sports hall (*FAZ*, 26.08.2015, p. 4). This served to draw a boundary between the 'criminals' or 'right-wing extremists' and other Germans with xenophobic tendencies, here presented as 'asylum critics'. Similarly, *Die Bild*, employed a structural opposite in a commentary reading "Good Heidenau, bad Heidenau", whereby the former involved 'normal citizens' and the latter the "Nazi-mob" (*Bild*, 25.8.2015b, p. 2). The author then claimed that the town Heidenau is not bad at all, but rather that it was descended upon by the Nazi-grasshopper that plagued the town (*Bild*, 25.8.2015b, p. 2).

The assigning of other criminal behaviour as well as the boundary drawing to 'asylum critics' allows Germans committing racist acts against refugees to be constructed as deviant, as a minority, as already criminal anyway. However, in order to combat racist behaviour and to provide a longer-lasting context for the inclusion of refugees in society, racist behaviour whether committed by someone wearing neo-Nazi symbols or not, would need to be acknowledged as an integral part of Germany rather than being outsourced to a German 'Other'.

#### *7.2.2.4. Negative Representation*

A negative representation was apart from the already assigned collectivisation of 'right-wing extremists' further achieved by overlexicalization. For instance, perpetrators were described as "Nazi-thug" (*FAZ*, 24.8.2015, p. 1), "brutal thugs" (*Spiegel*, issue 41, 2014,

p. 32), "militant right-wing extremists" (*Spiegel*, issue 31, 2015, p. 23), "right-wing extremists and racists" and the phenomenon was called "continuously aggressively appearing right-wing extremism" (*FAZ*, 26.08.2015, p. 4). As right-wing extremism as well as Nazism can automatically be assumed to be both racist and violent, the over-ascription aided the persuasion of its negative traits. *Die Bild* further enhanced this negative representation of the perpetrators by repetition, comparison and the captioning of images. In relation to the abuse of refugees by the security personnel in the accommodation centre, *Die Bild* titled "Beaten, humiliated and tortured", which in German rhymes ("Geschlagen, Gedemütigt, Gequält!") (29.9.2014, p. 3). Furthermore, the image showing the abuse was captioned with "A photo of shame" and the actions of the perpetrators were compared to the prison torture and abuse in Abu-Ghraib in Iraq (*Bild*, 29.9.2014, p. 3).

*Der Spiegel* and *Die Süddeutsche*, on the other hand, made plenty of use of the example topos and showed many different examples of what 'extremists' said or did to refugees. For instance, it was described how security personnel called refugees from Somalia and Iraq "Monkey" and "Nigger" running through their rooms with masks at night (*Spiegel*, issue 41, 2014, p. 33). *Die Süddeutsche* further drew attention to attackers having placed pork leftovers at entrances and windows of asylum seeker accommodation centres with messages such as "Go home" (11.7.2015, p. 5; 3.7.2015, p. 6). In summary, the negative representation of 'right-wing extremists' served as the opposing pole to the positive moral judgement of 'mainstream Germans'. While helping and volunteering was praised and seen as morally desirable, criminal acts by 'right-wing extremists' were abominated by referring to the violence and hatred involved. The two opposing constructions need to be understood as reinforcing each other. Nevertheless, particularly the latter examples really

question whether only ‘right-wing extremists’ hold racist ideas or whether this phenomenon has greater reach.

#### *7.2.2.5. Relativization*

Despite this negative representation, the actions of ‘right-wing extremists’ were at the same time at least to some extent relativized and constructed to be in the minority. It was frequently pointed out that the arson attacks occurred on “vacant” or “non-inhabited” properties (*FAZ*, 12.09.2015, p. 2; *FAZ*, 21.10.2015, p. 2; *FAZ*, 26.08.2015, p. 4; *Süddeutsche*, 25.8.2015, p. 5) and that “no one was hurt” (*FAZ*, 12.09.2015, p. 2; *Süddeutsche*, 28.7.2015, p. 5). With reference to right-wing extremists, Prime Minister of Saxony Tillich (CDU) was quoted pointing out that “[h]ere is a minority that brutally violates the values and laws of Germany” (*FAZ*, 24.8.2015, p. 1). Also *Die Bild* noted that “it is a minority” that is loudly proclaiming against refugees and “[m]any seem to have been come from outside town” (8.4.2015a, p. 3). In addition, *Die Süddeutsche* argued that in Tröglitz the “NPD was the minority” and that the protests and demonstrations did not come from the inhabitants of the town (23.8.2013, p. 11).

On the other hand, the argument that a minority (of Nazis or right-wing extremists) committed the attacks against refugees was also questioned by *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel*. *Die Süddeutsche*, for example, warned that there is no day, “on which not somewhere a right-wing violent offender strikes or stabs” and that there is “daily neo-Nazi terror” (21.10.2015, p. 4). *Die Süddeutsche* called the attacked on the Cologne mayor as the “temporary peak in a whole series of intimidations” (29.10.2015, p. 6). Moreover, *Der Spiegel* argued that there are on average two right-wing attacks against asylum seeker accommodation centres per week (issue 51, 2014, p. 24). *Der Spiegel*

further displayed attacks by “right-wing extremists” on asylum seeker accommodation centres in 2014 and 2015 (issue 16, 2015, p. 30; issue 31, 2015, p. 20):

*Figure 7.9: Spiegel, issue 16, 2015, p. 30*





*Figure 7.10: Spiegel, issue 31, 2015, p. 20*



This visual demonstration and longer analysis by *Der Spiegel* stood in contrast to *Die FAZ* and *Die Bild*. Indeed, with an increasing number of attacks on refugees, it can be argued that in the latter two newspapers, there was a feeling of repetition leading to less interest and hence less or less detailed reporting. For instance, an article by *Die FAZ* titled "Attack on asylum seeker accommodation centre again" (12.09.2015, p. 2) and was 10 lines long. Similarly, *Die Bild* ran the headline "More attacks on asylum seekers" (24.7.2015, p. 1) and the article contained 2 sentences outlining the increased number of attacks without any comments or evaluation, let alone critical reflection.

Also, the announcement of the criminal statistics of "1305 [politically motivated crimes] until mid-November of this year" that was published following a parliamentary enquiry only made the news into the section "The Essentials in Brief" (11 lines) (*FAZ*, 16.12.2015, p. 4). Despite the visual display by *Der Spiegel* above, also *Der Spiegel* engaged in relativization. In its title "Well, we don't live in paradise", *Der Spiegel* rather indifferently pointed out that more important is that solidarity has risen and that many people are helping and showing that they do not support perpetrators (issue, 16, 2015, p. 32). Surely more engagement and detailed reporting of criminal acts against refugees would have threatened the construction of the perpetrators to be in the minority, and the construction of 'mainstream Germans' to be in the majority.

In the case of the 'watchmen' who abused refugees, the relativization went further and placed guilt on the wider socio-political developments or even the abused refugees themselves. *Die FAZ* discussed the causes of this assault to be due to the especially high numbers of refugees that came in 2015 and that they have caused a "challenge" and an "emergency situation" in the state of North-Rhine Westphalia (1.10.2014a, p. 4). Also *Die Süddeutsche* relativized the actions of the 'watchmen' by arguing that they only earn

nine Euros per hour, that "five watchmen were responsible for 400 habitants" and that they have been "completely overwhelmed" (21.8.2015, p. 6). Furthermore, the 'watchmen' were excused in another article by *Die FAZ* explaining that refugees are not only people in need but also go in hand with "alcohol, violence, drugs, religious and ethnic hatred" (2.10.2014, p. 1). Given that *Die FAZ* previously described the abuse as "a security man putting the foot onto the neck of an enchained asylum seeker lying on the ground" (1.10.2014a, p. 4), it was even more astonishing that only a day later, on the front page, the 'watchmen' were excused in the form of blaming the abuse on the supposed characteristics and "foreign cultures" of asylum seekers (2.10.2014, p. 1).

### *7.2.3. The 'East German Other'*

#### *7.2.3.1. Xenophobia*

Another 'deviant German' that was identified to be different from 'mainstream Germans', was the 'East German', although this construction was by far not as popular nor did it remain uncontested. The 'East German Other' was thought to go beyond right-wing extremists and to incorporate larger parts of the population who are xenophobic and who act against refugees. Therefore, boundaries between 'mainstream Germans' and 'right-wing extremists' became blurred, but instead were drawn between 'East' and 'West Germans'. This distinction between East and West Germany rested on the assumption that East Germany has a general problem with xenophobia, whereas in West Germany, there are only a minority of right-wing extremists or that xenophobic tendencies are not as widely spread. *Die FAZ* explained that

> [s]ince 1990, there are continuously reoccurring xenophobic riots in the new federal states […] Opinion polls on xenophobic attitudes show that there continues to be difference between East and West Germany. (*FAZ*, 31.8.2015, p. 6)

In another article, *Die FAZ* titled in relation to Saxony that "The protest against asylum seekers and refugees is discharging itself more severely than in other federal states" (20.08.2015, p. 8). *Der Spiegel* confirmed that "The attacks on refugees increasingly take place in the East" (issue 31, 2015, p. 22), and that "In villages of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern for example, resentments are particularly widespread" (issue 36, 2015, p. 28). Also drawing on the example of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, *Die Süddeutsche* explained that while it is nowhere easy to be a refugee, that "in some places in Germany, it is particularly difficult" (20.10.2014, p. 6).

On a general level, *Die Süddeutsche* in its title "Remains of a wall" argued that differences between East and West Germany have not completely disappeared and that particularly in East Germany there is a group "who is not sure about supporting democracy" (19.2.2015, p. 2). *Die Bild*, on the other hand, already reported in 2013 that "Every third East German is xenophobic", which were argued to be 9% more than for West Germans (26.3.2013, p. 1). However, while the right-wing extremists in the form of the NPD were still 'othered' as "real right-wing extremists" and accredited with the violent behaviour (*FAZ*, 20.08.2015, p. 8), it was also acknowledged that the NPD was essentially accepted in the population in former East Germany. *Die FAZ* confirmed that "The right-wing extremist party appeared to largely gain acceptance for being the mouthpiece for those opposed to the settlement [of refugees]" (7.4.2015, p. 2).

#### *7.2.3.2. Relativization*

Yet, as in comparison to right-wing extremists, 'East Germans' displaying xenophobia were not necessarily constructed negatively. Indeed, their responsibility was concealed through suppression, impersonalisation and the passive voice. Examples for impersonalisation included referring to people as "[n]ormal citizens" (*FAZ*, 20.8.2015, p.

8) and "participants" or employing the German form "man" (similar to 'one') (*FAZ*, 07.4.2015, p. 2). By means of a justificatory strategy for the purpose of conserving or reproducing the 'East German' identity, xenophobic behaviour was explained and excused by the lack of promoting "[d]emocratic engagement" in East Germany, the emigration of people to West Germany, the imposition of Western models and institutions after reunification, and hence the feeling in the population that politicians and politics are not serving or answering to people anymore (*FAZ*, 20.8.2015, p. 8).

A mayor in Saxony explained that "As long as one does not listen to the life story of East Germans, many East Germans do not want to hear the life stories of the new arrivals" (*Süddeutsche*, 20.3.2015, p. 3). It was argued that "many people [East Germans] had to suppress their pain, their questions, and their feelings of being lost" and were forced to show a welcoming culture (*Süddeutsche*, 20.3.2015, p. 3). As a result, it was claimed to be "unfair" to draw a "brown shadow" over the place (*Süddeutsche*, 20.3.2015, p. 3).

#### *7.2.3.3. Criticism*

The construction of the 'East German Other' did however not remain uncontested. *Die Süddeutsche* argued that "Xenophobia is indeed an all-German problem" and that "Right-wing extremists are almost everywhere" with anti-Semitic ideas even more prevailing in the West (19.2.2015, p. 2). While *Die FAZ* pointed out that "[t]he assumption that the person from Saxony is more xenophobic than the rest of the republic is nonsense" (20.8.2015, p. 8), *Der Spiegel* argued that arsons attacks "can be found in the West as much as in the East" (issue 16, 2015, p. 30). *Der Spiegel* also explained that "It does not help, if the West is calculating to the East, how xenophobic it is" (issue 37, 2015, p. 8). While the discussion of the 'East German' went beyond the boundary drawings of the

‘mainstream Germans’ and the ‘right-wing extremists’, xenophobia and racism were justified by East Germany’s historical past. Complicity, in the form of the population’s acceptance of the NPD, was instead relativized. The next two sections will further look into xenophobic attitudes and actions between and beyond the construction of ‘mainstream Germans’ and ‘right-wing extremists’.

## 7.3. The ‘Worried Citizen’

Germans with xenophobic attitudes and behaviour who though did not commit a crime or an attack against refugees, were also constructed as ‘worried citizens’[29]. A constructive strategy of dissimilation was used to differentiate ‘worried citizens’ from ‘right-wing extremists’. ‘Worried citizens’ were said to be afraid of refugees. These fears or worries were argued to be justified by means of various topoi such as the criminality topos or the danger topos. Hence, the construction of ‘worried citizens’ entailed a denial of racism and a normalisation of non-violent xenophobia. ‘Worried citizens’ were also sometimes referred to as comprising the ‘middle of society’, which implied a balanced, non-extremist stance. Furthermore, ‘worried citizens’ were described to be at demonstrations, at PEGIDA rallies, or to be people simply voicing their concerns in conversations or in exclusionary, yet non-violent actions towards refugees.

### *7.3.1. Fear of Refugees*

The denominating commonality of people discursively constructed as ‘worried citizens’ was their fear of refugees. This fear was more or less specified. In *Die Bild*, for instance,

[29] This corresponds in German with ‘der besorgte Bürger’.

it was argued that people are afraid and have prejudices because they do not know where refugees come from and the tragedies they have lived through (8.4.2015b, p. 3). As a result, they were thought to have many questions and above all concerns or worries, as was demonstrated with the following image and headline "Bild in the village of questions" (15.10.2015, p. 3):

*Figure 7.11: Bild, 15.10.2015, p. 3*



15. OKTOBER 2015 • BILD-BUNDESAUSGABE Seite 3

100 Einwohner und 1000 Flüchtlinge

BILD im Dorf der Fragen

Deutschland im Herbst 2015: Bei einer Bürgerversammlung wollen die Einwohner von Sumte (Niedersachsen) erfahren, wie ihr 100-Einwohner-Dorf 1000 Flüchtlinge aufnehmen soll

Mehr als zwei Stunden lang reden sich die Menschen aus Sumte die Sorgen von der Seele

Von KAI FELDHAUS und MICHAEL HÜBNER (Fotos)

Sumte – **Man möge das jetzt bitte nicht falsch verstehen, sagt die junge Frau mit dem Pferdeschwanz in Reihe drei. „Ich bin nicht fremdenfeindlich. Wirklich nicht." Aber: Die Türen von dem Flüchtlingsheim, das jetzt nach Sumte kommt, würden die denn abends abgeschlossen? „Damit ich beruhigt auf die Straße gehen kann?"**

Herbst 2015, der Tagungsraum des „Hotel Hannover" bei Sumte, Kreis Lüneburg, Niedersachsen. 100 Einwohner hat Sumte, 1000 Flüchtlinge haben die Sumter im Radio gehört oder per Dorffunk. Sie sind verunsichert, verängstigt, sie sind wütend. Sie würden auch gern mal gefragt, verdammt noch mal.

Die Bürger haben Gesprächsbedarf.

Die Frage, die hinter jeder Frage lauert, die an diesem Abend gestellt wird: Darf man sagen, dass man Angst vor der Überzahl der Flüchtlinge hat? Oder ist man dann gleich ein Nazi?

800 Bürger aus Sumte und den Nachbardörfern sind gekommen zur „Fragestunde" mit Verantwortlichen. Im Mittelpunkt: der Mann vom Innenministerium, Dr. Alexander Götz. Ablehnungs-

Der Bürokomplex am Dorfrand steht leer, seit 2012 ein Inkasso-Unternehmen fortzog. Hier sollen die Flüchtlinge unterkommen

tern stehen sie in Trauben.

**„Nein", sagt Dr. Götz zu der Frau, die wissen wollte, ob das Flücht-**

sem Abend achtmal wiederholen müssen. Das Signal des Dr. Götz: Die gehen wieder!

Sumte will wissen, Wo

The cause of the worries was thought to be one of ignorance and the lack of communication from the government and councils, which makes people worry about crime numbers and property prices (*Bild*, 8.4.2015b, p. 3).

*Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, wrote that "One never knows, who is coming to us" (issue 51, 2015, p. 31) and explained that the fear of citizens was similar in the 1990s, that people have "the irrational fear of the 'foreign'", while they have a "rational fear of unemployment" as a consequence of job competition (issue 36, 2015, p. 24). *Die Süddeutsche* generally reported about the fear of people by describing that inhabitants of a village are worried about living together with refugees and that refugees would be better accommodated elsewhere (5.3.2015, p. 7). Also a bishop was said to want to acknowledge the underlying fear of people in this regard (*Süddeutsche*, 23.10.2014, p. 5), and one Left party supporter was quoted fretfully saying that "I am worried that the Germans will have nothing to say anymore. Only the foreigners" (*Süddeutsche*, 19.9.2015, p. 6).

As mentioned above, these 'worried citizens' were further described to come from the middle of society. *Die Süddeutsche* argued that due to numerous refugees arriving in Germany, there is a division in the middle of society: one group falls into a "state of anxiety", and the other distributes "slogans of hatred" (29.8.2015, p. 5). Elsewhere *Die Süddeutsche* pictured that this polarisation is also in Dresden, where there is a silent group and a group that is taking the "stimulant Pegida" (19.10.2015, p. 3). This distinction seemed to refer to 'worried citizens' versus 'right-wing extremists'. In relation to how 'mainstream Germans' fit into this equation, *Die Süddeutsche* argued that volunteers helping refugees have already "worked away their fears that they may have as well" (29.8.2015, p. 5). As a result, the argument that people have fears and that there is a legitimate 'worried citizen' was further bolstered by claiming that also volunteers had the same fears. Hence, this section shows that the argument of fearing refugees was used in order to justify the 'worried citizen' and their xenophobic attitudes and acts. In the

following, this 'fear' shall further be discussed by elaborating on the argumentation schemes used.

### *7.3.2. Culture, Crime and Danger Topoi*

A few argumentation schemes were used to explain or to justify the fear 'worried citizens' have towards refugees. Firstly, refugees were argued to be culturally different (culture topos), which not only constructed them as a different 'Other' but also implied a danger (danger topos), based on the idea that they commit crimes (criminality topos). *Die Bild* reported that "Info-boards with behavioural rules" had to be established for refugees assuming that they had to be educated on how to behave due to their socialisation in different cultural settings (15.10.2015, p. 3). The argument of a different culture was then mixed with expressing ideas of crime and danger. Reporting about an open council meeting, *Die Bild* further described a woman asking whether the refugee accommodation centre would be locked at night for her to feel safer on the street (15.10.2015, p. 3). Another mother was said to be worried about "the many young men that come, who probably have needs" (*Bild*, 15.10.2015, p. 3).

Similarly, *Der Spiegel* listed several examples of how refugees have different values due to their different cultural background. Refugees were claimed to be ungrateful due to returning donated items, and due to having a different image of women and attitude towards homosexuality (issue 51, 2015, pp. 33-34). As a result, a man was quoted explaining that "his girlfriend does not feel comfortable, when she comes home from work in the evening" (*Spiegel*, issue 51, 2015, p. 32), and that he fears "rising criminality" (*Spiegel*, issue 51, 2015, p. 33). He further lamented: "I am worried, how things will continue. Our constitution entails good laws" (*Spiegel*, issue 51, 2015, p. 34), thereby

implying that refugees do not fit or respect the German constitution and will do away with it.

This representation of refugees and the argumentation schemes used very much reflect what has been presented and discussed in the chapter on 'cultural integration' and specifically on the 'Muslim Other' as well as for example criminality discussed as part of 'structural integration'. Even though this construction of refugees did not feature as prominently as the one of refugees as victims who need to be helped, it fulfilled a vital role in the discursive construction of 'worried citizens'.

### *7.3.3. Liability and Xenophobia Topoi*

The justification of fears was moreover achieved by means of the liability and the xenophobia topos. The liability topos in general implies that refugees present a form of liability to the German population whether this liability is thought to be economic or societal, and that hence refugees ought to be rejected. For instance, *Die Süddeutsche* reported about a "worried native", who was anxious about "compulsory admissions" of refugees into German homes (5.3.2015, p. 7). *Die Süddeutsche* also reported about the fears of people from the Left party who see refugees as competitors for jobs and money (19.9.2015, p. 6). In *Die Bild*, the inhabitants of a village further explained that "it has never been that bad. My son has not had sports classes for weeks because the gym has been converted into a camp" (*Bild*, 23.9.2015, p. 7).

The fears of 'worried citizens' were lastly justified with the xenophobia topos. The xenophobia topos entails that increased immigration results in xenophobia and that hence in this case, the arrival of refugees needs to be restricted. Also *Die Süddeutsche* applied the xenophobia topos arguing that if as many people continue to come to Germany until

the end of the year, then the "limit will indeed be reached" (14.11.2015, p. 6). Hence, *Die Süddeutsche* worried that due to the number of refugees, the (positive) mood in Germany could change (20.7.2015, p. 2), and that there was anxiety that "Muslim refugees" would stay (1.9.2015, p. 3). Similarly, *Der Spiegel* asked with regards to receiving 130 people, "Will it work out? Will the „ugly German" restrain himself? Does he even exist?" (issue 2, 2015, p. 53). As a result, *Der Spiegel* argued that there need to be limits to the number of refugees "so that Germany will not be overwhelmed, and the openness and the willingness of people to help will not be overstretched" (issue 36, 2015, p. 28).

*Der Spiegel* continued that "Living together with hundred thousand Arab and African Muslims – next to the millions of Turks and people of Turkish origin – will put the tolerance of Germans to the test" (issue 36, 2015, p. 28). It is interesting to note here that *Der Spiegel* did not explain or comment on the reason of why living together with Muslims from Arab and African countries puts 'Germans to the test' and rather automatically assumed that its readers know why. The fact that *Der Spiegel* did not need to repeat its reasoning of Muslims as the 'Other' shows that this indeed is the dominating discourse, as it is expected that people automatically understand why living with people from such countries is supposed to be a problem.

The tolerance of people was further described as "extremely strained" and that the people's attitudes were between "tolerance and anger" (*Bild*, 23.9.2015, p. 7). As part of an opinion poll, *Die Bild* illustrated that only 10% of its readers think that Germans can take more refugees and that 90% of its readers think that the limit has been reached (9.10.2015c, p. 3):

*Figure 7.12: Bild, 9.10.2015c, p. 3*


+++ Flüchtlingskrise +++ Flüchtlingskrise +++ Flüchtlingsk

Die Meinung der BILD-Leser

10%

„Wir schaffen das!“

90%

„Mehr geht nicht!“

In summary, the liability and xenophobia topos legitimise German xenophobia and blame refugees, while refugees are again constructed as an incompatible ‘Other’.

## *7.3.4. Boundary Drawing and Denial of Racism*

Linguistically, the construction of ‘worried citizens’ was achieved by boundary drawing to ‘right-wing extremists’. *Der Spiegel*, for example, argued that “We cannot vilify 10000 people as right-wing extremists” and that “amongst demonstrators in Dresden, there are many “bourgeois people”” (issue 51, 2014, p. 24). *Der Spiegel* further lamented that “We should not put every protest criticising asylum into the corner of right-wing extremism”

and referred to Pegida as a "right-wing populist movement of outrage" (issue 44, 2015, p. 28).

Yet, by separating 'worried citizens' from 'right-wing extremists', racist attitudes and behaviour were also denied. An example of a denial of racism in *Der Spiegel* included how a neighbour in the village Sumte defended a group of young people closing the only driveway to the refugee accommodation centre by arguing that "They are no Nazis" and that one has to defend oneself from the "wobs" (*Spiegel*, issue 42, 2015, p. 39). Furthermore, a perpetrator argued at court that "This had nothing to do with xenophobia" and that women, particularly his wife, are afraid of these men from other cultures (*Spiegel*, issue 20, 2015, p. 37). Also *Die Süddeutsche* showed signs of denials of racism by excusing or justifying the behaviour of the 'worried citizen'. After riots against refugees, Minister of the Interior of Saxony Markus Ulbig (CDU) explained to see the cause of the riots in alcohol and that "people had simply goaded each other" (*Süddeutsche*, 24.8.2015b, p. 5). Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* described how people from the village Einsiedel do not want to be put in the brown corner and that they argue that they "do not have a problem with foreigners" (1.12.2015, p. 3).

Also Die Bild normalised such thinking and hence contributed to denials of racism by writing that worrying about crime numbers are "worries of normal citizens, who are by far not already Nazis" (8.4.2015b, p. 3). In relation to a committed arson attack in Tröglitz, *Die Bild* titled "We are not a Nazi village" (8.4.2015a, p. 3):

*Figure 7.13: Bild, 8.4.2015a, p. 3*




*Die FAZ* bolstered the idea of justified fears by claiming that "The worry of many citizens about values is a positive reflex" because it shows that the majority of Germans support "the values of democracy" (12.11.2015, p. 10). Yet, the value of democracy, specified in article 1 of the constitution in Germany is that the dignity of a human person is inviolable and with article 4 that there is freedom of religion (Deutscher Bundestag n.d.). As a result, if 'worried citizens' indeed cared about the state of democracy in Germany, they would go onto the street to defend refugees rather than to protest against them or to get involved in measures of chicanery against them.

The section showed that 'worried citizens' were discursively separated from 'right-wing extremists'. Compared to the 'right-wing extremists', 'worried citizens' were argued to

have legitimate fears and hence to carry out or voice legitimate ideas. This legitimisation was achieved by employing a negative construction of refugees. So far both the construction of 'right-wing extremists' and the one of 'worried citizens' did not seriously engage with wider problems of racism in society. As a result, this will be discussed in the next section.

## 7.4. Hatred and Racism in German Society

### *7.4.1. Criticism of 'Worried Citizens'*

The construction of 'worried citizens' was however contested, and existing boundary drawings were rejected by means of a destructive strategy. *Die Süddeutsche* explained that a distinction is made between the xenophobic incitements of Pegida and the vague fears and worries of many protesters but that one has to ask, "Why actually?" (15.12.2014, p. 4). Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* claimed that protesters may have to be taken seriously, but not their desires for "an authoritarian society" (22.12.2014, p. 4). Also *Der Spiegel* agreed with the belief that people indeed have fears, but still argued that if someone is a racist due to fear, this person is still a racist (issue 37, 2015, p. 60).

Another criticism was that not only 'worried citizens' have fears but also refugees. Indeed, *Die Süddeutsche* asked "What about those who are running away from Pegida?" (28.1.2015, p. 6), and questioned whether refugees can ever feel safe if there have been attacks on their accommodation (8.4.2015a, p. 5). On the other hand, *Die Süddeutsche* ridiculed supposed fears of people by criticising that in relation to a sit-down strike, people act "as if this was about leaking nuclear waste barrels and not 59 refugees" (1.12.2015, p. 3). Also *Der Spiegel* ridiculed the 'worries' of people by, for instance,

quoting that people fear “oriental music on clerical public holidays" (issue 25, 2012, p. 39).

Furthermore, the distinction between violence committed by ‘right-wing extremists’ and non-violent fears of ‘worried citizens’ was questioned, and with it hence the construction of ‘worried citizens’ itself. *Die Süddeutsche* captioned the following two images “This is how it looks like, when “worried citizens” express their fear: In Heidenau violence escalated two nights in a row” (SÜD, 24.8.2015b, p. 5):

*Figure 7.14: Süddeutsche, 24.8.2015b, p. 5*



*Figure 7.15: Süddeutsche, 24.8.2015b, p. 5*




*So sieht es aus, wenn „besorgte Bürger" ihrer Angst Ausdruck verleihen: In Heidenau eskalierte die Gewalt in zwei Nächten in Folge (Bild oben). Anlass der Proteste ist die geplante Nutzung eines alten Baumarkts als Notunterkunft für Flüchtlinge (unten).* FOTO: IMAGO/CHRISTIAN DITSCH, DAVIDS/BOILLOT

*Die Süddeutsche* described this violent demonstration against refugees as an image reminding of a "civil war" rather than "as solely "worried citizens"" (24.8.2015b, p. 5). Moreover, *Die Süddeutsche* argued that these demonstrations "are everything else than innocent gatherings of worried citizens" (29.12.2015, p. 26), and criticised that "xenophobic resentments are reinterpreted as "worries that one has to take seriously"" (11.7.2015, p. 5). Also *Die Bild* connected demonstrations with violence by running the headline "From paroles of hatred to violence" (20.10.2015, p. 2), and *Der Spiegel* voiced that "The way from the word to the deed appears to get shorter and shorter" (issue 42, 2015, p. 39).

The criticism of the 'worried citizens' shows that the distinction between protesters inciting violence and people with fears is questionable as well as the idea that people engage in xenophobic acts because of fear and not because of xenophobia and racism. Indeed, the deconstruction of these two different representations allows for the existence

of violent behaviour not only to be acknowledged at the extremes but in wider parts of German society. As a result, a bigger group of Germans were described to carry out racist hate speech or actions and this representation and information was mainly only provided by *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel*.

### *7.4.2. Hatred and Exclusion in Society*

*Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* by means of a destructive strategy both went on to describe how hatred against foreigners exists in larger parts of society in Germany. For instance, *Der Spiegel* argued that in Vorra, where an attack on an asylum seeker accommodation centre had taken place, it became clear that "the hatred towards refugees cannot only come from the right-wing spectrum" (issue 16, 2015, p. 31). *Der Spiegel* further noted that there is widespread resistance against refugees in Germany, which stretches "from protest letters to politicians to right-wing riots" (issue 43, 2014, p. 30), including "Thousands of hate e-mails" every week to the CDU party office (issue 44, 2015, p. 25). *Die Süddeutsche* reported on various occasions of people protesting refugee accommodation centres (28.7.2015, p. 5), including in Freital (26.6.2015, p. 6) and in Dresden (20.1.2015, p. 5).

Both newspapers also drew on academic studies to show that hatred is more widespread in society. Andreas Zick from the Bielefeld institute was quoted saying that "in some areas almost half of Germans share misanthropic sentiments" and that "hatred is diverse" and "coming from all social classes and milieus" (*Spiegel*, issue 44, 2015, p. 25). *Der Spiegel* further referred to Oliver Decker from the University of Leipzig explaining that the rejection of particular groups has actually increased and that there is an "utility racism", which classifies immigrants into useful and useless ones (issue 37, 2015, p. 61).

*Die Süddeutsche* argued that not few people would like to see the German nation as one of mostly ethnic Germans and that with this "the way to nationalism is not far" (17.10.2015, p. 4).

*Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* criticised that hateful and racist messages and actions are intended to exclude refugees. *Die Süddeutsche* explained that "right-wing populists want to define, who is allowed to belong to this society and who does not" and that 'they' (right-wing populists) do not want Jews, Muslims, Homosexuals or those helping refugees to belong (11.7.2015, p. 5). Similarly, *Der Spiegel* argued that Pegida demonstrators say, "You do not belong here – because of your skin colour or your religion" (issue 4, 2015, p. 13). Already in 2012, *Der Spiegel* applied a variation of 'the boat is full'- metaphor by running the headline "The village is full", and lamented that refugees were excluded (issue 29, 2012, p. 34).

### *7.4.3. Boundary drawing*

Nevertheless, there was no clear boundary drawing for 'racist Germans'. There were only few attempted boundary drawings for a xenophobic or racist German that was neither the 'worried German' nor the 'right-wing extremist German'. *Der Spiegel* subsumed the 'right-wing extremists' and the 'lot' into what Federal President Gauck referred to as "dark Germany", and put it in opposition to the "light Germany" that entails 'mainstream Germans' (issue 36, 2015, p. 20). As a result, *Der Spiegel* recognised that Germany is "a divided country" (issue 31, 2015, p. 21).

Linguistically, *Der Spiegel* referred to this 'dark Germany' as "racists" (issue 31, 2015, p. 22), "citizen with hatred" ("Hassbürger", issue 44, 2015, p. 24), "citizen with anger" ("Wutbürger", issue 51, 2014, p. 23); "racist and right-wing extremist agitators" (issue

31, 2015, p. 22), or the "disinhibited republic" (issue 44, 2015, p. 24), while *Die Süddeutsche* referred to them as "right-wing populists" (11.7.2015, p. 5; 22.9.2015, p. 30). However, in most cases, the subject and here the people carrying out racist acts were not named or described but rather their actions were described and evaluated. *Der Spiegel* talked about "racist violence" (issue 44, 2015, p. 29), while *Die Süddeutsche* described a "proximity to right-wing extremists" (29.12.2015, p. 26), "racist and right-wing populist statements" (31.10.2015, p. 41), or a rhetoric full "of right-wing populism" (4.11.2015, p. 30).

Hence, this shows that at least *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* were aware and did engage with racism in society that went beyond the 'right-wing extremist' and the 'worried citizen'. They also recognised that this racist discourse has at the route of it the purpose to say that 'Others' do not belong and to exclude them from the national 'Self'. While this recognition is important in order to also take measures and to work towards the inclusion of newcomers in Germany, it can be criticised that it was not sufficient, since the two newspapers simultaneously engaged in the other previously discussed constructions of German identity, and because of that were also rather vague in naming and defining 'racist Germans' and instead more often referred to 'right-wing populism'.

## 7.5. Discussion

This chapter discussed the different constructions of the German 'Self' in relation to the reactions and attitudes towards newcomers and in this case specifically towards refugees. A number of different representations of the German 'Self' were identified: Firstly, all four newspapers constructed Germans to have become more open-minded, and to be helping and volunteering for refugees, although *Die FAZ* appeared to be less enthusiastic

about it. This helping and volunteering was argued to be morally desirable due to humanitarian and image reasons. Since this group of Germans was argued to comprise the majority of Germans, this construction was in the analysis referred to as ‘mainstream Germans’.

Theoretically, ‘mainstream Germans’ represent a voluntaristic construction because with the transformative strategy, they are said to have changed to have become more open-minded. Refugees, on the other hand, were represented as ‘victims’ who needed help. This can also be seen as a voluntaristic construction, in the sense that they have just arrived, and no indication or information was provided about the adaptation process in this context. The voluntaristic-voluntaristic combination then implies an inclusionary relationship. With regards to the second theoretical framework, this translates to conviviality because the idea of a more open-minded Germany involves tolerance towards diversity and hence towards refugees. Conviviality assumes an inclusionary approach, which can be confirmed in the sense of volunteering activities fostering the inclusion of refugees. Nevertheless, the representation of refugees as ‘victims’ can also entail a deterministic construction if refugees are deprived of any agency and the opportunity to overcome their victimisation. A voluntaristic construction of helping Germans combined with a deterministic construction of refugees then becomes semi-inclusionary, since refugees may simultaneously be accepted in society, yet trapped in their position as the victim ‘Other’. In the context of the second theoretical framework, this combination then signifies the integrationist discourse, in which a deterministic ‘Other’ is somehow accommodated in the voluntaristic ‘Self’.

In practically however, the expectation of a voluntaristic ‘Self’ and hence this inclusionary or semi-inclusionary relationship can be questioned. While a majority of

welcoming and open-minded Germans is surely desirably for the purpose of including 'Others' into the national community, the criticism was that if 'mainstream Germans' are constructed to be in the majority, then this leaves less room for acknowledging attitudes and actions to the contrary. It was also questioned whether volunteering necessarily proves that people are open-minded and free of prejudice. Lastly, it was criticised that the call for volunteering and open-mindedness was also based on image reasons that can have more to do with white saviourism than with the purpose of including refugees into the national community.

In this context, the call for open-mindedness and for Germans to be helping can also be understood by the concept of the 'welcoming culture' (Haller 2017: 58) - a positively charged concept with euphemism - even though little reference was made in the data to the concept itself. It needs to be noted that the call for a 'welcoming culture' in Germany originated with the industry in the context of German businesses not being able to recruit enough high-skilled labour abroad, after changes in migration policy allowed for the loosening of the entry criteria (Haller 2017: 59). As a result, the term 'welcoming culture' was created in order to engage various actors in German society and to call for a united effort for improving measures that would ultimately lead to obtaining and retaining skilled migrants.

In the chapter on 'structural integration', we have seen how Germany constructs itself as a leading economy and how 'Others' are judged based on their utility to the German labour market. The call for being open-minded and for helping refugees as well as the focus on one's image in the world are therefore not surprising, given that Germany's goal is to recruit high-skilled migrants. This shows that the call on Germans to be welcoming and to volunteer for refugees based on humanitarian grounds can also be interpreted as a

self-serving measure on behalf of the German elite not only for the positive image of Germany per se, but also with the purpose of fostering 'development' in refugees and to use them as labour. As a result, the German 'Self' may have been constructed as inclusionary, but this was counterproductive if it was used to conceal or relativize exclusionary attitudes and behaviour or if it served image reasons and the recruitment/training of skilled labour. As a result, in this context, the theoretical frameworks were limited in their explanatory value.

Secondly, all four newspapers negatively constructed 'right-wing extremists' as a deviant and non-German 'Other' that is in opposition to 'mainstream Germans' and in the minority. Another construction of a deviant German 'Other' represented in all four newspapers was the one of the 'East German'. The 'East German' incorporated larger parts of the population and was pitched against the 'West German'. All four newspapers however also criticised this construction arguing that there are similar levels of xenophobia in West Germany. The construction of the 'East German' was furthermore not as common, which was rather unexpected given how much this representation has generally been used for explanations in the past.

Theoretically, 'right-wing extremists' and "East Germans' were represented in the form of violence and hatred being inherent to them and their construction would hence tend more towards determinism. Refugees as victims, on the other hand, were still characterised by voluntarism. With a deterministic-voluntaristic combination, a semi-exclusionary relationship can be expected. Yet, in this context, the constructions of 'right-wing extremists' and 'East Germans' vis-à-vis refugees could be seen as exclusionary rather than as semi-exclusionary because refugees do not have the opportunity to assimilate to the deterministic 'Self' and to basically become racist against themselves.

Karner's framework may hence fit better because 'right-wing extremists' (perpetrators) and refugees (victims) can be understood as opposing poles and as an orientalist boundary drawing, which consequently involves an exclusionary relationship.

Yet, also the orientalist boundary drawing showed some theoretical limitations. While the denouncement of violence against refugees should be welcomed, it was however criticised that racist acts were by means of various linguistics realisations outsourced to the deviant and extremist spectrum. The problem with this is that racist violence is understood as something that is not German, and hence this lack of acknowledgement also leads to not being able to combat it appropriately and to work towards the inclusion of refugees. Consequently, if a larger group of Germans beyond the 'right-wing extremists' were to be constructed as a deterministic racist 'Other', the deterministic nature may still be exclusionary, but the recognition of wider racism in society alone may be helpful towards a better self-understanding and be a starting point for the inclusion of refugees. Subsequently, also in this instance, the two theoretical frameworks were limited in their explanatory or better said predictive value.

A further construction identified in the data were 'worried citizens'. 'Worried citizens' were thought to be 'normal' citizens who do not engage in violent attacks against refugees, but who reject refugees due to various fears. This construction not only assisted in explaining the thousands of protesters at anti-refugee rallies including Pegida or the dismissing attitudes of residents against having refugee accommodation centres built in their neighbourhood, but also legitimised xenophobic and racist attitudes and actions. It was criticised that this legitimisation was based on negatively constructing refugees as

culturally different, as criminals or as a liability. The representation of refugees was thereby similar to the one identified in 'cultural integration' and excluded refugees from the national 'we'.

Theoretically, 'worried citizens' could at first sight be regarded as a voluntaristic construction because they were thought to be able to drop their 'fears' if they received better information about refugees. However, it is questionable whether more information would indeed change the position of 'worried citizens', and ultimately they would only drop their 'fears' if there were simply less or no refugees in their area. As a result, 'worried citizens' can also be understood as a deterministic construction because the only way that change is possible is with the non-existence of refugees. Moreover, the construction of refugees can be considered deterministic because refugees were represented to be inherently culturally different. The deterministic-deterministic relationship then implies an exclusionary outcome. With regards to the second theoretical framework, an orientalist and hence exclusionary discourse can be identified, since 'worried citizens' and refugees were represented as opposing poles and were constructed as inherently different: 'worried citizens' with fears vs. dangerous, criminal migrant. Exclusion can certainly be confirmed, since the construction of 'worried citizens' because racism was legitimised by talking about 'fears' and 'worries' and because refugees were negatively constructed and ultimately blamed for xenophobic and racist behaviour.

The construction of 'worried citizens' was however also contested. *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* criticised that 'fears' incorporate xenophobic and racist ideas that often also translate into racist actions. With the large number of Germans participating in anti-refugee demonstrations, and the widespread dismissing attitudes and behaviour of

Germans against refugees[30], the newspapers found themselves in a dilemma, since they could not represent such a large number as deviant 'right-wing extremists' (as the minority), nor could they ignore existing racism in society and the interplay between hate speech and violence that contradicted the construction of the 'worried citizen'. While the *Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie* subtitles its study "right-wing extremist dynamics in the middle of society" (Decker and Brähler 2018), *Die Süddeutsche* and *Der Spiegel* rather focussed on describing racist actions than labelling persons or by referring to 'right-wing populism'.

While references to 'right-wing populism' were not too numerous, I would still argue that this explains the popularity of the term 'populism' in recent years. The term 'right-wing populism' can be criticised for relativization of wider racism in German society, since it is arguably more acceptable in society to be right-wing populist than to be a racist extremist. As a result, the construction of a German racist identity may not be nice but could help to more appropriately engage with the fact that Germans are essentially socialised with racist ideas and that racism exists in society. This in turn could then also improve the inclusion of refugees and ethnic minorities in Germany, since it alters the whole understanding of the 'Self' and its shortcomings in open-mindedness towards 'Others'.

In conclusion, in the context of this chapter, the two theoretical frameworks were limited in their ability to explain the inclusionary or exclusionary boundary drawings between the German national 'Self' and refugees. Rather than rejecting both frameworks as well

[30] E.g. the *Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie* shows that 35.6% of Germans believe that there is too much 'foreignness' as a result of foreigners in Germany (Decker et al. 2018: 77).

as their combinations, it can be argued that these two theories are not designed for or have been applied to the analysis of German reactions or what has here been termed 'perceptions' of 'Others'. Indeed, also the theoretical dualism of the ethnic nation vs. the civic nation, usually revolve around ideas of culture and descent vs. constitutional patriotism or various civic values, but do not independently from these values classify racist ideas or ideas about society's openness to pluralism. This shows that this chapter with its discursive analysis of the reactions and behaviour of the host society is important and can even ultimately determine the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others'. Hence, the theories could possibly be modified or adapted to also incorporate the aspect of 'perceptions' into its framework.

This chapter furthermore confirmed the mutually constitutive nature of 'inner-Self' as well as 'Self' and 'Other' relations, and it once again showed the complexity and often contradictory nature of national identity constructions. It was also illustrated that the identified discursive constructions needed to be considered in a larger context in order to determine their inclusionary or exclusionary nature. The findings of this chapter furthermore related to those of the previous two chapters: Firstly, the construction of refugees as culturally different, potentially dangerous and criminal etc., resonated with the findings of the construction of the Muslim 'Other' in the chapter on 'cultural integration'. Secondly, the emphasis and desire to construct Germans as welcoming, was linked to the aim of recruiting skilled labour as outlined in the chapter on 'structural integration'. This furthermore shows that the discursive constructions of national identity on the three contents are linked.

# CHAPTER 8

# CONCLUSION

This thesis set out to investigate constructions of German national identity in (migrant) integration discourses in the German print news media from 2010-2015, aiming to identify discursive constructions of national identity, to understand how these are linguistically and discursively constructed, and to reveal whether these constructions are inclusionary or exclusionary of particular groups of people considered as 'Others'.

Integration was described as a contested concept lacking a singular definition. For the purpose of this thesis and the selection of data with regards to 'integration discourses' in the media, integration was understood as the long-term adaptation process between migrants and the host society involving structural, cultural, social, and identificative integration as well as the reactions, reception and measures from and by the host society (see Heckmann 2015). The term inclusion (vs. exclusion), on the other hand, was used in this thesis to evaluate whether particular constructions of national identity (of the 'Self' or the 'Other') are open to newcomers and whether migrants/ethnic minorities have the opportunity to become part of this imagined national community.

Germany served as a single case study because it represents a key case for the investigation of national identity constructions and their implications for inclusion/exclusion for both intrinsic and instrumental purposes. It represents a key case with an intrinsic purpose because the findings are specific to Germany's socio-historical context - its paradox between its commitment to pluralism and its focus on ethno-cultural principles - and are therefore of interest in itself. Yet, at the same time, Germany also

represents a key case with an instrumental purpose because it embodies an interesting case for illuminating and facilitating understanding and insight into how different constructions of national identity lead to the inclusion or exclusion of migrants and ethnic minorities.

While the literature stipulated that the whole discussion on migrant integration conceals the underlying issue and 'real debate' on German identity, the literature review on German immigration and integration discourses showed that there is a gap for a systematic study of the discursive constructions of national identity in (migrant) integration discourses of recent years that simultaneously analyses the co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' constructions as well as their inclusionary or exclusionary impact for those considered 'Others'.

The theoretical and methodological framework used for this analysis was CDA. This interdisciplinary, multi-theoretical and multi-methodological approach defines discourse as social practice and as socially constitutive. CDA was chosen as the overarching framework because it views discourse as constituting social identities and because its aim is to reveal how elite discourses construct objects of knowledge, identities, dominant ideologies and 'unequal power structures'. As a result, on the one hand, CDA firstly allowed for the incorporation of various theories and concepts that view identities as narrative, discursive, dynamic and multiple, and for identities to be based on the inherent co-constitutive relationship of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. This assumption of the mutually constitutive relationship between the 'Self' and the 'Other' was key for the analysis of national identity in integration discourses and the various constructions of the German host community vs. the ones of migrants or ethnic minorities. Secondly, CDA allowed for the incorporation of theories on nationalism, and more specifically the idea of the

modernist/constructivist stance that the nation is an 'invented' or 'imagined' community that is constructed by the elites by means of communication.

On the other hand, for the purpose of hypothesising the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of particular constructions of national identity, the thesis employed two theories for classifying constructions of national identity going beyond traditional dualist paradigm of the civic (inclusionary) vs. ethnic (exclusionary) nation. Instead, Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) extension of determinism and voluntarism to a four-squared diagram involving migrants and the host society, and Karner's (2011) extension of 'grammars of identities' and the theorisation of boundary drawings were used to classify national identity constructions and to test their explanatory value on inclusion/exclusion.

Methodologically, CDA does not have a single approach. The thesis drew on Wodak et al.'s (1999) discourse-historical approach (DHA) and the three-level model of 'contents', argumentation/discursive constructions (strategies and topoi), and linguistic means. This model was chosen because it was purposefully developed for the analysis of national identity (on the example of Austria) and because its methodological tools specifically enable the analysis of discursive 'Self' and 'Other' constructions. While the 'contents' had to be slightly adjusted to this particular research project and were reduced from five to three contents, and not all listed linguistic means were used or identified in the data, the general three-level model of the DHA showed particularly well *how* national identity was constructed.

Newspaper articles for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* were collected with reference to the previously defined understanding of 'integration' by going through their entire publications, while a variety of search terms were used for the collection of 'integration'-

relevant material on the online archival databases of *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ*. Since the collection led to a corpus of 2175 newspaper articles, in the first instance, a qualitative content analysis based on Mayring (2000) was performed. This served to not only identify the main categories and themes in the integration discourse but to understand the context, from which the sample for in-depth analysis would be taken. While the content analysis identified eight categories, all four newspapers published more than 95% of the collected articles in relation to three categories: 'Cultural integration', 'structural integration' and 'perceptions'. As a result, these three categories and their integrated themes served as the basis for three empirical chapters. With regards to these three empirical chapters, the thesis aimed to answer two overarching research questions:

***How is national identity constructed in discourses on (migrant) integration in Germany?***

***And are these identified constructions inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others' for becoming part of German society?***

I argue that recent constructions of German national identity are rather exclusionary and show remarkable historical as well as synchronic and diachronic continuity in their contents despite different situational contexts and political affiliations. The findings further illustrate that constructions of national identity are inherently based on the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other'. Furthermore, the assumptions about inclusion and exclusion based on two theoretical frameworks could be confirmed for two empirical chapters but were only partially confirmed for the third empirical chapter. Therefore, I argue that an added mechanism to one of the frameworks could be beneficial. Consequently, the thesis makes a contribution to the empirical study and data of

discursive constructions of national identity in German (migrant) integration discourses, and the theoretical literature on types of national identity and their impact on inclusion vs. exclusion. In the following sections, the empirical and theoretical findings with regards to the two research questions as well as their contribution to the literature will be discussed in more detail. A methodological contribution will be briefly outlined before wider implications of the findings will be pointed out. Finally, the limitations of the study and possibilities for further research will be presented.

## 8.1. Empirical Findings and Contribution

Chapter 5 discussed discursive constructions of national identity on the category of 'cultural integration', which was defined as entailing aspects of culture such as language, religion, customs, norms etc. whether this was in relation to the host society or the culture of migrants/ethnic minorities. I argued that by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation, the German 'Self' was represented in opposition to a Muslim 'Other'. The German 'Self' was characterised by the German constitution and German values such as gender equality, various freedoms, order and security as well as the Judeo-Christian tradition and German language. The Muslim 'Other', on the other hand, was characterised by gender inequality, patriarchy, hostility, violence and crime, and partially a lack of German language. With the German 'Self' being positively constructed in opposition to the negative Muslim 'Other, I argued that this represents a highly exclusionary boundary drawing for those considered Muslim 'Others'.

With regards to *how* this opposing construction was discursively achieved, the constructive strategy of dissimilation was firstly assisted by various topoi. Most importantly, the German 'Self' was constructed by means of the history and the culture

topos to be different from the culture of the Muslim 'Other'. The negative representation and difference of the Muslim 'Other' was further upheld by the criminality and the danger topos. Secondly, linguistic realisations such as the deictic 'we', lexical choices such as danger and violence, as well as referential strategies representing the Muslim 'Other' as a homogeneous entity, assisted the opposing construction of the German 'Self' and the Muslim 'Other'.

Chapter 6 looked at the discursive constructions of national identity with regards to 'structural integration'. 'Structural integration' was understood as "migrants and their descendants' aiming at the acquisition and the 'quality' of participation in the key institutions of the host society" (Heckmann 2015: 72). Key institutions were thought to comprise the education system, the labour market, social security system as well as membership in the political community. The findings showed that the German 'Self' was constructed as a leading economy with the aim of maintaining economic wealth and prosperity. This in turn limited the construction of 'Others'. By means of the economic utility topos, 'Others' were expected to meet the criteria of successful labour market integration/employment, appropriate education and German language skills, and were judged with regards to meeting these requirements and hence their economic utility.

Apart from general references to migrants, four overarching groups of 'Others' were identified in the data: 1) Muslims and Turks, 2) Southern and Eastern Europeans, 3) Romanians and Bulgarians including Roma, and 4) refugees. While Southern Europeans were positively represented as educated, learning German, being employed and hence as useful to the German economy, the representations of the remaining three groups was mixed. Particularly, Romanians and Bulgarians in the form of 'poverty migrants' or Roma were negatively represented with no economic utility and hence as a burden to German

society. Due to this conditional acceptance of 'Others' depending on labour market performance together with the expectation that it was mostly the responsibility of 'Others' to acquire the relevant skills, I argued that this boundary drawing can be considered rather exclusionary of 'Others'.

Chapter 7 showed the identified constructions of national identity in the category 'perceptions'. 'Perceptions' was applied to articles that discussed the reactions, behaviour or opinions of the German host population in relation to migrants/ethnic minorities. The chapter on 'perception' hence represents the two-way or mutual adaptation process of integration between the host society and migrants. While 'cultural' and 'structural integration' often stipulate the adaptation of migrants, 'perceptions' focuses on the adaptation of the host society. Various constructions of the German 'Self' were identified, while they were mostly discussed in relation to the refugee 'Other'.

Firstly, by means of a transformative strategy and the humanitarian and image topos, the German 'Self' was constructed to be predominantly open-minded, welcoming and volunteering and was hence referred to as 'mainstream Germans'. 'Mainstream Germans' were constructed in opposition to two deviant Germans, the right-wing extremist 'Other' and the 'East German'. This was linguistically achieved by assigning criminal behaviour and anonymity, by lexical choices contributing to a negative representation of violence and extremism. All three constructions of the 'Self' were accompanied by the construction of refugees as 'victims', either due to persecution or as victims of racist and violent attacks by Germans.

Lastly, the German 'Self' was constructed as 'worried citizens' whose xenophobia and racism were legitimised as fears by simultaneously constructing the refugee 'Other' by

means of the culture, criminality, liability and xenophobia topos as culturally different and dangerous. While the construction of 'mainstream Germans' as open-minded and welcoming can be considered inclusionary for refugees, I argued that constructing wider racism in society as the actions of an extremist 'Other' as well as by legitimising racism in the form of justified 'fears' from a dangerous refugee 'Other' involves identity constructions that are rather exclusionary of refugees.

As a result, the findings in all three empirical chapters show that the constructions of the 'Self' and of the 'Other' and their prevailing boundary drawings are still largely exclusionary of those considered 'Others'. Put differently, this means that 'Others' are still mostly excluded from the national community and national belonging. Moreover, exclusion was found to be intensified in cases of an overlap of not meeting the criteria for *Germanness* in 'cultural integration' and of not meeting the criteria for successful integration in 'structural integration'. For example, someone who is culturally 'Othered' as a Muslim also has it more difficult in proving his/her worthiness to the economy, and is excluded more severely than, for instance, an unemployed Italian. Indeed, the most exclusionary constructions identified in the data were those that combined cultural prejudices with utility racism. This, for instance, involved articles in *Die Bild* outlining how bad integration of migrants is and thereby constructing the 'Other' as culturally different, Muslim, hostile and dangerous, unemployed, abusing welfare benefits and being criminal. Hence, this overlap of cultural prejudices and utility racism can considerably increase the exclusion of 'Others'.

Apart from this, also the distinction between successful/failed integration and *Germanness* was identified to enhance differentiation and hence exclusion. While the 'Self' stipulated *Germanness*, 'Others' were mostly referred to as either successfully

integrated or not but not as German. This differentiation was very obvious with regards to 'structural integration' but also surfaced in 'cultural integration'. The usage of the term 'integration' and its forms of being integrated or not thereby served to determine levels of belonging without allowing 'Others' to become German. While the literature has engaged with the aspect and representation of 'failed integration' (Peeck 2014), the exclusionary aspect of 'successful integration' has been neglected. 'Others' may be judged to be well-integrated and as complying with the criteria of *Germanness* but independent of this, they be still not considered German – only successfully integrated.

The finding of predominantly exclusionary boundary drawings stands in contrast with the discourse identified in the media or an academic study (Schmidtke 2017) that argues that Germany has become more open-minded and tolerant of 'Others'. While this thesis cannot make any comparable statements about volunteering actions in the past and during the 'refugee crisis', the analysis has shown that the media's motivation for constructing Germany as more open-minded and tolerant were image reasons, the prospect of getting refugees through volunteering activities quicker into the labour market, and the externalisation of racism to a deviant German 'Other'. On the other hand, Schmidtke's (2017) argumentation of Germany having become more open-minded is based on the increasing number of civic frames. The following section on theoretical findings will however show that civic frames are not an appropriate indicator for openness and inclusion.

Apart from the key finding of exclusionary boundary drawings, the analysis also showed that the identified discursive constructions are remarkably consistent both synchronically and diachronically. Surely, some differences between the newspapers were identified. For instance, *Die Bild* and *Die FAZ* as more conservative media outlets more strongly

emphasised German language, German tradition and (Judeo-)Christian heritage as well as the importance of labour market integration. *Der Spiegel* had an interesting combination of showcasing racism and the exploitation of migrants together with some of the most exclusionary portrayals of Muslims. Only *Die Süddeutsche* was identified as somewhat more liberal by reporting most criticism on dominant constructions and discourses. At the same time, however, *Die Süddeutsche* also reproduced the very same dominant 'Self' and 'Other' constructions. As a result, in spite of these thematic differences as well as differences in style, layout and register, all four newspapers showed remarkable agreement and engaged in the same or similar discursive constructions of national identity.

Furthermore, in relation to diachrony, discursive constructions of 'Others' changed over time depending on specific events or the group of 'Others' concerned. For instance, at the start of the 'Sarrazin debate' in 2010, Muslims or Turks were represented much more negatively than in 2011 during the 50-year jubilee of the Turkish guest worker treaties. Also with regards to 'structural integration', different groups of 'Others' were thematised at different points in time and some groups such as the Southern and Eastern European were constructed more positively than for example the Roma who were characterised by exclusionary identity constructions. On the other hand, the constructions of the 'Self', the German *Leitkultur* or German pride in its economy as well as the argumentation schemes used and criteria posed towards 'Others' were not only static throughout the analysed time frame, but also show remarkable historical continuity.

The findings of the Muslim 'Other' largely confirm previous studies that have investigated the representation of Islam or the Muslim 'Other' (e.g. Hierl 2012; Halm 2013; Jäger and Halm eds. 2007; Klug 2010), while the findings on 'structural integration'

confirm some of the key arguments of earlier investigations on German immigration discourses. For instance, Schönwälder (2001) pointed out that West Germany constructed itself by placing pride in economic recovery and economic power in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, aspects of economic utility have previously been discussed in the form of migrants needing to bring skills and wealth to Germany (Bauder 2008b; Wengeler 2003). Moreover, Eder et al. (eds. 2004) identified that the same argumentation schemes and representations of migrants as criminals or as benefits abusers in the 1990s with regards to expellees, Poles and Turks.

The findings of this thesis add to this existing knowledge by providing a systematic analysis of integration discourses and by drawing on new and extensive data of five and a half years that go beyond the focus of singular issues such as the headscarf or honour killings, singular events or a pre-defined data selection on Muslims or specific migrant groups. In addition, having defined 'integration' as a two-way adaptation process between migrants and the host society, 'cultural' and 'structural integration' have been accompanied by the analysis of 'perceptions'. The data showed that 'perceptions' have only become thematised in relation to the 'refugee crisis'. While the idea of a 'welcoming culture' has been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Haller 2017), and previous research has investigated the narratives on right-wing extremism (e.g. Graef 2016), there was a gap with regards to research on the attitudes of the host society in the form of a qualitative discourse analysis, which my thesis addressed.

Moreover, the findings of the thesis add to the understanding of constructions of national identity by illustrating the co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations. In chapter 2, it was explained that national identity essentially rests on the mutually constitutive constructions of the 'Self' and the 'Other' (Aydin 2009: 176; Ricœur 1992;

Rommelsbacher 2002: 10; Hall 2004: 51). The literature review on immigration or integration discourses in Germany however revealed that most previous studies have either investigated the discursive construction of the 'Self' or of the 'Other', but less in its combined co-constitutive nature. Consequently, my thesis focused on analysing both – the 'Self' and the 'Other'. In particular, my findings demonstrate that German cultural identity is selectively constructed to oppose a Muslim 'Other' and is hence also constrained by a global opposition between the 'West' and the Muslim 'Other' (Orientalism).

On the other hand, the construction of German identity as a leading economy was argued to have a historical tradition independent of immigration or migrants that consequently imposes restrictions on possible representations of 'Others' with regards to 'structural integration'. Lastly, the construction of Germans as open-minded and welcoming required racism and racist violence to either be marginalised to the right-wing extremist 'Other' or to be legitimised ('worried citizens') by representing refugees as a cultural and criminal 'Other'.

As a result, my thesis illustrates how constructions of the 'Self' and the 'Other' are intertwined and how they influence or limit each other. All three empirical chapters note the difficulty in separating the 'Self' and the 'Other' for the purpose of the analysis and demonstrate the challenge of describing the 'Self' without already showing assumptions about the 'Other' and vice versa. This reinforces the importance of paying attention to the co-constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other' in analysing national identity constructions in integration discourses and the idea that one needs to be accompanied by the other in order to fully understand the dynamic nature of constructions of national identity. Consequently, my thesis makes an empirical contribution in this regard, but also

a theoretical contribution confirming and show-casing the dialectical nature involved in constructions of national identity.

As a result, achieving a more inclusionary construction of identity and boundary drawings is in several ways challenging. The prevailing constructions of national identity can with their synchronic and diachronic continuity be considered hegemonic. Indeed, the rather static construction of the 'Self' points towards path dependency in constructions of national identity. This means that change in content or indeed in constructions of the 'Self' is due to its hegemony and enshrined nature extremely difficult. Moreover, due to the confirmed co-constitutive nature of 'Self' and 'Other' relations, an opposing discourse with a destructive strategy, deconstructing the prevailing dichotomies, would be required in order to truly combat the discursive exclusion of 'Others'. Put differently, rejecting the negative construction of Muslims, for instance, and representing Muslims more positively in terms of cultural adaptation or structural integration only reinforces assumptions about the content of national identity, the argumentations and the requirements made for national belonging. Instead, an inclusionary boundary drawing will need to break with the dialectical dichotomy of the 'Self' and the 'Other' and draw on pluralist discourses of conviviality.

## 8.2. Theoretical Findings and Contribution

Apart from confirming the theoretical assumption of the mutually constitutive nature of the 'Self' and the 'Other', my thesis makes a theoretical contribution by confirming the criticisms and limitations of the civic/ethnic framework. The literature review revealed that most research on Germany attempting to classify constructions of national identity and explaining their inclusionary or exclusionary impact continues to draw on the dualist

conception of the civic vs. ethnic nation. I argued however that the literature has pointed out that this framework is limited for determining the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others' firstly because civic and ethnic aspects are often intertwined, and a distinction cannot always be made (Spencer and Wollman 2005a: 197-198; Smith 1995: 99; Aydin 2009: 178; Antonsich 2016: 1792); and secondly because civic constructions of identity have increasingly been used for purposes of exclusion (Antonsich 2016: 1792).

My findings confirmed the difficulty in distinguishing between civic and ethno-cultural aspects, for instance, in the context of 'cultural integration' with the 'Self's' commitment to the German constitution. While the German constitution can particularly in the form of constitutional patriotism be understood as a civic construction of identity, the laws of the constitution are also based on specific values, which represent the 'thick' aspects and have their origin in the culture of the community. This is similar to the context of 'structural integration', in which it can be argued that the requirement of education, employment and financial independency are civic aspects or duties. Yet, the emphasis on educational and professional contribution to the German economy can also be understood as the desired German work ethic that represents a deeply embedded cultural value.[31] Lastly, also in the context of 'perceptions', host society behaviour towards foreigners can be understood in legal and hence civic terms that criminal or discriminatory acts against foreigners are prohibited, but behaviour towards foreigners both positive or negative can also be seen as a 'way of doing things' and hence as a form of 'welcoming culture' or its lack thereof.

[31] See Max Weber's (1905/2002) work *The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, in which he postulates that the Protestant work ethic as a religious and cultural value is an important aspect in the emergence of capitalism.

The second criticism of civic aspects potentially also leading to exclusion was, for instance, shown by the civic aspect of gender equality in the constitution being pitched against a non-complying Muslim 'Other' and hence to exclude the Muslim 'Other' for being incompatible with the German constitution and its values. Also the civic values of education and employment led to the exclusion of 'Others' if 'Others' were constructed as not meeting or fulfilling a particular standard of education and of being self-sufficient through employment. Hence, the limitations of the civic/ethnic framework for explaining inclusionary or exclusionary constructions of national identity were confirmed.

Consequently, this thesis incorporated two new theories going beyond the civic/ethnic divide – Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) framework involving voluntarism and determinism and Karner's (2011) discourses on 'grammars of identity' – thereby making a theoretical contribution by putting these two theories into practice and exploring their explanatory value in the case of Germany. In relation to 'cultural integration' and Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) framework, the German 'Self' was argued to be predominantly deterministic because the German constitution and German values were seen as non-negotiable. Moreover, also the Muslim 'Other' was classified as deterministic because migrants/ethnic minorities were argued having to 'cut ties' in order to be part of German society.

The deterministic-deterministic relationship implied an exclusionary relationship, which was confirmed by the identified construction of the Muslim 'Other'. Furthermore, this exclusionary relationship was also confirmed by Karner's (2011) framework. The deterministic-deterministic combination was hypothesised to relate to the exclusionary orientalist discourse. Indeed, the findings confirmed that the German 'Self' was

essentially constructed in opposition to the Muslim 'Other' and that this was highly exclusionary of the Muslim 'Other'.

In relation to 'structural integration' and Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) framework, the German 'Self' as a leading economy was argued to represent a deterministic construction because of its historical continuity and particular importance for German identity. The construction of 'Others', however, was argued to be both deterministic and voluntaristic. At the most deterministic level, genetics and the family environment were argued to ensure that 'Others' and specifically Turks and Arabs were not educated, determined or able to be professionally successful and that they were basically born that way. At the voluntarist end, 'Others' were thought to be able to change based on adequate training and support, and hence to become professionally successful and self-sufficient. The deterministic-deterministic combination once again implied exclusion, while the deterministic-voluntaristic combination implied a semi-exclusionary relationship. Both assumptions were confirmed, since 'Others' were either excluded for being constructed as not having acquired the relevant skills or education to contribute to the German economy, or to be conditionally accepted based on continuous economic contribution.

Different from the chapter on 'cultural integration', and instead of drawing on Karner's (2011) orientalist discourse for the deterministic-deterministic combination and on the assimilationist discourse for the deterministic-voluntaristic combination, I argued that Karner's (2011) instrumentalist discourse fits better to national identity constructions in 'structural integration'. Instrumentalism describes the cost/benefit prism, in which educated, and professionally successful 'Others' are a benefit, and non-educated, unemployed 'Others' are considered as costs. The cost/benefit prism implies a rather

exclusionary relationship, and this was confirmed by the conditional acceptance of 'Others' based on their market 'value'.

The expectations and explanatory value of both Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) as well as of Karner's (2011) theoretical framework with regards to the inclusion or exclusion of 'Others' could be confirmed in the context of 'cultural' and 'structural integration'. Both theories thereby improved the classification of boundary drawings and confirmed their value for predicting inclusion or exclusion compared to the civic vs. ethnic framework. By assigning deterministic and voluntaristic classifications to 'Self' and 'Other' constructions, the inclusionary or exclusionary character of the constructions could be better determined than with civic and ethnic typology. However, also Karner's (2011) theory of boundary drawing assisted with regards to better understanding the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of boundary drawing by adding a classification of different types of discourses, which showed that exclusion can be based on orientalist or instrumentalist discourses. Subsequently, both theories and more so their combination helped to shed light on classifying national identity constructions.

This was different with regards to the empirical chapter of 'perceptions', in which both theoretical frameworks were limited in their explanatory value. 'Mainstream Germans' were argued to represent a voluntaristic construction because the German 'Self' was thought to have changed and to have become more open and tolerant. Also refugees as 'victims' were argued to represent a voluntaristic construction. The voluntaristic-voluntaristic combination corresponds with a discourse of conviviality in Karner's (2011) framework and implies an inclusionary relationship. At first sight this could be confirmed, since the German host society helping and being open to refugees implies inclusion for refugees. Nevertheless, I argued that the construction of 'mainstream Germans' also

served image and labour recruitment purposes and simultaneously helped to construct wider racism in society as something at the extremist end that is considered as not German. Furthermore, it was questioned whether volunteering necessarily proves that people are open-minded and free of prejudice, or whether it is rather used to conceal racism in society.

As a result, in this context, there were limitations with regards to the explanatory value of the two theories and their ability for determining inclusion and exclusion in boundary drawings. This shows that it is important to consider the context and motivations behind constructions of national identity as well as how these different discursive constructions relate to one another both within and across the categories of 'cultural' and 'structural integration' and 'perceptions'. Arguably both theories were developed in relation to migrants' adaptation towards the host society but not with regards to general attitudes held by the host society with regards to the presence of migrants. I argue, however, that this aspect of 'perceptions' is crucial for determining whether national identity is ultimately inclusionary or exclusionary of 'Others'.

Subsequently, instead of rejecting the two theories, I suggest that they complement each other and could be enhanced by adding another mechanism for the context of 'perceptions'. In Kriegbaum Jensen's (2014) framework, the voluntarism/determinism dualism is more difficult to expand. While I think that the theory is very useful, since it not only involves a categorisation for boundary drawings but also for the 'Self' and the 'Other' on their own, this theory could benefit from adding another dimension. The ability to change (voluntarism) may on its own not be able to determine inclusion in the context of 'perceptions' and beyond if we do not ask for what purpose and change in which direction – whether this relates to the 'Self' or the 'Other'. Therefore, the combination

with Karner's (2011) theory here was useful since the different boundary drawings in the form of discourses entailed assumptions about purposes and motivations.

Karner's (2011) theory on its own however only classifies boundary drawings but does not make singular assumptions about the 'Self' or the 'Other'. As a result, both theories can be seen to complementary to each other. Moreover, in relation to Karner's (2011) framework, a new discourse involving a dual possibility such as with the instrumentalist discourse (cost/benefit) or the integrationist one (assimilationist/social cohesion) could be added in order to explain inclusion or exclusion in the context of 'perceptions'. This could be along the lines of a 'differentiating discourse' with the possibilities of 'countering racism' and 'concealing racism', whereby the former would be considered inclusionary and the latter exclusionary. With this also a new causal pathway between voluntarism/determinism and the 'differentiating discourse' would need to be established.

## 8.3. Methodological Contribution

The thesis also makes a methodological contribution firstly by drawing on a broader set of data. The data selection went beyond particular key events and instead involved a larger time frame of five and a half years. Moreover, the collected data was sampled systematically, which avoided the selection of articles based on their discursive content and hence countered the criticism of 'cherry-picking', which is often directed at critical discourse analysts.

Secondly, this thesis made a methodological contribution to the existing literature by using CDA in the context of analysing constructions of national identity in Germany. Previous documentary research into the constructions of national identity in relation to migration in Germany have drawn on quantitative text analysis (Klug 2010), qualitative

content analysis (Halm 2013; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2010), framing (Rauer and Schmidtke 2001), grounded theory (Rauer 2009) or singular aspects of discourse analysis such as topoi (Sauter 2009) or non-specified discourse analysis (Jonker 2013; Korteweg and Yurdakul 2014), which are arguable insufficient for analysing the discursive construction of the 'Self' and the 'Other'.

Wengeler (2003) developed argumentation structures (topoi) in relation to the German immigration discourse of the 1960s to the 1980s in Germany, and Bauder (2008a, 2008b, 2011) analysed in his various contributions the topoi employed in the immigration discourse from 2000-2004. While topoi form an essential part in this thesis's analysis, this thesis however went beyond the investigation of topoi by drawing on Wodak's et al. (1999) three layered DHA of contents, strategies and topoi, and linguistic means of realisation. I argue that an investigation of boundary drawings between the 'Self' and the 'Other' requires such an in-depth analysis in order to get the full picture of the dynamics of discursive constructions, and for instance, the additional linguistic means such as the language used, represent a powerful tool for analysing *how* we construct the 'Self' and the 'Other'.

## 8.4. Wider Implications

The thesis addresses a significant and timely-relevant subject matter in Germany. The media is a particular powerful actor and it has been argued that "even short exposure to a daily newspaper appears to influence voting behaviour and may affect turnout" (Gerber et al. 2009: 47). As a result, identifying exclusionary discourse in the media is important for combatting discrimination and the exclusion of different groups in society. With rising levels of diversity in the population - there were 20.8 million people with a so-called

migrant background in Germany in 2018 comprising 25% of the German population (Groll 2019) – and an increase in hate speech, right-wing extremism (BKA 2015) and nationalist slogans (e.g. Roßmann 2018), insights into the constructions of identity and negotiations of belonging can in this era of polarization help to explain the context and practice of exclusionary discourse.

Lastly, the issue of simultaneously rising levels of diversity and nationalism are not restricted to Germany. The use of religious differences as legitimation for exclusion of migrants and minorities has similarly been used by Eastern European countries with their proclamation of being 'Christian countries'. Brexit can furthermore be understood based on group identities and a framework of 'Us' vs. 'Them' (Critin et al. 2016). Far-right discourse and by now also mainstream discourse in the US has been argued to comprise "a toxic mix of racial and religious intolerance" towards those considered as 'Others' (Beauchamp 2017). Indeed, it can be argued that with the number of refugees worldwide alone, there is no end to migration and the continuous mix of people of different ethnicities. Hence, the case of Germany can serve as an insight and basis for understanding the processes and aspects of the construction of national identity in other countries.

In addition, insights into the construction of national identity in the case of Germany can also be useful with regards to studies on diaspora politics. While rising nationalism does not only affect the discourse and treatment of internal migrants and minorities, nationalism also affects the policy towards diasporas. For instance, Turkish President Erdogan has been mentioned in the data several times for speaking out on integration matters of Turks in Germany, while acting as a patron for safeguarding Turks from a supposed 'Germanisation' and against anti-Muslim discrimination. German discursive

constructions and the ‘Othering’ and hence exclusion of (ethnic) Turks in Germany suits Turkey as a sending state not least because Turkish passport holders in Germany identifying with Turkey can form a good number of the electorate, but also because Turkey can mobilise (ethnic) Turks in Germany and expand “its identity as a majority Muslim country as a source of soft power” (Adamson 2019: 225). As a result, discursive constructions of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ in Germany can also be relevant and intertwined with the construction of identity of sending states and can hence affect sending states’ diaspora policy. Moreover, the insights on the discursive constructions of identity have wider implications going beyond the case of migrants. Processes of group identification and delimitation can also be found with regards to different ethnic minorities within a country, native populations, or separatist movements. While the contexts may be different, the construction of a group identity will still have to entail boundary drawings of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ and will have to negotiate these in discourse. Moreover, also identity ‘contents’ in the form of cultural and socio-economic aspects will be drawn upon by ethnic minorities and native populations and will be relevant for the construction of a number of group identities.

## 8.5. Limitations and Further Research

This thesis focused due to restrictions of time and space on the discourses of the German print news media. The news media was chosen as one form of elite discourse because it is important due to its function of mass communication and because it plays a powerful role in setting the agenda and in advancing particular constructions of reality. Nevertheless, other sources of elite discourse such as statements and speeches by

politicians, party manifestos and communications could be investigated for a fuller picture of national identity constructions in (migrant) integration discourses.

Furthermore, while CDA has traditionally focused on elite discourses, it may be interesting to see how 'ordinary people' receive, reproduce or negotiate communicated constructions of national identity. Although there are many surveys and opinion polls on people's attitudes on immigration, these studies are due to closed survey questions and quantitative analysis, limited with regards to our understanding on people's discursive construction of national identity. Discursive structures, linguistic choices as well as argumentation structures cannot be identified as part of structured surveys. Yet, there is only limited qualitative research on discursive constructions of national identity of 'ordinary people'. For instance, Ehrkamp (2006) included 21 Germans in her ethnographic study with 39 Turkish people in Germany in 1998-2000 in order to identify local assimilation discourses in the city of Duisburg. Miller-Idriss and Rothenberg (2012) studied identity constructions of ordinary people through interviews from 2000-2002 in order to analyse how pride and shame are constructed in German identity. Furthermore, Miller-Idriss (2006) investigated in 60 interviews in 2000-2001 how young German people understand citizenship. As a result, research into the re-contextualization of 'ordinary people' of the German majority population is still under researched.

In addition, this study selected a time frame of five and a half years in order to not only analyse constructions of national identity in relation to a specific event or group, but to be able to show a fuller picture of current/recent discourses and constructions of identity. However, this thesis did not attempt to analyse change in discourse over time. Hence, a longitudinal study over a longer period such as of 20 years could provide further understanding of continuance or change in integration discourses and their constructions

of national identity. Moreover, further research could follow-up on the discursive constructions of 'EU migrants' and explore the politics of differentiation and their changes over time. Lastly, as Müller (2018: 275) points out, it would be interesting to see how identified discursive constructions about the 'Self' and the 'Other' relate to "changes in public opinion, voting behaviour and legislation".

For this thesis, Germany was chosen as a case study because it represents a key case amongst 'Western countries' with regards to the explicit tension between increasing diversity and a commitment to pluralism, and the continued focus and emphasis on ethno-cultural ideas. While the literature on different 'Western countries' is relatively abundant in this regard, 'non-Western countries' could be excellent case studies for further research. It would be interesting to see for example how Mexico constructs its national identity between being 'Othered' by the US, while being a host society for 'Others' such as citizens from Guatemala, Honduras or El Salvador at the same time. Yet, research on the inclusionary/exclusionary nature of constructions of national identity does not necessarily have to focus on the context of migrants but can also investigate this in relation to ethnic minorities and ethnic or separatist conflicts.

Finally, the main purpose of this thesis beyond identifying different constructions of national identity was to find out whether these constructions lead to the inclusion or exclusion of different groups of people in society considered as 'Others'. In order to combat racism in society and to encourage discursive inclusion, exclusionary discourse first must be identified and understood. This research project attempted to show the dynamic and co-constitutive relationship between the 'Self' and the 'Other' and tried to highlight exclusionary boundary drawings by classifying them with the help of two different theories. While the showcasing of exclusionary discursive practice is essential

for combatting racism and exclusion in society, further research could focus on strategies directly countering racist and nationalist discourse or hate speech.

The last few years have not only shown that right-wing parties in Europe have increased their share of votes with their anti-immigration rhetoric, but that such discourse has entered the political mainstream as well as executive offices. In Italy, former Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini suggested actions against Roma and refugees, while criminalising those rescuing migrants at sea. Meanwhile, in Germany, Minister of the Interior Seehofer called migration in the wake of right-wing extremist demonstrations to be "the mother of all problems" (Roßmann 2018). Eastern European countries continue to reject the admission of refugees, while one of the key factors in the referendum on EU membership in the UK was the issue of (ending) freedom of movement (Critin et al. 2016). Finally, US President Trump referred to Mexican immigrants as 'rapists' and enforced the separation and detention of migrant families.

This increase in nationalism and exclusionary discourse and practice has moreover inspired racist violence. In Germany, attacks against refugees and their accommodation were at a record high in 2015 (BKA 2015). Moreover, the life of the now Mayor of Cologne, Henriette Reker, was in danger after being attacked with a knife on 17 October 2015 due to her work of accommodating refugees (*Spiegel Online* 2016). On the other hand, German politician Walter Lübcke was shot in his garden by a right-wing extremist due to his pro-refugee stance (Giebel et al. 2019). Well-known examples of racist, right-wing extremist violence in other countries include the Christchurch mosque shooting in New Zealand (Mercer 2019), the attack on migrants in Macerata in Italy (*The Guardian* 2018) and the El Paso shooting in the US, in which the perpetrator attempted to gun down Mexicans (Fernández Campbell 2019). As a result, with rising nationalism and even

violent attacks against people considered as ‘Others’ or those supporting them, it is more important than ever to not only point out exclusionary or racist discourse and practices, but to also find better means to fight against them.

# APPENDIX

## A. Qualitative Content Analysis

### 1. *'Cultural Integration'*

*a) Coverage over Time and Events*

Articles that were assigned the category 'cultural integration' were published throughout the time frame with the greatest numbers of articles in 2010, 2012, and 2015 and the lowest number in 2013. All four newspapers followed a similar pattern with a peak in 2010 that first decreased for 2011 before increasing again for 2012. All four media outlets published a lower number of articles in 2013, before the number picked up again in 2014 except for *Der Spiegel* and continued to rise in 2015 except for *Die Bild*.

*Figure A.1: 'Cultural Integration' Totals July 2010 to December 2015*





*Figure A.2: 'Cultural Integration' by Newspaper over Time*




In all five years, there were events that the newspapers reported on. These events comprised discussions on religious issues and mostly Islam, discussions on German culture versus other cultures as well as the consequences and impact on social cohesion following these religious and cultural issues. The table below shows an overview of identified events that the newspapers reported on in relation to 'cultural integration'. The events identified in 2010 can all be viewed with regards to the publication of Sarrazin's (2010) book *Germany does away with itself* that was purposefully selected to initiate the chosen time frame. Also the final two events identified in 2015 can be seen as part of the purposefully selected event of the 'refugee crisis' that was used to frame the end of the chosen time frame.

The remaining events identified in articles on 'cultural integration' comprised several scheduled political events such as the yearly German Islam conference or speeches held

by Turkish President Erdogan. On the other hand, non-foreseen identified events entailed the outcome of a new court ruling on religious dress codes in public services, a discussion on male circumcision following the severe injuries of a boy, and above all discussions on cultural belonging as a result of international conflict and violent attacks. The table furthermore shows that topics relating to 'cultural integration' were continuously reported on throughout the selected time frame.

*Table A.1: Events related to 'Cultural Integration'*


| **Time** | **Event** | ***FAZ*** | ***SZ*** | ***Bild*** | ***Spiegel*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug-10 | Publication of Sarrazin's (2010) book *Germany does away with itself* | X | X | X | X |
| Oct-10 | Federal President Wulff's speech on German unity | X | X | X | X |
| Oct-10 | CSU leader Seehofer's demand of an immigration stop from 'other cultures' | X | X | O | O |
| Oct-10 | Merkel's statement that the approach to multiculturalism has failed | X | X | X | O |
| Feb-11 | The construction of a mosque in Cologne | X | X | O | O |
| Mar-11 | Erdogan's speech in Germany | X | X | O | X |
| Mar-11 | CSU proposal to write down the necessity of integration into the constitution | X | X | O | O |
| Mar-11 | Yearly Islam conference | X | X | X | O |
| Aug-11 | Islamic classes in school | X | X | O | O |
| Oct-11 | Jubilee of Turkish guest worker treaties | O | X | X | O |
| Mar-12 | Publication of a study on integration | X | X | X | X |
| Mar-12 | Publication of a study about Muslims | X | X | X | O |
| Apr-12 | Yearly Islam conference | X | O | X | O |
| Jun-Dec-12 | Discussions surrounding male circumcision | X | X | X | X |
| Aug-12 | Start of Islamic school classes in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) | X | X | O | O |
| May-13 | Yearly Islam conference | X | X | O | O |
| Sep-13 | Court ruling on Muslim girls having to participate in swimming classes | X | X | X | O |
| Jul-14 | Gaza war; anti-Israel demonstrations in Germany | X | O | X | X |
| Aug-14 | Arson attack on synagogue | O | X | O | O |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dec-14 | Keynote motion on German language (CSU) | X | X | O | O |
| Oct-Dec-14 | Discussions on the prohibition of the burka | X | X | X | O |
| Jan-15 | Reactions to Paris attack - Merkel says Islam is part of Germany | X | X | X | O |
| Mar-15 | New supreme court ruling on the veil for public school teachers | X | O | X | X |
| Sep-Nov-15 | Discussion on German codes of conduct and 'guiding culture' (refugees) | X | X | X | X |
| Oct-Nov-15 | Discussion on anti-Semitism of Muslim refugees | X | X | O | X |

*b) Themes*

The category 'cultural integration' was divided into the following themes: 'German language', 'German values', 'Islam', 'other culture', 'crime', 'xenophobia', 'male circumcision' and 'religion'. Of these themes, 'crime' and 'German language' also have a structural version, but the structural version was not discussed or quantified as part of 'cultural integration'.

*Figure A.3: Themes of 'Cultural Integration' by Newspaper*




(1) ‘German Language’ & ‘German Values’

‘German language’ and ‘German values’ were two themes identified as aspects of German culture and ‘cultural integration’. The two themes were often mentioned simultaneously within one article. Articles with the theme ‘German language’ discussed whether speaking German is required for successful integration and ultimately for becoming part of German society. For instance, *Die Bild* affirmed in its title that “Speaking German should be put into the constitution” (10.9.2010, p. 1) and *Die Süddeutsche* informed its readers that “Foreigners should learn German within one year” (12.11.2010, p. 24), while *Die FAZ* quoted that “German is a requirement for integration” (21.9.2011, p. 4).


With regards to publications over time, most articles on ‘German language’ were published in 2010 and 2011 and only a minority was published in 2012 and 2013. The rise of the issue in 2010 was caused by the ‘Sarrazin debate’ and Chancellor Merkel’s subsequent remark of the failing approach to multiculturalism. This involved the idea that migrants had not made enough effort to learn German and that this would be required for integration. While this debate continued into 2011, also the 50-year jubilee of the Turkish guest worker treaties kept the issue of ‘German language’ relevant. The publications in 2014, on the other hand, mostly corresponded with the CSU’s keynote motion on families needing to speak German at home, while the publications in 2015 were in relation to the increasing number of refugees.

*Figure A.4: Articles on 'German Language' by Newspaper over Time*




Articles with the theme ‘German values’, on the other hand, comprised aspects ranging from German traffic laws, rules of politeness all the way to historical knowledge about Germany and the German constitution. For instance, *Die Bild* titled that “Those who come to us, have to know the rules of the game” (30.9.2015, p. 2) and *Die FAZ* talked about a “Code of conduct for refugees” (9.10.2015, p. 5). Furthermore, ‘German values’ also involved the discussions surrounding a German ‘guiding culture’. The idea of a German “guiding culture” featured in the headlines of all four newspapers (*Der Spiegel*, issue 45, 2015, p. 12; *Die Bild*, 5.10.2015, p. 2; *Die Süddeutsche*, 20.10.2010, p. 6; *Die FAZ*, 10.10.2015, p. 10). Articles on ‘German values’ were more than other themes on ‘cultural integration’ restricted to the two key events of the ‘Sarrazin debate’ and the arrival of refugees, and hence to the years 2010 and 2015.

*Figure A.5: Articles on 'German Values' by Newspapers over Time*





(2) 'Islam'

The theme 'Islam' was created for grouping content on Islam. It comprised various aspects including discussions on Islamic classes in schools, school swimming classes for girls, the headscarf and the burqa, mosques in Germany and the education of Imams, the Islam conference, values of Islam and their compatibility with German culture, and ultimately whether Islam can be part of Germany. For instance, *Die Süddeutsche* reported on "Islam-teaching in schools" (4.7.2011, p. 18) and "Courses for Imams" (6.10.2010, p. 6), while *Die Bild* informed its readers that "Germany discusses the prohibition of the burqa" (2.12.2014, p. 2) and that the "Sharia-police patrols Wuppertal" (6.9.2014, p. 7). *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, reported on "The jihad and Islam" (issue 6, 2015, pp. 104-107) and questioned "Risky sermons" (issue 42, 2010, p. 56). Lastly, *Die FAZ*, discussed the topics "Burqa or liberty" (2.7.2014, p. 1) and the "Five theses for a German Islam" (1.2.2015, p. 8).

The theme ‘Islam’ had by far the largest number of articles published as part of ‘cultural integration’, which shows the importance of religion or more specifically of Islam in debates about cultural identity in integration discourses. With regards to articles published on ‘Islam’ over time, the graph below illustrates that the highest number was published in 2010 followed by a decrease to a low in 2013 and an increase again for 2014 and 2015. This dynamic can be explained considering that the two main events framing the selected time frame were both directly relevant to ‘Islam’. The ‘Sarrazin debate’ was evoked by the idea of *Muslims* being unable to integrate into German society and the arrival of refugees consisted of mostly *Muslim* refugees. At the same time, however, the continuous reporting on the issue shows the consistency of ‘Islam’ in integration debates.


*Figure A.6: Articles on 'Islam' by Newspaper over Time*



(3) ‘Male Circumcision’

‘Male circumcision’ was singled out as a separate theme and not included in the theme on ‘Islam’ because it also involved Jewish culture and tradition that added an extra layer and different dynamic to the debate. Since the political and legal debate on male circumcision took place mostly in the second half of 2012, all articles except one from *Die Bild* were published in 2012. On the one hand, *Der Spiegel* ran the title “Unacceptable pain” (issue 30, 2012, pp. 124-125). On the other hand, after the German government decided to keep male circumcision legal, *Die Bild* concluded that “Jewish life in Germany is safe” (9.11.2012, p. 1).

*Figure A.7: Articles on 'Male Circumcision' by Newspaper in 2012*




(4) Further Themes

The theme ‘religion’ was intended to represent theological articles or articles that discuss the co-existence of different religions and religious institutions without the particular emphasis of Islam only. Since this theme was only identified in a minor number of articles for two newspapers, it was further neglected in the analysis. The theme ‘other culture’ entailed articles that depicted further cultural ‘Others’ that were not or not directly referred to as Muslims. This mostly included articles reporting on Turkish or Jewish culture. *Die Süddeutsche* talked about “How Turks shape Germany” (22.10.2011, pp. 8-9) and about “Alina Treiger, an in Berlin educated rabbi, who is the first after 75 years” (4.11.2010, p. 4). *Die Bild* further reported in one article about Poles titling “Poles have made our village richer” (7.11.2012, p. 9), while *Der Spiegel* talked about African refugees and African culture (issue 41, 2012, p. 71). The number of articles on the theme ‘other culture’ was however also very small.

Furthermore, the two themes of ‘crime’ and ‘xenophobia’ were identified in the data as the supposed behaviour of migrants and ethnic minorities, but more precisely as the behaviour of Muslims. ‘Crime’ involved articles discussing crimes committed by ethnic minorities that were specifically argued to be committed because of their ethnic or cultural background and were hence relevant to ‘cultural integration’. Most of the identified articles covered crimes that in the dominant discourse were referred to as honour killings or forced marriages. For instance, *Die FAZ* titled “An escape route out of forced marriage” (8.11.2011, p. 10) and *Der Spiegel* titled “The lost honour of the Khan family” (issue 42, 2015, pp. 46-48). All four newspapers reported on this theme, although not many articles were published overall. There were no specific patterns or trends, and the newspapers did almost exclusively report on different examples of committed crimes.

*Figure A.8: Articles on 'Crime' by Newspaper over Time*





The theme 'xenophobia' represented articles that describe xenophobic or discriminatory behaviour of migrants and ethnic minorities. On the one hand, this xenophobic behaviour was found to be hostility against 'Germans'/non-ethnic minorities. For example, *Die Bild* titled "Hostility towards Germans at German schools" (7.10.2010, p. 3). On the other hand, the reporting focused on Muslims displaying anti-Semitic behaviour as with *Die Süddeutsche* questioning "Do refugees bring more anti-Semitism to Germany?" (21.9.2015, p. 9).

Similar to the theme on 'crime', all four newspapers reported on 'xenophobia', although the number of articles was also comparatively small. Articles were mostly published in 2010, 2014 and 2015, but newspapers significantly differed in their reporting and quantity of articles over time. Hence, also for 'xenophobia', there was no specific pattern and newspapers mostly reported on different examples. For instance, *Die Bild* reacted to the anti-Israel demonstrations in the wake of the Gaza war in 2014, thereby reporting on

Muslims voicing anti-Semitism. *Die FAZ* instead responded to published studies on anti-Semitism amongst Muslim migrants in March and October 2015, while *Die Süddeutsche* picked up on these discussions in September and November 2015.

*Figure A.9: Articles on 'Xenophobia' by Newspaper over Time*





In conclusion, it can be noted that 'Islam' was by far the most frequent theme in articles on 'cultural integration', followed by the themes of 'German language' and 'German values'. While a greater number of articles on 'cultural integration' was published during the major events of the 'Sarrazin debate' in 2010 and the 'refugee crisis' in 2015, articles were also published at different points in time depending on the theme in question. For instance, the theme 'male circumcision' occurred only in 2012 and the theme 'crime' mostly in 2010, while the theme 'xenophobia' was found mostly in 2014. Furthermore, despite the 2010 and 2015 peak, the theme 'Islam' featured continuously throughout the time frame.

## 2. *'Structural Integration'*

### *a) Coverage over Time and Events*

While articles on 'structural integration' were mostly published in 2015, there was also a steady number of publications between 2010 and 2014. The spike in the number of articles for 2015 can be explained with the increasing number of refugees and the concern of integrating refugees quickly into the labour market.

*Figure A.10: 'Structural Integration' Totals July 2010 to December 2015*




The trend for all four newspapers was similar. Since the overall number of articles for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* was much lower than for *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ*, this is difficult to show in one graph. Hence, the graph was split for the two newspaper pairs. While the number of articles for *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* followed a u-shaped pattern with a large increase for 2015 (see *Figure A.11*), the number of articles for *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* also had its lowest point in 2012 and showed an increase towards the year 2015 (see *Figure A.12*).

*Figure A.11: Articles for Die FAZ and Die Süddeutsche over Time*






*Figure A.12: Articles for Der Spiegel and Die Bild over Time*



In all five years, there were events, on which all four newspapers reported. During the 'Sarrazin debate', the media focused on the educational achievements and employment rates of Turks, while in 2013 and 2014, the emphasis shifted to the education and employment of Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants gaining freedom of movement on 1 January 2014. This also included the discussion of so-called 'poverty migrants', welfare benefits and the Roma. From the end of 2014 onward and particularly the second half of 2015, the focus was largely on the education and employment of refugees. In addition, on various occasions including in July 2011, February/March 2013, October/November 2013 and February/March 2014, the media reported on the government's proposals surrounding dual citizenship. The following table shows an overview of identified events directly or indirectly related to 'structural integration' that the newspapers reported on.

*Table A.2: Events related to 'Structural Integration'*


| **Time** | **Event** | ***FAZ*** | ***SZ*** | ***Bild*** | ***Spiegel*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul-10 | Federal court rules on benefits for asylum seekers | O | X | O | O |
| Aug-10 | Sarrazin's book publication *Germany does away with itself* | X | X | X | X |
| Oct-10 | Federal President Wulff's speech on German unity | X | O | O | O |
| Mar-11 | Erdogan's speech in Germany | X | O | O | O |
| Mar-11 | New rule on the recognition of foreign qualifications | X | X | O | O |
| Jul-11 | New citizenship proposal | X | X | O | O |
| Oct-11 | Jubilee of Turkish guest worker treaties | X | X | X | X |
| Jan-12 | Publication of a study on integration | X | X | X | O |
| Feb-12 | National Integration Plan (more migrants into public service) | X | X | X | O |
| Jun-12 | Publication of a study on the education of migrants | X | X | X | O |
| Jul-12 | Federal court ruling on benefits for asylum seekers | X | X | X | O |
| Sep-12 | Book publication by Buschkowsky | X | X | X | O |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Feb-Mar-13 | Discussions surrounding the anticipation of freedom of movement for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens | X | X | X | X |
| Feb-Mar-13 | Initiative for new ruling on dual citizenship | X | X | X | O |
| May-13 | Initiative for more migrants in public service | X | X | O | O |
| Jul-13 | Employment of asylum seekers at a local train station and subsequent discussion on minimum wage | X | X | X | O |
| Sep-13 | Federal court ruling on benefits for asylum seekers | O | X | O | O |
| Oct-13 | Start of debate on 'poverty migrants' | X | X | X | X |
| Oct-Nov-13 | New coalition government discusses dual citizenship | X | X | O | X |
| Nov-Dec-13 | Peak of debate on 'poverty migrants' and benefits | X | X | X | O |
| Jan-Apr-14 | Lifting of restrictions on freedom of movement for Romanians and Bulgarians and benefits discussion | X | X | X | O |
| Feb-Mar-14 | Negotiations on dual citizenship | X | X | O | X |
| May-14 | Court ruling on benefits for EU migrants | O | X | X | O |
| Aug-Dec-14 | Continuing discussions on benefits for EU migrants | X | X | X | X |
| Since Oct-14 | Increasing number of refugees – discussions on the 'structural integration' of refugees | X | X | X | X |
| Nov-14 | Government announces 1 billion Euros for refugee integration | X | X | O | O |
| Jun-15 | Integration of refugees into the labour market – programmes and finances | X | X | O | O |
| Aug-15 | Fights in refugee accommodation centres | X | X | X | O |
| Sep-15 | School start for many refugee children | X | X | O | O |
| Sep-Oct-15 | Debate on employment for refugees (access, exploitation and minimum wage) | X | X | X | X |
| Oct-15 | Fights in refugee accommodation centres | X | X | X | X |
| Nov-15 | Seehofer's (CSU) statement on integration costs | X | X | O | O |
| Nov-Dec-15 | CSU asks for integration law again | X | X | O | X |

*b) Themes*

Several themes were identified as part of 'structural integration': These included 'political integration', 'citizenship', 'costs', 'finance', 'integration measures', 'labour market', 'education', 'German language', 'welfare benefits', 'poverty', 'crime' and 'ethnic segregation'. The following graph provides an overview of the frequencies of these themes:

*Figure A.13: Themes of 'Structural Integration' by Newspaper*





(1) 'Labour Market'

The theme 'labour market' was used to code several aspects surrounding the employment of migrants and ethnic minorities. This firstly included the reporting of the employment or unemployment of migrants itself. For instance, *Die Bild* reported that "Foreigners are

twice as often unemployed" (28.6.2012, p. 1), while *Die FAZ* informed its readers that "Migrants find work quicker" (23.3.2013, p. 14). 'Labour market' also entailed the issue of access to the labour market and training for employment. *Die FAZ* titled "Asylum seekers should be able to work earlier" (7.7.2014, p. 15) and *Der Spiegel* noted that the "[German] Train qualifies refugees" (issue 46, 2015, p. 74). Further aspects of 'labour market' revolved around employment policy and more specifically the recognition of qualifications as well as making the public sector more diverse by employing more ethnic minorities. For instance, *Die FAZ* announced that "The government plans the recognition of foreign certificates" (19.10.2010, p. 1), while *Die Bild* titled that "The government wants to employ more migrants" (1.2.2012, p. 2). Lastly, also aspects of discrimination and exploitation on the labour market were coded under 'labour market'. With regards to discrimination, for example, *Die Süddeutsche* maintained that "Ayse has it more difficult than Anna" (31.10.2014, p. 5) and that "All want to [work], but are not allowed to" (1.9.2015b, p. 18). Lastly, *Der Spiegel* reported on the exploitation of migrant workers titling "Legal slavery" (issue 21, 2011, p. 44).

The theme 'labour market' accounted for the largest number of articles on 'structural integration'. Most articles on 'labour market' were published in 2015 with particularly *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* reporting a great number of articles on the employment possibilities for refugees. Yet, the number of articles found between 2010 and 2014 was also steady and still higher compared to the number of articles found for other themes of 'structural integration'.


*Figure A.14: Articles on 'Labour Market' by Newspaper over Time*




(2) 'Education'

With the theme 'education', all aspects surrounding the education of migrants and ethnic minorities as well as the impact of diversity on education were coded. This ranged from articles discussing education as early as nursery, to those discussing school and university, but also included articles on specific vocational education as well as related aspects such as scholarships. For instance, *Die Bild* judged "Asylum seekers [to] have an educational deficit of several years" (8.12.2015, p. 2) and *Die FAZ* informed its readers that "Syrian school children have learnt little" (9.12.2015, p. 17). Yet, *Die FAZ* also recognised "Successes for migrants in the education system" (28.6.2012, p. 5), and *Die Süddeutsche* titled "More foreigners with the Abitur" (28.6.2012, p. 6). The frequency of articles on 'education' thereby mirrored the u-shaped pattern of *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* for 'structural integration' with peaks in 2010 and 2015.


*Figure A.15: Articles on 'Education' by Newspaper over Time*




(3) 'German Language'

'German language' here as part of 'structural integration' referred to articles discussing the language skills of migrants and ethnic minorities mostly in relation to career prospects but also in relation to language acquisition and communication purposes themselves. For instance, *Die Bild* cited a migrant saying, "I learnt German in the football club" (19.10.2011, p. 3), and argued that "Foreign doctors should take the German test" (12.3.2013, p. 6). *Die Süddeutsche* informed its readers about "Language difficulties" (12.4.2014, p. 28), meanwhile *Die FAZ* reported on migrants' "First German course" (10.11.2015, p. 13). The frequency of the theme 'German language' was smaller compared to the previous two themes and was also more confined to the years 2010, 2011, and 2015. In addition, *Der Spiegel* only published a limited number of articles on this theme and in 2012 only.

*Figure A.16: Articles on 'German Language' by Newspaper over Time*





(4) 'Integration Measures'

The theme 'integration measures' described articles reporting on government initiatives towards migrants that were intended to improve German language skills and to facilitate labour market access. The most commonly mentioned governmental support were the integration courses offered by the government. For instance, *Die FAZ* announced "More language courses for refugees" (12.6.2015, p. 18), while *Der Spiegel* criticised "Longer waiting times for language courses" (issue 34, 2015, p. 30). 'Integration measures' also entailed discussions surrounding an integration law that was called for by some political parties. For instance, *Die Bild* informed its readers that "Böhmer announces integration treaties starting in spring" (17.1.2011, p. 2) or *Die FAZ* advised about an "Integration law [being] put forward in Berlin" (4.8.2010, p. 4). Lastly, the theme 'integration measures' entailed various other aspects ranging from government health policy towards migrants to laws about opening a bank account. For example, *Die Süddeutsche* published the

headline “The difficult path to the bank account” (26.9.2015, p. 27) and “Fast to the doctor” (23.9.2015b, p. 6), while *Die Bild* titled “SPD in favour of driver’s license test in Arabic” (19.9.2015, p. 1). With regards to publications over time, the theme ‘integration measures’ was mostly found in articles in 2010 and 2015, since the ‘Sarrazin debate’ and the ‘refugee crisis’ both stirred up questions about integration policy and adopted measures by the government.

*Figure A.17: Articles on 'Integration Measures' by Newspaper over Time*





(5) ‘Costs’ & ‘Finance’

The theme ‘costs’ was coded for articles discussing the costs of ‘structural integration’ and was closely related to ‘finance’, which described the issue of money being sought or requested for fostering ‘structural integration’. The theme ‘costs’ was mostly identified in relation to refugees and for *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ*. For instance, *Die*


*Süddeutsche* titled "Seehofer: Integration will cost billions" (4.11.2015, p. 1), while *Die FAZ* reported on the "Arguments over the costs of refugees" (11.10.2014, p. 4).

*Figure A.18: Articles on 'Costs' by Newspaper over Time*




The theme 'finance' was found to be a bit more frequent over the years despite its 2015 peak and was found to be much more relevant for *Die Süddeutsche*. In comparison to 'costs', the emphasis was not on how much a particular measure or policy costs, but that there is a financial need for specific measures or that an investment should be made. For instance, *Die FAZ* reported that there needs to be "More money for refugees" (18.12.2014, p. 4) and *Die Süddeutsche* argued that "Local councils ask for millions for refugees" (7.5.2015, p. 44).

*Figure A.19: Articles on 'Finance' by Newspaper over Time*





(6) 'Welfare Benefits'

The theme 'welfare benefits' was coded for articles discussing the issue of migrants/ethnic minorities receiving a range of different welfare benefits. This theme was mostly found in relation to Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants, but also in relation to refugees, Lebanese and Turks. Hence, the number of articles published on 'welfare benefits' was relatively continuous over the years, yet articles published in 2010 were in relation to Lebanese and Turks, while articles published in 2013 and 2014 were mostly in relation to Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants, and the articles published in 2015 were mostly in relation to refugees. Examples included *Die Süddeutsche* informing its readers about "More Hartz IV for Bulgarians"[32] (12.6.2014, p. 5) and *Die Bild* that "Germany paid for 95452 children abroad" (7.11.2014, p. 2). *Die FAZ* noted that there will be

[32] Hartz IV is the name for a particular type of social welfare benefits programme in Germany.

"Harsher punishment for benefits abuse" (28.8.2014, p. 15) and that "Almost a fifth more refugees receive Hartz IV" (31.10.2015, p. 19).


*Figure A.20: Articles on 'Welfare Benefits' by Newspaper over Time*




(7) 'Poverty'

The theme 'poverty' described the poverty of migrants and ethnic minorities, often also referring to them as 'poverty migrants'. The theme 'poverty' was mostly identified in relation to Romanian and Bulgarian immigrants and was hence found in articles published in 2013 and 2014, since they acquired freedom of movement in the EU on 1 January 2014. *Der Spiegel* titled "Wooden bed without pillow" (issue 9, 2013, p. 36) and "Precarious relations" (issue 6, 2013, p. 17). *Die Süddeutsche* published the headline "Arrived aloof" (14.10.2011, p. 6) and *Die FAZ* titled "The Basement inhabitants" (22.2.2013, p. 1), while *Die Bild* noted that "Migrants are more often threatened by poverty in age" (9.7.2013, p. 1).

*Figure A.21: Articles on 'Poverty' by Newspaper over Time*





(8) 'Crime'

'Crime' was coded as part of 'structural integration' for the reporting of crimes that were not outright associated with cultural factors as for example the 'honour killings'. Instead, articles of this theme reported on general statistics, crimes following poverty and socio-economic problems as well as crimes committed by asylum seekers and refugees. *Die Bild* informed its readers about migrant/ethnic minority crime numbers in its article "The bitter truth about violence and crime" (20.9.2012, p. 9). *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, discussed the consequences of socio-economic problems and the dealing of drugs in its article "End of line Görli" (issue 14, 2013, pp. 38-41). All four newspapers reported on criminal activities and mostly fights of refugees in refugee accommodation centres (*Bild*, 16.10.2015, p. 3; *Spiegel*, issue 41, 2015, pp. 28-30; *Süddeutsche*, 26.10.2015, p. 5; *FAZ*, 28.9.2015, p. 5). Since most of the articles on 'crime' were in relation to refugees, they

were published in 2015. The frequencies of this theme for the other years were rather small.

*Figure A.22: Articles on 'Crime' by Newspaper over Time*





(9) ‘Ethnic Segregation’

The theme ‘ethnic segregation’ on the one hand described the physical segregation of migrants and ethnic minorities into different neighbourhoods. Socio-economic factors such as poverty or the asylum process as well as refugee accommodation centres were mentioned as reasons for ‘ethnic segregation’. *Die Süddeutsche* titled “No refugee flats” (8.8.2015, p. 8) and *Die FAZ* noted “Berlin realities” (29.10.2010, p. 4) in this regard. On the other hand, ‘ethnic segregation’ also had a cultural explanation and the idea of ‘parallel societies’, when migrants or ethnic minorities supposedly live in a world of their own values that are different from German values. This cultural explanation however was not separately coded under ‘cultural integration’ since it was part of the discussion on ‘German values’ and ‘other culture’ and was explored as part of the critical discourse

analysis on ‘cultural integration’. In this context, for example, *Die Bild* published the headline “The bitter truth about Multikulti [multiculturalism]” (17.9.2012, p. 7). Although all four newspapers reported on ‘ethnic segregation’, the number of articles identified was very small and mostly as a result of the cultural version following the ‘Sarrazin debate’ in 2010 on the one hand, and the structural version following the increased number of refugees in 2014 and 2015 on the other hand.

*Figure A.23: Articles on 'Ethnic Segregation' by Newspaper over Time*





(10) ‘Citizenship’

As the name of this theme suggests, ‘citizenship’ involved the reporting of the discussions surrounding German citizenship. This theme was found in all four newspapers in 2013 and 2014 during the coalition-building phase for a new government, when the issue of new rules for dual citizenship was on the agenda. The larger number of articles published on ‘citizenship’ in 2011, on the other hand, can be explained as a response to Turkish

President Erdogan's speeches about citizenship and integration in Germany and the resulting political debate. Overall the number of articles published on 'citizenship' was rather small and one can argue that there was not too much interest in 'citizenship' because the different political positions on citizenship have essentially not changed and only limited legal alterations have been made. As a result, the issue of 'citizenship' was also neglected in the CDA, since the focus was on 'labour market' integration and on the themes more directly associated with that.

Firstly, articles on 'citizenship' reported on statistics regarding naturalisation. *Die Bild* stated that "27970 Turks [were] naturalised" (18.7.2014, p. 1). Secondly, articles on 'citizenship' discussed political proposals and developments. *Die Süddeutsche* noted a "New move for dual citizenship" (27.7.2011, p. 6) and *Der Spiegel* highlighted "With a high school degree towards dual citizenship" (issue 4, 2014, p. 15). Lastly, articles on 'citizenship' either intended to show associated danger due to dual citizenship or danger as a result of questions over national identity. For instance, *Die FAZ* warned about "Terror with two passports" (21.6.2014, p. 5) and philosophised about "The new German We" (23.5.2014, p. 3).


*Figure A.24: Articles on 'Citizenship' by Newspaper over Time*




(11) ‘Political Integration’

The theme ‘political integration’ referred to articles discussing the representation of ethnic minorities in German politics on the one hand, and the political engagement and political rights of foreigners and ethnic minorities on the other hand. For instance, *Die Süddeutsche* reported on the “Praise for Özoguz-appointment” (17.12.2013, p. 6), while *Der Spiegel* informed its readers that the “SPD-vice wants to have foreigners vote” (issue 32, 2014, p. 32). Moreover, *Die FAZ* insisted that “Ditib: Muslims should be more actively involved” (14.3.2012, p. 1). There were only very few articles on this theme, and these were notably not in relation to refugees and not in 2015. Also *Die Bild* published no article on this theme. Hence, the issue of ‘political integration’ was equally neglected in the critical discourse analysis.

*Figure A.25: Articles on 'Political' by Newspaper over Time*




In conclusion, the theme with the by far largest number of articles was ‘labour market’. This was closely followed by ‘education’. Indeed, ‘labour market’, ‘education’ and ‘German language’ were often employed in conjunction when discussing how to get newcomers into employment (quickly). On the other hand, the themes ‘costs’, ‘finance’ and ‘integration measures’ were also relevant to ‘labour market’ integration, since they discussed the costs and spending in relation to educational measures, languages courses and training for migrants and ethnic minorities in order to improve migrants’/ethnic minorities’ employment opportunities. As a result, these latter themes were also often found in conjunction. The themes ‘citizenship’ and ‘political integration’, on the other hand, revolved around a more separate discussion, although both themes showed that successful ‘integration’ or being considered deserving of dual citizenship was also tied to ideas of ‘education’, ‘German language’ and ‘labour market’ integration. While there were similarities between the newspapers in terms of their frequencies for themes, there

were also some differences. For instance, *Die FAZ* focused more on the 'costs' of integration, while *Die Süddeutsche* was more inclined to report on the financial resources still required ('finance'). Moreover, the theme with the largest number of articles for *Die Bild* was 'welfare benefits', while the dominant theme for the other three newspapers was 'labour market'.

## 3. *'Perceptions'*

### *a) Coverage Over Time and Events*

Articles that were assigned the category 'perceptions' were mostly published in 2015. Indeed, almost twice the number of articles was found for 2015 than for 2010-2014 combined. *Die Süddeutsche* clearly dominated the publications within this category and had far more articles published in 2014 and 2015 than any other newspaper. With regards to the development over time, *Die Süddeutsche* listed several articles for 2010 and had an increasing tendency from 2013 onward. *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, showed a steady amount of 3-8 articles between 2010 and 2014. This may not seem much but was on average more compared to *Die Bild*, which had no articles on 'perceptions' in 2010 and 2011 and only 2 articles in 2012. For all four newspapers, the amount was at least threefold for 2015 compared to 2014 and fivefold compared to any other previous year.

*Figure A.26: 'Perceptions' Totals July 2010 to December 2015*





*Figure A.27: 'Perceptions' by Newspaper over Time*




Also in the context of 'perceptions', several events could be identified. Some of these events such as the PEGIDA demonstrations or the growing violence against refugees do not relate to a specific instance, but rather indicate the start of a period of time of several or continuous events on that matter. The table of events below shows that most events were in relation to the arrival of asylum seekers in Germany since 2013. This explains the increased reporting on 'perceptions' particularly in 2014 and 2015. Indeed, only 5.5% (4/73) of articles from *Die Bild*, 12% (54/437) from *Die Süddeutsche*, 19% (23/119) from

*Die FAZ* and 25% (13/53) of articles from *Der Spiegel* were identified to *not* be in relation to asylum seekers, refugees and general public opinion polls looking at xenophobia.

Apart from the events in relation to asylum seekers and refugees, the higher number of articles published in 2010 can be explained by the 'Sarrazin debate'. Sarrazin's publication on genetic superiority/inferiority of different ethnic groups triggered some discussion on racism, discrimination and the idea of how Germans think and behave towards different ethnic and religious groups. It was however surprising that not more articles with the category 'perceptions' were found for 2010 in this regard and that *Die Bild* did not engage in this discussion altogether. Further articles that were not related to refugees were published on a variety of topics or examples but there was no common trend between the newspapers and the examples rather differed. *Die Süddeutsche* was by far the most active news outlet discussing amongst other the discrimination of Roma, an attack on a synagogue or the exclusionary and discriminatory language against migrants. All newspapers reported to a minor extent on singular incidents of discrimination due to skin colour, ethnicity or religion. The following table provides an overview of identified events in relation to 'perceptions'.

*Table A.3: Events related to 'Perceptions'*


| **Time** | **Event** | ***FAZ*** | ***SZ*** | ***Bild*** | ***Spiegel*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug-Dec-10 | Racism and exclusion of Muslims as a result of the 'Sarrazin debate' | X | X | O | X |
| May-13 | 20-year jubilee of racist attack in Solingen | O | X | O | O |
| Aug-13 | Start of xenophobic demonstrations against refugees | X | X | X | O |
| Sep-13 | Publication of opinion poll on refugees | O | X | O | O |
| Dec-13 | Federal President Gauck's Christmas speech | X | X | O | O |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr-14 | Bishop's speech on refugees | O | X | O | O |
| Aug-14 | Arson attack on synagogue | O | X | O | O |
| Sep-14 | Abuse of refugees in refugee accommodation centre by security personnel (Burbach) | X | X | X | X |
| Nov-14 | Federal President Gauck's speech on refugees and German responsibility | O | X | O | O |
| Dec-14 | Peak of PEGIDA demonstrations | X | X | O | X |
| Mar-15 | Politicians talk to PEGIDA | O | X | X | X |
| Apr-15 | Xenophobic attacks in Tröglitz | X | X | X | X |
| May-15 | Refugees abused by police | O | X | O | O |
| Jul-15 | Growing violence against refugees - attacks | O | X | X | X |
| Jul-15 | Federal President Gauck's speech in light of growing violence against refugees | X | X | O | O |
| Aug-15 | Debate about hatred on social media | O | X | O | O |
| Oct-15 | Right-wing extremist attack was prevented | X | X | X | O |

*b) Themes*

The category 'perceptions' referred to the reactions, opinions and behaviours of the host society in relation to migrants and ethnic minorities. This was generally divided into two themes: 'Welcoming' and 'Xenophobia'. 'Welcoming' described any form of positive reaction or call for a positive reaction towards migrants and ethnic minorities, while 'xenophobia' involved the reporting on any negative reactions including the criticism of negative reactions. Articles coded on 'welcoming' or 'xenophobia' however did not necessarily tell us whether either of the reactions was judged to be favourable or unfavourable. The evaluation of whether the two themes and their arguments led to inclusionary or exclusionary constructions of identity were part of the critical discourse analysis.

*Figure A.28: Themes of 'Perceptions' by Newspaper*





All newspapers had far more articles coded with ‘xenophobia’ rather than ‘welcoming’, although *Die Bild* with 34 to 40 articles had a close tie. This implies that in relative terms *Die Bild* either published more on the positive reactions and behaviour of the German society or in contrast did not publish as many articles on the negative reactions of the German people than the other newspapers. In the data, it can furthermore be seen that the two themes appeared to only be conflated to a minor extent in *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ*, which means that both themes were found in one article weighing up the positive and negative reactions at the same time. This can be explained due to the fact that *Die Bild* and *Der Spiegel* tend to keep their reporting more simplistic, at times drawing black and white pictures, while *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* attempt to provide different opinions on the same matter. Both themes also had further sub-themes, which will be described in the following.

(1) Sub-themes of ‘Welcoming’


The two themes were then further divided into sub-themes. For ‘welcoming’, four sub-themes were coded: ‘Demonstration’, ‘openness’, ‘public opinion’ and ‘volunteering’. ‘Demonstration’ and ‘public opinion’ were also coded in their negative version under the ‘xenophobia’ theme. ‘Demonstration’ described the reporting of demonstrations either in favour or against refugees/migrants and the associated (cultural) diversity, while the latter referred to the reporting of surveys, opinion polls etc. that either showed favourable or unfavourable opinions towards refugees, migrants and/or ethnic minorities. Both sub-themes were however not frequently found under ‘welcoming’ nor under ‘xenophobia’. For instance, in relation to ‘welcoming’ and ‘demonstration’, *Die Süddeutsche* titled “Protest for refugees” (2.3.2015, p. 5), while as part of ‘welcoming’ and ‘public opinion’, *Die FAZ* discussed that “Berlin is tolerant towards foreigners” (8.9.2015a, p. 4).

*Figure A.29: Sub-Themes of 'Welcoming' by Newspaper*




In comparison, there were far more articles coded with the sub-themes ‘openness’ and ‘volunteering’. ‘Openness’ entailed both the actions and calls for more understanding and tolerance towards migrants and ethnic minorities as well as the appreciation of diversity. For instance, an article describing the federal president’s speech, in which he called upon the German population for more understanding and sympathy towards refugees, was coded as ‘openness’. Other examples included *Die Bild* reporting on a “Concert for tolerance” (27.1.2015, p. 1), *Die FAZ* noting that “Bishops [are] for open-mindedness” (25.09.2015, p. 6) and *Die Süddeutsche* discussing the issue that the “FDP wants more open-mindedness in the world” (9.12.2010, p. 5). The headlines “Diversity pays off” (*Süddeutsche*, 23.10.2015, p. 2) and “Appreciating diversity – strengthening cohesion” (*FAZ*, 4.10.2010, p. 8) furthermore illustrated the call for the appreciation of diversity. While ‘openness’ was also prominent for the ‘refugee crisis’, this sub-theme was equally identified in earlier years, for instance, in relation to Federal President Wulff’s German Unity Day speech or in relation to calls for sympathy towards refugees since 2013.

*Figure A.30: Articles on 'Openness' by Newspaper over Time*



The last sub-theme of 'welcoming' was 'volunteering', which encompassed the reporting of the assistance, activities, donations etc. that the German population provided to refugees and ethnic minorities. For instance, *Der Spiegel* asserted that "Helping is worthwhile" (issue 40, 2015, p. 80) and that people should be "Helping instead of complaining" (issue 43, 2014, pp. 30-32). *Die Süddeutsche* also called for "Projects instead of polemic" (18.11.2010, p. 32) and reported on the "Free trade show entry for refugees" (16.9.2015, p. 11), while *Die Bild* generally postulated that "We help refugees in Germany" (18.8.2015, p. 7). The sub-theme 'volunteering' was almost entirely found in articles published in 2015. With again *Die Süddeutsche* leading in all sub-themes and particularly standing out for 'openness', *Die FAZ* also had more articles on 'openness' than on 'volunteering'. On the other hand, *Der Spiegel* had the same number of articles for both sub-themes, while the trend was reversed for *Die Bild* by having more articles published on 'volunteering' than on 'openness'.


*Figure A.31: Articles on 'Volunteering' by Newspaper over Time*



(2) Sub-Themes of ‘Xenophobia’

The theme ‘xenophobia’, on the other hand, was apart from the already mentioned sub-themes of ‘demonstration’ and ‘public opinion’ further divided into: ‘attack’, ‘exclusion’, ‘prejudices’, ‘discrimination’ and ‘eugenics’.

*Figure A.32: Sub-Themes of 'Xenophobia' by Newspaper*




As already mentioned, ‘demonstration’ now as part of ‘xenophobia’ involved the reporting of demonstrations against refugees and ethnic minorities. This sub-theme was frequently identified in relation to PEGIDA that was prominent at the end of 2014 and in early 2015. For example, *Die Süddeutsche* pointed out that “Right-wing extremist protests increase” (8.4.2015b, p. 5). On the other hand, ‘public opinion’ as part of ‘xenophobia’ entailed articles covering negative public opinion towards refugees, migrants and ethnic


minorities. This sub-theme was found over the entire time frame and for example included *Die Bild* highlighting that "Every 3. East German is xenophobic" (26.3.2013, p. 1) and *Der Spiegel* lamenting that "There are many Sarrazins" (issue 36, 2010, pp. 22-30). Yet, for both sub-themes (except for *Die Süddeutsche* on 'Demonstration'), there were only few articles for each newspaper with only a couple of articles (if any) per year.

The sub-theme 'attack' involved the reporting of physical and/or verbal attacks against migrants or ethnic minorities. For example, *Die FAZ* reported that an "asylum seeker [was] injured" (7.6.2014, p. 4), which in 2015 was summarised to "More attacks on asylum seekers" (*Bild*, 24.7.2015, p. 1) and "Arson attacks in refugee accommodation centres again" (*FAZ*, 8.9.2015b, p. 4). Verbal attacks were mostly reported by *Die Süddeutsche*, which informed its readers that "Food rescue organisations complain about demagoguery against asylum seekers" (28.3.2015, p. 45) and in relation to hatred on the internet, titled "Undeleted hatred towards asylum seekers" (28.8.2015, p. 6). As a result, *Der Spiegel* summed up the issue with its headline "The disinhibited republic" (issue 44, 2015, pp. 24-29).

The sub-theme 'attack' was dominant in all four newspapers, although *Die Süddeutsche* had more articles published on 'attack' than the other three media outlets. Lastly, articles on 'attack' were almost entirely published in 2014 and 2015. Given the fact that the Federal Criminal Police Office registered over 1.000 politically motivated offences against asylum seeker residences in 2015[33] (BKA 2015, p. 32), it may come as no surprise that the reporting on 'attack' was also dominant.

[33] Offences against asylum seeker residences politically motivated criminality – right-wing and politically motivated criminality – other/not classified in 2015 and 2014 (BKA 2015, p. 32).


*Figure A.33: Articles on 'Attack' by Newspaper over Time*




The sub-theme ‘prejudice’ then was applied to the reporting of stereotypes or voiced fears about migrants/ethnic minorities. For instance, “Bild exposed 7 prejudices about refugees” was the title by *Die Bild* (27.8.2015, p. 2). *Die FAZ* reported on “The most dangerous prejudices about refugees“ (25.8.2015, p. 15) and that “Germans criticise the prejudices against Muslims” (13.3.2013, p. 4), while *Die Süddeutsche* noted that there are “Many prejudices against Sinti and Roma” (4.9.2014, p. 4) as well as “Distorted images and stereotypes” (11.5.2011, p. 6). However, also the resulting fears and attitudes from these stereotypes were coded under ‘prejudice’. In this context, *Die Süddeutsche* referred to refugees as the “Unwanted neighbours” (7.8.2015, p. 5) and *Die FAZ* titled “Not [no refugees] in my neighbourhood” (28.4.2015, p. 4). *Die FAZ* went as far as calling it “The worries of the 99.9 per cent” (16.12.2014, p. 2), as opposed to *Der Spiegel* that criticised people “To finally be quiet” (issue 30, 2015, p. 50).

With regards to frequencies, ‘prejudice’ like most sub-themes was related to refugees and hence most articles were found to be published in the years 2014 and 2015. Prior to 2014, ‘prejudice’ was often found in relation to Muslims. In relative terms, *Die Süddeutsche* and also *Der Spiegel* substantially reported on this sub-theme, whereas *Die FAZ* had far few articles and *Die Bild* only had a couple of articles in 2015.

*Figure A.34: Articles on 'Prejudice' by Newspaper over Time*





The sub-theme ‘discrimination’ was coded when articles reported on discriminatory acts against migrants or ethnic minorities that did not as such entail verbal or physical assaults (‘attack’). Typical examples in all four newspapers described discriminatory behaviour towards persons of different skin colour and ethnicity/religion. *Die Bild*, for instance, used the headlines “I did not get my parcel because I am black” (16.12.2013, p. 6) and “We had to pay more rent because we are Arabs” (16.1.2015, p. 6). *Die FAZ*, on the other hand, noted racial profiling in its article “Why does it always hit me?” (12.12.2013, p.

25). Only *Die Süddeutsche* went further not only reporting on discriminatory actions but also on discriminatory language/discourse by mostly criticising statements by CSU politicians in relation to the 'Sarrazin debate' (2.11.2015, p. 36).

'Discrimination' was found to be a bit more spread over the entire time frame, although the overall number was much lower than for 'Attack' or 'Prejudice'. Articles entailing this sub-theme were on the one hand connected to the two major debates of the 'Sarrazin debate' and on refugees, but also focused on single occurrences of different people experiencing discriminatory behaviour outside of these two main events.


*Figure A.35: Articles on 'Discrimination' by Newspaper over Time*




'Exclusion', as a further this sub-theme, entailed articles that describe exclusionary behaviour of the German population. This sub-theme did not focus as the previous sub-themes on the xenophobic behaviour/action itself, but more on the consequences of these actions. 'Exclusion', for instance, discussed how Germans have frequently seen Muslims

as outsiders or how, for instance, the term 'with migrant background' is exclusionary. *Die FAZ* therefore titled "Migration background? No, thank you!" (5.1.2013, p. 2), while *Die Süddeutsche* generally lamented the "Negative image of migrants" (20.2.2013, p. 6) and criticised "Cowardly rhetoric" (28.3.2014, p. 11). Not many articles were however coded with 'exclusion' and most of them were for *Die Süddeutsche* in 2010 and 2015. *Die Bild* did not address or tackle the topic of 'exclusion' at all.

*Figure A.36: Articles on 'Exclusion' by Newspaper over Time*




And lastly the sub-theme 'eugenics' entailed articles going beyond 'exclusion' and 'discrimination' and reported on claims of superiority/inferiority of certain people due to their genes. Yet, this sub-theme only had a couple of articles and was solely coded in relation to the criticism of the biological theses voiced by Thilo Sarrazin in 2010. For instance, *Der Spiegel* discussed Sarrazin's claim of Germany becoming dumb in the

future due to the supposed ‘integration unwillingness’ and lower level of intelligence of Muslims (issue 35, 2010, pp. 125-127).

In conclusion, the category ‘perceptions’ broadly entailed the reactions and actions of the German host population in relation to ethnic minorities, migrants and above all refugees. All four newspapers reported to a large extent on the attacks against refugees, the PEGIDA demonstrations and on hatred against refugees including on the internet. Since these events only started to unfold with the rising number of asylum seekers in 2013 and mostly in relation to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, all four newspapers also reported more articles on ‘perceptions’ towards the end of the selected time frame. The exception was *Die Süddeutsche* that also reported on the themes of ‘perceptions’ to a greater extent prior to the ‘refugee crisis’.

# B. Critical Discourse Analysis - 'Structural Integration'

## 1. *Welfare Benefits*

'Others' were by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation constructed as receiving welfare benefits as opposed to the German 'Self', who was implied to be self-sufficient and employed. As a result, 'Others' were thought of as 'not integrated' and were excluded from the national 'Self'. On the one hand, the representation of 'Others' relying on welfare benefits was explained by the outlined aspects of lacking education, knowledge of German language and by being poor and prone to exploitation. Due to these characteristics, 'Others' were thought of as more likely to be unemployed and hence to require social welfare assistance. On the other hand, however, 'Others' were also accused of purposefully taking welfare benefits. This argument was constructed by means of the abuse topos, which implies that migrants/ethnic minorities do not want to work and purposefully want to receive benefits.

All four newspapers discussed welfare benefits, although *Die Bild* in relative terms published the largest number of articles on welfare benefits. While the issue of 'Others' receiving welfare benefits was relevant throughout the selected time frame, different periods of time corresponded with different 'Others', as was generally the case with 'structural integration'. The same groups of 'Others' were found with regards to welfare benefits, only the group of the Southern and Eastern European 'Other', considered as successfully integrated, was not mentioned with regards to welfare benefits.

### *a) Muslim and Turkish 'Other'*

The first group that was constructed as the recipient of welfare benefits were Turks or Arabs also referred to as Muslims. *Die Süddeutsche* quoted an Islamic magistrate saying

that “men sit in the café and cheat with welfare benefits” (31.7.2010, p. 14), while *Die FAZ* argued that “almost fifty per cent” of Turks in Berlin receive welfare benefits (9.9.2010, p. 32). However, the issue of welfare benefits in relation to this group was mostly discussed by *Die Bild*. *Die Bild* listed a table with numbers of foreign nationals receiving welfare benefits (23.11.2010, p. 2). With the attempt to spark outrage and describing it as “numbers that are shocking!”, the headline informed the readers that “90 per cent of Lebanese receive Hartz IV”[34] (*Bild*, 23.11.2010, p. 2). In addition, *Die Bild* identified the quota of foreign nationals receiving benefits overall to be more than twice as high as for German nationals (23.11.2010, p. 2). In another article, *Die Bild* titled “Iraqi most frequently receive Hartz IV” (16.1.2012, p. 1). This was described as “shockingly high!” and “10 times as many as the average of German citizens” (*Bild*, 16.1.2012, p. 1).

With regards to the reason for receiving welfare benefits, *Die Bild* suggested that they have become comfortable with not working, since asylum seekers from Lebanon have previously not been allowed to work in their country of origin either. Furthermore, *Die Bild* argued that “this way of life has been passed on from generation to generation” and that hence not working is somehow part of Lebanese culture (23.11.2010, p. 2). *Die Bild* however also named the lack of education and the lower income sector, as well as discrimination on the labour market as reasons for why foreign nationals are more likely to be unemployed and to rely on benefits (23.11.2010, p. 2). As a result, *Die Bild* asked for “qualified immigration” of migrants who are educated and who “fit to us”, because “We do not want immigration into our benefits system” (23.11.2010, p. 2).

[34] Hartz IV is the name for a particular type of social welfare benefit in Germany.

*Die Bild*, furthermore, reported about areas or schools, in which 80-90% of the parents live on welfare benefits, judging them to be a "school standing on the edge of precipice!" (26.11.2010, p. 2). In this context, *Die Bild* pitched 'German' low-wage workers against these 'Others' by arguing that 'Others' receive school materials for free, while 'German' low-income households have to manage to obtain school materials themselves (13.1.2012, p. 7). Consequently, *Die Bild* ran the title "Without welfare benefits, you are the stupid one in school" (13.1.2012, p. 7).

*b) Romanians and Bulgarians / Roma*

The second group that was constructed as recipients of welfare benefits were Romanians and Bulgarians / Roma. With a series of short articles and aided by the number topos, *Die Bild* warned about an increasing number of persons from Romania and Bulgaria receiving benefits: "More and more EU-citizens collect Hartz IV from us" (7.2.2014, p. 1); "52000 Hartz-recipients from Bulgaria and Romania" (31.5.2014, p. 2). Also *Die FAZ* and to a lesser extent *Die Süddeutsche* noted the increase of Romanians and Bulgarians receiving welfare benefits. *Die FAZ* subtitled "Every tenth Bulgarian and Romanian receives Hartz IV in Germany" (3.12.2013, p. 11) and *Die Süddeutsche* titled "More Hartz-IV support for Romanians and Bulgarians", thereby claiming that the number has risen by 51% in one year (6.3.2014, p. 1).

*Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, only published a few articles on the issue of social welfare and only mentioned Roma from Romania in this regard. Describing one Roma village in Romania migrating to Germany, *Der Spiegel* argued that there is "The history of poverty migration into the German welfare state" and that "*Many* of them live from the support of the job centre" [own emphasis] (issue 14, 2012, pp. 42-43). The construction of a large

number of benefit recipients among the Roma was supported by the argument of Roma to live in big families and was demonstrated and visualised by an image of such a big family of 10 children in Fantanele in Romania:

*Figure B.1: Spiegel, issue 14, 2012, p. 44*




**Familie in Fântânele:** *Staunen über einen Staat, der Geld verschenkt*

Furthermore, the newspapers except *Die Süddeutsche* denounced the fact that EU migrants receive benefits implying that they should not be entitled to and consequently attempted to encourage outrage. This was firstly achieved with the already mentioned number topos but also with the abuse topos, which entails that migrants/ethnic minorities purposefully want to receive benefits and that they are hence different and undesirable. In relation to EU citizens and child benefits, *Die Bild* reported that "public authorities for finance investigate 39845 cases of fraud" (7.11.2014, p. 2). In addition, *Die Bild* reported about a new app for Romanians and Bulgarians to officially request welfare benefits (19.9.2014, p. 1). It highlighted that "Bulgarians and Romanians can in the future request support in Germany more easily!" (19.9.2014, p. 1).

Also *Die FAZ* identified Romanians and Bulgarians as benefit abusers and applied the abuse topos. It talked about "Romanian family clans, who have no interest in work" (*FAZ*, 11.1.2014, p. 1). More specifically however, *Die FAZ* saw a problem with the so-called 'Aufstocker' (persons topping up) (24.12.2012, p. 3). *Die FAZ* argued that "70 per cent of Romanian and Bulgarian Hartz-IV recipients are those topping up, they are employed but due to their low income receive additional money" (14.11.2014, p. 15). While German councils may have "consistently denied Hartz IV to unemployed EU citizens", *Die FAZ* lamented that those who are topping up are not strictly investigated (11.1.2014, p. 1; 15.2.2013, p. 1). *Der Spiegel* also identified abuse in the form of bogus self-employment (issue 14, 2012, p. 43), but once again focused more on benefits abuse by Roma. *Der Spiegel* not only represented Roma as welfare abusers but ultimately as different from German society by arguing that "They do not know that a welfare state will reach its limits if there are too many people with benefit claims" (issue 14, 2012, pp. 43-44).

Secondly, outrage and this negative representation of 'Others' as different was achieved by linguistic means such as exclamation marks following statements of EU citizens receiving benefits or the lexical choice of the word "kassieren" (*Bild*, 7.2.2014, p. 1), which in German has a negative connotation for 'collecting money'. Further linguistic means to construct 'Others' as different included the deictic 'we'. It was argued that Romanians and Bulgarians receive benefits "from *us*" (*Bild*, 7.2.2014, p. 1) and that "*foreigners* receive *German* child benefits" [own emphases] (*Bild*, 7.5.2014, p. 1). *Der Spiegel* also employed repetition and pointed out on multiple occasions that people were "Hartz IV recipients" (issue 14, 2012, pp. 42-44).

On the other hand, the newspapers except *Die Bild* also rejected the construction of Romanians and Bulgarians predominantly as welfare recipients by drawing on a

destructive strategy. *Die FAZ* admitted that while "some migrants may profit from the welfare systems", it will "surely be no mass phenomena" (29.4.2011, p. 15). *Die Süddeutsche* confirmed this by citing the Appointee for Integration Özoguz (SPD) that "There is no mass migration into the social welfare system, there is no mass welfare abuse of specific migrant groups" (26.3.2014, p. 5). Moreover, *Die FAZ* countered that the numbers do not confirm that Romanians and Bulgarians come to Germany for receiving child benefits (9.10.2013, p. 10). Also *Der Spiegel* countered the idea of Roma as welfare recipients arguing that they are here to work (issue 29, 2013, p. 44), while *Die Süddeutsche* equally claimed that "[t]he great majority of EU migrants come to Germany for work" (21.5.2014, p. 1). Furthermore, *Der Spiegel* pointed out that EU migrants can generally not expect welfare support from the German government (issue 16, 2012, p. 41).

While *Die Süddeutsche* and *Die FAZ* acknowledged that there may be some problems with EU free movement in cities "such as Duisburg, Offenbach and Mannheim" (*FAZ*, 13.8.2014, p. 1; *FAZ*, 9.10.2013, p. 10), due to non-educated, low-wage EU migrants or Roma (*Süddeutsche*, 3.1.2014, p. 6; *Süddeutsche*, 6.3.2014, p. 1; *Süddeutsche*, 11.11.2014, p. 1; *Süddeutsche*, 21.5.2014, p. 1), they still employed the economic utility topos arguing that EU migrants make an overall positive contribution to German society. *Die FAZ* argued that freedom of movement has positive consequences "for the financing of the welfare system" (29.4.2011, p. 15) and *Die Süddeutsche* argued that "Romanians and Bulgarians, who work in this country, bring money to the state" (4.1.2014, p. 21; also see 28.8.2014, p. 4).

Lastly, it can be argued that *Die Süddeutsche* made use of a transformative strategy envisioning a different Europe or different rules for freedom of movement. After the court

ruled against EU migrants receiving benefits even if they are actively looking for a job, *Die Süddeutsche* lamented this to be a "refusal of a social Europe" (16.9.2015, p. 4). In a different article on the same court ruling, *Die Süddeutsche* asked "Can you refuse to EU citizens, what you provide to asylum seekers? Welfare benefits for refugees, but not for migrants from other EU countries – above all to those who are looking for work?" (16.9.2015, p. 8).

### *c) Refugees*

Lastly, also refugees were constructed as recipients of welfare benefits and were argued to only come to Germany to receive welfare benefits (abuse topos). As a result, *Die FAZ* and *Die Bild* argued that refugees, or at least some asylum seekers, should not be entitled to welfare benefits or should not receive the legally rightful minimum support, also because they believe that doing so would prevent further immigration. *Die Bild* reported on the federal constitutional court's decision that the amount of benefits for asylum seekers needs to be raised in order to match the one of Germans. While in one article, *Die Bild* did not make any judgments and simply informed its readers about the raise by titling "More money for asylum seekers" (22.8.2012, p. 1), in another article, it concluded with the comment "additional costs for the state: around 225 million Euros/year" (19.7.2012, p. 2). *Die FAZ*, on the other hand, wrote that "A dignified treatment of refugees does not only depend on the amount of benefits" and that "the constitutional state can of course pursue a policy that does not provide an incentive for unwanted immigration (into the benefits system)" (19.7.2012, p. 1). Hence, both newspapers were of the opinion that asylum seekers/refugees do not deserve the same minimum support as Germans.

This, in the eyes of *Die FAZ*, does not violate the guarantee of human dignity, since "refugee law serves the protection from persecution and is in itself not an instrument for permanent immigration" (16.10.2015, p. 17). Moreover, in 2012, *Die FAZ* reported on a reform by the CSU minister of the interior entailing cuts on the benefits for asylum seekers from so-called safe countries of origin that were specifically directed at Roma from Serbia and Macedonia (1.12.2012, p. 4). In this context, *Die FAZ* echoed the conception of the minister of the interior implying that "the abuse of benefits for asylum seekers will need to be stemmed" (1.12.2012, p. 4).

Furthermore, in relation to the increased number of refugees in Germany in 2015, the newspapers except *Der Spiegel* reported the risen number of welfare recipients. *Die Süddeutsche* talked about 272 000 additional recipients of welfare benefits (9.12.2015, p. 1), and *Die Bild* noted an increase of 24,6% of benefit recipients from "asylum countries" (8.12.2015, p. 2). Similarly, *Die FAZ* first reported that there will be about 240.000 to 460.000 new benefit recipients (2.9.2015, p. 15). A month later, *Die FAZ* then titled that due to refugees, there will be "One million additional Hartz-IV recipients" (10.10.2015, p. 19), which indirectly implies that all incoming asylum seekers will be on benefits. In addition, *Die FAZ* captioned an image "Now refugees – soon Hartz-IV recipients?" (10.10.2015, p. 19):

*Figure B.2: FAZ, 10.10.2015, p. 19*

# Eine Million zusätzliche Hartz-IV-Bezieher

**Die SPD fordert von den Firmen Hunderttausende Praktika für Flüchtlinge. Die Wirtschaft bemüht sich – und stolpert über den Mindestlohn.**

de. BERLIN, 9. Oktober. Der anhaltend starke Zustrom an Flüchtlingen wird zu einer Belastungsprobe für das Hartz-IV-System. Nach Schätzungen von Arbeitsministerin Andrea Nahles (SPD) könnte damit die Gesamtzahl der Hartz-IV-Empfänger bis zum Jahr 2019 von derzeit 6,1 Millionen Erwachsenen und Kindern um eine Million Personen steigen. Allein für kommendes Jahr rechnet sie mit einem Anstieg um bis zu 460 000 und Mehrkosten von bis zu 3,3 Milliarden Euro im Jahr.

Umso mehr wächst der Druck auf die Regierung und andere Akteure der Arbeitsmarktpolitik, die Bedingungen für eine rasche Eingliederung der Flüchtlinge in den Arbeitsmarkt zu verbessern – denn daran entscheidet sich, wie viele tatsächlich längerfristig auf Hartz IV angewiesen sein werden. SPD-Generalsekretärin Yasmin Fahimi hat die Unternehmen schon öffentlich in die Pflicht genommen und sie aufgefordert, „mehr Initiative" zu zeigen. Die Wirtschaft müsse Geld investieren und eine „Offensive zu ausbildungsvorbereitenden Programmen starten". Auch Nahles verlangt von den Unternehmen, dass sie Flüchtlingen nun in großer Zahl zusätzliche Praktika und Einstiegsqualifizierungen bieten, um sie auf eine Berufsausbildung vorzubereiten.

Nach Auffassung der Arbeitgeberverbände wird dies in der erhofften Form jedoch nur erfolgreich gelingen, wenn sich die große Koalition bereitfindet, das seit Januar geltende Mindestlohngesetz gerade in diesen Punkten zu überarbeiten. Dem Gesetz zufolge müssen Unternehmen grundsätzlich auch Praktikanten den Mindestlohn von 8,50 Euro je Stunde zahlen. Ausnahmen gelten für Praktika, die im Rahmen einer Ausbildungsordnung oder eines Studiums verpflichtend sind, und für bestimmte Praktika, die höchstens drei Monate dauern. Entsprechendes gilt für spezielle Einstiegsqualifizierungen, die nach dem Sozialgesetzbuch gefördert und als förderfähig eingestuft werden. In der Realität bedeute dies, dass Betriebe von potentiellen Praktikanten vielfältige Nachweise fordern müssten und dabei trotzdem oft nicht sicher sein könnten, ob ein Praktikum wirksam vom Mindestlohn ausgenommen sei, monierte die Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) auf Anfrage dieser Zeitung. „Wenn es das Ziel ist, dass Unternehmen mehr Praktika und Einstiegsqualifizierungen anbieten, dann sollten gerade diese Vorschriften des Mindestlohngesetzes dringend einfacher gestaltet werden", forderte die BDA. So sollten Pflichtpraktika generell vom Mindestlohn ausgenommen werden. Zugleich sollten freiwillige Praktika aller Art für einen Zeitraum von bis zu einem Jahr befreit bleiben.

Tatsächlich fielen im Gesetzgebungsverfahren im Jahr 2014 gerade diese Regelungen recht kompliziert aus, weil die Regierung den Unmut der Gewerkschaften fürchtete. Zeitweilig drohten gar von den Tarifparteien der Chemie- und der Metallindustrie eigens entwickelte Programme für bis zu einjährige Ausbildungsvorbereitungskurse am Mindestlohn zu scheitern. Schließlich wurden in der Gesetzesbegründung genau diese Programme als Ausnahmefälle erwähnt. Unternehmen, die nun auf freiwilliger Basis ähnliche Vorbereitungskurse anbieten wollen, können allerdings nicht so sicher sein, dass die Ausnahme dann auch für sie gilt.

Den Vorstellungen der Arbeitgeberverbände zufolge sollten daher nun überdies solche Arbeitskräfte für bis zu einem Jahr vom Mindestlohn ausgenommen werden, die noch nie gearbeitet haben oder die anerkanntermaßen schwere Vermittlungshemmnisse aufweisen. Bisher sind nur Jugendliche bis zum 18. Lebensjahr, die keine Ausbildung haben, vom Mindestlohn befreit. Forderungen von Ökonomen, den Mindestlohn generell abzuwerken oder spezielle Ausnahmen für Flüchtlinge einzuführen, teilt die BDA hingegen nicht.

Arbeitsministerin Nahles hat indes bisher jegliche Änderungen am Mindestlohngesetz strikt abgelehnt. Allerdings richtet auch sie hohe Erwartungen an die Wirtschaft. Diese solle „Hunderttausenden jungen Leuten für sechs bis zwölf Monate eine Chance geben, in unsere Betriebe über Einstiegsplätze und Praktika hineinzuschnuppern", forderte sie in der „Süddeutschen Zeitung". Rechtliche Hürden gibt es dabei ihrer Auffassung nach nicht.

Für Diskussionsstoff sorgt derzeit überdies ein anderer Vorschlag, den die Regierung schon vorgelegt hat, um Flüchtlingen den Zugang zu Arbeit zu erleichtern: Der Koalitionsausschuss von Union und SPD hatte kürzlich vereinbart, das bisher geltende Zeitarbeitsverbot für Flüchtlinge zu streichen – derzeit dürfen sie vier Jahre lang nicht als Zeitarbeiter tätig werden, während ansonsten eine Arbeitsaufnahme nach drei Monaten möglich ist. In dem nun vorgelegten Gesetzentwurf, den der Bundestag kommende Woche verabschieden soll, sieht die Regelung nun aber anders aus: Das Verbot soll nur teilweise aufgehoben werden. Flüchtlingen, die keine anerkannten Fachkräfte sind, soll der Zugang zur Zeitarbeit nun doch für 15 Monate untersagt bleiben. Auch dies stößt in der Wirtschaft auf Unverständnis.

Ihre Schätzung zur Entwicklung der Hartz-IV-Zahlen hat Nahles Anfang September vorgelegt und nun abermals bestätigt. Sie besagt auch, dass die Ausgaben für Hartz-IV-Bezieher im Jahr 2016 um bis zu 3,3 Milliarden über der bisherigen Planung liegen werden. Von 2019 an könnten es gar 7 Milliarden Euro jährlich sein.



*Jetzt Flüchtlinge – bald Hartz-IV-Empfänger?* Foto AFP

Lastly, *Die FAZ* employed the danger topos and the flood metaphor arguing that the "continuous and considerable flood of refugees to Germany will become a challenge for the Hartz-IV system" (31.10.2015, p. 19).

In summary, all three groups of 'Others' were represented as welfare benefit recipients and hence as different from the German 'Self'. All three groups of 'Others' were also accused of abusing the system and purposefully wanting to receive benefits. The construction of the 'Self' can be seen as deterministic because there is no understanding or willingness for 'Others' to receive welfare benefits. Also the construction of 'Others' can be seen as deterministic, since the idea of 'Others' as benefit recipients is reported as

an inherent aspect due to their poverty and lack of education and skills. This implies an oppositional boundary drawing of the orientalist discourse. In both cases, the boundary drawing is exclusionary of these 'Others'. Only Romanians and Bulgarians were also constructed as being employed (voluntaristic construction) and hence as having assimilated or successfully integrated into the German 'Self' (assimilationist discourse).

## 2. *Crime*

The criminality of migrants/ethnic minorities was further discussed as part of failed 'structural integration'. As mentioned in the content analysis, reasons for criminality in 'structural integration' as opposed to 'cultural integration' entailed unemployment, poverty, lack of opportunity and in the case of refugee's desperation, lack of appropriate accommodation, trauma etc., although a clear -cut separation from implied cultural reasons could not always be made.

### *a) Romanians and Bulgarians / Roma*

The first group of 'Others' that was singled out in relation to crimes were Romanians and Bulgarians / Roma. All newspapers except *Die Bild* reported on the problem of "prostitution" by Eastern Europeans (*Süddeutsche,* 16.3.2013, p. 6; *Spiegel,* issue 19, 2012, p. 36; *FAZ,* 14.10.2014, p. 3; *FAZ,* 24.12.2012, p. 3). Moreover, all newspapers except *Der Spiegel* informed their readers about "criminal gangs" from South-Eastern Europe (*Süddeutsche,* 24.8.2015, p. 5; *FAZ,* 14.10.2014, p. 3) and the so-called "stealing kids" (*FAZ,* 14.10.2014, p. 3; *Bild,* 6.3.2013, p. 2). For example, *Die FAZ* described that the 'stealing kids' are children like the 14-year-old Elisabeta who has already carried out more than 200 cases of theft (14.10.2014, p. 3). *Die Bild,* on the other hand, focused on

Roma, and gave an account of seven Roma being accused of theft, property damage and trespassing due to ruining a vacant house (5.3.2013, p. 6). A day later, *Die Bild* published an article called "The truth about Roma" and argued that they are responsible for an increase in the criminal statistic (6.3.2013, p. 2).

### *b) Muslim and Turkish 'Other'*

Another group that was singled out in relation to crimes were Turks, Arabs or more generally Muslims. The criminality of this 'Other' was mainly described and constructed by *Die Bild*, although to some extent by *Die FAZ*. *Die FAZ* named an incident of a woman having been beaten up by "three Turkish adolescents" (1.11.2011, p. 4) and otherwise reported on "two German-Turks" who manipulated German language certificates so that different persons could adopt German citizenship (2.2.2012, p. 4).

*Die Bild* exclaimed that "Too many young foreigners are criminal!" (4.9.2010, p. 1) and identified "Muslim adolescents" to be three times more criminal than "German adolescents" (4.9.2010, p. 2), thereby also implying that Muslims are not German. *Die Bild* further reported that around "80% of all "registered multiple offenders" come from immigrant families" and that with 8.3 per cent, adolescents of Turkish origin come in first place (4.9.2010, p. 2). Moreover, Heinz Buschkowsky, former mayor of Berlin-Neukölln, voiced in *Die Bild* that the risk factor is "young, male, migrant" and explained that young males feel discriminated and hence try to obtain what they think they have been denied (*Bild*, 20.9.2012, p. 9). Lastly, employing the example topos, *Die Bild* used the example of an Arab man called Mahmut and accused him of "drug trade" (8.9.2010, p. 2).

*c) Refugees*

All newspapers reported on crimes committed by refugees in accommodation centres in 2015. While *Der Spiegel* described two cases of refugees fighting in accommodation centres (issue 44, 2015, p. 30), *Die Süddeutsche* reported about "Fights among refugees" in several accommodation centres (26.10.2015, p. 5) including a greater fight in Suhl (22.8.2015, p. 4); about a refugee committing arson in an accommodation centre in Schwäbisch Hall (9.3.2015, p. 8), and about sexual assaults against women in accommodation centres (21.7.2015, p. 26). Similarly, *Die FAZ* informed its readers in their headlines about a "Fight amongst refugees" (28.9.2015, p. 5), about "Violence in narrow space" (1.12.2015, p. 4) and about "Riots in the first reception centre in Suhl" (21.8.2015, p. 2). *Die Bild* equally published headlines about a "Beating in asylum seeker accommodation" (16.10.2015, p. 3), about "17 injured after riots in refugee accommodation centre" (21.8.2015, p. 7) and about "Centre rage" ("Lagerkoller") (2.10.2015, p. 10).

*Figure B.3: Bild, 2.10.2015, p. 10*



++ Krise in Unterkünften ++ Schon wieder Massenschlägerei ++

# Lagerkoller!

## Warum die Situation in vielen Flüchtlingsheimen immer kritischer wird

## DE MAIZIÈRE MAHNT FLÜCHTLINGE ZUR RUHE

*Die Bild* further published a title page with the headline "Crisis in refugee accommodation centres!", while noting above the headline "Mass fights once again" (2.10.2015, p. 1):

*Figure B.4: Bild, 2.10.2015, title page*




With regards to the reasons for this criminality, *Die Süddeutsche*, *Die FAZ* and *Die Bild* generally argued that refugees come from countries "in which violence is omnipresent" (*Süddeutsche*, 22.8.2015, p. 4) or from "abusive everyday life" (*FAZ*, 1.12.2015, p. 4); and that many are "traumatised" (*Süddeutsche*, 22.8.2015, p. 4; *Süddeutsche*, 29.9.2915, p. 4; *FAZ*, 24.8.2015, p.4; *FAZ*, 30.9.2015, p. 4; *FAZ*, 1.12.2015, p. 4; *Bild*, 3.8.2015, p. 3). While *Die Süddeutsche* admitted that there are also criminals among refugees, it

generally saw the problem with overcrowded accommodation, "narrow space and without possibilities for retreat" (29.9.2015, p. 4).

Also *Die FAZ* saw the cause of arguments and fights in the "overcrowding" in accommodation centres (30.9.2015, p. 4; 24.8.2015, p. 4), where a mass of people has to stay in what was thought to be temporary (1.12.2015, p. 4). Equally *Die Bild* identified "overcrowded" accommodation to be the source of the problem (21.8.2015, p. 7; 3.8.2015, p. 3; 2.10.2015, p. 10) and talked about an accommodation centre that was built for 300 people yet houses 3300 refugees (2.10.2015, p. 10). And lastly, *Der Spiegel* mentioned "little space without room for privacy" (issue 44, 2015, p. 30).

Furthermore, *Die Süddeutsche* thought that this leads to "frustration, boredom, religious enthusiasm or indifference, great fears and hopes" (22.8.2015, p. 4). *Die FAZ* saw a "lack of perspective and boredom" as causes for criminality (24.8.2015, p. 4), while *Die Bild* found "boredom" and "frustration" to be the result (2.10.2015, p. 10). As a result, it can be argued that all three newspapers rather saw refugees as victims than as criminals. However, it was also obvious that both *Die FAZ* and *Die Bild* devoted more space to describing the violence of refugees and that *Die Bild* also drew on the danger topos to represent refugees: "We run danger that the situation in refugee accommodation centres gets out of control" (2.10.2015, p. 10).

All four newspapers however also reported on crimes committed by refugees outside of the accommodation centres. *Die Süddeutsche* reported about refugees committing fraud by selling other refugees fake bus tickets (17.9.2015, p. 36) and by ordering from Zalando worth "181188 Euros" without ever paying for it (7.10.2015, p. 20). Yet, the other three newspapers discussed the crime figures of refugees in more details. While *Die Bild*

actually admitted in its title that “Criminality has almost not risen due to refugees!” and explained that most crimes entail not having paid for public transport tickets or the forgery of identification, and that “cases of sexual violence make less than 1% of the crimes committed by migrants”, *Die Bild* then also claimed by not providing any statistics that ““citizens from Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia” disproportionally commit many crimes” (14.11.2015, p. 2). As a result, refugees from Syria and Iraq were represented as less criminal, while persons from the Balkans were negatively represented as criminals.

This was also the case in *Der Spiegel* that on the one hand with the headline “Delicate numbers” argued that asylum seekers “should not be stigmatised” (issue 44, 2015, p. 30). On the other hand, *Der Spiegel* explained that “of course a few newcomers also commit crimes” and that near some accommodation centres there was a ““significant rise in case numbers” for theft” (issue 44, 2015, p. 30). The nationalities or ethnic groups cited however were “North Africans” who as unaccompanied minors were said to be used for criminal actions; on the other hand, “Syrians and Iraqi” were argued to be rather “modest in appearance” in terms of crime statistics (*Spiegel*, issue 44, 2015, p. 30).

*Die FAZ* made use of the example topos and described criminality to have risen due to refugees in the city of Braunschweig (28.10.2015, p. 4) and in Saxony (19.12.2015, p. 4). As with the other newspapers, *Die FAZ* identified theft as the main type of crime in Braunschweig and argued that the biggest group of “war refugees” such as the Syrian and Iraqi families “make us the least problems” (28.10.2015, p. 4). This was thought to be opposed to “men from Central Africa and North Africa” and “groups from Kosovo” who supposedly come “under the cover of asylum in order to commit crimes” (*FAZ*, 28.10.2015, p. 4).

In summary, by means of a constructive strategy of dissimilation, 'Others' were negatively represented as criminals, although the emphasis varied depending on the group and the context. The construction of 'Others' as criminals can be classified as both voluntaristic and deterministic. Voluntaristic examples thereby include refugees in accommodation centres whose criminal activities were explained by their circumstance of little space and frustration or Romanian and Bulgarian migrants whose criminal activities were thought of as a consequence of poverty. On the other hand, a deterministic construction of 'Others' as criminals stressed the inherent criminal nature of refugees from certain countries, of Turks, Arabs or generally of Muslims as well as of Romanians and Bulgarians in gangs. Hence, the construction of 'Others' as criminals represented both the orientalist discourse and the assimilationist discourse (with the idea of circumstances needing to change for 'Others' being able to change), which implied an exclusionary or semi-exclusionary boundary drawing.

# LIST OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES CITED

## *Der Spiegel*


"Glaubenskrieger", issue 28, 2010, p. 57.

"Eine Liebe in Deutschland", issue 30, 2010, pp. 48-52.

"Deutschland, deine Amokläufer", issue 35, 2010, pp. 125-127.

"Es gibt viele Sarrazins", issue 36, 2010, pp. 22-30.

"De Maizière besucht Bürgerinitiative", issue 41, 2010, p. 17.

"Deutsch – Migrant – Muslim", issue 41, 2010, pp. 146-147.

"Verweigerer die Ausnahme?", issue 42, 2010, p. 15.

"Riskante Predigten", issue 42, 2010, p. 56.

"Die Deutschmacherin", issue 44, 2010, p. 69.

"„Jetzt bist du eine Hure"", issue 1, 2011, pp. 34-38.

"Der Sultan von Almanya", issue 10, 2011, pp. 30-31.

"Wie hast du's mit der Religion?", issue 11, 2011, pp. 152-153.

"Die Hoffnungsreisenden", issue 16, 2011, pp. 34-37.

"Der SPD ins Stammbuch", issue 18, 2011, pp. 22-23.

"Legale Sklaverei", issue 21, 2011, pp. 44-45.

"Die verlorenen Töchter", issue 24, 2011, pp. 104-107.

"Allahs Richter", issue 35, 2011, pp. 57-59.

"Unzufriedene Eltern", issue 41, 2011, p. 16.

"Fremde Heimat", issue 44, 2011, pp. 38-44.

"Die Scharfmacher", issue 8, 2012, pp. 48-50.

"Schlaflose Nächte", issue 10, 2012, p. 18.

“Paradies Neukölln”, issue 14, 2012, pp. 42-44.

“Alles besser als Athen”, issue 16, 2012, pp. 41-42.

“„Hilferufe, Wut, Empörung””, issue 19, 2012, pp. 36-37.

“Im Namen Allahs”, issue 25, 2012, pp. 36-38.

“Gestörte Ruhe”, issue 25, 2012, p. 39.

“Das Dorf ist voll”, issue 29, 2012, pp. 34-35.

“Unzumutbare Schmerzen”, issue 30, 2012, pp. 124-125.

“Allah ist der Beste”, issue 39, 2012, pp. 60-64.

“Schatzi, spiel”, issue 41, 2012, p. 71.

“Prekäre Verhältnisse”, issue 6, 2013, p. 17.

“Der deutsche Traum”, issue 9, 2013, pp. 31-35, 37.

“Pritsche ohne Kissen”, issue 9, 2013, pp. 36-37.

“Endstation Görli”, issue 14, 2013, pp. 38-41.

“Gekommen, um zu bleiben”, issue 29, 2013, pp. 44-45.

“Im Bus der geplatzten Träume”, issue 32, 2013, pp. 42-44.

“Frau K. lernt kein Deutsch”, issue 39, 2013, pp. 50-52.

“Stich um Stich”, issue 40, 2013, p. 54.

“Gott ist kein Tyrann”, issue 41, 2013, p. 46.

“Türkisiert”, issue 45, 2013, pp. 74-75.

“Mit Schulabschluss zum Doppelpass”, issue 4, 2014, p. 15.

“SPD-Vize will Ausländer wählen lassen”, issue 32, 2014, p. 32.

“Reinheit, Ehre, Todesverachtung”, issue 37, 2014, pp. 110-111.

“Schande mit System”, issue 41, 2014, pp. 32-35.

“Anpacken statt Jammern”, issue 43, 2014, pp. 30-32.

“Ausbeutung ist Alltag”, issue 48, 2014, pp. 74-80.

“Neue Deutsche Welle”, issue 51, 2014, pp. 23-26.

“In der Chancenlotterie”, issue 52, 2014, pp. 44-46.

“Unter Sachsen”, issue 2, 2015, pp. 50-54.

“Spiel der Ängste”, issue 3, 2015, pp. 26-29.

“Karfreitag und Ramadan”, issue 4, 2015, p. 10.

“Widerstand gegen Islam-Äußerung”, issue 4, 2015, p. 12.

“Merkels Mut”, issue 4, 2015, p. 13.

“Der Dschihad und der Islam”, issue 6, 2015, pp. 104-107.

“Botschaft vom Scheiterhaufen”, issue 13, 2015, pp. 128-133.

“„Wir leben halt nicht im Paradies””, issue 16, 2015, pp. 30-32.

“Biedermann, Brandstifter”, issue 20, 2015, pp. 37-38.

“Mittäter und Mitwisser”, issue 22, 2015, p. 46.

“Seid endlich still”, issue 30, 2015, p. 50.

“Der Hass und die Heime”, issue 31, 2015, pp. 20-26.

“Eine Frage des Glaubens”, issue 33, 2015, pp. 48-49.

“Langes Warten auf Sprachkurse”, issue 34, 2015, p. 30.

“Die guten Deutschen”, issue 34, 2015, pp. 40-43.

“Zum Nichtstun verdammt”, issue 35, 2015, pp. 58-63.

“Unter dem Regenbogen”, issue 35, 2015, pp. 120-121.

“Das neue Deutschland”, issue 36, 2015, pp. 18-29.

“Was heilt”, issue 37, 2015, p. 8.

“Wir Kanaken”, issue 37, 2015, pp. 58-61.

“Helfen lohnt sich”, issue 40, 2015, pp. 80-82.

"Prügelei mit Bettgestellen", issue 41, 2015, pp. 28-30.

"Sie sind wieder da", issue 42, 2015, pp. 39-40.

"Die verlorene Ehre der Familie Khan", issue 42, 2015, pp. 46-48.

"Die enthemmte Republik", issue 44, 2015, pp. 24-29.

"Heikle Zahlen", issue 44, 2015, p. 30.

"Linke Leitkultur", issue 45, 2015, p. 12.

"Vor dem Zusammenbruch", issue 45, 2015, pp. 26-27.

"Integration – Richter unterrichten", issue 46, 2015, p. 22.

"Bahn qualifiziert Flüchtlinge", issue 46, 2015, p. 74.

"Für Israel, gegen Scharia", issue 49, 2015, p. 30.

"Angespannt", issue 51, 2015, pp. 28-34.

"Wir können doch mehr!", issue 53, 2015, p. 10.

## *Die Bild*

"Haben diese Gespenster-Eltern ihre Tochter gefangen gehalten?", 14 July 2010, p. 8.

"ARD schockt mit Dokumentation: So werden deutsche Schüler von Ausländern terrorisiert", 22 July 2010, p. 2.

"Thilo Sarrazins drastische Thesen über unsere Zukunft – DEUTSCHLAND SCHAFFT SICH AB!" 23 August 2010, p. 7.

"„Bei keiner anderen Religion ist der Übergang zu Gewalt und Terrorismus so fließend"", 26 August 2010, p. 9.

"Das wird man ja wohl noch sagen dürfen", 4 September 2010, p. 1.

"Diese Sätze muss man sagen dürfen, weil ...", 4 September 2010, p. 2.

“Bundesrepublik Absurdistan”, 8 September 2010, p. 2.

“Deutsch sprechen soll ins Grundgesetz”, 10 September 2010, p. 1.

“Bundespräsident Wulff – Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland!”, 4 October 2010, p. 1.

“Der Integrationspräsident”, 4 October 2010, p. 2

“Riesen-Diskussion um Einheits-Rede von Bundespräsident Wulff – Wie viel Islam verträgt Deutschland?”, 5 October 2010, p. 1.

“Hat der Bundespräsident damit recht?”, 5 October 2010a, p. 2.

“Fakten zum Islam in Deutschland”, 5 October 2010b, p. 2.

“Wütende Bürger schreiben an den Bundespräsidenten”, 6 October 2010, p. 2.

“Lehrer-Gewerkschaft schlägt Alarm: Deutschen-Feindlichkeit an deutschen Schulen”, 7 October 2010, p. 3.

“Wenn aus Türken Deutsche werden...”, 16 October 2010, p. 2.

“75% für Deutsch-Pflicht auf Schulhof”, 18 October 2010, p. 1.

“Bye-bye, Multikulti”, 18 October 2010a, p. 2.

“Herr Bundespräsident, diese Probleme sollten Sie in der Türkei ansprechen!”, 18 October 2010b, p. 2.

“Abgeordnete wollen Deutsch ins Grundgesetz schreiben”, 18 November 2010, p. 2.

“90 Prozent der Libanesen kriegen Hartz IV”, 23 November 2010, p. 2.

“Sigmar Gabriel auf den Spuren von Thilo Sarrazin”, 26 November 2010, p. 2.

“Selbstjustiz in Deutschland”, 3 December 2010, p. 7.

“Böhmer kündigt Integrationsverträge ab Frühjahr an”, 17 January 2011, p. 2.

“„Zukunft durch Bildung””, 17 February 2011, p. 8.

“„Bei mir haben schon Weizsäcker, Herzog und Schröder gegessen!””, 29 September 2011, p. 10.

“„Wer fleißig ist, hat Erfolg““, 1 October 2011, p. 3.

“„Ich bin die schönste Türkin Deutschlands!““, 11 October 2011, p. 3.

“„Ich habe eine eigene Kanzlei auf dem Ku’damm!““, 12 October 2011, p. 3.

“Ich habe im Fußballclub Deutsch gelernt”, 19 October 2011, p. 3.

“50 Jahre Türkische Gastarbeiter – „Ich regele den Zugverkehr am Bahnhof““, 22 October 2011, p. 3.

“„In der Schule war ich Jahrgangsbester!““, 24 October 2011, p. 3.

“So leben Türken in Deutschland wirklich”, 25 October 2011, p. 8.

“Bei Daimler traf ich den deutschesten Türken”, 28 October 2011, p. 8.

“Glücklich in Deutschland und der Türkei!”, 29 October 2011, p. 8.

“Ohne Hartz IV bist du in der Schule der Dumme”, 13 January 2012, p. 7.

“Iraker bekommen am häufigsten Hartz IV”, 16 January 2012, p. 1.

“Staat will mehr Migranten einstellen”, 1 February 2012, p. 2.

“Studie belegt – Jeder fünfte Muslim in Deutschland will sich nicht integrieren”, 1 March 2012, p. 2.

“Die Multi-Kulti-Illusion is gescheitert!”, 3 March 2012, p. 2.

“Wir haben in Deutschland unser Job-Glück gefunden”, 14 April 2012, p. 2.

“Darf sich eine Türkin SO zeigen?”, 15 April 2011, p. 8.

“Kauder entfach Debatte über Islam in Deutschland”, 20 April 2012, p. 2.

“Ausländer doppelt so häufig arbeitslos”, 28 June 2012, p. 1.

“Asylbewerbern stehen 350 Euro im Monat zu”, 19 July 2012, p. 2.

“Deutsche sind ausländerfreundlich”, 9 August 2012, p. 1.

“Mehr Geld für Asylbewerber”, 22 August 2012, p. 1.

“„Ich will andere aufrütteln und retten” – „Meine Tochter hilft mir beim Deutsch””, 14 September 2012, p. 11.

“Die bittere Wahrheit über Multikulti”, 17 September 2012, p. 7.

“Die bittere Wahrheit über Gewalt und Kriminalität”, 20 September 2012, p. 9.

“Polen haben unser Dorf reich gemacht”, 7 November 2012, p. 9.

“Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland ist sicher”, 9 November 2012, p. 1.

“Ich bin Roma und habe es trotzdem geschafft”, 5 March 2013, p. 6.

“Die 6 Wahrheiten über Roma in Deutschland”, 6 March 2013, p. 2.

“Ausländische Ärzte sollen zum Deutsch-Test”, 12 March 2013, p. 6.

“Dieser „Friedensrichter” urteilt im Namen Allahs!”, 19 March 2013, p. 5.

“Jeder dritte Ostdeutsche ist ausländerfeindlich”, 26 March 2013, p. 1.

“Will Gabriel eine „Tagesschau”-Sprecherin mit Kopftuch?”, 6 July 2013, p. 2.

“Migranten droht häufig Altersarmut”, 9 July 2013, p. 1.

“Türkische Straftäter in die Türkei entlassen”, 4 September 2013, p. 2.

“BILD ging im Burkini baden”, 13 September 2013, p. 2.

“Ich bekam mein Paket nicht, weil ich schwarz bin”, 16 December 2013, p. 6.

“Immer mehr EU-Bürger kassieren bei uns Hartz IV”, 7 February 2014, p. 1.

“366751 EU-Ausländer bekamen deutsches Kindergeld”, 7 May 2014, p. 1.

“52000 Hartz-Bezieher aus Bulgarien und Rumänien”, 31 May 2014, p. 2.

“27970 Türken eingebürgert”, 18 July 2014, p. 1.

“SCHARIA-POLIZEI PATROULLIERT IN WUPPERTAL”, 6 September 2014, p. 7.

“1. Hartz-IV-App für Rumänen und Bulgaren”, 19 September 2014, p. 1.

“Geschlagen, Gedemütigt, Gequält”, 29 September 2014, p. 3.

“„Unser Kindergeld ist höher als ein Lehrer-Gehalt in Rumänien””, 29 September 2014, p. 9.

“So verführen Salafisten Teenager zum Terror”, 30 September 2014, p. 5.

“Die Muslima hat Abitur, aber nicht das Recht, sich ihren Mann auszusuchen”, 1 October 2014, p. 6.

“Deutschland zahlte für 95452 Kinder im Ausland”, 7 November 2014, p. 2.

“Deutschland diskutiert das Burka Verbot”, 2 December 2014, p. 2.

“HANDWERK WILL SYRISCHE FLÜCHTLINGE EINSTELLEN”, 8 December 2014, p. 1.

“Wir mussten mehr Miete zahlen, weil wir Araber sind”, 16 January 2015, p. 6.

“Konzert für Toleranz”, 27 January 2015, p. 1.

“Lehrerinnen dürfen Kopftuch tragen”, 14 March 2015, p. 1.

“„Wir sind kein Nazi-Dorf””, 8 April 2015a, p. 3.

“Warum reagieren Anwohner so ängstlich auf Flüchtlinge”, 8 April 2015b, p. 3

“Mehr Angriffe auf Asylbewerber”, 24 July 2015, p. 1.

“Warum kommt es immer wieder zu Gewalt in Heimen?”, 3 August 2015, p. 3.

“Wir helfen Flüchtlingen in Deutschland”, 18 August 2015, p. 7.

“17 VERLETZTE BEI KRAWALLEN IN FLÜCHTLINGSHEIM”, 21 August 2015, p. 7.

“Neo-Nazis sind nur Pack”, 25 August 2015a, p. 2.

“Liebes Heidenau, böses Heidenau”, 25 August 2015b, p. 2.

“DAS KANN ICH JETZT TUN”, 25 August 2015a, p. 3.

“Rechts-Extremist uriniert auf Kinder”, 25 August 2015b, p. 3.

“Bild entlarvt 7 Vorurteile über Flüchtlinge”, 27 August 2015, p. 2.

“So funktioniert die große Hilfs-Aktion von Bild”, 29 August 2015a, p. 3.

“Darum muss jeder helfen”, 29 August 2015b, p. 3.

“Wir unterstützen die BILD-Aktion”, 31 August 2015, p. 2.

“Immer mehr machen mit”, 31 August 2015a, p. 3.

“Das ist das Ekel das ausländische Kinder anpinkelte”, 31 August 2015b, p. 3.

“BILD-Aktion „Wir helfen” bewegt Deutschland”, 1 September 2015a, p. 5.

“Auch wir unterstützen die Bild-Aktion”, 1 September 2015b, p. 5.

“Vorbildlich! So helfen BILD-Leser Flüchtlingen”, 2 September 2015, p. 7.

“Meine ersten Tage IN DEUTSCHLAND!”, 3 September 2015, p. 5.

“Es gibt viele Jobs für Zuwanderer”, 4 September 2015, p. 2.

“Stiftung bietet Patenschaften für Flüchtlings-Familien an”, 5 September 2015, p. 7.

“DIE GANZE WELT FEIERT UNS DEUTSCHE”, 8 September 2015, p. 2.

“„Wie wollen Sie Europa vor Islamisierung schützen, Frau Kanzlerin?””, 9 September 2015, p. 2.

“SPD für Führerschein Prüfung auf Arabisch”, 19 September 2015, p. 1.

“„Muslime gehören zu Deutschland, aber der Islam nicht””, 21 September 2015, p. 2.

“Wie soll das gehen? 1180 Einwohner, 3100 Flüchtlinge”, 23 September 2015, p. 7.

“Gabriel lässt Grundgesetz auf Arabisch drucken – „Wer zu uns kommt, muss Spielregeln kennen””, 30 September 2015, p. 2.

“Krise in Flüchtlings-Heimen!”, 2 October 2015, p. 1.

“De Maizière mahnt Flüchtlinge zur Ruhe”, 2 October 2015, p. 2.

“Lagerkoller”, 2 October 2015, p. 10.

“Das Grundgesetz: Bild druckt unsere Leitkultur”, 5 October 2015, p. 2.

"„Liebe fremde Frau, lieber fremder Mann" – Gemeinde stellt Benimm-Regeln für Flüchtlinge auf", 8 October 2015, p 3.

"Bürgermeister verteidigt Benimm-Regeln", 9 October 2015a, p. 3.

"Flüchtling in Heim vergewaltigt", 9 October 2015b, p. 3.

"Die Meinung der Bild-Leser", 9 October 2015c, p. 3.

"Brandstiftung ist versuchter Mord", 12 October 2015, p. 2.

"LERNT SCHNELL DEUTSCH!", 14 October 2015, p. 3.

"Bild im Dorf der Fragen", 15 October 2015, p. 3.

"Prügelei in Asylbewerberheim", 16 October 2015, p. 3.

"Aus Hassparolen wird Gewalt", 20 October 2015, p. 2.

"Zuwanderer sollen Sprachkurse selbst zahlen", 20 October 2015, p. 4.

"Razzia in Bayern: Rechtsradikale planten Anschlag auf Flüchtlinge", 23 October 2015, p. 2.

"Anschläge und Angriffe gegen Flüchtlinge", 2 November 2015, p. 2.

"BKA-Bericht: Kriminalität durch Flüchtlinge ist kaum gestiegen!", 14 November 2015, p. 2.

"Asylsuchende haben mehrere Jahre Schulrückstand", 8 December 2015, p. 2.

"Institut rechnet mit 376 000 arbeitslosen Flüchtlingen", 14 December 2015, p. 1.

## *Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)*

"Böhmer: Ausländer zu oft ohne Arbeit", 8 July 2010, p. 4.

"Integrationsgesetz in Berlin vorgelegt", 4 August 2010, p. 4.

"Sie würde niemals ein Kopftuch tragen", 1 September 2010, p. 33.

"Einwachsen statt Auswachsen", 6 September 2010, p. 29.

"Inland in Kürze", 8 September 2010, p. 4.

"Die unterschlagenen fünftausend Prozent", 9 September 2010, p. 32.

"Pflicht zur Bildung", 16 September 2010, p. 6.

"Vielfalt schätzen – Zusammenhalt fördern", 4 October 2010, p. 8.

"Für die Vielfalt", 4 October 2010, p. 10.

"Das Problem liegt in der Kürzung", 7 October 2010, p. 10.

"3:0", 11 October 2010, p. 12.

"Gelassenheit und Vorbild", 14 October 2010, p. 10.

"Der Islam und die Deutschen", 16 October 2010, p. 1.

"Eine republikanische Offensive", 18 October 2010, p. 10.

"Regierung plant Anerkennung ausländischer Zeugnisse", 19 October 2010, p. 1.

"Parallelgesellschaften am schlimmsten in Berlin", 27 October 2010, p. 4.

"Berliner Realitäten", 29 October 2010, p. 4.

"Böhmer: Deutsch muss Vorrang haben", 2 March 2011, p. 5.

"Die Hochschuld des Innenministers", 5 March 2011, p. 1.

"Friedrich: Mehr Sicherheit", 30 March 2011, p. 5.

"Man höre doch mal dem Heiland zu", 18 April, 2011, p. 28.

"Wenig Zuwanderung ins Sozialsystem erwartet", 29 April 2011, p. 15.

"Beschimpft, bespuckt und ausgegrenzt", 6 July 2011, p. N6.

"Die postidentischen Deutschen", 31 August 2011, p. 29.

""Deutsch Voraussetzung für Integration"", 21 September 2011, p. 4.

"Ganz unten", 31 October 2011, p. 7.

"Oh, Meister, keine Heimat hier, keine Heimat da", 1 November 2011, p. 4.

“Ein Fluchtweg aus der Zwangsverheiratung”, 8 November 2011, p. 10.

“Stopp dem Anwerbestopp”, 31 January 2012, p. 12.

“Betrug mit Integrationskursen”, 2 February 2012, p. 4.

“Inland in Kürze”, 7 February 2012, p. 4.

“Debatte über Integrationsstudie”, 2 March 2012, p. 4.

“Ditib: Muslime sollen sich aktiver beteiligen”, 14 March 2012, p. 1.

“Ein Ort, zwei Zeiten, viele Probleme”, 11 April 2012, p. 6.

“Erfolge für Migranten im Bildungssystem”, 28 June 2012, p. 5.

“Das Nötigste”, 19 July 2012, p. 1.

“Islam ist Barmherzigkeit”, 13 October 2012, p. 10.

“Neukölln ist nicht überall”, 10 November 2012, p. 12.

“Inland in Kürze”, 1 December 2012, p. 4.

“Gekommen, um zu leiden”, 24 December 2012, p. 3.

“Migrationshintergrund? Nein, Danke!”, 5 January 2013, p. 2.

“Städtetag besorgt über Armutseinwanderung”, 15 February 2013, p. 1.

“Die Kellerbewohner”, 22 February 2013, p. 1.

“Deutsche kritisieren Vorurteile gegenüber Muslime”, 13 March 2013, p. 4.

“Zuwanderer finden schneller Arbeit”, 23 March 2013, p. 14.

“Städtetag fordert Maßnahmen gegen Armutseinwanderung”, 22 June 2013, p. 4.

“Friedrich: Neonazis schaden unserem Vaterland”, 23 August 2013, p. 4.

“Wieder Proteste gegen Neonazis”, 26 August 2013, p. 2.

“Mehr Geld für arme Zuwanderer”, 9 October 2013, p. 10.

“Zu Besuch in der Realität”, 8 November 2013, p. 4.

“Einwanderung in Sozialhilfe nimmt zu”, 3 December 2013, p. 11.

“Warum trifft es immer mich?”, 12 December 2013, p. 25.

“Gauck wirbt um Verständnis für Flüchtlinge”, 24 December 2013, p. 1.

“Städte rüsten sich für Armutswanderung”, 31 December 2013, p. 14.

“Städte beschwichtigen in der Armutsdebatte”, 10 January 2014, p. 13.

“Aufstand für Hartz IV”, 11 January 2014, p. 1.

“Ein herzhaftes Weiter-so”, 3 February 2014, p. 2.

“Parallele Welten”, 23 April 2014, p. 3.

“Das neue Deutsche Wir”, 23 May 2014, p. 3.

“Wende”, 4 June 2014, p. 8.

“Asylbewerber verletzt”, 7 June 2014, p. 4.

“Terror mit zwei Pässen”, 21 June 2014, p. 5.

“Burka oder Freiheit”, 2 July 2014, p. 1.

“Asylbewerber sollen früher arbeiten”, 7 July 2014, p. 15.

“Mädchen als Eigentum”, 11 July 2014, p. 1.

“Test für Deutschland”, 11 July 2014, p. 8.

“Mehr Hartz-IV-Bezieher aus ärmeren EU-Staaten”, 13 August 2014, p. 1.

“Härtere Strafen für Sozialmissbrauch”, 28 August 2014, p. 15.

“Schuldzuweisungen nach der Katastrophe”, 1 October 2014a, p. 4.

“De Maiziére “bestürzt” über Umgang mit Flüchtlingen”, 1 October 2014b, p. 4.

“Die Schattenseite”, 2 October 2014, p. 1.

“Streit über die Kosten für Flüchtlinge”, 11 October 2014, p. 4.

“Kämpfen, damit sie nicht entgleiten”, 14 October 2014, p. 3.

“Hartz-IV Urteil geht an meisten armen Einwanderern vorbei”, 14 November 2014, p. 15.

“Mitbewohner Flüchtling”, 26 November 2014, p. 2.

“CSU bleibt dabei: Ausländer sollen in der Familie Deutsch sprechen”, 8 December 2014, p. 1.

“CSU ändert Leitantrag nach viel Kritik”, 9 December 2014, p. 1.

“Die Sorgen der 99.9 Prozent”, 16 December 2014, p. 2.

“Mehr Geld für Flüchtlinge”, 18 December 2014, p. 4.

“Bundespräsident: Fürchtet euch nicht”, 24 December 2014, p. 1.

“Wer gehört zu Deutschland?”, 15 January 2015, p. 1.

“Die Zeiten ändern sich”, 15 January 2015, p. 3.

“Fünf Thesen für einen deutschen Islam”, 1 February 2015, p. 8.

“Feuer in einem zerissenen Ort”, 7 April 2015, p. 2.

“Mehr Mut zur deutschen Sprache”, 21 April 2015, p. 8.

“Nicht in meiner Nachbarschaft”, 28 April 2015, p. 4.

“Zaghafte Schritte zur “Willkommenskultur””, 21 May 2015, p. 10.

“Mehr Sprachkurse für Flüchtlinge”, 12 June 2015, p. 18.

“Prüfsteine für die Willkommenskultur”, 24 June 2015, p. 15.

“Schneller Bafög für Flüchtlinge”, 13 August 2015, p. 4.

“Warum Sachsen? Der Protest gegen Asylbewerber und Flüchtlinge entlädt sich heftiger als in anderen Bundesländern”, 20 August 2015, p. 8.

“Ausschreitungen in Suhler Erstaufnahmeeinrichtung”, 21 August 2015, p. 2.

“Schutzzone um Notquartier für Asylbewerber in Heidenau”, 24 August 2015, p. 1.

“Wasser auf die Mühlen der Hassprediger”, 24 August 2015, p. 4.

“Die gefährlichsten Vorurteile über Flüchtlinge”, 25 August 2015, p. 15.

“Woidtke: Bürger sollen sich vom fremdenfeindlichen Mob distanzieren”, 26 August 2015, p. 4.

“Hell und Dunkel”, 31 August 2015, p. 1.

“Deutschland den Deutschen”, 31 August 2015, p. 6.

“Arbeitsmakrt rüstet sich für Flüchtlinge”, 2 September 2015, p. 15.

“Berlin ist tolerant gegenüber Fremden”, 8 September 2015a, p. 4.

“Wieder Brände in Flüchtlingsheimen”, 8 September 2015b, p. 4.

“Wieder Anschlag auf Asylheim”, 12 September 2015, p. 2.

“Warnung vor Belastung des Arbeitsmarkts”, 17 September 2015, p. 1.

“Flüchtlinge für den Arbeitsmarkt”, 19 September 2015, p. 18.

“Vor dem Sprachgesetz sind alle gleich”, 22 September 2015, p. 11.

“Bischöfe für Offenheit”, 25 September 2015, p. 6.

“Schlägerei unter Flüchtlingen”, 28 September 2015, p. 5.

“Sorge über Konflikte in Asylunterkünften”, 30 September 2015, p. 4.

“Helden der Leitkultur”, 1 October 2015, p. 1.

“Verhaltensregeln für Flüchtlinge”, 9 October 2015, p. 5.

“Deutsche Leitkultur”, 10 October 2015, p. 10.

“Willkommen auf Akademisch”, 10 October 2015, p. 11.

“Eine Million zusätzliche Hartz-IV Bezieher”, 10 October 2015, p. 19.

“Brand bei Flüchtlingsheim”, 21 October 2015, p. 2.

“Der steinige Weg der Flüchtlinge an die Hochschulen”, 24 October 2015, p. 20.

“Das wird man ja wohl noch ermitteln dürfen”, 28 October 2015, p. 4.

“Fast ein Fünftel mehr Flüchtlinge beziehen Hartz IV”, 31 October 2015, p. 19.

“Erster Deutschkurs”, 10 November 2015, p. 13.

"Keine Kompromisse bei unseren Werten", 12 November 2015, p. 10.

"Westliche Werte unter Druck", 14 November 2015, p. 26.

"Gewalt auf engstem Raum", 1 December 2015, p. 4.

"Syrische Schulkinder haben wenig gelernt", 9 December 2015, p. 17.

"Flüchtlinge sind besonders fleißige Schüler", 15 December 2015, p. 17.

"Mehr Angriffe auf Flüchtlinge", 16 December 2015, p. 4.

"Sächsische Differenzierungen", 19 December 2015, p. 4.

"Wir – und die anderen", 24 December 2015, p. 7.

## *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)*

"Richter ohne Auftrag", 31 July 2010, p. 14.

"Eiad Jawabreh, Restaurantbesitzer", 4 September 2010, p. V2/5.

"Der Mann mit dem schweren Rucksack", 7 September 2010, p. 5.

"„Jeder achte Zuwanderer will sich nicht integrieren"", 9 September 2010, p. 1.

"„Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland"", 4 October 2010, p. 1.

"Einheit, Europa, Einwanderung", 4 October, 2010, p. 6.

"Gebote der Integration", 5 October 2010, p. 4.

"Lob für Wulff-Rede", 5 October 2010, p. 6.

"Studiengang für Imame", 6 October 2010, p. 6.

"CSU gegen Zuwanderung", 15 October 2010, p. 6.

"Der Bundespräsident als Integrator", 20 October 2010, p. 4.

"Leitantrag zur Leitkultur", 20 October 2010, p. 6.

"Mehr Schutz vor Zwangsheirat", 28 October 2010, p. 8.

"Alina Treiger in Berlin ausgebildete Rabbinerin, die erste nach 75 Jahren", 4 November 2010, p. 4.

"Vorwärts in die Vergangenheit", 12 November 2010, p. 34.

"Projekte statt Polemik", 18 November 2010, p. 32.

"FDP will mehr Weltoffenheit", 9 December 2010, p. 5.

"Yo, Merkel, Yo", 10 December 2010, p. 3.

"Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland – vielleicht", 5 March 2011, p. 5.

"Friedrich will Dialog mit Muslimen fortsetzen", 7 March 2011, p. 6.

"Seehofer will bayerische Verfassung ändern", 10 March 2011, p. 1.

"Zerrbilder und Stereotypen", 11 May 2011, p. 6.

"Der Schirmherr", 27 June 2011, p. 4.

"Islam-Unterricht in der Schule", 4 July 2011, p. 18.

"Celal Özcan", 23 July 2011, p. 42.

"Neuer Vorstoß für doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft", 27 July 2011, p. 6.

"Angekommen im Abseits", 14 October 2011, p. 6.

"Wie Türken Deutschland prägen", 22 October 2011, pp. 8-9.

"Überraschendes Lob", 3 March 2012, p. 6.

"Opfer der eigenen Familie", 2 May 2012, p. 10.

"Der falsche Ritterschlag", 10 May 2012, p. 4.

"Mehr Ausländer mit Abitur", 28 June 2012, p. 6.

"Schelte und Zuspruch", 24 September 2012, p. 7.

"Die Kinder, die wir uns wünschen", 17 November 2012, p. 13.

"Man spricht besser Deutsch", 27 November 2012, p. 6.

"Negatives Bild von Migranten", 20 February 2013, p. 6.

“Die Sorgenkinder”, 16 March 2013, p. 6.

“Schauplatz Berlin”, 23 August 2013, p. 11.

“Lob für Özoguz Ernennung”, 17 December 2013, p. 6.

“Gauck fordert mehr Hilfe für Flüchtlinge”, 24 December 2013, p. 1.

“Die CSU steht allein da”, 31 December 2013, p. 5.

“Die Sicht der Praktiker”, 3 January 2014, p. 6.

“Fakt und Vorurteil”, 4 January 2014, p. 21.

“Leitfransen der EU”, 14 January 2014, p. 4.

“Mehr Hartz-IV-Hilfen für Rumänen und Bulgaren”, 6 March 2014, p. 1.

“Mehr Kontrolle, mehr Integration”, 26 March 2014, p. 2.

“Feige Rhetorik”, 28 March 2014, p. 11.

“Sprachschwierigkeiten”, 12 April 2014, p. 28.

“Zuwanderer ohne Job sollen weiterhin kein Hartz IV erhalten”, 21 May 2014, p. 1.

“Lernort und Nothilfe”, 10 June 2014, p. 15.

“Mehr Hartz IV für Bulgaren”, 12 June 2014, p. 5.

“Der Nahost-Konflikt in Bayern”, 25 August 2014, p. 36.

“Die CSU missbraucht Zuwanderer aus Osteuropa”, 28 August 2014, p. 4.

“Viele Vorurteile gegen Sinti und Roma”, 4 September 2014, p. 4.

“Und nachts suchte der „SS-Trupp” Streit”, 2 October 2014, p. 6.

“Zentrale von Flüchtlingsheim-Betreiber durchsucht”, 7 October 2014, p. 6.

“Nachts kommt die Angst”, 20 October 2014, p. 6.

“In Gottes Namen”, 23 October 2014, p. 5.

“Ayse hat es schwerer als Anna”, 31 October 2014, p. 5.

“Zuwanderer finden öfter Arbeit”, 11 November 2014, p. 1.

“Kühles Willkommen”, 6 December 2014, p. 9.

“Sprache als Waffe”, 9 December 2014, p. 4.

“Falsche Differenzierung”, 15 December 2014, p. 4.

“Die neue wilde Jagd”, 22 December 2014, p. 4.

“Gauck gegen Abschottung Deutschlands”, 24 December 2014, p. 1.

“Der lange Weg zur Arbeit”, 8 January 2015, p. 19.

“Der Druck steigt”, 20 January 2015, p. 5.

“Der sächsische Irrweg”, 28 January 2015, p. 6.

“Was kommt”, 31 January 2015, p. 24.

“Mauerreste”, 19 February, 2015, p. 2.

“Protest für Flüchtlinge”, 2 March 2015, p. 5.

“Der brüchige Dorffriede”, 5 March 2015, p. 7.

“Feuer in Flüchtlingsheim selbst gelegt”, 9 March 2015, p. 8.

“„Tragödie für unsere Demokratie””, 11 March 2015, p. 5.

“Alle mal herhören”, 20 March 2015, p. 3.

“Tafeln beklagen Hetze gegen Asylbewerber”, 28 March 2015, p. 45.

“Nur nicht weichen”, 8 April 2015a, p. 5.

“Rechtsextreme Proteste nehmen zu”, 8 April 2015b, p. 5.

“Flüchtlinge willkommen”, 13 April 2015, p. 7.

“Gedenkfeier in Ravensbrück”, 20 April 2015, p. 5.

“Kommunen fordern Millionen für Flüchtlinge”, 7 May 2015, p. 44.

“Bewährung für Anschlag”, 12 May 2015, p. 6.

“Vorwurf gegen Polizisten”, 20 May 2015, p. 6.

“Asylverfahren dauern im Schnitt 7,1 Monate”, 27 May 2015, p. 6.

“Sie wollen arbeiten”, 16 June 2015, p. 19.

“Konfrontation in der Kreisstadt”, 26 June 2015, p. 6.

“Flüchtlingsheim attackiert”, 3 July 2015, p. 6.

“Schibboleth”, 11 July 2015, p. 5.

“Asyl-Unterkunft in Brand gesetzt”, 17 July 2015, p. 1.

“Hass, Hilfe, Hoffnung”, 20 July 2015, p. 2.

“Frauen in Bedrängnis”, 21 July 2015, p. 26.

“Ein lauter Knall”, 28 July 2015, p. 5.

“Ungewollte Nachbarn“, 7 August 2015, p. 5.

“Keine Flüchtlingswohnungen”, 8 August 2015, p. 8.

“Einschreiben, bitte!”, 17 August 2015, p. 14.

“„Alles an der Brust war blau””, 21 August 2015, p. 6.

“Frust und Eifer”, 22 August 2015, p. 4.

“„Wir haben wirklich Angst””, 24 August 2015a, p. 5.

“Brauner Schatten”, 24 August 2015b, p. 5.

“Verbrechen gegen Flüchtlinge”, 25 August 2015, p. 5.

“Schäuble: Höhere Kosten für Flüchtlinge verkraftbar”, 26 August 2015, p. 1.

“Ungelöschter Hass auf Asylbewerber”, 28 August 2015, p. 6.

“Angst in der Mitte”, 29 August 2015, p. 5.

“In einem anderen Land”, 1 September 2015, p. 3.

“Endlich selbstständig”, 1 September 2015a, p. 18.

“Alle wollen, dürfen aber nicht”, 1 September 2015b, p. 18.

“Bücher für Flüchtlinge”, 8 September 2015, p. 10.

“Karlsruhe muss übernehmen”, 16 September 2015, p. 4.

"EU-Bürger haben kein Recht auf Hartz IV", 16 September 2015, p. 8.

"Freier Messe-Eintritt für Flüchtlinge", 16 September 2015, p. 11.

"Flüchtlinge betrügen Flüchtlinge", 17 September 2015, p. 36.

"Die Stille am Rand", 19 September 2015, p. 6.

"Bringen die Flüchtlinge mehr Antisemitismus nach Deutschland?", 21 September 2015, p. 9.

"Beifall von rechts für SPD-Schreiben", 22 September 2015, p. 30.

"Deutschland auf Platz zwei bei Immigration", 23 September 2015a, p. 6.

"Schnell zum Arzt", 23 September 2015b, p. 6.

"Sie arbeiten am nächsten Wirtschaftswunder", 24 September 2015, p. 17.

"Es muss noch viel passieren", 26 September 2015, p. 25.

"Der schwierige Weg zum Konto", 26 September 2015, p. 27.

"Endlich angekommen", 28 September 2015, p. 17.

"Enges Asyl", 29 September 2015, p. 4.

"Betrüger tricksen Zalando aus", 7 October 2015, p. 20.

"Tempo für Flüchtlinge", 13 October 2015, p. 17.

"Der Barbier von Hoyerswerda", 15 October 2015, p. 3.

"Zu gut integriert", 15 October 2015, p. 36.

"Was für eine Nation", 17 October 2015, p. 4.

"Kalter Krieg", 19 October 2015, p. 3.

"Die Zäune der Zivilität", 21 October 2015, p. 4.

"Vielfalt zahlt sich aus", 23 October 2015, p. 2.

"Überstunden für ein neues Leben", 24 October 2015, p. 34.

"Schlägereien von Flüchtlingen", 26 October 2015, p. 5.

“Reker-Attentäter angeklagt”, 29 October 2015, p. 6.

“CSU-Funktionär beleidigt Pfarrer”, 31 October 2015, p. 41.

“Wanka für Flüchtlings-TV”, 2 November 2015, p. 27.

“Das schwarze Loch der CSU”, 2 November 2015, p. 36.

“Seehofer: Integration wird Milliarden kosten”, 4 November 2015, p. 1.

“Geschärfter Blick”, 4 November 2015, p. 30.

“Aufgewühlte Republik”, 14 November 2015, p. 6.

“Was auf dem Spiel steht“, 20 November 2015, p. 17.

“Apokalypse”, 1 December 2015, p. 3.

“Mangelware Deutschlehrer”, 3 December 2015, p. 27.

“Umfrage: Flüchtlinge überfordern Schulen”, 7 December 2015, p. 1.

“Nahles will Zehntausenden Flüchtlingen Jobs verschaffen”, 9 December 2015, p. 1.

“Der Rechtsstaat in 03:14 Minuten”, 18 December 2015, p. 36.

“Flüchtlinge als Freiwillige”, 24 December 2015, p. 8.

“Zunehmend radikal”, 29 December 2015, p. 26.

“Neue Heimat”, 30 December 2015, p. 4.

“Flüchtlinge im und auf dem Theater”, 31 December 2015, p. 11.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

**Adam, S. (2009)** *Bringing the Mass Media in – The Contribution of the Mass Media for Understanding Citizens' Attitudes towards the European Union*. KFG Working Paper Series, no. 4. Freie Universität Berlin, FB Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe".

**Adamson, F.B. (2019)** Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s). *International Migration Review*, vol. 53 (1): 210-236

**Althusser, L. (1971)** "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes towards an Investigation" In: Althusser, L. *"Lenin and Philosophy" and Other Essays*. Trans. B. Brewster, transcribed A. Blunden. New York: Monthly Review Press. pp. 85-126. Available URL: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm [Accessed 10 March 2020]. (Original work published in 1970)

**Amnesty International (2015)** Refugee Crisis: Balkans Border Blocks Leave Thousands Stranded [Internet]. *Amnesty International*, 20 November 2015. Available URL: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/refugee-crisis-balkans-border-blocks-leave-thousands-segregated-and-stranded-in-greece/ [Accessed 27 July 2017].

**Anbarani, A. (2013)** Nation, Nationalism in Controversial Debates and Thought: A Review of Origin of Nation and Nationalism. *Canadian Social Science*, vol. 9 (3): 61-67

**Anderson, B. (1983)** *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London/New York: Verso.

**Anderson, B. (2006)** *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. rev. B. Anderson. London/New York: Verso.

**Antonsich, M. (2016)** International Migration and the Rise of the 'Civil' Nation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 42 (11): 1790-1807

**Archetti, C. (2010)** Comparing International Coverage of 9/11: Towards an Interdisciplinary Explanation of the Construction of News. *Journalism*, vol. 11 (5): 567-588

**Arnold, R. (2007)** Integrationsdebatten 1807 und 2007: "Le Grand Sanhédrin" und die Deutsche Islam Konferenz. *Gesellschaft/Geschichte*, vol 5: 17-20

**Astheimer, S. (2014)** Deutschland ist zweitbeliebtestes Einwanderungsland [Internet]. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 May 2014. Available URL: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/oecd-studie-deutschland-ist-zweitbeliebtestes-einwanderungsland-12948274.html [Accessed 10 April 2015].

**Aydin, Y. (2009)** *Topoi des Fremden: Zur Analyse und Kritik einer sozialen Konstruktion*. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft.

**Bade, K.J. (2013)** *Kritik und Gewalt: Sarrazin-Debatte, 'Islamkritik' und Terror in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft*. Schwalbach: Wochenschau-Verlag.

**Bade, K.J. (2018)** Kritik und Gewalt: Sarrazin-Debatte, 'Islamkritik' und Terror in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft [2013/2014]. *Historical Social Research*, Supplement, vol. 30: 306-317

**Balibar, E. (1991)** "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" In: Balibar, E. and Wallerstein, I. (eds.) *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London: Verso Books. pp. 17-28.

**Baringhorst, S. (2013)** "Paradigmenwechsel in der deutschen Migrations- und Integrationspolitik – Quellen der Legitimation und neue Forschungsdesiderate." In: Schimany, R. and Loeffelholz, H.D. (eds.) *Beiträge zur Migrations- und Integrationsforschung. Aus Anlass des 60-jährigen Bestehens des Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge*. Nürnberg: BAMF. pp. 44-63.

**Barry, B. (2001)** *Culture and Equality*. Cambridge: Polity.

**Barth, F. (1969)** "Introduction" In: Barth, F. (ed.) *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. pp. 9-38.

**Bauder, H. (2008a)** Media Discourse and the New German Immigration Law. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 34 (1): 95-112

**Bauder, H. (2008b)** Neoliberalism and the Economic Utility of Immigration: Media Perspectives of Germany's Immigration Law. *Antipode*, vol. 40 (1): 55-78

**Bauder, H. (2009)** Humanitarian Immigration and German National Identity in the Media. *National Identities*, vol. 11 (3): 263-280

**Bauder, H. (2011)** *Immigration Dialectic: Imagining Community, Economy, and the Nation*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

**Bauder, H. (2014)** Re-Imagining the Nation: Lessons from the Debates of Immigration in a Settler Society and an Ethnic Nation. *Comparative Migration Studies*, vol. 2 (1): 9-27

**Bauder, H. and Semmelroggen, J. (2009)** Immigration and Imagination of Nationhood in the German Parliament. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 15 (1): 1-26

**Bauman, Z. (1990)** Modernity and Ambivalence. *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 7: 143-169

**Baumann, G. (2004) "Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach"** In: Baumann, G. and Gingrich, A (eds) *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. pp. 18-52.

**Baumann, G. and Gingrich, A. (eds.) (2004)** *Grammars of Identity/Alterity: A Structural Approach*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

**Bayat, M. (2016)** *Die politische und mediale Repräsentation in Deutschland lebender Muslime: Eine Studie am Beispiel der Deutschen Islam Konferenz*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

**Beauchamp, Z. (2017)** White Riot: How Racism and Immigration gave us Trump, Brexit, and a Whole New Kind of Politics [Internet]. *Vox*, 20 January 2017. Available URL: http://www.vox.com/2016/9/19/12933072/far-right-white-riot-trump-brexit [Accessed 9 March 2017].

**Beer, I. (2013)** Quartiersentwicklung als Diversitäts- und Teilhabestrategie. Zwischen traditionellen Integrationsdiskursen und gelebten Migrationsrealitäten. *Migrationsort Quartier, Quartiersforschung*, vol. 3: 41-53

**Benwell, B. And Stokoe, E. (2006)** *Discourse and Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

**Berger, P.L. and Luckmann, T. (1966)** *The Social Construction of Reality*. London: The Penguin Press.

**BKA (2015)** *Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung: Bundeslagebild 2015*. Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt.

**Blaikie, N.W.H. (2007)** *Approaches to Social Enquiry: Advancing Knowledge*. 2nd edn. Cambridge: Polity Press.

**Blas Arroyo, J.L. (2000)** Mire usted Sr. Gonzalez …. Personal deixis in Spanish Political-electoral Debate. *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 32: 1-27

**Bloor, M. and Bloor, T. (2007)** *The Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis – An Introduction*. New York: Hodder Education.

**Boukala, S. (2016)** Rethinking *topos* in the Discourse Historical Approach: Endoxon Seeking and Argumentation in Greek Media Discourses on 'Islamist Terrorism'. *Discourse Studies*, vol. 18 (3): 249-268

**Breitenbach, E. and Schubert, K. (2010)** Demokratie als Schlüssel zu gesellschaftlicher Integration: Anmerkungen zur Integrationsdebatte. *Standpunkte*, vol. 37. Berlin: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.

**Breuilly, J. (1994)** "The Sources of Nationalist Ideology" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 103-113. (Original work published in 1982)

**Brochmann, G. (2003)** "Citizenship of Multicultural States: Power and Legitimacy" In: Brochmann, G. (ed.) *The Multicultural Challenge*. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 1-11.

**Brown, D. (2000)** *Contemporary Nationalisms: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multicultural Politics*. London: Routledge.

**Brubaker, R. (1992)** *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

**Brubaker, R. (1999)** "The Manichean Myth: Rethinking the Distinction between 'Civic' and 'Ethnic' Nationalism." In: Kriesi, H., Armingeon, K., Siegrist, H. and Wimmer, A. (eds.) *Nation and National Identity*. Zürich: Rügger. pp. 55-71.

**Brubaker, R. (2013)** Categories of Analysis and Categories of Practice: A Note on the Study of Muslims in European Countries of Immigration. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 36 (1): 1-8

**Bryman, A. (2008)** *Social Research Methods*. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2011)** *Business Research Methods*. 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Bukow, W.D. (2002)** *Der aktuelle Integrationsdiskurs* [Internet]. Berlin: Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Available URL: http://www.rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/Veranstaltungen/2002/Kommen_und_Bleiben/buckow.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2014].

**Butler, J. (1997)** *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

**Butterwegge, C. (2013)** "Sarrazynismus, Rechtspopulismus und Rassismus. Das neu-alte Sprechen über Migration und Integration" In: Roth, H.-J., Terhart, H. and Anastasopoulos, C. (eds.) *Sprache und Sprechen im Kontext von Migration*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. pp. 85-102.

**Caple, H. and Knox, J.S. (2015)** A Framework for the Multimodal Analysis of Online News Galleries: What Makes a "Good" Picture Gallery? *Social Semiotics*, vol. 25 (3): 292-321

**Castells, M. (2001)** *The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Cheng, W. (2012)** Corpus-based Linguistic Approaches to Critical Discourse Analysis [Internet]. *The Encyclopaedia of Applied Linguistics*. Available URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal0262/full [Accessed 1 December 2016].

**Collier, D., Hoeffler, A., and Sambanis, M. (2005)** "The CollierHoeffler Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Research Project Design" In: Collier, D. and Sambanis, M. (eds.) *Understanding Civil War: Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications. pp. 1-34.

**Connor, W. (1994a)** "A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a …" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 36-46. (Original work published in 1987)

**Connor, W. (1994b)** *Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

**Conversi, D. (2004)** Can Nationalism Studies and Ethnic/Racial Studies Be Brought Together? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 30 (4): 815– 829

**Critin, J., Hanley, J., Levy, M. and Wright, M. (2016)** Brexit Proved Again that Identity Can Trump Economics [Internet]. *The Washington Post*, 2 July 2016. Available

URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/02/brexit-proved-again-that-identity-can-trump-economics/?utm_term=.b3488e35d64a [Accessed 11 March 2017].

**Czitrich, H. (1989)** *Konservatismus und nationale Identität in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.

**Davy, U. (2005)** Integration of Immigrants in Germany: A Slowly Evolving Concept. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, vol. 7 (2): 123-144

**de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (1999)** The Discursive Construction of National Identities. *Discourse & Society*, vol. 10 (2): 149–173

**De Vaus, D.A. (2001)** *Research Design in Social Research*. London: SAGE.

**Decker, O. (2018)** "Flucht ins Autoritäre" In: Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (eds.) *Flucht ins Autoritäre: Rechtsextreme Dynamiken in der Mitte der Gesellschaft*. Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag. pp. 15-64.

**Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (eds.) (2018)** *Flucht ins Autoritäre: Rechtsextreme Dynamiken in der Mitte der Gesellschaft*. Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag.

**Decker, O., Kiess, J., Schuler, J., Handke, B. and Brähler, E. (2018)** "Die Leipziger Autoritarismus-Studie 2018: Methode, Ergebnisse und Langzeitverlauf" In: Decker, O. and Brähler, E. (eds.) *Flucht ins Autoritäre: Rechtsextreme Dynamiken in der Mitte der Gesellschaft*. Gießen: Psychosozial-Verlag. pp. 65-116.

**Demireva, N. (2017)** Immigration, Diversity and Social Cohesion [Internet]. *The Migration Observatory*, 1 November 2017. Available URL: https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/immigration-diversity-and-social-cohesion/ [Accessed 29 October 2019].

***Der Spiegel* (2017)** Der Spiegel – das deutsche Nachrichtenmagazin [Internet]. Spiegel Media. Available URL: http://spiegel.media/medien/print/der-spiegel [Accessed 4 April 2017].

**Descombe, M. (1998)** *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects*. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill International UK Limited.

**Deutsch, K. (1994)** "Nationalism and Social Communication" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 26-29. (Original work published in 1966)

**Deutscher Bundestag (n.d.)** Parlament [Internet]. *Deutscher Bundestag*. Available URL: https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/aufgaben/rechtsgrundlagen/grundgesetz/gg_01-245122 [Accessed 15 May 2019].

**Diel, C. and Steinmann, J.-P. (2012a)** Cool Minds in Heated Debates? Migration-related Attitudes in Germany before and after a Natural Intervention. *International Journal of Violence and Conflict*, vol. 6 (1): 141-162

**Diel, C. and Steinmann, J.-P. (2012b)** The Impact of the "Sarrazin Debate" on the German Public's Views on Immigration. *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration Focus Papers*. Washington: German Marshall Fund of the United States.

**Dolezal, M., Helbling, M. and Hutter, S. (2010)** Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland: Ethnic Citizenship, Church-State Relations and Right-Wing Populism. *West European Politics*, vol. 33 (2): 171-190

**Duffy, B. and Rowden, K. (2005)** *You Are What You Read? How Newspaper Readership is Related to Views* [Internet]. London: MORI. Available URL: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/publication/1970-01/sri_you_are_what_you_read_042005.pdf [Accessed 19 August 2017].

**Dumont, L. (1980)** *Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

**Eder, K., Rauer, V. and Schmidtke, O. (eds.) (2004)** *Die Einhegung des Anderen: Türkische, polnische und russlanddeutsche Einwanderer in Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

**ef (2016)** Übersicht: Politisch meinungsbildende Zeitungen und Zeitschriften in deutscher Sprache [Internet]. *Eigentümlich frei*, 2 August 2016. Available URL: http://ef-magazin.de/2016/08/02/1761-uebersicht-politisch-meinungsbildende-zeitungen-und-zeitschriften-in-deutscher-sprache [Accessed 4 April 2017].

**Ehrkamp, P. (2006)** "We Turks are no Germans": Assimilation Discourses and the Dialectical Construction of Identities in Germany. *Environment and Planning*, vol. 38 (9): 1673-1692

**Esser, H. (1980)** *Aspekte der Wanderungssoziologie. Assimilation und Integration von Wanderern, ethnischen Gruppen und Minderheiten. Eine handlungstheoretische Analyse*. Darmstadt: Luchterhand.

**Estel, B. (1994)** "Grundaspekte der Nation" In: Estel, B. and Mayer, T. (eds.) *Das Prinzip der Nation in modernen Gesellschaften: Länderdiagnosen und gesellschaftliche Prinzipien*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. pp. 13-81.

**Estel, B. (2002)** *Nation und nationale Identität*. *Versuch einer Rekonstruktion*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

**European Commission (n.d.)** Schengen, Borders & Visas [Internet]. *European Commission*. Available URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas_en [Accessed 13 January 2020].

**Eurostat (2016)** Asylum in the EU Member States Record Number of over 1.2 million First Time Asylum Seekers Registered in 2015 [Internet]. *Eurostat*, 4 March 2016. Available URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6 [Accessed 30 January 2020].

**Eurostat (2019)** Gender Pay Gap Statistics [Internet]. *Eurostat*, 5 March 2019. Available URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Gender_pay_gap_statistics [Accessed 12 August 2019].

**Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1940)** *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

**Fairclough, N. (2001)** *Language and Power*. 2nd edn. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.

**Fairclough, N. (2003)** *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. London: Routledge.

**Fairclough, N. and Wodak, R. (1997)** "Critical Discourse Analysis" In: Van Dijk, T.A. (ed.) *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, Vol. 2, Discourse as Social Interaction*. London: SAGE. pp. 258-284.

**Faist, T. (1994)** How to Define a Foreigner? The Symbolic Politics of Immigration in German Partisan Discourse, 1978-1992. *West European Politics*, vol. 17 (2): 50-21

**Faist, T. and Ulbricht, C. (2013)** Doing National Identity through Transnationality: Categorizations of Inequality in German Integration Debates. *COMCAD Working Papers*, no. 120.

**Favell, A. (2003)** Integration Nations: The Nation-State and Research on Immigrants in Western Europe. *Comparative Social Research*, vol. 22: 13-42

***FAZ* (2012)** Zielgruppe F.A.S. – Leser: Eine eingeschworene Sonntagsgemeinde [Internet]. FAZ.net, 1 August 2012. Available URL: http://verlag.faz.net/zielgruppe-f-a-s-leser-eine-eingeschworene-sonntagsgemeinde-11855800.html [Accessed 4 April 2017].

***FAZ* Media** (n.d.) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland [Internet]. *FAZ.net*. Available URL: http://www.faz.media/medien/frankfurter-allgemeine-zeitung-fuer-deutschland/ [Accessed 3 April 2017].

**Fernández Campbell, A. (2019)** The El Paso Shooter Told Police that He Was Targeting Mexicans [Internet]. *Vox*, 9 August 2019. Available URL: https://www.vox.com/2019/8/6/20756750/el-paso-shooter-targeted-latinx-walmart [Accessed 20 August 2019].

**Fichte, J.G. (1997)** "Reden an die deutsche Nation" In: Österreich, P.L. (ed.) *Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Schriften zur angewandten Philosophie*. Werke II. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag. pp. 539-788. (Original work published in 1808)

**Foroutan, N. (2012a)** "Innerdeutsche Grenze Islam? Desintegrative Folgen der Integrationsdebatte" In: Ha, K.N. (ed.) *Asiatische Deutsche. Vietnamesische Diaspora and Beyond*. Berlin: Assoziation A. pp. 321-335.

**Foroutan, N. (2012b)** Muslimbilder in Deutschland: Wahrnehmungen und Ausgrenzungen in der Integrationsdebatte. *Wiso Diskurs*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

**Foroutan, N., Canan, C., Arnold, S., Schwarze, B., Beigang, S. and Kalkum, D. (2014)** *Deutschland Postmigrantisch I. Gesellschaft, Religion, Identität –Erste Erbebnisse*. Berlin: Berliner Institut für empirische Integrations- und Migrationsforschung der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (BIM).

**Foucault, M. (2002)** *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. Oxon: Routledge. (Original work published in 1972)

**Francis, E. (1965)** *Ethnos und Demos – Soziologische Beiträge zur Volkstheorie*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.

**Fulbrook, M. (1996)** "Aspects of Society and Identity in the New Germany" In: Mertes, M., Muller, S. and Winkler, H.A. (eds.) *In Search of Germany*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 229-252.

**Fulbrook, M. (1999)** *German National Identity after the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

**Garrett, P. and Bell, A. (1998)** "Media and Discourse: A Critical Overview" In: Bell, A. and Garrett, P. (eds.) *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 1-20.

**Geddes, A. (2003)** *Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe*. London: Sage.

**Geertz, C. (1994)** "Primordial and Civic Ties" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 29-34. (Original work published in 1963)

**Gehring, J. (2016)** Race, Ethnicity and German Identity: A Media Analysis of the 2010 World Cup Men's National Soccer Team. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 39 (11): 1962-1980

**Geissler, R. (2011)** "Migranten und Kriminalität" In: Löfler, R. (ed.) *Nationale Identität und Integration: Herausforderungen an Politik und Medien in Frankreich und Deutschland.* Freiburg: Herder. pp. 142-157.

**Gellner, E. (1964)** *Thought and Change*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

**Gellner, E. (1994)** "Nationalism and High Cultures" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 63-69. (Original work published in 1964)

**Gellner, E. (2006)** *Nations and Nationalism*. 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

**Gerber, A.S., Karlan, D. and Bergan, D. (2009)** Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behaviour and Political Opinions. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, vol. 1 (2): 35-52

**Gerdes, J. (2010)** Migrants' Rights and Immigrant Integration in German Political Party Discourse. *COMCAD Arbeitspapiere- working papers*, 90. Bielefeld: COMCAD – Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development.

**Gerring, J. (2007)** *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

**Giddens, A. (1994)** "The Nation as a Power-Container" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 34-35. (Original work published in 1985)

**Gidley, B. (2004)** "Doing Historical and Archival Research" In: Seale, C. (ed.) *Researching Society and Culture*. 2nd edn. London: SAGE. pp. 249-264.

**Giebel, M., Kettenbach, M., Strobl, R., Haase, K., Lanzinger, J., Plagmann, S., Dimitriu, M. and Fürthauer, M. (2019)** Fall Walter Lübcke: "Dramatische Entwicklungen" – neue Hintergründe zum Festgenommenen [Internet]. *Merkur.de*, 23 July 2019. Available URL: https://www.merkur.de/politik/luebcke-verdaechtiger-wohl-npd-mann-dramatische-entwicklungen-zr-12342984.html [Accessed 20 August 2019].

**Giesen, B. (1993)** *Die Intellektuellen und die Nation. Eine deutsche Achsenzeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

**Glazer, N. (1993)** Is Assimilation Dead? *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 530: 122-136

**Goel, U. (2009)** Für eine nachhaltige Migrations- und Integrationspolitik in Deutschland –Wider die (Re) Produktion ungleicher Machtverhältnisse und Privilegien. *WISO DISKURS*. Bonn: FES.

**Goffman, E. (1990)** *Stigma. Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

**Götz, I. (2011)** *Deutsche Identitäten: Die Wiederentdeckung des Nationalen nach 1989*. Köln: Böhlau Verlag.

**Graef, J. (2016)** Narrating Violent Crime and Negotiating *Germanness*: The Print News Media and the *Nationalist Socialist Underground* (NSU), 2000-2012. *A thesis submitted to the University of Birmingham for the Doctor in Philosophy*. University of Birmingham, 2016.

**Green, S. (2000)** Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millennium. *German Politics*, vol. 9 (3): 105-124

**Green, J. and Thorogood, N. (2009)** *Qualitative Methods for Health Research*. 2nd edn. London: SAGE.

**Grix, J. (2010)** *The Foundations of Research*. 2nd edn. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

**Groll, T. (2019)** Ein Viertel der Bevölkerung in Deutschland hat andere Wurzeln [Internet]. *Zeit Online*, 21 August 2019. Available URL: https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2019-08/migration-einwohner-deutschland-statistisches-bundesamt-berufsqualifikation-integration [Accessed 21 August 2019].

**Habermas, J. (1991)** *Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität: Überlegungen zur europäischen Zukunft*. St. Gallen: Erker.

**Hacking, I. (1999)** *The Social Construction of What?* London: Harvard University Press.

**Halbwachs, M. (1992)** *On Collective Memory*. Trans. and rev. L.A. Coser. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

**Hall, D.E. (2004)** *Subjectivity*. London: Routledge.

**Hall, S. (1990)** "Cultural Identity and Diaspora" In: Rutherford, J. (ed.) *Identity: Community, Culture, Difference*. London: Lawrence & Wishart. pp. 222-237.

**Hall, S. (1996)** "The Question of Cultural Identity" In: Hall, S., Held, D., Hubert, D. and Thompson, K. (eds.) *Modernity. An Introduction to Modern Societies*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 595-634.

**Hall, S. (2000)** "Who needs Identity?" In: du Gay, P., Evans, J. and Redman, P. (eds.) *Identity: A Reader*. London: SAGE. pp. 15-30.

**Haller, M. (2017)** Die "Flüchtlingskrise" in den Medien: Tagesaktueller Journalismus zwischen Meinung und Information. *OBS-Arbeitsheft 93*. Frankfurt am Main: Otto Brenner Stiftung.

**Halliday, M.K.A. (1973)** *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. London: Edward Arnold.

**Halm, D. (2008)** *Der Islam als Diskursfeld: Bilder des Islams in Deutschland*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

**Halm, D. (2013)** The Current Discourse on Islam in Germany. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, vol. 14 (3): 457-474

**Harding, L. (2015)** Angela Merkel Defends Germany's Handling of Refugee Influx [Internet]. *The Guardian*, 15 September 2015. Available URL:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/15/angela-merkel-defends-germanys-handling-of-refugee-influx [Accessed 27 August 2017].

**Hargreaves, A.G. (1995)** *Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary France*. London: Routledge.

**Hargreaves, A.G. (2001)** "Media Effects and Ethnic Relations in Britain and France" In: King, R. and Wood, N. (eds.) *Media and Migration: Constructions of Mobility and Difference*. New York: Routledge. pp. 23-37.

**Hart, C. (2010)** *Critical Discourse Analysis and Cognitive Science: New Perspectives on Immigration Discourse*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

**Haug, S., Müssig, S. and Stichs, A. (2008)** Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland: Im Auftrag der Deutschen Islam Konferenz [Internet]. *Forschungsbericht 6*, Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) und Deutsche Islam Konferenz (DIK). Available URL: https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/Forschungsberichte/fb06-muslimisches-leben.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=11 [Accessed 11 October 2020].

**Heckmann, F. (2003)** "From Ethnic Nation to Universalistic Immigrant Integration: Germany" In: Heckmann, F. and Schnapper, D. (eds.) *The Integration of Immigrants in European Societies: National Differences and Trends of Convergence*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius. pp. 45-78.

**Heckmann, F. (2015)** *Integration von Migranten: Einwanderung und neue Nationenbildung*. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien.

**Hegel, G.W.F. (1977)** *Phenomenology of the Spirit*. Trans. A.V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Original work published in 1807)

**Helbling, M. (2007)** *Re-conceptualizing the Construction of Nations with Bourdieu's Help*. CRONEM conference, Nationalism and National Identities Today: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, June 12-13, 2007, University of Surrey.

**Helbling, M. (2014)** Framing Immigration in Western Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 40 (1): 21-41

**Hierl, K. (2012)** *Die Islamisierung der deutschen Integrationsdebatte: Zur Konstruktion kultureller Identitäten, Differenzen und Grenzziehungen im postkolonialen Diskurs*. Berlin: Lit Verlag.

**Hjerm, M. (1998)** National Identity: A Comparison of Sweden, Germany and Australia. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 24 (3): 451-469

**Hobsbawn, E. (1983)** "Introduction: Inventing Traditions" In: Hobsbawn, E. and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-14.

**Hochman, O., Raijman, R. and Schmidt, P. (2016)** "National Identity and Exclusion of Non-Ethnic Migrants: Germany and Israel in Comparative Perspective" In: Grimm, J., Huddy, L., Schmidt, P. and Seethaler, J. (eds.) *Dynamics of National Identity: Media and Societal Factors of What We Are*. Oxon: Routledge. pp. 64-82.

**Hogwood, P. (2000)** Citizenship Controversies in Germany: The Twin Legacy of Völkisch Nationalism and the Alleinvertretungsanspruch. *German Politics*, vol. 9 (3): 125-144

**Hoffman, L.H. (2006)** Is Internet Content Different After All? A Content Analysis of Mobilizing Information in Online and Print Newspapers. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, vol. 83 (1): 58–76

**Hülse, R. (1999)** *The Discursive Construction of Identity and Difference – Turkey as Europe's Other*. Discussion paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 26-31 March 1999, Mannheim.

**Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) (1994)** *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Ignatieff, M. (1994)** *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*. London: Vintage.

**Ingram, J.D. and Triadafilopoulos, T. (2010)** Rights, Norms, and Politics: The Case of German Citizenship Reform. *Migration Politics*, vol. 77 (1): 353-382

**IOM (2016)** Migrant Integration [Internet]. Geneva, *International Organization for Migration*. Available URL: https://www.iom.int/migrant-integration [Accessed 13 October 2016].

**IVW (n.d.)** Quartalsauflagen [Internet]. Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e. V., *IVW*, ivw.eu. Available URL: http://www.ivw.eu/aw/print/qa/all/all?titelbez=&verlagsname=&titelnr=&ivwnr=&titelcode=&erschort=&erschweise=All&titelstatus=All&sachgrp%5Bmin%5D=&sachgrp%5Bmax%5D=#views-exposed-form-aw-titel-page-qa [Accessed 14 November 2016].

**Jäger, M. (1996)** *Fatale Effekte. Die Kritik am Patriarchat im Einwanderungsdiskurs*. Duisburg: DISS.

**Jäger, S. (2001)** "Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis" In: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE. pp. 32-62.

**Jäger, S. (2007)** "Der Karikaturenstreit im "Rechts-Mitte-Links"- Diskurs deutscher Print Medien" In: Jäger, S. and Halm. D. (eds.) *Mediale Barrieren: Rassismus als Integrationshindernis*. Münster: UNRAST Verlag. pp. 51-104.

**Jäger, S. and Halm. D. (eds.) (2007)** *Mediale Barrieren. Rassismus als Integrationshindernis*. Münster: UNRAST Verlag.

**Jenkins, B. and Sofos, A.S. (1994)** *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.

**Jonker, G. (2013)** *Im Spiegelkabinett: Europäische Wahrnehmungen von Muslimen, Heiden und Juden (1700-2010)*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag.

**Joppke, C. (2004)** The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 55 (2): 237-257

**Joppke, C. (2007)** Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *Western European Politics*, vol. 30 (1): 1-22

**Kahn, C. (2004)** *Resurgence of Jewish Life in Germany*. London: PRAEGER.

**Kallis, A. (2012)** Landscapes of 'Othering' in Post-war and Contemporary Germany: The Limits of the 'Culture of Contrition' and the Poverty of the Mainstream. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 12 (2): 387-407

**Karner, C. (2011)** *Negotiating National Identities: Between Globalization, the Past and 'the Other'*. Surrey: Ashgate Publishing.

**Kastoryano, R. (2002)** *Negotiating Identity: States and Immigrants in France and Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

**Kecskes, R. (2000)** Soziale und Identifikative Assimilation Türkischer Jugendlicher. *Berliner Journal für Soziologie*, vol. 1: 66-78.

**Kienpointner, M. (1997)** On the Art of Finding Arguments: What Ancient and Modern Masters of Invention Have to Tell Us about the 'Ars Inveniendi'. *Argumentation*, vol. 11: 225-236

**Klug, P. (2010)** *Feindbild Islam? Der Diskurs über Muslime in Bundestagsdebatten vor und nach dem 11. September*. Marburg: Tectum Verlag.

**Klusmeyer, D. (2001)** A 'Guiding Culture' for Immigrants? Integration and Diversity in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 27 (3): 519-532

**Ködel, C. (2007)** ""Unheimliche Gäste. Die Gegenwart der Muslime in Deutschland". Anti-integrative Integrationsdiskurse" In: Jäger, S. and Halm. D. (eds.) *Mediale Barrieren: Rassismus als Integrationshindernis*. Münster: UNRAST Verlag. pp. 201-228.

**Kohn, H. (1965)** *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*. New York: Anvil.

**Kolakowski, L. (1995)** "Über kollektive Identität" In: Michalski, K. (ed.) *Identität im Wandel: Castelgandolfo-Gespräche 1995. Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. pp. 47-60.

**Korteweg, A.C. and Yurdakul, G. (2009)** Islam, Gender, and Immigrant Integration: Boundary Drawing in Discourses on Honour Killing in the Netherlands and Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 32 (2): 218-28

**Korteweg, A.C. and Yurdakul, G. (2010)** *Religion, Culture and the Politicization of Honour-Related Violence: A Critical Analysis of Media and Policy Debates in Western Europe and North America.* Geneva: UNRISD.

**Korteweg, A.C. and Yurdakul, G. (2013)** Gender Equality and Immigrant Integration: Honour Killing and Forced Marriage Debates in the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. *Women's Studies International Forum*, vol. 41: 204-214

**Korteweg, A.C. and Yurdakul, G. (2014)** *The Headscarf Debates: Conflicts of Belonging in National Narratives*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

**Kostoudis, K. (2006)** "News Bulletin Captions as Ideological Indices" In: Lassen, I., Strunck, J. and Vestergaard, T. (eds.) *Mediating Ideology in Text and Image – Ten Critical Studies*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. pp. 235-249.

**Kotowski, J.M. (2013)** Narratives of Immigration and National Identity: Findings from a Discourse Analysis of German and U.S. Social Studies Textbooks. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, vol. 13 (3): 295-318

**Kress, G. and van Leeuven, T. (1998)** "Front Pages: (The Critical) Analysis of Newspaper Layout" In: Bell, A. and Garrett, P. (eds.) *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 186-219.

**Kriegbaum Jensen, K. (2014)** What Can and Cannot Be Willed: How Politicians Talk about National Identity and Immigrants. *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 20 (3): 563-583

**Krieger, R. (2012)** Lukratives Buch: Wie Sarrazin Millionär wurde [Internet]. *Handelsblatt*, 21 May 2012. Available URL: http://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/it-medien/lukratives-buch-wie-sarrazin-millionaer-wurde/6647994.html [Accessed 15 April 2015].

**Kruse, I., Orren, H.E. and Angenendt, S. (2003)** The Failure of Immigration Reform in Germany. *German Politics*, vol. 12 (3): 129-145

**Kurthen, H. (1995)** Germany at the Crossroads: National Identity and the Challenges of Immigration. *International Migration Review*, vol. 29 (4): 914-938

**Kühnhardt, L. (1996)** "Multi-German Germany" In: Mertes, M., Muller, S. and Winkler, H.A. (eds.) *In Search of Germany*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 211-228.

**Kymlicka, W. (2012)** *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future*. Washington: Migration Policy Institute.

**Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg (2017)** Fremdenfeindliche Anschläge nehmen zu [Internet]. *Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg*. Available URL: https://www.lpb-bw.de/fremdenfeindlichkeit.html [Accessed 9 March 2017].

**Le Gloannec, A.-M. (1996)** "On German Identity" In: Mertes, M., Muller, S. and Winkler, H.A. (eds.) *In Search of Germany*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 147-166.

**Lepsius, R.M. (1990)** "Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland" In: Lepsius, R.M. (ed.) *Interessen, Ideen und Institutionen*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. pp. 232-246. (Original work published in 1982)

**Li, J. (2009)** Intertextuality and National Identity: Discourse of National Conflicts in Daily Newspapers in the United States and China. *Discourse and Society*, vol. 20 (1): 85-121

**Light, D. and Young, C. (2009)** European Union Enlargement, Post-Accession Migration and Imaginative Geographies of the 'New Europe': Media Discourses in Romania and the United Kingdom. *Journal of Cultural Geography*, vol. 26 (3): 281-303

**Lin, A. (2012)** Critical Discourse Analysis: Overview [Internet]. *The Encyclopaedia of Applied Linguistics*. Available URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781405198431.wbeal1351/full [Accessed 1 December 2016].

**Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. (1986)** But Is It Rigorous? Trustworthiness and Authenticity in Naturalistic Evaluation. *New Directions for Program Evaluation*, no. 30: 15-25

**Lubawinski, M. (2008)** Paradigmen in der Politik: zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel: zum Verhältnis von parlamentarischem Diskurs und staatlicher Steuerung in der Ausländerpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1981-2005) [Internet]. *Masterarbeit*, Universität Potsdam. Available URL: http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2013/6736/pdf/master_lubawinski.pdf [Accessed 2 November 2014].

**Macdonald, K. (2008)** "Using Documents" In: Gilbert, N. (ed.) *Researching Social Life*. 3rd edn. London: SAGE. pp. 285-303.

**Machin, D. and Mayr, A. (2012)** *How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE.

**Mannitz, S. and Schneider, J. (2014) "**Vom "Ausländer" zum "Migrationshintergrund": Die Modernisierung des deutschen Integrationsdiskurses und seine neuen Verwerfungen" In: Nieswand, B. and Drotbohm, H. (eds.) *Kultur, Gesellschaft, Migration: Die reflexive Wende in der Migrationsforschung*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. pp. 69-96.

**Manz, S. (2004)** Constructing a Normative National Identity: The *Leitkultur* Debate in Germany, 2000/2001. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, vol. 25 (5-6): 481-496

**Marlow, J. (2002)** Some Thoughts on the Poetics of the Order of Mediatized Political Discourse: Facts, Fun and Fulmination in the Tabloids. *Contemporary Politics*, vol. 8 (4): 335-342

**Marr, A. (2004)** *My Trade: A Short History of British Journalism*. London: Macmillan.

**Marshall, B. (2001)** *The New Germany and Migration in Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

**Martin, D.-C. (1995)** The Choices of Identity. *Social Identities*, vol. 1 (1): 5-20

**Martins, N., Weaver, A.J., Yeshua-Katz, D., Lewis, N.H., Tyree, N.E. and Jensen, J.D. (2013)** A Content Analysis of Print News Coverage of Media Violence and Aggression Research [Internet]. *Journal of Communication*. Available URL: http://jakobdjensen.com/PDF%20Versions/Martinsetal_earlyview.pdf [Accessed 19 August 2017].

**Mason, J. (1996)** *Qualitative Researching*. London: SAGE.

**Matthay, S. (2017)** Negotiating National Identity: German Intellectuals Debate the 2015 Migrant Influx. *The European Legacy*, vol. 22 (7-8): 769-778

**Mattissek, A. and Schopper, T. (2019)** "'Culture' in German Media Discourses on Refugees: A Political Geography Perspective" In: Marttila, T. (ed.) *Discourse, Culture and Organization*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 245-266.

**Matuschek, I. and Kühnel, W. (1995)** *Gruppenprozesse und Devianz. Jugendliche in großstädtischen Monostrukturen*. Weinheim/ München: Juventa.

**Mawby, R.C. and Gisby, W. (2009)** Crime, Media and Moral Panic in an Expanding European Union. *The Howard Journal*, vol. 48 (1): 37-51

**May, T. (2001)** *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process*. 3rd edn. Buckingham: Open University Press.

**May, T. (2011)** *Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process*. 4th edn. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill/ Open University Press.

**Mayring, P. (2000)** Qualitative Content Analysis [Internet]. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research/ Sozialforschung*, vol. 1 (2): Art. 20. Available URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0002204 [Accessed 1 June 2014].

**Mayring, P. (2014)** Qualitative Content Analysis: Theoretical Foundation, Basic Procedures and Software Solution [Internet]. *Open Access Repository*, Klagenfurt. Available URL: http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/39517/ssoar-2014-mayring-Qualitative_content_analysis_theoretical_foundation.pdf?sequence=1 [Accessed 26 October 2017].

**Meinecke, F. (1928)** *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat. Studien zur Genesis des deutschen Nationalstaats*. 7th edn. München, Berlin: Verlag R. Oldenbourg. (Original work published in 1907)

**Mercer, P. (2019)** Christchurch Shooter First to Face Terror Charges in New Zealand [Internet]. *The Telegraph*, 21 May 2019. Available URL: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/05/21/christchurch-shooter-first-face-terror-charges-new-zealand/ [Accessed 20 August 2019].

**Merriam, S.B. (1998)** *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

**Miera, F. and Sala Pala, V. (2009)** The Construction of Islam as a Public Issue in Western European Countries through the Prism of the Muhammad Cartoons Controversy. *Ethnicities*, vol. 9 (3): 383-408

**Milačić, F. and Vuković, I. (2018)** The Rise of the Politics of National Identity: New Evidence from Western Europe. *Ethnopolitics*, vol. 17 (5): 443-460

**Miles, R. (1993)** *Racism After Race Relations*. London: Routledge.

**Miller-Idris, C. (2006)** Everyday Understandings of Citizenship in Germany. *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 10 (5): 541-570

**Miller-Idris, C. And Rothenberg, B. (2012)** Ambivalence, Pride and Shame: Conceptualisations of German Nationhood. *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 18 (1): 132-155

**Mollenhauer, D. (2002)** "„Den Volksgeist beschören": Wilhelm Heinrich Riehls „Wissenschaft vom Volke" und die Konstruktion eines deutschen 'Nationalcharakters'" In: Einfalt, M., Jurt, J., Mollenhauer, D. and Pelzer, E. (eds.) *Konstrukte nationaler Identität: Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien (19. und 20. Jahrhundert)*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag. pp. 155-170.

**Mualem Sultan, M. (2011)** *Migration, Vielfalt und Öffentlich-Rechtlicher Rundfunk*. Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen und Neumann.

**Müller, T. (2018)** Constructing Cultural Borders: Depictions of Muslim Refugees in British and German Media. *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, vol. 12: 263-277

**NDR (2016)** Recherchekooperation NDR, WDR und SZ [Internet]. *Norddeutscher Rundfunk*, 28 July 2016. Available URL: http://www.ndr.de/der_ndr/daten_und_fakten/Recherchekooperation-NDR-WDR-und-SZ,kooperationen100.html [Accessed 4 April 2017].

**Nouripour, O. (2011)** "Deutschland zwischen Integrationsdebatten und Loyalitätsparanoia" In: Oppong, M. (ed.) *Migranten der deutschen Politik.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS. pp. 13-24.

**Oakley, A. (2000)** *Experiments in Knowing – Gender and Method in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

**OECD (2014)** *International Migration Outlook 2014* [Internet]. OECD, Paris: OECD Publishing. Available URL: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2014_migr_outlook-2014-en [Accessed 20 March 2015].

**OECD (2018)** *Equity in Education: Breaking Down Barriers to Social Mobility* [Internet]. Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), Paris: OECD Publishing. Available URL: http://www.oecd.org/pisa/Equity-in-Education-country-note-Germany.pdf [Accessed 15 February 2019].

**Palinkas, L.A., Horwitz, S.M. and Green, C.A. (2015)** Purposeful Sampling for Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis in Mixed Method Implementation Research. *Administration and Policy in Mental Health*, vol. 42 (5): 533-544

**Paltridge, B. (2013)** "Critical Discourse Analysis" In: Hyland, K. (ed.) *Discourse Studies Reader Essential Excerpts*. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 89-110.

**Park, R.E. (1914)** Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups with Particular Reference to the Negro. *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 19 (5): 606-623

**Parsons, C. (2002)** "Constructivism and Interpretive Theory" In: Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.) *Theory and Methods in Political Science*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 80-98.

**Patton, Q.M. (2002)** *Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods*. 3rd edn. London: SAGE.

**Pautz, H. (2005a)** *Die deutsche Leitkultur. Eine Identitätsdebatte. Neue Rechte, Neorassismus und Normalisierungsbemühungen*. Stuttgart: Ibidem.

**Pautz, H. (2005b)** The Politics of Identity in Germany: die *Leitkultur* Debatte. *Race & Class*, vol. 46 (4): 39-52

**Peeck, C. (2014)** ""Integration gescheitert?" Die Diskussion über das "Scheitern" in der Debatte um Islam und Einwanderungspolitik in Deutschland" In: John, R. and Langhof, A. (eds.) *Scheitern – Ein Desiderat der Moderne?* Wiesbaden: Springer VS. pp. 61-80.

**Perdigão Ribeiro, F. (2010)** Asymmetrical Power in Discourse: The Case of 'Experts' and 'Laypeople' on the Radio Phone-In Programme Antena Aberta. *Estudos em Comunicação*, vol. 7 (1): 29-54

**Pew Research Center (2012)** The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity [Internet]. *Pew Research Center*, 9 August 2012. Available URL: https://www.pewforum.org/2012/08/09/the-worlds-muslims-unity-and-diversity-executive-summary/ [Accessed 10 October 2020].

**Phillips, D. (2010)** Minority Ethnic Segregation, Integration and Citizenship: A European Perspective. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 36 (2): 209-225

**Pichler, E. and Schmidtke, O. (2004)** "Migranten im Spiegel des deutschen Mediendiskurses: „Bereicherung" oder „Belastung"?" In: Eder, K., Rauer, V. and Schmidtke, O. (eds.) *Die Einhegung des Anderen: Türkische, polnische und russlanddeutsche Einwanderer in Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS. pp. 49-76.

**Piwoni, E. (2012)** *Nationale Identität im Wandel: Deutscher Intellektuellendiskurs zwischen Tradition und Weltkultur*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.

**Piwoni, E. (2013)** Latent but Not Less Significant: The Holocaust as an Argumentative Resource in German National Identity Discourse. *German Politics and Society*, vol. 31 (3): 1-26

**Piwoni, E. (2015)** Claiming the Nation for the People: The Dynamics of Representation in German Public Discourse about Immigrant Integration. *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 21 (1): 83-101

**Pleitner, B. (2002)** "Die 'vernünftigen' Deutschen. Deutsche Identitätskonstruktionen in den 1850er und 60er Jahren" In: Einfalt, M., Jurt, J., Mollenhauer, D. and Pelzer, E. (eds.) *Konstrukte nationaler Identität: Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien (19. und 20. Jahrhundert)*. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag. pp. 171-188.

**Pries, L. (2019)** "We will Manage It" – Did Chancellor Merkel's Dictum Increase or Even Cause the Refugee Movement in 2015? *International Migration*, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of International Organization for Migration.

**Prior, L. (2003)** *Using Documents in Social Research*. Lodon: SAGE.

**Ram, U. (1994)** Narration, Erziehung und die Erfindung des jüdischen Nationalismus. *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geisteswissenschaft (ÖZG)*, vol. 5 (2): 151-177

**Rash, F. (2012)** *German Images of the Self and the Other: Nationalist, Colonialist and Anti-Semitic Discourse 1871-1918*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

**Räthzel, N. (1994)** Cultural Studies und Rassismusforschung in der Bundesrepublik. *IKUS Lectures*, no. 17 and 18.

**Räthzel, N. (2006)** "Aussiedler and Ausländer: Transforming German National Identity" In: Stark, R. (ed.) *Transformations of the New Germany*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 157-180.

**Rauer, V. (2004)** "„Kriminelle Ausländer" und „deutsche Jungs": Mediale Täterrahmen als Stigma and Markierung kollektiver Identitäten" In: Eder, K., Rauer, V. and Schmidtke, O. (eds.) *Die Einhegung des Anderen: Türkische, polnische und russlanddeutsche Einwanderer in Deutschland.* Wiesbaden: Springer VS. pp. 77-98.

**Rauer, V. (2009)** "Kulturelle Grenzziehungen in Integrationspolitischen Diskursen Deutscher Printmedien" In: Ezli, Ö., Kimmich, D. and Werberger, A. (eds.) *Wider den Kulturzwang. Migration, Kulturalisierung und Weltliteratur*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag. pp. 81-94.

**Rauer, V. and Schmidtke, O. (2001)** "Integration" als Exclusion? *Berlin Journal für Soziologie*, vol. 11 (3): 277-296

**Reisigl, M. and Wodak, R. (2009)** "The Discourse Historical Approach" In: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. 2nd edn. London: SAGE. pp. 87-121.

**Renan, E. (1994)** "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-18. (Original work published in 1882)

**Ricœur, P. (1992)** *Oneself as Another*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

**Rommelsbacher, B. (2002)** *Anerkennung und Ausgrenzung: Deutschland ist eine Multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.

**Roßmann, R. (2018)** Seehofer zeigt Verständnis für Demonstranten [Internet]. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, SZ.de, 6 September 2018. Available URL: https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/horst-seehofer-chemnitz-1.4118883 [Accessed 20 August 2019].

**Rostock, P. and Berghahn. S. (2008)** The Ambivalent Role of Gender in Redefining the German Nation. *Ethnicities*, vol. 8 (3): 345-364

**Rothberg, M. and Yildiz, Y. (2011)** Memory Citizenship: Migrant Archives of Holocaust Remembrance in Contemporary Germany. *Parallax*, vol. 17 (4): 32-48

**Saharso, S. (2007)** Headscarves: A Comparison of Public Thought and Public Policy in Germany and the Netherlands. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 10 (4): 513-530

**Said, E.W. (1979)** *Orientalism*. New York: Random House.

**Sardinha, J. (2009)** Immigrant Associations, Integration and Identity: Angolan, Brazilian and Eastern European Communities in Portugal. *IMISCOE Dissertations*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

**Sarrazin, T. (2010)** *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen*. München: Random House.

**Sauerbrey, A. (2016)** "What is German?" [Internet]. *New York Times*, 26 May 2016. Available URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/27/opinion/what-is-german.html [Accessed 10 June 2016].

**Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2012)** *Research Methods for Business Students*. 6th edn. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.

**Sauter, S. (2009)** "Das Sprechen über Multikulturalism. Anfragen an die Politik der Differenz" In: Spetsmann-Kunkel, M. (ed.) *Gegen den Mainstream: kritische Perspektiven auf Bildung und Gesellschaft.* Münster: Waxmann. pp. 40-60.

**Schiffer, S. (2007)** "Die Verfertigung des Islambilds in deutschen Medien" In: Jäger, S. and Halm. D. (eds.) *Mediale Barrieren: Rassismus als Integrationshindernis*. Münster: UNRAST Verlag. pp. 167-200.

**Schmid-Drüner, M. (2006)** Germany's New Immigraton Law: A Paradigm Shift? *European Journal of Migration and Law*, vol. 8: 191-214

**Schmidtke, O. (2017)** Reinventing the Nation: Germany's Post-Unification Drive Towards Becoming a 'Country of Immigration'. *German Politics*, vol. 26 (4): 498-515

**Schmitt, A. (2007)** The Basic Law and the Limits of Toleration. *German Politics*, vol. 9 (3): 145-160

**Schönwälder, K. (2001)** *Einwanderung und ethnische Pluralität. Politische Entscheidungen und öffentliche Debatten in Großbritannien und der Bundesrepublik von den 1950er bis zu den 1970er Jahren*. Essen: Klartext.

**Schröder, J. (2012)** Analyse: der typische Süddeutsche.de-Leser [Internet]. *MEEDIA*, 5 December 2012. Available URL: http://meedia.de/2012/12/05/analyse-der-typische-suddeutsche-de-leser/ [Accessed 3 April 2017].

**Schröder, J. (2013)** Analyse: Der typische Bild-Leser [Internet]. *MEEDIA*, 24 January 2013. Available URL: http://meedia.de/2013/01/24/analyse-der-typische-bild-leser/ [Accessed 4 April 2017].

**Schunck, R. (2014)** *Transnational Activities and Immigrant Integration in Germany*. Basel: Springer International Publishing Switzerland.

**Scott, J. (1990)** *A Matter of Record*. Cambridge: Polity.

**Segal, E.M. (1995)** "Narrative Comprehension and the Role of Deictic Shift Theory" In: Duchan, J.F., Bruder, G.A. and Hewitt, L.E. (eds.) *Deixis in Narrative: A Cognitive Science Perspective*. New York and London: Routledge. pp. 3-18.

**Shenton, A.K. (2004)** Strategies for Ensuring Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research Projects. *Education for Information*, vol. 22: 63-75

**Silver, H. (2010)** The Social Integration of Germany since Unification. *German Politics and Society*, issue 94, vol. 28 (1): 166-188

**Silverman, M. (1994)** *Rassismus und Nation: Einwanderung und die Krise des Nationalstaats in Frankreich*. Hamburg and Berlin: Argument Verlag mit Ariadne.

**Smith, A.D. (1994)** "The Origins of Nations" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 147-154. (Original work published in 1989)

**Smith, A.D. (1991)** *National Identity*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

**Smith, A.D. (1992)** National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. *International Affairs*, vol. 68 (1): 55-76

**Smith, A.D. (1995)** *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

**Smith Cooney-Petro, E. (2019)** Branding White Saviorism: The Ethics and Irony of Humanitarian Discourse on Instagram [Internet]. *Bachelor Thesis*, Syracruse University. Available URL: https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1317&context=thesis [Accessed 11 October 2020].

**Spencer, P. and Wollman, H. (2005a)** "Good and Bad Nationalism" In: Spencer, P. and Wollman, H. (eds.) *Nations and Nationalism: A Reader*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. pp. 197-217.

**Spencer, P. and Wollman, H. (eds.) (2005b)** *Nations and Nationalism: A Reader*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

***Spiegel Online* (2016)** Messerangriff auf Kölner OB-Kandidatin: 14 Jahre Haft für Reker-Attentäter [Internet]. *Spiegel Online*, 1 July 2016. Available URL: https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/attentat-auf-henriette-reker-angeklagter-frank-s-zu-14-jahren-haft-verurteilt-a-1100893.html [Accessed 20 August 2019].

***Spiegel Online* (2017)** Mehr als 3500 Angriffe auf Flüchtlinge [Internet]. *Spiegel Online*, 26 February 2017. Available URL: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/fluechtlinge-mehr-als-3500-angriffe-auf-fluechtlinge-im-jahr-2016-in-deutschland-a-1136334.html [Accessed 9 March 2017].

**Spielhaus, R. (2006)** Religion and Identity: How Germany's Foreigners Have Become Muslims. *Islam und Politik*, Spring 2006: 17-23

**Spielhaus, R. (2010)** Media Making Muslims: The Construction of a Muslim Community in Germany through Media Debate. *Contemporary Islam*, vol. 4: 11-27

**Staab, A. (1998)** *National Identity in Eastern Germany: Inner Unification or Continued Separation?* Westport, Connecticut: PRAEGER.

**Stake, R.E. (2005)** "Qualitative Case Studies." In: Denzin, K.N. and Lincoln, Y.N. (eds.) *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 3rd edn. Thousand Oaks, California; London: SAGE. pp. 443-466.

**Stalin, J. (1994)** "The Nation" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 18-21. (Original work published in 1973)

**Stark, S. and Torrance, H. (2005)** "Case Study." In: Somekh, B. and Lewin, C. (eds.) *Research Methods in the Social Sciences*. London: SAGE. pp. 33-39.

**Süddeutscher Verlag (n.d.)** Süddeutscher Verlag [Internet]. *Süddeutscher Verlag*. Available URL: http://www.sueddeutscher-verlag.de/info/facts/portrait [Accessed 4 April 2017].

**Taguieff, P.-A. (1990)** The New Cultural Racism in France. *Telos*, vol. 83: 109-122

***The Guardian* (2018)** Italian Extremist Given 12-year Sentence for Gun Attack on Migrants [Internet]. *The Guardian*, 3 October 2018. Available URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/03/italian-extremist-given-12-year-sentence-after-shooting-at-migrants [Accessed 20 August 2019].

**Thomas, G. (2011)** A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse and Structure. *Qualitative Inquiry*, vol. 17 (6): 511-521

**Thomas, G. (2013)** *How to Do Your Research Project: A Guide for Students in Education and Applied Social Sciences*. 2nd edn. Los Angeles, London: SAGE.

**Thränhardt, D. (2002)** Include or Exclude: Discourses on Immigration in Germany. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, vol. 3 (3-4): 345-362

**Tonkiss, F. (2004)** "Analysing Text and Speech: Content and Discourse Analysis" In: Seale, C. (ed.) *Researching Society and Culture*. 2nd edn. London: SAGE. pp. 367-382.

**Traynor (2015)** Europe Split over Refugee Deal as Germany Leads Breakaway Coalition [Internet]. *The Guardian*, 30 November 2015. Available URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/29/germanys-plan-to-strike-eu-wide-refugee-sharing-deal-stalls [Accessed 27 August 2017].

**Triandafyllidou, A. (2000)** The Political Discourse on Immigration in Southern Europe: A Critical Analysis. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, vol. 10: 373-389

**Triandafyllidou, A. (2001)** *Immigrants and National Identity in Europe*. London: Routledge.

**Unger, C. (2014)** "Aydan Özoguz fordert von Deutschen mehr Interesse an Muslimen" [Internet]. *Hamburger Abendblatt*, 3 November 2014. Available URL: https://www.abendblatt.de/politik/deutschland/article133956938/Aydan-Oezoguz-fordert-von-Deutschen-mehr-Interesse-an-Muslimen.html [Accessed 25 July 2015].

**van Dijk, T.A. (1987a)** "Introduction" In: Zavala, I.M., Diaz-Diocaretz, M. and van Dijk, T.A. (eds.) *Approaches to Discourse, Poetics and Psychiatry*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V. pp. 15-24.

**van Dijk, T.A. (1987b)** "Elite Discourse and Racism" In: Zavala, I.M., Diaz-Diocaretz, M. and van Dijk, T.A. (eds.) *Approaches to Discourse, Poetics and Psychiatry*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V. pp. 81-122.

**Van Dijk, T.A. (1993a)** *Elite Discourse and Racism*. Sage Series on Race and Ethnic Relations, vol. 6. London: SAGE.

**van Dijk, T.A. (1993b)** Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis. *Discourse & Society*, vol. 4 (2): 249-283

**van Dijk, T.A., Ting-Toomey, S., Smitherman, G. and Troutman D. (1997)** "Discourse, Ethnicity, Culture and Racism" In: van Dijk, T.A. (ed.) *Discourse as Social Interaction: Discourse Studies – A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, vol. 2. London: SAGE. pp. 144-180.

**van Eemeren, F.H., Grootendorst, R. and Snoeck Henkemans, F. (1996)** *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments*. New York: Routledge.

**van Leeuwen, T. (2008)** *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**van Leeuwen, T. (2009)** "Critical Discourse Analysis" In: Renhema, J. (ed.) *Discourse, Of Course: An Overview of Research in Discourse Studies*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. pp. 277-292.

**van Leeuwen, T. and Wodak, R. (1999)** Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis. *Discourse Studies*, vol. 1 (1): 83-118

**Vassiliou-Enz, K. (2014)** "'…denn sie wissen nicht was sie tun.' Wie Journalismus die Integrationsdebatte beeinflusst" In: Zotta, F. and Neumann, K. (eds.) *Vielfältiges Deutschland: Bausteine für eine zukunftsfähige Gesellschaft*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. pp. 392-419.

**Vertovec, S. (2007)** Superdiversity and its Implications. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 30 (6): 1024-1054

**Volmert, J. (1989)** *Politikrede als komunikatives Handlungsspiel: Ein integriertes Modell zur semantisch-pragmatischen Beschreibung oeffentlicher Rede*. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

**Weber, M. (1994)** "The Nation" In: Hutchinson, J. and Smith, A.D. (eds.) *Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 21-25. (Original work published in 1948)

**Weber, M. (2002)** *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. 3rd edn. Trans. S. Kahlberg. Oxford: Blackwell. (Original work published in 1905)

**Wengeler, M. (2003)** *Topos und Diskurs: Begründung einer argumentationsanalytischen Methode und ihre Anwendung auf den Migrationsdiskurs (1960-1985).* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.

**Wengeler, M. (n.d.)** Erklärung der Rubrik "Argumentationsmuster" bzw. "Topoi" [Internet]. *Heinrich Heine Universität Düsseldorf*. Available URL: https://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/germ1/migration/toposdef.html [Accessed 30 January 2020].

**Widdowson, H. (1995)** Discourse Analysis: A Critical Review. *Language and Literature*, vol. 4(3): 157-172

**Winter, E. (2010)** Trajectories of Multiculturalism in Germany, the Netherlands and Canada: In Search of Common Patterns. *Government and Opposition*, vol. 45 (2): 166-186

**Wodak, R. (2001)** "The Discourse-Historical Approach" In: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds.) *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: SAGE. pp. 63-94.

**Wodak, R. (2002)** Aspects of Critical Discourse Analysis. *Zeitschrift für angewandte Linguistik*, vol. 6: 5-31

**Wodak, R. and de Cillia, R. (2007)** Commemorating the Past: The Discursive Construction of Official Narratives about the 'Rebirth of the Second Austrian Republic'. *Discourse and Communication*, vol. 1 (2): 337-363

**Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (2009)** "Critical Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory, and Methodology" In: Wodak, R. and Meyer, M. (eds) *Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage. pp. 1-33.

**Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Liebhart, K. (1999)** *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

**Wodak, R., Menz, F. Mitten, R. and Stein, F. (1994)** *Sprachen der Vergangenheit*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

**Wodak, R., Nowak, P., Pelikan, J., Gruber, H., de Cillia, R. and Mitten, R. (1990)** *'Wir sind alle unschuldige Täter'. Diskurshistorische Studien zum Nachkriegsantisemitismus.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

**Wood, N. and King, R. (2001)** "Media and Migration: An Overview" In: King, R. and Wood, N. (eds.) *Media and Migration: Constructions of Mobility and Difference*. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-22.

**Wulff, C. (2010)** Speech to Mark the Twentieth Anniversary of German Unity [Internet]. *Der Bundespräsident*, 3 October 2010, Bremen. Available ULR: http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Christian-Wulff/UebersetzteReden/2010/101003-Deutsche-Einheit-englisch.html [Accessed 15 April 2015].

**Yilmaz, F. (2012)** Right-Wing Hegemony and Immigration: How the Populist Far-Right Achieved Hegemony through the Immigration Debate in Europe. *Current Sociology*, vol. 60: 368-381

**Yin, R.K. (2009)** *Case Study Research, Design and Methods*. 4th edn. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

**Zimmer, O. (2003)** Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity. *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 9 (2): 173-193

**Zupnik, Y. (1994)** A Pragmatic Analysis of the Use of Person Deixis in Political Discourse. *Journal of Pragmatics*, vol. 21: 339-383