EVALUATING GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY

by

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ABSTRACT

Over the last two decades there has been significant increase in application of counter-terrorism policy globally, with corresponding increase in impact on human lives. Thus, it is important to consider the security needs of all humans. While international commitments have been made to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, beginning with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, meaningful implementation of gender mainstreaming is still falling short. This project is designed with a comparative case study format to evaluate three representative institutional approaches to gender mainstreaming. The case study selection was narrowed to countering violent extremism programs, due to their definitional commitment to upholding human security principles. These programs were developed as part of the preventative pillar of many counter-terrorism strategies. However, this project argues that countering violent extremism programming lacks commitment to gender mainstreaming, due both to its application within a state security framework and to its misunderstanding of the complexity of gender. This research contributes substantively in two ways. First, it generates new knowledge on the application of gender analysis by applying Feminist Security Theory to critical terrorism studies. Second, it contributes policy recommendations by effectively evaluating countering violent extremism programming design, implementation, and evaluation practices.

DEDICATION

Dedicated to my beloved grandmother who passed away last year. She will not get to see me finish this journey, but she was so proud of me for embarking on it. I love you, Grandma, for always encouraging me to pursue my dreams.

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Please note, this thesis has been written with American spellings.

ABBREVIATIONS

COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DA	Development Assistance
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FST	Feminist Security Theory
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GoK	Government of Kenya
HoA	Horn of Africa
IR	International Relations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NKE	Non-Key Expert
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
RBA	Rights-Based Approach
RCT	Randomized Control Trial
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
STRIVE	Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism
ToC	Theory of Change
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
VE	Violent extremism

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

Security is one of the most fundamental concerns of individual states, as well as the foundation for their participation in the international community. Historically, security frameworks have excluded gender issues, but in 2000 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 formally acknowledging that women need to be included in issues of conflict, peace negotiation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Although this formal recognition was a first step, there has been much debate on how to practically implement gender into security issues (Davies and True,2018; Paffenholz *et al.,* 2016; Shepherd, 2009). I am recommending that there needs to be a fuller understanding of gender and its importance to security, so that women do not become pawns but rather an integral fixture in the process of creating a secure world. In today's world counter-terrorism (CT) policy has moved to the forefront of global security concerns. Given the increasing scope, scale and reach of CT policies on human security and human lives worldwide, it has become correspondingly more important to scrutinize them. I argue that scrutiny should include whether they achieve what they set out to do, but also whether they adhere to and support emancipatory norms for all individuals.

In my research I specifically posit that the inclusion of gender equality goals impacts the framework of security and thus, the formation and application of CT policy. I examine whether the inclusion of a gender-sensitive perspective improves effectiveness of long-term CT methods through its positive impact on CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. I also highlight how inequality can be part of the pattern of causation in the radicalization of individuals, therefore supporting the need for the inclusion of equality in security. This holds CT policies accountable on both levels – effectiveness and upholding wider emancipatory

norms. Specifically, I use a qualitative comparative case-study model to analyze three programs. As CT incorporates a broad range of methods, it is notable that all three of the case studies are characterized as countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. The focus on CVE is justified because this set of policies claims to address both underlying causes of terrorism as well as more immediate causes. CVE also shifts attention from the more collective security aim of CT policy to a more individual focus on the radicalization process and a priority on human security. CVE programming has largely resulted from a shifting view of terrorism since the September 11th, 2001 attacks in the United States (US) (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit, 2016). It has developed significantly over the last two decades, with massive increases in budgets and resources (Lint and Kassa, 2015). However, unfortunately it still remains difficult to define, as its policy attempts to cover such a wide range of underlying causes (Koehler, 2016).

Due to the international commitments made through UNSCR 1325 to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, there has been an increase in the number of CVE programs which include components focused on empowering women and using women as assets in the CVE process (Davies and True, 2018). The WPS agenda has developed a normative and narrative link between women's rights, security, and CVE (Brown *et al.,* 2020). However, only recently has this link been more critically assessed through programs which are being implemented with a gender-sensitive perspective (True *et al.,* 2019; True and Wiener, 2019; Gordon and True, 2019; Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020). For the most part CT policy is still formulated, implemented, and evaluated from a gender-blind perspective; therefore, no gender data is being gathered. This lack of evidence weakens claims about CVE and security being linked to gender equality (Davies, George and True, 2017). This allows gender to goals to be easily side-stepped

and women to become essentialized tools instead of meaningful participants in the security process (Giscard d'Estaing, 2017). Therefore, there are criticisms about security and CVE programming from feminist theorists, as well as criticisms about feminist intervention from CT experts. This thesis aims to address the lack of evidence by making a case for gender equality being a necessary element of effective and sustainable CVE programming. I argue that gender inequality is one of the underlying causes of terrorism and that gender in CVE policies has gone largely misunderstood and unmeasured. Gender is a complex, far-reaching web of masculinity and femininity as defined by relationships, society, and language. Through these many facets it impacts security and CT.

This project aims to provide in-depth investigation of how gender can be effectively included in the security process, as well as to improve understanding of gender's impact on CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation. The topic of women in security and even in CT and CVE policy has been gaining traction the last few years, because it has been recognized that greater inclusion is needed for national CT policy objectives as well as for international organizations devoted to the improvement of CT and CVE policy (GCTF. 2020; Brown, 2019; Davies, George and True, 2017; Giscard d'Estaing, 2017). This project seeks to not only provide timely and effective additions to the academic conversation on what is gender in security and how can CVE programming be implemented with gender-sensitive human security goals, but also recommendations on the policy implications of including gender for those seeking to improve effectiveness of CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

The two key branches of inquiry for this project are the framework of security under which CVE programming is applied and how that affects its goals and outcomes, as well as the

definition of gender that is being applied to security and how misunderstanding of its complexity leads to ineffective implementation of gendered goals in CVE programming. I originally set out from a more positive position to test the hypothesis that gender equality goals improve the successfulness of CT programming. However, due to the lack of gender data, I had to adjust my approach to a more interpretivist one, focusing on knowledge generation regarding the need for gender-sensitive CT policy research. This allows me to focus on showing how the lack of commitment to equality goals in CVE policy will ultimately leave it unable to effectively and sustainably address VE.

2. Research Questions

My thesis investigates two key questions:

- How does the security framework which CVE programming is being held accountable to affect its gendered perspective?
- How does understanding of the definition of gender affect its inclusion in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation?

CT is an issue of utmost concern for most countries around the world as well as the international community. Since the September 11th 2001 attacks in the US and the declaration of the "War on Terror" there have been significant increases in attention to and budgets for CT programs worldwide (Lint and Kassa, 2015). These have been focused on the perceived evolution in the terrorist threat to primarily religious extremism (Crelinsten, 2013). Unfortunately, a clear amount of success or even evaluation has not accompanied these developments (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). While Feminist Security Theory (FST) scholars and those from various critical approaches to terrorism studies have contributed largely to the debate on security and

the best ways to establish human security, there has been little attention given to gender in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of CT at the program level. I address this gap by utilizing a comparative case study design to show how the lack of attention to gender equality and gender-sensitive research in CT programs has contributed to failures of design, implementation, and evaluation. I also examine how gender inequality can be a contributor to insecurity and radicalization. My theoretical framework is based on a feminist constructivist evaluation of gender mainstreaming in CT policy.

There are two main research questions which are addressed by this research.

1. How does the security framework which CVE programming is being held accountable to affect its gendered perspective?

CT is a security mechanism of the state, but CVE is a branch of CT policy usually aimed at providing a more holistic and non-coercive approach to countering terrorism and the spread of radicalization. Can CVE programming fill its intended emancipatory purpose if it is being implemented with a state security framework, or does it need to be implemented with a human security framework? I analyze how CVE programming being implemented with a state security framework tends to overlook the importance of gender equality and easily side-steps the implementation of gender equality goals.

2. How does understanding of the definition of gender affect its inclusion in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation?

I argue that the common interpretation in security policy of gender as women is a misconception. Gender is actually a multidimensional concept which applies to all people and impacts security in a multitude of ways. The underlying socialized concepts of masculinity

and femininity influence not only the drivers of extremism but also the solutions to violent extremism (VE).

3. Research Process

The process of this thesis has been a journey with some unexpected turns. The motivation for this project began with the policy puzzle of trying to determine if I could show that gender equality goals improve successfulness of CT policy. If so, it was also about finding an efficient and effective way to include gender in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. This is why I started with the positivist hypothesis testing method. I wanted to test the hypothesis that gender equality goals improve the successfulness of CT policy. After a systematic search through CT and CVE policies and programs, I realized that the gendered data simply does not exist to support my hypothesis. I began my project under the assumption that my research was going to be a data-mining project, and that I would be able to prove or disprove my ideas about gender equality and CT through examination of program evaluations. However, the frustrating process of being unable to support my hypothesis, through my intended research process, actually led me to the generation of knowledge. At this point in the research process I adjusted my approach to a more interpretivist one. Just as Enloe's (2014) question "where are the women" opened up the path to seeing the relevance of gender to IR, my question of "where is the gender analysis" does the same for the area of CT and CVE policy. Instead of coming to conclusions from data I found, I am able to reveal some new insights about what the data should be in regards to gender and security.

This opens up the intellectual problem of the gap which exists in academic analysis of gender in CT policy. As Harding (2016) explains, there is a paradox. She is a scientist who is arguing

that science needs more women and feminists because so much research is gender blind. Unfortunately, the paradox exists because if you cannot see the relevance of gender in the first place, then the importance of gendered questions will not be raised. Therefore, no gendered research gets done because gender blindness prevents researchers from seeing the relevance of gender. If no gendered data is generated, then in the end gender-blind research seemingly confirms that gender is not relevant (see Chapter 3, Section 3 for further explanation). I, therefore, use this thesis to review the variety of ways in which feminist theory can be used to analyze international relations (IR), security, and equality and then apply the depth of that gender analysis to CT policy and CVE programming. Often, in the field of security, gender is simplified down to adding women and "stirring" them into the already existent mix of policy. However, I can show through feminist gender analysis how foundational gender is to the many social and political elements which can lead to radicalization as well as be a part of the solution to VE. Although I am ultimately unable to test my original hypothesis, through the journey of this research project I am able to show how gender-sensitive analysis can reveal previously unconsidered gendered elements. I use my qualitative comparison of the three CVE program case studies and their guidelines for program design, implementation, and evaluation to show where lack of meaningful gender consideration and inclusion has led to gaps. I can therefore argue that taking into account the complexity of gender and measuring CVE programs against a security framework which includes consideration of gender would help improve successfulness of CT policy.

4. Thesis Outline

My thesis is broken down into nine chapters, the first of which is this introductory chapter. In this chapter I give an overview of the project and define key terms. The second chapter is a literature review. I use the literature review to overview the ways in which feminist gender analysis has been applied to IR, equality, and security in order to make a strong case for why it is important to apply these methods of analysis to CT policy and CVE programming. This situates my project in the work which has already been done on approaches to gender analysis, as well as highlighting the gaps that my research fills in relation to security and gender. The literature review first examines the complexity of gender and how different feminist IR theories can assist with gender analysis and illuminate the multitude of ways in which it impacts security. Next it investigates the existing perspectives on gender equality, two extremely complex concepts which when intertwined can also be analyzed under various feminist perspectives. The literature review then looks more deeply into security frameworks, including human security and emancipation. Finally, it examines how gender has been implemented into the literature on terrorism studies, CT, and CVE thus far.

The third chapter is a methodology chapter which overviews the methods that I used for my project. I adopt a comparative case study design, mostly using content analysis to examine published policy papers and evaluations for CVE programming and augmenting it with an interview with a key expert. A feminist constructivist theoretical approach is used to examine how gender is being applied and where the gaps are in relation to feminist human security theory. This chapter also contains a record of the case selection process for the three CVE programs which were chosen. I narrowed down the criteria to search in the places most likely to include gender in their CVE programming, but was still unable to find the data. Therefore,

this chapter also addresses the limitations of this project and how the positivist hypothesis testing method was not possible due to lack of data. However, I was able to generate new knowledge through a more interpretivist approach, looking at the gaps which exist due to gender-blind research on CT policy.

The fourth chapter is devoted to examining the "best practices" for CVE program design and evaluation. The policies and guidelines of the implementing agencies for my three case studies are compared and analyzed. It offers a standard by which to measure the case studies and is key to the analysis of them. This allows for critique of "best practices" as well as the establishment of the guidelines by which CVE programs are designed, implemented, and evaluated. At the outset of the project this was intended to be a chapter which followed on from the hypothesis testing to show where gender should be included in the program design, implementation, and evaluation. Ultimately, with the hypothesis testing not being possible, the importance of this chapter shifts slightly. I am, instead, able to show how the lack of gender data and consideration has led to shortcomings in program design, implementation, and evaluation.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters are devoted to the three case studies. Chapter 5 contains analysis of the primary case study which is the European Union (EU) funded Royal United Services Institute's Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism Program in the Horn of Africa. This case was chosen because it one of the few examples which did have a gender component within its four main programming objectives. This case is the central point of reference on a spectrum of approaches to gender displayed across the three cases. I had the most access to program documentation for this case, as well as the ability to interview a key expert on this CVE program. Chapter 6 is a supplemental case study devoted to the United

States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Kenya Transition Initiative CVE programming. The US and the EU are leading providers of CVE programming around the world. This case was chosen as a comparison because even though USAID similarly made claims supporting the inclusion of gender the case was actually implemented with a gender-blind approach. Chapter 7 is the second supplementary case study of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women's (UN Women) Engaging Women in Preventing and Countering Extremist Violence in Kenya Program. This case was chosen as a comparison case because the UN relied upon the same program design, implementation, and evaluation techniques as the US and EU. However, UN Women implemented their program with the express purpose of taking a gender-sensitive approach. Therefore, it offered a good comparison case on the other side of the spectrum of gender approaches. These three case study chapters each contain background information; assessment of gaps in CVE definition; identification of CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation gaps; and gender analysis components.

All the findings are compiled, compared, and evaluated in the eighth chapter. This discussion chapter not only includes comparison across the case studies, but also comparison with other closely related fields. Gender analysis methods from areas like military sciences and peacekeeping can improve the analysis for this project, as well as benefit from its generation of knowledge. The ninth chapter concludes the project, summarizes its contributions, and gives recommendations for where future follow-on investigations could be made.

5. Defining Key Terms

In order to answer these research questions some basic definitions need to be established:

5.1 Gender

Gender is difficult to define because the concept itself has a contested definition but also because the ways in which it is applied to other fields of study (such as terrorism studies, IR, or security studies) are extremely complex. Historically, 'gender' was conflated with sex, a term used to describe the distinctive physical features which differentiate people understood to be men or women (Carver, 2016). However, as the term 'gender' has evolved now the term 'sex' is used to differentiate the biological differences and 'gender' is reserved as a more ideological term (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007). "Masculine" and "feminine" genders[1] have become ideological terms referring to the expectation of certain traits, interactions, and material relationships which exist between the two sexes (Steans, 2013). Due largely to the 1960's feminist movement's push to describe "sex roles" as determined by society and not physically inherent, the term gender has come to describe the social expectations set upon each gender. The feminist movement took root in opposition the idea that men's "roles", as protectors and breadwinners, were attributed with higher social value than women's, as homemakers and mothers (Steans, 2013; Carver, 2016).

The difference in value cultures assign to gender roles, which are based on biological sex differences, has played a key role in the structuring of social inequalities. According to Tickner (1992), this has resulted in unjustified differences in self-identifications, human understandings, social status, and power relationships. There has historically been a great deal of social pressure on the individual to conform to their appointed stereotypical roles, but the

[1] I acknowledge that gender is fluid and people hold more than just male and female identities. I also acknowledge that this gender fluidity does have an impact on VE because of the way that extremists characterize masculinity, but it will be only be addressed when it relates to VE.

feminist movement seeks to show that women have a "shared interest" in challenging the prevailing order and power structure. Although the implication of feminism is attention to the female gender, according to Zalewski (1995, p. 339) "the driving force of feminism is its attention to gender and not simply to women. To be sure, for most feminists the concern about the injustices done to women because of their sex is paramount, but the concept, nature and practice of gender are key." Feminism is a wide-ranging concept but for the most part is ultimately about seeking gender equality, regardless of what gender you are. In this project, the interpretation of gender is regarding the socially constructed male and female gendered roles and how the socialization of certain expectations of femininity and masculinity, based on biological sex, can not only lead to violence but can be challenged as a way to counter VE.

5.2 International Relations

IR is the field of study which encompasses states, the interactions between states, security, military action, and CT. Terrorism studies have traditionally been conducted firmly under the umbrella of the IR field and from the viewpoint of Western powers' interpretations of terrorism (Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning, 2009). Historically, the IR field of study has been dominated by a realist epistemology, with the state being the primary source of identity (Steans, 2013; Vasquez, 1999; Olson and Groom, 1991). The original hope of modern IR was that a peaceful world order could be established. However, that popular version of IR thought was proven a failure with the collapse the League of Nations and the fallout from the World Wars. After that time, the notions of Machiavelli and Hobbes and the theory of realism were applied to IR with such single-mindedness that realism could be considered the "orthodoxy" of IR (Cox, 1981; Steans, 2013; Lawson *et al.,* 1998).

IR takes the interactions between states and reduces them down to interactions between "individuals" to make them more predictable in nature, so that the sole concerns of an individual (such as power and security) become the sole concerns of the state (Maclean, 1981). Previously it was thought that states would be willing to work together in order to maintain a peaceful world order, but now it is mainly believed that states are ultimately only interested in retaining their own power and maintaining their security. Some IR scholars would argue that the notions of power and security make this a gender-neutral position, but feminists argue that there is a gross marginalization of gender issues in IR theory (Weber, 2014; Parashar, Tickner and True,2018). Enloe (2004) suggests that realism in IR is inherently masculine and the existing patriarchal structure and ideological system perpetuate the privileged position of masculinity. The patriarchal structure of IR theory is important to this thesis because it is the basis for the security framework under which state-run CT policy is implemented.

5.3 Security

Security is a concept which can be defined in a multitude of different ways and which exists on many different levels. At its base, according to Booth (1991), security is the freedom for people (as individuals and groups) to choose what they want to do without physical or human constraints. These could be constraints such as war or the threat of violence, but also constraints like poverty, poor education, political oppression, etc. Booth (1991) states that security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, rather than power or order, produces true security and is theoretically security itself. This definition of security requires an acknowledgment that emancipation is not static and would require molding to different circumstances and situations and would also need to be elastic over time, as

circumstances changed (Basu, 2011; Steans, 2013). Tickner (2001, p. 47) says that "security must be analyzed in terms of how contemporary insecurities are being created and by a sensitivity to the way in which people are responding to insecurities by reworking their understanding of how their own predicament fits into broader structures of violence and oppression."

If the definition of security is based on what makes people insecure, then insecurity must be given a definition as well. Insecurity can be considered any avoidable civilian death caused by changeable social, political, or economic institutions or structures which are initiated or run by humankind (Roberts, 2008). The enforcement of man-made impositions, leading to the death or intimidation of others, is a violation of security. Violations of security do not necessarily have to be intentional, they can be "presumably unintended but recurring patterns of suffering or harm that result from the way social institutions or structures "order" expectations, norms, and practices" (Peterson, 2013, p. 50). Those societal norms, which can inflict a state of suffering from insecurity, could be from a person being associated with a particular category such as a gender, race, or class (Sjoberg, 2011). The WPS agenda was developed in recognition of the way in which gender impacts security, both experiences of insecurity and perspective on security processes (Chinkin, 2019). Security is a key concept to my hypothesis and research questions, as the security framework under which CT policy is enforced significantly impacts the way in which gender is interpreted.

5.4 Terrorism

Terrorism has been a widely controversial concept because "deciding whether a particular act of violence constitutes an 'act of terrorism' relies on judgements about the context, circumstances and intent of the violence, rather than any objective characteristic inherent to it"

(Jackson *et al.,* 2011, p. 35). Before the late 1960's to early 1970's, when terrorism emerged as a distinct subject, scholars studied political violence as a part of war or insurgency (Jackson *et al.,* 2011). There was not a categorical distinction given to independent, political acts of violence until this time because generalizations about terrorism are very difficult to make (Jackson, 2009). One of the main reasons for this being that "terrorist movements are usually small; some are very small indeed, and while historians and sociologists can sometimes account for mass movements, the movements of small particles in politics as in physics often defy any explanation" (Laqueur, 2001, p. 80). While there has been debate on whether or not states can be perpetrators of terrorism, as often their actions are of the same type of violence which terrorist groups resort to, Pape (2005) defines terrorism as violence used by non-governmental organizations to incite fear among a target audience. Although Pape (2005) does not use the term political in his definition it is widely agreed among terrorism scholars that the term terrorism refers to violence, or the threat of violence, being used to achieve a political goal. Hoffman (2006, p. 41) describes terrorism as "designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale".

During different periods throughout time terrorism seems to have dominated the global scene with various political ideologies (English, 2010). "[A]s the technology of terrorism can be mastered by people of all creeds, so does its philosophy transcend the traditional dividing lines between political doctrine. It is truly all-purpose and value-free" (Laqueur, 2001, p. 5). With the modern era of globalization, the invention of weapons of mass destruction, and the prevalence of mass media the previous assumption that the political goals of terrorist

organizations would limit them from destroying their own neighbors and friends has been challenged. There has been a redefinition of terrorism to "encompass both the dark forces that threaten 'civilization' and the fears they arouse" (Nunberg, 2004). This "new era" of terrorism has unleashed a response, the scale of which has never seen before, beginning with the US "War on Terror" (Collins and Glover, 2002; Silke, 2018). Instead of declaring war on terrorism itself, President Bush declared "War on Terror". Semantics or not, this seems to have left the door open for the US to combat anything it sees as causing fear (Nacos, 2012). Although every branch of the US government uses a slightly different definition of terrorism, the US Department of Defense uses: "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological" (Theohary and Rollins, 2011). With this policy and the US military at the forefront, the Western world in general has seen massive increases in state budgets for the implementation of CT policies and practices. This new insertion of terrorism into our everyday lives has led to a crisis of modern democracy in many ways because the very freedoms we hold dear leave a door open for exploitation. Terrorism now shapes everything from culture, to political conversation, to even the architecture and public spaces where people engage (Barnard-Wills, Moore and McKim, 2012). Therefore, CVE programming has been developed over the last two decades as a counterbalance to the traditional invasive, use-of-force CT policies (Bjørgo, 2013). CVE is the preventative pillar of CT policies and it takes a non-coercive approach to addressing the underlying drivers of radicalization.

5.4.1 Radicalization

It is important to note a transition within the language of terrorism to a focus on the process of radicalization. After the attacks on the US in 2001, terrorism studies have largely become fixated on religious extremism, which some have argued has taken on a more pervasive and irrational nature than was considered "reasonable" before in pursuance of a political aim. "[D]estruction, per se, could well be the target of individuals convinced that not only the society surrounding them was sinful but that the world at large was not worth surviving and that a few chosen individuals had the holy duty to speed up its destruction" (Laqueur, 2001, p. XII). Islamist extremism is considered by some a distinct form of terrorism and catalyst for radicalization (Richards, 2019). However, even with the current focus on religious extremism, Pantucci (2015, p. 7) argues that "behind the terrorist threat lay various social, political and religious factors which were catalysed by the impact of an external ideology". It is not so simple as a political or religious goal, "generally it is process of ideology, grievance, and mobilization converging together" (Shaffer, 2016, p. 384). This convergence of factors is now commonly referred to as radicalization:

> "Radicalization" is presented as a rational, even clinical, study of illegitimate political ideologies and violence, characterized by an emphasis on individuals and presumed risks to the state. However, the term "radicalization" remains ill-defined, thinly understood, and poorly operationalized, and is used in myriad ways. Nevertheless, the term has gained popularity, is used widely in a search to better explain "new terrorism," and currently frames many countries' counter-terrorism policies. It is seen to capture a process of change and socialization, and is therefore more encompassing than a focus on root causes or on acts of terrorism, and generates dynamic frameworks of understanding. (Brown, 2013, p. 37)

The concept of radicalization has been directly linked with "extremism", which becomes VE when violence is used to achieve its goals. These terms for terrorism seem to grey the line between personal and political goals for terrorism (Kundnani, 2015). The personal becomes

political when acts of terrorism are blamed on radicalization and "[r]adicalization is blamed on many things, including exposure to ideology, victimization, alienation, socialization, social networks, the internet, deficiencies in family bonds, trauma, relative social and economic deprivation, and 'cultures of violence'" (Brown, 2013, p. 37). This discursively increased scope of terrorism calls for an increased scope of CT measures, which is where the language of CVE programming comes in. However, it is important to note that acceptance of radical ideology does not necessary lead to terrorism, and not all terrorists have been radicalized (Borum, 2011). CVE supports an emancipatory aim by implementing human security goals.

5.5 Counter-Terrorism

The most basic definition of CT refers to strategies or policies put in place to eliminate or alleviate the threat of terrorist attacks (Enders and Sandler,2011; Detraz, 2012). While this definition seems simple enough, in reality CT is a very porous concept consisting of many different components (Bolz Jr, Dudonis and Schulz, 2016). CT can be carried out on many different levels (Hoffman and Taw, 1992). On an international scale the UN's Global CT Strategy (2006b) defined a basic CT strategy as needing: "to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; to prevent and combat terrorism; to take measures to build state capacity to fight terrorism; to strengthen the role of the United Nations in combating terrorism; and to ensure the respect of human rights while countering terrorism." State CT methods can be anything from the hardening of soft targets, such as increasing airport security; to deterrence through increasing punishments and passing international resolutions; to outright military intervention. It can be helpful to sort these responses to terrorism into categories for consideration, of which there are four: the use of force, intelligence and policing, homeland security, and conciliation and dialogue (Jackson *et al.,* 2011).

CT can often be an even murkier concept than terrorism itself. While terrorism is an action completed to achieve a goal, CT is often a reaction and left unchecked can evolve to counter the very ideological foundations of those carrying it out (Wilkinson, 2011). Open and democratic societies will always be vulnerable to terrorism because of their basic principles and freedoms (Hoffman, 2002). Unfortunately, now Western countries often find themselves sacrificing their concepts of liberty or democracy in their application of CT methods (Nacos, 2016; Foley, 2013). Laqueur (2001, p. 234), said: "[i]f the power of democratic societies shrinks so does the sphere in which terrorism can operate". This perspective has led the way for CT to encroach upon civil liberties and basic freedoms which should be guaranteed and protected by democratic states. "[T]he notion that responding to terrorism requires force and counter-violence, and sometimes even war and torture, has come to assume a form of widely accepted 'knowledge'" (Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning, 2009, p. 74). This is allowing terrorism another victory, as it erodes confidence and trust in government and society. "[C]ounterterrorism policy in democratic states and in a globalizing world order where democratization is a valued norm must try to achieve a balance between effectiveness and a variety of other values that underlie the social contract in democratic societies" (Crelinsten, 2013, p. 244).

Since the attacks on the US in 2001 and the subsequent "War on Terror" there have been massive increase in budgets around the world for implementation of CT programs. Unfortunately, there has been very little measurement of the success or failure of these different policies (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). This is at least partially due to the challenge that measurement itself presents. For effective measurement, multi-layered questions must be answered regarding how effective the policies are, how can effectiveness be measured, and

how some of the policies might even be counterproductive. For example, Ganor (2005) argues that terrorism has two main factors: ability (which includes things like funding, access, manpower, weapons, etc.) and motivation. Effective CT therefore has to address both factors evenly; otherwise you get a "boomerang effect". If you only decrease their ability, through military strikes for example, then you are most likely increasing their motivation. Two distinct levels of success in measurement can be identified in regard to CT programs, operational and strategic success (Enterline, Stull and Magagnoli, 2013). Operational success being the ability to reduce terrorist organizations' ability to operate, numbers of people they are recruiting or exporting, access to weapons and supplies, etc.; and strategic success being the supporting factors, such as the financial cost of the program versus its operational success.

The tricky part of terrorism is that it is not a war; therefore, it cannot be won and there will not be a finite end to it. Terrorism has existed for thousands of years and evolves in order to stay alive, so CT methods must also evolve (Hoffman, 2002). With the evolution of CT over the last fifteen years has come the emergence of distinctions between CT, counter-insurgency (COIN), and CVE strategies. An argument has also arisen over whether or not these methods can be used together or should be considered completely separate entities. Some of these measures are more compatible with including a gender equality component than others, but none of them thus far have attempted to do so in any consistent or fundamental way. The ambiguous distinctions between these methods of CT has also given some governments political maneuvering room to avoid commitment to implementing equality goals as part of CVE programming.

5.5.1 Counter-Insurgency

Insurgencies, as opposed to terrorist groups, are generally considered larger and more nationalistic. They are localized groups who use the same violent means as terrorist organizations, but to achieve a specific political goal or set of goals (Boyle, 2010). Thus, in the minds of some, insurgents can be negotiated with and terrorists cannot, as terrorists are interested in spreading fear without an obtainable political resolution (Kilcullen, 2005). COIN operations are therefore generally a type of CT campaign which are more focused on winning the "hearts and minds" of the population, in order to use social sway to influence the insurgency group which is being countered (Enterline, Stull and Magagnoli, 2013). The COIN approach tries to integrate warfighting and nation-building goals as opposed to simply the warfighting, use-of-force approach of traditional CT policy. The distinctions between this strategy and CVE have at some points become blurred, especially within US CT policy as is shown with the case study in Chapter 6. The challenges of countering the impact of transnational terrorist organizations are sometimes difficult to distinguish from that of COIN (Kalic, 2005).

5.5.2 Countering Violent Extremism

The muddle of CT policies in the West, especially in the US, and the lack of measurement and desired outcomes of traditional "hard" CT measures in the "War on Terror" suggested that it would be beneficial to add a strategy focused on resolving the causes of terrorism before terrorist attacks happen. Therefore, CVE programming was added to international and national level CT strategies worldwide as the prevention pillar of CT policy (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit, 2016). It was intended to work alongside previously defined CT pillars, such as policing, military intervention, and legal deterrence. CVE was defined

loosely as the strategy of attempting to head off radicalization before it led to terrorism (Vidino and Hughes, 2015). VE groups, which are the focus of this policy, are generally considered smaller than insurgent groups with less support and manpower, less territorial control, and less organizational capacity. For example, they often do not maintain non-violent elements of their organization as some insurgencies do (to provide civil service and manage civil disobedience) (USAID, 2011a; Khalil, 2013). VE organizations may be found in more periphery locations where they lack the levels of support and control, etc. (Khalil, 2013). Therefore, VE groups might be considered the beginning phases of groups which might later become insurgents or international terrorist organizations.

The term CVE has become common in national security planning in the last few years but is still unclear in nature. Georgetown University and the US National Security Critical Issues Task Force (2016) conducted a joint study on the concept of CVE which resulted in four main conclusions:

- CVE has an unclear definition, mission, and leadership structure.
- VE shares risk factors with other social ills, enabling use of pre-existing capabilities and resources in its prevention.
- A multi-sector and non-discriminatory approach which enables a holistic strategy using multiple capabilities.
- Success remains difficult to quantify; the lack of meaningful metrics to evaluate CVE initiatives complicates evidence-based program design and funding decisions.

The study found that the public health model was the best way to break down CVE, which suggested three levels at which to address CVE (National Security Critical Issues Task Force,

2016). The primary level is about addressing societal issues at large, which allows mitigation of the root causes of terrorism. This would include advocating things like education, health services, social engagement, cultural awareness, personal development, and human rights. The second level is about focusing attention on individuals or groups which are particularly at risk: including intervention, community engagement, and counter-messaging. The tertiary level focuses on radicalized individuals or groups, attempting to neutralize the threat through disengagement, de-radicalization, isolation, and re-direction (Bjørgo and Horgan, 2008; Bjørgo, 2011). Therefore, CVE is addressing violent extremists from the pre-radicalization stage through the radicalizing process and into the radicalized state (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016). Traditional CT only addresses the radicalized state through to an actual terrorist attack.

There is a lot of debate around whether or not this method of addressing base level societal issues, in an attempt to counter the roots of radicalization, can be considered CT or whether they should even be in the same conversation. There is also disagreement over the effectiveness of these types of strategies (Stevens, 2009). Many would argue CVE methods fall under development, stabilization, and conflict resolution strategies more than CT (Frazer and Nünlist, 2015). Some would even argue that these methods should not be tainted by the humanitarian and democratic violations CT programs are historically associated with (Foot, 2007). CT and COIN methods are associated with use-of-force methods and their aggressive nature could be considered incompatible with methods like CVE or societal stabilization (Gilmore, 2011). However, ultimately, CVE is attempting to address base level social factors in order to reduce the risk of radicalization and future involvement in terrorism and is therefore is a CT measure. One of the largest challenges for CVE policy is that it is attempting to address something which

is nearly impossible to predict. There is no profile which fits all terrorists, they come from all socio-economic levels of life and there is no universal recipe for radicalization (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016). Therefore CVE strategy has to adapt to cover a comprehensive and contextual list of drivers of VE (Holmer, 2013).

One of the main advantages of CVE programming is that it can offer more localized and sustainable methods of CT than traditional military and use-of-force methods alone. There has been a relatively new development in the language of this type of programming, with some recommending that CVE remain focused on dealing with the second tier of addressing "at risk" individuals and preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming be developed to fill the first tier requirements. This would allow CVE to remain a pillar of CT strategy while disassociating PVE programming from the human rights violations associated with CT policy (Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier, 2019). However, for the purposes of this project all three tiers of programming will be referred to as CVE.

These concepts are the core building blocks upon which this project is built. The concept of gender is the first block and is essential to answering the research questions. Gender is a term which refers to the socially constructed nature of masculinity and femininity and the roles which are assigned to people based on their sex. Gender relations play an important role in IR, which is the study of the ways in which states interact with each other and citizens with their state. IR theory, as the framework within which the world's states currently operate, is the basis for security theory. Security measures, under IR theory, are actions taken to protect the state. This project challenges the application of the state security framework as a successful framework for CVE programming, which definitionally supports human security. Human security is security focused on the individual, rather than the protection of the state. However,

applying a human security framework to CT policy can be challenging. Terrorism is the threat posed generally by non-state actors who employ violence in order to achieve political, social, or religious aims. This definition has been challenged by a shift from the traditional focus on political aims to the process of radicalization and perhaps more undefinable religious and social aims. This has resulted in a shift in the language to VE. This expansion of terrorism and its permeation into everyday life since the September 11th attacks in the US have challenged traditional, use-of-force CT measures such as military or legal action. CVE programming was developed as a more holistic, preventative pillar of CT policy. CVE programming is a three-tiered approach, including: addressing drivers of extremism before people turn to VE, assisting those most "at risk" of VE, and engaging in deradicalization of those who have already chosen the path of VE. Each of these concepts builds on the one before to complete the analytical framework which is needed to answer the research questions.

6. Impact of Research

Critical approaches investigate terrorism from alternative perspectives, including feminism, but have thus far focused almost entirely on the perspective of states. This is problematic because CVE definitions are based on emancipatory human security. However, because CVE is still held accountable to state security goals the process of implementation becomes unclear. The lack of clarity makes it easy to side-step gender equality goals. The rooting of CVE in traditional realist, masculine concepts of state security means that the principles of the WPS agenda, set forth in UNSCR 1325, do not get carried effectively forward into programming implementation. This is largely due to the way in which most governments and CVE program implementors define gender and security, often overlooking the many underlying gendered

implications (Caglar, Prügl and Zwingel,2013). FST scholars have analyzed the complexity of the definition of gender and discussed gender mainstreaming in security from the perspective of women's groups, but this leaves a gap in the academic conversation on gender equality as a goal of CT policy. The academic problems this project is trying to solve are acknowledgment of the impact a complex definition of gender has on CT policy, as well as how CVE programming requires a human security framework to meaningfully implement gender equality goals.

Both critical terrorism studies and FST have missed the trans-national space where state and non-state actors are working on CVE programming. Although most of the organizations are working under some kind of state umbrella, they are supposed to be implementing CVE programming under a human security framework in the international arena, not being impacted by state security goals and the difficulties this places on implementing gender equality goals. I exemplify these challenges through analysis of my three CVE program case studies, showing the lack of understanding of the scope of gender and the multitude of ways in which it influences security. This analysis shows how meaningful gender mainstreaming in CT policy needs to challenge traditional academic interpretations of gender, security, and CT. However, the findings are also applicable to other areas where gender equality needs to be meaningfully integrated into programming goals, such as gender equality in peacekeeping forces or the military.

Additionally, I use the case studies to examine "best practices" on CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation, which will help future policy design and evaluation strategies. Since the beginning of the "War on Terror" and the substantial increase in CT programs, little measurement has been conducted on the success of these policies, partially due to the lack of

efficacious means of measurement. There is currently a push in the international community to develop guidelines for CVE programming, to which this project contributes. I recommend that gender equality should be included as a criterion of evaluation for CT policy. I also offer recommendations on how and why to include it in CVE program design. This is important because the inclusion of gender equality goals in CVE program design and evaluation will not only allow nations to meet their normative commitments to the WPS agenda but will also improve their CT policy and make it more effective in the future.

7. Key Issues

This research provides new insight into the increasingly recognized need for the inclusion of gender in security and CT policy. In the introduction I posit that a realignment of security needs to occur from state-based to human security. Security, on an individual level, needs to account for the voice, identity, power, situation, and location of the people it is protecting. Since gender has an influence on what is seen as a threat or violence as well as on policy regarding security, then the specific concerns of men and women need to be taken into account (Hudson, 2009). Applying this expansive concept of human security to CT can be very challenging. Traditional state CT methods can be anything from the hardening of soft targets, such as increasing airport security; to deterrence through increasing punishments and passing international resolutions; to outright military intervention and the use of force (Jackson *et al.,* 2011). These "hard" CT measures can lead to repression and rampant violation of human rights. CVE programming "has evolved in response to an understanding that while conventional militarized and repressive CT strategies may be necessary, they are insufficient in ending terrorism when employed alone" (Chowdhury-Fink, 2015, p. 65). Even with the non-

coercive and more holistic approaches of CVE programs, it is still a challenge to safeguard all human rights and to find a pathway to the meaningful inclusion of gender in the security process.

8. Conclusion

This project started out seeking to address the question of whether the inclusion of gender equality goals improved the successfulness of CT policy. Unfortunately, due to the gender-blind nature of much research there is simply not enough data to prove or disprove that hypothesis. However, this discovery opened up my research process to ask why the gendered data is not being gathered. This process led to my two main research questions around the impact of the security framework and its expectations on the inclusion of gender in CVE programming, as well as the lack of understanding of gender and its complexity affecting how it is applied in security programming. These questions guide my comparison and analysis of three CVE program case studies and the design, implementation, and evaluation guidelines of their implementing institutions. By comparing and contrasting their approaches to gender, I can show how lack of meaningful inclusion has left gaps their program design, implementation, and evaluation processes. This research process has guided me to generate new knowledge on gender analysis of CVE programming which will not only aid the CT policy world but can also be applied to other areas requiring more meaningful inclusion of gender. In the next chapter I situate my work in the literature and identify various strands of gender analysis which are useful in identifying "where is the gender" in all of the gender-blind research which has been done on CT policy. I also establish which of those strands of gender analysis are the most useful for making the case for gender equality in CT policy.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction

In the previous chapter I introduce my project, the research questions, and the research process that I went through. This process led me to ask "where is the gender data" in counter-terrorism (CT) policy, due to the gender-blind nature of the research. I ended up positioning my research around two main questions: how does the framework of security impact understanding of gender, and how does lack of understanding of the complexity of gender impact its inclusion in CT policy. In Chapter 1, I define the concepts which are the key building blocks for my framework of analysis. So, in this chapter I will examine various strands of gender analysis used in feminist IR in order to identify how they can help me conduct gender analysis on CT policy. This situates my project in the work which has already been done on gender analysis, but it also allows me to identify the strands of analysis which will be the most useful in making the case for meaningful inclusion of gender in CT policy (Mlambo-Ngcuka and Coomaraswamy, 2015).

Ultimately, I am highlighting the need for gender-sensitive research in order for meaningful gender mainstreaming to improve effectiveness of CT policy and countering violent extremism (CVE) programming. Terrorism has been present for thousands of years but continually evolves as it meets different obstacles. With the September 11th attacks in the United States (US) and the following "September 12th" mentality, there has been a significant shift from the primarily left-wing political focus of terrorism in the late 20th century to the "War on Terror" and what has been seen as the rise of religious extremism in the early 21st century (Crelinsten, 2013). Western CT policies have seen massive increases in budgets and manpower over the last two decades, but have lacked corresponding or meaningful increases in success (Lint and

Kassa, 2015). CT is a varied discipline which involves methods ranging from the hardening of soft targets such as airports, to military responses, to legal prosecution, to more preventative methods.

Part of the failure of CT policy to produce positive results was attributed to the lack of a long-term preventative approach to radicalization. CVE programming was developed to fill this gap in CT strategies. CVE is a pillar of CT policy which attempts to address the root causes of terrorism through addressing base level societal drivers, hopefully preventing individuals from becoming radicalized (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). According to the public health model of CVE, the primary level should be dedicated to addressing societal issues as a whole, issues such as: education, health services, social engagement, cultural awareness, human rights abuses, and personal development (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016). I am arguing that for this method of preventing radicalization to be successful, gender inequality needs to be present on the list of societal factors to be addressed by the primary tier of a holistic CVE strategy. The Women, Peace, and Security agenda (WPS), implemented initially through United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000, was the first international recognition that gender is an important element of security and that women need to be included more meaningfully in the process of creating lasting security (Jansson and Eduards, 2016).

Originally, my hypothesis was that the inclusion of gender equality goals increases successfulness of CVE programming. There were three main roadblocks identified which prevented me from reaching a conclusion through this positivist approach. The first is a disconnect between how CVE is defined and how it is applied in programming. The second is that the small-scale application of CVE programming does not allow the time, budget, or scope to affect meaningful changes to deeply engrained social issues such as gender inequality. The

third is a lack of effective evaluation methods for CVE program measurement, at least partially caused by a misunderstanding of gender and the multitude of ways in which it is intertwined with the issue of violent extremism. These three roadblocks meant that there has not been enough gender data gathered for me to test my hypothesis. However, this challenge required me to adjust my strategy to a more interpretivist approach and shape the research questions which allow me to challenge the gender-blind nature of most research on CT policy. Therefore, this project aims to make the case for meaningful inclusion of gender in CT policy and to provide recommendations for improving design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE programming through improved understanding of the role of gender.

My thesis is situated theoretically between Feminist Security Theory (FST) and critical terrorism studies. It is based in FST, which is already addressing issues of gender in security and raising the need to look at all aspects of gender. FST brings attention to the fact that gender is a multidimensional concept which impacts participation in violence and security. However, the gap I found within the feminist work on security and terrorism is that it is has not yet been focused on CT policy. FST, as a security theory, does not reach to terrorism or methods of CT. So, one contribution I am making with this project is to stretch the critical approach of FST into terrorism studies. Critical terrorism studies offer a pathway to study issues of terrorism from the perspective of different traditions, such as feminist studies. However, these critical approaches have not yet focused on the importance of the meanings of gender to successful CT methods (True, 2016d). Therefore, if I situate my thesis between the two and draw from the strengths of both, I can examine my research questions and add to the literature connecting these two areas of study.

In this literature review, I first look at international relations (IR) theory because it is the basis for the state security framework upon which CT policy was built. Security frameworks have a significant impact on the way in which gender is viewed and integrated into CT policy. I also overview the strands of feminist theory which look critically at how gender is included in IR. Overviewing these strands allows me to show how gender analysis can be used to expose the gender in a historically gender-blind field of study. It also supports my conclusion that a wider interpretation of the concept of gender allows for better understanding of the multitude of ways in which gender impacts security. I will identify which strands are the most useful to the argument for meaningful inclusion of gender in CT policy.

Second, I look at the concepts of femininity and masculinity. This is important because this thesis is committed to gender equality, which includes both men and women. Due to the historically masculine space the topic of security occupies, the presence of men is assured although is not often fully understood. Therefore, this thesis ends up being primarily empirically focused on the inclusion of women. However, fundamentally this project is committed to equality for all and is recommending that a better understanding of both masculinity and femininity is needed to effectively mainstream gender in CT policy. Third, I outline what equality is and root it in international agreement. This is important because I am making the argument that gender inequality should be addressed by CVE programming. Fourth, I briefly introduce the conversation around gender mainstreaming and clarify how it is used it in reference to CT policy. Gender mainstreaming is a very controversial term in feminist literature, but it has been adopted by most governments and international organizations to describe their processes of including gender. Therefore, it is a key term to my evaluation process, even though I recognize the limitations of its current definition.

Fifth, I use FST to frame the analysis for my first research question about the impact of the security framework on understanding of gender. Security frameworks are attached to certain sets of expectations and associated markers for success. This can either facilitate meaningful inclusion of gender or allow for easy side-stepping of gender goals. Finally, I use critical perspectives on terrorism studies to examine the different CT methods themselves and what has already been written about effectiveness of methods of CT. This section is necessary so that I can highlight how a gender-sensitive perspective in design, implementation, and evaluation can improve effectiveness. I am therefore anchoring my research in security studies but using feminist theory to highlight where the gender is missing and how this negatively impacts the effectiveness of CT policy. My literature review is organized in a thematic fashion. This allows me to address each of these topics and their literature in sections, while bringing them together with analysis and critique.

2. Gender and International Relations

Gender in IR theory is important to this thesis because CT methods are a security mechanism of the state, which operates under the principles of IR theory (Tickner and True, 2018; Ackerly and True, 2018). This relationship requires that CT methods are being implemented to fulfil state security framework expectations. I argue that this limits the scope and implementation of CVE programming's human security goals. While a gender-sensitive approach can be taken to human security, as discussed in Section 6.1, gender is not necessarily a consideration of state security. In addition, to support my argument about gender inequality being a driver of VE, I need to examine more factors than just how gendered components affect programming success. I also need to examine whether gender

equality improves the safety and stability of societies (Caprioli, 2005). Feminist IR perspectives can help to illuminate the wider aspects of how gender influences society, and where it might contribute to violence or improve approaches to security (Peterson, 1992).

In traditional, realist-centric IR men are portrayed as the political actors and women are excluded from the picture entirely (Enloe, 1996). Women can even be considered subversive to the male dominated society because they draw men out of the political realm and into the family. This can make men unwilling to defend the state at all costs (Steans, 2013). Grant and Newland (1991) have said that as long as the IR field continues to eliminate gender from the conversation they are working with an incomplete and distorted view of the world. Until the field includes an evaluation of the ways in which gender has shaped our understanding of the state and IR, as well as being a form of analysis, it is only legitimizing the subordination and oppression of women. If we are to get to the point of ungendered or pure human science study of international politics, Tickner argues (1988) we must be successful in adding a feminist perspective to the epistemology of IR. Feminist empiricism, as defined by Keohane (1989), guided by a feminist reconceptualization could allow for the role of women in IR to be re-examined. It could also support a critical analysis of contemporary IR theory itself and its ability to account for what is happening in world politics today.

Feminist perspectives can address several of the shortcomings of realist IR theory, regarding gender equality (Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006; Sylvester, 2002). Firstly, because men dominate the roles of power and security in the Hobbesian version of reality, they self-perpetuate their own position. Therefore, there is nowhere for women to break into political or power roles (Steans, 2013). Women's traditionally designated roles in the household, reproduction, and even in the economy are not considered relevant to the roles of politics,

power and warfare. Consequently, women's voices are considered inauthentic. Men are able to perpetuate these role generalizations because they control the majority of the positions in seats of power (Steans, 2013). Secondly, because realism always draws upon masculine social roles (e.g.-politician, warrior, etc.) then men have historically dominated women in modern society. They have controlled the way in which women's roles are constructed or portrayed in society. Historically, women have been considered to be more apolitical and peaceful by nature, so peace itself has become associated with femininity in the realm of IR (Sjoberg and Gentry, 2007). This mindset has locked women out of assuming roles as politicians, strategists, war-makers, and CT policy influencers. However, as Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) have suggested, women are not only capable of driving war and peace from positions of power, they are also perfectly capable of and willing to commit violence themselves. Therefore, women can no longer be seen only as vessels of peace. Women must be considered equal political beings to their male counterparts, capable of carrying out and countering violence and terrorism.

Thirdly, since realism allows claims of "knowledge" to be made, it follows that there can be many different perspectives and different versions of knowledge. For example, feminists challenge the idea that the state is the primary source of identity. This challenges the assumption in realist IR that all citizens (who under the Hobbesian view of realist IR are all male, as women and children are not considered) are willing to sacrifice for the security of the state (Steans, 2013). In a globalized world, it seems that the concept of nation states is being fundamentally challenged, as well as the normative systems established with them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). As information and people travel more freely, borders become harder to define. International organizations, while being undermined in some ways

by state-centric policies, are also often seen as an acceptable platform for international governance and implementation of transnational CT policy (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Therefore, a feminist strategy is needed in order to effectively diffuse normative commitments to women's rights and gender equality through the international governance system (Caglar, Prügl and Zwingel,2013). The global diffusion of gender norms is a widely debated topic (True, 2019; Park, 2006; Çağlar, Prugl and Zwingel, 2013). However, the WPS agenda is a good example of the ways in which gender equality norms have been diffused through the international governance system and within application of a transnational security agenda (True, 2016b). Gendered norm diffusion often occurs through gender mainstreaming strategies, and will be discussed further in Section 5, as well as in Chapter 8, Section 4.

Unfortunately, overall, there is a lack of attention paid by the traditional IR studies field to gender because it is seen as synonymous to feminism, and many do not identify with this complicated critical perspective (Carpenter, 2002). Because there are so many feminisms and varied perspectives on what a more equal world should look like, it is difficult to identify all the different feminist perspectives on IR theory and the ways in which they address and expose patriarchy (Zalewski and Parpart, 2019). For this project, I am highlighting how the historical exclusion of women from IR theory has shaped expectations for their ability to participate in and solve violence. This is key to the expectations placed on CT policy and to the roles women are allowed to assume. Lack of consideration for the variety of ways in which gender inequality impacts security leaves gaps in CT policy design, implementation, evaluation. Below I highlight several of the ways in which feminist theory has been applied to IR. I am not investigating the intricacies of each of these different feminist perspectives, as a large amount of literature exists on each of these different approaches to the inclusion of

gender in IR. However, I am exemplifying that there are multiple perspectives on gender, and how these varied perspectives can help to highlight different aspects of its impact on security. This variety of analysis supports my assertion that the "add women and stir" approach usually applied in CT policy does not work, due to the complexity of gender. Misunderstanding or oversimplification of gender leads to failure of gendered initiatives in CVE programming.

The following are some of the different ways in which gender can be analyzed with feminist IR theory. I apply these analytical perspectives to examples from my primary case study in Chapter 5, to show how lack of understanding of the complexity of gender correlates to lack of success within CVE programming components.

2.1 Gender as a Category

I am looking at the use of gender as a category of analysis because it is the most common method currently found in security and CT policy (Giscard d'Estaing, 2017). This strand of analysis is often associated with the term "gender mainstreaming". If a policy does include gender, this is most likely the form of gender analysis it has relied upon (Brown, Huckerby and Shepherd, 2019). Gender as a category of analysis is an empirical examination of where women are present and an attempt to add them into the mix, without challenging any of the assumptions of security or CT. This approach often translates into the perspective that gender equals women, and that gender mainstreaming is just about adding an equal number of them into the currently existing system (Steans, 2013). Harding (2016) argues that this is an effective method of introducing women into a field where they have historically been excluded, but she recognizes that this perspective does not allow for a true examination of gender and its multidimensional definition. Others have used the empirical analysis of gender as a category

to start the conversation, but then have got on to explore other definitional aspects of gender's impact (Enloe, 2014).

This is a common way of inserting gender into CT policy, at least partially due to its accessibility for measuring and assessing gender. I find that it is often not a meaningful way to measure gender's impact, because it usually reduces gender down to women. This simplified understanding of gender does not allow for exploration of the many ways in which gender, femininity and masculinity, interact and impact societal relationships and norms (Gordon and True, 2019). Adding women into a CT policy and then measuring it success as a category often leads to a negative interpretation of gender's impact on programming effectiveness. This is due to the many underlying social implications, which are difficult to address or overcome. This allows governments to determine that the inclusion of gender (or women) does not have meaningful impact or is even detrimental to CT policy (True and Wiener, 2019). Therefore, it is not the most useful strand of gender analysis to fully support meaningful inclusion of gender in CT policy. However, it is useful as a strand of analysis to highlight how current usage of gender as a category in CT policy leads to gaps in program design, implementation, and evaluation. This is primarily due to the way that gender is simplified down to women and then "women" are simplified down to a homogenous category, despite their many differences.

2.2 Gender as a Power Relationship

I have included the strand of gender analysis which looks at it as a power relationship because, while this is also a simplified form of analysis, it highlights the challenges of including women in an area which is traditionally the domain of men. The theory of gender as a power relationship was most prominent within 1970s radical feminism and it pitted "women" and "men", as homogenized groups, against each other in a struggle for power (Enloe, 1996).

Historically, this strand of analysis saw "women" as the inevitable losers in the struggle, due to their disadvantaged position within the patriarchal structure of most social orders. Contemporary feminisms almost universally accept that "women" are not a homogenized group. However, whilst the wider homogenization of society and application of patriarchy have been abandoned for the most part, power relationships still exist (Steans, 2013). One of the initial stages of designing a CVE program is to determine what the contextual drivers of VE are in the region where the program is to be implemented. Often in these regions very conservative patriarchal social structures exist, which systematically exclude women from power within the community or a voice on issues such as security. This exhibits a power relationship in which the male leadership are often unwilling to share power with women in the community. This position of power also allows men to perpetuate gender inequality (Ruxton, 2004).

This strand of gendered analysis is also not the most effective strand to support a complete argument for gender mainstreaming in CT policy. However, it usefully highlights the challenges of including women equally in security related programs being implemented in contexts with resistant traditional and patriarchal societal structures. Gender analysis of power relationships allows this project to highlight one of the most significant practical problems on the ground with CVE program implementation, which is often pushback from community leaders on programming components they dislike. However, as an overall form of gender analysis it lacks the depth to be able to examine gender as a multidimensional concept of femininity and masculinity. It also overlooks the complicated ways in which people cannot be homogenized.

2.3 Gender as a Social Relationship of Inequality

Gender can also be examined theoretically as defined by society. This strand of analysis is important to my project as it highlights the constructed nature of gender and the inequalities which have been assigned to it. It considers the complexity of gender while also deconstructing the socialized versions of its definition (Squires, 2007; Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2002; Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). Instead of gender roles being an inherent identity they are instilled in each individual by social institutions and practices. Social institutions, and even much more basic day-to-day interactions and expectations, tie gender into social relationships of inequality and domination (Østby, 2013). Some roles are reinforced as masculine, with traits such as rationality and strength. Others are reinforced by social institutions and practices as feminine, with weakness and inferiority (Jones, 1996). This can be seen in how traits traditionally associated with masculinity and femininity are often reinforced through institutions such as marriage and the public/private divide which exists in family life. Often, in this association, women are the unpaid caregivers in the home and because men earn the wages they can exert authority over the family (Steans, 2013). There are many examples of how social institutions reinforce inequality.

Analyzing gender under this theoretical perspective could help to identify and more effectively rank drivers of VE in societies where CVE programming interventions are being implemented. I find that this is the most useful strand of gender analysis overall. While each of the others exemplified in this section do open interesting avenues of inquiry in regard to gender mainstreaming, this strand embraces the multidimensional and socially constructed nature of gender. This strand of gender analysis is the most effective in highlighting where gender is

intwined with issues of security and I will show how it can be used to help implement meaningful gender mainstreaming in CT policy.

2.4 The Discourse of Gender

Examining gender as a discourse is another theoretical method of showing how gender is not an inherent identity (Fairclough, 2001; Machin and Mayr, 2012; Bloor and Bloor, 2007). This strand of gender analysis is included because it challenges some of the terminology commonly used in CT policy. It also allows for further examination of the assumptions often made around term gender (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009; Ferree, 2013). Poststructuralist feminism suggests that gender is constructed through discourse and is not linked to an individual by physical or biological differences (Butler, 2011). This theory emphasizes the power that society and language have over what the terms "men" and "women" mean (Steans, 2013; Tannen, 1989). This is important with CVE programming, because often in policies on conflict areas there are connotations associated with categories of people. Gender essentialism is used to lump people together in a way which makes it easier to condense them down into categories (Carpenter, 2005). "Women and children" are most often seen as the victims of violence and conflict. "Women" are also often seen only as peaceful mediators. "Men" are seen as heads-of-households and leaders in these deeply traditional societies. These are essentializations.

"Youth" is a category which is often applied in CVE programming. It is a key category because those in the 15-25 age range are often the ones mostly likely to be recruited into VE groups. However, "youth" is usually left oddly gender-neutral in the discourse. In a way, this lack of definition and social interpretation protects the category of "youth" from the binary opposition present with the language of "men" and "women" and the implicit dominance that one category must take over the other. However, it also leaves a gap in measurement and understanding.

Additionally, the lack of definition discounts the fact that male and female youth are having different experiences and might be susceptible to extremism drivers in different ways (UN, 2017).

Using this strand of gender analysis to look at gender as a discourse highlights some common assumptions which take place around the use of gender in the language of CT policy and CVE programming design and evaluation. It is useful as a tool to highlight the need to challenge gender essentialism and the meanings commonly attached to gendered terms. However, as a single strand of gender analysis it has some limitations to its scope of inquiry. It is therefore the most useful when combined with other strands, such as looking at gender as a social construction. Social construction of identity is linked to the power that society holds in shaping discourse.

2.5 The Complexity of Identities

Intersectionality is the gender theory which emphasizes that "women" are not a homogenized group, but rather a diverse group of marginalized, multidimensional individuals (Crenshaw, 1989). This is an important form of gender analysis to include because it focuses on the ways in which men and women cannot be put into singular categories. This strand of analysis challenges the often-one-dimensional nature of most policy language. Each woman is more than just a woman, they belong to different classes, races, nations, families, tribes, times, and places (Peterson and True,1998). The over-simplification of a very complex issue like identity is one that has been challenged by many different strands of feminism, such as black feminism and postcolonial feminism (Steans, 2013). Most people find themselves with more than one form of identity, often with intersecting points (Nash, 2008). This makes people very complex.

It also makes it very difficult to lump people into singular categories like “women” or “men” (Yuval-Davis, 2006).

CVE programming’s inclusion of gender often makes the mistake of lumping women into singular categories. This approach overlooks the many different intersecting aspects of identity such as urban vs. rural, tribal affiliations, family, culture, ethnic background, and other factors. Any or all of these different elements of identity could affect how these women interact with VE. Including this strand of gender analysis is therefore important to open avenues of inquiry into the ways in which people identity with different factors in their life. It can be used to examine how these identities overlap, not only with each other but also with their participation in violence or security processes.

I think it is important to include an introduction to the literature around these different strands of gender analysis for two reasons. First, it gives an overview of what strands are available with which to conduct gender analysis on CT policy. As I discovered in my attempt to test my hypothesis, most of the research around CT has been gender blind. This left me needing to find strands of gender analysis which have been used in other fields so that I could apply them to my analysis of CT policy. Second, I use this overview in the literature review to highlight the ways in which the different strands are useful to my project and how they open up various lines of inquiry. This process allows me to determine which strands are the most useful in my evaluation of gender mainstreaming in CT policy. Ultimately, I found that while each of the strands contributes a different perspective and highlights important questions, the most useful strand of gender analysis overall for this project is looking at gender as a socially constructed relationship of inequality.

3. Femininity vs. Masculinity

All the different feminist IR theories highlighted above are identifying different ways to analyze gender. However, I argue that one of the most important points of understanding the multidimensional nature of gender for CT policy is remembering that gender does not just equal women. This section on femininity and masculinity is important to this project because gender equality is about both men and women (Holmgren and Hearn, 2009; Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004; Ruxton, 2004). The main reason that women are more of a focus for this project is because of their current absence from the research and often the policy (Harding, 2016). However, it is key to meaningful and comprehensive inclusion of gender that aspects of masculinity are recognized and included in analysis as well. "Adding women and stirring" is not enough to create gender equality, just as it is not enough for feminisms to focus only on women as a subject in IR.

Only once you look at the perspective of men and IR do you begin to see where the depth of the ingrained masculinity begins and what that actually means to men (Zalewski and Parpart, 2019). Often, in the feminist study of gender, more attention is given to femininity than masculinity, but this should be avoided in a conversation that is about gender equality. Attention must be given equally to "masculinity" and how being a "man" is often endowed with all the socially constructed traits and expectations of masculinity, such as strength, honor, dominance, anger, and violence, etc. (Connell, 2005; Ahmadi and Stanikzai, 2018). "Although there is no one feminism, feminist commitments to the transformation of structural oppressions generate a commonality of concerns or questions without specifying universal or totalizing solutions" (Peterson and True,1998, p. 15). Feminism should therefore be as committed to transforming the expectations of masculinity as femininity.

Because gender is a structural impartation of identity it is scary to challenge gender hierarchy, as it is paramount to challenging self-identity.

> As noted earlier, women cannot simply be "added" to categories (e.g., the public sphere) that are constituted by their masculinity because such categories are defined by the exclusion of femininity. Either women as feminine cannot be added (i.e., women must become men) or the category must be transformed to accommodate the inclusion of women and femininity. Doing so transforms not only the meaning of the category but also the meaning of masculinity (because masculinity and the public sphere are defined in terms of each other and masculinity and femininity are a mutually constituted dichotomy). (Peterson and True,1998, p. 19)

The expectations of masculinity are extremely prevalent in deeply conservative and religious societies and are unfortunately often reinforced by the perspectives of those that work with men and male youth in these areas. CVE program design commonly exhibits acceptance of gender essentialism for women and men. It often perpetuates acceptance of the stereotypical gender roles assigned by society and traditional definitions of masculinity and femininity (Gordon and True, 2019; Schmidt, 2018). This means that CVE programming is reinforcing the premise that men are naturally more inclined to violence and women are more interested in caring for the community and being a peaceful force for good. However, I posit that the masculine expectations of these societies put men in a position to become more violent or susceptible to the message of radicalization, not that it is their natural inclination. For example, the men or male youth would traditionally be the ones responsible for providing for their families, by crime or violent means if necessarily (Ahmadi and Stanikzai, 2018), which makes them more likely to get involved in gangs or behaviors that might lead down a road to radicalization.

Ultimately, it is just as damaging to gender equality goals to assign men a social role as it is to say that women can only be viewed as wives and mothers. Therefore, this project includes

both men and women in its examination of gender and in its argument for gender equality. Essentializing any gender role leads to misunderstanding and therefore negatively impacts policy. In the argument for meaningful gender mainstreaming in CT policy both men and women must be considered, in order to gain a more complete understanding of the impacts of gender on security.

4. Gender Equality

An overview of the literature on the complexity of gender equality is necessary to this project because it is investigating the impact of gender-sensitive perspective on effectiveness of CT policy, as well as inequality's contribution to the radicalization process. I argue that gender equality is one of the primary level social issues which needs to be addressed, in order to add viability to preventative CT methods and their attempts to mitigate future terrorism (Mlambo-Ngcuka and Coomaraswamy, 2015). However, just as the definition of gender is multi-faceted, so is the concept of gender equality.

> While several terms designating gender equality are used in theory and practice, the various labels are seldom clearly distinguishable. Across countries, the label used can be equal opportunity or empowerment of women, to give a few examples. While all these labels can be linked back to theoretical and political debates that articulate them as different forms of each other, research and practice show that what is labelled equal opportunity in one context can be very similar to what is called empowerment in another, while the content of similar labels can diverge tremendously. Labels matter, but they can be a misleading feature in understanding the content and strategy of gender equality policies. (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009, p. 1)

It is necessary to examine some of the ways in which gender equality is defined and used in order to determine its definition for the purposes of this project (Inglehart, Norris and Welzel, 2002). Feminism is basically the belief that everyone is entitled to equal rights, but there are

different approaches to achieving this outcome. Equality is when women are treated the same as men or are allowed into "the seats of power" in the same way as men. Equity is about recognition that although women may fill different roles in society, such as being wives and mothers, their roles contain the same value as the roles of men. These variable approaches can make gender equality very difficult to enforce (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009).

While according to some feminist theory a "shared interest" among women has been developed over the last several decades, there is still a great deal of division over what gender equality should look like. Equality has been challenged in various ways by the multitude of different strands of feminist thought (Moghadam, 2005). Below is an overview of the different challenges I have faced in finding a central gender equality definition upon which to base my argument about the necessity of gender equality in true security.

4.1 Gender Equality as Discourse or Law

Gender equality as a discourse leaves its definition limited to what a certain society is willing to describe it as. This makes it mutable instead of a fixed concept, as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) suggests (UN. 1948). Most countries in the world have agreed to the UDHR, which fixes equality as one of the basic human rights everyone is entitled to (Donnelly, 2013; Lombardo and Meier, 2008). However, even though it is enshrined in law, some would argue that legal interpretations are impacted by cultural relativity over time (Donnelly, 1984). It can be immutable in the text of the law, but even this can be subject to change as a legal discourse. In a way this can be positive.

> If the concept of gender equality is pinned down to specific labels that might narrow down its content, a shrinking of the concept of gender equality shapes the latter by reducing its meaning to something that is confined to a particular

> policy area or a specific interpretation of an issue". (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009, p. 4)

If gender equality is boiled down to simply non-discrimination, then it has been deprived of other aspects of its definition. Expansion of the definition of gender equality is required because gender equality is actually tying together two individually immensely complex topics – gender and equality. While these two concepts are entwined, they can also be in competition with each other. There are so many different dimensions of the relationship between these two concepts that it can cause tension between them (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009).

Gender equality as a discourse requires an open definition (Shepherd, 2013). It needs the variety of meanings which different political histories, contexts, struggles and debates give to it. However, being discursively constructed also makes gender equality a "contested concept", because it cannot be fixed with an essential meaning (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009). Gender equality, for the purpose of this project, is easier to ground in the essential meaning of the legal framework of the UDHR. In order to support gender equality as a necessary component of successful CT policy, it needs to be based in a centrally recognized, agreed upon definition.

4.2 The Intersectionality of Inequalities

Gender inequality is pervasive, it exists throughout all the domains of reality and intersects with other inequalities. Gender equality being only one of many equalities can either lead to competition between them, or a stretching of their meaning in order to make them more inclusive. Stretching gender equality's boundaries to include other inequalities might strengthen the collective struggle (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009; Walby, 2009; Verloo, 2006; Squires, 2005). There are structural obstacles to gender equality, so there is a need to

transform power relations between men and women and a need for the empowerment of women (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009; Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2013). With all the different cultural, political, and social viewpoints it often becomes difficult to disentangle gender issues from other social issues, they are usually intricately linked (Steans, 2013). In order to affect social change, multiple factors have to be addressed, including economic development and political change. Moghadam (2003, p. 2) argues that "social change and societal development come about principally through technological advancements, class conflict, and political action" and because all of these are affected by the regional and global events happening around them then "no major social change occurs outside of the world context".

The status of women and men varies greatly across the countries of the world and thus inequality cannot be generalized. It is affected by culture, history, and class, among other things. As it is often hard to disentangle gender discrimination from other social inequalities, such as class discrimination and culture biases, a single definition for gender equality becomes even more difficult (Caprioli, 2005; Johnston and True, 2019). Especially as you factor in different versions of what equality should look like, which are affected by different political and theoretical perspectives. Care must be taken not to enforce a specific definition of gender equality in such a way that it imposes a certain set of ideals (Fay, 1996; Mahmood, 2009; Ahmed, 2011). There are many different theological and ideological approaches asserting pressure on feminisms and impacting the end-goals which they are seeking to achieve. Western policies of multi-culturalism and identity politics are among these pressures, and they wield a significant amount of influence on feminist theorizing (Kandiyoti, 1996). How the geographical or theological contexts affect the concept of gender equity need to be taken into consideration; for example, considering if gender equality should look different in the Middle

East than it does in the West (Verloo, 2007). This an important element to be considered, as CVE programming is often implemented by Western countries in other parts of the world. Local concern about cultural imperialism is a common challenge for CVE programming design and implementation (Okin, 1994; Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

4.3 Men vs. Women in Gender Equality

Çağlar (2013) finds that men's traditional "role" in many societies is to be the provider and protector for their families. As skyrocketing unemployment and increasing insecurity has rendered this impossible in many places, men may have a greater tendency to turn to violence. This suggests that the pressure of the culturally assigned gender role itself pushes people towards involvement in terrorism. Gender equality has been shown to make society less susceptible to violence (Caprioli, 2005; Ortbals and Poloni-Staudinger,2018). I argue that gender equality does not apply only to women, but instead it is a leveling of the social playing field. Thus, it distributes the burden of security to be shared equally among all members of society (Østby, 2013). It also does not apply only to raising the number of women being represented in positions "usually" held by men in society. "When the dominant focus of a gender equality issue is on increasing women's numerical representation, there is a risk of depoliticizing the issue by suggesting that gender equality is a matter of achieving target figures rather than transforming power relations between men and women" (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009, p. 4). When discussing transforming power relations, which have traditionally been patriarchal in many societies, there is a tendency to associate gender equality only with women's empowerment or emancipation. However, gender equality is ultimately about equality for all genders, and men must also be invested in equality if it is to become a reality (Ruxton, 2004).

The position of men in the conversation about gender equality is a varied and difficult one (Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004). While the conversation about gender equality has a "hegemonic core of double emancipation; the idea that both men and women will gain equally from, and be liberated by, gender equality" it is still resisted by the majority of men who see no need to change their position in society (Holmgren and Hearn, 2009, p. 414). While "men" is a homogenizing category, which ignores a multitude of intersecting identities, historically in many societies "[m]en's practices (re)producing gender inequality are heavily embedded in social, economic and cultural relations – so that men's dominant or complicit practices may often easily be equated with what is considered and counts as the 'normal', usual, or even the official way of doing things" (Holmgren and Hearn, 2009, p. 404). It can therefore be difficult to engage men in championing gender equality as they often feel they are giving up some of their privileged or "normal" status (Ruxton, 2004; Holmgren and Hearn, 2009; Bolzendahl and Myers, 2004).

4.4 Emancipation and Equality

For the purposes of creating human security, as CVE is seeking to do, gender equality must apply to everyone. In terms of human security, the concept of emancipation is used to express a state in which all individuals or groups are free to pursue their lives free of threat or discrimination (Hans and Reardon, 2010). "Integral to emancipation is the idea of the reciprocity of rights. The implication of this is the belief that 'I am not truly free until everyone is free'" (Booth, 1991, p. 322). This engages all people, as individuals, in the quest for freedom and equality, which makes security and emancipation reliant upon a core legal definition of gender equality (Harvey, 2002). While there are often varied levels of local resistance to the implementation of CVE programming focused on gender or equality initiatives, it should be

noted that most of the countries in the world have agreed to the core human rights principle that there should be equality (Donnelly, 2013). I argue that pursuance of gender equality initiatives as part of CVE programming can be grounded on the basis of that core agreement.

In the international arena, gender inequality has been recognized as closely linked to the presence of VE. Respect for basic human rights is seen as essential to successful CT and CVE policy (Brown, Huckerby and Shepherd, 2019; Satterthwaite and Huckerby, 2013; UNDP, 2016). The UN General Assembly has reiterated in their Global CT Strategy Review (2016) that they are:

- *Reaffirming* that the acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy.

- *Expressing* deep concern that acts of sexual and gender--based violence are known to be part of the strategic objectives and ideology of certain terrorist groups and are used as an instrument to increase their power through supporting financing and recruitment and through the destruction of communities.

- *Stressing* also that a national criminal justice system based on respect for human rights and the rule of law, due process and fair trial guarantees is one of the best means for effectively countering terrorism and ensuring accountability.

CVE programming components focused on the empowerment of women or on gender equality, therefore, have a clear mandate even though they are usually met, especially in culturally traditional and conservative societies, with resistance (UN, 2016). Although it means overcoming difficult obstacles, CVE program design and implementation cannot allow gender

essentialism and discrimination to continue. Otherwise, gender inequality will encourage discontent, violate human rights, and thus leave open the door to radicalization (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011).

Ultimately, for the purposes of this project, I will base my argument for gender equality on the national commitments which have been made in the international space to a legally defined concept of gender equality as part of the UDHR. Since most countries in the world have agreed to uphold the UDHR, of which equality is a part, then a security framework based on human rights and emancipation must include gender in security. Social and cultural disagreements over inclusion of women or definitions of equality should not be allowed to override this central agreement. Men need to be equally vested in its achievement, and thus included in the process of gender mainstreaming. However, it is this legalistic approach to gender equality which has led to some of the controversy over "gender mainstreaming". It is a term sometimes associated with the simplistic approach of just adding women into the mix of the existing security processes without challenging their base assumptions. In order to avoid this, a human rights compliant and gender sensitive monitoring and evaluation framework is needed to give recommendations for how to apply a gender lens and what needs to be considered. Although, there are challenges to implementing gender equality through legal perspective (Huckerby, 2020).

5. Gender Mainstreaming

An important and relatively recent development in the discourse of gender equality has transformed it, in part, into the concept of gender mainstreaming.

> [T]he concept of gender equality has, broadly speaking, evolved from its original, legalistic approach based on equal rights to equal opportunities supported by positive action and, finally, to gender mainstreaming, an approach that has the potential to expand thinking about the structural and institutional causes of inequality, and to involve men more closely in the measures planned to achieve gender quality. (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009, p. 7)

Gender mainstreaming is a controversial concept, but it is also increasingly the dominant term used in policy making (True, 2010; True, 2003). The feminist strategy for gender norm diffusion through the international governance system has largely focused on the WPS agenda. WPS has offered a platform for implementation of gendered security policy goals (True and Parisi,2013). Therefore, I use gender mainstreaming in the title of my thesis, because this project is evaluating the ways in which governments and international bodies have included gender in CT policy. The term gender mainstreaming has been widely adopted by these bodies as the term of choice for their approaches to the inclusion of gender (Brown, Huckerby and Shepherd, 2019; True, 2010). The United Nations (UN), which is the international body with the largest scope, defines its perspective: "gender equality as the goal - gender mainstreaming as the strategy" (UN, 2002, p. 1).

In the academic conversation, this term is often associated with the "add women and stir" sort of approach to the inclusion of women. This can led to an unproductive focus on equaling out the numbers of women present without meaningfully challenging the ways of thinking about gender (True, 2010). I am arguing that this approach is not ultimately effective. However, in the policy world gender mainstreaming is also associated with the outcome of a gender equal environment, which is what this thesis is advocating for (Ni Aolain and Huckerby, 2018a; Ni Aolain and Huckerby, 2018b). "Gender mainstreaming strategies 'may accept certain norms and institutions provisionally but challenge them at an appropriate

time', thus not precluding fundamental social change" (Ackerly, 2001, p. 317). In that sense I agree with the UN's definition that gender equality is the goal, it is just that the process of getting to gender equality needs to take a much more in-depth and meaningful approach than simply adding women to the mix of existing security policy. True (2016c, p. 457) recommends the adoption of a:

> more transformative model of gender mainstreaming that mobilizes diverse gender perspectives to challenge conventional biased, male-centered frameworks. For this to be achieved, the participation of women and women's organizations in designing and implementing gender mainstreaming policies is crucial, as well as the involvement of international organizations in strengthening the relationship between governments and civil society in delivering gender mainstreaming.

It is the role of feminist scholarship to use a critical lens to examine the impact of gender mainstreaming in shaping policies (True, 2003). Gender mainstreaming is a concept often applied to CT and other security and development policies. Governments use it as a way to display their commitment to the inclusion and empowerment of women in the security process. However, they do not always use it effectively. Kusakabe (2005, p. 46) has summarized some of the problems with gender mainstreaming strategies:

> The weak influencing power commanded by gender focal points [tasked with implementing gender mainstreaming], lack of resources, the evaporation of gender policies when it comes to implementing, and the difficulty of gender mainstreaming in the face of gender-biased organisational culture and discourse... gender mainstreaming is co-opting the feminist agenda, instrumentalising and diluting it, and thus doing more harm than good for gender equality.

This list of problems sums up many of the gaps that are found in relation to gender mainstreaming in the case studies in Chapters 5-7. There is a general failure to value gender equality as an essential element of the solution to VE. Gender mainstreaming can sometimes allow gender equality to get lost in policy discourse and implementation, unless it is grounded in context (True, 2003). The way in which gender equality or gender mainstreaming are shaped

discursively by implementing governments or bodies has an immense impact on how it is practically included or excluded from CT policies.

For the purposes of this project, I am evaluating the gender mainstreaming approaches taken in my three case studies and highlighting their pros and cons. It is important to consider the implications of the term gender mainstreaming, but also to highlight that I am looking at the representative contexts most often used by international institutions and governments in security policy making (Caglar, Prügl and Zwingel,2013). This project is not focused on the wider arguments around the term, but rather on the areas relevant to the discussion of CT policy. Gender mainstreaming can be used as a positive policy tool for the inclusion of women in security and the goal of gender equality.

6. Gender and Security

This section is key to this project, as gender and security are the core of the argument (Gentry, Shepherd and Sjoberg, 2018). The various approaches to gender mainstreaming in CT policy all arise out of the base assumptions made around how gender applies to security (Gentry, 2018; Gentry, 2019). With the basic definitions of security and insecurity already established in Chapter 1, a picture begins to form of the challenges for state-centric IR theory to cover the huge number of insecurity causes. This is especially true when the causes can be categories not even recognized by traditional IR studies, such as gender. However, there is a danger, as seen by some, that trying to expand the definition of traditional, state-provided security to include these social implications will only strengthen the hold the state has over more areas of life (Waever, 1995). A solution for this is to shift the security paradigm for CT policy from state security to human security, at least for the application of the preventative methods. Trying

to implement gender equality goals under a CVE program which is being held to the evaluation standards of a state security framework is not effective. This is because state security does not recognize the need for equality and thus makes it easy to side-step gender goals.

Another challenge presented to the state security framework, in the modern world, is globalization.

> Globalization presents many challenges to the nation-state as a provider of security. For example: the global spread and reach of military technologies; economic interdependence and periodic economic crises; trans-boundary flows in the form of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees; trans-boundary pollution, resource depletion and global warming. (Steans, 2013, p. 117)

Along with these global challenges has come the rise of transnational terrorism, which threatens not only states and their ability to provide security but also individuals from all societies in a newly pervasive way (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). Due to globalization and the related threat of transnational terrorism, CT policy has an increasingly large impact on all human lives worldwide. I am recommending that there is a corresponding need to hold security to a standard which applies to all lives equally and not just the security of the state (Hans and Reardon, 2010). Because of its link to the state, CT studies focus on the group or collective security of the state. However, the shift to preventative CVE programming has shifted attention to the individual and the prevention of their radicalization process. Therefore, the concept of security also needs to shift to the individual, supporting the argument for a human security perspective.

Much of the work done by through feminist approaches to security studies has addressed the need for human security principles to achieve meaningful inclusion of gender (Reardon and Hans, 2018; Hudson, 2005). However, it must be recognized that human security has historically largely only acknowledged the experience of individuals as men, still ignoring the

experiences of women. Therefore, a feminist approach must be taken to human security, adding in a gender-sensitive understanding of the individual and security needs. In addition to feminist approaches to security studies emphasizing the need for attention to the experiences of women, the WPS agenda has linked gender to the world of security policy and CT. However, there has been a gap thus far in examination of the necessity of meaningful inclusion of gender equality goals for successful CT policy and thus security.

6.1 Human Security

Human security challenges the base priority of the state and focuses the requirements of security on the individual, thus it is more conducive to principles of equality (King and Murray, 2001). This approach is more about measuring the practice of security policy, rather than what it says. The human security framework has become increasingly important in the era of globalization, as the roles of the state and international institutions have evolved (True and Tanyag,2017).

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people… Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. (UNDP, 1994)

While human security can be implemented by the state, it is generally a multi-disciplinary, multi-faceted approach (Hans and Reardon, 2010). It is often implemented at different levels by states, NGOs, international agencies, and private sector entities (Lang, 2012). These bodies are all aiming to address different causes of insecurity and empower people to develop resistance and resilience to whatever difficult conditions might be causing their insecurity (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Due to the huge variety of people in the world and

their different insecure conditions, the implementation of human security methods varies massively. However, it is a paradigm which allows more focus to be placed on the need for gender equality (Hudson, 2009; Ferree, 2013).

It must be recognized that, although in theory human security includes all human individuals, it is basically a gender-neutral concept which has historically focused on the security of individuals from men's perspective (Hoogensen and Stuvøy, 2006). The discourse has largely omitted women's varied experiences of insecurity and security. Therefore, while it provides a framework within which to center the focus of security on the individual, the gender-sensitive perspective also needs to be added to this approach to security (Gibson and Reardon,2007; Moussa, 2008). In the critical terrorism studies literature (which is discussed further below) the concept of human security is tied very closely with emancipation. Emancipation needs to consider what makes the individual unsafe (e.g. sexual violence is an everyday cause of insecurity for the individual) and rectify those causes as the basis of human security.

Just as there is a danger with widening the scope of state security, in allowing the state control over even more aspects of life, there is also a danger in the human security discourse as well.

> The tendency of states, particularly Northern[2] states, to use human security discourses to justify military intervention runs counter to the hope of those who originally embraced human security as a way to highlight both the pressing security needs of individuals or groups, as well as the insecurities that result from activities of states. (Detraz, 2012, p. 162)

[2] The traditional division of states into 1st and 3rd world has been challenged in recent times and thus the paradigm has moved to 'northern' vs. 'southern' - to make the distinction between the relatively advanced states of the northern hemisphere vs. the struggling states of the southern hemisphere (e.g. in Africa, South America, and southern Asia).

There are many scholars who fear the implementation of human security is simply a form of imperialism, with more powerful states ever expanding their reach by means of waging war in the name of "protection" or "emancipation" (Mahmood, 2009; Ahmed, 1992). This form of imperialism can often present itself as cultural imperialism (Silfver, 2010). This goes back to the same argument as the one over the meaning of equality and all the different cultural and social values to be considered (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). It is important that caution is taken to ensure that CVE programming, often implemented by Western states, is not used to force Western ideals on other parts of the world. However, human security principles still offer a security framework within which meaningful gender mainstreaming can be designed, implemented, and evaluated in CT policy (see Chapter 4, Section 5.4 for further discussion).

6.2 Feminist Security Theory

Security, on an individual level, needs to account for the voice, identity, power, situation, and location of the people it is protecting. Since gender has an influence on what is seen as a threat or violence, as well as on policy regarding security, then the specific concerns of men and women need to be taken into account (Hudson, 2009). For the sake of gender equality there needs to be a paradigm shift from states being the only actors, entirely masculine in nature, to a focus on human security and human rights as applied equally to all people. "When gender discrimination is framed as a human rights issue, practices that are experienced as oppressive and/or harmful can be addressed at both national and international levels" (Steans, 2013, p. 84). With the beginning of the feminist movements in the 1960s and 70s came the first international recognition of the need for women's rights. There was the UN Decade for Women from 1975-1985 and in 1993 the Vienna World Conference recognized that women's rights are human rights (Newland, 1988). The Millennium

Development Goals (MDG) were established in 2000 by the UN, one of pillar of which was gender equality and the empowerment of women. This was broken down into three basic areas of inequality which needed to be addressed: education, employment, and political participation (Kabeer, 2005). The UN determined that if these three elements could be addressed then at least a greater level of gender equality could be reached (Kabeer, 2005). This acceptance that gender equality needs to be on the agenda of human rights implementation shows that it is an important factor to the stability and health of societies, which indicates that it should be carried over into the implementation of preventative CT methods (Reardon, 1996).

In addition to the human rights aspect, liberal feminists challenge the idea that the military and the state are central to security. They stress the idea that civil, political, economic and social rights, distributed equally for all people, are necessary to achieving a genuine state of security (Steans, 2013). Prior to the MDG it was thought, for a large part, that economic growth would lead to greater equality for all. It was assumed that the presence of jobs would increase education and resources, which would automatically lift the situation of all residents, including women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). This was ultimately proven untrue though, with the examples of the Gulf states being some of the richest countries in the world and still the most repressive of women's rights.

> The abandonment of grand narratives to account for the subordination of women is making room for detailed analyses of the different institutional realms through which gender hierarchies are reproduced and has broadened the research agenda to include a much wider variety of cultural practices. (Kandiyoti, 1996, p. 17)

Feminist approaches to security studies focus on exposing the ways in which politics contribute to the insecurity of individuals. It especially focuses on individuals who are marginalized and

disempowered, which in many cases are women (Enloe, 2007; Enloe, 2000; Enloe, 2010; Hans and Reardon, 2010).

Feminist security studies are about looking at security with feminist methodological commitments and a gendered lens. This is more than looking at gender as a variable, which is not necessarily a feminist position, it is about looking at security with feminist theory and brining in previously silenced voices, asking different questions, and examining everyday experiences. This perspective challenges ontological and epistemological assumptions of IR and security theory. Feminist approaches to security focus on policies and practices by asking two main questions: what work is gender doing? (e.g. how does it challenge the state as the center of security and gendered power dynamics); and where are the women? (e.g. how do everyday challenges for women impact their security) (Shepherd, 2016). Sjoberg (2009) suggests that gender matters in the theory and practice of international security in three main ways: it is necessary to be able to understand international security, it is important to the analysis of insecurity, and it is essential to finding answers and encouraging change in the field of security.

FST address four major issues within IR security politics (Blanchard, 2003):

- The non-existence of women or women's issues as a consideration;
- If women are even secured by state protection in times of war;
- The association of women with peace, while disregarding their participation in war;
- The idea that gendered discourse is not only about women, as gender encompasses all people.

According to Blanchard, FST ultimately challenges that there is a domestic and international divide, or that one or the other of those two concepts can be assigned explicitly to one gender. Tickner (1992) argues that the multiple levels of violence, at international, national and domestic levels, are all interrelated. She also argues that gender and social justice are required for enduring peace and must be at the center of it. Political, economic, and human ecological relationships characterized by dominance and subordination are not compatible with authentic security (Tickner, 1992).

By focusing on the individual, feminist human security theory and FST shed much needed attention on issues of gender and equality. Combined, they also take a significant step towards ensuring equal protection and safety for all people, irrespective of differences. While the state security framework allows human security goals like equality to be side-stepped in favor of focusing on state security solutions, the human security framework allows the program components to fulfil the actual definition of CVE. My work fits under the theoretical framework of FST in the way that this approach challenges the place of women, their participation in conflict, and the way in which gender is defined. Where I am adding to this literature is by taking FST and applying it to policy related goals for CT programming. I use the developing field of critical approaches to terrorism studies to apply FST to CT policy and challenge its definition, implementation, and evaluation principles as well as its approach to gender.

7. Critical Terrorism Studies

Terrorism studies can be an ambiguous area of study, as it often fits under security studies or wider IR theory. This, alongside its relatively recent emergence, has led to some critique of

its quality and rigor, as well as sometimes a lack of contributing perspective. However, like Youngman (2018), some have recommended building terrorism studies as an interdisciplinary space to help overcome some of these shortcomings. Some who critique the perspective of terrorism studies strive to bring new voices into the traditional study of terrorism. This critical terrorism studies perspective is modeled in a large part after critical security studies, which also provides a challenging voice to the traditional IR view of state applied CT and its methods of application (Toros and Gunning,2009). Critical approaches to terrorism studies not only challenge the realist IR commitment to the state as the central sense of identity, but also challenge the masculine role assigned to power and conflict. This critical space also offers a niche where gender can be welcomed as a standard of measurement for interactions between violence, politics, and states (Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning, 2009). This is not necessarily to say that terrorism studies cannot adopt a gender perspective, but rather that it has not historically and would need to become more interdisciplinary in nature to bring in a feminist perspective.

Challenges to the tradition of terrorism studies are not a new concept. They have been going on for decades, through the voices of different academic traditions (Silke, 2009). There are critiques to many different areas, from what defines a terrorist to how the Western perspective dominates IR and terrorism studies (Silke, 2009). These critiques have, thus far, taken place almost entirely outside the main scholarly acceptance of the terrorism studies field. However…

> More recently, it has been possible to detect a growing sense of unease from many different quarters with both the state of much current terrorism studies research output, and the practical outworking of Western counterterrorism policies – which are often rooted in, or at least legitimized with reference to,

> the orthodox terrorism studies literature. (Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning, 2009, p. 1)

The general quality of the large amounts of research that have been conducted in this area since the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks has been challenged, even by respected scholars in the field (Silke, 2004; Ranstorp, 2006).

It is not only the lack of quality in the research which has highlighted the problems in the field, but also the mixed outcomes resulting from the "War on Terror". There have been numerous adverse moral and political effects of the last two decades years. The use of torture, questionable causes for invasion, erosion of civil liberties, and other apparent violations in the name of CT has caused a growing sense of concern (Black, 2008; Gilmore, 2011). People including scholars, security practitioners, media pundits, and politicians are finally starting to challenge the establishment's knowledge about terrorism, in a way that was seen as unthinkable following the 2001 attacks (Black, 2008; Hooks and Mosher, 2005; Sanders, 2011; McCoy, 2007). It is this space of disillusionment that has opened up the intellectual and political opportunity for a critical approach to take ahold. This has made room for some new ideas about, approaches to, and paradigms for the study of terrorism. This critical space is dominated by a desire to study terrorism from a different point of view and to meld critical and orthodox points. It has, therefore, widened its scope to include a range of disciplinary and methodological approaches, including: political science, anthropology, psychology, IR, area studies, conflict resolution, and feminist studies (Jackson, Breen Smyth and Gunning, 2009).

Critical terrorism studies offers a platform for what my research is trying to accomplish, by taking a critical look at the current application of CT policy (Hirschkind and Mahmood, 2002). This approach values the emancipation perspective and links it to the human security discourse.

It considers some of the challenges, such as concern of exporting politicized Western ideals of emancipation. However, it has not yet applied a gender perspective to emancipation, to highlight effectively women's empowerment as women's agency in their own security (Toros, 2016; McDonald, 2009). Empowerment means giving women the power to make their own decisions about their own security and making them aware of their own rights. It is about making space for them at the community, national and international levels to wield their own agency (True *et al.,* 2019). Critical terrorism studies often look at gender by looking at women's agency in terrorism and participation in violence (Sylvester and Parashar,2009; Daphna-Tekoah and Harel-Shalev, 2017). However, these approaches have not yet looked thoroughly at how gender inequality drives violence and therefore how equality is necessary to human security. FST offers the basic theoretical tools to conduct gendered analysis of security, but it is still lacking in its scope of practical application to policy. Therefore, my contribution is to use FST through a critical approach to terrorism studies to challenge current use of gender in CT policy and to investigate whether the meaningful inclusion of gender equality goals can improve the effectiveness of CVE programming. The gender perspective needs to not only be considered in program design, but also to be included as a component of evaluation and a measurement of success for these policies.

8. Gender and Counter-Terrorism

"For critical scholars committed to emancipation, an increased awareness of the role played by gender in the roots or causes of political violence can point to more effective alternatives to violence and to ways of ending or mitigating its damaging effects" (Jackson *et al.,* 2011, p. 77). An understanding of why people choose to commit acts of terrorism must be developed in order

to be able to assess whether there are alternative ways for them to achieve their goals which do not involve acts of violence or imposing insecurity and fear upon others (Detraz, 2012; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2006). McDonald (2009, p. 121) argues that it is necessary to listen to a wider range of voices in order to redress " the structures of inequality and deprivation that both constitute forms of violence and provide conditions in which the specific use of force is more likely to occur."

Women's voices need to be heard equally in order to be able to assess the causes for and the solutions to violence and terrorism (Satterthwaite and Huckerby, 2013). Including the whole population is key to the development of successful CT methods. This has been recognized internationally with establishment of the WPS agenda in UNSCR 1325, adopted by UN on 31 October 2000 (Shepherd, 2017). The WPS agenda:

- reaffirms the role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building;
- stresses the importance of equal participation in all efforts to promote peace and security;
- reaffirms the need to increase women's role in decision making in conflict prevention and conflict resolution;
- points to the need to implement international humanitarian and human rights law to protect the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts (Article 1)

Since the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 there have been seven more UNSCRs 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015) which

reaffirm the WPS agenda and the importance of including women in the process of conflict mitigation and resolution. The UN Security Council (2014) reiterated its position by stating that the 'persistent barriers' facing gender equality need to be demolished. It called on its member states to commit to women's empowerment, participation, and human rights as well as ensuring their full and equal participation in peace and security issues.

> Despite the growing awareness of women playing an important role in terrorism and violent extremism – including as suicide bombers – the potential for women to act as a vital resource in policy and planning on CVE has traditionally remained largely untapped. Women build resilience to radicalization to violence and conflict, inter alia through their influence on the family, community, and government. Women's inclusion is therefore an indispensable component of any comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. (UN, 2015a)

UNSCR 2242 established the strongest links yet between gender and successful CVE programming. It includes "a commitment to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers and impacts of violent extremism and greater consultations with women's organizations affected by this violence…and states the need for more senior women leaders in all levels of decision-making in peace and security" (UN Women, 2015b). The importance of the WPS agenda and its impact on gender inclusion in security policies will be explored further through the following chapters.

Unfortunately, international recognition has not yet led to widely increased application of gender to CT policy (Pratt and Richter-Devroe, 2011). However, there is recognition by the US and other Western governments that they need to further address the issue (Ni Aolain and Huckerby, 2018a; Ni Aolain and Huckerby, 2018b; Ni Aolain, 2015). Using the US as an example, the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2011) of New York University put together the first global study of the impacts and implications of gender on US CT policy.

While their report was not attempting to claim that promoting gender equality will increase successfulness of CT policy, it does establish that failure to include gender in design, implementation, and assessment will undermine success of CT programs. The report also makes recommendations for how gender should be recognized by and applied to different areas of the US government's (USG) CT policy (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). Looking back on lessons learned from the "War on Terror" the USG has accepted that a more holistic approach is needed to counter terrorism efficiently. They have designated their strategy as the "3 Ds": development, defense, and diplomacy. They have also recognized that gender integration (defined as identification and adjustment to gender inequalities during program planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation) is key to more successful CT programs (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). I find that this is a positive recognition of some of the shortcomings of applying CT policy with a state security framework. However, even with these advances, the application of gender by the USG into CT policy still uses gender narrowly, as equaling women. This research shows how that perspective diminishes the effects of including gendered programming and falls short of including gender equality goals.

The US National Security Strategy (2010) recognizes that countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women have equal rights and opportunities. This perspective shifts gender equality from a normative or moral issue, as it is seen by some, to a national security matter. However, there are some concerns when integrating gender into USG security dialogue, including reducing the meaning of women's empowerment movements to just another national security objective. There is also the potential backlash it might bring to women on the ground, if they are seen as implementing a Western agenda. With the potential negatives in mind, the

US needs to ensure its commitment to gender equality issues without reliance on harmful stereotypes. In the past these stereotypes have included Muslim women as victims of Islam or breeders of terrorists. Governments should support gender equality because it is the right thing to do, regardless of CT objectives. The report also placed emphasis on integrating gender into the measurement and evaluative tools for CT and CVE programs, which have had difficulty in finding and implementing effective methods of evaluation (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011).

The report addresses gender in US militarized CT approaches (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). The current USG approach to CT is considered part of an "irregular warfare" strategy which includes five principal activities: CT, unconventional warfare, COIN, stability operations, and foreign internal defense. Systematic and sound gender analysis remains largely absent from these programs, not only under the US but under most Western governments. This is in spite of the exponential impact these activities have upon women and sexual minorities (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). The clearest example of gender being included in militarized responses has been the use of female engagement teams (FETs) by multiple branches of the US and coalition military forces, as well as by foreign forces trained them (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). The success of these teams has been controversial at best. The underlying reason for the use of these teams clouds the issue of national security versus gender equality goals, especially seeing as the US military itself does not support gender equality in combat military roles (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). The FETs were created to establish rapport with the local populations, show respect for culture and traditions, and invest in the special needs of gender issues as a way to improve local opinion of US and coalition forces. They hoped to use this strategy to

minimize recruitment for terrorist organizations (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011). These foundational causes were not addressed properly though. FETs are often not given cultural or sensitivity training, are often rotated before fulfilling commitments made to local populations, and are sometimes even counter-productive by causing increased targeting of gender groups by terrorist organizations (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011).

This assessment of the inclusion of gender in militarized or "hard" CT measures highlights the difficulties of meaningful inclusion of gender equality goals in traditional state security apparatuses like the military. While this example focused on the USG, it is similar and applicable to other Western government's approaches. There has been a lot of open debate on the need for and the best ways in which to include women in these policies (Peters, 2015; Ni Aolain, 2015; Anderlini, 2018; Chowdhury Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, 2016). Recently, Cook (2020) published an in depth reexamination of women in US CT policy, updating much of what was published in that report. Awareness of the need to include gender is on the rise in the international governance system, so there are multiple emerging studies on the role of women in CT and CVE (Brown *et al.,* 2020; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020; Brown, 2020; Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020; True *et al.,* 2019).

There are some recent studies which have been published that look at gender inequality as a driver of extremism. It is highlighted in one study how gender based violence is often seen as forerunner of VE or as first-warning sign of extremism (Johnston and True, 2019). This study coincides with increased emphasis in the international arena on the need to look at masculinities and femininities in society and how they drive violence (GCTF, 2020). VE organizations know how to take advantage of gender inequality and use it to their advantage in the recruitment

process. They promise men the ability to fulfill their socially imposed masculine role, with expectations of violence, etc. On the other hand, they promise women their own agency, such as the ability to make their own decisions or pursue their own economic opportunities, etc. (Brown *et al.,* 2020).

If CT policy and CVE programming continue to ignore the multidimensional nature of the impact of gender, then they will ultimately remain ineffective. Threats will remain hidden, such as women as perpetrators and enablers of VE, and women will remain a lost asset in preventing and countering VE (Gordon and True, 2019). There remains a lack of consideration of role of gender identities in radicalization, as well as of consideration of gendered impacts of policy and programming. Recent research has really begun to focus on these limitations. One report highlights how a gender lens needs to be included across spectrum of CT policy (Kapur, Watson and Schluchter, 2019):

- In legal frameworks: How to prosecute women who joined VE groups?
- In militarized/security approaches: What are the unequal impacts of these measures?
- In CVE – How to use limited resources effectively and include gender perspective?

All of these examples highlight how more gender data needs to be gathered to provide an evidence base for gender impacts. The gender lens is essential to improvement of future CT policy (Phelan, 2020; Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020).

The above examples of the ways in which gender impacts understanding of security highlight why the human security definition of CVE programming provides a better base for the inclusion of gender equality goals. The US implements the majority of their CVE programming through the US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is also

responsible for development programming, therefore linking these programs as part of their holistic strategy. However, gender has unfortunately largely been left out of the programming and measurement guides (Satterthwaite, 2013). The measurement of the success of these programs has been difficult and indeterminant on whether they successfully counter VE. I argue this is due to the drivers of terrorism not being clearly defined, the lack of empirical evidence, and the cause-and-effect relationships not being established between program activities, resources, and achievements. There has also been some backlash to the securitization and militarization of development and aid programs. I argue that the human security framework can help to offset the concerns of securitization and that a gender lens needs to be incorporated into program design, implementation, and assessment.

Internationally, CVE programming guidelines have been heavily influenced by the Royal United Services Institute's (RUSI) research (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). Their research highlights a few additional difficulties with the inclusion of gender in CVE. As discussed above, the majority of international CT policy is implementing gender with the perspective that gender equals women. To compound this misunderstanding of the complexity of gender there is additional gender essentialism of viewing women almost entirely as wives and mothers. CVE programs which do include "gendered" programming components most often include elements aimed at empowering women to counter radicalization in the home, through their families. I argue that this is not only essentializing gender, but it is also underestimating the roles that women can play in VE (Winterbotham, 2018; Zeuthen and Sahgal, 2018). Ultimately, this perspective underestimates the scale of gender's impact on security issues and the potential solutions.

A large part of the difficulty in establishing a link between gender and CVE is the lack of data. UN Women recently completed a CVE program aimed at gathering the data on how gender was impacting drivers of extremism in a certain region and also how gender equality programming goals could be effectively implemented and evaluated (Abdilatif, 2017). This study was conducted out of recognition that conclusions cannot be reached on the impact of gender when such a gap in empirical evidence exists. My research examines CVE case studies from these three organizations, USAID, RUSI and UN Women. While I was unable to test my hypothesis, due to the same lack of data recognized by UN Women, I am able to use these cases to demonstrate the challenges of implementing meaningful gender mainstreaming in CT policy.

9. Conclusion

As shown above, there are a lot of factors to be considered when examining the importance of gender-sensitive research and meaningful inclusion of gender mainstreaming in CT policy. The field of study on gender in CT is still in the stages of nascency (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2011; Chowdhury Fink, Zeiger and Bhulai, 2016; Cook, 2020; Brown *et al.,* 2020; True *et al.,* 2019; Pearson, Winterbotham and Brown, 2020). Therefore, there are some foundational definitions and standards of analysis which still must be established before gendered evidence can be gathered. There has been some policy "show and tell" of application of gendered components into CT programming. However, there has only recently been emerging academic examination of the importance of gender sensitive research to CT policy or the corresponding application of gendered analysis to CVE program design and implementation methods (Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020; Phelan, 2020; Brown, 2020). This

is largely due to the paradox suggested by Harding (2016) about gender-blind research, and how the lack of gender data encourages further gender-blind research. FST has established the importance of a feminist understanding of human security and meaningful inclusion of gender, and some approaches to terrorism studies have critiqued CT policy within the state security framework. However, there is a gap in the academic literature on how and why gender equality impacts CT policy, which I intend to fill.

FST offers a theoretical basis for argument on the exclusion of gender from the state security framework. It also examines the complexity of the definition of gender. However, it has not yet been applied efficiently to CT policy. The critical approaches to terrorism studies have been developed due to the lack of alternative perspectives in traditional terrorism studies and they often recognize the value a variety of perspectives can offer. Not only does using a gendered lens offer a different set of concerns for each individual as a victim of violence or insecurity, but it can also offer different perspectives on positions of power (such as policy making, war fighting, and peace mediating). The gender-sensitive human security framework is needed for effective implementation of CVE programming, as CVE's defined purpose is to address underlying social issues which render individuals more susceptible to radicalization. Feminist perspectives on terrorism are often considered marginal and sometimes trivialized because of that marginality (Brown, 2015). However, if almost two decades of conflict between the West and terrorism has shown anything, it is that the "traditional" core perspective is not alone capable of combatting terrorism. Traditional CT has multiple methods of implementation, from the hardening of soft targets, to prosecution of terrorist offences, to militarism and use of force. However, it has been criticized for being reactionary. While CVE is a concert of strategies which are implemented to address the causal factors of terrorism in

order to prevent radicalization, it has been criticized for being difficult to evaluate and for securitizing development, peace building, and other types of programming.

In order to develop an effective approach to CT, I am recommending that there needs to be two layers in the policy response to VE and terrorism. Gender analysis is key to both layers. The first layer is to examine how gender is relevant to helping us understand and stop violence, aiding the short-term responses to immediate threats of violence. For this purpose, the methods of gender analysis examined in Section 2 are necessary. The study of CT has largely been conducted from a gender-blind perspective. Therefore, the gender data does not exist to reach any conclusions. The various methods of gender analysis borrowed from IR theory are necessary to highlight where gender is present in security and CT policy. Ultimately, although each one of them is useful in raising different questions, the most useful strand overall is examining gender as a social construction of inequality. Equality is a basic human right and therefore should be an essential element to security. Unfortunately, it has historically been overlooked by state security frameworks. Gender mainstreaming is the concept most commonly used by governments and international institutions to define their more recent policy commitments to the inclusion of gender. While this term involves a wider argument, this thesis is committed to evaluating the ways that gender mainstreaming is currently used in CT policy. This will allow me to highlight how and where gender is relevant to understanding and countering VE.

The second layer is a long-term response of focusing on the root issues of how people are socialized into gendered roles. I will look at how this contributes to radicalization and how these socialization processes can be equalized to head off violence and extremism before it takes root in a society. This layer involves examination of the complex meaning of gender and

the implications of femininity and masculinity in the roles people fill in society. Analysis shows how it is often the expectations of these socialized roles which encourage people to participate in violence. This is useful in making the argument that gender inequality is one of the base level drivers of VE which needs to be addresses as part of successful, holistic CVE strategy. The discussions of CT policy and CVE programming strategies are key to this argument. The way in which gender is understood in these policy formations hugely impacts the gaps which appear in program design, implementation, and evaluation. In the next chapter I set up the methodology for this project and its comparative case study design. I chose the three cases which are the most likely to contain gendered data. Unfortunately, I found that there is not enough gender data with which to test my hypothesis. However, this process opened the opportunity for me focus on two main research questions. I use these questions to center my analysis on demonstrating, through the case study chapters, why and where the gender is missing. I also show how its exclusion or misunderstanding of its scope has let to gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

1. Introduction

The first chapter of this thesis focused on introducing the process of this research project, its core building blocks, and the purpose it is intended to fulfill. Building on that introduction, the second chapter situated it in the literature. Gender analysis strands from feminist international relations (IR) theory were introduced so that they could be used as a method of analysis for counter-terrorism (CT) policy, which has largely been conducted from a gender-blind perspective. The core elements of gender equality and how it feeds into the concept of gender mainstreaming were established. Gender mainstreaming is the focus of this project's evaluation process. Therefore, it is it is important to highlight where this project situates its understanding of the concept. Finally, the issues of security and CT policy itself were discussed in relation to gender. I highlighted their intersecting points, some examples of the scholarship which already exists and emerging studies on the issue, and the gaps this project intends to fill. These core concepts and their supporting literature are essential to understanding the methodology of this project and why it was designed as a comparative case study.

In this chapter I first outline the theoretical framework upon which this project is built. This framework guides the approach this project took to the research. I then take a reflective look at my research strategy. It was impacted in significant ways by the process of the research and the challenges of finding gender data. Next, I outline the case study method, its design, and its evaluation processes. These are the foundation for my research design and methods. Finally, I review the process I went through to choose the case studies and the criteria upon which I based my selections. Therefore, this chapter establishes the methodology of this

project in a reflective manner, examining how the challenges of the research shaped its approach and led to generation of knowledge.

2. Theoretical Framework

As a base theoretical framework, I draw upon feminist theory (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). This project is grounded in Feminist Security Theory (FST), which has been developed as part of the feminist critiques of the security studies field. FST has multiple components; however, there are two main areas which are key to the theoretical framework of this project. These two areas are linked closely with the two main research questions of this project.

First, I set out to examine the ways in which gender has been excluded from CT policy due to the state security framework within which it is implemented. FST emphasizes the importance of a feminist approach to human security, so that human security principles consider gendered perspectives of individual security. The critical approaches to terrorism studies have used alternative perspectives to examine the impact and effectiveness of current CT policy. However, they have not yet conducted this critique from a human security perspective. Therefore, this project will fill that gap by using FST to add to the body of work critiquing CT policy. CT policy has historically been implemented under a state security framework, due to its creation under realist IR theory. This sets the primary goals of CT policy as immediate state security needs and focuses on collective security. However, countering violent extremism (CVE) programming has been developed as a preventative pillar of many CT strategies and its focus on the individual radicalization process reorients the policy towards human security goals, which conflict with the state security framework it is being held accountable to. This project, therefore, emphasizes the need for a change in the

security framework to human security, in support of emancipatory norms. Only this shift in expectations would allow CVE programming to fulfil its set definition and space for meaningful inclusion of gender equality as a goal. I use FST to underpin this position and identify where the lack of meaningful gender mainstreaming has led to gaps in CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation.

Second, I use FST to highlight the ways in which misunderstanding of the complexity of gender has impacted gender mainstreaming negatively. Another main component of FST focuses on the complex and multidimensional nature of gender, which needs to be recognized in security studies. I use this theoretical approach to underpin my argument about the lack of understanding of gender in CT policy and CVE programming. This second research question links back to the first as well. The misunderstanding of the complexity of gender is, at least partially, due to the interpretation of women in traditional, realist IR theory. Due to the gender-blind nature of most CT research, I borrow strands of gender analysis from feminist IR theory to illustrate some of the diverse ways in which gender impacts security, VE, and CVE programming. I then use this analysis in Chapter 4 to show how misunderstanding of gender has led to gaps in CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation.

Therefore, FST is the theoretical base upon which I make my contributions to the field of critical terrorism studies. I use it to conduct my evaluation of gender mainstreaming in CT policy, and to adapt my research process in order to identify new aspects of a gender lens in security and CT policy.

3. Research Strategy

As indicated previously this project underwent some significant research strategy changes from my initial approach to the final way in which I sought to generate knowledge. However, I find that reflecting on this shift is important, to show how my perspective was challenged by lack of data. This difficulty led to me ask the more useful questions about 'where is the data', which in turn enabled the knowledge generation. I began my research process with a more positivist hypothesis testing strategy, solely based on my invalid assumption that there would be gender data available to test my hypothesis. My hypothesis was that there is a gender gap in CT policy and that it leads to failures. I wanted to test whether gender mainstreaming improves successfulness of CT policy. Specifically, I sought to address those policies known as CVE, due to their definitional commitment to human security principles. CVE is the preventative pillar of many CT policies and it attempts to address the root drivers of extremism to prevent individuals from becoming radicalized (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). I argue that for this method to be successful, gender inequality needs to on the list of societal level drivers addressed by a holistic CT strategy.

Unfortunately, I ran into what Harding (2016) describes as the paradox of gender-blind research. She is a scientist who ran into the issue of not being able to find any gender data. She hypothesized that, due to the gender-blind nature of much scientific research, gender data is not generated. However, without the gender data, it is very difficult to make a case for why more gender-sensitive research needs to be completed. Therefore, scientific research needs more feminist researchers and feminist perspective in order to highlight where more gender data is needed. Her observation, about the nature of research, is important to my thesis because I ran into this paradox when trying to prove my hypothesis. CT research has mostly been

conducted from a gender-blind perspective. Therefore, no gender data has been gathered. This makes it impossible to prove empirically the importance of gender equality to successfulness of CT policy. Without evidence, governments do not want to commit the resources to doing the required gender-sensitive research to gather the data, which could be used to prove the importance of gender equality to CVE.

I was ultimately unable to find enough gender data to test my hypothesis. However, this led to me to ask "where is the gender data" in CT policy research. This process forced me to switch from the more positivist hypothesis testing approach to a more interpretivist examination of research questions, in order to generate new knowledge where there was before no data (Ackerly and True, 2020). This switch in approach encouraged me to refocus my research strategy on two main research questions. While it is unfortunate that I met with these limitations, as discussed further in Section 4, it did lead me to generate new knowledge looking at aspects of gender analysis. The interpretivist approach opened up my examination of how cultural interpretation of gender, as constructed societal roles assigned to people according to their biological sex, impacts the ways in which gender mainstreaming is applied to CT policy and CVE programming. The interpretivist perspective on cultural gender definition can complement the realist perspective on biological sex and challenge it, with its examination of how human practices of patriarchy, insecurity and violence cannot be understood without the wider 'web of meaning' (Neufeld, 1993).

This approach allows me to focus on the culturally constructed meaning of gender and how it impacts understanding of CVE as well as its design, implementation, and evaluation. It opens up the space for a feminist constructivist approach to examining gender mainstreaming, as the constructivist perspective is in the family of interpretivist approaches (Bevir and Rhodes,

2006). While feminism began in the 70s and 80s with a positivist focus, it has expanded now to encompass a wide range of ontological and epistemological positions (Wise and Stanley, 2002; Bryman, 2016). I am taking the position of feminist constructivism, acknowledging that my analysis is affected by my personal viewpoint (Zehfuss, 2002; Wendt, 1995; Onuf, 2001). My own self-understanding of insecurity and inequality shape my response to them in this project (Moore, 2006). I base my analysis upon what I argue are socially constructed gender roles and how they impact understanding of women's role in security.

I do this through a case study design. As Farrands (2010) explains, the case study design allows for in-depth exploration, which encourages generation of new knowledge and a deeper understanding of the big picture. Even if it does not allow for broad generalizations, constructivist perspective in case study design can be rigorous and logical (Farrands, 2010). The methodological approach to interpretivist work is often qualitative, as qualitative methods of data gathering usually allow for that in-depth examination of the topic, such as interviews or observations or text examination. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2011) highlight how the two hallmarks of research design are rigor and testability. These concepts may look different with interpretivist research, although are not less valid due to the difference. Interpretivist research does not usually set out to test key concepts, as was my original intent with the hypothesis testing model. Rather, it develops a and understanding of how concepts are understood through the data gathering process, and for testability of this process the researcher needs to be reflective and check their own assumptions (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011).

I bridge the positivist beginning and interpretivist ending of my perspective with a critical realist approach to comparative qualitative analysis of three case studies (Flick, 2014). The Critical Realist approach is a philosophical perspective that distinguishes between the "real"

part of the world that exists independent from perception (for the purposes of this project, biological sex) and the "observable" part of the world which is based upon human interpretation and construction of perspective and cultural experience (culturally defined gender roles, assigned based on biological sex) (Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994; Archer *et al.,* 2013; Tony Lawson *et al.,* 1998). This philosophical perspective is conducive to the comparative case study format, especially for applied policy-based research. "Experimental methods can never tell us 'what works' in complex systems" (Byrne, Olsen and Duggan,2009, p. 511). I am completing an applied research project which aims to address the gender gap in CT policy. The objective of this research is to show how the lack of attention to gender equality in CT programs has contributed to shortcomings in program design, implementation, and evaluation. Also, to show how gender can be used as a criterion of measurement for a field lacking in efficacious means of evaluation.

I use the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) case study research design developed by Ragin (2014) with three CVE programs, which all approach gender from a different perspective. The in-depth, interpretive examination of a case allows for what Geertz (1973) calls 'thick description' to be developed, in this case about the importance of meaningful gender mainstreaming to long-term CT policy (see Chapter 8, Section 7 for further discussion). The QCA design suggests then that comparison of these 'thick descriptions' can allow policy makers and practitioners "to transfer understanding of complex social processes in context from one locale of social action to another" (Byrne, Olsen and Duggan,2009, p. 511). The interpretivist approach is used, due to the challenges of social context in data generation and understanding. My research is conducted in a rigorous fashion with systematic elements and

supports an argument with "generalizable" aspects to wider CVE and CT efforts, rather than just description of my chosen cases (Mason, 2006).

Therefore, I make a significant contribution to terrorism and security studies by using FST to contribute to knowledge of gender mainstreaming in CT policy. Gender has been studied in IR, security, and terrorism studies. However, little attention has been paid thus far to the need for gender equality in CT policy. This project contributes the first comparative review of gender mainstreaming in CVE programming. I use my review to highlight why the gender data is not currently present and how the lack of meaningful gender mainstreaming contributes to gaps in CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation.

4. Limitations of Project

There were some difficulties and limitations to the scope of this project. Due to the sensitive, securitized nature of CVE programming it was often impossible to gain access to information on ongoing CVE programs. The notable exception is the level of access I was granted, through a key expert interview, to my primary case study. In some cases, I was able to talk to practitioners who were working on ongoing projects, but I was limited in how I could include the data because of the need to protect their identities (Ackerly and True, 2008; Hesse-Biber, 2013). Due to the need for content analysis of documentation, I was limited to using CVE programs which were already completed and had published documentation on their program design, implementation, and evaluation practices.

There was also a limitation of scope for the project due to the nature of transnational CVE programs being mostly implemented by Western governments. Because of the large footprint

of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) in CVE, it is their programming which has had significant influence on the development of "best practices" for CVE program design and evaluation. This narrowed the scope of my choices for case studies (see Appendix I for full list of potential cases). The challenges of finding gender data also impacted the entire process of this project. Due to the reasons described above there is just not enough gender data being gathered. Lack of gender data meant that I could not in the end test my hypothesis. However, the process of searching for the data raised some important questions about why there was a lack of gender data and its negative impact on CT policy.

5. Research Design and Methods

For my project I chose a comparative case study design. However, due to the shift in my research strategy from a more positivist hypothesis testing approach to an interpretivist knowledge generating examination of research questions, much of my original case study approached was designed in a more positivist fashion (Thomas, 2016; Gerring, 2016; Gerring, 2007). It was later adjusted to a critical realist approach to QCA which allowed for interpretivist knowledge generation (Ragin, 2014). I determined that the QCA approach was the most suitable framework from which to address the project's main research questions (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011; Grix, 2010). Case studies, as an evaluative method, are an excellent way to examine situations which are too complex for a survey or experiment. They are also able to explain the presumed causal links in real-world interventions (Blaikie, 2007; Blaikie, 2000).

I focus on the explanatory usage of a case study, to show the relationship between exclusion of gender equality and gaps in CT programs. According to Simons (2009, p. 21), a "[c]ase

study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a "real life" context". I employ a multiple case design to be able to draw a single set of "cross-case" conclusions, which is sometimes referred to as a comparative case method (Dion, 1998). The replication logic used in a multiple experiment design is very similar to what is needed in a multiple case design (Hersen and Barlow, 1976). It is not about meeting a correct sample size but instead that "[e]ach case must be carefully selected so that it either (a) predicts similar results (a *literal replication*) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a *theoretical replication*)" (Yin, 2014, p. 57).

According to Thomas (2017), "[t]he case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of phenomena that provides an analytical frame – an object – within which the study is conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates." For my research I am examining how and why there is a gender gap in CT programs, and how it causes failures. I am also looking at how effective gender mainstreaming can improve design and evaluation methods for CT programs. Gender will be the structure from within which I complete my analysis. For each of my case studies the subject will be a particular CVE program. The policy is the lens through which I view my object, gender equality in CT policy. The subject enables me to go into analytical depth on the object, the issue of gender equality in CT policy. For my multiple case design, I choose two cases with literal replications. These two show the value of two different representations of the inclusion of gender in CT policy. I then contrast them with another case where gender was not accounted for, creating a theoretical replication. The advantage of this design is that having multiple cases to support

my hypotheses is more substantial than a single case, and consequently more compelling (Herriott and Firestone, 1983).

In order to successfully carry out this comparison case study I implement a rigorous research design (Thomas, 2013). This is the "blueprint" for my research. It allows me to connect the empirical data, which I collect from the policy documents, to my research questions. I do this by answering: what questions to study, what data is relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyze the results (Philliber, Schwab and Samsloss, 1980). Yin (2014) divides the design into 5 elements:

1. A case study's questions;
2. Its propositions, if any;
3. Its unit(s) of analysis;
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions; and
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings.

Using Yin's recommended framework for the design, I will breakdown these five elements as the "blueprint" for my research. My two main questions are:

- How does the security framework which CVE programming is being held accountable to affect its gendered perspective?
- How does understanding of the definition of gender affect its inclusion in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation?

While the questions capture the topics I want to address, my propositions are:

- That gender equality is a necessary component of successful long-term CT policy.
- That effective gender mainstreaming can contribute to improvement of guidelines for CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

These propositions help to move the research forward.

According to Yin (2014), the third component is about choosing the correct subjects or defining the cases which are to be studied. It is also about bounding the cases or setting parameters within the cases, so that you do not end up gathering data which is not relevant to the question. Using programs as case studies can be difficult in a couple of ways: examination may reveal variations in program definition, depending on the actor perspective, or components of the program which preexisted its formal designation (Ragin and Becker, 1992; Yin, 2014). For my research I choose three CVE programs which should accommodate a gender equality component. I then clearly define how the various portions of the policy are directly connected to the issue of gender. Trying to look at the all the possible components of a successful CT program would provide an excess of information. The distinction needs to be made between data about my subject versus data external to the case, or the "context" of the case. I include a more in-depth description of my case study selection process in Section 8.

Yin's (2014) fourth component is focused on trying to predict the form of data analysis I complete, in order to ensure that the correct data is gathered. For my project the primary method of analysis is content analysis. However, I will also be conducting some discourse analysis and cross-case synthesis (Woodside-Jiron, 2011; Fairclough, 2003; Paltridge, 2006). The fifth component involves identifying and addressing alternative explanations for my findings. By addressing and refuting alternatives, I can increase the validity of my interpretation. In the design I try to anticipate as many of these rival arguments as possible.

The first three components of this design are focused on identifying the data which needs to be collected. The second two components are focused on anticipation of how I am going to perform analysis of the data.

On top of these five components, a theoretical design is needed to provide a roadmap for the analytical generalizations throughout. These will be compiled in Chapter 8 with cross-case comparison and synthesis. Including a theoretical element in the design is not always about having to formally address the grand social science theories. Rather, it can be about providing a simple, guiding theoretical statement. The theoretical proposition is "a [hypothetical] story about why acts, events, structure, and thoughts occur" (Sutton and Staw, 1995, p. 378). My initial theoretical statements are:

- My comparative case study shows how most CT programs are lacking meaningful gender mainstreaming.
- My research and analysis show how meaningful gender mainstreaming can improve program design and evaluation in the field of CVE programming, which has thus struggled to find efficacious means of evaluation.

When using a case study to evaluate a program, such as I will be doing, the theory needs to differentiate between the substance of the program (eg. the issue the program is addressing) and the implementation process of the program (eg. how a successful program is installed) (Bickman, 1987). This allows the correct data to be focused on in order to provide substantive recommendations and critiques, separated from the necessary examination of the procedural processes.

As stated previously, the goal of a case study is analytical generalization, which allows the findings of the case study to be applied theoretically to situations beyond just other similar case studies (Befani, 2013; Byrne, 2013). In order for this to be possible, care has to be taken not to treat a case as a "sample" to be used in statistical generalization, but rather as an "opportunity to shed empirical light about some theoretical concepts or principles" (Yin, 2014, p. 40). This is similar to the 'thick description' defined by Geertz , which in a comparative design can allow policy makers and practitioners to apply knowledge gained from one contextual case study to another locale (Byrne, Olsen and Duggan,2009, p. 511).

> Configurational approaches in the form of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987, 2000) are particularly suited to small-N comparisons of cases in which there is a movement through from detailed qualitative interpretation of traditional qualitative material in the form of documents, observational field notes and interview /focus-group transcripts to the specification of components that can be entered into QCA procedures in order to establish multiple causal configurations. In other words, such approaches can offer multiple answers to the question 'what works?' (Byrne, Olsen and Duggan,2009, p. 515).

When looking at complex systems of policy questions and trying to determine 'what works' it can be challenging to focus on 'thick description' of socially specific contexts, which is needed for deeper meaning, rather than reverting back to more positivist search for causation. I intend to use the analysis from this comparative case study to shed light on the theoretical principles around why gender data is not be gathered in the study of CT policy and how the lack of meaningful gender mainstreaming is negatively impacting CVE program design and evaluation, which can then be applied to other cases than the ones that I examine here.

A wide range of methods can be used to gather both quantitative and qualitative data within the case study design (Bryman, 2016). In the interpretivist approach often interviews, observations and document analysis are used to provide an in-depth look at a particular

context (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011). I am primarily using content analysis to interrogate policy documents and generate qualitative data on the design, implementation, and evaluation practices of my CVE case study programs (Greene, 1994; Gorard, 2013). I also use official data on program implementation and measurement. From this data I highlight elements which are identified as pertaining to gender, how they were implemented, and whether they were deemed successful. I predicted that I would be able to show correlation between inclusion of gender equality and success of CT policy from analysis of the data. However, I did meet with challenges, due to the lack of programs which included gender data, which required me to switch from my hypothesis testing method to an interpretivist approach. Although, this adjustment of the research strategy opened some important lines of inquiry for the project to address.

6. Research Quality Evaluation

Historically, there have been four tests common for evaluation of quality in positivist social science research methods: construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability (Kidder and Judd, 1986). It is often a critique of interpretivist research that it lacks rigor (Flyvbjerg, 2010). However, I would argue it is more accurately a difference in the way of looking at what rigor is. Positivists tend to look at rigor as replicability, while interpretivists would suggest that it is more important to examine the larger theories or narratives and whether methods chosen are suitable to find the required data (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006). Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2011) go on to suggest that testability should be about reflexivity, as a researcher examining your own assumptions. The interpretivist approach does not set out to test key concepts, rather to develop an understanding of the concepts through the research being

completed. This allows learning from the research instead of 'front loading' it, as in a hypothesis testing method (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2011).

Instead of the four traditional tests applied to positivist research, Tracy (2010, p. 840) suggests eight criteria by which you can judge the reliability and validity of a qualitative research project:

1) Worthy topic: I find that evaluating gender mainstreaming in CT policy, in order to improve the processes of CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation is very worthy topic – as it is trying encourage security for all and improve a field which has struggled to find efficacious means of monitoring and evaluation.
2) Rich Rigor: I clearly define the key concepts necessary to my research from the outset, in order to have a continuous and rigorous framework. I also clearly define my theoretical framework, acknowledge my own perspective and its impact, and outline a "blueprint" for my research design. All these steps contribute to the academic rigor of my findings.
3) Sincerity: There is transparency and reflexivity regarding the changes that occurred to my research strategy. I learned from the challenges throughout the process to adapt my approach and was clear on the methods that were used and why.
4) Credibility: Multiple sources of information were used, including theoretical literature, intermediate program reports, independent final reports, as well as a key expert interview. This allows for credibility and triangulation of data. Acknowledging my perspective accounts for my place in the analysis, which maintains credibility. Also, I take care to not disregard other factors which might be

influencing this relationship, by acknowledging the challenges of measuring the impact level of these programs.

5) Resonance: The 'thick description' that is generated by these three case studies regarding the importance of meaningful gender mainstreaming is transferrable to the whole field of CVE, even though other programs would be implemented in different contexts.
6) Significant contribution: This is one of the first comprehensive, comparative evaluations that has been conducted on gender mainstreaming in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. It provides a great deal of insight into practical and theoretical considerations for future CVE programming and CT policy.
7) Ethical: The university's ethical approval process was undertaken, to ensure that interviews were conducted ethically. Due to the security concerns of conducting CVE programming in many areas, caution was taken to redact data where necessary to protect identities of practitioners.
8) Meaningful Coherence: I find that the research project achieves what it set out to. Even with the challenges of researching gender in the CT context, after some adjustment, an effective interpretivist approach was taken and QCA method employed to generate new knowledge about meaningful gender mainstreaming and its impact on CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation.

As I am conducting an applied research project looking at the complex systems of CT policy, I not only want to contribute substantively to the academic conversation around gender and security, but I also want to make valid and reliable contributions for the improvement of CT policy (Ragin, 2014; Ragin, 2000; Robson and McCartan, 2015).

7. Case Selection

I began this project with the intended positivist research strategy of gathering the necessary gender data to test my hypothesis – that gender mainstreaming improves successfulness of CT policy. In order to guarantee the rigor of my project I engaged a systematic process in the search for my case studies. The first step of the process was conducting a comprehensive search of preventative CT programs, or those other than conventional, coercive, or military-only responses. These programs were excluded based on their lack of relevance to the desired goal of providing a long-term solution which supports emancipatory norms. According to the justifications given in Chapter 2 regarding the definition and security framework of CT policy, I narrowed down the focus of my case study options to the preventative CVE programs. This is primarily due to their definitional commitment to the principles of human security and their focus on addressing the underlying causes of terrorism. It should be noted that the language of CVE is something predominately existent in the language of Western policy. This is due largely to the events of 11 September 2001 and relates directly to the War on Terror. CVE was developed as a pillar of CT strategies over the last decade to try to address some of the inadequacies of traditional CT policy, by addressing the underlying cases of violent extremism (VE).

Even where CVE is implemented in other locations, it is often done so with the assistance of Western governments or international organizations. Most states participate in worldwide forums related to CT and CVE. However, many do not necessarily execute CVE programs within their own borders, outside of counter-messaging or prison/reform type programs. Taking these limitations into consideration, the full list of programs considered (see Appendix

I) is largely made up of EU and US initiatives, as well as those implemented in coordination with international (e.g. UN) or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It should be noted that I have included several cases which, according to their own verbiage, are dealing more with development issues than CT. This is reflective of the overlap between development and CVE, which will be discussed further in Chapter 4. The principle goals of CVE are often linked more closely to development programming than traditional CT policy.

An inductive process was used to further narrow down the list of options for the case study. The strategic level, of differentiating cases based on their CT goals, does not enable meaningful distinction between them. Therefore, the operational level of criteria is used to narrow down the list of potential cases. Please see the charts below for inclusion and exclusion criteria:

INCLUSION CRITERIA	
CRITERIA	REASONING
Practical Intervention	My practical definition of gender equality in society requires policies which practically interpret gender mainstreaming in CT policies. Therefore, potential cases should exhibit gender mainstreaming practices, and not just discuss gender narratives.
Timeline	The international perception of CT has changed immensely since the September 11th attacks in the US and the beginning of the War on Terror. In order to consider the relevant adaptations to CT policy, which have occurred since that event, I need to look at cases of programs which are current or were conducted in the last 5-10 years.

Longevity	The program must be implemented over a long enough period of time to affect change, either related to gender equality or other human security goals.
Prevention	My project is focused on finding a long-term solution to VE, so the case should be correspondingly focused on addressing drivers of extremism and not responding only to immediate security problems.

EXCLUSION CRITERIA	
CRITERIA	REASONING
Instability	Extreme instability does not allow preventative type CVE programs to be implemented effectively, therefore could skew the results of the programs. This would not allow accurate interpretation of their gender initiatives.
Prison Programs	Prisons do not offer adequate opportunity for gender mainstreaming, as they are most often single-gender environments.
Urban Programs	Urban programs are often specifically focused on police interaction with local communities in reaction to immediate security problems. While these programs can also benefit from gender mainstreaming, they are not a valid source of data for testing gender mainstreaming in long-term, transnational CVE type programming.

After compiling a list of potential cases according to these criteria, I discovered that there were not enough cases available, which included gender mainstreaming, to test my hypothesis (True and Riveros-Morales, 2019). I, therefore, shifted the strategy of my project at this stage to focus on an interpretivist approach to two main research questions. At this juncture I also had

to adjust my case study design to the critical realist QCA approach, in order to bridge the gap between my original positivist hypothesis testing strategy and my final interpretivist approach to generating new knowledge in a nascent field of study. Ragin (1992, pp. 8-11) suggested that there are two ways to understand a case: cases as an empirical unit, which is the more positivist perspective I started from, and cases as a theoretical construct where one is looking at the case as the consequence of theory, which is the position I took on my case selection after I readjusted my research strategy (Rihoux and Lobe,2009). For this process I narrowed the list of cases to those which should have been most likely to include gender mainstreaming, due to the normative commitments of their implementing governments or organizations.

There were still not enough cases which included gender mainstreaming to conduct a three-case literal comparison. Therefore, I utilized a staged comparison format. My primary case study is one that implements CVE programming with a very standard, mostly gender-blind approach. However, the reason it is the primary case study is that it is one of the few that have included an entire component specifically focused on the empowerment of women, which did include a gender-sensitive approach for that one element. It is, therefore, the center of the spectrum for my cases. I then conduct a comparison between this primary case and a secondary case, which implements its programming with a completely gender-blind perspective. The third comparison is between my primary case and another secondary case, which implements its entire program with a gender-sensitive perspective. This three-tiered approach allows for cross-case comparison and synthesis in the discussion chapter, looking at the theoretical construct of three different contextual situations and their application of gender. It is important to note that I narrowed the cases to the same region of the world in order to aid comparison.

However, the 'thick description' is still application to the wider 'what works' question, due to the similarities of transnational CVE programming being implemented worldwide.

My main, central case is the European Commission's (EC) program called Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE HoA). STRIVE programs are implemented on behalf of the EC in multiple regions around the world, but I chose to focus on their program in the HoA region due to its inclusion of a component focused on the empowerment of women. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) are the independent body commissioned by the EC to implement the program. My gender-blind, secondary case study is the US government's (USG) Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) CVE program implemented by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Finally, my gender-sensitive, secondary case study is a program entitled "Engaging Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremist Violence in Kenya", which is implemented by United Nations (UN) Women. These three cases provide me the opportunity to conduct a staged comparison, with which to examine the various impacts of different approaches to gender mainstreaming in CT policy.

8. Conclusion

The research process of this project has not necessarily been a smooth one, but its challenges have presented the opportunity to generate new knowledge by looking at previously unexplored aspects of gender analysis. I use the theoretical framework of FST to substantively contribute to the academic conversation, by adding gender analysis to the ongoing critique of CT policy. I started with a research strategy of hypothesis testing but was forced to adapt due to the lack of gender data available. This process raised the important question of "where is the gender

data" in CT policy. I thus formulated two key research questions. First, I want to examine how the framework of security within which CT policy is implemented impacts its inclusion of gender. Second, I want to examine how misunderstanding of the complexity of gender leads to gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

The overall research design is a comparative case study, in which I apply mostly content analysis to gather qualitative data from documentation on CVE programming. I employ a rigorous approach to my design by clarifying definitions, questions, and key drivers of the research. While the case study selection process was challenging, due to having to determine appropriate inclusion and exclusion criteria, I ultimately chose my cases based on an interpretivist approach of looking where I thought it most likely I would find the gender data. This assumption was based on the normative commitments of the implementing governments or organizations. I was still unable to find enough cases for multiple literal comparisons. Therefore, I settled on a staged comparison design. Ultimately, I chose three case studies to conduct cross-case analysis on a gender-blind, partially gender-blind, and gender-sensitive approach. This allows me to complete important analysis on the impact of gender mainstreaming in CT policy.

The next chapter is devoted to examining and comparing the best practice guidelines, developed primarily by RUSI and USAID, for CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. This establishment of "best practice" gives me a baseline upon which to base my evaluation of the case studies. It also allows me to highlight, with gender analysis, where a lack of gender mainstreaming has led to gaps in these practices.

CHAPTER 4: PROGRAM DESIGN AND EVALUATION

1. Introduction

The first three chapters of this thesis have been devoted to setting up the project. In Chapter 1, I introduce the research project and the process that I go through. I also use this chapter to establish definitions for key concepts which are the building blocks for this project. In the literature review in Chapter 2, I situate the thesis in the literature. I use this chapter to highlight strands of gender analysis, which I borrow from feminist international relations (IR) theory to apply to counter-terrorism (CT) policy. I establish where I sit in the conversations around gender equality and gender mainstreaming. I, then, look at the current debates on security frameworks and gender in CT policy. As I establish in my methodology chapter, I make a significant contribution to the literature by approaching this project with a Feminist Security Theory (FST) framework and applying this gender analysis to the ongoing critiques of CT policy occurring within critical approaches to terrorism studies. There were challenges to my research process, due to the gender-blind nature of most research done on CT policy. I struggled with a lack of data and so reformatted my project to look for where the gender data should be and why it was not present. This approach sets me up for my comparative case study design, in which I highlight were lack of meaningful gender mainstreaming has led to gaps in countering violent extremism (CVE) programming design, implementation, and evaluation.

At this point in the thesis, I am shifting from the focus on introducing and setting up the processes and methodology, to the data collection and analysis portion. This chapter allows me to establish a key baseline of "best practice" for CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation upon which I can base the analysis of my case study chapters.

I focus primarily on comparing and contrasting the guidelines established by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), as they have played significant roles in establishing international guidelines for CVE programming. Although, there are other contributors included at various points, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). In the following case study chapters I will use gender analysis to show how lack of meaningful gender mainstreaming has led to gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation based on the "best practices" established in this chapter.

1.1 Defining CVE

It is important to reaffirm the definition of CVE before beginning this chapter on programming guidelines. In Chapter 1 I gave a general definition of CVE, placing it in the spectrum of CT responses. CVE "has evolved in response to an understanding that while conventional militarized and repressive counter-terrorism strategies may be necessary, they are insufficient in ending terrorism when employed alone" (Chowdhury-Fink, 2015, p. 65). CVE is generally defined as countering terrorism from the pre-radicalization stage all the way through to the de-radicalization process in three steps: addressing structural issues which might make someone more disposed to the radical message, focusing on individuals who are particularly susceptible through intervention and counter-messaging, and attempting to de-radicalize people who have already participated in VE (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016). This general definition varies slightly to the definitions given by governments, for the purposes of the development and evaluation of their CVE programming. I primarily examine programming guides established by both USAID and RUSI, as these two bodies are

implementing two of my case choices and are contributors to international standards. This allows me to highlight the differences between their approaches to program development and how this might affect their agendas, in reference to gender equality. I also offer critiques of their methods and suggest reforms which could be applied to their design and evaluation processes, in order for the CVE programs to redefine security in a way which allows a meaningful integration of gender and produces true human security.

1.2 Defining CVE Programming

Unfortunately, CVE programming does not conform to a standard definition. Therefore, it is important to consider how each organization defines it. USAID handles a large portion of the United States government's (USG) CVE program implementation, in addition to their development assistance goals. USAID defines its CVE strategy as: "Proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence (DoS and USAID, 2016, p. 4). This is slightly different than the approach taken by the European Union (EU). RUSI, which has been one of the primary implementors of the EU's Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) programming in the Global South, give their definition of CVE programming in their Guide to Program Design and Evaluation (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 4):

> Countering violent extremism programmes involve a broad range of non-coercive and preventative activities that are united by the objective of counteracting the key drivers of violent extremism specific to the locations in which the programmes are taking place. Such programmes include activities that target individuals specifically identified as potentially 'at risk' of being drawn to violence to the extent that this is feasible in each location.

While these definitions are very similar in some ways, they do accentuate some different focuses. One of the main differences is RUSI's focus on "at risk" individuals, which is discussed in more depth in Section 2.3.

Both organizations recognize that CVE programming can quite closely overlap with a variety of other government programming, such as risk-reduction or de-radicalization, development, peace-building, and conflict resolution (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016; USAID, 2011a). In order to maintain CVE program integrity, RUSI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, pp. v-vi) suggests a set of guidelines:

- **Adopt robust classification systems for VE drivers:** Here the report is critiquing the method established by USAID for identifying drivers as *push* and *pull* factors, as they find this too simplistic. They recommend three distinguishing categories of drivers: *structural motivators, individual incentives,* and *enabling factors*.

- **Apply the 'results frameworks' and 'theories of change' approaches:** These methods of analysis assist with identifying assumptions that could be made during the development, implementation, or evaluation stages of programming. They also promote critical thinking about program initiatives and potentially problematic aspects of the interventions.

- **Recognize that CVE is *not* rebranded development programming:** RUSI finds that the problem with these programs becoming indistinctive is that you run the risk of not developing the required holistic preventative solution. If CVE programming only addresses the "development" issues, such as the *structural motivators,* it would be leaving out the other drivers which also contribute to people participating in VE.

- **Target 'at risk' individuals:** Here again the report is critiquing the methods of USAID, in that they do not emphasize this element equally in their CVE programming. RUSI finds this element critical, in addition to programming elements targeting the wider community of actual or potential VE supporters where relevant.

- **Mitigate risk without being excessively risk-averse:** Program designers need to be aware of the risks of operating in communities where they might be stigmatizing the people or putting them at more risk from VE organizations in the area, but they also need to balance the risks with potential positive outcomes of intervention.

- **Explore possibilities for experimental and quasi-experimental designs:** RUSI wishes to provide accuracy and legitimacy to its program evaluation through the possible use of randomized control trials (RCTs) and quasi-experimental methods where possible. They seek to "test" a group of "at-risk" individuals, "treating" half of them with program interventions and assessing their changes in behavior against the other half's control group.

In RUSI's guidelines, you can see where it highlights some areas of disagreement with USAID: the classification of drivers, what constitutes drivers, as well as the targeting of "at risk" individuals. I find that part of this disagreement arises from the less strict distinction USAID makes between development aid and CVE, as it is the primary implementor of both sets of USG programs (USAID, 2011a). Ultimately, USAID approaches CVE programming with very similar guidelines to RUSI, but several distinctions are highlighted throughout the following sections. These include how RUSI and USAID differ over what are appropriate amounts of risk (see Section 3.3).

In the following sections, I agree with the first three points of RUSI's established guidelines, but not necessarily with the second three. The first three points are establishing a helpful set of parameters, within which to design CVE programming. I agree with RUSI that two categories of drivers are insufficient to take into account all of the contributing factors and appropriately address them, but I would side with USAID on their wider acceptance of what should be defined as structural drivers (see Section 2.1). Contributing a holistic solution is key to mitigating future extremism and violence, therefore distinction for CVE programming is needed. However, I find that structural motivators play a larger part than RUSI allows, because structural inequality breeds discontentment which leaves open a window for extremist ideals (Brinkman, Attree and Hezir, 2013).

The methods of analysis, through results frameworks and theories of change, are helpful (see Section 3). However, they need to be properly expanded to include gender analysis (see Section 5). I do not find that the focus on targeting "at risk" individuals is effective in a holistic strategy. There are a lot of variables in profiling who would be considered "at risk", and questions about whether this focus is providing a holistic solution (see Section 2.3). Also, I find there are some ethical concerns in randomly selecting "at risk" people for randomized control trials (RCTs). Using RCTs requires control groups and intervention groups to measure success of programming interventions (see Section 4.3). Finally, the "do no harm" principle versus the acceptance of a certain level of risk is another difference in approach between the two agencies. This is something that has wide ranging implications and needs a great deal of consideration (see Section 3.3). These issues are all discussed in more depth in the coming sections.

1.3 Challenges for CVE Programming

While the above six points are the basis for its CVE program design, RUSI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016) insists that there are still further concerns, such as the following, which need to be addressed. Githens-Mazer and Lambert (2010) warn that the "conventional wisdom" of the CT world cannot be heeded in CVE programming because it is plagued by assumptions, and that each individual situation is highly contextual and variable in its drivers of VE. It is the awareness of situational context which hopefully sets CVE programming apart as more successful than just a standard, traditional CT approach. The conventional methods of CT and its evaluation have failed to effectively and efficiently reduce terrorist violence and to take into account the constantly changing nature of the threat of extremism and terrorism (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). This, I argue, is in part due to the lack of effective evaluation methods. It also suggests that more attention needs to be paid to designing the CT or CVE programs to the particular situations they are trying to address, perhaps allowing them to solve the problems which lead to violence before it happens.

Another concern voiced by Heydemann (2014, p. 1) is that:

> Despite its impressive growth, CVE has struggled to establish a clear and compelling definition as a field has evolved into a catch-all category that lacks precision and focus; reflects problematic assumption about the conditions that promote violent extremism; and has not been able to draw clear boundaries that distinguish CVE programs from those of other, well-established fields, such as development and poverty alleviation, governance and democratization, and education.

This was certainly true in the beginning of the use of the term CVE and is still a concern today. However, I do find that there are ways to mitigate some of these concerns. CVE has become a more commonly used term by governments and thus has had to be more clearly defined as a field of practice. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has

established a set of guidelines and terminology to help standardize CVE programming evaluation (OECD, 2012). This is not to say that there are not still issues with CVE programming borrowing terminology and purpose from closely related fields, in order to gain government funding. However, I argue that the more methods of program design and evaluation can be challenged and improved, the more CVE will be recognized as its own distinct field of practice. It has been shown in the study of program design and evaluation that it is ineffective to design outcome evaluation around a program that is still in the process of defining its own goals and services (Jacobs, 2017). "Moves in this direction will require that donor organizations commit themselves to support 'dual purpose' programming: approaches that exploit interventions as opportunities to test causal assumptions, explore the efficacy of tools, clarify and sharpen the boundaries of the field, and refine strategies and practices" (Heydemann, 2014, p. 11).

2. Program Design

2.1 Identifying VE Drivers

Identifying drivers becomes the first task of the program design process.

> A detailed and nuanced understanding of the context, therefore, represents the first step toward the development of adequate policy responses to stem the flow of volunteers into VE organizations, deter community support for those organizations, and/or create an environment that makes it harder on them to operate. (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b, p. 84)

USAID has developed a *push* and *pull* factor system, while RUSI prefers three tiers of distinction. USAID defines *push* factors as "important in creating the conditions that favor the rise or spread in appeal of violent extremism or insurgency', such as: social

marginalization and fragmentation, poor or non-existent government, oppressive government, human rights violations, endemic corruption, elite impunity, and cultural threat perceptions (USAID, 2011a, pp. 3-4). Whereas the *pull* factors are "associated with the personal rewards which membership in a group or movement, and participation in its activities, may confer", such as: access to material incentives, social status, adventure, self-esteem, personal empowerment and a sense of belonging, as well as "the presence of radical institutions or venues, service provision by extremist groups, and extremist involvement in illegal economic activity" (USAID, 2011a, pp. 3-4). In addition to the *push* and *pull* factors, USAID particularly takes note of the power of belief and ideology as drivers in the rise of the Islamist groups of the last few decades (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b).

RUSI finds that because these *push* and *pull* categories are so broad it becomes for easy for interpretation to be inconsistent and drivers to be overlooked. Thus, Khalil and Zeuthen (2016, p. 9) have proposed the use of the following three categories:

- **Structural motivators:** These include repression, corruption, unemployment, inequality, discrimination, a history of hostility between identity groups, external state interventions in the affairs of other nations, and so on.
- **Individual incentives:** These include a sense of purpose (generated through acting in accordance with perceived ideological tenets), adventure, belonging, acceptance, status, material enticements, fear of repercussions by VE entities, expected rewards in the afterlife, and so on.
- **Enabling factors:** These include the presence of radical mentors (including religious leaders and individuals from social networks, among others), access to radical online communities, social networks with VE associations, access to weaponry or other

relevant items, a comparative lack of state presence, an absence of familial support, and so on.

I agree with RUSI that the use of three tiers of distinction provides more clarity for VE drivers than USAID's two tiers. However, I think that even with the presence of three tiers drivers can be overlooked and interpretations can vary. For example: both RUSI and USAID agree that structural drivers are over-emphasized in many regards (because a large percentage of individuals are exposed to the same factors, but only a small percentage become radicalized). Although, in RUSI's interviews with former VE participants, there is often a strong focus on the structural motivators (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 9; Denoeux and Carter, 2009b, p. 8). USAID finds the problem is not only that the traditional structural drivers of unemployment or poverty, for example, get too much of the credit. It is also that the category of "structural drivers" has historically been insufficiently defined and needs to be expanded to include things such as political factors and cultural and ideological issues (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b).

I agree with USAID's assessment and find that the narrow definition of structural motivators is a large part of the reason gender inequality has been generally overlooked by the CVE community. Gender inequality is both a cultural and ideological issue in many societies, which makes it very challenging to address (Okin, 1994). When a driver is not only a practical issue, such as poverty or unemployment, but is part of the cultural history or ideological position of a society it becomes a much more intricate problem to solve. This depth of problems requires that you change the hearts and minds of people rather than just their financial or employment circumstances. As is discussed in further detail in section 5.4, challenging cultural norms can cause resistance to initiatives. However, in leaving these issues unresolved I find that a holistic

solution can never be achieved. Structural inequality is a source of discontent among people, which can lead to acceptance of extremist ideology (Brinkman, Attree and Hezir, 2013).

Just because a society is historically patriarchal or a village religious leader interprets beliefs in a way that approve gender inequality, does not mean that these ideas cannot or should not be challenged. I do not find it unethical to challenge any religious or cultural idea, if it is done in a respectful manner (as argued in Chapter 5, Section). As discussed in the literature review, human security must include everyone (Hudson, 2005). This means that every person, including women, are free to live emancipated lives. Gender inequality not only affects women and their prospects, but also plays into family dynamics, child rearing, and various community relations. Seeking gender equality is simply seeking equal consideration for all people, regardless of gender identity. If this issue is left un-addressed, in the name of prioritizing other security goals, a huge gap is left in producing lasting human security.

A point of agreement between USAID and RUSI on identifying drivers, although RUSI does emphasize it more with their commitment to focus programming on "at risk" individuals, is that the importance of *pull* factors should not be discounted. They agree that human agency has a great deal to do with why some individuals participate in VE and some do not (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b; Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). I agree that individual incentives and enabling factors do play an important role in why some individuals become radicalized and others do not. However, my argument is based on gender inequality, as a structural motivator, putting people in a position of more vulnerability to radicalization. If CVE can stabilize communities through establishment of human security, which includes gender equality goals. Then, I would reason that this would reduce the chance of people becoming "at risk" to begin with. This would then reduce the need for RUSI's core design feature of targeting "at risk" individuals.

USAID (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a, p. ii; USAID, 2011a) suggests six steps to guide program developers through the gathering and ranking of drivers for any CVE project:

- **Step One:** determine the characteristics of the VE phenomenon in the specific setting being analyzed.
- **Step Two:** assess whether prevention or mitigation is the main task and whether recruitment, community support, or an enabling environment that permits VE groups to operate are the most pressing concerns.
- **Step Three**: identify which populations, geographical areas, and/or institutions are particularly vulnerable and why.
- **Step Four:** ascertain those social processes and group dynamics that are critical to facilitating or undermining recruitment and/or community support.
- **Step Five:** determine the key political, socioeconomic and cultural drivers at work and assess their salience after reviewing the analysis in Steps One through Four.
- **Step Six:** prioritize drivers and target locations; determine Development Assistance (DA) and strategic communications interventions.

These six steps provide a good method by which to gather and prioritize the drivers of CVE. This establishes a set of guidelines by which to develop the CVE program components. USAID's steps to gather and rank drivers allows for a somewhat blurred line between CVE language and that of DA. However, RUSI does not find this acceptable, as one of their guidelines to maintaining CVE programming integrity is to recognize that CVE is not re-branded development programming. The basis of RUSI's concern is that by allowing CVE to become blurred with DA only structural drivers will be addressed and a holistic solution will not be found. While the wording of USAID's six steps does seem to indicate more focus on

structural type drivers (e.g.: determine the key political, socioeconomic and cultural drivers at work), I think this could easily be adjusted to clearly include recognition of the fact that are individual incentives and enabling factors which need to be considered as well (e.g.: determine the key political, socioeconomic, cultural, individual and enabling drivers at work). I think that for CVE to avoid problematic assumptions about VE drivers, a wide-ranging assessment needs to be made before, during, and after programming implementation. This is to ensure that programming is positively affecting conditions.

2.2 Issues of Correlation and Causation

One of the points of dissention among CVE practitioners and experts is on where the relationships should begin and end with people who support the ideas of the VE organizations but who do not participate in the violence themselves. Khalil and Zeuthen (2016, p. 11) "argue that a comprehensive understanding of VE requires researchers to treat attitudes and behaviours as two separate, albeit closely interrelated, lines of inquiry." Khalil and Zeuthen have done some work on identity theory (Schwartz, Dunkel and Waterman, 2009). They make the argument to keep interpretations of drivers purposefully group-centric, even with the focus on individual incentives, by including psychosocial motivators. This is something that I agree with. Even though it is ultimately up to the individual to make the decision to participate in VE, all the factors leading up to that choice are interrelated with social factors. Here is where we enter into the difficult world of causation, correlation, and complexity. While there is a correlation between unemployment, for example, and VE, it is very difficult to prove that it causes VE. This is made even more complex by the additional factors that might drive one unemployed youth to VE and not another, or those same drivers having effect on the unemployment itself. RUSI likes to refer to these factors as "confounding

variables" and they have the ability to direct causality, sometimes in more than one direction at once (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016).

> To confuse matters further, it is increasingly recognised that the notion of simple linear relationships between potential causes (such as unemployment) and effects (such as involvement in violence) succumbs to a reality of tipping points, feedback loops, path dependencies and other complexities. In addition, pairs of variables do not interact in isolation, but instead interrelate in equally elaborate manners with a potentially infinite range of additional factors, including many of the other structural drivers, individual incentives and enabling factors listed in the previous section. (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 16)

USAID agrees with this position.

> [I]t is precisely on the exact nature of those indirect connections, and on the particular combinations of variables that produce VE, that a great deal more attention needs to be placed if we are to avoid the reductionist and misleading nature of arguments that draw too direct a line of causation from underlying social and economic conditions on the one hand, to VE on the other. (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b, p. iv)

Causation is a very challenging argument to make with so many intervening factors. Therefore, correlation is the strongest relationship that this project seeks to establish. The case study design outlined in Chapter 3 is well suited to determine causative and correlative relationships.

2.3 Choosing Program Components

The most critical point of emphasis in this step is that: program components should be chosen based upon the VE drivers discovered during the data collection phase. Drivers are contextual, and they will vary by location and situation (Hassan, 2012). RUSI and USAID agree on this point made by Denoeux and Carter (2009a, p. 1):

> Programming must reflect the distinctive features of the specific environment in which a particular VE group or movement operates. To be

> sure, many such movements present similarities in their characteristics and the dynamics that sustain them; they often are influenced by the same regional or global forces as well. Nonetheless, they also are shaped by local grievances and problems, and by idiosyncratic historical legacies and cultural attributes. Programming must reflect that situation and avoid "off-the-shelf" or "cookie-cutter" approaches.

The UNDP also emphasizes the importance of focusing programming on contextually significant drivers (UNDP, 2017). The first task basically becomes to compile a list of the key drivers, in accordance with the categories of drivers presented in Section 2.1. Then the process of identifying possible interventions and program components, which can address the drivers while also adhering to the definition of CVE programming, begins. The validity of the ideas should be challenged with questions of efficiency and effectiveness, to assure that the most possible will be gained from the program (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). While many of these principles are adhered to by both RUSI and USAID, USAID (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a, p. V; USAID, 2011a, p. V) has officially developed 12 core principles to guide program development and shape the decisions made about program components:

- **Rule 1** suggests developing a strategy after an adequate understanding of local conditions and dynamics has been acquired.
- **Rule 2** is to disaggregate the threat and prioritize strategy elements accordingly.
- **Rule 3** requires that one systematically identify and tap into those features of local society that may protect it against VE in developing a strategy.
- **Rule 4** challenges the program designer to think holistically:
    - Design all activities to fit the overarching counter-extremism (CE) strategy.
    - Integrate interventions across sectoral areas.

- Look for complementary and mutually reinforcing impacts
- Coordinate among key stakeholders. (This point is particularly applicable to USAID as they are a government organization and are in direct coordination with the Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense (DoD), etc. and actively coordinate strategies and resources (DoS and USAID, 2016; USAID, 2011a).)

- **Rule 5** recommends that assistance be directed to at-risk groups and communities. It also recommends prioritizing interventions and maintaining a sense of modesty in projecting likely results.
- **Rule 6** argues that it is best to anchor development program implementation in partnerships.
- **Rule 7** reminds practitioners to convey respect for indigenous religious and cultural norms and tradition.
- **Rule 8** ensures that development interventions are designed to produce CE benefits or impacts, and that the CE benefits are significant enough to merit the interventions.
- **Rule 9** emphasizes effective communication and requires that a plan be formulated early and as a core element of the CE development strategy.
- **Rule 10** considers the potential unintended consequences of interventions before making any final decision about programming.
- **Rule 11** balances the advantages of continuity and consistency against the need for flexibility.

- **Rule 12** addresses high VE risk environments by challenging the practitioner to consider the trade-offs that may exist between CE objectives and strategy elements and DA approaches.

The Australian DFAT, which is responsible for CVE programming, has established two further guidelines. I find these are beneficial additions to USAID's 12 rules above. They emphasize the promotion of local ownership –"locally-led projects will be more sustainable, build capacity; be better targeted; and be perceived as more credible than external programs" and also the engagement of host governments –"an appropriate level of engagement will be essential for the viability of an activity" (DFAT, 2016, p. 2). The use of local partners and involvement of host governments should help encourage the acceptance of CVE program initiatives and sustainability of the program's principles.

RUSI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016) maintains that while all programs will vary, some program components can be directed at community-wide drivers or bases of support for VE. However, some program components need to be directed at "at risk" individuals. Khalil and Zeuthen (2016, p. 21) suggest that:

> While males and youths are obvious candidates in most contexts, more precise targeting may also be achieved in specific communities by focusing on individuals from specific ethnic or clan groups, recent religious converts, attendants of specific religious institutions, school drop-outs, unmarried individuals, those involved with crime, those with existing familial links to VE entities, and so on. Of course, this is only applicable if research has adequately demonstrated that such traits are disproportionately associated with VE, rather than basing such efforts on anecdotal evidence that may simply reflect existing prejudices and preconceptions in the societies in question.

Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) argue the benefits of specific targeting of "at risk" individuals as much as possible, instead of communities as a whole. According to their programming

experiences in the Global South, the most effective CVE program components are a combined assortment of preventative and non-coercive measures. These could include: "community debates on sensitive topics, media messaging, interfaith dialogues, training of state governance and security actors, and a variety of initiatives with individuals deemed to be 'at risk' of being drawn to violence, such as vocational training and mentorship programmes" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. V). While this allows the focusing of program objectives, it can also incriminate and stigmatize a certain group for a wider problem. USAID does not take the position of needing to target "at risk" individuals. Instead, they highlight the difficulty and questionable validity of trying to profile and select those who are "at risk" (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b). USAID does however subscribe to the importance of individual drivers and trying to understand why some individuals choose violence and others do not (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b).

I agree with USAID and find that the structural factors affecting the whole community should retain most of the focus. These are the "roots" of the problem, which is later encouraged by additional drivers in certain individuals. Another reason I argue not to put all the programming focus on "at risk" individuals is that I do not think it will lead to a holistic solution. The whole problem of radicalization and VE cannot be addressed by only focusing on one piece of the issue. A community, which tends to have members supporting or participating in VE, is not going to be "fixed" by just removing or rehabilitating the members currently involved in VE. The underlying issues which placed them in a position to be more susceptible to radicalization will remain and could still drive others to VE.

Ultimately, RUSI focuses on two core features of CVE program design. First, CVE programming must respond to drivers carefully assessed in each individual location. Second, it should focus its programming on "at risk" individuals in each location as much as possible

(Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). I find that the second core feature here overrides the first, as they have placed more emphasis on the individual incentives than the structural motivators or enabling factors. This approach disregards their own three tier distinction of drivers. USAID's three core features of developing CVE programming are more attentive to multiple levels of drivers, even though they only use two defining categories. Their three core features are "a solid understanding of the factors that generate and sustain VE; identification of the primary challenge being confronted; and determination of the populations, areas and institutions that appear to be particularly vulnerable to VE" (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a, p. ii). I find USAID's third core feature to be a more practical and effective goal: to identify populations, areas, and institutions rather than to focus on "at risk" individuals. These core features are a good way to guide the design process in establishing CVE program components. In order to minimize communities feeling labeled or targeted by CVE programming, it is in the implementors best interest to develop relationships with community leaders and be clear about the intent of their program (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a; Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). The program components need to not only be carefully assessed and planned, but also carefully executed. This is the only way to bring effective change to communities and reduce the risk of future participation in or support for VE.

3. Data Collection and Analysis

3.1 Challenges of Data Collection

All of these complex factors lead to a great deal of difficulty in finding adequate ways to gather data for program design and analysis. In order to identify drivers for a potential CVE program, data has to be gathered in that location on the relevant drivers and contextual social issues.

Data also has to be gathered throughout program implementation and post-program implementation for evaluation purposes. There are several methods typically used by RUSI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 16) to collect data in these environments, including:

- **Key informant interviews:** Interviewees will vary according to location, but may include implementers of related programmes, government officials, NGO workers, private sector representatives, religious leaders, and so on. Semi-structured research tools are generally preferred, allowing the research team to tailor their lines of inquiry while also covering the themes of key interest.
- **Focus group discussions (FGDs):** FGDs enable key information to emerge through discussion among participants, with the most suitable approach again generally being semi-structured research instruments. FGDs tend to be conducted with selected groups (such as women, youths, religious leaders, and so on) and are often used in preference to one-on-one interviews as they provide respondents with a sense of 'safety in numbers' while being asked about sensitive issues.
- **Quantitative surveys:** Surveys deliver statistically based information on a broad range of topics, such as perceptions of the legitimacy of violence, perceptions of the state, local employment prospects, and so on.[3]
- **Observations:** Under selected circumstances researchers may be able to observe events that drive VE, such as sermons which advocate violence. However, more commonly

[3] RUSI makes note here that proper survey practices [See (Nanes and Lau, 2018)] may vary by location and the particular cultural, logistical, and security-based constraints within each location. Unfortunately, not all practitioners take note of these concerns and how they might affect the validity of the data gathered and conduct the surveys irrespective of the conditions, therefore presenting highly questionable evidence to support a wide range of claims.

this method is of value for monitoring and evaluation purposes, as it is often possible to witness CVE programme components in action, including community debates, livelihood trainings, and so on.

There are four main hurdles RUSI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016) identifies, which may hinder data collection:

1. There are always pressuring agendas and stakeholders affecting research teams, which may lead to the data being skewed to fit certain parameters.
2. It is impossible for research methods to be applied flawlessly, especially in areas where there are cultural and security concerns.
3. The security concerns may limit the access research teams have to certain areas.
4. The cultural constraints might make it difficult for research teams (e.g. with access to certain portions of the population, or discussion of certain taboo topics).

These concerns could all affect the accuracy of the data being gathered to varying degrees. For example, because all people might not be able to contribute data, this limits its scope. Or, some people might be framing data to seem more acceptable to the researchers. This can lead to incorrect assumptions or claims in the pre-, mid-, or post- programming stages. Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) argue that continual evaluation throughout the lifecycle of the program is important, versus just an initial and final collection. This approach helps research teams to understand the constantly evolving nature of the situation. They (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 18) have developed a set of recommendations for the "best practices" in keeping the data collection as pure as possible:

- Adopting a mixed method approach to draw from the strengths of each of the selected techniques.

- ‘Triangulating’ information from various sources (state officials, religious leaders and community members, among others) to the extent possible in order to cross-validate the collected data.
- Focusing research efforts on those individuals who have travelled some way down the radicalisation path, to the extent that this is possible. This is important since information drawn from many other community members often represents little more than hearsay.
- Selecting local research providers with suitable expertise and experience, an understanding of development- and security-related issues, and established ties to local communities.

I find that this is an honest assessment of the concerns over data collection. There are always going to be factors such as researcher bias or contextual and ethical concerns. However, continual data collection and evaluation throughout the cycle of the program is a practical way to assess reliability and validity. This should be done in addition to the four suggestions made above. Data collection and evaluation processes are discussed in more detail in Section 4.

3.2 Results Framework vs. Logical Framework

Once the data has been collected, a method of analysis needs to be applied in order to properly assess and rank drivers and turn them into effective program components. The idea of using a results framework is supported by RUSI, in their programming development guide (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). In order to determine which program components would be the most successful, a number of considerations have to be made. For example, the ability the components have to create the desired impact in an “effective, efficient and sustainable manner” (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 23). Sustainability is particularly emphasized by

USAID as they recognize it as the key to stabilization of areas. "[S]tabilization refers to the process of making a country or territory less likely to descend into, or return to, a state of conflict or instability and contributing to conditions that will advance sustainable development" (USAID, 2011a, p. 8).[4] In order to create a results framework, the program developers must have determined what the program objectives are and developed an expected outcome, by which to judge their success at the outset of their selection process. This technique, of having a results framework, is not employed by all agencies implementing CVE programs (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). However, I find it is an excellent method by which to monitor and evaluate program success against its own established goals. If you first establish your final set of goals, you can then use them to create a framework by which to judge the success of the program components that you design. This allows you to at least be able to effectively evaluate success of the final result against your original established set of goals (whether or not those goals are positively impacting the overall security situation being a much more complicated evaluation to make). USAID has more recently begun to implement the concept of a results framework as part of their program design and evaluation process (DoS and USAID, 2016).

Historically, in the development field, a logical framework has been a more common method of analysis (Special EU Programmes Body, 2007). This type of framework focuses more on establishing a wider, forward-looking set of analysis questions instead of a narrower, retrospective one. Instead of comparing success to the particular program's set of goals, a

[4] USAID notes: "Stabilization is also used in conflict prevention,management, and mitigation, as well as post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction but is distinct from humanitarian assistance. Stabilization does not imply preserving the status quo. Political, social and economic transformation can be unstable, but may lead to more propitious conditions for development" (USAID, 2011a, p. 8).

logical framework is about establishing a set of goals measurable against wider conflict, economic, and social elements (Special EU Programmes Body, 2007). A logical framework for analysis would be beneficial in preparing requests for funding from government bodies, as a more quantitative assessment of impact on the bigger picture could be presented. However, I am not convinced that it is a more effective method for analyzing CVE programming. As is discussed further in Section 4.2, while looking at the wider picture may show how to make programming more sustainable regionally, it does not effectively act as an assessment of program design and implementation. Thus, the logical framework does not necessarily help to make future programming more efficient and effective.

The preparation of both frameworks would provide the most thorough analysis of a particular situation, but it might not always be practical to maintain both focuses. A good way to potentially combine these two frameworks into a manageable system of analysis is a type of evaluation called Action Evaluation. This concept was developed by Ross and Rothman (Ross, 2001) and it suggests that if you first focus on the internal goals (the results framework) then you are more likely to have success in meeting the external impact goals (the logical framework). This suggests that you first need to allow the immediate stakeholders to consider the drivers, develop the program components, and create a framework of expectations for the CVE program. Then you can continually gather data to measure the successfulness of the program against its results framework. Ultimately, you can use this as a baseline to provide an assessment of how these immediate CVE program goals and their successes fit into and benefit the wider CT program in a region.

3.3 Theories of Change

Theories of change (ToCs) "serve simply to articulate the intended pathways from inputs/activities to the desired programme impact, and to identify the key assumptions associated with these pathways" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 26). This is helpful in identifying underlying and possibly previously unrecognized assumptions program developers are making regarding the communities, drivers, their program components, and other factors. ToCs help designers to challenge their own intended pathways to success, in order to improve them where possible. Some valuable lessons on this topic can be taken from closely related fields, such as lessons learned in peace-building program design:

> Too often we are driven in our program choices by our favorite methods– training, dialogue, trauma healing, political negotiation, grassroots mobilization – without considering which of these has the greatest likelihood of leveraging the desired change in the conflict. Program effectiveness is tied to a clear understanding of the ways that change happens in the particular context. (Church and Rogers, 2006, p. 11)

RUSI's ToCs are similar to the 12 rules established by USAID as core principles of program development. These assumptions can be tested through the collection of relevant empirical data. The ToCs might reveal that some assumptions are misguided, and certain elements of the program need to be revised or entire components deleted.

An additional benefit, identified by RUSI, of the ToCs is that they provide a vehicle by which to examine the possible negative impacts of a program intervention. For example (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 27):

- Programme implementing partners, beneficiaries or other stakeholders being threatened or physically targeted as a consequence of their involvement.
- Specific communities being stigmatised if programmes appear to be targeted at these particular groups.

- VE entities being enabled to rally support through highlighting evidence of 'Western meddling' in cases of externally-funded initiatives occurring in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.

The possible negative impacts must be taken into consideration, as interventions are made in communities with human subjects (see Chapter 5 for some empirical examples). RUSI and USAID disagree on what their acceptable program negative impacts are. Many authorities, including Denoeux and Carter (2009a, p. 45), adhere strictly to the "do no harm" principle. However, Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) argue that in order for practitioners to reach their optimal level of achievement they must be willing to take calculated risks, which unfortunately will sometimes result in negative impacts. I find that ethically the "do no harm" principle must be strictly observed, when taking into consideration CVE programming putting anyone (practitioner or participant) in jeopardy of physical harm or death. Therefore, I find that CVE programs in active conflict zones are not an acceptable risk nor an effective means of programming. The level of risk that an active conflict zone presents to CVE programming only produces two results, according to research completed by Farsight (2016, p. 22):

1. It leads practitioners to limit their own effectiveness and efficiency due to a limited capacity to engage. This reduces the practical rationale for conducting the program in the first place. We acknowledge that the political rationale for trying to act is not necessarily reduced.

2. It causes beneficiaries not to participate, or increases the likelihood they will be threatened, injured or killed. This not only reduces the practical rationale for conducting countering violent extremism programme, it also raises ethical questions for designers and implementers.

The ethical line becomes more blurred when discussing program components possibly stigmatizing communities or encouraging a support base for VE entities. These elements are very difficult to gauge and predict. As RUSI states, if an entity is unwilling to accept any calculated risk then very little can be achieved (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). If the objective of the program is to challenge cultural or ideological norms, then the possibility or even probability of some stigmatization or social backlash throughout the process could be considered an acceptable risk. However, the program must be able to minimize personal harm and ultimately produce an environment more committed and able to provide true and lasting human security.

4. Program Evaluation

4.1 Evaluation Challenges

With the rise of attention given to CVE programming, unfortunately has not come an equivalent rise in evaluation of these programs (Chowdhury Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat, 2013). The Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) held an international symposium in March of 2013 from which an *Evaluating CVE Programming* guide (2013) was established as a summary of the lessons learned thus far. It suggests that two levels of factors contribute to the difficulty of evaluating CVE programming. The first level is made up of conceptual factors, such as selecting the content which uniquely identifies CVE programming. Once the programming has been defined as CVE, another set of measurable indicators must be determined. These are used to measure success of the programs identified as CVE. These two factors are very pronounced difficulties, especially in government program evaluation. The competition between agencies and projects for resources and funding often leaves policy

writers purposefully blurring the intentions of the program, in order to cast the widest net for support. USAID admits that they are aware of the limitations of their current evaluation process, and the fact that a viable method of evaluation for CVE programming is still nascent. Thus, they are devoted to developing a new Evaluation Policy (USAID, 2011a).

USAID has noted that they will be selective about what programs to implement, based upon achievement of the greatest impact. They will avoid programs which could have a destabilizing effect, as well as the targeting of certain demographics, sectoral areas, and locations (USAID, 2011a). However, I find that they have not sufficiently linked this selective process to program evaluation data. USAID, in conjunction with the other US government (USG) implementation partners, state that they wish to continue to learn from their efforts and "ensure that future efforts are guided by both qualitative and quantitative monitoring information, evidence of results and effects, and where appropriate, innovation" (DoS and USAID, 2016, p. 12). RUSI recognizes the fact that more attention needs to be paid to evaluation, in order to justify budgeting for programs and determine the best pathways to success (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). However, they have not themselves claimed a great breakthrough in the best method by which to do this. Khalil and Zeuthen (2016, p. 31) say:

> If the intended impact of a specific CVE initiative is understood to be a reduction in violence and a reduction in support for such acts, then straightforward indicators may include: number of incidents of violence in Location A across Time B and percentage of population supporting VE entities in Location A across Time B.

While these may be good indicators of the wider effects of CVE programs or the *impact* level, Khalil and Zeuthen (2016, p. 31) argue that you cannot judge a CVE program only against these things for three reasons:

- Firstly, the limited budgets that are generally available to implementers realistically preclude an ability to drive substantial changes at this elevated level.
- Secondly, specific CVE initiatives typically form single elements of far broader responses to VE, and the above indicators are more applicable to such system-wide efforts than they are to individual projects.
- Finally, crediting changes at the impact level is particularly problematic in light of what is widely referred to as the 'attribution problem'. While a reduction in VE in a given location may be driven by a specific CVE intervention, such a change may also be a consequence of lower levels of violence in neighbouring locations, political accommodations, an economic boost offering increased employment, a decrease in the availability of arms and other equipment, and so on.

These three points are excellent examples of the conceptual difficulties in determining an appropriate set of identifiers by which to judge CVE programming. It must be decided whether the most appropriate evaluation should be made on the macro-/impact or micro-/outcome level. This is similar to the difference between results and logical frameworks for data analysis. There are also operational factors which lead to difficulty in evaluating CVE programs. Seeing as there is already a limited pool of resources and funding available for these programs, the facilitators are often reluctant to devote a large portion of that funding to conducting extensive amounts of evaluation or brining in an independent evaluation body (Chowdhury Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat, 2013). This leaves the quality of the evaluation that is done open to questions on its thoroughness and bias, in a lot of cases. There is also an increasing need, recognized by international bodies and participating governments, for a universalized manual

on terminology and methodology in order to standardize evaluation for this growing field (Chowdhury Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat, 2013).

4.2 Evaluation Techniques

In order to help overcome some of these conceptual and operational barriers to clear and beneficial evaluation, I am suggesting that the first step should be to choose a program evaluation technique. These techniques can be considered as a way to designate focus to the evaluation and clarify the evaluation's goals. Five currently used program evaluation techniques have been identified by Gielen (2017):

1. **Effect evaluation:** This type is devoted to making sure that the program is meeting its stated objectives. This entails research of policy wording and can be addressed through two different approaches: positivist and interpretivist. The positivist approach encompasses quantitative measurement and prioritizes randomized control trials (RCTs). This approach offers a scientific approach to evaluation but can be criticized for omitting social context. The alternative is interpretivist or qualitative evaluation, which encompasses all the context and influencing factors. However, it can be criticized for bias in measurement.

2. **Pragmatic evaluation**: This approach focuses on the utilization of programming and it centers evaluation around the stakeholders. This type of evaluation encourages stakeholders to become involved in not only the evaluation of the program but also its development, so that it can be entirely focused on their specific needs. This is a very common approach to evaluating CVE programming. However, it can be very malleable to the needs of policy makers. It is easy to make this type of evaluation sound positive in every way and gloss over the negative aspects of the programming.

3. **Theory-driven evaluation:** This type of evaluation is devoted to the "policy theory" or the "theory of change" for the program. This can be very useful in identifying the underlying assumptions of the programming and practitioner goals, as well as allowing insight into CVE programming without actually having to evaluate a current program. The downfall is that it lacks any real scientific data, as is based entirely on qualitative insight.

4. **Process evaluation:** This evaluation is primarily of the processes put into place to implement the CVE programming. It is very useful to critique program administration and management, but it does not truly address the CVE intervention itself.

5. **Realist evaluation:** This approach aims to use a combination of evaluation techniques to identify mechanisms and contexts which consistently lead to successful outcomes (Context-Mechanism-Outcome CMO). It is a useful method of blending more than one evaluation process in order to provide a list of the most successful approaches.

I agree with Gielen (2017) that the realist evaluation seems to provide the most complete method of evaluation, as it allows for multiple techniques and angles of examination (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). It is similar to the concept of Action Evaluation (Ross, 2001), because of its blending of outcome and impact level viewpoints. By combing multiple evaluation techniques and not making assumptions about the best mixture of program components, realist evaluation technique takes into consideration the most context possible. It is a downfall of government evaluation that they tend to rank evaluation methods. This approach disregards the importance of context, which is a key element in these types of programs. By applying a mixture of all four evaluation techniques, the most comprehensive understanding of the successes and failures of a CVE program can be reached.

4.3 Evaluation Designs

Once an evaluation technique has been decided upon, then a compatible design for data gathering needs to be determined. RAND has developed a *Program Evaluation Tool Kit for CVE*, which makes some very useful suggestions on five evaluation designs and key issues to consider when choosing designs (see Appendix II for design descriptions) (Helmus *et al.,* 2017). RAND suggests that a CVE program select the most rigorous evaluation design they are capable of handling, while considering the following influencing factors (Helmus *et al.,* 2017, p. 44):

1. The number of program participants,
2. Selection of a control or comparison group,
3. The timing of the evaluation and the intended audience,
4. The data security and protection of human subjects,
5. Team evaluation expertise, and
6. The resources available for the evaluation.

It should also be noted that even the least rigorous of the designs can still "provide you with valuable data on the effectiveness of your program and ways that it can be improved" (Helmus *et al.,* 2017, p. 44).

Various evaluation designs have been employed in the past on USAID projects, but some of them have been critiqued for not following proper scientific methods. For example, USAID employed a retrospective pre-/post- intervention evaluation design on their CVE project in Somalia. However, data on treatment and control groups was only collected post-intervention (USAID, 2013). Kahlil and Zeuthen (2016) critiqued this method, as they felt results could not properly be differentiated between the intervention itself or pre-existing conditions which

might have existed. Another example is USAID's evaluation of their project in Chad, Mali, and Niger. They employed pre-/post- intervention evaluation with a control group, but they conducted testing prior to selecting trial and control groups to assure that populations were similar (USAID, 2011b). Khalil and Zeuthen (2016) felt they failed to use random selection properly and exposed the evaluation process to bias, by testing groups for similarity. The groups were possibly, similarly pre-disposed to the ideas of the project. These questions of validity and bias in the collection of data compound an already difficult process of evaluation. No matter what evaluation design is chosen, care needs to be taken to follow proper scientific methods as much as possible. USAID has committed, in their new Evaluation Policy, to "higher standards of methodological rigor, greater transparency about evaluation findings and, on average, dedicating to external evaluation at least three percent of the program budget managed by an operating unit" (USAID, 2011a, p. 14).

There are many challenges to differentiating, at the impact level, the effects of CVE programming from the multitude of contextual factors, which could also be contributing to results. Therefore, RUSI in particular emphasizes the use of RCTs to verify the outcome level results of specific CVE interventions. This occurs by "treating" an "at risk" group with CVE program components and testing the results against a control group, which does not receive "treatment" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). While I can see the value of this method if the CVE program is only targeting a small group of "at risk" individuals, I remain quite skeptical about the benefits of "at risk" individuals being the main focus of CVE programming. I do not think this approach actually addresses the security problem as a whole. Also, I question the ethics of random selection and only treating a group of "at risk" individuals and leaving another "untreated" for the purposes of scientific inquiry. To offset this ethical concern, often "programs put individuals in the control group on a waiting list and offer the same services to

these individuals after the evaluation is over"; however, "randomizing people to the groups being compared can be challenging" (Helmus *et al.,* 2017, p. 46). When dealing with a very complex issue like participation in VE, I do not find that an experiment like an RCT is able to provide the whole picture of why one person or small "at risk" group chooses violence and others do not. Ultimately, I think that the decision of appropriate evaluation design(s) must be CVE program specific and dependent on a variety of factors.

4.4 Evaluation Criteria

After the evaluation technique has been chosen and appropriate designs have been used to gather data, the final step is to establish specific evaluation criteria by which to build a framework of evaluation questions. RUSI argues that CVE programs should be evaluated at the outcome level and judged against the results framework for their specific CVE intervention, rather than the impact level of the overall security situation (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). RUSI's approach falls into the realist evaluation technique, as they employ theory driven and process evaluation with a focus on effect evaluation. It is important to remember that "success is an arbitrary determination of progress and can be set at any point along the continuum in the desired direction of change" (Church and Rogers, 2006, p. 12). Much of RUSI's experience in implementing CVE programming has been in the Global South, where the VE problem is extensive. Therefore, they have come to realistically expect a reasonable reduction rather than an eradication of the problem (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016).

I agree that the outcome level is a more realistic scale against which to frame the successes or failures of a CVE program. However, I think these outcome level evaluations can be used as a baseline for impact level evaluations, in conjunction with other CT measures or CVE programs in the area. I find that measuring a CVE program against a results framework, which

was established in the beginning of the program development, allows the program implementors a clear set of expectations for the process. They can use these expectations to plan program components, measure progress throughout the duration of the intervention, and clearly evaluate success at the end of the program. This type of clear evaluation will allow for more efficient and cohesive planning of the next phase of CVE programming, or for programs being implemented elsewhere. The further use of this information in an impact level evaluation can be beneficial, if an overview is needed for policymakers or funding applications, etc.

The results framework, which forms the basis of developing evaluation criteria, should focus on effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. RUSI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016) recommends including relevance in the framework. Also, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD, 2012) more recently recognized the importance of coherence. Therefore, these five categories form the basis for evaluation criteria against which programs at the security-development nexus are increasingly assessed. However, it should be noted that they might not all be equally applicable to every situation (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016; OECD, 2012). The five criteria -effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, relevance, coherence- set a standard against which evaluation questions (see Figure 1) can be formed. This process is most effective when completed by the programming team themselves, in cooperation with advisors who specialize in monitoring and evaluation. Ideally, RUSI finds these questions would be developed early on in the design of the programs, so that they can promote critical thinking about the components prior to their initiation (see Appendix III for example RUSI program evaluation categories and questions) (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016).

Another set of categories from which criteria could be derived are the "types of change" which are being sought by CVE programs. "Types of change" are commonly looked at in the peace-building field, which has clarified the distinction between theories and types of change:

> While the TOCs refer to the broad strategies behind different approaches to peacebuilding, almost all peacebuilding programs implicitly target specific changes in people, communities, organizations, institutions, cultures and/or societies. These more-specific changes help in articulating goals and objectives and in developing indicators for monitoring and evaluation. (Church and Rogers, 2006, p. 18)

In the peace-building field, the types of changes they would be looking for would be in relationships, status, behavior, attitude, knowledge, skills, etc. (Church and Rogers, 2006). Examples of specific changes for relationships might be (Church and Rogers, 2006, p. 18):

- From adversaries to partners in problem solving;
- From suspicion to solidarity;
- From different ethnicities to a common nationality;
- Former neighbors reconciled.

These categories could easily be adapted to fit within the CVE conceptual framework. The "types of change" could then be used to form another set of criteria, by which to evaluate the success of programming. Defining evaluation criteria allows for a specific set of evaluation questions to be determined, in order to direct data collection and analysis. It also allows conclusions to be reached on whether the program was successful in reaching its goals. The steps given above, ending with the defining of evaluation criteria and a framework of evaluation questions, is a good method by which to form an efficient and effective CVE program evaluation policy.

5. Gender in Program Design and Evaluation

5.1 Defining Gender's Role

This project did not set out to only to look at CVE programming design and evaluation policies and suggest ways by which to improve them. It was also important to include the key element of gender, which has thus far been largely disregarded by the CVE field of practice. As was noted in the literature review, UNSCR 1325 (2000) first recognized the need for women to play a key role in the security and peace processes. UNSCR 1325 (2000):

- reaffirms the role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building;
- stresses the importance of equal participation in all efforts to promote peace and security;
- reaffirms the need to increase women's role in decision making in conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and,
- points to the need to implement international humanitarian and human rights law to protect the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts (Article 1).

Unfortunately, this international recognition of the need for gender equality in the CVE process has not yet been consistently and effectively translated into CVE programming policies. Four main concerns, regarding the roles of women, can be identified in the current conversation on VE (Jonge Oudraat, 2016, pp. 18-19):

- First, the debates about the roles of women and violent extremism are not connected to broader analyses about the relationship between gender and security. How, and to what extent, are gender roles and gender inequality driving violent extremism? We have an

increasing body of knowledge that shows strong correlation between gender inequality and the status of women and violent conflict.

- Second, many policy discussions and programs on the role of women and their roles in countering violent extremism do not listen to the voices of women on the ground and are based on misguided notions of the power of women in many societies.
- Third, the larger Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda—that is the agenda of gender equality and women's empowerment as embodied in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and its follow-on resolutions—must not become subordinate to the counter-terrorism agenda. In other words, gender equality and women's empowerment should not be reduced to a counter-terrorism policy, but should be pursued in its own right and according to national and international commitments.
- Fourth, international actors are not putting money where their mouth is. The amount of money spent on programming furthering the WPS agenda is very limited.

I agree with the challenges that these four concerns are highlighting and discuss them in greater detail in the following sections. Since the initial WPS focused UNSCR in 2000, many other international actors, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the GCTF, have also reiterated the UNs position (Jonge Oudraat, 2016; Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016). Unfortunately, this has not amounted to a significant change in the way that governments are discussing the issues around the role of gender in CVE. The UN Security Council itself recently reaffirmed its conviction on the importance of women's participation in designing national CVE strategies with UNSCR 2242 (2015c). However, the agreements made on the international level have not filtered down to the practical implementation of gender-based CVE programming.

> High rhetoric in the UN Security Council regarding the importance of women's organizations (as in Resolution 2242) is inadequate if unmatched by resources, security guarantees and political actions to ensure their active presence in decision-making forums. Failure to do so signals that the commitment to women's organizations is easily overtaken by geo-politics and short-term state interests, thus erasing any semblance of assurance women have against backlash for their activism. (Anderlini, 2016, p. 17)

In order to effectively mainstream gender in CVE programming I find there are three steps that must be taken:

- Establish the relevance of gender in CVE programming design and evaluation
- Define a process by which to identify and eliminate gendered inequalities in current CVE programming design and evaluation
- Provide a pathway to successful implementation of gender-based programming

Because of my focus on EU and US government policies, I want to specifically examine their understandings of and approaches to gender in CVE programming. I will use these to highlight the differences from my own.

5.2 Establishing the Relevance of Gender

RUSI's position on the relevance of gender to CVE is a skeptical one. I find that this is due to their instrumental understanding of gender, as well as to their assumption that gender equals women (Zeuthen, 2018). As I discuss in Chapter 5, this narrow understanding of gender severely underestimates the impact it has on security concerns, as well as on the programming trying to counter those concerns. Khalil and Zeuthan (2016, p. 29) feel that the CVE community needs to have further discussions about the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of CVE program components which include gender-based criteria:

> For instance, there are common calls for gender-based programming as a component of CVE, with the underpinning arguments including: (a) that mothers may have elevated influence over 'at risk' children; (b) that women may be more attuned to notice behavioural changes among other family members; and (c) that women are, of course, also involved directly in violence. However, little or no empirical evidence exists to demonstrate that gender-based activities actually contribute to CVE objectives in an effective and efficient manner in comparison to the feasible alternatives (leaving to one side the other potential positive effects). This is not to suggest that gender-based programming actually is ineffective or inefficient, but rather that it remains necessary to demonstrate that this offers a valuable use of resources.

I find that RUSI's position highlights several different issues surrounding the argument for gender mainstreaming in CVE programming, which need to be unpacked one at a time. First, they find that the underpinning arguments for including gender-based programming in CVE are that: "(a) that mothers may have elevated influence over 'at risk' children; (b) that women may be more attuned to notice behavioural changes among other family members; and (c) that women are, of course, also involved directly in violence" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 29). The first two arguments they use highlight the need for the conclusions of this project, both that the security framework of CVE programming needs to be reconsidered and that the complexity of gender needs to be better understood. Even if mothers have higher levels of influence over their children and may be in tune with the effects that extremist messages are having on their family members, these should not be considered the underpinning reasons that women need to be included in CVE programming (Winterbotham, 2018). There should only be one underpinning argument: that women, as human beings, have an equal right to security and to live emancipated lives. All the rest of the valuable roles, which women might be able to play in CVE programming, are secondary.

As the international political system developed within the cannon of realist perspectives, women are traditionally not considered as citizens or sometimes not considered at all (Steans,

2013). This has unfortunately led to an understanding of security as it applies to men, with no regard for women being approximately half the world's population. In a world increasingly affected by security threats and corresponding CT and CVE programming, a closer look needs to be taken at the effects of these programs on human security. With international recognition of human rights and the importance of human security, must come a recognition that human security includes all humans. This means that everyone get an equal right to live emancipated lives (Booth, 1991; Basu, 2011). Thus, the traditional paradigm of security must be reimagined in order to include all people as equal citizens of the state and equally invested in contributing to security and peace.

RUSI's first two arguments include women only because of their supposed influence over family members, thus only including them in their roles as mothers and caregivers. This is not reflective of gender equality. There are differing approaches to gender equality, with some seeking equity through equal respect for differing roles and some seeking equality through equal access to the same roles. I consider both these approaches equally important in achieving true gender equality. Unfortunately, RUSI's reflections on women's roles upholds neither perspective. The third argument RUSI acknowledges, for including women in the CVE process, is due to their participation in the violence. This is a logical argument, as RUSI has emphasized the importance of listening to the voices of those who have traveled down the path of radicalization when trying to understand and identify drivers (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016; Zeuthen and Sahgal, 2018).

There is a second issue, which needs to be addressed, about RUSI's skeptical position on the inclusion of gender-based programming. It is where they highlight that "little or no empirical evidence exists to demonstrate that gender-based activities actually contribute to CVE

objectives in an effective and efficient manner in comparison to the feasible alternatives (leaving to one side the other potential positive effects)" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 29). This highlights my argument about the paradoxical nature of the problem with gender-blind research, which was introduced by Harding (2016). Very little empirical data exists on the effectiveness and efficiency of gender-based programming, largely because government institutions have been reluctant to implement these components. They do not include gender-based goals in their result frameworks or other evaluation methods. Yet, because there is not enough data to support claims of its impact, they are not willing to devote resources to the implementation of gender mainstreaming in CVE policy. It is a paradox. This critique is discussed in further detail in the RUSI case study (see Chapter 5). The case study is used to highlight how their lack of understanding of the complexity of gender also contributes to the lack of data. Unfortunately, RUSI largely advocated the abandonment of gender-based programming components in favor of more traditional components of CVE programming (RUSI, 2017). However, if no one is willing to implement gender-based program components in order to observe and evaluate their worth, then there will never be empirical evidence by which to determine their effectiveness or efficiency.

The second portion of this statement about "leaving to one side the other potential positive effects" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 29) eludes to an underlying conflict with the overall lack of support for the normative ideal of gender equality. I think that this also stems from the practical narrowing of the definition of CVE to a primary focus on those "at risk" of participating in violence. Ultimately, this highlights the gap between implementation practices and the underpinning governmental definitions of CVE. The EU committed itself, after UNSCR 1325, to the normative ideal of supporting human rights and gender equality.

They formed a council and a developed a checklist to ensure gender mainstreaming and implementation of UNSCR 1325 (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007). However, they are willing to abandon this set of normative ideals due to its confliction with traditional security concepts and outcome expectations for CVE programming. I find this to be an abandonment of their espoused principles and of the positive effects they have agreed that gender equality would bring.

The final portion of RUSI's statement is: "This is not to suggest that gender-based programming actually is ineffective or inefficient, but rather that it remains necessary to demonstrate that this offers a valuable use of resources" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 29). I argue that this is their effort to try to justify their position and show that they are open to changing their practice, if someone else can demonstrate that it would be efficient and effective. Unfortunately, this lack of commitment to ideals, which they claim are essential, leaves a feeling of disconnection and disillusionment for those trying to complete work on the ground. Civil society leaders have agreed:

> It is not enough to merely counter or even to prevent violent extremism, states must articulate and adhere to positive alternative values, policies and strategies. Recommitting to basic universal human rights principles alongside the sustainable development goals (SDGs) and implementing national action plans derived from these would be an important start. Provision of public services, effective inclusion and integration of all sectors and strata of society, and upholding the dignity of individuals are fundamental to achieving peace. (Anderlini, 2016, pp. 50-51)

Practitioners and civil society leaders, who have first-hand experience dealing with CVE programming, emphasize the importance of countries sticking to their normative ideals and the fundamental nature of equality in achieving a true and lasting peace. I return to this

fundamental issue of equality in Section 5.4 and show how it is essential to successful implementation of gender-based programming.

USAID, in conjunction with its implementation partner the DOS, have also issued a statement regarding their position on the implementation of gender-based CVE programming. Their position is less outwardly skeptic than RUSI's. However, whether it leads to more meaningful integration of gender-based CVE programming is debatable. Their commitment is that:

> State and USAID will expand programs that engage women as key stakeholders in preventing and countering violent extremism in their communities. Women's groups and individual women can play a critical role in identifying and addressing drivers of violent extremism in their families, communities, and broader society. State and USAID will ensure that these programs are informed by rigorous analysis of existing gender dynamics in communities and take into account the fact that women's perceptions of violence and security may be different than those of men in the community. (DoS and USAID, 2016, p. 11)

I find several instances of wording in this statement which allow USAID to be very obtuse on the level of commitment it is making to the issue of gender mainstreaming in CVE programming. USAID has said that they "will *expand* programs that engage women as key stakeholders", not that they will afford them equal importance as more traditional CVE program components (DoS and USAID, 2016, p. 11). This wording leaves a lot of room for interpretation and the ability to skirt meaningful mainstreaming of gender in CVE programming. They do support a more equal concept of women's roles, identifying them as effecting their "families, communities, and broader society". Unfortunately, here again the wording used in their statement allows room for interpretation on the importance of this effect, as they say women "*can* play a critical role" not women *do* play a critical role (DoS and USAID, 2016, p. 11). A positive element of USAID's position is their clear commitment to completing gender analysis. While this commitment is not ensuring that the analysis will

translate into gender-based CVE programming, it is at least ensuring the development of a gender analysis method, as is shown in Section 5.3. I think USAID's gender analysis method can be adapted to help define drivers and results frameworks for gender-based programming components.

Ultimately, I find that both implementing organizations and governments have shown a lack of understanding of and commitment to the need for gender-based CVE programming, even though they both supported UNSCR 1325. They have made minimal efforts to acknowledge their respective normative commitments to the ideal of gender equality. However, they have left themselves a significant amount of wiggle room in policy writing, to avoid having to devote their resources to finding a way to meaningfully mainstream gender into CVE program design and evaluation.

5.3 Defining a Process of Analysis

As mentioned above, USAID has established a process by which to identify and describe gender differences in a particular society, as well as the power dynamics and relevance of gender roles (Cozzarelli, 2010). Cozzarelli (2010) prepared tips for conducting this analysis and suggests:

- That it typically involves examining the gender differential of the impact of policies.
- That it may include the collection of gender-sensitive data.
- That it needs to identify the roles and rights associated with gender, as well as disparities.

The establishment of a conceptual gender framework is the core feature of this type of gender analysis and a requirement to turn it into a tool for identifying gender discrepancies, which

need to be addressed by CVE programming. The data needs to identify the disparities in the roles and rights of women, so that analysis can examine whether these disparities impact the security situation of a certain area. The establishment of some core questions, to guide the gathering of data, is an important step in making sure the data will contribute to the gender framework. It is also key to establishing a results framework, by which to conduct evaluation of the gender-based programming objectives. These questions might fall under two major categories:

- First: How do the different roles occupied by women and the status given these roles (eg. in the community, workplace, home, political sphere, etc) affect the work to be undertaken by the CVE programing? This category addresses the disparities of roles, which might impede success of the programming components. Asking these questions allows design adjustments to be made in the CVE program to address these issues before and throughout program implementation.
- Second: How do anticipated results of the project affect women and men differently? This category of questions would allow you to consider gender in your ToCs, so that program design can be adjusted to ensure equal and sustainable project impact for everyone.

Under these two main questions a series of domains can be determined to guide specific policy questions which need to be addressed. USAID has suggested the *6 Domains of Gender Analysis*. These include: Access; Knowledge, Beliefs, and Perception; Practices and Participation; Time and Space; Legal Rights and Status; and, Power and Decision Making (see Appendix IV for domain descriptions and corresponding questions) (Cozzarelli, 2010, pp. 5-10). The domains and questions were provided as examples of what could be used in

designing an entrepreneurship program. However, they could easily be adapted to the types of questions which would cover a CVE program.

Overall, this gender analysis process could inform the steps of CVE program design and evaluation to produce effective and efficient gender-based programming. First, the gathering of gender specific data and understanding of gender roles in a certain society would allow for the identification of drivers. Second, the establishment of domains and corresponding questions would be beneficial in establishing a results framework and examining ToCs. Third, the three tips provided by Cozzarelli (2010), formatted into the CVE perspective, provide a good base by which to choose gender-based program components. All of this combined allows for a successful design process and development of evaluation criteria which would satisfy the expectations established in Section 4.4.

5.4 Providing a Pathway to Successful Implementation

The final demand of mainstreaming gender in CVE programming is overcoming the issue of implementation. RUSI found the resistance to their gender-based components spearheaded by the traditional cultural leaders of the society in which they were working (RUSI, 2017; Zeuthen, 2018). Those community leaders are used to being free to perpetuate the patriarchal ideals which keep them in power. Therefore, they concluded that intervention on issues of gender a form of Western imperialism (RUSI, 2017). As stated previously, RUSI decided to abandon the gender-based agenda in order to keep the favor of the village elders in allowing the implementation of more traditional CVE program components (RUSI, 2017). USAID have also struggled with their implementation of gender-based programming. This has caused them to question the goals and methods currently in use:

> A gender rights program implemented from a human rights or Western secular humanist perspective (with a focus on equality) in a society that has largely accepted Wahhabi/Salafi views or clings to traditional mores might backfire, discrediting the US (and perhaps the national government) and certainly not demonstrating respect for local cultural norms or interpretations of Islam. Implementing such a program within the frame of rights granted to women within Islam might change the activities and how they are implemented and articulated but could also generate more support, less hostility and greater impact. (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a, p. 38)

USAID is thus questioning the benefit of pursuing the gender-based program components, because it potentially requires influencing conservative cultures to accept liberal normative ideals of human rights and gender equality. They suggest that perhaps the method of implementation needs to be adapted to more closely align with the traditional views of a certain society. A good example of this can be seen with the rise of Islamic feminism, which allows ideas of gender equality to be introduced within existing cultural or religious frameworks and trust to be established (Mahmood, 2009; Mahmood, 2012; Coleman, 2010; Ahmed, 1992). I agree that for gender-based programs to be accepted in conservative societies they need to be implemented in a way that is respectful of the local culture and ideology (Fay, 1996; Mernissi, 2003; Ahmed, 2011; Abu-Lughod, 2010). However, I do not think that CVE programming can abandon the gender-based components due to resistance. If they are abandoning these components, then it reinforces the notion that human rights are something that can be bargained away in preference for other CVE components or traded-in for less resistance to CVE generally. Equality is a basic human right that most countries have agreed to, and no cultural or religious tradition should be allowed to override that (Donnelly, 1984). It is invalid to state that equality is a form of "Western" imperialism because most countries have agreed to the core legal principles of international human rights through the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, the discourse of law is not static and the concept of rights change through stages of cultural interpretation (Donnelly, 2013). I argue that violence and conflict will only continue,

until a way can be found to make principles of equality universal. Jonge Oudraat (2016, p. 21) emphasizes that, even though very little research has been conducted in this area, surveys of women conducted by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and Women Without Borders show that women practitioners of CVE programming underscore how gender inequality and a lack of socio-economic and political empowerment for women are "major enablers for violent extremism" and "a major obstacle to preventative efforts".

In order to overcome the initial resistance to or failure of gender-based program components, some further analysis can take place to re-evaluate ToCs and redesign program components to be more successful. This type of adjustment could be made by returning to the conceptual framework and challenging the data already gathered from the elements of the poorly received components. This process may alert implementors to previously unconsidered social, religious, or cultural dynamics, about which they need to gain further understanding, before devising a method of program intervention which could be successful. "Local perspectives and experiences are crucial in improving national and international responses to end radicalization and bring sustainable peace" (Anderlini, 2016, p. 51). While people may interpret equality differently, everyone has grievances and desires which can be assessed and molded into agreeable methods of implementation. Finding a practical pathway to successful implementation of gendered programming components can be a very difficult task and is discussed further in the following chapters.

6. Conclusion

I have shown, through this comparison of RUSI and USAID guidelines, that there are gaps and inconsistencies in CVE practice. These gaps make it very difficult to determine the most

effective approaches to CVE. By comparing and contrasting their methods, the best of each can be extracted and combined into a "best practice" set of guidelines. One of the main issues I identified throughout this chapter was the disassociation between how governments define CVE and how CVE is interpreted during the design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE program components. This is a gap in which the normative commitment to gender equality and the practical considerations of designing and evaluating gendered programming components generally become dislocated. Ultimately, this makes it impossible to gather enough data to test conclusions about the importance of gender mainstreaming to meaningful solutions to VE.

Another gap, which directly impacts ability to conduct a gendered analysis, occurs during the process of determining drivers of violence. In the guidelines there are multiple categories of drivers identified. However, due to budget, time, and other constraints, program component design is often narrowed to address only a small portion of the indicated drivers. Therefore, the larger structural issues, like inequality, often get put aside for more easily achievable and measurable goals. This not only impacts program design, but also evaluation. Evaluation has been an ongoing concern for CT and CVE, as effective means of evaluation have been elusive. By combining the approaches of RUSI, USAID, and others, I think this chapter sets out some very effective evaluative frameworks. However, these frameworks must still be infused with a thorough understanding of the complexity of the issues they are trying to assess. Gender cannot be meaningfully implemented in CT or CVE policy without a deeper understanding of the multitude of ways in which it is a part of security, violence, and the solution to VE. Examples of this are examined in greater depth, using the strands of gender

analysis introduced in Chapter 2, through the CVE program case studies in the following three chapters.

This chapter has established the key components of CVE program design and evaluation, through comparison of two of the primary sets of guidelines available. This, therefore, sets the groundwork for a "best practice" set of guidelines, by which to evaluate the following CVE program case studies. It has also highlighted some of the gaps, which are due the lack of commitment to meaningful gender mainstreaming. The gaps link back to both main research questions. The definitional gaps are largely due to expectations placed on CVE programming to fulfill state security goals, as well as due to the lack of understanding around the complexity of gender. The program design and evaluation gaps are often related to the lack of gender data available, by which to prove the importance of gender mainstreaming. These challenges will be examined in more depth in the following three chapters. These chapters are devoted to three CVE case studies, which have each been implemented with different gender perspectives. The next chapter is my primary case study. It is an EU program that was implemented by RUSI, whose guidance has been integral to the establishment of these "best practices. I will, therefore, use much of their own guidance by which to evaluate their program. This will allow me to highlight, using gender analysis, where challenges around understanding of security and gender have led to gaps.

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY – STRIVE HOA

1. Introduction

This chapter contains the primary case study for this project. In order to get to this point, I started the thesis by defining key concepts and outlining the research process. Then I based it in the literature and highlighted where it is making contributions to the academic conversation, by applying Feminist Security Theory (FST) to critique of counter-terrorism (CT) policy occurring in terrorism studies. In the methodology chapter, I set up the case study design and discussed the challenges of conducting gendered research, due to the lack of available gender data. The last chapter marked the shift in the thesis from the setup chapters to the data gathering portion of the thesis. Chapter 4 is important to the case studies because I use it to compile the main approaches to countering violent extremism (CVE) program design and evaluation into a set of "best practice" guidelines, by which I can measure the case studies. I now use the case studies as the analytical frame, through which I highlight the need for meaningful gender mainstreaming. I illustrate examples of where its absence or misunderstanding of its impact has led to gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

I use the various strands of gender analysis, which I introduced in the literature review, to gather data from this case and to critique its approach to CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation. This case study is very representative, as it is a good example of the most common approach to gender mainstreaming. Therefore, my analysis is generalizable. I also use feminist theory to recommend ways in which gender could be better incorporated, in order to improve CVE programming going forward. This is my primary case study, partially due to it being a representative example of the common approach to

implementing gender, and partially due to the significant amount of access I was granted to data on its design, implementation, and evaluation practices.

1.1 Case Study Overview

I chose the European Commission (EC) program called Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE HoA) as my primary case study example of how gender is being mainstreamed into CT policies. This program is a typical example of a CVE program. CVE programming is mostly implemented by Western governments, which are following similar sets of guidelines reviewed by international CT-focused bodies. STRIVE is a subset of the larger European Union (EU) CT Strategy. STRIVE HoA focuses specifically on Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia and was established after the 2013 attack on the Westgate Shopping Centre in Nairobi, Kenya (EC, 2016; GoK, 2013). This EU program was implemented by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) National Security and Resilience Team, based in Nairobi. It was designed to identify and understand the particular drivers of extremism and threats to security in this part of the world, to develop CVE "best practices" through short pilot activities in the region, and to make recommendations for increasing impact and focusing interventions. This program was the first EC attempt to implement a CVE project outside Europe (EC, 2016). It ran from January 2014 through January 2017, and investment in women was one of its four main thematic priorities (EC, 2016). As a follow-up to this program, STIVE HoA II (STRIVE Kenya) has been re-designed with the lessons learned from STRIVE HoA I in mind and is currently ongoing.

There were four main programming component categories of STRIVE HoA, which RUSI named "Result Areas". There was some input from EU stakeholders on what programming components needed to be addressed (Zeuthen, 2018). However, the practical steps of

program design and implementation were left to the RUSI STRIVE HoA team. The following four Result Areas were designed by RUSI, based on EU and RUSI research about what drives extremism in the HoA region (EC, 2016, pp. 23-24):

- **Result Area 1**: To build an apparatus for a relationship between regional security organizations and civil society. This is essential so that the police can be used as partners in CVE programming and not be seen as separate from the CVE process, or even perpetrators of grievances due to enforcement of government CT policies. The program looked at the approaches of law enforcement to terrorism and how to improve their engagement with civil society in order to increase prevention. They also looked civil society actors working in that space and their mandates, to determine how they could better help to reduce the gap between law enforcement and civil society.
- **Result Area 2**: To fight violent extremism (VE) through building the capacity of women's organizations, especially in Puntland and Somaliland. In these locations, the patriarchal clan structure systematically excludes women from most aspects of social engagement, including education, employment and participation in politics. While RUSI recognized that women play a key role, they need to increase their understanding of how women participate in the radicalization process. They can play many roles, possibly through recruitment, financing, mobilization and even active participation in the violence. RUSI then worked with women's organizations to leverage existing peace-building projects to also include CVE objectives. These interventions often included training workshops for the women's organizations on

how to more effectively engage with security providers at both state and clan levels, in an effort to contribute to CVE initiatives.

- **Result Area 3**: To increase understanding of challenges faced by EU-born youth, who returned to Somaliland, and how to prevent their presumed alienation from the local communities from becoming a driver of their radicalization. Ultimately, RUSI experts found that instead of being alienated, the diaspora youth often played a role in propagating a violent expression of ideological values to the more conservative Somali-born youth. Thus, RUSI worked to create spaces which brought together Somaliland born youth and the returned diaspora youth, with civil society actors capable of facilitating dialogue between the two groups. This was intended to increase resilience to radicalization in both the EU-born and Somaliland native youth.
- **Result Area 4**: To identify and address a wide array of factors which lead to the radicalization of youth in Kenya. These factors can be limited access to education and political processes, or the lack of rule of law. Additionally, the local and regional factors including narratives of historic injustice, tribal and local identity issues, and pressures from families and communities. RUSI employed a number of different pilot interventions, such as: facilitating inter-generational dialogue within Muslim congregations in the coastal region, mentorship programs in urban environments in Nairobi, work with media and radio stations which reach the youth, and inter-faith programs to decrease intolerance which is often seen as a driver of radicalization.

Although the second Result Area focuses particularly on empowering women and building the capacity of women's organizations, which gives obvious attention to gendered issues, this is not be the only Result Area I am looking at. Whether gender is specifically mentioned or not,

each Result Area holds gendered implications. While increasing the participation of women in CVE programming helps offer a solution to the immediate problem of how to make security more gender-equal, a look at the underlying socialization of masculinity and femininity shows that gender factors into every Result Area. Therefore, gender needs to be fully and meaningfully addressed in order to find a sustainable, long-term solution to gender inequality and VE.

RUSI began its implementation of the STRIVE HoA project when CVE was a relatively new concept and not well known among regional governments, national agencies, and civil society organizations. They conducted workshops to educate local partners about CVE principles and the process of radicalization. They also realized that previous CVE initiatives had very little monitoring or evaluation, so it was necessary to carefully collect and analyze information regarding the activities of the STRIVE program. This analysis could then be used to develop "best practices" regarding the implementation of CVE programs in the HoA region, and to provide recommendations for increasing impact and focusing intervention.

The STRIVE HoA program had a 36-month timeframe. It included three phases: a six-month research and assessment phase, a 24-month pilot program implementation phase, and a six-month wrap-up and evaluation phase. A conference concluded the wrap-up portion in November 2016, where the lessons learned were shared and discussed with EU, United Nations (UN), and civil society participants. An independent evaluation was conducted on the program, with a final report published in January 2017. Ultimately, this report found that the program had been successful overall, and produced lessons learned which could be passed on to aid the entire CVE community in formulating their programs in the future (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). RUSI's own findings were compiled in an overall

program wrap-up report, which was published in April 2017. It details the actions taken, lessons learned, and suggestions made (RUSI, 2017). A limited number of programming interventions were made, so that impact could be demonstrable in the allowed timeframe. This fulfilled two goals of the program, which were to identify "best practices" and to widen the evidence base regarding CVE programming. This case study evaluation is largely based on these published reports, as well as an interview with the RUSI STRIVE HoA Team Leader.

1.2 EU's Definition of CVE Programming

The EU's STRIVE platform was applied world-wide. Therefore, a core set of definitions by which the regional STRIVE programs could define CVE was developed (EC, 2016). According to the EU (2015), CVE policies primarily seek to reduce radicalization and recruitment ability through increasing peace and stability. They can accomplish this by addressing social factors and increasing economic opportunities, especially for the youth and marginalized. I concluded in Chapter 4 that CVE programs are generally the type of CT policies which are most capable of combatting terrorism and violence while also supporting emancipatory norms. I have identified this commitment to emancipatory norms as essential to creating sustainable human security. Since VE seeks to incite violence through telling of half-truths and focusing on grievances (EC, 2016), the EU recognizes that "hard" CT measures alone are not enough to stem the violence. A proactive prevention plan is also required (EU Council, 2014). In their 2005 CT Strategy, they established four pillars (EU Council, 2005):

- Respond: to prepare for and minimize the consequences of a successful terrorist attack.
- Protect: to protect citizens and infrastructure and reduce vulnerability to an attack.
- Pursue: to pursue terrorists, bring them to justice, and build local capacity to do so.

- Prevent: to prevent people turning to terrorism by tackling the factors which can lead to radicalization and aid recruitment.

The prevention strategy, recommended through the fourth pillar, requires a coalition between governments, communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector actors. This coalition approach has the scope to implement CVE programs jointly on local, regional, national, and international levels (EU Council, 2014). I find that in order to address all grievances, the prevention strategy must also include a multi-faceted understanding of the complexity of gender and the various ways it impacts VE.

Equal opportunities for economic development, human rights, governance, and rule of law are often the base level social factors which CVE tries to address, in order to have a stabilizing effect on societies. The EU recognizes this as the "security-development nexus". Security cannot exist without development and vice-versa (EC, 2016, p. 13). Fragile states, poor governance, and social grievances provide fertile recruitment and radicalization grounds, while armed conflicts offer a convenient narrative for radicalizers. Therefore, addressing security must also include addressing development (EU, 2015). CVE is a concept without singular definition. However, it is loosely regarded as subset of CT measures, which consists of a mixture of policies, programs, and interventions intended to use non-coercive means to reduce the threat of terrorism by directly addressing its root causes (Holmer, 2013). There is, however, some controversy over what CVE should address. Some would define CVE as countering terrorism from the pre-radicalization stage all the way through to the de-radicalization process. This requires a three tiered approach, which: addresses structural issues which might make someone more disposed to the radical message, focuses on individuals who are particularly

susceptible through intervention and counter-messaging, and attempts to de-radicalize people who have already participated in VE (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016). Others say that CVE programming should focus mostly on those "at risk" and already participating in VE (the second and third tiers above) (UNDP, 2017). Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programming has been labeled as taking a broader preventative approach to the underlying drivers, which might render people more vulnerable to VE (the first step) (International Alert, 2018). According to the STRIVE program policy, CVE "constitutes all actions that strengthen the resilience of individuals and communities to the appeal of radicalizers and extremism" (EC, 2016, p. 10).

While the EC allows for local conditions and drivers to be taken into consideration, all CVE programming actions must follow a few general guidelines (EU, 2015, p. 12):

- They must be evidence based;
- The local context must be taken into account for tailored programming; and,
- A multidisciplinary approach must be adopted involving many actors beyond traditional law enforcement and military services, including health, educational, good-governance and human-rights agencies, and civil society.

CVE programming conducted by the EU draw resources from across the spectrum of EU thematic and geographic instruments, from the European Development Fund (EDF) to the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) (EU, 2015). CVE actions taken by the EU are generally divided into three broad categories, spanning eight thematic areas (EU, 2015, p. 13):

- **Public engagement:** including media campaigning and inter-communal cultural activities to reach broad audiences.

- **Targeted interventions:** focused on vulnerable individuals or communities. These interventions include improving educational and socio-economic inclusion, programs to develop women and youth leaders, and justice and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) initiatives.

- **Enhancing CVE capabilities:** of relevant government and non-governmental actors. Governance capacity-building programs include conflict resolution and peace-building experts, police, civil society, policy-makers, and media.

This is the base EU definition of CVE programs, which was established for the STRIVE platform. Therefore, it was applied to STRIVE HoA program design and evaluation. The EU has agreed that "hard" CT actions alone do not work, and that there needs to be a link between security and development programming for the prevention of radicalization to be possible. This shows a commitment, at the EU level, to the need for addressing the structural factors which lead to radicalization, as well as the individual factors. The structural factors include health, education, and human rights, which includes gender equality. From this, I conduct analysis on how these guidelines match up to the CVE program design and evaluation guidelines published by RUSI, the EU's implementing partner for STRIVE HoA (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016).

2. Gaps in Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

RUSI was the organization chosen to be the implementing partner of the EU for STRIVE HoA. They were responsible for managing the program development, implementation, and evaluation. As a part of the learning process, because CVE program design and evaluation was still quite a new concept when STRIVE HoA began, the International Team Leader Martine Zeuthen and a colleague compiled *CVE and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation* (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). I relied upon this guide heavily for establishment of "best practices" in Chapter 4. These guidelines are reflected strongly in the definitions and CVE program design and evaluation practices, which were applied to the STRIVE HoA program. However, these guidelines are not always in alignment with the EU STRIVE CVE definitions established above. I highlight below the major ways in which there are gaps between the definitions and guidelines established by the EU, and the way that the definition is applied on-the-ground in program development and implementation.

2.1 "Say-Do" Gap in Definition of CVE programming

As mentioned in Section 1.2, when the EU established their CT Strategy in 2005 they recognized the need to include a prevent pillar. This pillar was aimed at preventing people from turning to terrorism, by tackling the factors which lead to radicalization (EU Council, 2005). The EU established that there was a "security-development nexus," in which one was dependent on the other. Thus, they linked together the concepts of CVE and development. This combined the approaches taken to improving health, education, good governance, human rights, etc. with the security focused functions of the local governments (EC, 2016). This is perhaps the largest "say-do" gap. There is a significant difference between the definition of

CVE in the EU guidelines for STRIVE programs, and what has been implemented by RUSI in the program design.

RUSI calls for CVE programming to be "a broad range of non-coercive and preventative activities that are united by the objective of counteracting the key drivers of violent extremism" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 4). These activities must focus on targeting "individuals specifically identified as potentially 'at risk' of being drawn to violence to the extent that this is feasible in each location" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 4). RUSI specifically set out, as one of its CVE program definition guidelines, that CVE should not be rebranded development programing. This is due to concern that conflating the two would result in CVE programming only addressing the structural motivators of radicalization, which are associated with development assistance (such as education, employment, infrastructure, etc). Therefore, leaving out the individual motivators, which lead people to participate in VE (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 4).

This perspective resulted in STRIVE HoA being almost solely focused on "at risk" individuals. Programming was directed at the specific portions of the community which were considered to be more susceptible to recruitment to VE. STRIVE HoA made no claim to address the larger structural factors, which I argue are responsible for making communities less stable and more vulnerable to radicalization. When I asked Zeuthen (2018) about why the RUSI programming did not attempt to address the wider, structural drivers she gave the following reasons:

- Radicalization happens through a smart recruiter being able to combine whatever marginalization a person is feeling with some sort of personal incentive into a reason to participate in VE. Therefore, it is not usually only due to structural factors that a person would turn to VE.

- Addressing structural factors under the banner of CVE or CT overly politicizes these issues. Education, employment, etc. programs should not be done for the sake of reducing terrorism, but simply for the sake of making a better world.

- Those considering VE or identified as "at risk" should not be given more access to development type assistance (e.g. education, employment, etc.) than everyone else in need. When access to these resources is granted as a part of a CVE program, it can then become perceived as a kind of incentive for considering VE.

The issues she has raised highlight the distinct line, being drawn in the field, between development and CVE programs. They often vie against each other for government funding and manpower resources, as well as for the attention of their target communities and local governments. So instead of blending the two together into a seamless transition between development and CT, there is a distinct effort to keep them as separate entities. This is a "say-do" gap between the EU's definition for CVE and how it is being implemented on the ground. In reality, development programming is addressing the structural issues (the first tier) and CVE programming has been developed to target those who are particularly "at risk" of the radicalization message (the second tier). Deradicalization programming is often considered separate as well. It addresses those who have been participants in VE (the third tier). Therefore, the holistic solution CVE was designed as is not being applied. This relates back to my research questions and the challenges of trying to implement CVE programming within a state security framework. The expectations of this framework do not allow for meaningful implementation of human security, which feminist theory argues is essential.

I argue that there are multiple issues which lead to this gap between definition and application of CVE. They include the way that governments think about program resource delegation and definition. This gap often forces the on-the-ground programming to make sacrifices in the way that CVE programs address the issues which lead to extremism. Also, I think it is a failure in the way that governments and program developers think about terrorism and security (Lum, Kennedy and Sherley, 2006). Instead of focusing on a long-term programming solution based on human security, which would arguably lower the instances of terrorism around the world, they are hamstringing CVE programming (Hudson, 2005). Due to the state security framework it is applied within, they are seeking to show immediate results on reduction of numbers of people who indicate interest in VE. The issue of terrorism has become so politicized in the Western world, beginning with the September 11th attacks and the War on Terror, that the need for overall human security has been disregarded in an effort to show immediate results in the reduction of the number of terrorist instances (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2006). These issues contribute significantly to the concerns, regarding conflating CVE with development assistance, of those on-the-ground implementing programming.

2.2 Implementation Gap

Another, practical reason that CVE programming design has been narrowed to target "at risk" individuals are the constraints of funding and time. While the EU (2015) states that it wants CVE programming to be addressing fragile states, poor governance, and social grievances to reduce the appeal of extremism, it has not in fact set up the framework for these programs to have the resources and scope to do so. The STRIVE HoA program was only granted a budget of €2 million for three years of programming in three countries. For comparison, an

education program implemented by the EC in the same region over three years was granted €24 million (EC, 2019). Therefore, Zeuthen (2018) highlights how trying to introduce education programs or job creation programs or address other similar structural factors is simply not possible under CVE programming. The scope of these types of programs are much bigger undertakings than the CVE implementation framework allows. Due to their need to produce positive results in such a short timeframe with a limited budget, practical decisions had to be made about how they could piggy-back programs and platforms which were already present in the target countries and utilize them for CVE purposes (Zeuthen, 2018).

Some (unpublished) research was completed on region specific issues, which encourage the spread of VE, and programs were designed to try to address these issues. However, there were other constraints, which also had to be considered. Zeuthen (2018) indicated these constraints included: budget, time, security concerns in the places where programs were being implemented, available implementing partners, and EU stakeholder programming interests. For example, when trying to prioritize the regional extremism drivers in order to design the program components, RUSI had to juggle not only the context of where they were working and what would work well there, but also input from stakeholders in the EU who felt certain components would be more relevant (Zeuthen, 2018). In fact, Zeuthen (2018) indicated that the Result Area focused on gender and the empowerment of women was one of those components pushed by the EU. They wanted to test some of the strategies, which had been used in other work on gender in conflict zones, to see if it could be applied to gender-related programming in areas suffering from conflict due to VE (Zeuthen, 2018).

Even though this element was of interest to the EU and its partners, it still suffered from lack of resources and implementation concerns. When doing research for the portion of the programming which was supposed to occur in Puntland, the researcher was reportedly threatened by Al-Shabab. Therefore, this portion of the component was disregarded, as it did not seem appropriate risk management to push the issue when it was going to be a relatively small, short program component anyway (Zeuthen, 2018). Even the portion of this component which did take place in Somaliland suffered from lack of resources. The RUSI administration team was so small that they did not have the necessary amount of time to visit often and manage the program more closely. The bulk of the program design and management had to be left to the partnering organizations working there, which coincidently were run by all men. Additionally, the only English-speaking liaisons in these organizations were men (Zeuthen, 2018). So, in the end, this Result Area suffered from lack of time, money, partners, and attention. This, ultimately, led to the recommendation by RUSI that it was not a particularly essential element of CVE. They indicated that it should be left as a secondary issue, in favor of keeping the community leaders on the side of allowing the more traditional CVE elements to be implemented (RUSI, 2017).

This gap between the intended purpose of CVE programing and the reality of its implementation leaves it focused on the secondary tier of the CVE process. As stated in the previous chapter, CVE is intended to be a three tier process (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016):

- **Primary level**: to address societal issues at large, which allows mitigation of the root causes of terrorism (this would include advocating things like education, health services, social engagement, cultural awareness, and personal development).

- **Secondary level**: to focus attention on individuals or groups that are particularly "at risk", including: intervention, community engagement, and counter-messaging.

- **Tertiary level**: to focus on radicalized individuals or groups; attempting to neutralize the threat through disengagement, de-radicalization, isolation, and re-direction.

This gap cannot be blamed on the CVE program implementers, as they are simply doing the best they can to produce results with the resources they have been given. However, it is instead due to the lack of commitment on the part of the governments funding and defining these programs. I find that there is a lack of willingness to commit to long-term, in-depth projects, which are more about increasing stability and human security in the target societies than about seeing immediate results on the highly political issue of terrorism (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018). The issue of security performance concerns overriding normative commitments will be revisited again throughout Chapter 8. This relates back to my first research question, about the expectations of CVE programming when it is being implemented within a state security framework. Ultimately, there is also an unwillingness to adopt the professed ideas of CVE, which require focusing on a long-term commitment to combining programs for human security and development. This lack of commitment trickles down to cause gaps in the program design and evaluation of the CVE programs.

2.3 Program Design and Evaluation Gaps

The implementation restrictions outlined above led to sacrifices being made on issues of program design and evaluation. The "best practices" guide established by RUSI, which I examined in Chapter 4, laid out steps by which program design and evaluation should be managed (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). Therefore, in this section I examine how the "best

practices" line up with how STRIVE HoA design and evaluation was conducted. The first gap I pointed out was in the base definition of CVE. I find that there is a fundamental gap between how the EU defined CVE for the STRIVE platform and how it was applied to STRIVE HoA. This gap, as shown above, leads to two very different design and evaluation styles of CVE programming. From the beginning, the design for STIVE HoA was limited to focusing on "at risk" individuals, due to RUSI's definition of CVE. The first step of the design process is to identify VE drivers particular to the region in which you intend to implement the program. Ideally, you can base your program components on them, with the aim of addressing the most relevant drivers of VE for the region. Research was done, as part of RUSI's design process (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017; Zeuthen, 2018). However, ultimately, the drivers discovered during this process were not the only issues considered when completing the second step of the design process, which is prioritizing drivers and designing program components. The prioritization process, which is often based on state security needs, leaves room for some drivers, such as gender inequality, to be easily side-stepped.

When it came to the prioritization of drivers for the design of program components, there were many more factors which became involved in the decision-making process. Zeuthen (2018) indicated that, realistically, it was a combination of the research done on the drivers, the context of the particular locations, and what felt relevant in those areas. Also, there was input from additional stakeholders and what they felt was relevant, and guidance from the EU on what issues they wanted prioritized (Zeuthen, 2018). Programming was then further limited in the design phase due to the implementation constraints of time and budget. This constricted the capacity of the components to such a degree that it ruled out any attempt to address structural drivers of radicalization (Zeuthen, 2018). For example, while structural issues such as

education programs and job creation programs were identified as a key part of the VE concern for the region, the budget of €2 million for three countries in three years was nowhere near large enough to address programs of this magnitude. Therefore, they went undressed by this program. These types of programming components also required a different skill set then was available among the small administration team established by RUSI and the EU to implement the CVE program (Zeuthen, 2018). The four main thematic areas ultimately chosen for STRIVE HoA were based only somewhat on the research done on prominent VE drivers in the region. They were also based on: designing the programs around what implementing partners were available for RUSI to use, what programs were already up and going and would require less of a financial and time commitment, and what programming issues the EU and other stakeholders were particularly interested in seeing included (Zeuthen, 2018).

The next portion of the RUSI guide focuses a great deal on the monitoring required to understand if program components are being effective, and if intended results are being achieved. Kahlil and Zeuthen (2016) suggest "theories of change" (ToC) as a good way to test if a hypothesis about program components, and the impact they will have on reducing VE, are correct. ToCs should be continually tested and retested throughout the program implementation cycle, to ensure that programming continues to be beneficial and successful. As a field, CVE has lacked appropriate levels of evaluation. Therefore, one of the goals of STRIVE HoA was to develop "best practices" and recommendations, which could be used across the CVE community (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017).

However, this was a gap in STRIVE HoA, as clear ToCs were not consistently applied to their programming. The independent evaluation conducted at the conclusion of STRIVE HoA noted that program design would have been improved by consistent application of ToCs, which could

have guided the direction of programming components (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). Zeuthen (2018) explained that they had conceptualized what their intended ToCs were for the program components. However, as practices were still being developed and the EU had not required this monitoring element, the theories were not written down. Therefore, monitoring was not consistent throughout the implementation portion of the programming (Zeuthen, 2018). This was partially due to only having a small administration team for the project. The limitations made it impossible to consistently test their ToCs and challenge their expectations for the program components (Zeuthen, 2018). This highlights an implementation gap and an important lesson learned. With the implementation of STRIVE HoA II has come a bigger administration team, which makes it much more feasible to articulate and consistently test their ToCs (Zeuthen, 2018). This allows for a much more effective monitoring process of program design and successfulness.

In addition to the monitoring of program design throughout the implementation phase, there also needs to be a "results framework", according to the guide (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). This is a set of goals established for the program components, against which the components can be measured throughout their implementation and at their completion. In Chapter 4 I suggested five key elements, which need to be represented on this results framework. They are **relevance**, **effectiveness**, **coherence**, **efficiency**, and **sustainability**.

The final evaluation report found that STRIVE HoA was **relevant**, due to it piloting CVE programming and developing "best practices" to be shared with the wider CVE field (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). The program components were overall well-aligned with the EU's CT Action Plan, even though some areas proved less relevant than others. For example: Result Area 2, which focused on training policewomen in

Somaliland, ended up being less relevant. Due to the lack of a ToC for this pilot program, their result was not as effective as intended. Although they did increase women's presence in the police force, the relevance of this action to helping women recognize and report radicalization was not realistically found in the evaluation stage (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). Zeuthen (2018) indicated that, although the numbers of women in the police force had increased, they are not actually allowed to do the jobs relating to security and terrorism. They are not allowed to carry weapons or handcuffs and are, for the most part, put into administrative or housekeeping positions. So ultimately, even though they are present, they are not in a position to be able to address concerns around VE (Zeuthen, 2018).

Another issue, which the evaluation found partially diminished the relevance of the programming, was the reduction in its outreach area. Due to practical concerns of time and budget, as well as security concerns in certain areas of intended programming the scope of implementation was limited (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). For example, although research was begun for Result Area 2 in Puntland, after asking some questions at local school and madrassas the researcher reported he was threatened by Al-Shabab to discontinue his work. Therefore, the planned program component in this area was cancelled, as it was not deemed an appropriate risk to continue for the small-scale pilot program which had been planned (Zeuthen, 2018).

STRIVE HoA, according to the final evaluation report, was deemed as being **effective** overall. It was measured against its main purpose of being a pilot program to test CVE strategies and develop "best practices" for what works in the field (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). It was concluded that some areas were more effective than others. However, RUSI was able to innovatively pilot some new programs (such as the

component working with women in Somaliland). They also effectively continued other programs, which had previously been established and funded by other donors. Some of the areas, in which need for improvement was found, were the implementation of ToCs, the application of risk management, and the lack of a coherent programmatic approach. While STRIVE piloted a number of programs, each with their own individual plan, it was noted that they could have benefitted from more **coherency**. Comparison and communication across the pilot programs would have encouraged a more coherent programmatic approach.

They could have also benefitted from being more coherently connected with other actors working on CVE programs in the region (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). I asked Zeuthen if it was possible to link EU development programming and CVE programming, in order to provide a more holistic approach of addressing structural and individual drivers. She indicated that it is very difficult to get the program cycles and components lined up at the program level, even though this approach could be beneficial (Zeuthen, 2018). This indicates that any real cross-program coherency would have to be directed and implemented at the government level. It requires a structural commitment to make sure that development, peacebuilding, CVE, and other types of programming are be aligned and sharing resources. The lack of commitment to this goal and continued competition for resources between these programs illustrates the failing of governments to commit to a long-term, multifaceted definition of CVE. Although, with STRIVE HoA II's implementation, RUSI has been able to improve cooperation with other CVE actors in the region on some program components. They are participating in a consortium with the US and the Red Cross, to provide vocational training for one of their components (Zeuthen, 2018).

Sustainability and efficiency were perhaps the two weakest categories of STRIVE HoA. **Sustainability** was not really a concern of STRIVE HoA, as they purposefully planned their pilot programs as short-term, low-budget projects. However, the final evaluation report identified how this approach can have a negative impact, when programming is abandoned (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). When I asked Zeuthen about sustainability being an important factor of CVE programming, she indicated that going forward they have learned the best way to make their type of programming "sustainable" is to get the community and local stakeholders involved. That way, when RUSI's short-term pilot programs end, the programming missions can be carried on by those that remain (Zeuthen, 2018). Otherwise, sustainability requires governments to give enough time and resources for these programs to continue for longer. They would also need to conduct political negotiations with local governments, to allow and assist in program sustainability (Zeuthen, 2018).

RUSI was very **efficient**, in the sense that there was a very small administration team. They were able to oversee a wide variety of pilot programs and deliver visibility and learning to the wider CVE community. However, this "efficiency" also limited how much the staff could provide management to programs. The program components were actually found to be more efficient when there was enough administration staff to more closely monitor project progress and supervise implementing partners. Therefore, the remotely implemented projects especially suffered from a lack of management, and thus success (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). Zeuthen indicated how this was especially true in relation to Result Area 2. Due to the gender component being of particular interest to the EU and the international community, she spent a great deal of her time reporting back on what they were

doing and how they did it. Ultimately, this compromised attention to doing good fieldwork and being able to closely monitor the implementing partners for Result Area 2 (Zeuthen, 2018).

Ultimately, the gaps in program design, implementation, and evaluation probably had the most negative impact on the Result Area devoted to the empowerment of women. These gaps included practical issues of implementation partners; security concerns; and staff, budget, and time limitations. As a thematic element, this was one which was particularly requested by the EU (Zeuthen, 2018). However, ultimately, it was almost abandoned due to the gaps in program resources and design. Some positive practical experience was gained, on issues of including women in the CVE and security conversations (Zeuthen, 2018). However, a lack of commitment was ultimately shown, by the reticence to overcome hurdles in the pursuit of the gender mainstreaming in programming. When I asked Zeuthen if the inclusion of women improved results in CVE, she stated that the data cannot support this assumption. This is partially because enough data has not been gathered to say one way or another. However, it is also partly because she does not feel that inclusion of gendered programs has improved their program successfulness (Zeuthen, 2018). This type of perspective allows governments to be able to say that they have tried to include women, but that it has not led to results. I argue that this is mainly due to a lack of understanding of the complexity gender and the various ways in which in impacts security.

3. Understanding of Gender in Program Design and Evaluation

I chose STRIVE HoA as my primary case study partially due to its recognition of the need to include the empowerment of women and support of women's organizations in its strategy. This gives me a multi-tiered platform on which to conduct my gendered analysis of this CVE

program. I triangulate my analysis with two primary sources of information: documentation of the STRIVE HoA program (through published reports from the EU, RUSI, and the independent evaluators) and the interview with the STRIVE HoA Team Leader Martine Zeuthen. Firstly, I look at how the program designers and implementers viewed gender and thus developed program components to empower women to take part in CVE initiatives. Secondly, I use some of the different strands of feminist IR theory, introduced in Chapter 2, to examine how gender is significant throughout the thematic elements of the program, even the ones not dedicated to women.

To clarify the overall position of RUSI and the STRIVE HoA program management: STRIVE HoA did not consider gender inequality as a push factor of VE, or as one of the structural issues which needs to be addressed as part of the CVE process (Zeuthen, 2018). Zeuthen (2018) indicated that CVE programming should be focused on addressing violence and terrorism, which means that gender and equality are not usually a focus unless recruiters are specifically using them in the radicalization narrative. As discussed above, due to the existing implementation limitations of their program, RUSI would not have had the capacity to address wider gender inequality in society anyway, even if they had considered it an objective of CVE. The intention of their program component aimed at empowering women was not to overcome gender inequality, but rather to examine the ways in which women can be utilized to counter recruitment and radicalization.

STRIVE HoA programming was focused on empowering women, primarily as wives and mothers, to intervene where possible to reach family members who were "at-risk" of becoming radicalized (Zeuthen, 2018). In order to design Result Area 2 of the program, RUSI did gather some data on how women engaged in the public space and on security

issues. They also tried to consider the local gender norms, especially in Somaliland because this is where the program component was implemented. However, Zeuthen (2018) indicated that it was very difficult as security and VE are already somewhat taboo topics in these conservative cultures, without doubling the difficulty of the conversations by adding in discussion of women being involved in the security process. I argue that this narrow approach to the inclusion of women in security overlooks how gender inequality is part of the security problem itself. Gender inequality can be an indicator of VE as women are often the targets of VE organizations (Johnston and True, 2019; Amnesty International, 2010; Dietrich and Carter, 2017). There is a significant correlation, extracted from research and interviews from 30 countries world-wide, that women are "among the first targets of fundamentalism, which restricts their rights and frequently leads to increases in domestic violence before it translates into open conflict" (O'Reilly, 2015, p. 5). Overlooking the complexity of how gender factors into VE and thus into the CVE solution leaves program design and evaluation lacking a meaningful integration of gender.

3.1 RUSI's Approach to Gender

Ultimately, RUSI viewed "gender" as equaling women. For the purposes of Result Area 2, which was focused on women, they wanted to look at how women played a role in the facilitation of the radicalization process (such as facilitation of the movement of fighters and recruiters) and how to address that issue. They also wanted to empower women to engage in talking about the kinds of security issues which are associated with their role in society, as wives and mothers, etc. (Zeuthen, 2018). It was determined by RUSI that women had the potential to be powerful instruments, either positively or negatively. Through this unique connection, they can be very effective conduits of the radicalization message and extremist

sympathies, or they can be strong promoters of a non-violent path to engagement in civil society. Therefore, there is a clear need to include them in the CVE space (RUSI, 2017). This perspective on gender supports the idea that there is a difference between men and women, and that their roles in society and in CVE would be different. The understood ToC for supporting women's organizations in Puntland and Somaliland was that, if women were empowered to identify and address radicalization and were trained to attain a position in locally driven de-radicalization initiatives, they could then help to address VE (RUSI, 2017). RUSI held this ToC because they see women as having a special role in communities and families. Through supporting each other and exchanging good practices, RUSI felt women might be able to leverage this role to combat VE (RUSI, 2017).

While the inclusion of women can be seen as a step forward in any form it takes, I find that there are a couple of fundamental issues here surrounding RUSI's understanding of gender. Firstly, viewing gender as only women does not take into consideration the entire scope of the term gender and how it applies to all people in society. It also does not consider the ways in which underlying expectations of femininity and masculinity shape how and why people are drawn into VE. These less overt implications of gender are explored further in the next section. Secondly, there is a fundamental underestimation of the scope of empowering women in the assumption that women only fill one role in society, in the home as wives and mothers (Winterbotham, 2018). In STRIVE HoA there was very little emphasis placed on the alternative roles that women might play in CVE, or even their participation in VE (Margolin, 2019). This issue was recognized and remedied to some degree in STRIVE HoA II, with an examination of how and why women might become radicalized themselves (Zeuthen and Sahgal, 2018; Zeuthen, 2018).

3.1.1 Design Challenges

During the research and assessment phase a highly problematic issue, in relation to building a component focused on empowering women, was identified. RUSI had to work through male gatekeepers. Almost all the liaisons available to work with RUSI in Puntland and Somaliland, who spoke English, were men. As mentioned above, STRIVE HoA's intervention in Puntland was cancelled due to security concerns. However, the researcher who was threatened, while asking questions of local Imams and female madrassa teachers, was a man. He was the only one available, who could go into that area and who also spoke English (Zeuthen, 2018). There is also the probability that, in the highly conservative societies in these locations, male researchers would be the only ones allowed to ask question of local leadership. I find that it is problematic to address the empowerment of women entirely through the conduit of men.

After accounting for security concerns and budget and time restrictions, several urban sites in Somaliland were identified as suitable to outside intervention. They already had peacebuilding organizations running projects in the area (RUSI, 2017). While this allowed the design of components to fulfill Result Area 2, there were still significant concerns. Both the organizations RUSI partnered with were run by men. Being the only English speakers in their organizations, these men had to relay all conversations to the female staff (Zeuthen, 2018). Also, the male leadership of these organizations potentially saw working with women as a way to position themselves, because they realized this issue was important to donors (True and Wiener, 2019). Therefore, they were not necessarily altruistically trying to promote the empowerment of women, and could have been quite conservative men themselves (Zeuthen, 2018).

Another issue is that these peacebuilding organizations worked under the assumption that women are more peaceful then men. Thus, women could be consensus builders in societies where there had been significant conflict and recruitment to VE. This is an example of gender essentialism. They believed that all women are naturally inclined to be more peaceful than men, and that is what makes them an asset. These organizations had been mediating inter-clan conflicts in Eastern Somolia, so had already been operating with some women mediators (Zeuthen, 2018). This allowed RUSI to gather information on the women who were already involved in preventative action, in order to help tailor the local projects to be more effective. RUSI partnered with these local researchers to complete their programming component, so that they could capitalize on their pre-existing knowledge of the local practices and grassroots knowledge of women's agency in Somaliland (RUSI, 2017).

Pilot actions were designed to include and empower women to participate in Somaliland's existing security system (RUSI, 2017, p. 10):

- Two meetings were coordinated as part of the action to encourage interaction between women and community elders, religious leaders, and government actors on CVE initiatives.

- Eleven women's peace committees were organized to raise awareness of violent extremism and improve communication between law enforcement and civil society actors.

- Capacity building workshops were held for the women's peace committees to give women instruction on how to present themselves professionally with local authorities.

- Policewomen and members of women's police forums were trained so they could participate in CVE programs in their area and design targeted solutions.

These pilot programs offered the opportunity to gather valuable data on the inclusion of women in CVE policy. RUSI was able to report back to the EU and the wider international community on their field experience of trying to introduce women's participation in security issues into these conservative societies. This offered valuable, first-hand experience to what had previously been largely theoretical conversations on the issue (Zeuthen, 2018).

3.1.2 Implementation Challenges

There were many challenges to meaningful implementation. For example, the partner organization reported back to RUSI that the pilot training of policewomen resulted in increased employment of women on local police forces. As community women are much more likely to engage with policewomen then male security personnel, the ToC was that the active presence of women in the police force would reduce the gap between law enforcement and civil society. This would help reduce tension, and promote interaction between a larger number of male and female stakeholders (RUSI, 2017). However, while the partner organization framed these results as very positive, there is a need for independent verification of measurement and long-term sustainability (RUSI, 2017). The reality of the situation is that the women who were hired to be a part of the local police force are not allowed to wear guns or handcuffs, and they do not have the power to make arrests. If women did engage them about family members involved in VE, they do not hold the power to address these concerns. They are often relegated to traffic positions or even to cleaning the police stations. Therefore, on paper, the Somaliland police force have included more women, but without really increasing their ability to deal with security concerns (Zeuthen, 2018). Although women's roles are currently limited, it was hoped

that it would create an entry point for women into the security services and incite a broader change in cultural perceptions regarding women over time. However, I do not find that this exhibits very much meaningful success for this programming component.

Another example is the difficultly that the peacebuilding organizations had in trying to get women engaged in the security conversation. The topic of VE is taboo in these conservative cultures, so finding a way to begin the conversation was very difficult. In most cases, the conversations were limited to a basic introduction of the ways in which women might be facilitating recruitment or movement. They would ask women questions such as: "Would you feed the extremists? Would you host them? What would you do if your local Imam called you and asked you to host some of his friends and you did not know who they were, would you question it?" (Zeuthen, 2018). While this aspect of women's roles in facilitating movement and recruitment needs to be addressed, it is a very small step towards getting women meaningfully involved in the process of CVE.

The implementing organizations also identified a great deal of reticence by local community leaders to include women in discussions on topics of peace and security, particularly in the case of traditional and religious leaders. RUSI found that including these leaders in the research and assessment phase helped to reduce some of this reticence, by reducing the perception that foreign interests were trying to intervene in local customs. Some mitigation of this phenomenon could also be achieved with further explanation of CVE purposes, so it is not misconstrued as anti-Islamic and traditional values. However, ultimately, RUSI found that they did not want the STRIVE HoA program to be associated too strongly with gender mainstreaming. They felt that combining these two initiatives detracts from the traction, in conservative communities, of more traditional CVE program components (RUSI, 2017).

3.1.3 Evaluation Challenges

There were two lists of recommendations provided, one by RUSI in their lessons learned report and one by the independent evaluators in their final evaluation report. These lists indicated what they each felt had been learned from evaluations of Result Area 2:

RUSI (2017) recommendations:

- Village leaders should have access to the research and assessment phase and subsequent input in defining program objectives – especially in regard to gender related initiatives.
- While CVE policies need to be designed by experts, largely due to a general lack of knowledge on CVE, the programs need to be tailored to balance local customs, not appear as a foreign intrusion, and be flexible for locally desired amendments.
- Religious and local leaders need to be sensitized to the importance of including women in peace and security discussions, in order to encourage them to support women-led organizations combatting violent extremism rather than reject CVE initiatives.
- While practitioners should appreciate the impact of gender equality agendas on wider CVE initiatives, care should be taken not to allow gender equality to annex CVE. This may cause traditional CVE initiatives to lose wider support.

Independent evaluators' recommendations (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017):

- Rigorous research into cultural and social norms is required prior to program implementation to identify pre-conditions for change which can be addressed during program design.

- Community differences need to be considered, such as the different levels of conservativism present in a relatively small geographical area.

- Actor mapping can highlight sources of influence and programs can be designed to address different initiatives for the group and individual levels.

Overall, I find that these recommendations highlight a reluctance to pursue the empowerment of women as a course of CVE action. This is largely due to the strong local perceptions that gendered programming is a foreign intrusion into their local customs and the concern that this might lead to the rejection of other CVE components (Zimmermann, 2016). However, I posit that if equality is left to the side, in favor of other CVE goals, this leaves a gap where extremism can flourish. By allowing gender essentialism to continue and the placing of women into a very limited categories within these societies, CVE programming is allowing discrimination to continue. This can encourage discontent and thus lead down a path to radicalization. The notion that gendered traits are natural, instead of being due at least in part to socialization is much criticized today by scholars (Steans, 2013). However, it is being allowed to continue through projects such as these, where women are not granted the right to participate in any other form than as wives and mothers. They are essentialized as a peaceful influence on family members or a mediating force in the local community.

I recognize that changing local power structures and cultural beliefs is a very challenging prospect. When I asked Zeuthen about whether they had attempted to address these local power structures, she said that they had tried but it was very challenging. She found that the key to having these conversations was finding the correct intermediary. For example, when a member of their team, a women of American-Somali heritage, tried to address the local elders on the

issue she was dismissed as a foreigner. This was despite the fact she spoke Somali. However, when they were able to find an intermediary who was a women who wore traditional Somali dress and was from a well-respected local family who had had members join Al-Shabab, she was seen as more legitimate source of those conversations (Zeuthen, 2018). This method, of finding an entry point into these difficult discussions by searching for an intermediary deemed "legitimate" by conservative local leaders, shows support for the notion of gender as complementary. This is the perspective that difference in genders must be respected, especially when trying to change ideas in conservative, non-western cultures (Steans, 2013).

Result Area 2, with all of its successes and failures, was the component of the CVE program overtly dedicated to gendered programming and the empowerment of women. However, that does not mean that this component was the only place in STRIVE HoA where gendered implications were present. In terms of gendered analysis, Result Area 2 displayed an approach which placed gender as a category of analysis. I argue that it proved, with its overall lack of meaningful success, that the "add gender and stir" method in CVE programming does not produce lasting results. When gender was included in Result Area 2, it was being construed as a variable. This was intended to provide a measurable result for evaluation of the impact of gender mainstreaming in CVE programming. However, I argue that this is not a very meaningful way to measure its impact, as it severely limits how gender can be defined (often only as women). It also does not allow for consideration of gender relations and norms. For example, while they were able to add policewomen, they were not in positions of authority. Also, while RUSI had conversations with women about stopping the facilitation of recruitment, they were not able to meaningfully increase their presence in the security decision making process. This lack of quantifiable success leads CVE program implementing governments to

be able to say that the inclusion of gender does not improve the overall successfulness of CVE programming. However, I argue that the above method of considering gender is not a true representation of the extent to which gender impacts VE and CVE. In the next section I use some strands of gender analysis, borrowed from feminist IR theory, to show how gender is present throughout all four of the Result Areas of STRIVE HoA.

3.2 The Complexity of Gender

The field of feminist IR theory uses a variety of theoretical approaches to help explain gender's role. I introduced these various strands in Chapter 2 and have borrowed them to conduct gender analysis on my CVE program case studies. This was necessary due to the gender-blind nature of most research completed on CT policy. Many of the theoretical positions below were developed in opposition to or as further explanation of the basic approach of trying to insert gender as a variable of analysis. I use examples from throughout RUSI's Result Areas to illustrate the complexity of gender and how it can be present in many different forms. Gender is intertwined with issues of VE and is present in CVE programming whether or not it is overtly intended to include gender, such as Result Area 2's focus on empowering women. This analysis supports my conclusion that meaningful gender mainstreaming is an essential part of successful CVE programming.

3.2.1 Power Relationship

The theory of gender as a power relationship pits "women" and "men", as homogenized groups, against each other in a struggle for power. Women are inevitably the losers in this struggle, due to their disadvantaged position in the patriarchal structure of most social orders (Steans, 2013). While this theoretical perspective simplifies the contested issues of homogenized

gender groups and patriarchy, there is a good example which illustrates gender as a power relationship.

In Result Area 2:

One of the most concerning concepts I found, in RUSI's final recommendations from Result Area 2, was the idea that they were willing to give up programming due to resistance from the local leaders on the idea of allowing women to participate in security matters. I asked Zeuthen about why the recommendation was that pilot programs needed to be located "within the local community structures". I also asked her about what that meant for how much they were willing to challenge those local community leaders on discussing topics that were considered taboo, like gender roles and security. Zeuthen (2018) indicated that yes, they had tried to have these discussions with community members, but that clan leaders were constantly coming back to them and saying they had not been consulted in the appropriate manner.

As in all power relationships, often the biggest concern was over resources. The clan leaders wanted access to the resources the program had to offer more than they wanted to engage in taboo conversations on security and gender. Zeuthen (2018) indicated how:

> Of course the taboos are there because it is about power. You are asking a group of old guys to give up their platform that they are so comfortable with, because they get to choose who gets married, who gets what land, how many camels, you know... So, it comes from a place where you need to push a conversation about more equal and fair distribution of resources, and who would want to give that up for free, right.

This is an ideal of example of gender as a power relationship. Only those of male gender have been granted access to becoming community leaders. This puts them in a position of power to make decisions and allocate resources for the rest of the community. They do not want to give up that power, so they have a vested interest in perpetuating the patriarchal system.

3.2.2 Social Relation of Inequality

Gender can also be examined, theoretically, as a social relationship of inequality. From this perspective, gender is not just a sexual identity; it is reinforced by social practices and institutions. This can be seen in how traits traditionally associated with masculinity (strong, rational, etc.) and femininity (weak, irrational, etc.) are often reinforced through institutions such as marriage and the public/private divide which exists in family life. Women are usually the unpaid caregivers in the home, and men earn the wages and thus can exert authority over the family. These types of social institutions, and even much more basic day-to-day interactions and expectations, tie gender into social relationships of inequality and domination (Steans, 2013). There are several examples of how these types of inequal relationships exist throughout RUSI Result Areas:

In Result Area 1:

This result area was focused on building a bridge between government security forces and civil society, so that they could better work together to counter VE (RUSI, 2017). I asked Zeuthen about who they worked with in the security forces and civil society, and if they targeted this training only at men in positions of law enforcement and leadership. She indicated that they included everyone, but that women simply did not have much of a presence in these positions of power. There are relatively few female security personnel, such as in the police, intelligence, and army. The ones that are present are not used to engaging on issues of VE. The social structures that are present, such as polygamy, impact the status of women in the extremely religious and conservative clan societies in Kenya. They often do not consider it appropriate for women to be included in these issues (Zeuthen, 2018). It is very difficult for outsiders to come in and attempt to address these traditional social structures, which perpetuate

relationships of inequality. This is especially true when the projects are sort-term pilot programs.

In Result Area 2:

It was determined by RUSI that women had the potential to be powerful instruments, either positively or negatively. "Given their proximity to community 'grapevines' and their traditional management role in the family structure, women were highlighted as critical 'agents of change'" (RUSI, 2017, pp. 9-10). I find this to be a demeaning categorization of the way in which women communicate. By referring to their networks as "grapevines," I find that RUSI has potentially reduced women to "gossips" and their conversations to being "trivial". Women's conversations about security and social issues are often labeled as "chit-chat" or "gossip," whereas the same kinds of conversations that men have are granted the inherently higher level of "making a point" or imparting social knowledge (Spitzack and Carter, 1987; Rysman, 1977). This is another example of the underlying socialization of masculinity and femininity associated with the public/private divide. It automatically imparts greater respect for the conversations and communications networks of men than women.

In Result Area 4:

Result Area 4 consisted of multiple components aimed at identifying and addressing drivers which lead to the radicalization of youth in Kenya. There were several different pilot programs tested, but the largest of these components was a mentorship program used to target "at risk" youth in urban areas of Nairobi (RUSI, 2017). There are concerns, which I addressed in the Chapter 4, surrounding efforts to profile those "at risk". The ethics or even efficacy of such an approach are questionable. Therefore, I asked Zeuthen how RUSI approached this component.

She explained that she would not consider how they pick “at risk” youth for the program a matter of profiling so much as an application of risk management. They use a professional structural judgement on what factors might lead one youth to be more inclined to a path of extremism than others. She admits that the categories of criteria used for this professional structural judgement were not as robust in the original STRIVE HoA program. There was a learning curve for determining what issues play the most important role. There are also some instances when the professional structural judgement system has to be overridden due to practical concerns, time constraints, etc. However, the criteria for choosing participants has been more clearly established and consistently applied in STRIVE HoA II (Zeuthen, 2018).

The professional structural judgement that RUSI makes on selecting youth to participate in the mentorship program is based on three tiers of factors. The most importance is granted to the issues in the primary tier, and so on. The primary tier consists of:

1. If it is known to us that a young person has relatives that have gone to Somalia.

2. If a young person has relatives that have been located in urban areas where there has been a lot of crime, relatives who are in prison, or if they themselves have just been released from prison (UN Human Settlements Programme, 2001; UN, 2005; Omenya and Lubaale, 2012).

3. If a young person is known by the community to actively advocate for violence and/or extreme kinds of ideology.

These three are the first tier of determining factors. There are also second and third tier factors. The second tier is related to whether the youth has been involved in crime or gangs. This has been determined to have a, not yet fully documented, link to willingness to participate in VE

(Dininio and Werbel, 2016). The third tier includes many factors, such as: whether the youth comes from an unsupported environment, like maybe a father is in prison or they have lived without family; or if they have dropped out of school; or if they are out of job; or if they attend one of the mosques that is known to support recruitment. While not a profile, these factors give insight into how to make a difficult decision about which youth are more "at risk" to the message of radicalization (Zeuthen, 2018).

While there does not appear to be any overt gender considerations in these factors, as they could apply equally to all youth, there are underlying elements which are affected by structural expectations and institutions related to gender. When I asked the Team Leader if they had any gendered considerations built into their criteria for identifying "at risk" youth, she identified a couple of the places where the social institutions possibly led to a greater percentage of one gender of youth being recruited than another. For example, RUSI did work with some of the religious leaders and religious institutions particularly trying to understand why young people are attracted to certain mosques and not others and what the questions are that they come to the mosques with, in hopes of getting answers. Through this process, it was very clear that the female religious leaders are not in a position where they are allowed to answer these questions for the youth. There are mosque management committees which decide which Imam is conveying what sermon, and very often the female Ukhti does not have much of a role on the mosque management committee, which means that they potentially have less say in the answers given.

Also, the female youth rarely go to mosque to the same extent as the male youth (Brown, 2008). They certainly do not go on a Friday as much as the male youth do. It is often only the large mosques which have Friday prayers for both genders. Therefore, RUSI had to be

mindful of what messages might be given out on a Friday that only the male youth would be exposed to. Zeuthen (2018) reiterated that RUSI's focus was on limiting recruitment, and that there are just more men who are being recruited in these urban areas of Nairobi than women. I argue that the differentiation in numbers is partially due to the social institution of the mosques in these neighborhoods and the expectations of masculinity in this social institution. This could at least partially account for the exposure to and spreading of the extremist ideology in larger numbers among the male youth (Cornwall, 1997).

Another example can be seen in the inequality of labor division and the practical consideration of staffing for this mentorship component (McKeen and Bujaki,2007). This has a follow-on impact on the process of choosing and supporting youth for this programming component. For example, one of the things RUSI found they had to be conscious of was placing a mentee with a mentor of the opposite gender and what issues that might raise. Would a female mentor be respected and listened to if placed with a male mentee? Are there issues that a female mentee might not be comfortable sharing with a male mentor? Because of the deeply engrained social structure of gendered relationships, these situations could produce uncomfortable dynamics. Also, as part of the program the youth meet face-to-face with their mentor once a week and in a group area every two weeks, to discuss things together. This group discussion has been more recently identified as a concern, because there are some issues which the female youth are not comfortable sharing in the presence of males. This has prompted RUSI to consider whether they should segregate the group conversations, so the female youth have an environment in which they feel comfortable conversing about their issues (Zeuthen, 2018).

These types of interaction issues have impacted the effectiveness of the program. Another challenge is the practical issue of being able to find the correct number of mentors of the

corresponding gender to the mentees. I posit that this is at least partially due to the socialized labor expectation that women are more appropriate to fill caring/mentorship roles then men. Therefore, making men less likely to consider this type of work. RUSI continued this mentorship programing component into STRIVE HoA II. At the time of the interview in 2018 the staff levels were around 60/40, in terms of the ratio between men and women at the mentor level. However, at the mentee level the gender ratio was more like 70/30 or 80/20 male to female youth. Therefore, there are not enough male mentors to match the largely male majority of the youth mentees (Zeuthen, 2018). This presents a staffing issue, due to RUSI's decision to concede to gender norms. They could potentially have tried to alleviate this issue by encouraging the youth to challenge the stereotypes of male and female interaction and gender inequalities in their deeply religious and conservative areas.

In All Result Areas:

Another example of challenges, which correlate to the public/private divide in society and the associated gendered expectations of these roles, are practical considerations for programming. These include issues like: what time of day were meetings held and was it possible for everyone to attend; or, was childcare offered for those women who have childcare responsibilities? Due to the ingrained gender roles of women managing the house and children, these responsibilities can prevent them from having equal access to CVE programming components. These types of practical concerns can be applied equally to all the Result Areas. When I asked Zeuthen (2018) about this, she indicated that in the original STIVE HoA programming these factors were unfortunately not really taken into consideration. However, more effort has been made in the STRIVE HoA II program component designs.

She indicated that it was normal for women to just bring their children, and the RUSI staff allowed that. For example, in Result Area 1 components, some of the female police officers did not have anyone to cover their childcare responsibilities. Therefore, they would have to bring the children with them to the out-of-station trainings RUSI conducted for the police. Another example was in Result Area 4 with the mentorship program, the female youth mentees often had their kids with them because they were breast-feeding or looking after them. While it is socially acceptable for women to just take their children with them, it still sometimes disturbed to the program activities. For example, sometimes there were kids crying when they were trying to have a conversation or complete a training. This was something that RUSI had not considered when designing these programs (Zeuthen, 2018).

Another practical issue, besides childcare, are the expectations around women's dress and decorum. This impacted programming. In meetings, for various programming components, many of the women wear the niqab. They were often not comfortable sitting next to men. RUSI had not taken these social expectations into consideration. While Zeuthen (2018) indicated that the participants were very adept at managing their own behaviors, RUSI had to consider ways in which to make meeting environments more comfortable for the participants. They made adjustments, such as providing separate meeting rooms, dining areas, and prayer rooms for the participants (Zeuthen, 2018). These are just a few examples of the different ways in which gender can be analyzed as social relationship of inequality. Also, the examples highlight how gender is present, even in Result Areas not particularly focused on it.

3.2.3 The Discourse of Gender

Another way to examine gender in the STRIVE HoA programming components is as a discourse. Under the influence of poststructuralist feminism, analyzing gender as a discourse

suggests it is free from a connection to physical/biological differences. Instead, it emphasizes the power that society and language have in constructing what is meant by the terms "men" and "women" (Steans, 2013). This can be illustrated by the language in STRIVE HoA programming. The terms "man" and "woman" are used freely, throughout the program design and evaluation documentation, and are automatically imbued with all the socialized connotations which come with being seen as a man or a woman. These definitions are shaped by the societies within which RUSI was implementing their programming components. However, the impact of this discursive shaping is never accounted for in the CVE program design or evaluation documentation.

The continuity of this discursive judgement breaks down with the term "youth". "Youth" appears be viewed as a gender-blind concept, never further defined in the design or evaluation documentation as male or female youth. Youth are a significant focus of CVE programming, as the 15-35 age range are often considered the most "at risk" of being drawn into VE. Yet, they seem to be an undefined category. They are not "women and children", most often seen as the victims of violence and conflict. They are not "women", seen as the peaceful mediators and mothers. They are also not seen as "men", granted the status of leaders and heads-of-households in these deeply traditional societies. This lack of clarity in the discourse of "youth" protects it, in a way, from the binary opposition present in the language of "men" and "women," and the implicit dominance that one category must take over another. However, this also leaves a gap for measurement and evaluation. "Youth" is a category RUSI used for several of its Result Area components without ever having to explain, in the official documentation at least, whether they were aiming their CVE outreach at one gender of youth more so than another. This leaves no possible avenue for

measurement or evaluation of gendered implications for programming targeting "youth". It also indicates that the program design process is not taking into account that male and female youth are having different experiences and might be susceptible to extremism drivers in different ways (UN, 2017).

3.2.4 The Intersection of Identities

Closely linked with the concept of gender being discursively generated, is the concept of identity. Identity, through the lens of gender essentialism, is lumped into singular categories (e.g. women as one homogenized group and men as another). However, the over-simplification of a very complex issue like identity is one that has been challenged by many different strands of feminism, such as black feminism and postcolonial feminism (Steans, 2013). Most people find themselves with more than one form of identity, often with intersecting points. This makes people very complex, and it also makes it very difficult to lump people into singular categories like "women" or "men" (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Unfortunately, I find that RUSI has tried to simplify gender identities into these homogenized groups and has thus missed some interesting complexities.

In Result Area 2:

For example, in this Result Area women are considered a singular category. Therefore, in abandoning its programming in Puntland, due to security concerns, RUSI did not consider that it was leaving out the women with different identities. In those areas, women may identify by different clan cultures, social statuses, or even rural versus urban living (Hoehne, 2015). The final evaluation report phrased it as finding areas with "pre-conditions for change," to improve the successfulness of programming aimed at the empowerment of women (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017). However, what this meant in reality was

choosing urban areas in Somaliland, which had already been sensitized to some form of women's programs prior to RUSI's presence (Zeuthen, 2018). When weighing the time, money, and security constraints against the demands of trying to reach women in a more conservative and rural area, they opted for the urban centers. This, inevitably, narrowed the identities of the women selected to participate in the programming components. This is only one example of the issue of identity simplification, which is present throughout all program elements.

3.2.5 Femininity vs. Masculinity

The feminist theoretical perspectives presented above have, thus far, illustrated how gender is a socially and culturally reinforced identity, rather than a natural one. They have also highlighted how it intersects with other identities. The concepts of femininity and masculinity have been introduced, through the social and discursive constructions of "women" and "men". Often, in the feminist study of gender, more attention is paid to femininity than masculinity (Zalewski and Parpart, 2019). However, this is something that should be avoided in a conversation about gender equality. Equal attention must be given to "masculinity," and how being a "man" is also endowed with socially constructed traits and expectations. These are often traits such as strength, honor, dominance, anger, and violence (Ahmadi and Stanikzai, 2018). The expectations of masculinity are often extremely prevalent in deeply conservative and religious societies. Unfortunately, they are also often reinforced by the perspectives of those working with men and male youth in these areas.

In Result Area 4:

For example, while considering the tiers of factors for the identification of "at risk" youth for the mentorship program, Zeuthen (2018) found that they were identifying more male youth

who fit into these criteria than female. The youth they were choosing were peers, from the same neighborhoods and communities. However, it seemed to her that the female youth were more able to resist the life of crime and contribute constructively to society. Zeuthen (2018) felt that "giving back to" or "being something" in the community was of greater interest to the female youth than the male. Ultimately, Zeuthen (2018) determined that they have a larger percentage of male youth participants in the mentorship program not only because they fit the criteria better, but also because they are more violent. The patterns in Kenya indicate that more male youth have been recruited to Al-Shabab than female. Although, some recruitment of females has occurred, both forced and voluntary (Zeuthen, 2018).

This indicates to me that there is, generally, an acceptance of gender essentialism and traditional definitions of "masculinity". Therefore, it is accepted that men are naturally more inclined to violence and women are more interested in caring for the community and being a peaceful force for good. However, I posit that the "masculine" expectations in these societies puts men in a position to be more violent or susceptible to the message of radicalization, not that it is their natural inclination. For example, the men or male youth would traditionally be the ones responsible for providing for their families, by crime or violent means if necessarily (Ahmadi and Stanikzai, 2018). This makes them more likely to get involved in gangs or behaviors, which might lead down a road to radicalization. Instead of accepting the assumption that "men are more violent," I find that it would be beneficial for CVE programming to challenge the prevailing binary notions of masculinity and femininity. This would allow programming to support meaningful gender equality, and to convey to people that sharing the assigned "masculine" and "feminine" roles would lead to a more stable and peaceful society.

4. Conclusion

The issues introduced and examined above, under the lens of feminist IR theory, are in some ways unique to STRIVE HoA. However, they are also indicative of many of the same issues and stances taken across most CVE programming worldwide. I have found that transnational CVE programming is a concept most often supported and implemented by Western nations (e.g. US, EU, Australia, etc.). These countries are primarily using and contributing to the same set of CVE program design and evaluation guidelines. The guidelines are usually established through the UN or other international security policy bodies, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). While they differ slightly on definitions of CVE and "best practices" for its program design and evaluation, many of them have been approaching gender mainstreaming as the STRIVE HoA program did. They define gender as women and then utilize them as a variable, to be "added and stirred" into the mix. This has, for the most, part been relatively unsuccessful. Therefore, I use various strands of gender analysis to illustrate why this approach is usually unsuccessful. I accomplished this by highlighting the many ways in which gender is interacting with the issues around security. Underestimating the complexity of gendered implications in CVE programming does not lead to a meaningful understanding or integration of gender equality. Without effectively addressing inequality, CVE programming is ultimately leaving a door open to instability and VE.

Using gender analysis gives me a tool with which to highlight the complexity of gender, and how misunderstanding of this has led to gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. This problem is compounded by CVE programming being caught between its stated definition of focusing on human security and its practical goal of improving state security. Programming is, therefore, often left practically unable to fully embrace gender

equality as a necessary element. In order for gendered programming components to become more than an instrument of satisfying international expectations on the issue of WPS, CVE program design and evaluation processes need to take a closer look at how masculinity and femininity are woven throughout all of the drivers being addressed. Gender must be more meaningfully understood, for a holistic solution to be found. Otherwise, CVE programming will remain incomplete and gendered goals will be easily overlooked.

This primary case study chapter has highlighted the most common approach to gender mainstreaming in CVE programming, and its many gaps. RUSI implemented its program with a gender-blind perspective for three components and then tried to add in a gender-sensitive perspective for its component focused on the empowerment of women. This places it at the middle of the spectrum for my cases because it tried to straddle the two gender perspectives and offset its own gender position. The next two chapters are devoted to two secondary cases. They supplement the analysis of this primary case with contrasting gender perspectives, which fall on either side of the primary case in the spectrum. The CVE program case study, presented in the next chapter, is an example of a program implemented with a gender-blind approach. I will use the same "best practice" guidelines and methods of gender analysis as in this chapter, to show how this perspective has led to gaps in its program design, implementation, and evaluation.

CHAPTER 6: CASE STUDY – KTI

1. Introduction

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) program is my second case study of a countering violent extremism (CVE) program. I use it has a secondary comparison case to my primary case study, the Royal United Services Institute's (RUSI) Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE HoA) program. This case offers a representative example of a CVE program implemented with a gender-blind perspective. I use the same "best practices" guidelines for CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation, which were established in Chapter 4, to evaluate this case. I also use feminist theory from Chapter 2 to analyze the gaps resulting from the lack of attention to the impact of gender, due primarily to the gender-blind perspective.

This case offers a good analytical framework for comparison. I use it to compare the similarities and differences between the European Union (EU) and the United States government (USG) regarding CVE definition and program design, implementation, and evaluation. There is a unique comparability as Khalil and Zeuthen, who wrote the RUSI guidelines, also completed the independent final evaluation for KTI. I also contrast the gender perspectives of the two programs and highlight how they contribute to different gaps. The gender-blind perspective of this case limits the scope of its gender analysis. Therefore, I primarily use to analyze the gaps in CVE definition, which lead to gaps in program design, implementation, and evaluation. The lack of data from this secondary case helps to illustrate the paradox introduced by Harding (2016). Without data it is difficult to make a case for the importance of gender mainstreaming, but with a gender-blind perspective there is no gender data being gathered.

1.1 Case Study Overview

I chose the KTI CVE program as a case study example of a CVE program being implemented with a gender-blind approach. This program is an indicative example of a USG CVE program. USAID is the primary implementing body, of the USG, for CVE programming. USAID is also the USG agency responsible for implementation of development and aid programs. With the human security focus of CVE programming rhetoric, USAID was well placed to take on the role of implementor for these programs as well. It completes CVE programming either in addition to or in tandem with its development work. The KTI program consisted of multiple programming approaches, which were implemented from 2011-2014. It included programming components in multiple Kenyan counties. From 2011, KTI was operational in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi. In 2012, it expanded to the Coastal regions of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi, and Mombasa. KTI CVE programming was established with the mandate of addressing violent extremism (VE) in Kenya. It was initiated partially due to the spill-over of instability from Somalia (International Crisis Group, 2012). Also, due to the perceived political and economic marginalization felt by some communities, especially in the coastal regions. This program operated as a pilot for the USG of the new concept of CVE programming (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014).

KTI was designed with the goal statement of trying to encourage: "Stronger identity and self-confidence of youth to allow them to reject extremism" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 26). KTI's planned method of reaching this goal was to address the relevant factors driving VE in the regions where they were working. KTI programming focused on supporting individuals, networks, and organizations already working on the ground through flexible funding mechanisms. The most common funding approach was to offer small, short-term sub-grants.

These were awarded to state (local government) or non-state actors (community groups, youth groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), private sector, and media). KTI also offered short term technical assistance to ongoing programs, including sending consultants; and, "direct procurement" activities were funded, including conducting studies and surveys (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 46). The sub-grants funded through KTI were required to adhere to a Partner Performance Monitoring Plan, which included multiple intermediate results and outcome and output indicators. Each sub-grantee was also required to submit a final report and may have submitted various interim reports. USAID designed the grants to target the key factors driving VE, which they divided into categories of "push" and "pull" factors.

"Push" factors are identified as the issues which drive youth towards VE. While "pull" factors are the things which attract youth to VE, such as: satisfaction of a personal struggle for purpose, direction, and/or identity (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 2). USAID defines VE as "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives" (USAID, 2011a, p. 2).[5] The following were identified, generally, as the key drivers of VE:

	PUSH FACTORS	**PULL FACTORS**
USAID 2011 POLICY PAPER ON CVE AND INSURGENCY	• Social marginalisation and fragmentation • Poorly governed/ungoverned areas • Government repression/rights violations	• Access to material resources • Social status and respect from peers • Belonging • Adventure

[5] It should be noted that, in this definition of VE, they are not making a distinction between those who support, advocate for, or participate in VE. This is a dilemma, which was analyzed in Chapter 4.

	• Endemic corruption and elite impunity • Cultural threat perceptions	• Self-esteem and personal empowerment • Prospect of glory or fame • Social networks • Presence of radical institutions or venues • Service provision by extremist groups • Involvement in economic activity

This provides a "master list" of drivers. However, program design should be based on the context of the program location. For KTI it was decided, according to preparatory research, that more effort should be put into addressing the "pull" factors than the "push" factors. This was partially due to the results of the surveys, which were conducted with the local people regarding what they felt were the most prominent factors leading to radicalization (Zeuthen, 2018). It was also due to the USAID hypothesis that "addressing push factors is necessary but not sufficient to reduce the draw towards extremism" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 47).

Both the Eastleigh (KTI-E) and Coastal (KTI-C) CVE programs were designed by an independent assessment and design team in 2010. The surveys were used as a local assessment to inform the design of programming. From the assessments, the team determined that the following were the most prominent factors in the local community leading to radicalization. Therefore, they were the factors on which the funding mechanisms should focus (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 16):

	PUSH FACTORS	**PULL FACTORS**
KTI - E	• Police harassment and corruption • Very high youth unemployment	• Highly radicalised religious environment

	• Idleness • Marginalisation • Racial and cultural profiling • Lack of social amenities • Youth estrangement and frustration	• Misinterpretation of religious teaching • Personal appeal and charisma of radical preachers • Appeal of the concept of global Muslim community • Influence of cyber preachers and Shaykhs
KTI – C	• Poverty and unemployment • Marginalisation • Unattended historical injustices • Police harassment and cultural profiling	• Misinterpretations of teachings on jihad • Radicalised Religious environment • Appeal by charismatic preachers • Hero worship of extremist individuals • Lack of effective mosque structures

Implementation of KTI CVE programing took place for KTI-E from 2011-2014 and KTI-C from 2012-2014. The wrap-up was conducted in 2014 and KTI engaged an independent consulting firm to evaluate their program through a qualitative study (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). This study was conducted by Khalil and Zeuthen, who also wrote the RUSI guidelines for CVE program design and evaluation. The report they produced was the primary source of data for this case study, supplemented by a few interview questions with Zeuthen (2018). The intention of the final study was to not only evaluate KTI's successfulness, but also to produce lessons learned for future CVE programming in Kenya (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). It, therefore, contributed to guidelines written by both USAID and RUSI. The lessons learned from KTI were valuable during the design of a new USAID CVE program, which has been operating in Kenya since 2016, called Kenya NiWajibu Wetu (NIWETU).

1.2 USG's Definition of CVE Programming

It is important to establish the USG's definition of CVE, as this is the framework under which USAID would have implemented the KTI CVE programming. The US counter-terrorism (CT) strategy has evolved rapidly since the September 11th attacks in 2001 (European Parliament, 2018). CVE terminology emerged about a decade after the attacks with developments in the *National Security Strategy* (2010, p. 26) such as this:

> Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens' basic needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly threaten the American people. To advance our common security, we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.

In 2010, a shift began to occur in the security conversation, directing it away from the predominately military response of the previous decade. It redirected the conversation to focus on the underlying factors which "foster instability" and "enable extremism". This shift led to a strengthening of the interagency partnerships between the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), and USAID. This encouraged cooperation on a joint security, diplomatic, and developmental approach to CVE. The conclusion was reached that: "While intertwined with political and security dynamics, many of the drivers of violent extremism and insurgency are development challenges. Indeed, factors such as socioeconomic inequalities, repression, corruption, and poor governance often create an enabling environment for radicalization and violent extremism" (USAID, 2011a, p. 1). This conclusion put USAID at the forefront of the partnership, with their extensive knowledge of development project implementation in conflict affected areas. They brought the following strengths to the partnership (USAID, 2011a, p. 6):

- Development and technical expertise;
- Research, assessment and program development tools;
- Field presence, local staff, and partners;
- Mobilization mechanisms for targeted, rapid-response field analysis, program design and implementation; and,
- Focus on sustainability.

The DoS and USAID thus began to focus their efforts on developmental projects aimed at investing in "countries' efforts to achieve sustained and broad-based economic growth, which creates opportunities for people to lift themselves out of poverty, away from violent extremism and instability, and toward a more prosperous future" (US DoS and USAID, 2010, p. ix).

This gave USAID a new directive, to provide development programming with the dual or exclusive purpose of CVE. The *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy* (USAID, 2011a) was thus developed to outline and guide USAID's new mission of CVE, in line with the USG's broader commitment to human rights and democracy. "The policy's intended result is that USAID designs and implements effective, evidence-based development programming targeting drivers of violent extremism and insurgency while systemically learning from and adapting its approaches" (USAID, 2011a, p. 1). This new role of development programming in CT strategy was formalized in the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* (2011, p.2):

> We are engaged in a broad, sustained and integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power-military, civilian, and the power of our values-together with the concerted efforts of allies, partners and multilateral institutions. These efforts must also be complemented by broader

> capabilities, such as diplomacy, development, strategic communications, and the power of the private sector.

In 2011, the USG CT strategy was still very focused on al-Qa'ida, due to the September 11th attacks. However, many of the basic tenants they developed for CT's overarching goals still carry through to revised editions, which are evolving with the changing threats. Those tenants are (US Executive Branch, 2011, pp. 8-10):

- Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests.
- Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qa'ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents.
- Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
- Eliminate Safehavens.
- Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities.
- Degrade Links between al-Qa'ida and its Affiliates and Adherents.
- Counter al-Qa'ida Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence that al-Qa'ida Exploits.
- Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means.

The mandate for CVE programming falls largely under the strategy to "Counter Ideology" and "Diminish the Specific Drivers of Violence" (US Executive Branch, 2011, pp. 9-10).

Under this mandate, USAID started including CVE programming as part of their development outreach. They began with the KTI CVE program. The USAID *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy* (2011a, p. 1) is a guide to:

- Outlining key concepts, drivers, and development responses;

- Elaborating specific engagement criteria and programming principles; and,
- Identifying institutional enhancements to support USAID's development role.

The policy did not specifically define CVE, rather it defined USAID's "responses" to VE as:

> …often preventive – aimed at preempting radicalization by mitigating specific drivers. Programming usually targets specific geographic areas and/or subpopulations deemed vulnerable to the extremist appeal. In many contexts, USAID programming in this area is small scale and distinct, and often accompanies a larger, ongoing development portfolio. (USAID, 2011a, p. 4)

The language of their definition could be applied to the concept known today as preventing violent extremism (PVE). However, for the purposes of this case study, it will be designated as CVE. Since KTI ended there has been more clarity given to the CVE definition, programming design, and goals. This is due to its increased profile in USG CT strategies. Up until 2016, partnerships between the DoS and USAID were strengthened. They benefitted from the lessons learned from pioneering programs like KTI and more deeply entrenched the "security-development nexus" into the US National Security and National CT Strategies (DoS and USAID, 2016). The base principles of addressing "push" and "pull" drivers of VE and targeting areas deemed contextually more disposed to VE are the pillars of US CVE programming. As shown above, the USG is committed to observing human rights, which include gender equality. The policy paper specifically identified human rights violations as a "pull" factor of VE (USAID, 2011a). Using these base USG definitions, in the next section I conduct analysis on how USAID KTI programming matches up to the guides and policy paper published by USAID in 2009 and 2011 respectively.

2. Gaps in Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

CVE was a new concept when KTI CVE programming was being developed. However, USAID had commissioned two guides to be written: the *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b) and *Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to Programming* (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a). These guides later shaped their *Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency Policy* (USAID, 2011a). This policy paper was the foundation for the program design and evaluation of KTI. While USAID contracted out much of the fieldwork for KTI CVE programming to local NGOs and CSOs, through their small-grants program, the overall program management was conducted by USAID. Thus, ultimately, it was designed and evaluated according to their guidelines and policies. I, therefore, use these two guides and the policy paper as the base standard for my analysis. The guides and policy paper were reviewed in Chapter 4, in comparison with RUSI's established CVE guidelines, for the purpose of determining "best practices" for successful CVE program design and evaluation. The gaps between KTI's practices and "best practice" are analyzed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. However, first I examine the major gaps between the original USG definition for CVE and how it was implemented through the KTI CVE program.

2.1 "Say-Do" Gap in Definition of CVE Programming

This section identifies where the gaps are in between the definition of CVE implemented by USAID's KTI programming and the original USG definition. This is important as it relates back to my first research question and the expectations of the security framework within which CVE programming is implemented. Through analysis of this section I can show how lack of commitment to human security principles has contributed to these gaps. As shown in Section 1.2, the USG in their *National Security Strategy* (2010) and their *National Strategy for*

Counterterrorism (2011) committed to using an interagency, multi-tiered approach to addressing the structural issues or "underlying political and economic deficits", which can become push factors for VE (US Executive Branch, 2010, p. 26). I find that this commitment got lost in the difficulties of time and budget constraints for CVE programming, which needed to be able to show quick outcome results to continue receiving funding. This illustrates the "say-do" gap in the definition of CVE. The *Guide to the Driver of Violent Extremism* (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b, p. 11) suggests that:

> From a programmatic perspective, and particularly given funding constraints, explanations based on structural factors are not particularly helpful or practical. Typically, efforts to bring about significant reductions in such alleged "root causes" as high unemployment, pervasive poverty, systematic political exclusion, endemic corruption, and a lack of political and economic opportunities (to name but a few) will require large-scale investments, carried out through hard-to-implement and expensive programs sustained over long periods of time.

While USAID is not denying the importance of addressing the "root causes," they are suggesting that the USG has not committed enough time or money to CVE programs to carry out the mission of the original definition of CVE programming. This is very similar to the definitional gap found between the EU's definition of CVE and how RUSI designed and implemented programming.

Differently to the EU's and RUSI's planning, USAID has made a clear definitional distinction between VE and insurgency. USAID defines VE as: "advocating, engaging in, preparing, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives" (USAID, 2011a, p. 2); while,

> Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. It is primarily a political and territorial struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for

> their political, economic, and influence activities to be effective. Insurgency is not always conducted by a single group with a centralized, military style command structure, but may involve different actors with various aims, loosely connected in networks. (DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2009, p. 2)

I argue that USAID uses the slight distinction between VE and insurgency to justify narrowing the application definition of their CVE programming. USAID suggests that:

> While violent extremism and insurgency share many of the same drivers, they differ in their degree of organization, support base, and use of violence. Violent extremism, for example, often manifests itself at the individual level and in highly informal, diffuse networks. Such networks are often transnational in character, while insurgencies are often delimited by geography. Also, violent extremism can exist in quite stable environments, as well as in semi-permissive and non-permissive contexts associated with insurgencies. In certain cases, violent extremism and insurgency can overlap. (USAID, 2011a, p. 2)

This distinction between VE and insurgency gives USAID definitional room to focus the scale of their CVE programming down to the "at risk" individuals and "pull" factors. Therefore, they do not have to design their programming to be long-term enough to address the large-scale political and economic "push" factors, which the USG CVE definition requires. The large-scale programming design is saved for counter-insurgency (COIN) programming. They seek to contain and diminish support for ongoing insurgency by taking a more comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach. USAID refers to this as the "interagency stabilization effort" (USAID, 2011a, p. 4). I think that the COIN programming distinction limits the scope of ability for CVE programming. It cannot address all the contextual drivers, because it is not provided with the programming capacity to address both "push" and "pull" factors. Ultimately, implementing CVE programming with the expectation of fulfilling short-term state security goals severely limits its ability to address the complex and deeply rooted issues of emancipation and human security.

2.2 Implementation Gap

In conjunction with the definitional gap above, the limitation in scope for KTI is largely due to budget and time constraints (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b, p. 11). This is what I am calling an implementation gap. The implementation gap is the difference between how programs are defined and how they are actually designed, once project budget and scope have been determined by the government. KTI's programming in Eastleigh began in August 2011, almost a year before the coastal programs began in mid-2012. The total budget spent on Eastleigh programming was $2,422,576. This amount had to cover the cost of 53 small-scale sub-grants, 10 short term technical assistants and consultants, and 11 studies and surveys conducted. The coastal programming portion only received about half of that. $1,379,582 had to cover 30 sub-grants, 1 consultant, and 3 studies and surveys. Therefore, the total budget for KTI was $3,802,158 (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 46). This budget is exponentially smaller than other projects undertaken by USAID. For example, the USAID development program focused on improving education in Kenya had a budget of $30 million for just the fiscal year 2015 (USAID, 2015). In its definition of CVE, the USG recognized that there was a need for large-scale, long-term programming. However, it did not give USAID the budget or timeframe to complete that kind of programming. This ultimately shows a lack of commitment by the USG to CVE programming, and to funding the full scope of factors which lead to VE.

This implementation gap is what led USAID to undertake the small-scale funding mechanism model. This is an easy way to complete short-term projects with practitioners who are already operating in the field. However, there is a lack of consistency and coordination to it. While "sustainability" is one of the programming expertise categories that USAID supposedly brought to the interagency cooperation table, I do not find this method of programming to be

the most sustainable. Under this model, target communities are often not given consistent access to programming and resources. In order to verify my data I conducted an interview with Martine Zeuthen (2018), who was one of the primary researchers on the independent team which wrote the final assessment in the wrap-up stages of the KTI CVE program. She indicated that this approach was successful for USAID, in that it allowed them to complete programs quickly and relatively inexpensively. It also allowed them to show results for a number of programs in a short time frame. However, she commented how this small, short-term grant style limits the scope of work that can be accomplished. It is a "quick and dirty approach," which is successful for creating metrics. However, it does not allow for any types of projects that require longer time commitments, or for programs to focus on any types of goals that require more incremental change (Zeuthen, 2018).

This style of short-term funding mechanisms may explain why KTI chose to approach programming with a gender-blind perspective. Gender inequality is a deeply rooted social issue. Therefore, it would require a significant time and financial commitment to design sustainable programming, which would be able to challenge existing forms of inequality in society. Ultimately, I find that the time and financial limitations, placed upon this pilot USAID CVE program, did not allow it to sufficiently address the "push" and "pull" factors identified as leading to VE in this area. Therefore, the implementation gap led to a programming strategy which was not focused on improving overall human security, rather filling state security gaps. This is not necessarily a failing of USAID, but rather of USG commitment to the definition of CVE it espouses. The programming choices of USAID are made in line with the resources they are provided. Unfortunately, the implementation gaps contribute significantly to the program design and evaluation gaps, which are discussed further in the next section.

2.3 Program Design and Evaluation Gaps

The implementation gaps, as described above, contribute significantly to the largest gaps I found between the "best practices" established in Chapter 4 and how the KTI CVE program was designed and evaluated. The most prominent program design gap I found was in the predetermined effort to focus on "pull" factors. In order to better analyze this gap, it is important to clarify what the USAID guidelines are for the determination of drivers. As discussed in Chapter 4, USAID divided the drivers of VE into two categories, "push" and "pull" factors. They used their experience of field work and research in conflict situations to develop these categories. They found that these two categories would help them to better design their interventions. USAID emphasized that multiple factors are usually affecting each context and are often interrelated. Therefore, programming needs to be able to address different kinds of grievances and drivers.

USAID commissioned A *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Denoeux and Carter, 2009b). This guide defined "push" factors as socioeconomic, political, and cultural conditions which increase the appeal of VE. These factors can be things such as (USAID, 2011a, pp. 3-4):

- High levels of social marginalization and fragmentation
- Poorly governed or ungoverned areas
- Government repression and human rights violations
- Endemic corruption and elite impunity
- Cultural threat perceptions

However, in addition to "push" factors, USAID found that "pull" factors are also required for individuals to become radicalized. The guide designated "pull" factors as often related to personal rewards for turning to VE. They could be things such as (USAID, 2011a, p. 4):

- access to material resources, social status and respect from peers;
- a sense of belonging, adventure, and self-esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and,
- the prospect of achieving glory and fame.

All these drivers make up the USAID definition of CVE and should guide the design of programming. However, the definitional and implementation gaps introduced in the above sections impacted the way in which USAID ranked importance of these drivers. Ultimately, the gaps led them to focus most of their attention on the "pull" factors, while leaving aside the larger structural challenges of the "push" factors.

2.3.1 Design Challenges

As discussed in Section 2.1, there is a gap between the USG definition of CVE and how USAID's KTI program defines CVE. I find that this definitional gap led to USAID approaching KTI CVE program design with an intent to focus more on the "pull" factors than the "push," irrespective of what the local research determined about the most prominent drivers of VE (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). This shows a lack of proper research methodology. Unfortunately, this is a continuing issue throughout. KTI completed qualitative surveys as their primary method of field research for determination of regional contextual drivers for this programming. The following is an overview of the research which led them to identify specific "push" factors as the most regionally relevant (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014: 17-20):

- **Discrimination or Profiling**: These are very commonly discussed drivers of VE in the Kenyan context. USAID cited evidence provided by the International Crisis Group (2012, p. 10), which reported that "the war against Al-Shabaab has led to an increase in ethnic profiling and discrimination against Somalis in particular, and Muslims in general." They also cited the Institute for Security Studies, which similarly stated that "members of the Somalia-Kenyan and Somali communities claim to be victims of racial or ethnic profiling and to have been rounded up and arrested for little reason other than their race and ethnicity" (Botha, 2013, p. 9).

- **Security Force Harassment**: USAID found, in their regional research on VE "push factors," that there was explicit anger amongst the youth regarding the way that they are mistreated by the authorities, especially the police. The Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) was particularly identified by KIT-C participants as a key driver of tension.

- **Poverty**: This is a commonly cited driver of VE. However, there is some skepticism regarding this factor in the literature. USAID research indicates that most of those arrested or suspected of involvement in VE tend to be from middle- or upper-class families and are relatively better off than the average citizen.

- **Unemployment**: This is another driver which is commonly cited but is surrounded by some controversy. USAID cited a Mercy Corps study, conducted in Somaliland, as indicating that "actual employment status did not relate to propensity towards political violence" (Jolicoeur, 2013, pp. 1, 6). However, Mercy Corps also suggested, from research done in Kenya, that there is a positive relationship between having employment and a lower likelihood of participation in political violence.

Additionally, the most regionally relevant "pull" factors were identified by the following research (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 21):

- **Material Incentives**: USAID found that economic drivers were a motivation for recruitment into Al-Shabaab, as it was found that the group offered a salary to its members.

- **Fear**: The possibility was indicated that individuals were being coerced to join Al-Shabaab. However, this motivation can be overstated.

- **Vengeance**: USAID's research on the coast indicated that recruitment can be boosted by the killing of leading community figures, or even due to the involvement of Kenyan forces in Somalia. Al-Shabaab claimed that the Westgate attack in 2013 was a response to Kenyan interference (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 21).

This data was used to determine the most significant drivers of VE in the region. After their determination, KTI was required to rank the importance of these drivers. However, there is room for interpretation in this step, and KTI did not fully understand or document the subjectivity of this process (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014).

A couple of methodology issues come into question, during the process of identifying and ranking drivers for programming design. First, as discussed in Chapter 4, only having two categories of drivers limits, in some ways, the clarity with which the drivers can be ranked for programming component design. This is why RUSI allotted three categories of drivers: structural motivators, individual incentives, and enabling factors. Having only two categories requires the program designer to narrow the definition of the driver, in order to fit it into one of two category choices. For example, from the research KTI conducted there were three

reoccurring drivers identified. They were poverty, state repression, and material enticements (i.e. incentives offered by VE groups for certain activities) (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 3). Under the "push"/"pull" factor design of USAID, poverty and state repression would both be considered "push" factors and material enticements would be a "pull" factor. Even though two of the identified reoccurring factors fell into the "push" category, KTI was still predetermined to place more programming focus on "pull" factors. Thus, they did not give proportional representation to the contextual drivers. Therefore, they violated the first step of their own program design guide (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a).

Another example of questionable application of research methods was how USAID used qualitative survey response data to try to assign a numerical figure to the importance of drivers (see chart in Section 2.1). They identified seven primary "push" factors and five "pull" in the KTI-E region. This indicates that "push" factors should have been given a larger percentage of the programming focus, instead of intentionally weighting the importance of "pull" factors. For KTI-C they identified only 4 primary "push" factors and five "pull," so the increased focus on "pull" factors in this region was justified (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). However, Khalil and Zeuthen (2014, pp. 49-50) point out that you cannot quantify numerical percentages with a qualitative/subjective study. These indicators should be used to simply rank importance of factors, instead of assigning them a figure. Ranking importance of drivers is part of Step 6 in the guide (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a). However, appropriate methods must be applied. Otherwise, certainty is assigned to the results, which is unsubstantiated by the research data. As shown below, KTI used the data from the surveys to assign percentage points, ranking them out of 100%, to each of the regional factors they identified. Through this process they failed to consider the methodological issues with quantifying their data. Additionally, they failed to

consider that other factors, not identified by their research, might have also been influential. Their ranking system is show in the following chart (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, pp. 49-50):

	PUSH FACTORS	**PULL FACTORS**
KTI - E	• Police harassment and corruption (9%) • Very high youth unemployment (7%) • Idleness (6%) • Marginalisation (5%) • Racial and cultural profiling (5%) • Lack of social amenities (5%) • Youth estrangement and frustration (3%)	• Highly radicalised religious environment (15%) • Misinterpretation of religious teaching (15%) • Personal appeal and charisma of radical preachers (11%) • Appeal of the concept of global Muslim community (10%) • Influence of cyber preachers and Shaykhs (9%)

With these figures they justified their focus on "pull" factors, because they assigned them a greater percentage of the problem. This is not a methodologically valid assessment.

There were many challenges which factored into KTI's ranking of drivers, and ultimately influenced the focus of their program component designs. Some of the decision for the ranking of drivers was made simply based on the budget and timeframe limitations. These gaps limited the potential scope of the project, as discussed above. Other decisions were based on program implementation challenges.

> KTI's CVE program is a pilot program for USAID in that both components (KTI-E and KTI-C) were designed as specific CVE interventions and use CVE funds. Both were designed in 2010 by an independent assessment and design team. Both focus on the pull factors to extremism instead of the push factors that traditional development programs address. The hypothesis is that addressing push factors is necessary but not sufficient to reduce the draw towards extremism. Further, KTI found very early on that addressing the key push factors (livelihoods, legal residence, and government attitudes towards

> youth) are extremely difficult in the Kenyan context. (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 47)

This illustrates how KTI chose to reduce the importance of addressing "push" factors because it was "difficult". When I asked Zeuthen (2018) about what makes the Kenyan context more difficult, she replied that it is because CVE is so politicized in Kenya. She stated how the government of Kenya (GoK) is very uncomfortable with conversations which could be perceived as saying they are not doing a good job, or as being critical of their policies. They have made great efforts on CVE and do not want them to be overlooked. She emphasized how even discussing social issues, like marginalization, is very difficult to do with the GoK.

Ultimately, even though the definition of CVE is to address "push" and "pull" factors which lead to VE, the CVE programs are not equipped with the resources or time to address the full array of factors. KTI did not have the capacity to reduce the impact of all VE drivers. They are also often not equipped to build the necessary relationships of trust and diplomacy, which are required to encourage local participation and sustainable programming. This leaves programming with no option but to limit its scope. Therefore, programming must be designed to address the small array of "pull" factors which it can realistically impact, within the budget, time, and other restrictions it faces. These program design gaps are link to both the definitional and implementation gaps. Unfortunately, the design gaps only compound in the evaluation process.

2.3.2 Evaluation Challenges

The short-term grant system KTI employed allowed them to gather metrics in a short time frame. They designed programming this way so they could show "successful" use of budget and time back to the USG, which was important as this was a pilot program for the new CVE concept. The system also allowed them to utilize the resources and capabilities of currently

existing NGOs and CSOs. They funded program components, which were already recognized by existing regional programming, in order to quickly to address key factors leading to VE. However, this system denied them the capacity to start up long-term programming or programming aimed at addressing newly identified drivers, which were not already being addressed by existing programming (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). This led to drivers being ignored or disregarded due to the limitation of there being no convenient grantees to implement the programming component. While flexible short-term grants were good for reporting, they did not develop a good environment for continuity or sustainability, which are key evaluative elements identified by USAID guidance. Programming:

> …must seek to reconcile the competing demands of responsiveness and adaptability on the one hand,and steadiness and steadfastness on the other. A measure of continuity is essential to signalling determination and commitment. It helps reassure local partners that one will "stay the course," and conveys to the enemy that one will not be deterred or distracted. (Denoeux and Carter, 2009a, p. 48)

Without a sense of reliability, it is hard to build the trust with the local community, CSOs, NGOs, and government bodies. This trust is necessary for programming goals to be sustainable beyond the length of the CVE program itself.

KTI did display success against their own goals. However, without the continued presence of USAID or the presence of another donor government, many of their initiatives ended with their CVE programming cycle. Therefore, drivers of VE they had targeted unfortunately remained relevant.

> The termination of KTI leaves an obvious vacuum in CVE that the Kenyan state and other actors cannot yet fill. With this in mind, … [KTI programming could] incorporate capacity building of the state machinery (both security providers and public administrators) in CVE as an element of the wider KTI exit strategy. (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 34)

This illustrates a program evaluation gap in their results framework. They did not consider sustainability as a goal. Therefore, they did not make the necessary intermediate result markers to check whether they were developing local ability to continue with programming after KTI completion. I found that this was the most significant gap in their results framework. However, along with other gaps, this points back to the definitional gap. The USG defined CVE as a long-term, large-scale solution. However, they did not supply the necessary elements for USAID KTI programming to be designed as such. Additionally, as this was a pilot program, CVE "best practices" were still be designed at the time. Therefore, USAID did not have many previous lessons learned upon which to make their design and evaluation choices.

Another program evaluation tool, which was identified in Chapter 4, that they did not employ was the use of "theories of change" (ToCs). Without this program design and evaluation tool, they were not challenging their own assumptions. This can be illustrated with something as fundamental to their programming as their goal statement. Their statement was: "Stronger identity and self-confidence of youth to allow them to reject extremism" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 26). This is a difficult standard of measurement because it is not entirely clear in definition. They did not apply a ToC to the main goal of their project. Therefore, their system of targeting "vulnerable" youth was insufficient, due largely to a questionable process used to determine who were the most vulnerable (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 38). Determining "vulnerability" is a complex issue, as was discussed in the RUSI case study (Chapter 5). KTI's determination process for how to identify the most "vulnerable" youth failed to encompass proper research methods, or even to acknowledge the difficulty in making assumptions around determining vulnerability. Additionally, other key goal statement concepts such as "identity" and "extremism" were not suitably defined or clarified. Thus, it is impossible to properly

define the result they were seeking. Without a clear result in mind testing ToCs becomes impossible. You cannot test if programming components would lead to the desired result, if you do not know the result you are seeking.

The independent final evaluation found KTI to be a success overall (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). I agree that they did provide some valuable lessons learned and that they piloted a program which made good use of the resources and expectations they were given. However, I find that the above gaps illustrate some of the significant departures from their own "best practices". These gaps left the program design and evaluation process of KTI weak. This weakness can be traced back to the definitional gap about what security framework CVE programming is intended to fill. The USG did not ultimately provide the required resources for programming to fulfill human security goals. Instead, they expected KTI to be able to demonstrate short-term results by reducing the immediate threat of VE.

3. Understanding of Gender in Program Design and Evaluation

I chose USAID KTI as an example of a CVE program implemented with a gender-blind perspective. This allows me to illustrate how programming conducted under this perspective does not take gender into account, therefore does not gather any data on gender. Ultimately, the commonality of this type of gender-blind research, meant that I was not able to support my original hypothesis that gendered mainstreaming improves successfulness of CVE programming. However, this part of the research process led to me to focus on two research questions in order to generate some new knowledge about gender analysis in CT policy.

I find that the gender-blind perspective of this programming leaves it lacking clarity. This is similar to the lack of clarity described in the above section, with KTI not addressing some of the key definitions of their goal statement. It is possible that this lack of clarity was purposeful, so as to make it easier to get around difficulties of program implementation. However, it may also have been a lack of understanding of the need for clarity in program design. Either way, it illustrates a gap in understanding. This gap allowed KTI to disregard the factor of gender inequality in society, even though it would arguably fall under two identified "push" factors. Social marginalization and human rights violations are both highlighted as key drivers of VE in the policy paper's "master list" (USAID, 2011a). In the same paper, understanding of the role of gender is identified as fundamental:

> Gaps remain in USAID's understanding of violent extremism and insurgency. This includes the role of gender. Women may act as both a potential brake on, as well as a driver of, violent extremism. Some suggest that family ties, and women's roles in families, create psychological barriers for husbands, sons, or other male relatives to join violent extremist groups. Others have asserted that women may serve as motivators for male family members to join. Understanding the role of gender at the local level is fundamental. (USAID, 2011a, p. 4)

From this statement it can be determined that USAID equated gender with women, in a similar manner to RUSI. However, their policy emphasis on understanding the fundamental nature of the role of gender is not carried through to KTI CVE programming. Therefore, no data was gathered throughout the programming cycle, with which to analyze its importance.

KTI's gender-blind perspective means that they did not intentionally address the issue of gender in any way. Instead, they retained the gender status quo in the societies where they worked. This does not mean that they did not work with both men and women. Rather, it means that they did not consider the gendered element a factor, therefore they did not try to overcome any gendered barriers which might exist in society (True, 2013). The only place in

which women are mentioned specifically in their program design was in Intermediate Result 1.3, on their Results Framework. It stated that programming should result in: "Improved Messaging and Outreach Capacity of Moderate Voices Including Women and Religious Leaders" (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014, p. 3). This displays the same gender essentialism as was present in RUSI's approach. USAID determined that all women are naturally peaceful, and therefore can be used as a resource to moderate extremism in society. There was no gender data gathered to support this claim. However, one of the programming components was still aimed at increasing the outreach capacity of women and religious leaders as moderate voices. This another example of where there was a lack of ToC employed. A ToC should have been used to test if this theory, based in gender essentialism, would lead to the expected outcome.

As shown in Chapter 5 with the RUSI case study, under feminist theories there are various strands of gender analysis, which provide multiple ways to examine its impact on society. Each of these strands also highlight the many ways in which gender is intertwined with issues of VE and therefore CVE. Unfortunately, the data is not available with the USAID KTI case study to conduct this analysis. However, I argue that gender is present throughout the "push" and "pull" factors identified as regionally important to this programming. I also posit that a more thorough understanding of gender and a gender-inclusive perspective would have benefitted KTI's program design and evaluation processes. Since KTI programming completed, the partnership between the DoS and USAID has grown. With that partnership, more commitment has been made to the inclusion and understanding of gender.

> State and USAID will expand programs that engage women as key stakeholders in preventing and countering violent extremism in their communities. Women's groups and individual women can play a critical role in identifying and addressing drivers of violent extremism in their families, communities, and broader society. State and USAID will ensure that these

> programs are informed by rigorous analysis of existing gender dynamics in communities and take into account the fact that women's perceptions of violence and security may be different than those of men in the community. (DoS and USAID, 2016)

This illustrates some improvement in USAID's recognition of the importance of women. However, it still does not display a complete understanding of the complexity of gender and the multitude of ways in which it impacts society, security, and VE.

4. Conclusion

KTI, as a case study, allows for strong comparisons to RUSI on gaps between government definition of CVE programming and the resources which are being allotted to implementation of CVE programming. It also allows for comparison between the "best practices" devised for CVE programming design and evaluation in Chapter 4, versus the actual in-the-field program design and evaluation being conducted by implementing agencies. Due to KTI's perspective as a gender-blind case, it does not allow for the in-depth analysis of gendered program components. However, it does illustrate how for KTI CVE programming, and the many other programs which are implemented with this perspective, the data is not being gathered in order to address the integration of gender equality in security and in CVE. This is despite international level commitments to the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and gender mainstreaming. The gender-blind perspective leaves many gaps in programming. This is due to lack of understanding of the fundamental ways in which gender is influencing the "push" and "pull" factors CVE programming is aiming to address.

KTI was able to fulfill many of its own goals. Also, as a pilot program, it was able to display some of the benefits of its program design. However, I find that the lack of gender

understanding and perspective, which contributed to program design, implementation, and evaluation gaps, left KTI CVE programming ultimately unable to make a meaningful and sustainable impact. As a secondary, comparison case study, KTI has highlighted the negative impact of the gender-blind approach. The next chapter will present another secondary, comparison case. It will highlight a CVE program which takes a gender-sensitive approach. Therefore, each of these secondary, comparison cases are presenting the opposing extremes of the gender perspective spectrum. They are, also, each closely compared with the central perspective of the primary RUSI case study.

CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY – UN WOMEN KENYA

1. Introduction

The United Nations (UN) Women program entitled "Engaging Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremist Violence in Kenya" is my third case study of a countering violent extremism (CVE) program. It is my second supplementary, comparison case study. It represents the gender-sensitive perspective, which is the opposite side of the spectrum from the previous chapter. Due to their opposing ends on the spectrum of gender perspective, the two secondary cases are compared most closely with the central, primary Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) case study. This UN Women case study is used to analyze the differences between the UN and the European Union (EU) on CVE definition and programming design, implementation, and evaluation. I analyze UN Women's CVE program against the "best practices" established in Chapter 4. It must be noted that the UN primarily follows the guidance of the international community on CVE program design and evaluation, instead of developing their own set of guidelines.

Due to the gathering of gender data being a directive of this gender-sensitive program, I am able to analyze the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming more efficiently. However, there are still some gaps, which I highlight. First, I examine the definition of CVE which this program adheres to and compare it with my primary case study. I also look at the way it defines and uses gender in program design, implementation, and evaluation. As this case was primarily designed to engage women, it provides a depth of data for gender analysis on programming. While the gender-sensitive programming approach does overcome many of the obstacles other implementors faced with gendered programming, data from this secondary case also helps to illustrate that there are still more obstacles to face. For example, it has still not yet fully

identified the complexity of gender and the multitude of ways in which is it part of the security problem and solution.

1.1 Case Study Overview

I chose the UN Women CVE program in Kenya as a case study example of a CVE program being implemented with a gender-sensitive and human rights-based approach (RBA). The number of programs being implemented with this perspective is very limited. This approach is the most consistent, out of the three case studies, with my recommendations on understanding of gender. However, this CVE program is atypical, due to it being implemented by an entity focused specifically on women. This makes it a good comparison study. The UN is a global intergovernmental organization, which has many divisions and mandates. UN Women is the common name for the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women, no date). This CVE program was introduced in response to a surge of VE in Kenya in the preceding few years, and a substantial shift in Kenya's security landscape. UN Women indicated, "Violent extremist groups including Al Shabab influence in Kenya and the region is growing, with negative impacts on the rights of women and girls, creating urgent and unforeseen need to promote and advance women's active participation in efforts to prevent and respond to extremist violence in Kenya" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 7).

The CVE program was introduced as part of the UN Women Strategic Note 2014-2018 which was developed in 2013, in consultation with the national development priorities of Kenya. Kenya has a long-term national development plan called Kenya's Vision 2030. However, this particular program was described in the 2nd Medium Term Plan, which covered the years 2014-2018. The five impact areas of this Plan, which are particularly linked to the UN Women Strategic Note, are as follows (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 44):

1. Women lead and participate in governance;
2. Economically empowered women benefitting from public procurement and agriculture value chains;
3. Women and girls progressively living a life free from violence;
4. Peace, security and humanitarian action are shaped by women's leadership and participation;
5. National and devolved planning fully reflects accountability for gender equality commitments and priorities.

The fourth impact area particularly focuses on the participation of women in the security process and their role in shaping and leading conflict prevention and resolution programming. This role is advocated for by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2242, which was adopted during the process of this CVE program's design in October of 2015. UNSCR 2242 was the eighth UNSCR on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and it supported the strongest link yet between CVE programming and WPS. It calls on all UN Member States to more strongly link together their WPS, counter-terrorism (CT), and CVE agendas, in order to more effectively counter terrorism and its root causes (Abdilatif, 2017, pp. 43-44).

In order to fulfill their commitment to Kenya's national priorities, UN Women implemented the project "Engaging Women in Preventing and Countering Extremist Violence in Kenya" from 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017. It took place in five counties, which were determined particularly vulnerable to radicalization, recruitment, and attacks. These included three coastal counties: Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi, and two counties in northern Kenya: Wajir and Mandera (Abdilatif, 2017). UN Women implemented the project in partnership with the Institute of

Security Studies (ISS), the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, and multiple civil society organizations (CSOs). Specifically: Wajir Women for Peace in Wajir County, Horn of Africa Women Empowerment Network Kenya Agency (HAWENKA) in Mandera County, and Human Rights Agenda (HURIA) in the coastal regions- covering Kilifi, Mombasa and Kwale Counties. These CSOs supported "capacity building through trainings of women on identifying early signs of radicalization and building their confidence to meaningfully engage with security authorities and conflict resolution skills" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 7). UN Women also engaged closely in partnerships with government of Kenya (GoK) offices, such as: the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC); the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC); the Office of the President, which is responsible for implementing the national counter-terrorism strategy; and, the County Peace Secretariats.

> UN Women will work closely with the Ministry of Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs, and the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (MoICNG) to foster strategic engagement with the National Steering Committee on Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and support mainstreaming preventing and countering violent extremism policy and programming in their interventions. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 45)

The CVE program was implemented with funding donated by the Government of Japan. Therefore, the final evaluation report was commissioned by UN Women to fulfil their commitment to the Japanese government for evaluation. The majority of the data gathered for this case study comes from this final evaluation report (Abdilatif, 2017). The two key outcomes of the project were (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 2):

1. To undertake targeted and gender sensitive research on the drivers that motivate men and women to join in violent extremism that can inform an evidence-based approach to prevention and response efforts; and,

2. Strengthening the capacity of women's civil society groups to engage in efforts to prevent and counter extremist violence.

The program was designed with three impact levels: local, national, and international. On the local level, programming filled the gender gap left by the government and other CVE projects operating in the area which did not include women. Nationally, the project helped to further the GoK's *National Strategy to Counter-Terrorism* (NSCT). It also contributed to the development of gender-sensitive county CVE plans. Both of these elements are aimed at reducing violent extremism (VE) in these particularly vulnerable counties. Internationally, UN Women's CVE program fulfilled the requirements of UNSCR 2242, which had been adopted just prior to its inception.

> The project deliverables contributed to the UN Women's global programme that seeks to address root causes of extremist violence through strengthened women's empowerment and participation in CVE and generation of a relevant evidence base that has been used (and is being used) to inform integration of gender and women's participation in CVE plans, strategies and related efforts. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 2)

It was a program anchored in women's empowerment and getting women involved in peace and security issues. These are key elements of the UN's plan of action on CVE priorities.

The program design and evaluation elements are not as much of a focus in this case. Therefore, the analysis of these sections will be somewhat limited. Their practices are measured against the "best practices" outlined in Chapter 4, because the UN did not develop its own guidelines for CVE program design and evaluation. However, this case provides the ability to conduct important analysis on the effectiveness of gender mainstreaming. UN Women were focused on conducting gender-sensitive research and gathering gender data. UN Women's research will be published, in order to produce lessons learned for future CVE program planning.

1.2 UN's Definition of CVE Programming

The UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy was originally adopted by the General Assembly in September 2006 (UN, 2006a). The UN is the primary international body which compiles and produces international guidelines on "best practices" for CT and CVE programming. 2006 was the first time that a consensus had been reached, among Member States, regarding a common approach to prevent and fight terrorism. While these resolutions are not binding, they are adopted by Member States and do encourage governments worldwide to abide by a central set of principles. There are four pillars which are the foundation of the UN Global Strategy (UN, 2006b):

I. Addressing the Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism

II. Preventing and Combatting Terrorism

III. Building States' Capacity and Strengthening the Role of the United Nations

IV. Ensuring Human Rights and the Rule of Law

These pillars have guided the biennial review of the Strategy and have informed the updates and improvements which have been made since its original 2006 adoption. Additionally, the biennial reviews keep the document attuned to the CT priorities of the Member States. While all the pillars are aimed at countering terrorism, some are focused on more military or legal strategies rather than CVE.

Pillar I is the pillar which expresses CVE principles for national CT strategies. When this Strategy was originally adopted in 2006, CVE terminology had not yet prominently emerged. However, according to the description below, the principles of Pillar I make up the UN definition of CVE.

> Pillar I of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy commits Member States to implementing measures to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, such as preventing and resolving conflicts, encouraging economic development, reducing social exclusion and marginalization and fostering understanding among peoples of varied religions and cultures through dialogue. These measures serve as effective tools for countering the appeal of terrorism by reducing the chances of radicalization and violent extremism of vulnerable groups. Pillar I also emphasizes the need to support victims of terrorism and their families and support and engage with civil society groups, particularly women and youth. (UN, 2006b)

There are four subheadings under Pillar I, which divide out the goals above. The following are considered key points of the Global CT Strategy (UN, 2006b):

A. Countering the appeal of terrorism

B. Preventing and resolving conflicts

C. Fostering dialogue and understanding

D. Promoting economic and social development

With the emergence of CVE terminology, some have tried to separate these goals from that of CT. This was done in an effort to distance CVE from the securitization and human rights violations associated with CT. However, all these key points were agreed as part of the Global CT Strategy.

> In its resolution 2178 (2014), the Security Council makes explicit the link between violent extremism and terrorism, underscores the importance of measures being in line with international norms and recognizes the need for prevention: 'violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism', requires collective efforts, 'including preventing radicalization, recruitment and mobilization of individuals into terrorist groups and becoming foreign terrorist fighters'. (UN, 2015b, p. 2)

Therefore, the Global CT Strategy was the foundation of the international commitment to and guidance on CVE policy.

Prior to the mainstream emergence of CVE terminology and its emphasis on addressing human rights violations and marginalization, there was also development of the WPS Agenda in the UN starting in 2000. This began with the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325. While UNSCRs do not require the same large subscription of Member States as General Assembly Resolutions, they do require a majority vote of the Security Council Member States. Also, they are often issues supported by the UN Secretary General. The WPS agenda was the first international agreement which indicated that women should be included in all levels of decision making in security processes. This is necessary in order to find successful methods of mitigating conflict and building peace. There are four pillars of WPS: Participation, Prevention, Protection, and Relief and Recovery. These pillars cover a wide range of conflict situations in which women need to be granted more proportional attention. WPS also highlights that women need to be considered equal participants in peace and security processes.

The following are the key provisions of UNSCR 1325 (UN, 2000):

- Increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making.
- Attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict.
- Gender perspective in post-conflict processes.
- Gender perspective in UN programming, reporting, and in SC missions.
- Gender perspective & training in UN peace support operations.

Since the passing of UNSCR 1325 in 2000 there have been seven more UNSCRs which include the WPS agenda. They are: 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015). UNSCR 2242 reaffirms the WPS agenda and

the importance of including women in the processes of conflict mitigation and resolution. UNSCR 2242 achieved the most support yet, with unanimous adoption and co-sponsorship by 71 Member States. This UNSCR also established the strongest yet links between gender and successful CVE programming. It includes "a commitment to integrate a gender analysis on the drivers and impacts of violent extremism and greater consultations with women's organizations affected by this violence…and states the need for more senior women leaders in all levels of decision-making in peace and security" (UN Women, 2015b). The development of UNSCR 2242 occurred in conjunction with research and analysis for the 2016 biennial review of the Global CT Strategy.

The *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* (UN, 2015b) also emerged as part of the 2016 review of the Global CT Strategy. "In the Plan, the Secretary-General calls for a comprehensive approach encompassing not only essential security-based counter-terrorism measures but also systematic preventive steps to address the underlying conditions that drive individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups" (UN, 2016). This Plan includes more than 70 recommendations, which are intended to help Member States develop National Action Plans (NAPs) for CVE programming. They are also intended to help guide CVE program design and evaluation (UN, 2015b). The UN Secretary-General acknowledges that even though there is a lack of consensus within the research conducted on CVE, it has been widely acknowledged that drivers of VE can be divided into the two categories. These categories include: "'push factors', or the conditions conducive to violent extremism and the structural context from which it emerges; and 'pull factors', or the individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action" (UN, 2015b, p. 7).

Structural drivers identified as universally recurrent, through qualitative research, are as follows (UN, 2015b, pp. 7-8):

- Lack of socioeconomic opportunities
- Marginalization and discrimination
- Poor governance, violations of human rights and the rule of law
- Prolonged and unresolved conflicts
- Radicalization in prisons

However, the focus on 'pull factors' is important too. Even though much of the world's population is exposed to one or more of the structural drivers listed above, there are only a few of those individuals who become radicalized. The radicalization of individuals is encouraged by a combination of individual incentives and human agency. Therefore, the 'pull factors' identified as recurrent are as follows (UN, 2015b, pp. 9-10):

- Individual backgrounds and motivations
- Collective grievances and victimization
- Distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences
- Leadership and social networks

These "push" and "pull" factors identified above are the "master list" of drivers focused on by UN led CVE programming. However, one of UN Women's key project outcomes was to conduct region specific research on what factors were the most prominent drivers for both

men and women to get involved in VE. They were one of the first to make the research distinction of gendered impact of drivers.

While gender equality and human rights were priorities in UN Women's program design, these principles also feature in the UN's "master list" of "push" factors. Therefore, the UN has committed to inequality being eradicated as a method of CVE. While the UN *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* has initiated a change in terminology from CVE to the language of preventing violent extremism (PVE), for the purposes of this paper I continue to refer to efforts to counter the "push" and "pull" factors which lead to radicalization and VE as CVE. In the next section I will examine the gaps between this UN level commitment to the human security principles of CVE and the way in which it was implemented by UN Women. I will also compare these gaps with the ones present in the RUSI case study, in order to highlight how gender perspective has impacted the gaps.

2. Gaps in Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation

With this section in the previous two case studies I examined the gaps between program design and evaluation methods and the "best practices" established in Chapter 4. These "best practices" were largely influenced by RUSI and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which were the implementing partners for the European Union (EU) and the United States government (USG) in the first two CVE case studies. The UN has not developed its own "best practices" guidelines on program design and evaluation. Instead, it relies heavily upon the research done by members of the international community, such as that of RUSI and USAID, for its programming practices. While I do not conduct an in-depth comparison between the program design and evaluation practices of UN Women's CVE

program in Kenya and the "best practices" established in Chapter 4, I do point out a few gaps as compared with those principles. Overall, the program design and evaluation practices of UN Women are quite similar to those of RUSI and USAID. While the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* was not a CVE program design and evaluation guide, it did recommend a list of elements to Member States which need to be addressed as part of programming (UN, 2015b, pp. 14-20):

- Dialogue and conflict prevention
- Strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law
- Engaging communities
- Empowering youth
- Gender equality and empowering women
- Education, skills development and employment facilitation
- Strategic communications, the Internet and social media

This list is very similar to the programming components of the other CVE program case studies. It exemplifies the same set of goals, as well as "push" and "pull" factors targeted.

2.1 "Say-Do" Gap in Definition of CVE Programming

The gap in definition between the UN level human security goals of CVE programming and the definition of CVE implemented by UN Women in Kenya is greatly reduced from that of the other two case studies. I argue that this is due to the UN's commitment to implementing CVE programming with a human security framework. This may be at least partially due to their position as an international intergovernmental body. They, therefore, do not have the

same state security considerations as individual governments. UN Women focused particularly on the issue of gender equality and human rights. Therefore, in reference to this element, there was close alignment to the UN's CVE definition. The gap that was apparent with this program was that it was only focused on gender inequality, therefore leaving aside many other drivers also relevant to the Kenya context. While gender mainstreaming is an important element of CVE programming, it alone cannot address VE. However, UN Women did acknowledge its limitations and indicated that it was not designed to be a large-scale CVE program. Rather, its goal was to inform others on gender research and produce lessons learned to help improve CVE programming in the future.

The Kenya CVE program's particular goals for UN Women, the GoK, and the Kenyan county governments were to produce lessons learned and recommendations for improving action plans and CVE strategies. It also wanted to improve future programming on WPS. UN Women produced the final evaluation report to help improve understanding of the challenges and opportunities for improvement of CVE program implementation. They also hoped to improve the regional and national understanding of the role of women in peace, security, and governance processes (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 11). Additionally, UN Women had a primary goal of producing findings and recommendations to encourage all key stakeholders, primarily the GoK, to (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 11):

- Strengthen national and county level capacity to design, implement and monitor implementation of CVE action plans and activities aligned to UNSCR 2242
- Empower women through capacity building and networking to engage and contribute in CVE in their communities

- Strengthen the role of women (in leadership and at grassroot level) in CVE efforts
- Support integration of human rights and gender equality principles (participation, inclusivity, non-discrimination and accountability) in peace, security and stability efforts at local, national and regional level

These goals are an important piece of improving the understanding of gender in CVE programming, and in improving the roles of women recognized in CVE. However, they do not represent a CVE program definition which is aimed at implementing a holistic solution. As the definitional gap suggests, this was a project focused on one particular element of the CVE process. Therefore, it was limited in scope. This limitation in scope was significantly influenced by the implementation gap, as discussed further below.

2.2 Implementation Gap

The UN Women CVE program in Kenya was funded by a donation from the Government of Japan. It was implemented with a total budget of $750,000. The duration of the project was only one year. UN Women worked in partnership with various GoK offices, CSOs, and UN partners to implement this project. The partnerships they utilized offered them local experience and access to organizations which were already running programs in the area. This helped to offset the time and budget limitations of this project. However, ultimately, there was a significant implementation gap which limited the scope of UN Women's CVE program. They had to design, implement, and evaluate a program, intended to bring about meaningful changes on gendered issues, within a very small timeframe and an extremely limited budget. I argue that this type of small scale, short term programming does not fulfill the UN's call for "comprehensive approaches" to CVE as in the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* (UN, 2015b).

Such a large implementation gap also severely impacts sustainability of programming goals. Sustainability was in the results framework of UN Women, and is also one of the key elements found in the "best practices" for evaluation in Chapter 4. The final evaluation report noted that in UN Women's CVE program:

> There are sustainability measures established including ranging from effective networks established greater empowerment and assumption of responsibility for CVE among women and evidence of knowledge and skill replication through trainings and sensitization programmes. There is also evidence of locally owned coordination structures such as inclusion of women in local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi Committees, which strengthens continuity of project gains. However, sustainability would have been strengthened by establishment of effective and strong formal linkages between women groups/networks with all the key stakeholders for greater ownership, coordination and support. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 3)

The independent evaluator also noted that the people left behind, after the completion of the UN Women program, lacked the financial and technical support with which to continue the CVE programming goals. Local CSOs and networks were not fully able to conduct the programming independent of partner and donor support (Abdilatif, 2017). Therefore, gains made on gendered issues were potentially lost after programming ceased. These sustainability limitations are part of the implementation gap and contribute to the program not being as "comprehensive" or meaningful as it could have been.

2.3 Program Design and Evaluation Gaps

Because the UN primarily depends on the international research conducted on CVE program design and evaluation practices, instead of establishing their own "best practices," I have no UN standard against which to measure this case study. Therefore, I am limited in my critique of UN Women's program design and evaluation gaps. I only make a few observations below, comparing their program design and evaluation practices against the "best practices" established in Chapter 4.

UN Women stated that the overall goal of their program was: "to promote and advance women's active participation in efforts to prevent and respond to extremist violence in Kenya, while ensuring their human rights are protected and promoted" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 8). This goal statement clearly narrows the focus of the CVE program to empowering women and encouraging their participation in CVE. This narrow goal statement allowed UN Women to develop a "theory of change" (ToC) and results framework based on achievable goals, within the implementation limitations they had. UN Women did follow the "best practices" established in Chapter 4 by developing a ToC. They also defined expected outcomes in a results framework, by which they evaluated their program's effectiveness. UN Women's program ToC assumed that:

> If the evidence on the drivers of extremist violence in Kenya is generated and made available to stakeholders for policy action, and if women are facilitated and given access and resources to participate effectively in the prevention, conflict management and recovery efforts of preventing and countering violent extremism and if are women are provided with safe spaces to share and exchange critical information, then vulnerable communities would be more resilient to risks of conflict, thus leading to improved cohesion amongst communities. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 45)

Their CVE program was designed with two specific Outcome goals, similar to the Result Areas of the RUSI project. These two Outcomes were each associated with a particular Output goal for the programming components. The Outcomes and associated Outputs are as follows (Abdilatif, 2017):

1. Outcome: Evidence base is strengthened on understanding the drivers of extremist violence in Kenya

    1.1. Output: Gender-sensitive research and sex-disaggregated data on the drivers of extremist violence in Kenya is available.

2. Outcome: Women and women's groups are actively involved in efforts to prevent and counter extremist violence in Kenya.

    2.1. Output: Strengthened capacity of women's civil society groups to advance the rights of women and girls in efforts to counter extremist violence

Their results framework was built on questions of whether or not the programming components were successful in fulfilling these Outcomes. The program evaluation took place from March to April 2017. Evaluation was an expectation from the inception of the program, due to donor requirements. The inclusion of evaluation is congruent with the "best practices" established in Chapter 4 and the key evaluation questions, determined for this program, line up with the recommended evaluation markers. The following are the key evaluation markers against which UN Women measured the successfulness of its CVE programming (Abdilatif, 2017, pp. 46-47):

- Relevance
- Effectiveness
- Efficiency
- Sustainability
- Gender Equality and Human Rights

Overall, it was determined that programming was successful. Some recommendations were given on where there could be improvements or lessons learned for future programming advice. This is in line with UN Women's desire to help improve CVE programming by providing lessons learned to the international community.

The project was **relevant**, as it engaged women in CVE programming in Kenya in a larger capacity than any other regional program had done. It was also relevant internationally, as it helped to provide gender-sensitive research and gender-segregated data on the drivers of VE. UN Women was **effective** in conducting gender-sensitive research, through the implementation of their program. However, it was found that the women's networks, which were created as a result of the program, were not sufficiently developed or connected to remain strong once programming ended. Thus, this had a negative impact on the **sustainability** of results. It was found that the program was **efficiently** managed. However, the resources they were given were not enough to fulfil the program's intended purposes, as discussed in Section 2.2. The project was deemed to be successful in implementing a **gender-sensitive approach.** It helped to empower women to engage in CVE, and to advance their human rights in their own communities. It was also considered a success that UN Women was able to help county governments and GoK agencies with the development of gender-sensitive CVE Action Plans focused on including women in the security process (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 2-3).

There were some significant design gaps in UN Women's CVE program in Kenya. From the outset, UN Women limited the drivers of VE that it was addressing. This meant that the program did not address CVE as a whole. Additionally, the implementation of the program was greatly inhibited by budget and time restrictions. However, the program did otherwise largely follow the "best practices" determined in Chapter 4 for program design and evaluation. They also achieved the smallest gap in CVE definition between UN intergovernmental level and the UN Women implementation level. I argue that this is largely due to their commitment to the human security framework, as well as their gender-sensitive perspective.

3. Understanding of Gender in Program Design and Evaluation

I chose UN Women's "Engaging Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremist Violence in Kenya" program as a case study example of a program implemented with a gender-sensitive and human RBA approach. This allows me to conduct analysis on how meaningful gender mainstreaming improves program design, implementation and evaluation. Their program sought to:

> …understand why women are joining extremist groups, the roles they play in inciting and persuading others to join and fight, but also to strengthen the capacity of women and women civil society groups to engage in prevention, response and recovery efforts to counter violent extremism, leveraging women's experiences and voices to reach vulnerable communities, including at-risk youths. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 44)

For Outcome 1, UN women wanted to help improve GoK agencies' design and implementation of CVE programs, by linking them to researchers who could help write informed policies and promote gender-sensitive governmental responses to VE. For Outcome 2, UN Women focused on providing "specialized training for women on early-warning signs of radicalization that lead to terrorism, enhancing their capacity on conflict resolution skills, as well as facilitating female practitioner networks" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 44). Both Outcomes of the project are in line with UN Women's global CVE platform. It "seeks to address root causes of extremist violence through integrated responses which will strengthen women's participation and empowerment to preventing and countering violent extremism and build an evidence base on the effectiveness of integrating gender and women's participation in these efforts" (Abdilatif, 2017, pp. 44-45). One of the successes of this program was that women, in the counties where programming was carried out, now have a better understanding of their own rights. Thus, they are able to question violations of their rights and continue to seek engagement in CVE, security, and peace processes, as well as recognition in other community roles (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 3). This

program, while not providing a holistic solution to VE, gives me a platform from which to conduct gender analysis. It is my only case study CVE program focused entirely on empowering women, gender sensitivity, and human rights.

3.1 UN Women's Approach to Gender

UN Women's definition of gender included both men and women, for the collection of their gender segregated data. However, their usage of gender for the purposes of their CVE program in Kenya was almost entirely focused on women and improving their participation in the CVE process. They were also focused on advancing recognition of women's wider rights and roles in society. Based on the UN *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* (UN, 2015b), the UN Women CVE program was designed around recognition of women's empowerment as a key ingredient of CVE and a critical force for sustainable peace.

> The project sought to not only understand why women are joining extremist groups, the roles they play in inciting and persuading others to join and fight, but also to strengthen the capacity of women and women civil society groups to engage in prevention, response and recovery efforts to counter violent extremism, leveraging women's experiences and voices to reach vulnerable communities, including at-risk youths. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 7)

In many ways, UN Women is similar to RUSI in their approach to women's empowerment. Like RUSI, they sought to determine the role that women play in inciting VE and encouraging others to join in VE. They also sought to leverage women and women's networks to reach those "at risk" with a preventative message. I find that these goals continue some of the same gender essentialism discussed in Chapter 5. Women are considered inherently more peaceful. However, UN Women does also recognize a need to examine why some women join in VE themselves. This is something that RUSI addresses more in the second iteration of their CVE program. Overall, UN Women assumes a more inclusive definition of women than RUSI did. It understands women to be more than just wives and mothers, which act as voices of peace.

Although, I find that UN Women still underestimates the complexity of gender and its multi-faceted impact on the security problem itself, as well as the process of finding meaningful and sustainable solutions to VE.

UN Women's CVE program components were mostly focused on trainings for women. These were intended to help them build confidence in their roles in the home and community, as well as to build bridges with the security forces. The intended outcome was for women to take a more prominent role in recognizing, reporting, and combatting radicalization. These trainings often targeted women who were exposed to marginalization, violence, and other drivers of VE. Some examples of these drivers were forced marriages, threats, sexual exploitation, and lack of ability to make their own decisions. The CSOs, who partnered UN Women to deliver these trainings, noted that their success could be seen in the increased confidence of the women. The participants were more able to engage the authorities on security issues and take part in CVE conversations within their communities (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 18). Overall, the UN Women CVE program reached 675 people: 645 women and 30 men. The training helped them better recognize early signs of radicalization and be leaders in community-based responses to VE and other security concerns.

> The 675 participants have a better understanding on the different roles and responsibilities that key stakeholders must play in matters of peace, security, and CVE are now well placed to form partnerships and develop collaboration strategies and messages to strengthen the management and coordination of activities related to community based security activities. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 21)

UN Women also reported successful training of women within the CSOs to better coordinate groups and networks. This is helpful to encourage women to participate in CVE and women's empowerment in general, such as education for girls. In addition, the UN Women training program increased recognition amongst GoK agencies, such as the NCIC, of the benefits of

including women in CVE training and programming. This allowed the NCIC to establish a database of 171 women across the five counties with whom to coordinate. UN Women was also responsible for building five women's networks, one in each of the counties where they were working. This allowed women to meet each other, share their situations, give and gain advice, and train other women on CVE. All of this builds the capability of women in these areas to respond to the risk of radicalization and identify early warning signs more appropriately than before (Abdilatif, 2017).

The final evaluation notes that, while these types of trainings did increase women's engagement in security matters, the program did not continue long enough to determine if this increased sharing of information actually reduced community vulnerability to VE (Abdilatif, 2017). Although there was not enough time to conclude impact, I find that increasing people's understanding of their rights and helping them take ownership in their communities generally increases community cohesion. Therefore, it also decreases the influence of VE (Finn *et al.,* 2016). Unfortunately, while the overall perspective of the UN Women CVE program was much more inclusive of gender, I found that there were still some gaps regarding understanding of the complexity of gender and its impact. These gaps relate back to my second main research question. However, it should be noted that UN Women's approach to gender was the most comprehensive of my three case studies. In the next section I illustrate how the gender-sensitive approach of UN Women helped them to overcome some of the gender programming obstacles which RUSI faced. I also analyze whether they were successful in implementing a fuller understanding of gender.

3.2 Analyzing Use of Gender

In this section I give a couple examples of how the gender-sensitive, human RBA design of the UN Women CVE program helped them to overcome obstacles which RUSI faced in implementing their gendered program components. I also use gender analysis to suggest some areas in which there still needs to be a fuller understanding of gender, in order for UN Women programming to achieve lasting and meaningful success.

3.2.1 Finding Women Gatekeepers

Result Area 2 of the RUSI implemented Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE HoA) program was focused on the empowerment of women. However, this was only one of the program's four main Result Areas. In contrast, the UN Women CVE program focused almost entirely on the empowerment of women, with over 80% of their participants being women. The gender directive of UN Women compelled them to focus more on including women in the management and oversight of project implementation (Abdilatif, 2017). Also, due to the prioritization of gender sensitivity in UN Women's program design, they devoted the time and budgetary resources to finding CSOs and other partner organizations which had female management teams and implementation personnel. This allowed them to overcome the obstacle that STRIVE HoA faced with implementing programming aimed at empowering women through male gatekeepers. This example illustrates a success for UN Women and their understanding of gender, in the design of their programming targeting women.

Also, having a high percentage of female leadership and participation encouraged other women to get involved with leadership and mentorship roles in their communities. Additionally, it created a conducive environment for women to speak openly about issues, things they would

not normally discuss in front of men (Abdilatif, 2017). These were two shortcomings that the RUSI STRIVE HoA team acknowledged and are seeking to remedy in STRIVE HoA II programming. They are trying to do this by creating segregated spaces for women to have conversations not considered culturally acceptable for men. They are also encouraging women to take up the role of mentor and overcome social expectations of the women's place being only in the home (Zeuthen, 2018).

In seeking to partner with organizations which had a strong presence of women, UN Women developed strategic advantages within the GoK and civil society. Due to their partnerships being based on mutual understanding of the gender-sensitive perspective and equality goals, they experienced improved success in project outcomes.

> The facilitators were said to be competent, knowledgeable, experienced and skilled in the subject matter which enhanced optimal skill and knowledge transfer as well as capacity development of the beneficiaries. Use of facilitators from relevant institutions with in-built capacity on CVE (such as NCIC) and diverse areas of expertise including security, human rights, peace building and cohesion was reported to improve articulation of multi-dimensional perspectives and approaches in CVE. (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 25)

UN Women overcame, for the most part, the STRIVE HoA obstacle of organizations seeking to implement gendered programs simply to gain funding. They were largely able to partner with CSOs and other organizations which were experienced and well-networked in dealing with women's issues and human rights implementation. These networks allowed the GoK to build a database of suitable and available partners for continuing the development of gender-sensitive CVE Action Plans, even after the completion of UN Women's CVE program.

UN Women sought to acknowledge the intersection of identities, by choosing a variety of program alumni for this GoK database. They chose women from different backgrounds, of different ages, and with different religious considerations, in order to widen the perspective of

programming knowledge. They hoped this would also enhance the capability of others to continue the work begun by their program. "This diverse representation increased opportunities for not only cross-learning experiences and sharing of rich experiences on successful CVE activities but also strengthening the partnerships and alliances" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 24). Acknowledgement of the intersectionality of identities and inclusion of alumni from multiple backgrounds helped to strengthen the base of knowledge and maintain the sustainability of program directives.

Ultimately, UN Women had a more successful outcome in implementing a fuller understanding of gender in their programming due to their use of women gatekeepers, focus on women's participation, and their acknowledgement of intersecting identities. "The implementing partners were reported to have the relevant experience, expertise and knowledge in identifying and formation of sustainable networks key in providing tailored capacity building exercises and overcoming barriers associated with building of trust and confidence among women and community in general" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 24). I argue that UN Women's success is due to two main factors. Women are often to be better positioned to understand and overcome the socialized barriers which other women face. Also, encouraging the participation of women helps to overcome the cultural perception that only men should be involved in security matters.

3.2.2 Overcoming Cultural Patriarchy

Changing cultural perceptions of masculine and feminine roles in society is not something that can be accomplished by a small scale, short-term project (Johnston and True, 2019). However, the UN Women CVE program did make advancements in the communities within which they worked. They were able to encourage women to assume responsibility for their roles in CVE. Women in these communities were more able to overcome the commonly held perception that

security is a "man's role." They have also begun to contribute positively to peace, security, stability, and resilience with their communities (Paffenholz *et al.,* 2016; True and Eddyono, 2018; True, 2013). The women participants generally reported feeling empowered to contradict the stereotypes of society and take positions of authority (Carella and Ackerly, 2017). Therefore, they are now able to call meetings or suggest solutions, whereas before this would only have been done by village elders or male chiefs. UN Women's CVE program helped local women to see how CVE was affecting their lives, through their families and communities, and was therefore also their responsibility (Abdilatif, 2017). Helping to bestow this confidence to overcome stereotypical gender norms in these traditional, patriarchal societies also helped UN Women to overcome the "fear and misconceptions associated with women victimization, discrimination and vulnerability. Contrary to prior to the project, women are now more empowered (through knowledge transfer, improved skills and networking) to speak out, be confident, defend and demand their constitutional rights" (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 33).

The success that UN Women had in promoting gender equality and women's rights demonstrates the value of the gender-sensitive and human RBA to CVE programming (Carella and Ackerly, 2017). Their focus on the needs and priorities of women allowed them to overcome cultural patriarchal barriers, which were roadblocks for STRIVE HoA programming (Cornwall, 1997). The measures that UN Women took to recruit diverse beneficiaries, to create spaces where women could speak openly, and to provide logistical support to women were beneficial to their successfulness. They were able to effectively entrench gender equality and women's rights into CVE activities. The GoK and the county governments, where UN Women operated, have committed to continuing gender sensitivity in their CVE action plans. Although, "Despite the successes, existence of strong patriarchal systems with strong cultural

values and beliefs, such as religious teachings against women empowerment and involvement in public activities, remains a key challenge in promoting gender equality and women rights in CVE" (Abdilatif, 2017, pp. 32-33).

Therefore, while UN Women were able to overcome the cultural barriers more effectively than RUSI, they were still not given the time or resources to make a lasting impact on changing culturally entrenched perceptions of women's rights and gender equality. Although, UN Women was able to conduct comprehensive gender analysis of the drivers of VE in the region, which is a lasting success. This data collection allows for future improvement of CVE program design. It will increase efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability, while responding to and safeguarding women's rights and gender quality (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 20).

3.2.3 Understanding the Complexity of Gender

While UN Women's gender-sensitive approach was more in tune with the complexity of gender than either RUSI or USAID's approaches, there were still gaps in their understanding of its impact. Some of the training UN Women conducted was focused on women as the key custodian of the home and the moral values within. These trainings essentialized women as inherently more in-tune with issues in the family (Abdilatif, 2017, p. 19). As discussed in Chapter 5, it is gender essentialism to assume that women understand the family better, and it is an unfounded assumption (Winterbotham, 2018). It is also a misconception on understanding of gender to assume that men are not capable of influencing the home. This assumption is largely due to the social expectation that men are more in tune with the public sphere than the private.

Ultimately, I find that there was an underestimation on behalf of UN Women regarding the impact of underlying expectations of masculinity and femininity on socialized gender roles.

For example, as suggested in Chapter 5, often it is the social expectations of masculinity which guide men down a path leading to a life of crime or violence. Additionally, it is often the socialization of femininity as submissiveness which encourages the perception of women as victims. This contributes to the perception of them as incapable of participation in roles of authority in the community. I argue that addressing these additional understandings of gender would improve UN Women CVE programming. I posit that a full understanding of the complexity of gender improves effectiveness of CVE program design, implementation and evaluation and allows it to implement meaningful, long-term change within societies.

4. Conclusion

UN Women's CVE program in Kenya allowed for meaningful analysis of the benefits of a gender-sensitive and human RBA to CVE programming. It also provided a beneficial framework for analysis and comparison with my primary case study. The gender-sensitive perspective impacted not only the CVE definition of UN Women, but also the programming design and evaluation practices. Their approach allowed for more gendered data to be gathered, as well as more meaningful program commitment to gender mainstreaming. Also, comparing the program design and evaluation practices of UN Women to the "best practices" suggested in Chapter 4, UN Women had less significant gaps than the other two case studies. Overall, this case study followed closest to the recommendations of the guidelines, in both program design and evaluation. I argue that this is primarily due to their commitment to the human security framework and the importance of gender. However, it may also be, at least partially, due to UN Women's CVE program being the most recent of the three. They, therefore, had more access to lessons learned from previous CVE programs.

UN Women's gender-sensitive and human RBA was the most successful in implementing gendered programming and in achieving positive results for gender equality in beneficiary communities. This illustrates that, although the program was limited by time and budget restrictions, CVE programming can be improved by taking a gender-sensitive and human RBA. These three case studies provide the analytical framework within which I can draw conclusions on the importance of gender mainstreaming to CT policy. The last four chapters have been devoted to developing a framework of understanding for "best practices" in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. These "best practices" were then used to evaluate the cases. Analysis of the cases highlighted how lack of commitment to human security principles and understanding of gender has led to gaps in CVE programming. The next chapter will conduct cross-case synthesis in order to come to conclusions based on comparison of findings from all three cases. This will allow me to reach conclusions on my research questions.

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION

1. Introduction

After having used the three case studies to highlight three different approaches to gender mainstreaming in counter-terrorism (CT) policy, in this chapter I examine the findings of the three case studies to assess what conclusions can be derived from their comparison. This chapter gives me the opportunity to examine how the gaps I highlighted in the cases are related to the research questions. I look at the impact of the security framework, as well as the understanding of gender. I also analyze how what I have learned adds to the existing literature on gender mainstreaming in countering violent extremism (CVE) programming. In each of the case study chapters I identified three main sections of analysis, so the first three sections of this chapter are the cross-case comparisons of those three sections. Firstly, the "say-do" gap between how governments and inter-governmental bodies are defining CVE and how the programs they fund actually interpret CVE during program design and implementation. Secondly, the implementation gaps from time and budget limitations which lead to program design and evaluation gaps. Thirdly, the definition and usage of gender within CVE programming and how misunderstanding of its scope leads to gaps in program effectiveness and evaluation.

Analysis of these three cases left me without the gender data that I needed to support my hypothesis, but it did open up the question of "where is the data" and the process of identifying why the data is not currently available. The research process led me to focus on two main research questions. The first one was looking at the impact of the security framework applied to CT policy, which links directly with gaps in all three sections. Also, I looked at how misunderstanding of the scope of gender leads to gaps in CT policy. This question is linked

directly to the gender mainstreaming process, which means that this project has policy implications for other closely related areas of gender and security. Feminist approaches to security studies have focused on various aspects of gendered security institutions, including peacebuilding, peacekeeping, security sector reform, post-conflict reconstruction, and others. However, there has not yet been a significant amount of investigation of gender mainstreaming in CT policy. This is the gap this this thesis aims to fill, as the first systematic review of gender in CVE Programming. Comparison of the three cases also leads to some unexpected discoveries about the evolution of CVE programming and gender and security over time (Glazzard and Rosand, 2017). This highlights the importance of aligning CVE programming with a definition of security which supports its underlying goals of upholding human rights and security.

2. "Say-Do" Gap in Definition of CVE Programming

The most significant gap I found across the three case studies is the definitional one. It is the origination point from which many of the other gaps follow. Across the board, CVE programming is not given the scope to be the holistic preventative solution that governmental and inter-governmental organizations are calling for it to be. The European Union (EU), United States government (USG), and the United Nations (UN) have each established a pillar of their CT strategies to be a prevention or CVE strategy. They have all committed to the idea that in order to prevent future terrorist attacks it is necessary to slow the spread of violent extremism (VE), to which they have determined that people become more vulnerable through a wide array of drivers in both structural and individual categories. Common issues under the category of structural drivers (or push factors) are political corruption, unemployment,

marginalization, violation of human rights, and others. The category of individual drivers (or pull factors) are the things that incentivize a few individuals, out of the millions who are exposed to these structural drivers, to actually take part in VE. These could be drivers such as money, fame, group identity, etc. There is disagreement on how many categories of drivers there should be, but they all agree on at least these two basic distinctions.

CVE programming is intended to be a holistic, long-term solution which addresses both categories of drivers. Their rank of importance is derived from analysis of the local context where programming is being implemented. This local context is necessary to understand and create an environment less conducive to a radical message. Since there is no valid profile for terrorists, it is very difficult to predict who might be more "at risk". However, the intention is that contextual drivers will be evaluated during a research phase and then individual programming components will be designed to fit the needs of that location and the drivers which are deemed most prominent in that context (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). While for all three case studies some background research was done on drivers in the region, in all three cases certain drivers were automatically eliminated from programming consideration due to constraints of time and budget. This immediately reduced the impact footprint of the CVE programs, which put them in violation of their intended purpose from the earliest stage of program design.

Time and budget constraints are discussed more in the next section, as implementation gaps. However, they are indicators of a wider argument (see below) over whether CVE programming should be conflated with development, peacebuilding, stabilization, conflict resolution, and other such programs, which are already running under each of these governments and inter-governmental organizations. This is linked to concerns about securitization of humanitarian

programming (Waever, 1995). Additionally, there is the issue of co-option and securitization of women's equality and empowerment programming, due to it being linked to the CT policy agenda (see Section 4 for further discussion) (Shepherd, 2017; George, Lee-Koo and Shepherd, 2018). The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), who implemented the Strengthening Resilience against Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (STRIVE HoA) program for the EU, indicated a determined desire to keep CVE programming separate from development programming. This was in spite of the EU establishing "prevent" as a pillar of their CT plan and linking CVE programming with development, governance, and security. RUSI indicated that CVE programming should be focused on at addressing "at risk" individuals and the drivers which are employed specifically in the radicalization narrative used by recruiters to VE groups. According to the logic: that their use in the narrative gives those drivers a direct link to the violence (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016).

Gender inequality was therefore not considered a structural driver of VE by RUSI because they found that it was not directly employed in this narrative. However, this is contradictory to the confirmation of the United Nations General Assembly in their review of the Global CT Strategy (2016), which emphasized that the destruction of human rights is an indicator and aim of terrorism. Gender-based violence and inequality are used by terrorists to destroy community resilience and social cohesion. Therefore, a system based on respect for human rights would be the best means for effectively countering terrorism. It is therefore interesting to note that almost all practitioners of CVE programming are quick to dismiss the direct relevance of gender inequality to the issue of VE or the goals of CVE. This is despite gender inequality being considered an indicator and goal of terrorism, due to the impact it has on social cohesion and stability. They also do not take into account the way that gender equality has been linked

making societies less vulnerable to violence (Caprioli, 2005). In addition to gender equality being able to stabilize societies, women's empowerment and gender equality are often key policy goals announced by governments and international organizations. Unfortunately, this project highlights how they are often not meaningfully implemented.

I have found that a significant element of the definitional gap within CVE is that empowerment and equality are key words commonly used in the policy space without a clear understanding of the wider arguments surrounding these terms. Carella and Ackerly (2017) investigate how a shift from women's rights and the rights-based approach (RBA) to gender equality in development programming has decreased the value and scope of the term empowerment. With the focus now being on "investing in women", the movement away from the RBA has allowed "empowerment" to become linked to the instrumentalization of women to achieve a set of goals. For example, a common goal is now to increase numbers of women achieving a certain level of education or formal sector employment, instead of focusing on meaningful change in the underlying societal norms around women in education or in the workplace. This shift away from the RBA disregards the lessons learned in the 1990s and the political consensus reached at the time on the importance of the RBA to gender equality.

The increased focused on efficiency and evaluation in today's development programming is not designed to understand the political dynamics of gender inequality and the difficultly for programming to effectively address global inequalities. This links directly back to the wider argument about gender mainstreaming and its application by governments and international institutions in policy making (True, 2003). Carella and Ackerly argue that commitment to the RBA would actually offer better tools for accountability and evidence-based learning, as it gives a benchmark for success to be measured. However, it must be remembered that human

rights are not just a legal entitlement and are not truly implemented until they are being exercised and enjoyed (Carella and Ackerly, 2017). These specific concerns were raised in regard to development programming but are equally applicable to CVE programming. The programmatic devaluing of gender equality to a set of statistical requirements for the inclusion of women does not result in meaningful implementation or in the resolution of the underlying social conditions which contribute to inequality and potentially to VE.

RUSI was also concerned about the conflation of CVE with other types of programming because of concern over securitizing development. This could potentially create a link between VE and programming which should be conducted simply because of the normative commitment to provide education or encourage observation of human rights, etc. RUSI expressed concern that those considering VE not be inadvertently rewarded by being offered more ready access to development programming, education, jobs, etc. than others in society who have not taken a path of violence (Zeuthen, 2018). Therefore, RUSI focused almost entirely on the individual drivers of VE, with very little to no emphasis placed on the structural drivers of violence. This helped to reduce overlap with other types of programming, like development or good governance.

RUSI's concern links back to an argument about whether or not CVE should even be considered a part of CT programming, as CT has historically been associated with democratic and human rights violations and violence (Foot, 2007). Those like RUSI argue that CVE programming, as a pillar of CT policy, should focus mostly on countering the activities of those most "at risk" or currently existing violent extremists (the second and third tiers under the public health model) (UNDP, 2017). This leaves preventing violent extremism (PVE) programming to take a broader preventative approach to the underlying drivers which might

render people more vulnerable to VE (the first tier) (International Alert, 2018). This would create a separation between the concepts of PVE and CVE. Thus allowing PVE to encompass all the programming not negatively associated with securitization, so that CVE can maintain its position as an non-coercive mechanism of CT programming (Stephens, Sieckelinck and Boutellier, 2019).

In direct contrast to the perspective of RUSI, the USG has appointed the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as its primary implementing body for CVE programming. This action inextricably links the two programmatic themes of CVE and development. This is similar to the UN's approach of implementing much of its CVE agenda under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Yet, even with both types of programming, CVE and development, being run by the same agency there is still competition between them for funding and resources. This indicates is an inability on the part of the EU, the USG, and the UN to pool resources or coordinate planning between departments or agencies. While the definition of CVE calls for a holistic approach to addressing structural and individual drivers of VE, these entities have not even developed a centralized plan of investment within their own agency structures to allow multiple areas of government funded programs to coordinate. That means that there is a lack of structure as well as programming ability to be able to provide a holistic solution.

Instead, they implement CVE programs as small-scale, short-term programming solutions which are being strung together in an unsustainable way to address little pieces of the problem at a time. I would suggest that this is in part due to the desire of governments to use development aid as an opportunity for branding, so that they can develop good-will and apply soft power by aiding the less developed areas of the world (Pamment, 2018). This could be

seen as “virtue signaling”. Meaning that Western countries are offering the funding for trans-national development and CVE programming in poor countries, with very little reflection on good governance of these programs and their potential impact. Western, domestic CVE programming typically receives much more in-depth examinations of the continuity issues and human rights implications. Largely due to the fact governments are more concerned about the opinions of their own people (a.k.a. voting base) and the appearance of CVE programming securitizing social welfare programming (Brown, de Londras and White, 2019).

If governments want to use CVE programming as “virtue signaling” then they would seemingly be unwilling to contribute to an international pooling of resources to create truly sustainable and diverse regional CVE programming. In an ideal world, I would recommend that governments should contribute resources into an international pool of funding for long-term programmatic solutions. These solutions would encompass development, education, employment training, peacebuilding, governance training, CVE programming and the like. Then that impartial international body would be capable of delivering sustainable programming large enough to cover all the regionally contextual drivers of CVE. This approach would also limit the securitization of these types of programming as individual governments would not be utilizing them as mechanisms of state security.

This would be a more holistic approach to creating the social stability and human security which arguably limits the influence of the radicalization message. Putting this type of programming in the hands of an organization like the UN would also allow other UN departments to include their areas of expertise and focus, like UN Women or United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). This would help to encourage new perspectives and increase the sensitivity of CVE programming. UN Women alone was not

capable of implementing programming which could address all the drivers of CVE in a particular region. However, they were able to use their expertise to improve understanding of the impact of gender on drivers in region, as well as how gender equality can be more effectively included in CVE program design and evaluation. A combined effort of funding and perspective could potentially improve the design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE programming.

The concerns over conflation and securitizing of CVE and its related programming link directly back to the importance of the framework of security to which CVE programming is being held accountable. The state security framework is negatively associated with securitizing programming, due to its turning normative commitments into tools of state power. However, the human security framework, which is part of the definition of CVE programming, supports the normative commitment to individual emancipation. Feminist approaches to security studies have looked at both the securitization of programming, as well as the links between gender and security. Wibben (2011) emphasizes feminist security studies support for the expectation that gender mainstreaming needs to be more than just the simple adding of more women into the current systems. Rather, a political commitment needs to be made to human security and emancipation, with the empowerment of women linked to the RBA to gender equality and broader social justice. In order for CVE programming to correct its definitional gap, it needs to be committed to emancipation and meaningful gender mainstreaming. In its current state, CVE programming does not match its definition and it does not fulfill the needs of long-term, sustainable programming. Therefore, CVE programming is not preventing radicalization as effectively as it could. Additionally, in its current state and with its application through a state security framework, CVE programming is not able to fulfill its commitment to emancipation,

human security, or human rights. This leaves it falling short on its gender mainstreaming commitments, made through international agreement to UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda was originally internationally agreed upon with UNSCR 1325 in 2000. It has been renewed and updated multiple times since, most recently with UNSCR 2242 in 2015. WPS formally recognizes the need for women to be included in the process of security, and for increased equality in various types of security programming. UNSCR 2242 emphasizes the need to redouble efforts and renew commitment to the WPS agenda with an emphasis on accountability. This indicates that there has not been significant meaningful change implemented over the last 20 years in regard to gender and security. The need to restate expectations with UNSCR 2242 is evidence of the wavering commitment to the principals and provisions of the WPS agenda (George, Lee-Koo and Shepherd,2018).

Peacekeeping offers a good example of the shaky commitment to the WPS agenda. Karim (2018) indicates that, since UNSCR 1325, gender is mentioned in almost every mandate authorizing peacekeeping missions. However, just because it is mentioned in mission design, does not mean it is being mainstreamed effectively. Some of the mandates only include gender in a very limited scope, such as prohibiting sexual exploitation and abuse or increasing women's participation in politics and the security sector. The difference in scope, within mandates, for gender is often due to the different focuses that the UN has had in these regions over time. It is reflective of how gender is seen in these areas, but it does not necessarily show commitment to meaningful gender empowerment where peacekeeping missions are taking place (Karim, 2018). This is reflective of the same gaps which exist between CVE definition

and implementation. In its definition, CVE programming like peacekeeping is committed to WPS and the inclusion of women in programming. However, often due to the social, political, and programmatic challenges in certain areas only small pieces of gender issues are actually being addressed by any one CVE program. This does not reflect true commitment to gender mainstreaming, and thus often leads to failure of what gendered initiatives do occur through programming. The lack of effective means of measurement and evaluation make it very difficult to empirically measure gendered goals' impact on programming. Therefore, the recommendations generated by the research in this project are also helpful to these other areas of security programming as well, such as peacekeeping.

As is shown in this section and others throughout the chapter, each one of these problems and gaps compound upon the next and directly impact each other. Many of the gaps in CVE programming are due to budget, time, design, and evaluation limitations, as is discussed in the next section. However, these gaps are also directly linked to the definitional one. Another issue, which directly impacts the definitional gap but also influences program design and evaluation gaps, is that CVE programming is being held accountable to the framework of state security. This is contrary to its core principles of upholding human rights. This challenge is discussed further in Section 7, but the confusion over whose security is the goal of CVE programming is fundamental to the "say-do" gap in definition. It generates confusion over what CVE programming is being designed to address, which leads to gaps, and eventually potentially to failure.

3. Program Design, Implementation, and Evaluation Gaps

Throughout the three case studies I found budget and time limitations restricting programming implementation, due to the lack of clear definition and purpose of CVE programming. All three programs had short time frames and small budgets. This limited the scope of the program designs and evaluations, which left gaps. The RUSI and USAID cases were pilot programs. They were not only testing government definitions of CVE programming, but also new program design, implementation, and evaluation techniques. Due to the newness of the CVE concept, these programs were required to be able to produce positive quantifiable results in a short time period to convince governments of the viability of CVE programming. If they were not able to do so, they would not continue to receive funding. While the UN Women case was not a pilot program for CVE programming in general, it was the first program to implement a gender-sensitive perspective. It was also the first to require the inclusion of women in the all the program design, implementation, and evaluation phases.

As pilot CVE programs, RUSI and USAID were expected to fulfill an immediate state security goal of stopping terrorism. They were supposed to be able to prove that their programming was contributing at the impact level to a reduction in the numbers of those participating in VE, within the space of one to three years and with budgets a fraction of those given to other development or good governance, etc. types of programs. This is what I refer to as implementation gaps. These gaps often leave programming limited to addressing only "at risk" individuals instead of pursuing long-term goals of stabilizing communities. This is mostly due to the scope for addressing the structural divers being outside their budget and time range capabilities. In Chapter 1, I introduced the public health model as applied to CVE with three tiers of programming approaches (National Security Critical Issues Task Force, 2016). I argue

that the implementation gaps indicated above are a large part of the reason why currently CVE programming is usually only focused on the secondary tier of addressing "at risk" populations.

The implementation gaps also have a significant impact on the way in which CVE programs are designed and evaluated. While RUSI and USAID have both developed guidelines on "best practices" for CVE program design and evaluation, they often do not follow their own "best practice" due to implementation limitations. According to "best practice", the initial step in planning a CVE program is to conduct research in the region to determine what the primary drivers of extremism are in that area. CVE programming is intended to be designed to fit the contextual requirements of each region in which it is being implemented. This is so that programming components can be tailored to what will be the most effective.

In each of the three cases there was some research was done on regionally contextual drivers. However, it was not published and there was little- to no- accountability for the process in which they chose how to rank the importance of the drivers they intended to address with their programming components. For example, in the case of RUSI's design of STRIVE HoA, it was not only research on contextual drivers that went into deciding how to spend the limited time and budget for designing program components. It was also stakeholder interests and requests from program donors which impacted program component design (Zeuthen, 2018). In USAID's Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), CVE programming research methods were not applied rigorously during the process of determining the most prominent drivers of VE in the region. Therefore, this rendered the validity of their program design choices questionable (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). In the case of UN Women, they did not base their program design upon the vast array of contributing drivers, but rather chose to focus their programming on a

particular gap they saw in other programming being implemented in the region. This gap was the inclusion of women.

Alongside implementation limitations there were also other concerns which factored into program design. Security concerns limited the scope of some of the CVE programming components. They were not able to implement programming in areas which were not stable enough to provide easy access or to be receptive to programming. This means that often CVE efforts are not reaching communities immediately threatened by terrorist violence. It usually falls to "harder" CT measures, military and police action, to secure those environments before CVE programming can take place.

There was also the question of finding suitable partnering agencies, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in the region. This provided a great challenge to program design and was a limiting factor in many instances across all three programs. USAID's KTI CVE program responded to this limitation in a unique way from the other two case studies. RUSI, USAID, and UN Women all partnered with local organizations already running CVE programming in the region. This was necessary to offset the budget and time frame limitations, and to get the programs up and running with as little investment of either as possible. However, USAID took it a step further and chose not to implement any of the KTI CVE programming itself. Instead, they applied a small-scale-funding method which allowed them to give out small grants to partner organizations to complete programming components on behalf of KTI (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2014). This was effective in producing quick and easily measurable results. Due to the programs being so small and short-term, they were more easily evaluated and placed into a matrix. This allowed USAID to quickly indicate success to the USG for their CVE pilot programming. However, this style

of delivery lacked coordination and consistency for the communities where programming was being implemented.

I argue that this kind of short-term approach to program implementation can actually be counterproductive to the goals of CVE programming, because communities are not being given the time to develop the tools to sustain the positive changes over time. Short-term, small-scale projects also do not allow time for incremental change, which is required to address deeply ingrained social and cultural issues like gender inequality. I argue that this factored into the decision for USAID to adopt a gender-blind perspective. Their programming was not formatted to address the challenging social and cultural implications of an issue like gender inequality as a structural driver of VE in the region.

UN Women tried to address gender equality with a small-scale, short-term programing and they had some success in starting off changes. However, the sustainability of their programming was lacking. Unfortunately, a significant portion of their successes potentially reverted back to status quo as soon as programming was finished (Abdilatif, 2017). The training and support required to bring lasting social changes was not possible to establish within such a small time period and budget allotment. The local understanding and capacity to carry on tenants of programming, without continued support from UN Women, was not yet fully developed when programming ended. While the budget and time scale limitations of programming were outside of UN Women's control, they did otherwise conform for the most part to "best practices" in the design and evaluation of their CVE program. The UN did not establish its own guide to program design and evaluation, but instead relied upon the "best practices" developed by others implementing CVE programming, such as RUSI and USAID. Therefore, I analyzed all three cases according to the "best practices" established in Chapter 4.

RUSI particularly has been instrumental to the international community on developing a set of guidelines for how CVE programs should be designed and implemented.

Just as the budget and time limitations are influenced by the definitional gaps, so do these implementation gaps influence programming design and evaluation gaps. Due to the lack of funding and time the "best practices" were not always followed. Some steps were only partially completed, and others were skipped altogether. None of the three case study programs actually followed all of their own "best practices" in all steps of program design and evaluation. However, this may be partially due to the fact that STRIVE HoA and KTI were both pilot CVE programs and some of the "best practices" were still being developed through learning from these ongoing programs. To their credit, each of the case study programs developed "lessons learned" as part of their final evaluation processes. This contributed to improvement of CVE understanding and guidelines for the international community going forward. This contribution is in line with feminist perspectives on research methodology. However, in future, further feminist perspective on knowledge and its measurement could help improve programming design and evaluation strategies (Ackerly and True, 2020; Tickner, 2006).

RUSI was the organization to develop the use of "theories of change" and the "results framework". These are crucial elements of designing successful program components (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016). However, even though they pioneered these concepts for CVE, they did not develop them sufficiently in their own STRIVE HoA programming, due to implementation gaps (Tana Copenhagen and Conflict Management Consulting, 2017; Zeuthen, 2018). Without first testing their "theories of change", program implementors are designing program components based on untested assumptions. This was a shortcoming of both STRIVE HoA and KTI. KTI did not ever even properly challenge their own program goal statement or

assumptions about how their program directives would lead to the intended outcomes. This left room for misinterpretation and poorly designed program components. UN Women was the organization which most effectively implemented "theories of change" and a results framework. This allowed them to measure their successfulness in an effective and rigorous manner. However, this may be because they benefitted from the lessons learned by RUSI and USAID, as theirs was the most recent programming initiative. This indicates a positive change over time, which is discussed further in Section 6.

The results framework calls for program implementors to develop a set of expectations at the beginning of program design, by which to measure their successfulness. Measurement against the framework should then take place throughout the course of program implementation, to make sure that program components are staying on track. It is also used at the completion of programming implementation, as a final assessment of program achievements. Through examination of the "best practices" in Chapter 4, I determined that there are five core elements which should be included in the results framework. These are relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability. Examining these elements across the three case studies leads to the following conclusions:

- **Relevance**: CVE programs are intended to be designed relevantly to their regional context and according to research completed on what drivers are most prominent. Unfortunately, all three programs fell short on this element. Some drivers, which were determined most relevant, were out of reach for programming due to budget and time restraints. Some drivers were overridden by stakeholder interests. Some drivers were inaccessible due to security concerns about program component implementation locations. Some drivers were overridden by the lack of available, local implementing

partners. In the case of the UN Women program, they chose to only address drivers related to gender inequality. This was in order to test the effectiveness of gender-sensitive programming. This made it an important case for gender analysis and evaluation of programming focused on the empowerment of women. However, it was not relevant to the other drivers, which are also prominent in that regional context.

- **Effectiveness**: In all three case studies, effectiveness was measured as the success programs had in reaching the goals which they had established for themselves, not an independent set of expectations. There is currently no internationally agreed upon standard of evaluation for CVE programming. This leaves evaluation open to interpretation, outside influence, and poor management. However, in all three of my cases, the implementing organizations contributed to the development of CVE program design and evaluation guidelines, through lessons learned from their own experiences.

- **Efficiency**: All three programs were determined to be efficient by their independent final evaluations. They did the best they could with the time and funding they were given. They all three trialed different methods of implementation, with varied success.

- **Coherence**: Efficiency did not necessarily lead to coherence. This element was missing, at two levels, across most of the programming components of the three case studies. At the level of coordination across programming in the region: governments and inter-governmental organizations were not able to coordinate amongst their own agencies much less across different CVE programs. At the level of coherency of programming components within a single program: there was still a lack of coherency. Due to the short-term duration of all three of the case study programs, they engaged almost entirely with local NGOs and CSOs already working in the target area (Mundkur

and Shepherd, 2018). They often re-funded programs, which were already in-progress, and put a CVE label on their programing goals. This was an effective method to get programming components up and running quickly. However, it did not provide the possibility to develop a coherent set of programming goals and appropriate program components, with which to implement them. This ad-hoc method of program implementation forced them to go with what programming components and partners were already available in the region. This raises several concerns:

- There is a concern that the use of CSOs in this way leads to an "NGOization" of civil society. This refers to the over- politicization and securitization of what should be community led and focused organizations (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; Lang, 2012).
- Reliance upon available partners leads to the danger of program implementors being forced to accept their perspectives, instead of sticking to the normative ideals of the implementing government or organization. Some elements of programming components might end up perpetuating the very drivers of VE programming it is intended to remedy. For example, there was the issue, introduced in Chapter 5, of RUSI having to use male gatekeepers through male led NGOs and CSOs to implement programming aimed at empowering women (Zeuthen, 2018). UN Women was largely able to overcome this particular hurdle, but only through an increased investment of time and commitment to finding organizations primarily led by women (Abdilatif, 2017).
- Being limited to existing partners also limits the scope of programming and the drivers which programming components are able to address. There is only so

far existing partners and programs can be adapted from their original purpose. This means that drivers have to be chosen which align with or are close to the problems these partners and their programs were already working on. If there is not the time or money to establish new programming components, then inevitably some of the drivers go unaddressed.

- **Sustainability**: The limited budgets and short-term duration of all three of the case study CVE programs impacted sustainability negatively. While program implementors attempted to design program components around locally contextual drivers, the one- to three- year program lengths guaranteed it was difficult to plan for the sustainability of program goals. There was not enough time and money to effectively establish the ability of local CSOs and NGOs to continue working towards the CVE programming goals without outside support. This often creates a sort of slinky effect for local communities. They make progress during the program implementation and then spring back to their original state as soon as programming is completed. This sometimes causes more damage than good, with backlash against unsustainable planning.

These conclusions illustrate just how difficult it is to balance all the influencing factors when designing, implementing, and evaluating a CVE program. Without putting in place a method of testing design intentions and conclusions, it is very easy for programming components to end up not making the intended impact. Rigorous methods need to be used to gather data and conduct analysis, in order to render program designs and evaluation conclusions valid. That validity is key to producing the intended results and providing essential lessons learned, with which to improve and implement international standards for CVE programming.

4. Gender Definition and Mainstreaming Gaps

Through the research process, I determined that there was a lack of understanding of the definition of gender and a correspondingly limited usage across all three case studies. This lack of understanding regarding gender and the extent to which it affects CVE programming reaches back to the definitional gap. The framework of security within which CVE programming is implemented impacts whether it is designed to address structural drivers of VE, like inequality. For USAID, gender data was not gathered as part of the research for regionally contextual drivers of VE. RUSI gathered gender data, but only for the one component of programming that was focused on the empowerment of women. UN Women was the only program which set out to implement a gender-sensitive perspective. They, therefore, prioritized the gathering of gendered data on drivers of VE and examined the differences in how the drivers impacted men and women. It is important to note: all three cases were implemented with a different gender perspective, and there were gaps in all three cases around the meaning of gender and its mainstreaming.

The lack of attention to gender in the initial stages of program design for RUSI and USAID trickled down to an inability to effectively understand and include gender-sensitive programming. Also, I argue that the lack of attention and commitment to gender in CVE programming is due to a lack of understanding of the widespread impact of gender (both masculinity and femininity) on society, security, and VE itself. USAID approached its programming with a gender-blind perspective, not including any analysis of gender. RUSI had one main programming component aimed at empowering women. However, gender inequality was not considered a driver of violence and was therefore not prioritized. UN Women focused their entire CVE program on women and gender equality with a gender-sensitive approach.

However, even in their program design there was a lack of understanding around the impact that gender has on security.

Due to implementation gaps in all three cases limiting the scope of program design and evaluation, the CVE programs were largely narrowed to addressing only the small group of people considered most "at risk". Especially in the STRIVE HoA and KTI cases, program designers tried to focus efforts on addressing only those drivers which were determined to lead directly to violence, or which were in the narrative being used by recruiters to encourage radicalization. This is distinctly different from the original definition of CVE being a large-scale, long-term, three-tiered solution. This approach often leaves out addressing structural drivers of VE, such as inequality. The EU and US have both committed internationally to the inclusion of women in the security process through UNSCRs 1325 and 2242, and so have tried to show implementation of this normative commitment through gender mainstreaming in CVE programming. However, this is often limited to a few elements focused on empowering women and commitment to these elements can be weak.

This links to the conversation about norm diffusion through the international governance system (True, 2019; True and Parisi,2013; Park, 2006). While analysis of this topic and its associated theories is limited in this thesis, it is an important area for future further examination. The CVE programming being implemented by Western countries is largely being organized through the international governance system, due CT policy being centralized in the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and other bodies (UN General Assembly. 2016; UN, 2006b). International cooperation on the development of CVE program design standards and goals has made them a central hub for diffusion of normative concepts of peace, social stability, and even gender equality. There has been a lot of work done on global norm diffusion and

feminist strategies for including gendered norms in this process. The WPS agenda is a good example of the diffusion of gender norms through transnational security apparatuses (True, 2016b; True and Parisi,2013). There are many challenges to these global diffusion strategies, including lack of commitment in the international governance system, as well as resistance to the norms being diffused (Zimmermann, 2016; Gordon and True, 2019).

The application of gendered equality norm diffusion strategies in policy agendas has largely become referred to as gender mainstreaming (Lombardo, Meier and Verloo,2009). Gender mainstreaming is widely debated by feminist scholars, due to it often being interpreted as simply adding women to the existing system instead of fundamentally challenging assumptions about gender equality (True, 2016c; True and Parisi,2013; True, 2010; True, 2003). There is also debate on if and how gender mainstreaming strategies need to be adapted to fit the target population; namely, whether there should be norm localization in diffusion strategies (Aharoni, 2014; True, 2016a). Gender mainstreaming is a term commonly used in CT policy. It can refer to the various strategies employed in CVE programs to empower women or utilize them in the fight against VE. However, this begins to show some of the challenges of categorizing gender equality goals as gender mainstreaming (Brown, Huckerby and Shepherd, 2019; UN, 2002; Squires, 2005; True, 2016c). Gender mainstreaming can both over-politicize gender equality, by putting it in competition for resources with other goals, and under-politicize it, by reducing it to another item on the checklist of programming goals. This combination can make it possible to avoid deeper issues of gender equality and to ignore a genuine focus on the complexity of gender issues (Standing, 2007, p. 104).

It is also very difficult to show results in relation to gendered elements, as gendered data is not being gathered. This is often due to a lack of understanding regarding the full impact of gender

on both the security problem and the security solution. In almost all cases of CVE programming, gender is determined to equal women. However, with this project I emphasize how the underlying implications of both socialized masculinity and femininity need to be taken into consideration. Without a fuller understanding of gender, there cannot be meaningful gender mainstreaming. Addressing masculinities and femininities and the socially imposed gender relationships would not only improve all CVE program components, it would also enforce gender equality as a tenant of human security. Human security being the security framework CVE programming is definitionally intended to fulfill. Because of the binary nature of gender and its assumption of dichotomous differences between femininity and masculinity, conversations about gender affect not only how participants in VE are discussed but also how men and women are utilized in security solutions.

> Masculinity is associated with logic, rationality, strength/ aggressiveness. Therefore, men are associated with these traits and from there it is assumed that men are naturally inclined to be involved in the public sphere. Women are associated with opposing traits, emotion, irrationality or hysteria, and passivity, which excludes them from the public and shutters them in the private sphere. These gendered assumptions about the presumed attributes and behaviours of men or women carry into Terrorism Studies. (Gentry, 2018, p. 144)

This underlying assumption about masculinity and femininity inserts men into the role of protector and aggressor and women into the role of peacemaker and nurturing center of the home. Women are often seen as "in need" of the protection of men. Therefore, those women who engage in security are seen as disruptive, and those who engage in VE as deviant and maybe even irrational. These gendered assumptions often intersect with other assumptions. For example, "men" often means white, non-disabled men (Leigh and Weber,2018). All of these underlying assumptions and intersecting identities are often ignored when implementing "gender" into CVE programming. Unfortunately, gender is usually simplified down to a

homogenized category of "women". This misunderstanding of the complexity of gender, as exemplified through the different avenues of gender analysis introduced in the literature review, means that gender mainstreaming cannot be effectively implemented or measured in security programming. Additionally, CVE programming is not the only type of security programming where a more meaningful understanding of gender is needed. Currently, there is a great deal of policy focus on the issues of returning foreign terrorist fighters and de-radicalization programs for those who have participated in VE (UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, 2019; International Civil Society Action Network and UN Development Programme, 2019). A meaningful understanding of the gendered dynamics of these security concerns is also key to effective and sustainable policies.

Unfortunately, the successful implementation of a program focused on empowering women must take into consideration the socialized masculinities which resist change in patriarchal cultures (Zimmermann, 2016). It must also consider how the empowerment of women cannot be limited to a concept of women as simply mothers or peacekeepers. A more meaningful understanding of the term gender needs to be taken into consideration in regard to all CVE programming components, whether it is focused on empowering women or not. Unfortunately, the lack of data being gathered or evaluated means that there cannot be an efficacious measurement of the impact of gender. Therefore, an empirical defense cannot be made to implementing governments and the international community on why a complete understanding of the impact of gender should be included. Without the data an empirical defense cannot be made, and without the defense organizations do not see the need to gather the data – so it is a paradox, as defined by Harding (2016).

The only CVE case study I found which focused on the gathering of gendered data was the UN Women case study. RUSI did try to gather some gender data for the design stage of their program components aimed at the empowerment of women. However, due to the security difficulties and the lack of suitable partner organizations, they chose to scale back or abandon most of those components in favor of other more traditional CVE goals. This lack of commitment to gender equality as a driver of extremism is an indication of how CVE is being used as a tool to implement state security goals. The absence of a human security framework, as its definition calls for, allows gender equality goals to be easily side-stepped in favor of more traditional CT goals. USAID did not gather any gendered data and they assumed a gender-blind perspective. This perspective did not consider any of the ways in which gender dynamics are influencing security, stability, or radicalization. Their approach makes it impossible to measure the impact that gender equality goals might have had on improving the effectiveness of their CVE programming.

The difference between viewing gender inequality as a driver of extremism and wanting to "empower women" or utilize them as tools to fight radicalization must be also acknowledged. UN Women tried to implement both these interpretations of "gender mainstreaming". However, they ended up focusing more on the later. RUSI only accepted the latter definition of gender mainstreaming, as they did not view gender inequality as a driver of VE which needs to be addressed by CVE programming. It must be noted that the original definitions of CVE for all three case studies included abuse of human rights as a driver of CVE and equality as a human right, as agreed under the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). However, this is an example of where empowerment and equality are used in policy language without consideration for the wider debate. Gender mainstreaming efforts are often

undermined by a lack of understanding. Meaningful gender mainstreaming requires an integrated framework for action, which needs to address institutional and structural barriers to equality.

Women play a multifaceted role in CVE. A gendered perspective can therefore help move CT policy beyond reaction to the large scale terrorist attacks, and on to prevention of everyday VE (True and Eddyono, 2018). Viewing women as "agents of change" risks re-inscribing an essentialist notion of women and assigning them as good peacemakers due to their femininity. Essentialism, of any kind, sustains inequality. Unfortunately, the international policy community has been somewhat ambivalent towards gender mainstreaming and lazy with the assumption that gender equals women (Shepherd, 2018). George, Lee-Koo, and Shepherd (2018) point out how it is important to recognize the implications of that assumption, as well as the negative impacts of ascribing women as inherently good peacemakers. There are multiple risks to writing policy based on this assumption. Firstly, when a woman actually has excellent peacebuilding capabilities, she is not given recognition for those political skills because it is written off as innate ability. Secondly, because of this assumption, women are often given the license to operate at grassroots or community level. However, they are not then given the recognition to enter the higher-level political arena of security decision making.

Due to these essentializations blocking women from receiving proper recognition for their political acumen, women are often still not included as official peace negotiators or mediators in peace processes. Women are not usually leaders of military or VE groups, so they often do not receive a seat at the table of negotiations. This renders their wartime roles as invisible or unimportant. It is a paradoxical barrier for women. Being considered inherently peaceful often blocks them from being allowed to take part in peace negotiations in a meaningful way

(Ellerby, 2018). Instead of trying to overcome this inequality, RUSI tried to find the best way in which to utilize women as part of the fight against VE. They conducted trainings focused on using the role of women in the household, as wives and mothers, to monitor and counter any radicalization which might be occurring within their families. Some trainings also focused on women being a tool in the community to build or maintain peace. These methods, of using women as a tool, might be the most accessible and successful when CVE programming is being used to satisfy the state security goal of mitigating immediate violent attacks against citizens. However, this perspective is doing very little to address the widespread inequality which exists in society.

Inequality, of any kind, is one of the violations of human rights which leads to human insecurity. However, inequality is such a complex and intersectional issue, as shown in the literature review, it becomes difficult to account for in small-scale, short-term programming. It is an enormous challenge to address a deeply ingrained social issue like inequality. This is especially true with the added challenge of indicating successfulness on a government metric or evaluation, as required to continue receiving funding. This is why the structural drivers, like inequality, are often abandoned in favor of drivers which are more easily addressed within programming limitations. However, if equality is put aside as one of those unrealistic normative goals, then CVE programming is left unable to fulfil its defined purpose of stabilizing communities and fostering human security. It is also unable to fulfill its evaluative commitment to sustainability, as inequality fosters instability.

The ease with which gender mainstreaming often becomes an empty signaling of norm solidarity instead of an effective tool of meaningful change causes concern that the WPS agenda is simply securitizing the issues of women's equality and women's empowerment

(Shepherd, 2017; True and Wiener, 2019; Davies and True,2018). Many feminists would argue that these policies utilize women as tools in the fight against VE, without actually benefitting them in any way. This occurs alongside the arguments from CT specialists that the inclusion of women does not have any significant positive effect on security outcomes (Brown, 2020; Brown, Huckerby and Shepherd, 2019; Brown, 2013). Therefore, in order to address both concerns, my research is situated between FST and critical approaches to terrorism studies. The positive developments achieved through the gender-sensitive approach of the UN Women case study demonstrate that meaningful progress can be made on gender initiatives within the institutional architectures of the CT policy framework. Therefore, the entire prospect of gender mainstreaming in security policy does not need to be dismissed as ineffective and exploitative by FST scholars. This thesis demonstrates that it is possible to achieve positive security changes without abandoning commitment to gender equality principles. Also, for those committed to the traditional architecture of CT policy, the UN Women program shows how following the "best practices" developed by the field of practice actually allows for more meaningful inclusion of gender. Therefore, a gender-sensitive approach to security does improve the effectiveness of CVE programming, by improving design, implementation and evaluation processes, as well as examining gender inequality's contribution to the radicalization process (UN Women, 2015a; Paffenholz *et al.,* 2016).

5. Analysis of Research Process

I began this project with a hypothesis, that the inclusion of gender equality goals improves the overall success of CT programming. However, I concluded from the research process that there was not enough data available to support that hypothesis. The analysis above illustrates

the challenges I faced with trying to evaluate gender mainstreaming in CT policy. Gender has not yet been included, measured, and evaluated in CT programming thoroughly enough to be determinant. This links back to the argument by Harding (2016) about the gender-blind nature of research. Because most research is done from a gender-blind perspective the importance of gender cannot be seen, and because the importance of gender cannot be seen research continues to be completed in a gender-blind fashion. It is a paradox. The presence of this roadblock to my hypothesis testing method led me to instead focus on two main research questions.

First, through analysis of the definitional gap in CVE programming I look at how the security framework within which CT policies are implemented impact their approach to gender mainstreaming. Implementing governments have committed to upholding principles of human rights and equality as part of successful CT and CVE programming. However, there is a lack of commitment to implementing programming elements focused on equal inclusion of all genders. This leads to the second main research question, which is regarding the impact of the lack of understanding of the meaning of gender and how it is intertwined with issues of security, violence, and peace in society. I argue that this overall lack of understanding of the complexity of gender leads to gaps in CT policy. The design, implementation, and evaluation gaps analyzed above show how misunderstanding of the impact of gender opens the opportunity for implementing bodies to say that gender mainstreaming is ineffective in improving successfulness of overall programming. Therefore, using the three case studies, I identified and exemplified some of the many ways in which gender is complexly entwined with human security and with finding effective solutions to VE. This illustrates how a deeper understanding of gender is required to find effective approaches to CT. Which in turn, supports that the

gathering of gendered data is necessary to determining whether the equal inclusion of women, as agreed in UNSCR 1325, leads to more meaningful success.

6. Unexpected Results: Change Over Time

As more and more CVE programs are being implemented, lessons learned from them are being used enhance knowledge of "best practices" for these types of programs. This has led to improvement of program design and evaluation practices. There have also been some positive changes in regard to gender in CVE programming, or at least greater recognition of its importance and inclusion of a gendered lens in programming (Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020; True *et al.,* 2019; Brown *et al.,* 2020). This has come with gendered norm diffusion through the international governance system. Gender mainstreaming has become a policy expectation for transnational CT programming (Gordon and True, 2019; True, 2019; True, 2016c). Primarily, this remains in relation to the commitment governments have made to fulfilling international guidelines on including women in security processes, such as UNSCR 2242. However, as is shown by the language of UNSCR 2242, there is still wavering commitment to gender equality goals. The links between ideas, policy, and practice are not always strong enough to survive the pressure from competing demands. Unfortunately, the increased inclusion of women in CVE program design and evaluation does not necessarily represent a more complete understanding of the multidimensional nature of gender. The positive changes did not occur within any individual case study, as they were all short-term programs which sought to fulfil a predetermined set of guidelines without time for adjustment within the period of programming. Rather, they occurred over the course of multiple programs being implemented and lessons begin learned throughout them. All three case studies published their

"lessons learned" as a mechanism to improve their own future programming guidelines, as well as those being gathered internationally.

USAID's KTI CVE program was the first of my case studies to be implemented, from 2011 to 2014. Lessons were learned during that program which informed future USAID programming as well as RUSI STRIVE HoA programming and even UN Women's CVE programming. USAID followed up after KTI was completed with a CVE program called Kenya NiWajibu Wetu (NIWETU), starting in 2016. This program does include an internal gender plan. USAID recognized that there was a need to include gender in their CVE programming design and evaluation and thus adjusted over time. This inclusion of gender analysis in program design and evaluation has not been the only positive change in US CVE programming. The US national security strategy (2015), which was written after KTI, calls for a sustainable and comprehensive approach to addressing the drivers of VE and combatting the persistent threat of terrorism. This is a positive change, which developed over time, and emphasizes sustainability and comprehensiveness as key elements of CVE programming strategy.

The national security strategy (2015) recognizes these elements as critical to advancing US national security and overall foreign policy goals. Reflecting this realization, the Department of State (DoS) and USAID increased the strength of their partnership to work to enhance, refine, and elevate ongoing CVE efforts. They are particularly focused prevention programming, in order to deliver a more coherent CVE program (DoS and USAID, 2016). A stronger partnership between USAID and DoS gives the USG the opportunity to "continue to promote international efforts to elevate the importance of CVE, alongside security-based counterterrorism measures, refine our understanding of the drivers of violent extremism, and expand the tools for effective CVE interventions, particularly at the local level" (DoS and

USAID, 2016, p. 5). USAID and DoS are also engaging in networking with other international bodies working on the development of CVE, including: the UN, the GCTF, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), Hedayah, the Strong Cities Network (SCN), and the RESOLVE Network. These bodies partner with each other in order to improve cooperation and understanding of CVE, as well as to standardize practice internationally (DoS and USAID, 2016).

RUSI used lessons learned from KTI, STRIVE HoA, and other CVE programs in order to improve practices for STRIVE HoA II (STIRVE Kenya), which is a second iteration of the EU's CVE program funded for 2016 to 2019. In the design of STRIVE HoA II some of the gender issues analyzed in Chapter 5 were taken into consideration, increasing the gender sensitivity of STRIVE HoA II programming. For example, they invested more planning into offering programming components at a time when both men and women would be able to attend. They also ensured that environments were provided where women would be able to feel comfortable in discussing their issues. These and other adjustments were made in order to increase awareness of gendered issues in program design and evaluation. RUSI has also increased the coherency and sustainability of their programming through other adjustments made to the design of programming components. For example, RUSI entered into a consortium with the US and the Red Cross who are delivering vocational training in the region. This partnership allows them to be able to offer vocational training as an element of their mentorship program component with "at risk" youth (Zeuthen, 2018). These developments show improvement, as they are addressing a structural driver alongside the individual drivers. Also, as it is a consortium, it proves the value of cooperation between governments and international organizations. The pooling of these programming resources improved the scope and

sustainability of this CVE program component. RUSI is a key partner with the international bodies mentioned above (GCTF, Hedayah, the RESOLVE Network, etc.) on developing international guidelines and training for CVE programming.

UN Women, who implemented their CVE program "Engaging Women in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremist Violence in Kenya" from 2016 to 2017, was the most recent of my case studies. They designed their CVE program with a gender-sensitive perspective specifically to fill a gap they had identified over time. UN Women's gender-sensitive CVE program was their answer to the gap they saw in gender mainstreaming in regional CVE programming. They found that women had not been included sufficiently in CVE programming in this region. Therefore, they designed a program to gather gendered data on drivers of VE in the region, as well as to test programming components delivered with a gender-sensitive perspective. They found that the lack of focus on including women in the process of security was detrimental to the effectiveness of CVE programming in the region. Alongside providing this groundbreaking gender focused CVE program, UN Women also benefitted from the accumulated knowledge of CVE programs run before them. Consequently, they were the most effective implementors of "best practices" in CVE program design and evaluation out of the three cases I examined. They too have gone on to continue to refine their practices with further programming in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020; True *et al.,* 2019; Brown *et al.,* 2020). This analysis shows that CVE programming has improved over time and that there is greater recognition of the need for more relevant, effective, efficient, coherent, and sustainable programming. In order for programming to meet these criteria, it must also include a more meaningful approach to gender mainstreaming.

7. Missing Links: Security and Gender

As stated in Section 2, the definition of security to which CVE is being held accountable greatly impacts what is determined as appropriate design and evaluation, as well as what is successfulness. CT programming is designed to fulfill a state security goal, to respond to the immediate threat of terrorism against the state. CVE programming was developed as a prevention pillar of the CT plan to be used for non-coercive, preventative programming components which could augment the "hard" measures of traditional CT programs. I am suggesting that the security framework for CVE needs to be realigned, because the application of CVE programming with the purpose of fulfilling the state security framework compromises its ability to focus on human security and address the multiple tiers of drivers which contribute to the radicalization process. I conclude that, in order for CVE to be able to fulfil its stated purpose of developing long-term stability and resilience in regions vulnerable to VE, it must be applied with a gender-sensitive human security framework.

In addition to the security framework realignment, there are at least two other definitional challenges, made apparent through this research, which need to be addressed. First, over the two-decade development of CVE programming there has been a gross oversimplification of the concepts of radicalization and VE (Bartlett, Birdwell and King, 2010). Unfortunately, the terms have become essentially synonymized with Islamist VE groups, due to the September 11th attacks and the subsequent global focus of CT policy (Kundnani, 2014). This in itself is an oversimplification, as there are many different VE groups with various ideologies based in different strands of Islamic theology (Vermeulen, 2014). Additionally, this does not take into consideration all the other VE groups, which are not based in Islamist ideology, such as far-right or far-left extremist groups. Therefore, this suggests that CT policy needs a more

meaningful understanding of the threat, as well as to be adaptable over time to changes in current threat profiles. This is something which should be explored in further detail in future research.

The indeterminate nature of VE challenges, to some degree, the generalizability of the findings of this study. While the need for meaningful gender mainstreaming would be key to combatting any form of VE, the approach would need to be adapted to the various gendered dynamics of the different forms of radicalization being addressed. This links to the second definitional challenge, which is that a more meaningful understanding of gender and how inequality is a driver of VE is required (Johnston and True, 2019). Even with the non-coercive and more holistic approaches of CVE programs, it is still a challenge to safeguard all human rights and to find a pathway to the meaningful inclusion of gender in the security process. Regardless if national or international CVE definitions are based on human security, as long as it is still used as a tool to achieve state security goals the process of program design, implementation, and evaluation will remain unclear. This makes it easy to side-step gender equality goals.

The rooting of CVE in traditional, realist, masculine concepts of security means that the principles of the WPS agenda, set forth in UNSCR 1325, do not get carried effectively forward into programming implementation. The state security framework does not allow room for understanding of the many underlying gendered implications of security. I find that the recommendations given within the final evaluation of STRIVE HoA highlight the overarching argument of my project, that a fundamental realignment of security is required to achieve meaningful integration of women into security and CT. While RUSI achieved some strategic implementation of women into the police force and into parts of the community discussion on

security, there needs to be a much deeper alteration to the way women are seen. This needs to happen not only in society, but also in security. This supports the argument for CVE programming to be implemented within a gender-sensitive human security framework, because human security requires that all individuals be free to live without constraint or fear or oppression (Booth, 1991). If the concerns of gender equality are disregarded in preference of other CVE initiatives or out of concern for cultural sensitivity, then a huge gap in social equality will remain. This gap will leave open vibrant breeding grounds for extremist ideology, thus ultimately undermining the effectiveness of the whole CVE process.

This thesis contributes to the knowledge around the missing links between gender, security, and CVE. These three elements have not been put together substantially in the fields which are examining security and terrorism studies critically. Tickner (2006) indicates that the field of critical security studies examines the importance of the principles of human security. However, it does not examine gender as an element of the matrix of power or the multitude of places where it intersects with other markers. Feminist approaches to security studies are committed to examining how gender relates to security within many different security institutions, but it has not yet thoroughly examined CVE programming. The WPS agenda set forth in the UNSCRs has granted international visibility to the issue of including women in the peace and security processes, but Shepherd (2013) argues that it also perpetuates a liberal concept of gender and politics which essentializes "women" as a homogenized group based on commonalities of pacifism and inherent interest in the social good. The various feminisms represented in security studies are "in the simultaneous business of deconstructing the universalized and gendered elements of traditional theories of war and conflict and bringing attention to the narratives of security in everyday life that the gendered nature of traditional

narratives makes invisible" (Sjoberg, 2018, p. 62). This thesis extends that conversation to include how narratives of security in everyday life need to be understood through a gendered lens in order to achieve human security through CVE programming. This process will remain impossible while CVE programming is still being held accountable to traditional security goals.

8. Conclusion

The comparison of analysis from all three case studies allows me to make some recommendations. Recommendations not only for the understanding of gender and its inclusion in CVE programming, but also for the definition of CVE itself and how that influences program design, implementation, and evaluation. The underpinning lesson learned, and the reason that my hypothesis could not be tested, is that more gendered research needs to take place. A more complete understanding of gender is needed in order to implement effective CVE program design and evaluation, and more gender data is required to make a judgement about the impact of gender. This is hampered by short-term, low-budget programming, which is not effective for implementing programming consistent with the governmental and international definitions of what CVE programming should be. When CVE programming is not able to address all the relevant drivers of VE, then a complete and effective program is not possible. This could be due to lack of budget, time, coordination with other government agencies/programs, stakeholder input, or security concerns.

There are five key elements, determined in Chapter 4, to successful CVE programming: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and sustainability. Sustainability is often one of the most lacking elements across the programs, due to the short-term, low-budget nature of CVE programming. There are two potential solutions to this. One: implementing governments

could pool their development, education, economic empowerment, good governance, CVE, and other related programming into one coordinated effort and thus create a more coherent, long-term approach to programming. Two: in an ideal world, governments could contribute to an international pool to cover this programming and allow it to be implemented by an inter-governmental body like the UN, therefore distancing it from the state security framework. CVE programming being implemented under a state security framework has made it easy for programming to side-step gender equality goals. It has also introduced the concern that CVE programming securitizes development and other similar types of programming. For CVE to be recognized as an effective, non-coercive CT tool, it needs to be held accountable to a human security framework. It also needs to be given the funding and time to address both structural and individual drivers of VE, in order to sustainably stabilize societies.

Development of an international "best practices" guide to CVE Program Design and Evaluation would help to standardize the field of CVE programming. Currently, everyone evaluates their programming against their own standards/results framework, instead of a centralized framework. Each of the three case studies were implemented with their own set of goals and their own assessment of what were the most important drivers. UN Women was the only one of the three cases which conducted significant gender analysis and implemented gender-sensitive programming. This contributed some data on the inclusion of gender equality in programming and the question of whether its inclusion would improve CVE programming effectiveness. However, it was not enough to reach well-supported conclusions. Gender equality is one of the human rights that the world has ascribed to. However, it is usually the first programming element which is put aside when programming implementation gets difficult, or it poses a challenge to more traditional CVE components.

In many of the places where CVE programming is taking place, half of the battle for gender equality is about making women themselves aware of their rights and giving them the tools and understanding with which they can stand up for themselves (Abdilatif, 2017). This was the training component that UN Women focused on. It allowed them to overcome the cultural patriarchy more effectively, which was a roadblock for RUSI programming. However, the implementation gaps limited the sustainability of UN Women's gains in this area. Even though UN Women did gather gender data as part of their program, it was not enough to test my hypothesis that the inclusion of gender equality improves the overall success of CT programming. Due to the gender-blind nature of most of the other research, there is not yet enough data to reach a valid conclusion. Gender data is not being gathered as a part of most CVE programming design and evaluation. I argue this largely due to the security framework CVE programming is being held accountable to. There needs to a realignment to CVE being implemented under a human security framework in order for future CVE programming to be focused on addressing all the drivers of extremism, including structural drivers such as inequality.

This chapter allowed me to complete cross-case comparison of my findings in the three main areas which included significant gaps. The analysis presented answers to the two main research questions my project was seeking to address. Multiple ways in which the security framework impacts CVE programming's definition of gender were highlighted throughout the sections above. Also, gender analysis was used to illustrate the gaps in understanding of gender and how this negatively impacts the design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE programs. Overall, some positive changes have occurred over time through lessons learned. However, the importance of gender-sensitive research needs to be more widely recognized for enough

gender data to be gathered in order to support conclusions on the impact of gender mainstreaming in CT policy. In the next chapter I will conclude the project, reflect on the process, and highlight the significant contributions it has made to the literature around gender mainstreaming in security.

CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION

1. Introduction

Following the discussion chapter, where cross-case analysis was conducted in order to reach conclusions on my research questions, this chapter allows me to conclude the project and reflect on what has been learned through the process. This project started as an examination of the hypothesis that the inclusion of gender equality as a programming goal of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming would improve its successfulness. Gender mainstreaming has been higher on the agenda of governments and international organizations since the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, established with the passing of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000. Unfortunately, this increased emphasis has not necessarily led to more meaningful implementation of gender mainstreaming. Through this project I highlight the challenges of doing gender-sensitive research. As Harding (2016) describes it, the paradox of most research being gender-blind is that it is difficult to then demonstrate why it is important to conduct gender-sensitive research. I was ultimately unable to test my hypothesis, due to lack of data. However, this process raised the important question of "where is the gender data" in counter-terrorism (CT) policy research.

The impossibility of my initial positivist investigation into a hypothesis led me to an interpretivist approach to answering two main research questions for the project. First, I needed to analyze what the meaning of security is to CVE programming and how it is interconnected with gender mainstreaming. Second, I needed to look at how misunderstanding of the complexity of gender was impacting CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. Using the findings from Chapter 4, I was able to highlight how ineffective gender mainstreaming has contributed to gaps. I borrowed gender analysis techniques from feminist

international relations (IR) theory and applied it to three CVE program case studies. Each of the case studies approached gender from a different perspective. This research revealed that even though some progress has been made on the inclusion of women under the WPS agenda, there is still a lack of commitment to gender mainstreaming goals in CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation. Due to the implementation of most CVE programming within a state security framework instead of a human security one, gender equality goals have largely been side-stepped. I therefore highlight theoretically, throughout this project, how gender-sensitive research can increase understanding of gender and encourage meaningful commitment to its mainstreaming in CT policy.

2. Outcome of Research Process

As mentioned above, I initially approached this project with the intention of using a hypothesis testing model. Ultimately, I was not able to test my hypothesis due to the lack of data. However, I think it is important to acknowledge this part of the research process because it raised the very important question of "where is the gender data" in CT policy research. This issue was described very well by Harding (2016) as a paradox. Most research is done from a gender-blind perspective, which means that gender data is not being gathered. However, without that gender data it is difficult to make a case for why gender data should be gathered. This is exactly the difficulty that I encountered. More feminist research and researchers are needed, in order to highlight where gender is important (Harding, 2016). Feminist approaches to security studies have highlighted the need for human security and for an understanding of the multidimensional nature of gender. Critical approaches to terrorism studies have critiqued traditional CT approaches. However, the two have not yet overlapped on CT policy. This

project has made a significant contribution to the literature by applying Feminist Security Theory (FST) to the space of critical terrorism studies and critiquing gender mainstreaming in CT policy.

Due to the challenge of the lack of data, I centered the project around an interpretivist approach to answering two main research questions. I first examined the question of whether gender inequality was being excluded as a driver of VE due to the security framework CVE programming was being implemented under. CVE programming was developed as a "prevention" pillar in most CT strategies. It is designed to augment the more traditional, "hard" or use-of-force CT measures and to expand the long-term, preventative approach of CT. Traditional CT programming is applied under a state security framework, as its purpose is to protect the state from the immediate threat of terrorism. However, CVE programming is defined by most governments and intergovernmental bodies as a long-term, large-scale array of measures designed to prevent the development of future terrorism threats by ensuring human security. Therefore, I argue that for CVE programming to be able to fulfil its defined purpose of prevention, it would have to be implemented under a human security framework.

Human security goals align with CVE programming's intended purpose of addressing structural and individual drivers of VE and increasing stability in communities considered more susceptible to radicalization. Inequality, of all kinds, is a violation of human rights which should be addressed under CVE programming as a driver of VE. However, because CVE is being designed, implemented, and evaluated under a state security framework, it is easy to side-step commitment to some drivers of extremism. This is being done in favor of addressing drivers which are more readily identified as fulfilling state security goals. State security is a concept rooted in patriarchal, realist concepts of IR where women are not even considered full

citizens, much less integral to security. Therefore, it is easy for gender equality goals to be minimized or disregarded by programming which is held accountable to a state security framework.

The second reason that the inclusion of gender equality is not being measured effectively enough for me to support a conclusion on my hypothesis is because the term gender is widely misunderstood in the context of security and CT policy. In the majority of CVE programming, the term gender is used synonymously with women. This means that what CVE programming does to mainstream "gender" is usually design a component or two around the "empowerment of women". This term, as discussed in Chapter 2, is drifting further and further from the rights-based approach (RBA) to gender equality. Under this interpretation of gender mainstreaming, CVE programs often only encourage women to participate in the security process in their homes or immediate communities, while essentializing them as inherently peaceful wives and mothers. I argue that this is a gross misrepresentation of gender and of the multitude of ways in which it impacts security, VE, and CVE.

Gender applies to all people and encompasses the underlying socialized conceptions of masculinities and femininities. The entirety of this concept needs to be examined, not just a homogenized category of women, in order to truly understand the variety of ways in which gender is impacting security issues and solutions. Through the application of multiple feminist IR gender analysis strands to my case studies, I illustrate a few examples of the many ways in which the impact of gender is being commonly overlooked by CVE programming. For example, the most significant target audience of CVE programming is often "youth". The age group of 15-25 are often deemed more "at risk" of radicalization. However, the term "youth" is usually applied as gender-neutral. This does not take into consideration the difference in

socialized gender roles that male and female youth would be experiencing in traditional societies. It represents a significant gap in CVE programming design and evaluation not to take these differences into account. Without a deeper understanding of the complexity of gender and its wide-reaching impact on why people are drawn to VE, programs to counter VE will have gaps. Meaningful gender mainstreaming, as this project highlights through examination of its two main research questions, would improve the design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE programming.

3. Contributions of the Project

This project makes significant contributions to both the academic and policy worlds. First, it makes a significant contribution to the academic conversation around gender mainstreaming and security policy. Feminist approaches to security studies have emphasized the gaps in understanding regarding the multifaceted nature of the definition of gender. They have also focused on the need for human security. However, they have not yet applied these conversations to CT policy. Critical approaches have critiqued traditional CT policy and its lack of effective evaluation processes, but they have not yet looked at the importance of gender equality. My thesis fills this gap between feminist and critical approaches to security and terrorism studies.

As long as "gender" in CT policy is defined only as women, there will be deficits in how CVE programming is implementing gender mainstreaming. There needs to be greater recognition and understanding of the complexity of the definition of gender in CT policy. This lack of understanding can be contributed largely to the framework of IR theory and state security under which CT policy has been developed. Currently, CVE programming often includes women

with only a very narrow conception of them as wives, mothers, and peacemakers. This perspective not only greatly underestimates the complex definition of gender, it also homogenizes and essentializes women. Women can and do play many roles in society. They are equally capable of participating in the violence as in the solution. The conversation about women as participants in violence, versus only as peacemakers, has been emerging more often over the course of this project (Zeuthen and Sahgal, 2018). There have also been some more recent challenges to the consistent definition of women as only wives and mothers in women's empowerment programming (Winterbotham, 2018). The increasing focus on inclusion of a gender lens is being shown in emerging studies (Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020; True *et al.,* 2019; Brown *et al.,* 2020). There is even more focus on how inequality, misogyny, and violence against women can be a warning sign and driver of extremism (Johnston and True, 2019). However, these are still perspectives which are considered challengers to the main body of work on gender in security.

The second significant contribution this project makes is an applied contribution to improving CT policy. This is the first comprehensive review of gender mainstreaming in CVE policy. I highlight how and where lack of commitment to meaningful gender mainstreaming causes gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. This can translate into improving CT policy, as well as wider understanding of gender in security. Many of the lessons learned from this project are applicable to other areas of inquiry for both feminist and critical scholars for security and terrorism studies. The focus on gender mainstreaming is becoming increasingly prominent in the international community, and subsequently for those states who agree to international resolutions. Gender equality is an important element of social stabilization, conflict resolution, development, and other such programming. Gender

mainstreaming is also a key discussion in feminist research on peacekeeping operations and militaries. The gender analysis conducted in this project could benefit these other areas of study as well.

The implications of human security are also a new challenge to the way in which governments are implementing CT policy through CVE programming. While principles of a human security framework have been adopted in theory by some governmental definitions, it is impossible to implement this framework when programming is being held accountable to state security goals. The issue of security frameworks in CT policy is evolving quickly, and it will be interesting to look at in future work. The WPS agenda has brought a lot more international attention to the importance of equality in the security process. Unfortunately, it often does not translate from high-level agreements to on-the-ground application. WPS and human security are more regularly being included in UN resolutions and even many National Action Plans. However, the agenda often becomes muted by the time it reaches the offices and policies responsible for implementing ground-level action. This project offers concrete examples where inadequate commitment to gender mainstreaming leads to gaps in CT policy. Therefore, it is contributing to the improvement of guidelines for CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

4. Evolution of Learning

There was a marked increase of literature on gender in CVE programming during the time I was conducting my project (Phelan, Johnston and True, 2020; True *et al.,* 2019; Brown *et al.,* 2020). The mainstreaming of gender in CT policy, along with the WPS agenda itself, have come under increased scrutiny since I began (Cook, 2020; Gordon and True, 2019). There has been greater recognition of some of the gaps in this area, and these topics are being more widely

discussed. From each of the three case studies I analyzed, the program implementors took lessons learned in regard to gender and applied them to their next CVE program iterations. This has led to improvements over time in gender mainstreaming approaches to CVE programming. The third case study I analyzed, which was also the most recent, was specifically designed by UN Women in response to the lack of attention given by previous CVE programming in the East Africa/Kenya region to the inclusion of gender equality goals in programming. Therefore, it purposefully assumed a gender-sensitive perspective for its CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation to try to fill some of the gaps.

These adjustments to practice demonstrate an increased focus on gender mainstreaming in CT policy and security processes. Before UNSCRs 1325 through to 2242 focused on the WPS agenda there was no commitment on behalf of states to engaging women in a meaningful way in the security process. The increased pressure through the international system for states to honor their commitments to the WPS agenda has opened up room for UN Women to engage in the issue of CVE programming. This would have previously been outside the scope of their influence. The transnational space in which international CVE programming takes place leaves it in a middle ground of political maneuvering. Its porous definition allows a variety of actors to partake. However, this also often renders it outside the scope of core academic disciplines which are discussing these issues.

Critical terrorism studies has developed as field of study which examines CT critically and welcomes various alternative perspectives, such as feminism. However, it has focused largely on the role of states in enacting CT policy. While implementing organizations like the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are acting on behalf of the European Union (EU) and the United States government

(USG) respectively, they are acting largely outside the realm of state politics. These programs are effectively dependent on their partnerships with local non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). This puts transnational CVE in an unusual space between feminist approaches to security and critical approaches to terrorism studies. Feminist approaches to security studies have carefully examined the role of local women's organizations in implementing gendered initiatives, but not necessarily their connection to wider CSOs, NGOs, and state appointed bodies. This means that international CVE programs often take place in this transnational space without a great deal of oversight, investigation, or guidance. Over time there has been increased focus on the need for development of international guidelines on CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation. RUSI has been a significant contributor to this effort, but there is much further to go to reach agreement on the scope of what CVE should encompass. This project therefore contributes to this process by offering some recommendations for improved means of CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation through incision of meaningful gender mainstreaming.

5. Implications for Future Research

There are far reaching implications to the work explored in this project, too many to be fully addressed in this thesis. Therefore, there are many questions which need to be addressed in future work. The first research question looked at the security framework under which CVE programming is being implemented and how that framework affects the definition to which CVE programming is being held accountable. There has been a lot of controversy over whether CVE should even be considered a branch of CT policy. Its foundation in CT policy has led to it, thus far, being implemented under a state security framework. This undermines its ability

to fulfil its human security goals of addressing the structural drivers of VE such as oppression and violation of human rights.

Future questions should include the following:

- Is there a risk of large-scale, long-term CVE programming securitizing issues like human rights, social cohesion, or gender equality?
- Would the pooling together of CVE, development, peacebuilding, good governance, and other types of programming resources, budgets, and goals inadvertently securitize them all?
- Or, could pooling resources be an effective solution to large-scale, long-term, sustainable programming which is able to stabilize communities and make them more resilient against radicalization?
- Can CVE programming success ever be properly measured if it is not given the time and scope to address the entire array of issues its definition calls for it to address?
- Are governments committed enough, under expectations of CVE fulfilling immediate state security goals, to allow the necessary social changes to take place? CVE programming is meant to be addressing deeply engrained cultural and social issues, which could take a generation to change perspectives on.

These are all questions which need to be addressed further in future work, in order to truly challenge the definition and expectations of CVE programming.

The other main branch of inquiry for this project was the lack of understanding on the multidimensional nature of gender and its wide-reaching impact on issues of security. Imposed characteristics of masculinity and femininity underlying socialized, gendered relationships is a

topic which has many different outlets. I was not able to identify or analyze them all thoroughly in this project. For example, under the topic of intersectionality, the idea of women not being a homogenized group was introduced on the basis of women coming from different tribal, regional, cultural, etc. backgrounds. However, intersectionality is also applicable to many other issues identified with introducing gender-related programming components. The concept of intersectionality can even be applied to the programming goals themselves, which are generally Western program goals being applied to other cultures. Are they acceptable or not? Who should get to determine that? Where does multiculturalism clash with a universal definition of human rights and gender equality?

There are also many other interesting issues, not directly related to gender mainstreaming in CVE, which were brought up in the case studies. The issue of gender-neutral discourse around "youth" and their importance to CVE programming was not examined thoroughly. Another issue brought up in the RUSI case study was the difficulty of finding a system for choosing those who are "at risk". RUSI developed some criteria with which to rank the risk of youth and called it a "structural professional judgement" system. Some of the criteria RUSI decided were the best indicators of the most "at risk" youth were whether the youth had parents who were absent, had been imprisoned, or knew participants in VE. An examination could be conducted on how parenting fits in to CVE, and if parenting training could be another useful component. However, I would caution that parenting needs to be considered a joint effort, and not just the implied role of the mother. These are just a few examples of the many topics which need to be researched further. There are still many aspects to be considered, in order to come to a complete understanding of just how much impact gender has on security, VE, and CVE.

6. Conclusion

Ultimately, some major gaps in CVE programming have been addressed by this project. I found that due to CVE being implemented within a state security framework, it is often incapable of fulfilling its human security goals. This dislocation between definition and expectation allow gender mainstreaming goals to be easily side-stepped. The understanding of gender under a traditional state security framework does not extend to its full meaning and often overlooks the complex and intertwined ways in which it impacts security. These misinterpretations and misunderstandings compound within CT policy, leaving gaps in CVE programming design, implementation, and evaluation.

The research process I went through allowed me to highlight the need for more feminist research to be conducted in the field of security. There is a significant lack of gender data available regarding CT policy. Not being able to find the data to test the importance of gender mainstreaming in CT policy led me to focus on two main research questions. These questions centered my investigations around the framework of security which is required to implement human security goals, and the deeper understanding of gender which is required to effectively mainstream gender in security. The analysis conducted as part of my project and the comparison of findings between the three CVE case studies allowed me to generate some valuable recommendations. Due to all three cases approaching gender from a different perspective, I was able to use triangulation of the perspectives to show how gaps in meaningful gender mainstreaming lead to gaps in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation.

My comprehensive review of gender mainstreaming in CVE policy makes a significant contribution to the literature on CT policy in the overlapping space between feminist approaches to security and IR and critical approaches to terrorism studies. I was able to make

some recommendations for academic examination and analysis of the security framework applied to CVE programming and its impact on understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of gender. I also applied this research to making some practical recommendations for policy improvements in CVE program design, implementation, and evaluation guidelines. Therefore, my project contributes some solutions to the lack of effective means of evaluation in the transnational space where international CVE programming often operates. Overall, this project highlights the many challenges to meaningful gender mainstreaming in CT policy. However, it also successfully builds a case for why meaningful gender mainstreaming is essential to effective and sustainable CT policy.

APPENDIX I: LIST OF POTENTIAL CASES

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
CT	DoS Bureau of CT & CVE	Global	USG	2015	-	?	Large	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/
CT	GCTF	Global	Gov	2011	-	?	Large (30 countries, EU, UN)	https://www.thegctf.org/
CT	USAID's Trans-Sahara CT Parternership (TSCTP)	West and North Africa	Gov	2005	-	?	Large	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSCTP
CT	Partnership for Regional East Africa CT	East Africa	USG	2009	-	?	Large	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#PREACT
CT	Antiterrorism Assistance Program	Global	US gov	1983	-	No	90,000 law enforce-ment personnel in 154 countries	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#ATA
CT	Countering the Financing of Terrorism	Global	USG	-	-	No	Large	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CFT
CT	CT Partnerships Fund	South Asia to Sahel	USG	-	-	No	Large	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#CTPF
CT	Foreign Emergency Support Team	Global	USG	1986	-	No	Small	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#FEST
CT	Regional Strategic Initiative	Global	USG	-	-	No	Medium	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#RSI

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
CT	Technical Support Working Group	US	USG	-	-	No	Small	https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#TSWG
CVE	Sisters Against VE	Global	NGO	2008	-	yes	Medium	http://www.women-without-borders.org/save/
CVE	Women's Alliance for Security Leadership	Global	NGO	2015	-	yes	Medium - (90 partners from 29 countries)	http://www.icanpeacework.org/our-work/womens-alliance-for-security-leadership/
CVE	STRIVE HoA	Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia	EU	2014	2017	Yes	Medium	https://rusi.org/projects/strive-horn-africa
CVE	Hedayah International Center of Excellence for CVE	Global	29 Govs, EU	2012	?	Yes	Large	http://www.hedayah.ae/
CVE	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund	Global	Gov/ Priv	2014	?	Yes	Large number of small projects	http://www.gcerf.org/
CVE	CVE: Sahel-Maghreb Region	Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia	EU	2015	2016	No	Medium	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
CVE	EU-Kofi Annan Foundation Youth Initiative on CVE	Global	EU	2016	2016	No	Small	http://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/news-releases/countering-violent-extremism/
CVE	World Leadership Alliance - Club de Madrid	Global	Govs	2015	?	?	Large	http://www.clubmadrid.org/
CVE	CVE: Middle East and North Africa	MENA	EU	2015	2017	No	Medium	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
CVE	CVE: Nigeria	Nigeria	EU	2014	?	No	Small	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
CVE	CVE: Pakistan	Pakistan	EU	2016	2019	Yes	Small	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
CVE	Regional Peace for Development II (PDEV II)	African countries	USG	?	?	No	Medium	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	USAID's Transition Initiatives for Stabilization (TIS)	Somalia	USG	?	?	No	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
CVE	Kenya Transition Initiative	Kenya	USG	2011	2014	No	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	Kenya Tuna Uwezo	Kenya	USG	2012	2016	No	Medium	https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/Detail.aspx?ctID=ODVhZjk4NWQtM2YyMi00YjRmLTkxNjktZTcxMjM2NDBmY2Uy&rID=MzgxMTM5
CVE	Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative	Nigeria	USG	2014	-	?	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	Niger Community Cohesion Initiative	Niger	USG	2014	-	?	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	Mali Transition Initiative	Mali	USG	2013	-	No	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	Maghreb-Sahel Capacity Building for CVE	North/East Africa	USG	?	?	?	Large	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	USAID's Middle Eastern country programs	Middle East	USG	?	?	?	Large	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
CVE	Pakistan Transition Initiative	Pakistan	USG	2007	-	?	National	https://www.usaid.gov/political-transition-

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
								initiatives/pakistan
CVE	USAID's Central Asian country programs	Central Asia	USG	2015	-	?	Large	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
DA	TSCTP's Peace for Development (PDEV) program	Niger and Chad	USG	2011	2016	No	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
DA	USAID's East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI)	Kenya and Somalia	USG	2009	2011	No	8,000 youth	https://www.usaid.gov/countering-violent-extremism
DA	USAID	Global	USG	2011	-	Yes	Large	https://www.usaid.gov/
DA	USAID Iraqi victims' program	Iraq	USG	?	?	Yes	Small	https://www.usaid.gov/iraq
DA	USAID's Pakistan Civilian Assistance Program	Pakistan	USG	2007	2014	?	National	https://www.usaid.gov/pakistan
DA	USAID's Yemen Program	Yemen	USG	1959	-	Yes	National	https://www.usaid.gov/yemen
DA	USAID's Libya Program	Libya	USG	?	?	Yes	National	https://www.usaid.gov/libya
DA	CVE: Philippines	Philippines	EU	2005	-	Yes	Small	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
DA	CVE: Mauritania	Mauritania	EU	2015	2018	Yes	Small	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
								terrorism/eu-strategy/
DA	CVE: Tunisia	Tunisia	EU	2012	2018	No	Small	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
Peace-Building	DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor program	Global	USG	?	?	?	Large	https://www.state.gov/j/drl/
Peace-Building	Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)	Middle East & North Africa	USG	?	?	Yes	Large	https://mepi.state.gov/
Peace-Building	CVE: Israel	Israel/ Palestine	EU	2015	2017	No	Small	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
Prison CVE	CVE in Prisons (GCCS)	Global	NGO	2016	?	No	Small	http://www.globalcenter.org/project-descriptions/countering-violent-extremism-in-prisons-cve-p-program/
Prison CVE	CVE: Middle East, North Africa and Asia	MENA and Asia	EU, UN	2017	2020	No	Medium	http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/eu-strategy/
Urban CVE	DHS CVE Grant Program	US	USG	2016	-	?	National	https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants

Type of Policy	Name	Location	Gov/ NGO	Start Date	End Date	Gender	Scale	Website
Urban CVE	DHS Office for Community Partnerships	US	USG	2015	-	No	National	https://www.dhs.gov/keywords/office-community-partnerships
Urban CVE	Strong Cities Network (Global Center on Cooperative Security)	Global	NGO	2015	2017	?	Large	http://strongcitiesnetwork.org/

APPENDIX II: RAND CVE EVALUATION DESIGNS

RAND has recommended five evaluation designs, listed in order from the least rigorous to the most rigorous (Helmus *et al.,* 2017, p. 43):

1. Retrospective pre-/post-intervention evaluation. This type of evaluation involves collecting data from program participants at only one time point but asking them how their skills, knowledge, or behavior has changed since before the program.
2. Pre-/post-intervention evaluation. This type of evaluation involves collecting data from program participants at two time points: before the program starts and after the program ends.
3. Interrupted time-series analysis. This approach uses secondary data (e.g., census data, school data) to assess changes at multiple time points before and after the program.
4. Pre-/post-intervention evaluation with comparison group. This is the same as a pre-/post-intervention evaluation (number 2), except that you also collect data from a group that did not participate in the program but is similar in composition to the participating group.
5. Pre-/post-intervention evaluation with control group. This type of evaluation requires you to randomly assign your pool of program participants to either participate in the program (intervention group) or not participate in the program (control group), then collect data at two time points: before the program starts and after the program ends.

Types of Evaluation Designs (Helmus *et al.,* 2017, p. 45)

Method	**Ease of Execution**	**Confidence in Result**	**Cost**	**Expertise Needed to Gather and Use Data**

Retrospective pre-/post-intervention evaluation	Easier than the standard pre/post evaluation	Only moderate confidence that the program caused the change, and it may be hard for participants to recall how they were at the start	Inexpensive	Low
Pre-/post-intervention Evaluation	Easy way to measure change	Only moderate confidence that the program caused the change	Moderate	Moderate
Interrupted time series analysis	Requires several years of data collected in the same way, which can be hard to find	Tracks short- and long-term changes, but one cannot be sure that the program caused the change	Inexpensive (data usually collected by other sources)	Low (for simple graphical technique; statistical methods are complex)
Pre-/post-intervention evaluation with comparison group	Can be hard to find group that is similar to the program group	Provides good level of confidence that the program caused the change	High; doubles the cost of the evaluation	Moderate to high
Pre-/post-intervention evaluation with control group	Hard to find group willing to be randomly assigned; ethical issues of withholding beneficial program from control participants	Provides excellent level of confidence that the program caused the change	High; doubles the cost of the evaluation	High

APPENDIX III: RUSI CVE PROGRAM EVALUATION GUIDE

Example Categories / Questions for CVE Programme Evaluations (Khalil and Zeuthen, 2016, p. 30)

Category	Questions
Relevance	• To what extent is the programme suited to the policies / priorities of the donor? • To what extent is the programme suited to the policies / priorities of the recipient government? • To what extent is the programme suited to the priorities of the target population?
Impact	• To what extent has the programme achieved its intended impact? • To what extent has the programme driven other positive effects? • To what extent has the programme inadvertently driven negative effects?
Effectiveness	• To what extent have the programme's outcomes been achieved? • To what extent have the programme's outcomes contributed to the achievement of the intended impact? • To what extent have the programme's outputs and activities contributed to the achievement of the intended outcomes?
Efficiency	• Have the programme's outcomes contributed to the intended impact in a resource efficient manner in relation to feasible alternatives? • Have the programme's outputs and activities contributed to the intended outcomes in a resource-efficient manner in relation to feasible alternatives? • Have the programme's components been optimally sequenced to maximise efficiency? • Have the programme's systems (budgetary, information management, etc.) been designed and applied in a manner that optimises efficiency
Sustainability	• Will the programme's benefits be sustained after the involvement of the donor / implementer ceases?
Coherence	• To what extent have donors / implementers ensured complementarity with other initiatives, including those funded by other donors? • To what extent have lessons been shared between relevant programmes?

APPENDIX IV: USAID 6 DOMAINS OF GENDER ANALYSIS

Table of Domain Names and Example Questions (Cozzarelli, 2010, pp. 5-10):

Domain	**Definition**	**Example Questions**
Access	This domain refers to a person's ability to use the necessary resources to be a fully active and productive participant (socially, economically, and politically) in society. It includes access to resources, income, services, employment, information, and benefits.	• Do men and women have equal access to technologies and services that support entrepreneurship, including training and other opportunities for skills development? • Will men and women have equal access to participation in the project or activity? Would unequal access interfere with the successful achievement of project goals?
Knowledge, Beliefs, and Perception	This domain refers to the types of knowledge that men and women possess; the beliefs that shape gender identities and behavior, and the different perceptions that guide people's understanding of their lives, depending upon their gender identity.	• Do gender stereotypes in the geographic area of the planned project/activity help or hinder entrepreneurial opportunities? For example, do such stereotypes depict entrepreneurship as something that men do more than women? • Do men and women have unequal education or knowledge in areas that are important for successful entrepreneurship? If yes, in what areas? • Will gender awareness training be necessary to ensure that husbands, families, and communities support female entrepreneurs? Will similar training be necessary to ensure the same support for male entrepreneurs in certain sizes (i.e., microenterprise) and types of businesses?
Practices and Participation	This domain refers to peoples' behaviors and actions in life – what they actually do – and how this varies by gender roles and responsibilities. The questions	• Are communication channels that are used to spread awareness of the project and encourage participation equally available to and used by both men and women?

	include not only current patterns of action, but also the ways in which men and women may engage differently in development activities. Some of these types of action include attendance at meetings and training courses, and accepting or seeking out services. Participation can be both active and passive.	• Will the overall project be designed in a way that facilitates active participation from both men and women? • Are men and women likely to have equal access to and equal participation in available training sessions in conjunction with this project?
Time and Space	This domain recognizes gender differences in the availability and allocation of time and the locations in which time is spent. It considers the division of both productive and reproductive labor; the identification of how time is spent during the day (week, month, or year, and in different seasons); and determines how men and women each contribute to the welfare of the family, community, and society. The objective of this domain is to determine how men and women spend their time and what implications their time commitments have on their availability for program activities.	• What are men and women's responsibilities regarding child care and housework? What are the cultural norms regarding the division of labor between men and women in the areas of child care and housework? • If women have greater responsibilities in these areas, do they have enough time to also engage in entrepreneurship? Will participating in this project increase a woman's workload to an unsustainable level? • Would it be possible for women to participate in the project that is being designed or to open a business, if support services (for example, child care) are not available to them? • Would a woman's home responsibilities prevent them from participating in a project at certain times of day or on certain days of the week?
Legal Rights and Status	This domain involves assessing how people are regarded and treated by customary legal codes, formal legal codes, and judicial systems. The domain encompasses legal documentation such as	• Are women and men treated equally in legislation related to employment and entrepreneurship? Are there legal impediments to men and women that prevent them from having an equal opportunity to participate in the

	identification cards, voter registration, and property titles. Additionally, the domain includes the right to inheritance, employment, atonement of wrongs, and legal representation.	project and/or equal opportunity of outcomes for both sexes? • In the legal or regulatory framework, are there any special benefits or restrictions that explicitly or indirectly target women or men?
Power and Decision Making	This domain pertains to the ability of people to decide, influence, control, and enforce personal and governmental power. It refers to one's capacity to make decisions freely, and to exercise power over one's body, within an individual's household, community, municipality, and state. This domain also details the capacity of adults to make household and individual economic decisions including the use of household and individual economic resources, income, and their choice of employment. Additionally, this domain describes the decision to vote, run for office, enter into legal contracts, etc.	• Do women hold the power to make economic decisions? • Do women have control over and benefit from the funds and assets they may accrue as a result of participating in a project? • Do women actively participate in formal decision-making structures/bodies that address business-related issues (for example, local economic development committees, business associations, and chambers of commerce)? • Do women and men hold an equal number of decision-making positions in these entities?

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